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Tuesday, February 14, 2017

the question of validity of the Karnataka Determination of Seniority of the Government Servants Promoted on the Basis of Reservation (To the Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002 (the impugned Act). The Act inter alia provides for grant of consequential seniority to the Government servants belonging to Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes promoted under reservation policy. It also protects consequential seniority already accorded from 27th April, 1978 onwards.= In view of the above, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment and declare the provisions of the impugned Act to the extent of doing away with the ‘catch up’ rule and providing for consequential seniority under Sections 3 and 4 to persons belonging to SCs and STs on promotion against roster points to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2368 OF 2011



B.K. PAVITRA  & ORS.
…APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA &  ORS.                                   ...RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2369 OF 2011, 2370-2373 OF 2011, 2374-2377 OF 2011, 2378
OF 2011, 2379 OF 2011, 4320-4327 OF 2011 AND 5280-5286 OF 2011


                               J U D G M E N T


ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J


1.    These appeals involve  the  question  of  validity  of  the  Karnataka
Determination of  Seniority of  the  Government  Servants  Promoted  on  the
Basis of Reservation (To the Posts in the Civil Services of the State)  Act,
2002 (the  impugned  Act).   The  Act  inter  alia  provides  for  grant  of
consequential seniority to the Government servants  belonging  to  Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes promoted under reservation policy.  It  also
protects consequential seniority already  accorded  from  27th  April,  1978
onwards.


2.    The validity of the Act was challenged before this  Court  by  way  of
Writ Petition (Civil) No.61 of 2002 titled M. Nagaraj and  others  v.  Union
of India and others.  The  issue  referred  to  larger  Bench  in  the  writ
petition along with connected matters was decided  by  this  Court  on  19th
October, 2006[1].   While  upholding  the  constitutional  validity  of  the
Constitution  (seventy-seventh  Amendment)  Act,  1995;   the   Constitution
(Eighty-first  Amendment)  Act,  2000;   the   Constitution   (Eighty-Second
Amendment) Act, 2000 and  the  Constitution  (Eighty-fifth  Amendment)  Act,
2001,  individual  matters  were  remitted  to  the  appropriate   Bench[2].
Thereafter, the matter was remitted back to the High Court for deciding  the
question of validity of the said enactment[3].


3.    The petition was re-numbered  by  the  High  Court  as  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.14672 of 2010.  The High Court by the impugned judgment has  held
the Act to be valid.  The question framed  for  determination  by  the  High
Court is as follows :


“Whether the State Government has  shown  the  compelling  reasons,  namely,
backwardness,  inadequacy  of  representation  and  overall   administrative
efficiency before making provision for reservation for Scheduled Castes  and
Scheduled Tribes in matters of promotion and as to  whether  the  extent  of
reservation provided for promotion in favour of  the  persons  belonging  to
Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled  Tribes  at  15%  and  3%  respectively,  in
Karnataka is justified?





4.    It will be appropriate  to  notice  the  factual  matrix  relevant  to
determine  the  controversy.   Policy  of  reservation  in   promotion   was
introduced in the State  of  Karnataka  vide  Government  Order  dated  27th
April, 1978.  The reservation in promotion was provided to the SCs  and  STs
to the extent of 15% and 3% respectively  but  upto  and  inclusive  of  the
lowest Group-A posts in the cadres where  there  is  no  element  of  direct
recruitment and where the direct recruitment does not exceed             66?
%.  A roster of 33 points was issued  applicable  to  each  cadre  of  posts
under each appointing authority.  Prior to 1st April,  1992,  there  was  no
carry forward system of the vacancies.  It  was  introduced  on  1st  April,
1992.  In the stream of graduate Engineers,  the  reservation  in  promotion
was available upto and inclusive of third level, i.e.,  Executive  Engineers
upto 1999 and on the date of filing  of  the  petition  (in  2002),  it  was
available  upto  second  level,  i.e.  Assistant  Executive  Engineer.    In
Diploma Engineers,  it  was  available  upto  third  level,  i.e.  Assistant
Executive Engineer – Division II.  According to  the  appellants,  Assistant
Engineers of SC/ST category recruited in the year 1987 were promoted to  the
cadre of Assistant Executive Engineers while  in  general  merit,  Assistant
Engineers recruited in 1976  were  considered  for  promotion  to  the  said
cadre.  The representation of the SC/ST group was as follows:


EE Cadre               19.9%


SE Cadre               23.95%


CE Cadre               4.3% (being a selection post)


Engineer-in-chief      44.44%


5.    Thus, according to the  appellants,  SC/ST  candidates  got  promotion
early and  on  account  of  consequential  seniority,  percentage  of  SC/ST
candidates was much  higher  than  the  permitted  percentage  and  all  top
positions were likely to be filled up by SC/ST  candidates  without  general
merit candidates getting to higher positions.  This  aspect  was  considered
in the judgment of this Court dated 1st December, 2000 in M.G.  Badappanavar
 v. State of Karnataka[4].  This Court applying the principles laid down  in
Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab (Ajit Singh I)[5]; Ajit Singh  (II)  v.
State of Punjab[6] and  R.K.  Sabharwal  v.  State  of  Punjab[7]  issued  a
direction to the State of Karnataka to redo the seniority and  take  further
action in the light of the said judgments.  Pointing out the consequence  of
accelerated seniority to the roster point promotee, it has been  averred  in
the writ petition that the roster  point  promotee  would  reach  the  third
level by the age of 45 and fourth, fifth and sixth level in next three,  two
and two years.  The general merit promotee would reach the third level  only
at the age of 56 and retire before reaching the fourth level.    This  would
result in reverse discrimination and  representation  of  reserved  category
would range between 36% to 100%.


6.    Stand of the State and the contesting respondents who have been  given
promotion under the reservation, is that inter se seniority amongst  persons
promoted on any occasion is determined as per Karnataka Government  Servants
(Seniority) Rules, 1957 (1957 Rules).  By amendment dated  1st  April,  1992
provision was made to fill-up backlog vacancies which  was  upheld  by  this
Court in  Bhakta  Ramegowda  v.  State  of  Karnataka[8].   On  that  basis,
Government order dated 24th June, 1997 was issued for fixation of  seniority
of SC/ST  candidates  promoted  under  reservation.   Thus,  all  candidates
promoted ‘on the same  occasion’  retained  their  seniority  in  the  lower
cadre.  This aspect was not considered in Badappanavar (supra).   Extent  of
reservation for SC and ST was 15%  and  3%  respectively  on  the  basis  of
census  figures  of  1951,  though  the  population  of  SCs  and  STs   has
substantially increased.  As per census figures of  1991  population  of  SC
and ST was 16.38% and 4.26% respectively.  The stand of the appellants  that
the SC/ST candidates reach level four at 45 years or become Chief  Engineers
by 49 years or there is reverse discrimination has been denied.


7.    In the light of the above pleadings and judgment of this Court  in  M.
Nagaraj (supra), the matter was put in issue before  the  High  Court.   The
contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  was   that   grant   of
consequential  seniority  to  candidates  promoted  by  way  of  reservation
affected efficiency of administration and was violative of Articles  14  and
16.  In spite of 85th  Amendment  having  been  upheld,  law  laid  down  in
Badappanavar (supra), Ajit Singh II (supra) and Union of  India  v.   Virpal
Chauhan[9] remained relevant in absence of  ‘backwardness’,  ‘inadequacy  of
representation’ and ‘overall administrative efficiency’ being  independently
determined.  The State Government had not provided any material or  data  to
show inadequacy of reservation to the members of SC/ST  nor  the  State  has
given any thought to the issue of overall administrative efficiency.


8.    On the other hand, the submission on behalf  of  the  State  was  that
reservation to SCs and STs to the extent of 15% and  3%  respectively  could
never be said to be excessive in view of progressive increase in  population
of SCs and STs.


9.    The High Court referring  to  this  Court’s  judgment  in  M.  Nagaraj
(supra)  observed  that  concept  of  “catch  up”  rule  and  “consequential
seniority”  are  judicially  evolved  concepts  to  control  the  effect  of
reservations. Deleting the said rule cannot by itself be  in  conflict  with
“equality code” under the Constitution.  The 85th Amendment gave freedom  to
the State  to  provide  for  reservation  in  promotion  with  consequential
seniority  under  Article  16(4-A)   if   ‘backwardness’,   ‘inadequacy   of
representation’ and ‘overall efficiency’ so warranted.  There  is  no  fixed
yardstick to identify and measure the above three  factors.   If  the  State
fails to identify and measure the above three factors, the  reservation  can
be invalid.  Examining whether the State had  in  fact  measured  the  above
factors, the High Court observed that  Order  dated  27th  April,  1978  was
issued by the State of Karnataka after considering the statistics  available
about the representation of SCs and STs in  promotional vacancies.   On  3rd
February, 1999, the policy was modified to limit  reservation  in  promotion
in cadre upto and inclusive of the  lowest  category  of  Group-A  posts  in
which there is no element of recruitment beyond 66?  %.  The said order  was
further amended on 13th April, 1999 to the effect that  reservation  in  the
promotion  for  SCs  and  STs  will   continue   to   operate   till   their
representation reached 15% or 3% respectively and promotion of SCs  and  STs
and against backlog was to continue as per order dated 24th June, 1997  till
the said percentage was so reached in the total working  strength.   As  per
the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward  Classes
(Reservation of seats in Educational Institutions  and  of  appointments  or
posts in the services under the State) Act, 1994 (the Karnataka  Act  43  of
1994), seniority in the lower cadre is maintained in promotional  posts  for
the persons promoted “on one occasion”.  Since reservation had not  exceeded
15% and 3% for SCs and STs while  population  of  the  said  categories  had
increased, there was adequate consideration of the above  three  factors  of
“backwardness”, inadequacy  of  representation”  and  “overall  efficiency”.
Section 3 of the  Act  provided  for  an  inbuilt  mechanism  for  providing
reservation in promotion to the extent of 15% and 3%  respectively  for  the
SCs and STs.  The State Government  collects  statistics  every  year.   The
High Court held that contention that if all the  posts  in  higher  echelons
may be filled by SCs and STs, the promotional  prospects  of  general  merit
candidates will get choked or blocked could not be accepted  as  reservation
in promotion was  provided  only  upto  the  cadre  of  Assistant  Executive
Engineers.  It was further observed that there was no pleading that  overall
efficiency of service would be hampered by promoting  persons  belonging  to
SCs and STs.


10.   The impugned judgment has been challenged on behalf of the  appellants
mainly  relying  upon  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Uttar  Pradesh   Power
Corporation Limited v. Rajesh Kumar[10].  It was  submitted  that  the  High
Court erroneously held that there was an inbuilt mechanism under  Section  3
of the impugned Act or that  the  seniority  rule  maintaining  lower  cadre
seniority in respect of persons promoted on  a  particular  occasion  was  a
safeguard  against  excessive  reservation.   Similarly,  the  finding  that
reservation was only  upto  a  particular  level  and  not  beyond  or  that
accelerated promotion upto that level did not affect further promotions  was
erroneous.  It was also submitted that there was no provision for  excluding
the creamy layer which also rendered the  Act  invalid.   It  was  submitted
that no exercise  whatsoever  in  terms  of     M.  Nagaraj  case  has  been
undertaken by the State.


11.   Shri Basava Prabhu S.  Patil,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf  of  the  State  submitted  that  the  Act  did  not  deal  with  the
reservation.   It  only  dealt  with  seniority.   Seniority   was   not   a
fundamental right but a civil right as held in Bimlesh Tanwar vs.  State  of
Haryana[11].  M. Nagaraj judgment of this Court had dealt  with  reservation
and not with  consequential  seniority.   Once  reservation  is  within  the
prescribed  limit,  there  was  no  bar  to  consequential  seniority  being
granted.  It was further submitted that even if seniority is  to  be  struck
down, the clock cannot be entirely reversed so as  to  affect  seniority  of
persons who had retired or who are  about  to  retire  or  who  had  reached
higher positions.


12.   Shri S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the private respondents  supported
the impugned judgment  and submitted that the Government  was  not  required
to carry out the exercise of  finding  out  ‘backwardness’,  ‘inadequacy  of
representation’  and  ‘overall  administrative  efficiency’  for   providing
consequential seniority to officers on the basis of reservation.   The  said
exercise was required to be carried out only for  providing  reservation  in
promotion.  Reservation in promotion  was  permissible  only  upto  Class  I
posts in Karnataka.  Moreover, inter se seniority of reserved  category  and
general category  candidates  promoted  together  was  not  disturbed.   The
roster  points  ensured  that  there  was  no  excessive  representation  in
different cadres  of  service.   In  view  of  Government  Order  dated  3rd
February, 1999 there was enough data available  to  justify  continuance  of
provision  for  consequential  seniority  under  the  impugned  Act.    Data
collected  by  the  Department  of  Statistics  with   regard   to   overall
representation of SCs and STs  as  on  31st  March,  2002  showed  that  the
representation of SCs and  STs  was  not  above  15%  and  3%  respectively.
Section 4 of the  Act  only  protected  consequential  seniority  which  was
already given.  Promotions already effected cannot be disturbed.


13.   Reference may now be made to the impugned Act.  The  preamble  of  the
Act refers to policy of reservation in promotion  in  favour  of  Government
servants belonging to SCs and STs in terms of order dated 27th April,  1978.
 Para 7 of the  said  order  stipulates  that  inter  se  seniority  amongst
persons promoted in accordance with the said order has to be  determined  in
the manner provided under Rule 4 or Rule 4A of  the  1957  Rules.  There  is
further reference to the judgment of this Court in Badappanavar  (supra)  to
the effect that there was  no  specific  rule  permitting  seniority  to  be
counted for persons promoted against a reserved roster  point.   It  further
refers  to  the  Constitution  (85th   Amendment)   Act,   2001   permitting
consequential  seniority  in  the  case  of  promotion  on  the   basis   of
reservation.  It states that to remove any ambiguity  and  to  clarify  that
government servants belonging to SCs and STs  promoted  in  accordance  with
the reservation in promotion  shall  be  entitled  to  seniority  as  it  is
available to government servants belonging to other categories.   Section  3
of the impugned Act provides that government servants belonging to  SCs  and
STs promoted in accordance with the policy reservation  in  promotion  shall
be entitled to consequential seniority on the basis of length of service  in
a cadre.  Proviso to the said section to the effect that inter se  seniority
of  government  servants  belonging  to  SCs/STs  and  those  belonging   to
unreserved category promoted at the same time by a common order shall be  on
the basis of inter se seniority in the lower cadre.  Section 4 provides  for
protection of consequential seniority  already  accorded  from  27th  April,
1978.  Since Sections 3 and 4 are the key sections, the same are  reproduced
below :


“3. Determination of Seniority of the Government Servants  Promoted  on  the
basis of Reservation.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any  other  law
for the time being in  force,  the  Government  Servants  belonging  to  the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes promoted in  accordance  with  the
policy of reservation in promotion provided for  in  the  Reservation  Order
shall be entitled to consequential seniority. Seniority shall be  determined
on the basis of the length of service in a cadre.


Provided that the seniority inter-se of the  Government  Servants  belonging
to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as well as those  belonging
to the unreserved category, promoted to a cadre,  at  the  same  time  by  a
common 5 order, shall be determined on the basis of their  seniority  inter-
se, in the lower cadre.


Provided further that where the posts in a cadre, according to the rules  of
recruitment applicable to them are required to be filled by  promotion  from
two or more lower cadres,-


(i) The number of vacancies available in the promotional (higher) cadre  for
each of the lower cadres according to the rules  of  recruitment  applicable
to it shall be calculated; and


(ii) The roster shall be applied separately to the number  of  vacancies  so
calculated in respect of each of those lower cadres;


Provided also that the serial numbers of the roster points specified in  the
Reservation Order are intended only to facilitate calculation of the  number
of vacancies reserved for promotion at a time and  such  roster  points  are
not intended to determine inter-se  seniority  of  the  Government  Servants
belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the  Scheduled  Tribes  vis-a-vis  the
Government Servants belonging to the unreserved  category  promoted  at  the
same  time  and  such  inter-se  seniority  shall  be  determined  by  their
seniority  inter-se  in  the  cadre  from  which  they  are   promoted,   as
illustrated in the Schedule appended to this Act.


4. Protection of consequential seniority already accorded from  27th  April,
1978, onwards.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any  other
law for the  time  being  in  force,  the  consequential  seniority  already
accorded to the Government servants belonging to the  Scheduled  Castes  and
the Scheduled Tribes who were promoted in  accordance  with  the  policy  of
reservation in promotion provided for in the Reservation Order  with  effect
from the Twenty Seventh Day of April, Nineteen  Hundred  and  Seventy  Eight
shall be valid and shall be protected and shall not be disturbed. “





14.   Question for consideration is whether the impugned Act  is  consistent
with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  The  said  question  has  been
gone into by this Court inter alia in identical circumstances in Suraj  Bhan
Meena v. State of Rajasthan[12] and Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation  Limited
(supra) to which we will make a reference at appropriate place.


15.   We proceed to deal  with  the  contention  that  High  Court  judgment
proceeds on incorrect understanding of the  law  laid  down  in  M.  Nagaraj
(supra).   While no doubt in M. Nagaraj (supra), 85th Amendment  was  upheld
with the observation that enabling the State to do away with the ‘catch  up’
rule, a judicially evolved concept to control the  effect  of  reservations,
was valid but the exercise of power to  do  away  with  the  said  rule  and
providing consequential seniority in favour of  roster  point  promotees  of
reserved category was subject to the limitation  of  determining  the  three
factors of  ‘backwardness’,  ‘inadequacy  of  representation’  and  ‘overall
efficiency’.  The High Court brushed aside the  said  mandatory  requirement
by simply observing that Section 3 provided for an inbuilt mechanism as  the
extent of mechanism was limited to 15% and 3% respectively for the  SCs  and
STs which dispensed  with  any  requirement  of  determining  inadequacy  of
representation or backwardness.   High  Court  further  dispensed  with  the
requirement of determining overall efficiency by observing  that  there  was
no pleading that overall efficiency would be hampered by  promoting  persons
belonging to SCs and STs.  This  reasoning  in  the  judgment  of  the  High
Court, it is submitted, is contrary to the mandate of law as  recognized  in
M. Nagaraj (supra) and the view similar to the impugned  judgment  has  been
repeatedly disapproved in decisions of this Court.


16.   We find considerable force in the submission.  The issue is no  longer
res integra and it will be suffice to refer to the law clearly laid down  by
this Court in this regard.


17.   In M. Nagaraj (supra), this Court considered  constitutional  validity
of 77th, 81st, 82nd and  85th  Amendments.   In  doing  so,  the  Court  was
concerned with the  question  whether  the  amendment  infringed  the  basic
structure of the Constitution.  It was held that equality  is  part  of  the
basic structure but in  the  present  context,  right  to  equality  is  not
violated by an enabling provision if exercise of  power  so  justifies.   In
this regard, following observations are worthwhile to note :

“31. At the outset, it may be noted that equality,  rule  of  law,  judicial
review and separation of powers are  distinct  concepts.  They  have  to  be
treated separately, though they are intimately connected. There  can  be  no
rule of law if there is no equality before the law;  and  rule  of  law  and
equality before the law would be empty words if their violation  was  not  a
matter of judicial scrutiny or judicial review and judicial relief  and  all
these features would lose their  significance  if  judicial,  executive  and
legislative functions were united in only one authority, whose dictates  had
the force of law. The rule of law and equality before the law  are  designed
to secure among other things,  justice  both  social  and  economic       ……
      ……                  ……
32. In Minerva Mills [(1980) 3 SCC 625] Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for  the
majority, observed that Articles 14  and  19  do  not  confer  any  fanciful
rights.  They  confer  rights  which  are  elementary  for  the  proper  and
effective functioning of democracy. They are  universally  regarded  by  the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If Articles 14 and 19 are put out  of
operation, Article 32 will be rendered nugatory      …..
……               ……                   ……

33. From these observations, which are binding on us,  the  principle  which
emerges is that “equality” is the essence of democracy  and,  accordingly  a
basic   feature   of   the   Constitution.              ……                ……
       ……

34. However, there is a difference between formal equality  and  egalitarian
equality which will be discussed later on.

xxxx

42.   ….. ….There can be no justice without equality. Article 14  guarantees
the fundamental right to equality before  the  law  on  all  persons.  Great
social injustice resulted from treating sections of the Hindu  community  as
“untouchable”  and,  therefore,  Article  17  abolished  untouchability  and
Article 25 permitted the State to make any law providing for  throwing  open
all public Hindu religious temples to  untouchables.  Therefore,  provisions
of Part III also provide for political and social justice.




18.      Considering   the   right   of   equality   in   the   context   of
reservation/affirmative action it was observed :

“43. … … … Therefore, the concept of “equality of  opportunity”  in   public
employment concerns an individual, whether that individual  belongs  to  the
general category or Backward Class.  The  conflicting  claim  of  individual
right under  Article  16(1)  and  the  preferential  treatment  given  to  a
Backward Class has to be balanced. Both the claims have a particular  object
to be achieved.  The  question  is  of  optimisation  of  these  conflicting
interests and claims.”

19.   Thereafter, concepts of ‘equity’,  ‘justice’  and  ‘merit’  in  public
employment were referred to and  it  was  held  that  application  of  these
concepts in public employment depends upon quantifiable data in  each  case.
It was observed:

“44. … … …Backward Classes seek justice. General class in public  employment
seeks equity. The difficulty comes in when  the  third  variable  comes  in,
namely, efficiency in service. In the issue of  reservation,  we  are  being
asked to find a stable equilibrium between justice to the backwards,  equity
for the forwards and efficiency for the entire system.  Equity  and  justice
in the above context are hard concepts. However, if you  add  efficiency  to
equity and justice, the problem arises in the context  of  the  reservation.
This problem has to be examined, therefore,  on  the  facts  of  each  case.
Therefore, Article 16(4) has to be construed in the light of Article 335  of
the Constitution. Inadequacy  in  representation  and  backwardness  of  the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are  circumstances  which  enable  the
State Government to act under Article 16(4) of  the  Constitution.  However,
as held by this Court the limitations on the discretion  of  the  Government
in the matter of reservation under Article 16(4) as well as Article  16(4-A)
come in the form of Article 335 of the Constitution.

45. … … …The basic presumption, however, remains that it is  the  State  who
is in the best position to define and measure  merit  in  whatever  ways  it
consider it to be relevant to public employment because  ultimately  it  has
to bear the costs arising from  errors  in  defining  and  measuring  merit.
Similarly, the concept  of  “extent  of  reservation”  is  not  an  absolute
concept and like merit it is context-specific.

46. … … …Therefore, “vesting of the power” by an enabling provision  may  be
constitutionally valid and yet “exercise of the power” by  the  State  in  a
given case may be arbitrary, particularly, if the State  fails  to  identify
and measure backwardness and inadequacy keeping in mind  the  efficiency  of
service as required under Article 335.”

20.   The above discussion  led  this  Court  to  hold  that  conferment  of
enabling power on State under Article 16(4A) did not by itself  violate  the
basic feature of equality.   If  the  affirmative  action  stipulated  under
Article 16(4A) could be balanced with the need for  adequate  representation
for justice to the backwards while upholding equity  for  the  forwards  and
efficiency for the entire system  with  the  further  observation  that  the
content of a right is defined by the Courts and even while the amendment  as
such could be upheld, validity of an individual enactment  was  required  to
be gone into.  If the State wished to exercise its discretion under  Article
16(4A), it was to collect quantifiable  data  showing  backwardness  of  the
class and inadequacy of representation of that class  in  public  employment
in addition to compliance with Article 335. It was made clear that  even  if
the State has compelling reasons, as stated above, the State  will  have  to
see that its reservation provision does not lead to excessiveness so  as  to
breach the ceiling limit of 50% or obliterate the  creamy  layer  or  extend
the reservation indefinitely.

21.   It may also be worthwhile to note further observations of  this  Court
in the said judgment :

“49.  Reservation  is  necessary  for  transcending  caste   and   not   for
perpetuating it. Reservation has to be used in a limited sense otherwise  it
will perpetuate casteism in the country. Reservation is  underwritten  by  a
special justification.
      xxxx

59. Giving the judgment of the Court in Indra Sawhney [(1992) Supp. (3)  SCC
217]  Jeevan  Reddy,  J.  stated  that  Article  16(4)  speaks  of  adequate
representation  not  proportionate  representation  although  proportion  of
population of Backward Classes to the total population  would  certainly  be
relevant    …………             ……                  ……
      xxxx

102.  ….    …..   …..    Therefore, in every case where  the  State  decides
to provide for reservation  there  must  exist  two  circumstances,  namely,
“backwardness” and “inadequacy of representation”. As stated above,  equity,
justice and efficiency are variable  factors.  These  factors  are  context-
specific. There is no fixed yardstick to identify and  measure  these  three
factors, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each  case.  These
are the limitations on the mode of the exercise of power by the State.  None
of these limitations have been removed by the impugned  amendments.  If  the
State concerned fails to identify and measure backwardness,  inadequacy  and
overall administrative efficiency then  in  that  event  the  provision  for
reservation would be invalid    ……           ……           ……

      xxxxx

104.   …..   …..  As  stated  above,  be  it  reservation   or   evaluation,
excessiveness in either would result  in  violation  of  the  constitutional
mandate. This exercise, however, will depend on the facts of each  case.  In
our view, the field of exercise of the amending power  is  retained  by  the
impugned amendments, as  the  impugned  amendments  have  introduced  merely
enabling  provisions  because,   as   stated   above,   merit,   efficiency,
backwardness and inadequacy cannot be identified  and  measured  in  vacuum.
Moreover, Article 16(4-A)  and  Article  16(4-B)  fall  in  the  pattern  of
Article 16(4) and as long as the parameters mentioned in those articles  are
complied with  by  the  States,  the  provision  of  reservation  cannot  be
faulted.  Articles  16(4-A)  and  16(4-B)  are  classifications  within  the
principle of equality under Article 16(4).

      xxxxx

106.  ……  …… According to the Constitutional Law of India, by H.M.  Seervai,
4th  Edn.,  p.  546,  equality  is  not  violated  by  mere  conferment   of
discretionary power. It is violated by arbitrary exercise by those  on  whom
it is conferred. This is the theory of “guided power”. This theory is  based
on the assumption that in the event of arbitrary exercise by those  on  whom
the power is conferred, would be corrected by  the  courts    …...       …..
……

107. …..  …… If the State has quantifiable data  to  show  backwardness  and
inadequacy then the State can make reservations  in  promotions  keeping  in
mind maintenance  of  efficiency  which  is  held  to  be  a  constitutional
limitation  on  the  discretion  of  the  State  in  making  reservation  as
indicated by Article 335. As  stated  above,  the  concepts  of  efficiency,
backwardness, inadequacy of representation are  required  to  be  identified
and measured  ……       ……                  ……

108. ……  …… Moreover, Article 335 is  to  be  read  with  Article  46  which
provides that the State shall promote with special care the educational  and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in  particular,
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and shall  protect  them  from
social injustice. Therefore, where the State finds compelling  interests  of
backwardness and inadequacy, it may relax the qualifying marks for  SCs/STs.
These compelling interests however have to  be  identified  by  weighty  and
comparable data.

xxxxx

117.    …..     ……  Therefore,  in  each  case  the  Court  has  got  to  be
satisfied that the State has exercised its opinion  in  making  reservations
in promotions for SCs and STs and for which the State  concerned  will  have
to place before the Court the requisite quantifiable data in each  case  and
satisfy the Court that such reservations  became  necessary  on  account  of
inadequacy of representation of SCs/STs in a particular class or classes  of
posts without affecting general efficiency  of  service  as  mandated  under
Article 335 of the Constitution.

118. The constitutional principle of equality is inherent  in  the  rule  of
law. However, its reach is limited because its primary concern is  not  with
the content of the law but with its enforcement and  application.  The  rule
of law is satisfied when laws are applied  or  enforced  equally,  that  is,
even-handedly, free of bias and without irrational distinction. The  concept
of equality allows differential treatment but it prevents distinctions  that
are not properly justified. Justification needs each case to be  decided  on
case-to-case basis.

xxxx

120. At this stage, one aspect needs to  be  mentioned.  Social  justice  is
concerned with the distribution  of  benefits  and  burdens.  The  basis  of
distribution is the area of conflict between rights, needs and means.  These
three criteria can be put under two concepts of  equality,  namely,  “formal
equality” and  “proportional  equality”.  Formal  equality  means  that  law
treats everyone equal. Concept of egalitarian equality  is  the  concept  of
proportional equality and it expects the States to take  affirmative  action
in favour of disadvantaged sections  of  society  within  the  framework  of
democratic polity. In Indra Sawhney all the Judges except Pandian,  J.  held
that the “means test” should be adopted to exclude  the  creamy  layer  from
the protected group earmarked for reservation. In Indra Sawhney  this  Court
has, therefore, accepted caste as a determinant of backwardness and  yet  it
has struck a balance with the principle of secularism  which  is  the  basic
feature of the Constitution by bringing in  the  concept  of  creamy  layer.
Views have often been expressed in this Court that caste should not  be  the
determinant of backwardness and that the economic criteria alone  should  be
the determinant of backwardness. As  stated  above,  we  are  bound  by  the
decision  in  Indra  Sawhney.  The  question  as  to  the  “determinant”  of
backwardness cannot be gone into by us in view of the binding  decision.  In
addition to the above requirements this Court in Indra Sawhney  has  evolved
numerical benchmarks like  ceiling  limit  of  50%  based  on  post-specific
roster coupled with the concept of replacement to provide  immunity  against
the charge of discrimination.

xxxx

122. We reiterate that the ceiling limit  of  50%,  the  concept  of  creamy
layer and  the  compelling  reasons,  namely,  backwardness,  inadequacy  of
representation and overall administrative efficiency are all  constitutional
requirements without which the  structure  of  equality  of  opportunity  in
Article 16 would collapse.”

22.   Question of application of principles laid down in M. Nagaraj  (supra)
for judging  the  exercise  of  enabling  power  of  granting  consequential
seniority and promotion was raised in Suraj  Bhan  Meena  (supra).   Therein
challenge  was to the validity  of  notification  dated  25th  August,  2008
issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under proviso to Article 309  of
the Constitution, amending the service  rules  in  the  State  of  Rajasthan
w.e.f.  28th  December,  2002.   The   notification    purported   to   give
consequential seniority to candidates belonging  to  SCs  and  STs  who  got
roster point  promotions.   The  challenge  to  the  notification  was  that
without quantifying figures of SCs and STs or  showing   compelling  reasons
such  as  ‘backwardness’,  ‘inadequacy  of  representation’   and   ‘overall
administrative efficiency’ as laid down in M. Nagaraj (supra) the  grant  of
consequential seniority was not permissible.  The  High  Court  quashed  the
notification providing for consequential seniority on  the  ground  that  no
exercise  had  been  undertaken  in  terms  of  Article  16(4A)  to  acquire
quantifiable data regarding inadequacy of representation to SCs and  STs  in
public service and to assess whether such reservation was  necessary.   This
was upheld by this Court as under :
“66. The position after the decision in M. Nagaraj case is that  reservation
of posts in promotion is dependent on the inadequacy  of  representation  of
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  and  Backward  Classes
and subject to the condition of ascertaining as to whether such  reservation
was at all required.
67. The view of the High Court is based on the decision in M.  Nagaraj  case
as no exercise was  undertaken  in  terms  of  Article  16(4-A)  to  acquire
quantifiable  data  regarding  the  inadequacy  of  representation  of   the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe  communities  in  public  services.  The
Rajasthan High Court has rightly quashed the Notifications dated  28-12-2002
and 25-4-2008 issued by the State of Rajasthan providing  for  consequential
seniority and promotion to the members of the Scheduled Caste and  Scheduled
Tribe communities and the same does not call for any interference.”


23.   Again in Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation  Limited  (supra),   validity
of Rule 8A of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority Rules,  1991,  inserted
by way of an amendment in 2007, was put in issue.  While  a  Division  Bench
of Lucknow Bench in Prem Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.[13]  struck  down  the
said rule, another Division Bench at Allahabad in  Mukund  Kumar  Srivastava
v. State of U.P.[14] took a contrary view.  This Court dismissed the  appeal
filed by the U.P. Power Corporation Limited  and  upheld  the  view  of  the
Lucknow Bench.  Reference was made to observations  in  para  819  in  Indra
Sawhney v. UOI[15] to the effect that reservation  under  Article  16(4)  of
the Constitution could only be at the stage of entry into the State  service
and not in promotion.  Reservation in promotion is bound to  generate  acute
heartburning and lead to inefficiency in  administration.   The  members  of
open category would think that whatever  be  their  record  or  performance,
members of reserved category will steal a march over  them  irrespective  of
their performance  and  competence.   Once  persons  coming  from  different
sources join a category or class, they must be treated alike  for  promotion
and  no  distinction  was  permissible  on  the   basis   of   ‘birth-mark’.
Reservation in promotion will be contrary to the  mandate  of  Article  335,
viz., maintenance  of  efficiency  in  administration  and  put  premium  on
efficiency.  Members of reserved category will not work hard since  they  do
not have to compete with their colleagues and because of assured  promotion,
which will be against  the  goal  of  excellence  under  Article  51-A  (j).
Reference was also made to para 831 in the said judgment to the effect  that
extending concessions and relaxations in the matter of promotion to  members
of reserved category could affect efficiency of  administration.   Reference
was then made to the  decisions of  this  Court  holding  that  roster  only
ensured  percentage  of  reservation  in  promotion  but  could  not  affect
seniority.[16]

24.   Reference  was  then  made  to  the  Constitution  amendment  enabling
reservation in promotions and consequential seniority which  was  upheld  in
M. Nagaraj (supra).  The said judgment was summarized as follows:

“  81. From the aforesaid decision in M. Nagaraj case and the paragraphs  we
have quoted hereinabove, the following principles can be carved out:
(i) Vesting of the power by an enabling provision  may  be  constitutionally
valid and yet “exercise of power” by the  State  in  a  given  case  may  be
arbitrary, particularly, if the State fails  to  identify  and  measure  the
backwardness and inadequacy keeping in mind the  efficiency  of  service  as
required under Article 335.
(ii) Article 16(4) which protects the interests of certain sections  of  the
society has  to  be  balanced  against  Article  16(1)  which  protects  the
interests of every citizen of the entire society. They should be  harmonised
because they are restatements of the principle  of  equality  under  Article
14.
(iii) Each post gets marked for the particular category of candidates to  be
appointed against it and any subsequent vacancy has to  be  filled  by  that
category candidate.
(iv) The appropriate Government has to apply the cadre strength  as  a  unit
in the operation of the  roster  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  a  given
class/group is adequately represented in the service. The cadre strength  as
a unit also ensures that the upper ceiling limit of  50%  is  not  violated.
Further, roster has to be post-specific and not vacancy based.
(v) The State has to form its opinion on  the  quantifiable  data  regarding
adequacy of representation. Clause  (4-A)  of  Article  16  is  an  enabling
provision. It gives freedom to the  State  to  provide  for  reservation  in
matters of promotion. Clause (4-A) of Article 16 applies  only  to  SCs  and
STs. The said clause is carved out of Article 16(4-A). Therefore, clause (4-
A) will  be  governed  by  the  two  compelling  reasons—“backwardness”  and
“inadequacy of representation”, as mentioned in Article 16(4). If  the  said
two reasons do not exist, then the enabling provision cannot be enforced.
(vi) If the ceiling limit  on  the  carry  over  of  unfilled  vacancies  is
removed, the other alternative time factor comes in and in that  event,  the
timescale has to be imposed in the interest of efficiency in  administration
as mandated by Article 335. If the timescale is not kept,  then  posts  will
continue to remain vacant for  years  which  would  be  detrimental  to  the
administration. Therefore, in each case,  the  appropriate  Government  will
now have to introduce the duration depending upon the fact situation.
(vii) If the appropriate Government enacts a law providing  for  reservation
without keeping in mind the parameters in Article  16(4)  and  Article  335,
then this Court will certainly set aside and strike down such legislation.
(viii) The constitutional limitation under Article 335 is  relaxed  and  not
obliterated.  As  stated   above,   be   it   reservation   or   evaluation,
excessiveness in either would result  in  violation  of  the  constitutional
mandate. This exercise, however, will depend on the facts of each case.
(ix)  The  concepts  of   efficiency,   backwardness   and   inadequacy   of
representation are required to be identified  and  measured.  That  exercise
depends on the availability of  data.  That  exercise  depends  on  numerous
factors. It is for this reason that the enabling provisions are required  to
be made because each competing claim seeks to  achieve  certain  goals.  How
best one should optimise these conflicting claims can only be  done  by  the
administration in the context  of  local  prevailing  conditions  in  public
employment.
(x) Article 16(4), therefore, creates a  field  which  enables  a  State  to
provide for reservation provided there exists backwardness of  a  class  and
inadequacy of representation in employment. These  are  compelling  reasons.
They do not exist in Article 16(1).  It  is  only  when  these  reasons  are
satisfied that a State gets the power to  provide  for  reservation  in  the
matter of employment.”


25.   Referring to the “Social Justice Committee Report” relied upon by  the
U.P. Power Corporation, it was observed that the said report was in  respect
of population and vacancies and not in respect of the  concepts  evolved  in
M. Nagaraj (supra).  Therefore, exercise in the  light  of  judgment  in  M.
Nagaraj was a categorical imperative.  The contention that no such  exercise
was necessary could not be accepted.  Accordingly,  this  Court  upheld  the
view that grant of consequential  seniority  in  promotion  to  the  persons
belonging to SCs and STs who were granted promotion  against  roster  points
could  not  be  sustained.   Reference  may  be  made   to   the   following
observations :

“85. As has been indicated hereinbefore, it has been  vehemently  argued  by
the learned Senior Counsel for the State and the learned Senior Counsel  for
the Corporation that once the principle of reservation was  made  applicable
to the spectrum of promotion, no fresh exercise is  necessary.  It  is  also
urged that the efficiency in service is not jeopardised. Reference has  been
made to the Social Justice Committee Report  and  the  chart.  We  need  not
produce the same as the said exercise was  done  regard  being  had  to  the
population and vacancies and not to the concepts that have been  evolved  in
M. Nagaraj. It is one thing to think  that  there  are  statutory  rules  or
executive instructions to grant promotion but it cannot  be  forgotten  that
they were all subject to the pronouncement by this  Court  in  Virpal  Singh
Chauhan and Ajit Singh.

86. We are of the firm view that a  fresh  exercise  in  the  light  of  the
judgment  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  M.  Nagaraj  is  a   categorical
imperative. The stand that the constitutional  amendments  have  facilitated
the reservation in promotion with consequential  seniority  and  have  given
the stamp of approval to the  Act  and  the  Rules  cannot  withstand  close
scrutiny  inasmuch  as  the  Constitution  Bench  has  clearly  opined  that
Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B) are enabling provisions and the State can  make
provisions for the same on  certain  basis  or  foundation.  The  conditions
precedent have not been satisfied. No exercise  has  been  undertaken.  What
has been argued with vehemence is that it is not necessary  as  the  concept
of reservation in promotion was already in vogue. We are  unable  to  accept
the said submission,  for  when  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  are
treated valid with certain conditions or riders,  it  becomes  incumbent  on
the part of the  State  to  appreciate  and  apply  the  test  so  that  its
amendments can be tested and withstand the scrutiny on parameters laid  down
therein.

87. In the ultimate analysis, we conclude and hold that Section 3(7) of  the
1994 Act and Rule 8-A of the 2007 Rules are ultra vires as they run  counter
to the dictum in M. Nagaraj. Any  promotion  that  has  been  given  on  the
dictum of Indra Sawhney and without the aid or assistance  of  Section  3(7)
and Rule 8-A shall remain undisturbed.”

26.   In Central Bank of India v. SC/ST Employees  Welfare  Association[17],
question was whether in absence of a rule of reservation for promotion  such
reservation  was  permissible  merely  because  the  banks  were   following
reservation policy of the Government of India.  The Madras High Court  after
considering the statistics found that there was no  adequate  representation
of SCs and STs in higher scales.  It directed that  such  representation  be
granted.  Plea of the Bank that such reservation will affect  efficiency  in
the administration was rejected.  This Court held that  in  absence  of  any
specific provision for reservation in promotion, the Court could  not  issue
a direction for reservation.  It was observed :

“32. We have already noticed above  that  in  matters  of  promotion  within
Group A posts, which carry an ultimate salary of Rs 5700  per  month,  there
was no provision for any reservation. On a conjoint  reading  of  these  two
Office Memorandums dated 1-11-1990 and 13-8-1997,  in  the  absence  of  any
other provision or rule evidencing such  a  reservation  in  the  matter  of
promotions, it cannot be  said  that  there  was  reservation  in  promotion
within Group A posts up to the ultimate salary of Rs  5700  per  month.  The
High Court in the impugned judgment has gone by the lofty  ideals  enshrined
in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution as well as the fact that in  these
Banks there is no adequate representation of SC/ST category of  officers  in
Group IV and above. That may be so. It can only  provide  justification  for
making a provision of this  nature.  However,  in  the  absence  of  such  a
provision, same cannot be read by overstretching the language of the  Office
Memorandum dated 13-8-1997. It is for the State to take stock of the  ground
realities and take a  decision  as  to  whether  it  is  necessary  to  make
provision for reservation in promotions to the aforesaid post as well.”

27.   In S. Panneer Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu[18], question  before  the
Court was whether in absence of any policy decision by the State for  giving
consequential seniority to candidates promoted on the basis  of  reservation
prior to a  senior  general  category  candidate,  claim  for  consequential
seniority could be accepted.  Answering the question  in  the  negative,  it
was held that in absence of provision for  consequential  seniority,  ‘catch
up’ rule will be applicable and the  roster  point  promotees  cannot  claim
such consequential seniority. The  senior  general  candidates  will  regain
their seniority on being promoted.  Observations  relevant  in  this  regard
are as follows :

“34. If we look at the above comparative table of  the  service  particulars
of the appellants and the  respondents,  it  is  seen  that  the  contesting
respondents U. Palaniappan joined the service almost seven years  after  the
appellants, his seniority is automatically accelerated at  an  unprecedented
rate and as on 1-4-2004 his seniority rank as ADE is 150  and  seniority  of
V. Appadurai is 120. The appellants who are qualified and  senior  than  the
contesting respondents are placed much below in rank in  comparison  to  the
person  belonging  to  the  reserved  class  promotees  who  were   promoted
following the rule of reservation. It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  private
respondents in the present case have been promoted  temporarily  under  Rule
39(a) and Rule 10(a)(i) of the General Rules with the condition  that  their
inclusion in the promotional order  shall  not  confer  on  them  any  right
whatsoever in the service. Determination of seniority is a vital  aspect  in
the service career of an employee and his future promotion is  dependent  on
this.  Therefore,  determination  of  seniority  must  be  based   on   some
principles which are just and fair. In the absence of  any  policy  decision
taken or rules framed by the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  regarding  Tamil  Nadu
Highways  Engineering  Service,   accelerated   promotion   given   to   the
respondents following rule of reservation in terms of Rule 12 will not  give
them consequential accelerated seniority.

xxxx

36. In the absence of any  provision  for  consequential  seniority  in  the
rules, the “catch-up rule” will be applicable and the roster-point  reserved
category promotees cannot count their seniority  in  the  promoted  category
from the date of their promotion and the senior general candidates if  later
reach  the  promotional  level,  general  candidates   will   regain   their
seniority. The Division Bench appears to  have  proceeded  on  an  erroneous
footing that Article 16(4-A) of  the  Constitution  of  India  automatically
gives the consequential seniority in addition to  accelerated  promotion  to
the roster-point promotees and the judgment of the Division Bench cannot  be
sustained.”


26.   It is clear from the above discussion that  exercise  for  determining
‘inadequacy of representation’, ‘backwardness’ and ‘overall efficiency’,  is
a must for exercise of power under Article 16(4A).  Mere fact that there  is
no proportionate representation in promotional posts for the  population  of
SCs and STs is not by itself enough  to  grant  consequential  seniority  to
promotees who are otherwise junior and thereby denying  seniority  to  those
who are given promotion later on account of reservation policy.  It  is  for
the State to place material on record that there  was  compelling  necessity
for exercise of such power and decision of the State was based  on  material
including the study that overall efficiency  is  not  compromised.   In  the
present case,  no  such  exercise  has  been  undertaken.   The  High  Court
erroneously observed that it was for the  petitioners  to  plead  and  prove
that the overall efficiency was adversely affected by  giving  consequential
seniority to junior persons who got promotion  on  account  of  reservation.
Plea that persons promoted at the same time were  allowed  to  retain  their
seniority in the lower cadre is  untenable  and  ignores  the  fact  that  a
senior person may be promoted later and not  at  same  time  on  account  of
roster point reservation.   Depriving  him  of  his  seniority  affects  his
further chances of  promotion.   Further  plea  that  seniority  was  not  a
fundamental right is equally without any merit in the present  context.   In
absence of exercise under Article 16(4A), it is the ‘catch  up’  rule  which
is fully applies.  It is not necessary to go into the question  whether  the
concerned Corporation had adopted the rule of consequential seniority.

27.   In view of the above, we allow these appeals, set aside  the  impugned
judgment and declare the provisions of the impugned Act  to  the  extent  of
doing away  with  the  ‘catch  up’  rule  and  providing  for  consequential
seniority under Sections 3 and 4 to persons belonging  to  SCs  and  STs  on
promotion against roster points to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of  the
Constitution.  The judgment will not affect those who have  already  retired
and  will  not  affect  financial  benefits  already  taken.   Consequential
promotions granted to serving employees, based  on  consequential  seniority
benefit, will be treated as ad hoc and liable  to  be  reviewed.   Seniority
list may be now revised in the light of this judgment  within  three  months
from today.  Further consequential action may be  taken  accordingly  within
next three months.

                                                        …………..…………………………….J.
                                                       [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]



                                                      .….……………………..……………..J.
                                                        [ UDAY UMESH LALIT ]



NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 09, 2017
-----------------------
[1]





      [2] (2006) 8 SCC 212
[3]

      [4] Para 124 of ‘M. Nagaraj’ (supra)
[5]

      [6] Vide order of this Court dated 18th March, 2010
[7]

      [8] (2001) 2 SCC 666
[9]

      [10] (1996) 2 SCC 715
[11]

      [12] (1999) 7 SCC 209
[13]

      [14] (1995) 2 SCC 745
[15]

      [16] (1997) 2 SCC 661
[17]

      [18] (1995) 6 SCC 684
[19]

      [20] (2012) 7 SCC 1
[21]

      [22] (2003) 5 SCC 604
[23]

      [24] (2011) 1 SCC 467
[25]

      [26] (2011) 3 All LJ 343
[27]

      [28] (2011) 1 All LJ 428
[29]

      [30] (1992) Supp. (3) SCC 217
[31]

      [32] R.K. Sabharwal versus State of Punjab, Ajit Singh Januja versus
State of Punjab (Ajit Singh I); Ajit Singh (II) versus State of Punjab and
Union of India versus  Virpal  Chauhan  (supra)
[33]

      [34] (2015) 12 SCC 308
[35]

      [36] (2015) 1 SCC 292


No circumstance to compromise - court can not force them to compromise = That the pending cases between the petitioner and Col.Satish Chander, if gone into their details, cannot be withdrawn under the circumstances mentioned below:- (a) That the Bhiwani Family Court allowed the marriage expenses for Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lacs) on 12.01.2015 in 2002/2012 in Sneh Lata Vs. Col.Satish Chander, the execution petition Exe/0000340/2015 is pending before Hon'ble Family Court, Bhiwani. Therefore at this stage of its execution how petitioner can be forced to withdraw the execution petition since all the expenses made by the petitioner for her daughter marriage was after obtaining the loans from relations and friends and the same is required to be paid back to them by the petitioner. (b) That the petitioner as well as Col.Satish Chander have filed appeal before this Hon'ble Court for increase of the grant of marriage expenses therefore, the same cannot be withdrawn as FAO No.3676 of 2015 and FAO No.4356 of 2015 are pending before this Hon'ble Court. (c) That the petitioner was granted maintenance on 06.3.2012 for Rs.20,000/- P.M., the petitioner has filed a suit under section 127 Crl.P.C. for enhancement of maintenance because it is not possible to live in a minimum required means by Award of Rs.20,000/- which includes her house rent also therefore, the same can not be withdrawn. (d) That the petitioner was left with no means by Col.Satish Chander when they both were residing at Flat No.4-C Sivsakti Apartment Plot No.10 Sec.10, Dwarka, New Delhi. Col.Satish Chander while deserting the petitioner took away his CSD Canteen Card, LPG Gas connection papers, ATM Card along with all the cheque books. Col.Satish Chander in collusion with the house owner got the electricity and water connection dis-connected specially when her daughter was appearing for M.Tech examination. Finally when the petitioner had gone out of flat and her daughter had gone to college, Col.Satish Chander got the house locked by the house owner by putting another lock over the lock of petitioner already put by the petitioner. The petitioner was not allowed to enter in the society premises of house thus her all belonging except the clothes she was wearing was under the control of house owner. This was done by help and advise of Col.Satish Chander, therefore, the petitioner filed a case for domestic violence against Col.Satish Chander which is on its final stage of hearing and can not be withdrawn it under any circumstances. (e) Therefore despite the facts mentioned above this Hon'ble Court has mentioned that both the parties undertake to withdraw the pending cases which was never agreed at all the endorsement made on this issue needs to be recalled by this Hon'ble Court.”= That this Hon'ble Court has committed grave error of law and facts while coming to the conclusion and passed the judgment dated 26.08.2015, which is apparently a legal error on the face of it which has resulted into a grave miscarriage of justice for the applicant and same is to be rectified by this Hon'ble Court by taking cognizance of the application and to meet the end of justice in furtherance of doing complete justice.” 8. The said application was taken up by the High court on 23.09.2015, when the High Court passed the following order :- “Heard. No ground is made out for recalling of the order dated 26.08.2015 passed by this Court. The application stands dismissed with special costs of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the High Court Legal Service Committee.” 9. Having regard to the averments made in the application for recall, it is fairly clear that it cannot be said that there is no ground made out for recalling the order dated 26.08.2015.= Since we propose to remit the review applications to the High Court, we refrain from making any further observation at this stage. The order dated 23.09.2015 is set aside and CRM No. 30993 of 2015 in C.R.R.(F) No. 151 of 2013 is remitted to the High Court.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 260-261 OF 2017
          [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 9773-9774 OF 2015 ]

      SUSHILA KUMARI                             Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

      COL. SATISH CHANDER                       Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.
1.    Leave granted.

2.    Heard Sh. Narender Hooda, learned senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant  and  Mr.  Rakesh  Dahiya,  learned  counsel  appearing  for   the
respondent.

3.    The appellant has challenged the order dated 26.08.2015 passed by  the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh  in  CRR  No.  1654  of  2012
(O&M) and CRR (F) No. 151 of 2013 (O&M).  Both petitions were taken  up  and
disposed of by a common Judgment.

4.    The short impugned Judgment is reproduced as under :-
“On the intervention of the Court, Lt. Col. Satish Chander  along  with  his
counsel Mr. Aman Pal, Advocate as well as Smt.  Sushila  Kumari  along  with
her counsel Mr.Babbar  Bhan,  Advocate,  who  are  present  in  Court,  have
resolved their dispute whereby Lt. Col. Satish  Chander  undertakes  to  pay
Rs. 21,000 per month w.e.f. today as maintenance which shall be credited  to
the  bank  account  of  Smt.  Sushila  Kumari  every   month   through   the
salary/pension account of Lt. Col. Satish Chander for which he  would  issue
necessary instructions to the authority concerned  for  regularly  crediting
the amount. Lt. Col. Satish Chander  further  undertakes  that  after  every
five years w.e.f. today he  will  increase  the  amount  of  maintenance  by
Rs.2,000 automatically. Both the parties undertake that they shall  withdraw
all the litigation pending against each other except  the  divorce  petition
and shall not  initiate  any  other  fresh  litigation  against  each  other
arising out of this matrimonial dispute. It has been  further   agreed  that
out of the total arrears amounting to Rs. 9,21,000  till  August,  2015,  an
amount of Rs. 3,56,000 which is still unpaid  shall  be  paid  by  Lt.  Col.
Satish Chander to Smt.Sushila Kumari within a period of six months in  equal
installments. The parties shall be bound by this settlement.
      In the light of statements made before the Court by  both  the  sides,
the present petitions stand disposed of.”

5.    According to the appellant, the facts, as recorded by the  High  Court
in the  impugned  Judgment,  were  factually  incorrect  and  there  was  no
agreement as recorded by the Court as far as withdrawal  of  the  cases  are
concerned.  The agreement was only to the schedule  of  payment  of  arrears
and enhancement of the maintenance by Rs.  1000/-.   In  that  view  of  the
matter, the appellant filed  an  application  for  recall  of  the  impugned
order, being Criminal Misc. Application No. 30993 of 2015.  At  paragraph  6
of the said application, it has been averred as follows :-

“That this Hon'ble Court in the order/judgment has mentioned that  both  the
parties undertake to withdraw all  their  litigation  pending  against  each
other except the divorce petition and shall not  initiate  any  other  fresh
litigation against each other arising out of this matrimonial  dispute.   It
is respectfully submitted that the petitioner along with  her  Advocate  who
was present in the Court vehemently opposed to withdraw  any  pending  cases
before the Court.  The Hon'ble Court had asked the petitioner  to  sign  the
agreement but the petitioner refused to  do  so  still  this  Hon'ble  Court
recorded in the judgment that both the parties  undertake  to  withdraw  all
pending cases which is far from the facts.”

6.    It is further stated at paragraph 7 that four criminal  cases  pending
between the parties cannot be withdrawn.  Paragraph 7 of the application  is
reproduced below :-
      “7.   That the pending cases between  the  petitioner  and  Col.Satish
Chander,  if  gone  into  their  details,  cannot  be  withdrawn  under  the
circumstances mentioned below:-
(a) That  the  Bhiwani  Family  Court  allowed  the  marriage  expenses  for
Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lacs) on 12.01.2015 in  2002/2012  in  Sneh  Lata
Vs. Col.Satish Chander, the execution petition Exe/0000340/2015  is  pending
before Hon'ble Family Court,  Bhiwani.   Therefore  at  this  stage  of  its
execution how petitioner can be forced to withdraw  the  execution  petition
since all the expenses made by the petitioner for her daughter marriage  was
after obtaining the loans  from  relations  and  friends  and  the  same  is
required to be paid back to them by the petitioner.
(b) That the petitioner as well as  Col.Satish  Chander  have  filed  appeal
before this Hon'ble Court for increase of the  grant  of  marriage  expenses
therefore, the same cannot be withdrawn as  FAO  No.3676  of  2015  and  FAO
No.4356 of 2015 are pending before this Hon'ble Court.
(c) That the petitioner was granted maintenance on 06.3.2012 for Rs.20,000/-
 P.M., the petitioner has filed  a  suit  under  section  127  Crl.P.C.  for
enhancement of maintenance because it is not possible to live in  a  minimum
required means by Award of Rs.20,000/- which includes her  house  rent  also
therefore, the same can not be withdrawn.
(d) That the petitioner was left with no means by  Col.Satish  Chander  when
they both were  residing  at  Flat  No.4-C  Sivsakti  Apartment  Plot  No.10
Sec.10,  Dwarka,  New  Delhi.   Col.Satish  Chander  while   deserting   the
petitioner took away his CSD Canteen Card, LPG Gas  connection  papers,  ATM
Card along with all the cheque books.  Col.Satish Chander in collusion  with
the house owner got  the  electricity  and  water  connection  dis-connected
specially when her daughter was appearing for M.Tech  examination.   Finally
when the petitioner had gone out of  flat  and  her  daughter  had  gone  to
college, Col.Satish Chander got the house  locked  by  the  house  owner  by
putting another lock  over  the  lock  of  petitioner  already  put  by  the
petitioner.  The  petitioner  was  not  allowed  to  enter  in  the  society
premises of house thus  her  all  belonging  except  the   clothes  she  was
wearing was under the control of house owner.  This was  done  by  help  and
advise of Col.Satish Chander, therefore, the petitioner  filed  a  case  for
domestic violence against Col.Satish Chander which is on its final stage  of
hearing and can not be withdrawn it under any circumstances.
(e)  Therefore despite the facts mentioned  above  this  Hon'ble  Court  has
mentioned that both the parties undertake  to  withdraw  the  pending  cases
which was never agreed at all the endorsement made on this  issue  needs  to
be recalled by this Hon'ble Court.”

7.    Hence, at paragraph 11 of the application,  the  appellant  prayed  as
follows :-
      “11.  That this Hon'ble Court has committed grave  error  of  law  and
facts  while  coming  to  the  conclusion  and  passed  the  judgment  dated
26.08.2015, which is apparently a legal error on the face of  it  which  has
resulted into a grave miscarriage of justice for the applicant and  same  is
to  be  rectified  by  this  Hon'ble  Court  by  taking  cognizance  of  the
application and to meet the end of justice in furtherance of doing  complete
justice.”

8.    The said application was taken up by the  High  court  on  23.09.2015,
when the High Court passed the following order :-
      “Heard.
      No ground is made out for recalling  of  the  order  dated  26.08.2015
passed by this Court.
      The application stands dismissed with special costs  of  Rs.  10,000/-
to be paid to the High Court Legal Service Committee.”

9.    Having regard to the averments made in the application for recall,  it
is fairly clear that it cannot be said that there is no ground made out  for
recalling the order dated 26.08.2015.  Mr.  Babbar  Bhan,  learned  counsel,
who appeared for the appellant before the High  Court,  has  also  filed  an
Affidavit before this Court, supporting the averments  in  the  application,
which is extracted above.

10.   Since we propose to remit the review applications to the  High  Court,
we refrain from making any further observation at  this  stage.   The  order
dated 23.09.2015 is set aside and CRM No. 30993 of  2015  in  C.R.R.(F)  No.
151 of 2013 is remitted to the High Court.

11.   We request the High  Court  to  consider  the  recall  application  on
merits and pass appropriate orders  therein  in  accordance  with  law.   In
order to avoid further round of litigation on an ancillary aspect,  we  also
make it clear that even if the High Court finds that  the  learned  advocate
had given the consent, the application may be considered as  one  filed  for
relieving the appellant from the undertaking given by the counsel.

12.   With the above observations and directions, the appeals  are  disposed
of.
                                                   .......................J.
                                                           [ KURIAN JOSEPH ]


                                                   .......................J.
                                                        [ A. M. KHANWILKAR ]

      New Delhi;
      February 08, 2017.

whether the appellant is an unauthorized occupant in suit premises and that he does not come within the definition of ‘family’ of the deceased tenant as per Section 3(g) nor an ‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.=The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of “family”. However, the present one is not a case where the tenant Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by his brother. Deo Narain, being the real brother of late Suraj Prasad, the tenant, had come to stay with his brother and was residing along with him as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted to the suit premises during the lifetime of Suraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights devolved on Deo Narain, he being the only heir. He too became a “tenant” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 3. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted. 10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the impugned order of the High Court is called for. Shri Upadhyay, the learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 3 invited our attention to the pleadings and pointed out that admittedly the sale deed executed by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi in favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, contains recitals to the effect that the former owner-landlord was well aware of Deo Narain occupying the suit premises after the death of Suraj Prasad, that he was acknowledged by the landlord as tenant in the premises, and that rent was also paid by Deo Narain to the landlord under receipts issued by the landlord though Deo Narain had fallen into some arrears of rent at the time of sale of the suit premises in favour of the appellant. Such admissions made by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi are binding on Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, inasmuch as the same are contained in the sale deed by which title has been derived by the appellant and thereunder the appellant has stepped into the shoes of the previous owner-landlord. Deo Narain’s status as tenant in occupation of the suit premises, cannot, therefore, be doubted or disputed by the appellant.”= Upon appreciation of the facts and evidence, the first appellate court and the High Court rightly held that the appellant is neither an ‘heir’ as visualized under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 nor ‘family’ within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act and that the appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is liable to be evicted. The High Court has directed the District Magistrate to pass appropriate orders under Section 16 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 on the release application of the landlord without further delay preferably within three weeks from the date of judgment of the High Court that is 09.03.2015. Father-in-law of Lalita had taken the suit premises on rent in the year 1940. In the facts and circumstances of the case, without relegating the matter to the District Magistrate to pass orders on the release application of the respondent-landlord, we deem it appropriate to direct the appellant to hand over vacant possession to the respondent-landlord. 18. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1305-06 OF 2017


Durga Prasad                                 …..         Appellant

                                   Versus

NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. LRS.      …..      Respondents



                             J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.


These appeals arise from the judgment of the High Court  of  Uttarakhand  at
Nainital in Writ Petition(MS) No. 2729 of 2014 dated  09.03.2015  dismissing
the writ petition and  also  the  review  petition,  thereby  affirming  the
findings of Additional District and Sessions Judge-VII,  Dehradun  that  the
appellant is an unauthorized occupant in suit premises and that he does  not
come within the definition  of  ‘family’  of  the  deceased  tenant  as  per
Section 3(g) nor an ‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.

2.    Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as under :

The respondent-landlord filed an  eviction  petition  before  the  Competent
Authority/Civil Judge, (Senior Division)  under  Section  21(1)(a)  of  U.P.
Urban  Buildings  (Regulation  of  Letting,  Rent  &  Eviction)  Act,   1972
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘U.P. Act XIII  of  1972’)  for  release  of
property from the tenant-Late Lalita Devi from  the  suit  property  bearing
No.6/7, Amrit Kaur Road, (New Road), Dehradun on  the  ground  of  his  bona
fide need. Father-in-law of deceased Lalita Devi–Hem Ram  Sharma  had  taken
the suit property on rent and after his death his  son  Baldev  (husband  of
Lalita) became the tenant of the  suit  property  and  after  the  death  of
Baldev, Lalita became the tenant of suit property.   The  appellant  is  the
brother of deceased Lalita, who was the tenant  of  the  respondent  herein.
The application was dismissed vide order dated 19.04.2010 by the  Prescribed
Authority. Aggrieved by the said  order,  respondent-landlord  preferred  an
appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972  before  the  appellate
court which was transferred  to  Additional  District  Judge-VII,  Dehradun.
During  the  pendency  of  appeal,  tenant-Lalita  Devi   passed   away   on
06.07.2013. The respondent-landlord moved a substitution application  before
the appellate court with a prayer  that  the  appellant,  who  is  the  real
brother of deceased, be substituted in her place. The said  application  was
allowed and the appellant was impleaded as  a  defendant/respondent  in  the
said appeal. The appellate Court allowed the said appeal  vide  order  dated
10.10.2014 holding that during the pendency of the appeal the  sole  tenant-
Lalita passed away and Durga Prasad, who  has  been  substituted  is  not  a
member of the ‘family’ and that he has not been able to prove  that  he  was
previously residing with his sister Lalita in the said  premises.  On  those
findings  the  appellate  court  set  aside  the  order  of  the  prescribed
authority and allowed the appeal. Thereafter the appellant-tenant  preferred
a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed vide the  impugned
order dated 09.03.2015, holding that the appellant does not come within  the
definition of ‘family’ as per Section 3(g) of U.P. Act  XIII  of  1972.  The
High Court further held that vacancy  was  liable  to  be  declared  on  the
demised  premises,  on  the  death  of  sole  tenant–  Lalita,  the   review
application filed by the appellant also came  to  be  dismissed  vide  order
dated 31.08.2015. Both the orders are impugned in these appeals.

3.    Mr. Parthiv Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant contended  that
the High Court erred in holding that the appellant is not a  legal  heir  or
representative of the deceased tenant and the said finding is  perverse  and
contrary to the materials on record. Learned counsel further submitted  that
on the death of the tenant  Lalita,  respondent-landlord  himself  filed  an
application for substitution of the present appellant as the legal  heir  of
the deceased tenant Lalita and the address of the appellant at the  time  of
filing of the application was shown  as  the  same  disputed  property  i.e.
House No.6/7, Amrit Kaur Road, Dehradun  and  which  by  itself  establishes
that appellant has been residing in the said property at the time  of  death
of tenant Lalita. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed  reliance
upon Ganesh Trivedi vs. Sundar Devi and Others (2002) 2 SCC 329  to  contend
that the brother would  inherit  the  tenancy  and  would  fall  within  the
definition of ‘family’.

4.    Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted  that  the  High
Court rightly held that the appellant being brother of tenant Lalita is  not
a member of the ‘family’ as defined under Section 3(g) of the U.P. Act  XIII
of 1972 and the appellant being an unauthorized  occupant,  the  High  Court
rightly ordered to be evicted. It was further contended that the  tenant  of
the suit premises was Lalita and that tenant was a female Hindu and  on  her
death, the devolution of tenancy will be determined as per Section  15(2)(b)
of the Hindu Succession Act and since the appellant does not fall under  the
category of ‘heir’  of  the  husband  of  Lalita,  the  High  Court  rightly
dismissed the writ petition as well as the review petition and the  impugned
orders do not warrant interference.





5.    We have carefully considered the rival  contentions  and  perused  the
impugned order and the materials on record.





6.    The question for consideration is  whether  the  appellant-brother  of
the deceased tenant-Lalita is included in the definition of  ‘family’  under
Section 3(g) or an ‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.





7.    For proper appreciation of the question and  the  contentions  raised,
it is apposite to refer to relevant provisions of Section 3 of the U.P.  Act
XIII of 1972 which defines the term ‘tenant’ and ‘family’ as under:-


“3 (a) “tenant”, in relation to a building, means a person by whom its  rent
is payable, and on the tenant’s death-
in the case of a residential building, such only of his  heirs  as  normally
resided with him in the building at the time of his death;
in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs;
[Explanation – An occupant of a room in a hotel or  a  lodging  house  shall
not be deemed to be a tenant];
……………
(g) “Family”, in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building  means,  his
or her-
(i) spouse;
(ii) male lineal descendants;
(iii) such parents, grandparents and any unmarried or  widowed  or  divorced
or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a  male  lineal  descendant,
as may have been normally residing with him or her,
and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right  of
residence in that building.”



8.    Section 12 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 relates  to  deemed  vacancies
of a building which reads as under:-



“12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases – (1) A landlord or  tenant
of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy  the  building  or  a
part thereof if-

            (a)  he has substantially removed his effects therefrom; or
            (b)  he has allowed it to be  occupied  by  any  person  who  is
      not member of his family; or
            (c)  in the case of  a  residential  building,  he  as  well  as
        members   of   his   family   have   taken   up    residence,    not
being temporary residence, elsewhere.

(2) In the case of non-residential building,  where  a  tenant  carrying  on
business in the building admits a person who is not a member of  his  family
as a partner or a new partner, as the case  may  be,  the  tenant  shall  be
deemed to have ceased to occupy the building.
(3) In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or  any  member  of
his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated  a
residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area  or  town
area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be  deemed  to
have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy:
……….

9.    A careful analysis of the above  provisions  indicates  that   Section
3(a) uses the word ‘heir’.   Definition  in  Section  3(a)  deals  with  the
contingency when a tenant dies.  It is significant to  note  that  the  word
“family member” is absent in  Section  3(a).   “Family  member”  is  defined
under Section 3(g) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 and is also referred  to  in
Section 12 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.  The word ‘heir’  in  Section  3(a)
is used in relation to a ‘tenant’ who has  to  succeed  as  “tenant  on  the
tenant’s death”; while ‘family’ is used in Section 12  which  deals  with  a
situation of an existing tenant.  The definition of  ‘family’  as  occurring
in Section 3(g) may not be relevant for  the  purposes  of  determining  the
question as to who would become tenant on  the  death  of  original  tenant,
since Section 3(a) uses the word ‘heir’.



10.   In the present case, we are dealing with the  case  as  to  who  would
become ‘tenant’ on the death of Lalita.  Hence, the definition  of  ‘family’
is not relevant for the purposes of  determining  as  to  who  would  become
tenant on the death  of  tenant  Lalita.   The  only  question  falling  for
consideration is whether the appellant-brother of the tenant  Lalita  is  an
‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.  The word ‘heir’  is
not defined in the Act.  ‘Heir’ is a person who inherits or may  inherit  by
law.  Section 3(1)(f) of the Hindu Succession Act defines ‘heir’ as  ““heir”
means any person, male  or  female,  who  is  entitled  to  succeed  to  the
property of an intestate under this Act;”. The word ‘heir’ has to  be  given
the same meaning as would be applicable to the general  law  of  succession.
In the present case, as pointed out by the High Court, the deceased  tenant-
Lalita being a hindu female, the devolution of tenancy  will  be  determined
under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.



11.   Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act lays down the general order  of
succession to the  property  of  a  female  intestate  who  dies  after  the
commencement  of  the  Hindu  Succession  Act  and  states  the  scheme   of
succession to her  property  which  is  different  from  that  of  order  of
succession to the property of a male intestate. Sub-section (2)  of  Section
15 carves out two exceptions to the general scheme and order of  succession.
 We are concerned with clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 as  noted
above which has been grafted as an exception to the provisions  relating  to
the general order of succession to  the  property  of  a  female  intestate.
Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act reads as under:-


“Section 15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus
…………
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),-
(a)……….
(b). Any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or  from  her
father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or  daughter  of  the
deceased (including the children of any predeceased  son  or  daughter)  not
upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the  order  specified
therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.”

The exception carved out in Section 15(2)(b) provides for  a  special  order
of succession in case of property inherited by her from her husband  or  her
father-in-law; but its operation is  confined  to  the  case  of  her  dying
without leaving a son or a daughter or children of pre-deceased children  to
inherit her property.  Language used in the section clearly  specifies  that
the property inherited from the  husband  and  father-in-law  would  devolve
upon  the  heirs  of  husband/father-in-law  from  whom  she  inherited  the
property.   We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in the  case
of V. Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian  Chettiar  (Dead)  by  Lrs.  And
Others, (2003) 6 SCC 633, and the relevant para reads hereunder:-


"10. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 carves out an  exception  in  case  of  a
female dying intestate without  leaving  son,  daughter  or  children  of  a
predeceased son or daughter. In such a case, the rule prescribed is to  find
out the source  from  which  she  has  inherited  the  property.  If  it  is
inherited from  her  father  or  mother,  it  would  devolve  as  prescribed
under Section 15(2)(a). If it is  inherited  by  her  from  her  husband  or
father-in-law, it would devolve upon the heirs of her husband  under Section
15(2)(b). The clause enacts that in a case where the property  is  inherited
by a female from her father or mother, it would devolve not upon  the  other
heirs, but upon the heirs of her father. This would mean that  if  there  is
no son or  daughter  including  the  children  of  any  predeceased  son  or
daughter, then the property would devolve upon  the  heirs  of  her  father.
Result would be -- if the property is inherited by a female from her  father
or her mother, neither her husband nor his heirs would  get  such  property,
but it would revert back to the heirs of her father."

12.   In the present case, the suit  property  was  taken  on  rent  by  the
father-in-law of deceased tenant-Lalita that is Hem  Ram  Sharma  and  after
his death, his son Baldev (husband of Lalita)  became  tenant  of  the  suit
property.  Upon his death, Lalita became the tenant of  the  suit  property.
Upon death of Lalita, in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the  Hindu  Succession
Act, in the absence of any son or daughter of deceased Lalita,  the  tenancy
would devolve upon the heirs of her husband.  Since the appellant  does  not
fall under the category of ‘heir’ of Lalita’s husband, the  tenancy  of  the
suit property will not devolve on him nor can he  be  called  as  an  ‘heir’
under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.



13.   Section 3(g) defines ‘family’, in relation to landlord which  includes
the spouse that is husband or wife of  a  person,  male  lineal  descendants
which means his or her son, son’s son, son’s son’s son and so  on,  parents,
grandparents, unmarried, widowed, divorced daughter or  granddaughter,  etc.
The definition given in the clause is an inclusive one and  is  supposed  to
be construed in its technical meaning which implies what is  not  given  has
to be excluded as not forming part of the  family  of  landlord  or  tenant.
Therefore, sisters and brothers of landlord and  tenant  are  excluded  from
his/her family.  In the facts of present case, the appellant  being  brother
of deceased tenant cannot be held to be the ‘family’ as the  inclusive  list
given under the Act clearly omits “brother and sister” and the  same  cannot
be read therein as the list has to be read and interpreted strictly.



14.   Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant is an  heir  of
Lalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death  of  Lalita,  the  appellant
has to be a ‘tenant’ within the meaning of Section  3(a)  of  the  U.P.  Act
XIII of  1972.    As  per  Section  3(a)(1),  in  the  case  of  residential
building, in the event of death of a tenant, for  heirs  to  be  treated  as
tenant, the statute requires them to prove  that  they  have  been  normally
residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death.    The  term
used in the section is ‘heir’ which implies  that  not  any  of  the  family
member residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but  only  the
heirs of  tenant  normally  residing  with  him/her.   The  words  “normally
residing with him” suggests that only those heirs would inherit the  tenancy
rights of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in  normal  course
and not temporarily.  The legislative intent appears to be that  only  those
heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with  the  tenant  and  not
occasionally.  In the present case, the appellant claims that  he  has  been
carrying on business in the property along with his deceased  sister  Lalita
and had been ordinarily living    with her because of the  medical  business
they were running.  The appellant being the brother of  deceased-Lalita  had
no reason to normally reside with his married sister.  Be it noted,  in  her
written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has  not  averred
that her brother-appellant Durga Prasad was living with her and that he  was
taking care of her.  As rightly held by the Courts below,  Durga  Prasad  is
neither a ‘heir’ within the meaning of  Section  3(a)  nor  fall  under  the
definition of ‘family’ as per Section 3(g) of the Act.





15.    As  discussed  earlier,  originally  Lalita’s  father-in-law-Hem  Ram
Sharma took the premises on rent in the year 1940.  After his death,  Lalita
Devi’s husband-Baldev became the tenant  of  the  suit  property  and  after
Baldev’s death, Lalita become the tenant of the suit property.   During  the
pendency of the appeal before the First Appellate Court, Lalita  expired  on
06.07.2013.  Thereafter,  the  respondent-landlord  moved   a   substitution
application before the appellate court to substitute the  appellant  who  is
the real brother of deceased-Lalita.  On  that  application,  the  appellant
was impleaded as a defendant-respondent in the said appeal.  As pointed  out
by the High  Court,  the  present  appellant  may  have  been  ‘rightly’  or
‘wrongly’ substituted after the demise of his sister.   Merely  because  the
appellant has been substituted in the place of tenant-Lalita, the  appellant
cannot become a ‘heir’ who normally resided with the tenant Lalita.





16.   Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance  on  Ganesh  Trivedi
(supra), wherein this Court found, as a matter of  fact,  that  brother  was
residing in the  tenanted  premises  and,  therefore,  tenancy  rights  will
devolve upon him on the death of  original  tenant  within  the  meaning  of
Section 3(a)(g) read with Section 12(1)(b) of the U.P.  Act  XIII  of  1972.
This is evident from the following observation made in paras  (9)  and  (10)
of judgment which are reproduced as under:




“9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition  of  “family”.
However, the present one is not a case where the  tenant  Suraj  Prasad  had
during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere  and/or  allowed  the  suit
premises to be occupied by his brother. Deo Narain, being the  real  brother
of late Suraj Prasad, the tenant, had come to stay with his brother and  was
residing along with him as such, even at the time of death of Suraj  Prasad.
It will not therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b)  of
sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted to the suit  premises
during the lifetime of Suraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy  had  occurred.  On
the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights devolved on Deo  Narain,  he  being
the only heir. He too became a “tenant” within the meaning of clause (a)  of
Section 3. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.
10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the impugned  order
of the High Court is called for. Shri  Upadhyay,  the  learned  counsel  for
Respondents 1 to 3 invited our attention to the pleadings  and  pointed  out
that admittedly the sale  deed  executed  by  Jagdamaba  Prasad  Awasthi  in
favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, contains  recitals  to  the  effect
that the former owner-landlord was well aware of Deo  Narain  occupying  the
suit premises after the death of Suraj Prasad, that he was  acknowledged  by
the landlord as tenant in the premises, and that rent was also paid  by  Deo
Narain to the landlord under receipts issued  by  the  landlord  though  Deo
Narain had fallen into some arrears of rent at the time of sale of the  suit
premises in favour of the  appellant.  Such  admissions  made  by  Jagdamaba
Prasad Awasthi are binding on Ganesh Trivedi,  the  appellant,  inasmuch  as
the same are contained in the sale deed by which title has been  derived  by
the appellant and thereunder the appellant has stepped  into  the  shoes  of
the previous owner-landlord. Deo Narain’s status as tenant in occupation  of
the suit  premises,  cannot,  therefore,  be  doubted  or  disputed  by  the
appellant.”


The aforesaid decision has been rendered in view  of  proven  facts  in  the
said case and, therefore, has no application to the  facts  of  the  present
case.

17.   Upon appreciation of the  facts  and  evidence,  the  first  appellate
court and the High Court rightly held  that  the  appellant  is  neither  an
‘heir’ as visualized under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act  XIII  of  1972  nor
‘family’ within the meaning  of  Section  3(g)  of  the  Act  and  that  the
appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and  is  liable
to be evicted.  The High Court has directed the District Magistrate to  pass
appropriate orders under Section 16 of the U.P. Act  XIII  of  1972  on  the
release application of the landlord without further delay preferably  within
three weeks from the date of judgment of the High Court that is  09.03.2015.
 Father-in-law of Lalita had taken the suit premises on  rent  in  the  year
1940.  In the facts and circumstances of the case,  without  relegating  the
matter to the District Magistrate to pass orders on the release  application
of the respondent-landlord, we deem it appropriate to direct  the  appellant
to hand over vacant possession to the respondent-landlord.

18.   In the result, the appeals are dismissed.  We direct the appellant  to
hand over the vacant possession of the  suit  premises  to  the  respondent-
landlord within four weeks from the date of this  order  failing  which  the
appellant shall be liable for contempt of this Court.


                                                             ...……………………….J.
                                                [DIPAK MISRA]


                                                              .………………………..J.
                                                [R. BANUMATHI]

New Delhi;
February 07, 2017.

Monday, February 13, 2017

whether the marriage of the appellant/landlady as subsequent event can extinguish the bona fide requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief sought in the release application filed prior to her marriage.= In our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage of appellant does not extinguish her requirement considering the comparative hardship, it is to be pointed out that the respondents have another business of sweet shop and thus, is not going to suffer if ordered to vacate the suit premises as they can shift the place of business to some other place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the parents of the appellant would be subjected to hardship as she has no other premises to accommodate her grandparents as well as her parents. While taking note of the subsequent events, the High Court has not considered the comparative hardship to the appellant and erred in declining the relief to the appellant.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1008 OF 2017
        [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.19117 OF 2013]


NIDHI                                                …..   Appellant
                                   Versus

RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRs.                …..   Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.



      This appeal by way of special leave is  preferred  against  the  order
dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in
Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein the  High  Court  affirmed  the  order
passed by  Additional  District  Judge,  Moradabad,  thereby  setting  aside
release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority.

2.    Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant  is  the  owner
and landlord of  the  premises  in  question,  which  is  a  non-residential
accommodation.  Allegedly, the premises was let  out  by  ancestors  of  the
appellant’s family when they did not require the premises for  personal  use
as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi wife of  Kunwar
Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside in.  After the demise  of
Smt. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became  the  owner  of  the  premises  in
question and continued to receive rent from the  respondent.  The  appellant
filed a release application being PCS No.97 of 1987, under Section  21(1)(a)
of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and  Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as  U.P.  Act   XIII  of  1972),  seeking
possession of the suit premises on the ground  of  her  bona  fide  personal
requirement.  The appellant alleged that she is in need of the  premises  as
the appellant wants to accommodate her grandparents  in  the  demised  house
who live in  village  and  are  in  need  of  care  and  medical  treatment.
Moreover, the appellant alleged that she and  her  younger  sister  required
separate room for study.  It was alleged that  the  respondent  carries  out
the said hotel business for namesake only and is being carried  out  by  the
servant of the respondent. It was further alleged by the appellant that  the
respondent’s main business is that of a sweet shop  and  he  has  sufficient
means to take some other place on rent to run his hotel business.

3.    Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in dispute  and
resisted the application for release of  accommodation,  claiming  that  the
appellant and her sister live in a big house called  Kath  Mahal  which  has
sufficient space comprising of large rooms and large halls. It  was  averred
that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords in the village  and
live in a palatial house there and they are unable to climb  stairs  in  the
suit premises.  Also, the alleged business of sweet shop is run by  his  son
and the entire family is dependent upon the income from hotel business.

4.    Upon consideration  of  evidence  and  on  hearing  the  parties,  the
Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in favour  of
the appellant and taking into consideration the social status of family  and
that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her parents,  found
that the appellant bona fide requires the  premises  and  vide  order  dated
29.10.1991 allowed  the  application  for  release  of  suit  premises.  The
Prescribed Authority  directed  the  appellant-landlord  to  compensate  the
respondent by giving him a sum  equivalent  to  two  years  of  rent  before
taking possession.

5.    Respondent-tenant challenged  the  aforesaid  order  by  way  of  Rent
Control Appeal No.72 of 1991 under Section 22 of  U.P.  Act  XIII  of  1972,
before the Additional District Judge at  Moradabad,  who  vide  order  dated
04.02.2003, allowed the appeal  and  set  aside  the  order  passed  by  the
Prescribed  Authority  holding  that  the  appellant’s  need  for  the  suit
premises  is  not  based  on  bona  fide  requirement  and  her   need   for
accommodation is not immediate or pressing.

6.    Aggrieved by the said order of  the  appellate  court,  the  appellant
filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003 before the High Court  of  Judicature  at
Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration  of  the  facts  and  materials
placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of the  parties
before it  dismissed  the  writ  appeal  holding  that  the  relief  claimed
originally has,  by  reason  of  subsequent  development  in  circumstances,
become inappropriate. The High  Court  found  that  when  the  statement  of
appellant was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc. and was  of  marriageable
age and as the matter went before the  appellate  authority,  the  situation
changed as the Court noticed that the appellant was  married  on  23.01.1996
and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue  Service  who  was,  at  that
time, posted at Delhi and subsequently  in  Mumbai.   The  High  Court  also
observed that the sisters of the appellant also got married and were  living
with their husbands, elsewhere and that the  alleged  need  had  disappeared
long back.  The High Court relied on the judgments of this Court  in  Hasmat
Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 and Kedar Nath  Agrawal  and  Anr.
vs. Dhanraji Devi and Anr.  2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC), to take  the  cognizance
of subsequent events.

7.    Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  first  appellate
court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief  sought  by  the
appellant in the release application only because  during  the  pendency  of
the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got  married  which  is  a
subsequent development which would naturally take place  and  the  appellant
cannot be made to suffer on  account  of  delay  in  adjudication.   It  was
further contended that only because the husband of the  appellant  has  been
allotted a government accommodation, the  need  of  the  appellant  did  not
disappear as the appellant required the scheduled premises for her  own  use
and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family  and  the
appellant requires the scheduled premises for herself as  well  as  for  her
parents and  grandparents  and  her  bona  fide  requirement  has  not  been
properly considered by the High Court.

8.    Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents  submitted  that  this
Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the  ground  of
bona fide need  and  comparative  hardship,  the  court  must  consider  the
subsequent changes in events to decide the  bona  fide  requirement  of  the
landlord.  It was further submitted that in  her  release  application,  the
appellant had set up her bona fide  need  but  failed  to  substantiate  her
stand and hence the  first  appellate  court  and  the  High  Court  rightly
dismissed the release application.

9.    We have considered the rival contentions of learned  counsel  for  the
parties and perused the impugned order and other materials on record.

10.   The point falling for consideration is whether  the  marriage  of  the
appellant/landlady  as  subsequent  event  can  extinguish  the  bona   fide
requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief  sought  in  the
release application filed prior to her marriage.

11.   Before proceeding further, it is apposite to  have  a  look  over  the
related provision under Section 21(1) of  the  U.P.  Act  which  deals  with
proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant,  clause  (a)
of sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act alone is germane in the  present
proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-

“21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation  of  tenant.-  (1)
The Prescribed Authority may, on an application  of  the  landlord  in  that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building  under  tenancy  or
any specified part thereof if it is satisfied  that  any  of  the  following
grounds exists namely-

(a)   that the building is bona fide required either in  its  existing  form
or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for  occupation  by
himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit  it  is
held by him,  either  for  residential  purposes  or  for  purposes  of  any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord  is  the  trustee  of  a
public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;

 ………..”

An analysis of the above provision would show that the  landlord  of  rented
property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in  the
event of his bona  fide  requirement  of  the  said  premises  for  his  own
residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him.

12.   In the facts  of  present  case,  the  appellant-landlady  herein  was
living in a small house with her family comprising four members and was  not
able  to  accommodate  her  ailing  grandparents  who  used  to  visit  them
frequently for medication purposes and were  willing  to  reside  with  them
permanently as they were living alone in  their  village  where  nobody  was
there  to  look  after  them.  Appellant  in  order   to   accommodate   her
grandparents with them and in the light of growing  needs  of  her  and  her
younger sister (who  were  then  studying)  filed  the  release  application
before the prescribed authority and the release order  was  granted  by  the
prescribed  authority  in  favour  of   the   appellant/landlady   directing
respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession  of  suit  premises  to  the
appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal,  preferred  by
the respondent-tenant, the  appellant  got  married  and  settled  with  her
husband. The first appellate court as well as the High Court  took  note  of
this as subsequent development and  held  that  the  requirement  no  longer
subsists and the claim of personal requirement has disappeared.  Of  course,
during the pendency of  lis  between  the  parties,  situation  underwent  a
change and the appellant got married to an Indian  Revenue  Service  Officer
and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. Though the  appellant
is married and settled with her husband, her bona  fide  requirement  cannot
be said to have ended as she wanted the premises not just  for  herself  but
to accommodate her parents and grandparents in the  suit  premises  so  that
they can live together. The family of the appellant  is  still  said  to  be
residing in rented premises in Moradabad,  despite  having  their  own  suit
premises to reside in.   In  the  facts  of  present  case,  the  change  in
subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant of her  right
to vacant possession of suit premises as it is  a  natural  event  that  the
daughter of the house  would  get  married  and  settle  with  her  husband.
Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different  accommodation
with her husband, the actual bona fide requirement of premises is still  the
same, since her parents and grandparents are still residing separately  from
each other with no one to look after  them.   More  so,  the  appellant  got
married but the family stays where it is and the bona  fide  requirement  of
premises for accommodation of parents remains the same.  Being  married  and
shifting to other place does not automatically result  in  extinguishing  of
bona fide requirement of the appellant as being the owner of  property,  she
alone is to decide what she wants to do with her property.

13.   The legislations made for dealing with such  landlord-tenant  disputes
were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant  in  order  to
do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing  justice  the  Court
cannot be over zealous and forget its duty  towards  the  landlord  also  as
ultimately, it is the landlord who owns the  property  and  is  entitled  to
possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond reasonable  doubt
as it is in the case before this Court.

14.   First appellate court as well as the High Court observed  that  during
the pendency of the appeal, the appellant got married, her husband a  member
of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at Delhi,  Mumbai  and  other  places
and this subsequent event has extinguished the personal requirement  of  the
appellant.  In the impugned judgment, the High Court referred to  number  of
judgments Hasmat Rai and Another vs. Raghunath  Prasad  (1981)  3  SCC  103;
Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram (1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments.

15.   Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on  the  date  of
institution of the suit.  However, the court has power to take note  of  the
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly.  Power of the  court  to
take note of subsequent events came up for  consideration  in  a  number  of
decisions.  In Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC  256,  this
Court held as under:-

“11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties  stand
crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore,  the
decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they  stood
at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power  to  take  note
of subsequent events  and  mould  the  relief  accordingly  subject  to  the
following conditions being  satisfied:  (i)  that  the  relief,  as  claimed
originally has, by reason of  subsequent  events,  become  inappropriate  or
cannot be granted; (ii)  that  taking  note  of  such  subsequent  event  or
changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable  complete  justice
being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event  is  brought
to the notice of the court promptly and in  accordance  with  the  rules  of
procedural law so that the opposite party  is  not  taken  by  surprise.  In
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1  SCC  770  this
Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the  notice  of  the
court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or  the  manner
of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court  cannot  be
blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of  procedure  if  no
specific provision of law or rule of fair play  is  violated  for  it  would
promote  substantial  justice  provided  that  there  is  absence  of  other
disentitling factors or  just  circumstances.  The  Court  speaking  through
Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that the court  can,  so  long  as
the litigation pends, take note of  updated  facts  to  promote  substantial
justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as  would
stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) rules  of  procedure  may
be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and  there  is  no
other special circumstance  repelling  resort  to  that  course  in  law  or
justice, (iii) such cognizance of subsequent events and developments  should
be cautious, and (iv)  the  rules  of  fairness  to  both  sides  should  be
scrupulously obeyed.

Om Prakash Gupta’s case was referred with approval in Ram Kumar Barnwal  vs.
Ram Lakhan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660.

16.   Though the court has the power to take note of the subsequent  events,
court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on the bona  fide
need of the landlord.  For the purpose of coming to the conclusion  on  bona
fide   need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties  will  have
to be taken into consideration.  As discussed above, in  the  present  case,
the appellant got married during the pendency  of  the  appeal  and  settled
with her husband; still her  requirement  to  accommodate  her  parents  and
grandparents continued. Appellant has established her bona fide  requirement
for accommodating her parents and grandparents in the suit  premises  merely
because  the  appellant  got  married  amidst  the  proceedings   does   not
extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of the suit premises.   In
our view, the subsequent event,  namely,  marriage  of  appellant  does  not
extinguish her requirement considering the comparative hardship,  it  is  to
be pointed out that the respondents have another business of sweet shop  and
thus, is not going to suffer if ordered to vacate the suit premises as  they
can shift the place of business to some other place  without  suffering  any
loss of occupation, whereas the parents of the appellant would be  subjected
to hardship as she has no other premises to accommodate her grandparents  as
well as her parents.  While taking note of the subsequent events,  the  High
Court has not considered the  comparative  hardship  to  the  appellant  and
erred in declining the relief to the appellant.

17.   In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of  the  High
Court is set aside and the order passed by  the  prescribed  authority  i.e.
Court of Second Upper Civil Judge, Moradabad dated 29.10.1991  is  restored.
The  appellant  shall  deposit  the  compensation  before   the   prescribed
authority payable to the  respondent  within  four  weeks  from  today.  The
respondent shall handover the possession of the  suit  premises  within  one
month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which the  respondent-
tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this Court.  No costs.



                                                             ...……………………….J.
                                                [DIPAK MISRA]



                                                              .………………………..J.
                                                [R. BANUMATHI]

New Delhi;
February  07, 2017