LAW FOR ALL

Thursday, August 11, 2016

Section 120(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act reads as follows:- “120. Incidence of property taxes (1) The property taxes shall be primarily leviable as follows:— (a) if the land or building is let, upon the lessor; (b) if the land or building is sub-let, upon the superior lessor; (c) if the land or building is unlet, upon the person in whom the right to let the same vests: Provided that the property taxes in respect of land or building, being property of the Union, possession of which has been delivered in pursuance of section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of 1954), shall be primarily leviable upon the transferee.”= According to Section 120 (1) (c), the person who has a right to let would be liable to pay tax for un-let land. Admittedly, this land is un- let. Incidence of tax has to be decided by the Authority after taking into consideration the provisions of the Act, rules and the licences, including the distribution licence- Section 120 (1) (c) contemplates that a person who has the right to let out un-let land is liable to pay tax. His status as a lessor or licensee is irrelevant. If the distribution licence empowers the Distribution Company to let out the land, notwithstanding the fact that the Distribution Company is a licensee as per Schedule ‘F’ of the Transfer Scheme Rules, it would still have to pay the tax. For the reasons afore-stated, we confirm the order of remand passed by the High Court in the impugned judgment with a direction to the Deputy Assessor and Collector of Municipal Corporation of Delhi to consider the provisions of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, Transfer Scheme Rules and the Distribution licence issued under Section 20 of the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act for deciding the matter pertaining to the incidence of tax.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 5653 of 2014

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
.... Appellant(s)
Versus

NORTH DELHI POWER LTD. (NOW TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LTD.) AND ANR.
… Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No.5654 of 2014

TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LTD. (FORMERLY KNWON AS NORTH DELHI POWER
LTD.)
.....Appellant(s)

Versus

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI (NOW KNOWN AS NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION)
… Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No._7389_of 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.17317 of 2015)

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI
.... Appellant(s)

Versus

NORTH DELHI POWER LTD. (NOW TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LTD.) AND ANR.
.… Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.17317/2015.
The issues in these three Civil Appeals are the exigibility and
incidence of property tax over a plot of 8,080 square meters of land.
2. On 26.03.2003, the Assessment and Collection Department of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation determined the rateable value of a vacant plot of
8,080 sq. meters allotted to North Delhi Power Limited at Rs.58,53,960/-
with effect from 01.04.2002. M/s North Delhi Power Limited filed an appeal
under Section 169 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 before the
District Judge, Delhi challenging the order dated 26.03.2003. By a judgment
dated 03.01.2004 in H.T.A. No.164/2003, the Additional District Judge,
Delhi held that the land in dispute stood transferred to the Delhi
Government and hence it was entitled for exemption from payment of property
tax in view of Section 119 (1) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
It was also held that M/s North Delhi Power Limited was a licensee of the
Government. On the basis of the above findings, the District Judge allowed
the appeal and quashed the assessment order dated 26.03.2003. Aggrieved by
the said judgment dated 03.01.2004 of the District Judge, Delhi, the
Municipal Corporation Delhi approached the High Court of Delhi by filing
Writ Petition No.3193/2004. A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed
the writ petition holding that the North Delhi Power Limited is liable to
pay the tax. The Single Judge held that the provisions of Section 120 (1)
(c) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 are applicable as North
Delhi Power Limited was entitled to let out the properties on which basis
it became liable to pay taxes. With reference to the Delhi Electricity
Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 which would be dealt in detail later,
the Single Judge held that North Delhi Power Limited is an effective and
full successor in respect to all matters relating to all liabilities and
assets and further held that there is no material to establish that the
Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer Scheme), 2001 ruled out liability of
North Delhi Power Limited from municipal taxation. North Delhi Power
Limited filed L.P.A.No.2630/2005, challenging the judgment dated 25.07.2005
passed by the Single Judge in Writ Petition No.3913/2004. A Division Bench
of the High Court of Delhi held that Delhi Power Company Ltd. was the owner
of land and land rights during the relevant assessment years i.e. 2002-2003
and 2003-2004, that the statutory transfer scheme creates a licence in
favour of the Delhi Power Company Ltd. and that the distribution licence
issued by Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission under Section 20 of the
Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 is distinct from the licence for land
granted in its favour. As Delhi Power Company Ltd. was not a party with the
proceedings before the Division Bench, the matter was remanded back to the
Deputy Assessor and Collector of the Respondent-Municipal Corporation of
Delhi for determination as to whether North Delhi Power Limited or Delhi
Power Company Ltd. is liable to pay property tax. The Deputy Assessor and
Collector of Municipal Corporation, Delhi was directed to give a hearing to
both North Delhi Power Limited as well as to Delhi Power Company Ltd.
before passing any final order.
3. Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 09.12.2013 in L.P.A.
No.2630/2005, Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited (formerly North Delhi
Power Limited referred to as ‘Distribution Company’ hereinafter) filed
Civil Appeal No.5654/2014. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi referred to
as ‘Corporation’ hereinafter for convenience, also filed Civil Appeal
No.5653/2014, aggrieved by certain findings in favour of the Distribution
Company. Civil Appeal No.______ of 2016 (arising out of Special Leave
Petition (C) No.17317 of 2015) was filed by Government of NCT of Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Government’), challenging the findings
recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the vacant land stood
transferred to Delhi Power Company Ltd. and the Government is not owner of
the vacant land.
4. It would be useful to refer to the provisions, Statutes and the Rules
for better appreciation of the dispute involved in this case. Chapter VIII
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 deals with taxation. Section
114 provides for imposition of tax on land and buildings in Delhi.
Section 119 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act exempts lands and
buildings being properties of the Union from the property tax specified in
Section 114. Section 120 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act deals with
the incidence of property tax according to which the property tax shall be
primarily leviable on the lessor if the land or building is let, upon the
superior lessor if the land or building is sub-let and if the land or
building is un-let upon the person in whom the right to let-out the same
vests. The Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 was enacted for
restructuring the electricity industry, to increase the avenues for
participation of private sector of the electricity industry and generally
for taking measures conducive to the development and the management of the
electricity industry in an efficient, commercial, economic and competitive
manner in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The process of
unbundling of the Delhi Vidyut Board was dealt with in Sections 14 and 15
of the Act which are as follows:-
PART V
“REORGANISATION OF ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
14. Incorporation of companies for the purpose of generation, transmission
or distribution of electricity.
(1) The government may, as soon as may be after the commencement of this
Act, cause one or more companies to be incorporated and set up under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 for the purpose of generation,
transmission or distribution of electricity, including companies engaged in
more than one of the said activities, in the National Capital Territory of
Delhi and may transfer the existing generating stations or the transmission
system or distribution system, or any part of the transmission system or
distribution system, to such company or companies.
(2) The Government may designate any company set up under sub-section (1)
to be the principal company to undertake all planning and coordination in
regard to generation or transmission or both; and such company shall
undertake works connected with generation or transmission and determine the
requirements of the territory in consultation with the other companies
engaged in generation or transmission for the National Capital Territory of
Delhi, the Commission, the Regional Electricity Board and the Central
Electricity Authority and any other authority under any law in force for
the time being, or any other Government concerned.
(3) The companies incorporated and set up under sub-section (1) shall
undertake the functions specified in this section and such other functions
as may be assigned to them by the Government.
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the duties and functions
assigned to the companies incorporated and set up under sub-section (1),
other companies engaged in generation, transmission or distribution of
electricity, or more than one of the said activities, may be incorporated
and set up in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
(5) The Government may, in consultation with the Commission, determine the
lines that shall be treated as transmission or distribution lines for the
purpose of division of responsibilities between the companies incorporated
and set up under this section, having regard to the voltage levels of such
lines and any other factor, which it may consider relevant.
(6) The Government may convert the companies set up under this Act to joint
venture companies through a process of disinvestment, in accordance with
the transfer scheme prepared under the provisions of this Act.
(7) Upon the transfer of all functions of the Board to corporate entities
in terms of this Part, the Government may appoint an administrator for the
purpose of finalisation of the accounts of the Board for all the pending
years till the date of such transfer and thereafter for winding up the
Board in such manner as the Government may direct.
15. Reorganization of Delhi Vidyut Board and transfer of properties,
functions and duties thereof.
(1) With effect from the date on which a transfer scheme prepared by the
Government to give effect to the objects and purposes of this Act, is
published or such further date as may be specified by the Government
(hereinafter referred to as “the effective date”), any property, interest
in property, rights and, liabilities which immediately before the effective
date belonged to the Board shall vest in the Government.
(2) The Government may transfer such property, interest in property, rights
and liabilities to any company or companies established under section 14
for the purpose in accordance with the transfer scheme prepared therefore.
(3) Such of the rights and power to be exercised by the Board under the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948), as the Government may, by
notification in the official Gazette, specify, shall be exercisable by a
company or companies established as the case may be, under section 14, for
the purpose of discharge of the functions and duties with which it is
entrusted.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or any other Act,
where:
(a) the transfer scheme involves the transfer of any property or rights to
any person or undertaking not wholly owned by the Government, the scheme
shall give effect to the transfer only after asset valuation;
(b) where any transaction of any description is effected in pursuance of a
transfer scheme, it shall be binding on all persons including third
parties, even if such persons have not consented to it.
(5) The Government may require any transmitting or distributing company
established under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14
(hereinafter referred to as "the transferor licensee") or any generating
company to draw up a transfer scheme to vest in a further licensee or
licensees (the "transferee licensee or licensees"), or any generating
company, any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities which
have been vested in the transferor licensee or generating company, as the
case may be, under this section and publish the same in the official
Gazette. The transfer scheme to be notified under this sub-section shall
have the same effect as a transfer scheme under sub-section (2).
(6) A transfer scheme may-
(a) provide for the formation of subsidiaries, joint venture companies or
other schemes of division, amalgamation, merger, reconstruction or
arrangements;
(b) define the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities to be
allocated-
(i) by specifying or describing the property, rights and liabilities in
question,
(ii) by referring to all the property, interest in property, rights and
liabilities comprised in a specified part of the transferor's under-taking,
or
(iii) partly in one way and partly in the other :
Provided that the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities
shall be subject to such further transfer as the Government may specify;
(c) provide that any rights or liabilities specified or described in the
scheme shall be enforceable by or against the transferor or the transferee;

(d) impose on any licensee an obligation to enter into such written
agreements with, or execute such other instruments in favour of any other
subsequent licensee as may be specified in the scheme;
(e) make such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as the
transferor licensee considers appropriate including provision specifying
the order in which any transfer or transaction is to be regarded as taking
effect;
(f) provide that the transfer shall be provisional subject to the
provisions of section 18.
(7) All debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all
matters and things done by, with or for the Board, or a company or
companies established as the case may be, under section 14 or generating
company or distribution company or companies before a transfer scheme
becomes effective shall, to the extent specified in the relevant transfer
scheme, be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or done by, with or
for the Government or the transferee and all suits or other legal
proceedings instituted by or against the Board or transferor, as the case
may be, continued or instituted by or against the Government or concerned
transferee, as the case may be.
(8) In the event a licensee is required to vest any part of its
undertakings in another licensee pursuant to sub-section (5), the
Government shall amend the transferee licence in accordance with section 24
or revoke its licence in accordance with section 23.
(9) The Board shall cease to exist with the transfer of functions and
duties specified and with the transfer of assets as on the effective date.
(10) The exercise by a licensee of any of Board’s rights and powers may be
made on such conditions as shall be specified in the transfer scheme
including a condition that such rights and powers shall be exercised by the
licensee only with the approval of the Commission/Government”.

5. The Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 were
notified on 20.11.2001 and were given effect from 01.07.2002. As per Rule
3 all the assets of the Delhi Vidyut Board stood transferred and vested in
the Government absolutely. Rule 4 classified the undertakings. In this
case, we are concerned with the distribution undertakings as set out in
Schedule ‘F’ thereof and the holding company as set out in Schedule ‘G’.
The assets set out in Schedule ‘F’ stood transferred and vested in DISCOM-3
and the assets and liabilities set out in Schedule ‘G’ stood transferred to
the Holding Company. Sub-rule 5 of Rule 5 provides that the distribution
companies shall issue shares and instruments in favour of the holding
company as specified in Schedules A to F, in consideration of the vesting
of the undertakings. Rule 9 postulates that the classification and
transfer of the undertakings, unless otherwise specified in any other order
made by the Government shall be provisional and shall become final upon the
expiry of three months from the date of transfer. According to Rule 12
(1) if any doubt, dispute, difference or issue arises in regard to transfer
under the said Rules, the decision of the Government shall be final and
binding on all the parties.
6. Schedule F of the Rules deals with the assets and liabilities and
proceedings concerning distribution and their transfer. There is a proviso
to items I, II and III of part I of Schedule ‘F’ which is as follows:-
“PROVIDED THAT notwithstanding I, II and III above and that the land was
being used immediately before date of the transfer exclusively or primarily
for the business of the transferee, no part of the land shall form part of
the assets transferred under these rules. The transferee shall be entitled
to use such land as a licensee of the government on payment of a
consolidated amount of one rupee only per month during the period the
transferee has the sanction or licence or authorization to undertake the
transmission business. As and when such licence or sanction or
authorization is revoked or cancelled or not renewed or the area of supply
where the land is situated is withdrawn from the transferee, the licence to
the transferee in respect of such land shall cancelled’’.

Schedule ‘G’ gives details of the assets and liabilities transferred to the
holding company which includes land and land rights.
7. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Senior Advocate, Ms. Madhu Tewatia and Ms. Avanish
Ahlawat, Advocates appeared and made their submissions on behalf of the
Distribution Company, the Corporation and the Government respectively.
8. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, submitted that the Government continues to be the
owner of the land in question and hence there is an exemption from payment
of property tax as per Section 119 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,
1957. It is his further submission that, in any event, the Distribution
Company is a licensee under the Government as per the Delhi Electricity
Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 and hence it does not fall within the
preview of Section 120 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. He
also submitted that the Government of NCT of Delhi has taken a categoric
stand that the land belongs to the Government. He relied upon the Cabinet
decision dated 06.01.2001 and other clarifications issued by the Government
in this regard. Mr. Mehta relied upon Rule 12 (1) of the Delhi Electricity
Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 to contend that the opinion of the
Government regarding the ownership of the land is final and binding. Mr.
Mehta also submitted that the Division Bench committed an error in
remanding the matter back to the Authority after recording the finding that
Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd. is only a licensee.
9. Ms. Madhu Tewatia, Advocate appearing for the Corporation submitted
that the land belongs to Delhi Power Company Ltd. which is the holding
company in accordance with Schedule G of the Transfer Scheme Rules. She
further submitted that Rule 120 (1) (c) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957 would be clearly applicable to the facts of the instant case as
the Distribution Company has the right to let out the land in dispute.
This liability to pay the property tax under Section 120 (1) (c) is
irrespective of the fact that the land belongs to the Government or to the
holding company i.e. Delhi Power Company Ltd. Ms. Tewatia contended that
the clarifications issued by the Government and the Cabinet decision relied
upon by the Distribution Company would not fall within the preview of Rule
12(1) of the Transfer Scheme Rules. She contended that the findings
recorded by the Division Bench to the effect that the Distribution Company
is a licensee and that the licence relating to land alone would be a
decisive factor to determine ownership without reference to the
distribution licence are not correct.
10. Ms. Avanish Ahlawat, Advocate, appearing for the Government submitted
that the Government is the owner of the land, there is no transfer of land
to the holding company and that the entry land and land rights as found in
Schedule G should not be given too much importance and has to be read in
conjunction with the other provisions of Schedule F and the other Rules.
11. We have carefully considered the submissions made and examined the
material on record. The first point that falls for our consideration is
exigibility of tax over the land of 8,080 sq. meters. Section 119 of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act exempts the properties of the Union from
taxation. We entertained a doubt about the properties of Union Territories
being treated as properties of the Union. The administration of Union
Territories is by the Central Government but that does not mean that Union
Territories become merged with the Central Government. They are centrally
administered but retain their independent entity. [See: Satyadev Bhushari
Vs. Padam Dev & Ors. (1955) 1 SCR 549; Government of NCT Delhi and ors. Vs.
All India Central Civil Accounts, JAO’s Association and ors. (2002) 1 SCC
344; Chandigarh Administration and Anr. Vs. Surinder Kumar and Ors (2004) 1
SCC 530]. But, we refrain from adjudicating this issue as constitutional
questions are not decided unless they directly arise for consideration.
12. Dismal performance of the Electricity Boards led to a decision of
unbundling generation, transmission and distribution activities which were
separated for increasing efficiency. Private participation in the
Electricity industry was also envisaged. Broadly understood, the scheme
contemplated by the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act and the Rules framed
therein is that the assets of the erstwhile Delhi Vidyut Board initially
stood transferred and vested absolutely in the Government. The
undertakings were transferred to generation, transmission and distribution
companies. The shares of these companies were allotted to the Holding
Company which is Delhi Power Company Ltd. which is a wholly owned
Government company. Land and land rights also were transferred to the
Holding Company. Thereafter the process of privatization takes place by
divesting shares in the distribution companies. It is clear that the
transfer of all the assets including land to the Government is a transitory
step as the Holding Company is to be in total control. In the above
background, the question is whether the land belongs to the Government and
exempt from tax. No doubt, all the assets of Delhi Vidyut Board stood
transferred and vested in the Government. It is also clear that the
distribution undertaking with assets mentioned in Items I, II & III of Part
I of Schedule F were transferred to the Distribution Company. The proviso
to Items I, II & III of Part I of Schedule F to the Transfer Scheme Rules
contemplates that land which was exclusively and primarily being used for
business purpose by the transferee before the transfer does not form part
of the assets transferred and the transferee would be a licnesee of the
Government for the said land on payment of a nominal amount. Schedule ‘G’
deals with transfer in favour of the Holding Company and land and land
rights is one of the entities therein. Mr. Mehta submits that the transfer
of assets and liabilities are dealt with in Schedule F and it is clear from
the said Schedule that the Distribution Company is a licensee of the
Government. He further submitted that Government continues to be the owner
of land and the entry land and land rights is vague and has to be ignored
as it is not applicable to the land already covered by Schedule F.
Whereas, the case of the Corporation is that there is no ambiguity in
Schedule G. Land was transferred to the Holding Company and Section 119 of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act is not applicable. The High Court held
that the initial transfer and vesting of land is in the Government, then
Distribution Company becomes licensee of the Government qua land and
finally there is a transfer of land to the Holding Company. In view of the
fact that Government was not to hold any asset and the vesting of land in
the Government was only transitory in nature, we uphold the findings of the
High Court that Holding Company is the owner of land.
13. We proceed to deal with the point as to whether there is any
contradiction in Schedule ‘F’ and ‘G’ pertaining to the ownership of land.
We see no conflict in the two Schedules. The proviso to items I to III in
Part I of Schedule ‘F’ refers to land which was exclusively and primarily
being used for the purpose of business by the transferee on the date of
transfer not forming part of the assets transferred to Distribution
Company. Such land would be subject matter of a licensee by the Government
in favour of the transferee. Only such land which satisfies the condition
as stated above will be treated as licensed to transferee. All other lands
would be part of land transferred to the Holding Company as contemplated in
Schedule ‘G’. Hence, we see no conflict in the Schedules.
14. Another issue connected to the ownership of the land is the stand of
the Government that the land continues to be vested in the Government.
Reference was made to the Cabinet decision dated 06.01.2001. M/s SBI
Capital Market Limited (referred to as ‘SBI Caps’ hereinafter) was
appointed by Delhi Vidyut Board for restructuring of the Board. A report
was submitted by the SBI Caps by which they recommended that the land in
possession of Delhi Vidyut Board which were earmarked for the purpose of
electricity generation, transmission and distribution cannot be used for
any other purpose without bringing about a change in land use by the
Competent Authority. The SBI Caps further recommended that the ownership
of the land should be retained by the State Government and land should be
provided on licence to the successor entities. This recommendation made by
the Consultant i.e. SBI Caps was approved in the Cabinet decision on
06.01.2001. Apart from the said Cabinet decision, we were also shown some
material which indicated that the Government was maintaining its stand that
the land belongs to them. As we have interpreted the provisions of the
Act, Rules and the Transfer Scheme to conclude that the land transferred
and vested in the Holding Company, the Cabinet decision dated 06.01.2001
which was much prior to the Statutory Scheme cannot be taken into
consideration to reach a different conclusion.
15. Another issue that calls for consideration is relating to the scope
of Rule 12 (1) of the Transfer Scheme Rules. Rule 12(1) of the Rules reads
as under:-
“Decision of Government final:- (1) If any doubt, dispute, difference
or issue shall arise in regard to the transfers under these rules, subject
to the provisions of the Act, the decision of the Government thereon, shall
be final and binding on all parties.”

The stand of the Government that the land continues to vest in
it would not amount to a decision by the Government in resolving a dispute
between the parties to the Transfer Scheme. Rule 12(1) will not be
applicable in the instant case as the interpretation of the provisions of
the statute and the rules is involved in adjudication of the dispute.
16. A similar provision fell for consideration before this Court in
Municipal Commissioner of Dum Dum and Ors. Vs. Indian Tourism Corporation
and ors., reported in (1995) 5 SCC 251. The issue in that case was
whether the properties vested in the International Airport Authority of
India could be called as properties of the Union, within the meaning of
Article 285 of the Constitution of India and exempted from tax. The
Government of India asserted that the properties of the Authority are the
properties of the Union and reliance was placed on certain letters of the
Government for the above assertion. Section 12(3) of the International
Airport Authority of India Act, 1971 provided that decision of the Central
Government shall be final, if any dispute or doubt arises, as to which of
the properties, rights or liabilities of the Central Government have been
transferred to the Authority. Interpreting the said provision, this Court
held that a dispute under Section 12(3) should be between the Union of
India and the Authority. It was also held that the decision would not bind
the Municipal Corporation. In addition to the points mentioned above, Ms.
Madhu Tewatia submitted that there was no opportunity given to the
Municipal Corporation by the Government before taking such stand. In view
of the above discussion, we uphold the findings recorded by the Division
Bench in the impugned judgment that the Government is not the owner of the
land.
17. Having answered the point about the exigibility of tax, the point
which remains to be decided is the incidence of tax. Section 120(1) of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act reads as follows:-
“120. Incidence of property taxes
(1) The property taxes shall be primarily leviable as follows:—
(a) if the land or building is let, upon the lessor;
(b) if the land or building is sub-let, upon the superior lessor;
(c) if the land or building is unlet, upon the person in whom the right to
let the same vests:
Provided that the property taxes in respect of land or building, being
property of the Union, possession of which has been delivered in pursuance
of section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act, 1954 (44 of 1954), shall be primarily leviable upon the transferee.”

18. The High Court remanded the matter back to the Deputy Assessor and
Collector of Municipal Corporation of Delhi for determination as to whether
the Distribution Company or the Holding Company i.e. Delhi Power Company
Ltd. is liable to pay the property tax. The High Court also said that
Holding Company was not a party to the case and in view of the findings
recorded in the judgment that the Holding Company is the owner of the land,
the matter has to be decided by the Assessing Authority after giving an
opportunity to the Holding Company.
19. According to Section 120 (1) (c), the person who has a right to let
would be liable to pay tax for un-let land. Admittedly, this land is un-
let. Incidence of tax has to be decided by the Authority after taking into
consideration the provisions of the Act, rules and the licences, including
the distribution licence. The High Court held that the licence pertaining
to land as per the Transfer Scheme would show that the Distribution Company
is only a licensee and not a lessee. The High Court further held that the
distribution licence under Section 20 of the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act,
2000 is distinct and separate from the licence for land. It was further
held by the High Court that the distribution licence can neither govern nor
be used as a tool to interpret the licence for land. We do not agree with
the said findings of the High Court. Section 120 (1) (c) contemplates that
a person who has the right to let out un-let land is liable to pay tax.
His status as a lessor or licensee is irrelevant. If the distribution
licence empowers the Distribution Company to let out the land,
notwithstanding the fact that the Distribution Company is a licensee as per
Schedule ‘F’ of the Transfer Scheme Rules, it would still have to pay the
tax. For the reasons afore-stated, we confirm the order of remand passed
by the High Court in the impugned judgment with a direction to the Deputy
Assessor and Collector of Municipal Corporation of Delhi to consider the
provisions of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, Delhi Electricity Reforms
Act, Transfer Scheme Rules and the Distribution licence issued under
Section 20 of the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act for deciding the matter
pertaining to the incidence of tax.
The appeals are disposed of in terms of the above directions.
................................J.
[ANIL R. DAVE]

................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]

New Delhi;
August 10, 2016

While there can be no manner of doubt that in the present case compensation under Section 17(3A) was paid (on 18th April, 2006) after the date of taking over of possession (on 17th March, 2006), time and again, it has been held by this Court that the said fact by itself would not invalidate the acquisition.=So far as the taking over of possession without notice is concerned, we do not find the said ground to be substantiated by the records placed before the Court in I.A. No.17. Notice to handover possession was issued on 10th March, 2006 and report of service of such notice(s) was submitted to the concerned authority on 16th March, 2006. Thereafter, possession was taken on 17th March, 2006. From the Possession Certificates, which are also on record, we do not find the contention of the land-owners that taking over of such possession was symbolic to be substantiated in any manner. Consequently, the reliance placed on the decision of this Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana and others[5] is not of any consequence. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the High Court that the impugned acquisition suffers from any fundamental flaw or illegality which would require the same to be struck down as has been done by the High Court in Writ Petition No.196 of 2006 (impugned in Civil Appeal No.6900/2009). Consequently, we allow the appeal filed by the State, namely, Civil Appeal No.6900 of 2009 and set aside the order of the High Court dated 1st March, 2007 passed in Writ Petition No.196 of 2006. The natural corollary of above would be to dismiss Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009 which we hereby do. As we have expressed no opinion on the entitlement of the any of the parties to apportionment of the compensation no order will be called for in this regard except that compensation for the acquisition will now be determined in accordance with the provisions of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6900 OF 2009

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. ..APPELLANTS

VERSUS

RAJIV BERRY & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6901 OF 2009

SHASHANK SHARMA ..APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARANCHAL & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

The Civil Appeals arise out of two separate orders passed by the High
Court of Uttarakhand in the matter of acquisition of land for the purpose
of expansion of the Uttaranchal Secretariat. While Civil Appeal No.6901 of
2009 arises out of the judgment and order dated 23rd December, 2005 of the
High Court dismissing the challenge to the acquisition made by the
appellant land-owner on grounds to be noticed herein below, Civil Appeal
No.6900 of 2009 arises out of another judgment and order dated 1st March,
2007 by which the impugned acquisition has been interfered with by the High
Court.
2. A brief conspectus of the relevant facts may now be set out.
By notification dated 4th May, 2004 issued under Section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the L.A.
Act") the land mentioned in the schedule thereto was notified for
acquisition for the purpose of expansion of secretariat on both sides
(North/South) of the existing secretariat in Dehradun. By means of the
aforesaid notification the urgency clause under Section 17(1) of the L.A.
Act was invoked and furthermore enquiry under Section 5A of the L.A. Act
was dispensed with in exercise of power under Section 17(4) of the L.A.
Act. The acquisition was subjected to a challenge before the High Court of
Uttarakhand in Writ Petition No.469 of 2004 which was disposed of by the
order of High Court dated 30th October, 2004 in the following
term:

"In these three writ petitions, particularly in writ petition No.469 of
2004 (M/B) 874 of 2004 (M/B) the notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act has been challenged. So also challenge is to the
notification under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act by applying
the urgency clause. In writ Petition No.840 of 2004 (M/B) there is a common
challenge to the notification which provides for the acquisition of the
land for extension of the Secretariat as also for the expansion of the
road. These notifications are different.

Mr. Sudhanshu Dhulia, Senior Advocate, in his usual fairness has shown
readiness to hear the petitioners or as the case may be the persons
interested. Instead of going ahead with the urgency clause and more
particularly dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. In view of the
statement made, Mr. Naithani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioners withdraws the writ petitions, so far as challenge to the
notification dated 5.5.2004 is concerned.

In view of the urgency felt, we feel that it will be better for us to
fix the programme. Public notice shall, therefore, be given within seven
days from today inviting the objections. The concerned Land Acquisition
Officer, who is to hear the objection, shall hear them within fifteen days.
All the objections shall be filed before the Land Acquisition and the Land
Acquisition Officer shall dispose of the matter one way or the other after
giving full opportunity of hearing, etc. by December, 2004 or as the case
may be earlier thereto.

With this, we dispose of the Writ Petition No.469 of 2004.”

Consequent to the aforesaid order of the Court all the land-owners who were
affected by the acquisition notification submitted their objections which
were heard by the Special Land Acquisition Officer/Collector. Insofar as
the appellant in Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009 is concerned, it appears that
the aforesaid appellant had filed his objections after the expiry of the
time stipulated by the High Court in the aforesaid order dated 30th
October, 2004. Despite the same his objections were considered on merits
and as the same pertained to the quantum of compensation to be awarded the
same were left open for consideration at an appropriate stage. The writ
petition filed by the appellant land-owners was dismissed by the High
Court.

Insofar as the other land-owners are concerned, the objections under
Section 5A of the L.A. Act appear to have been rejected on merit.
Thereafter on 14th March, 2005 the declaration under Section 6 of the L.A.
Act was issued. Notice to handover possession was issued to the land-owners
on 10th March, 2006 and report of service of the said notice(s) was
submitted to the concerned authority on 16th March, 2006. Thereafter the
possession of the land was taken on 17th March, 2006. The said
possession was taken in exercise of powers under Section 17(1) of the L.A.
Act which provision had already been invoked by the Notification dated 5th
May, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act. Compensation, as required under
Section 17(3A) i.e. 80% was, however, deposited in Court on 18th April,
2006. No award could be passed as in the meantime Writ Petition No.196 of
2006 (out of which Civil Appeal No.6900/2009 has arisen) was instituted and
interim orders were passed therein. The said writ petition, as already
mentioned, was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 1st March,
2007 by which the acquisition in question was set aside by the High Court.
It is in these circumstances that the State of Uttarakhand has filed Civil
Appeal No.6900 of 2009 challenging the judgment and order of the High
Court. Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009, as already noticed, has been filed by
an individual land-owner by which his challenge to the same acquisition was
negatived by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 23rd
December, 2005 in Writ Petition No.393 of 2005 on the grounds mentioned
herein above.

We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6900 OF 2009 -

6. A perusal of the order of the High Court would go to show that
the principal basis on which the High Court thought it proper to strike
down the acquisition in question is that the records and material laid
before it by the State did not disclose due and satisfactory consideration,
by the State Government, of the report of the Collector submitted after
holding of the enquiry under Section 5A of the L.A. Act. Such consideration
by the State Government being a mandatory requirement under Section
6, before publication of the declaration contemplated thereunder, the High
Court found fault with the notification/ declaration issued under Section 6
of the L.A. Act. The High Court further held that with the striking down of
the Section 6 declaration/notification it will become impossible to meet
another statutory requirement, namely, publication of the Section 6
declaration/notification within a period of one year of the publication of
the notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Hence the notification under
Section 4 was also interfered with/set aside by the High Court.
7. To demonstrate that the basis of the High Court’s order in
striking down the acquisition is apparently wrong and unacceptable Ms.
Rachana Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant State in Civil Appeal
No.6900 of 2009 who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009, has
placed before the Court the record in original pertaining to the decision
taken by the State Government on the report of the Collector submitted
after completion of the enquiry under Section 5A of the L.A. Act. In fact
the said record was specifically called for by this Court by its order
dated 27th July, 2016,

8. Shri M.L. Varma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in
C.A.No.6900 of 2009 and Dr. Abhishek Atrey, learned counsel for the
appellant in Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009 have very elaborately taken the
Court through the orders of the High Court and the materials laid before
the High Court in the course of the adjudication of the writ proceeding in
question. It is contended that the Office Memorandum dated 15th April,
2006 under the signature of the Secretary, Public Works Department,
Government of Uttarakhand, which was issued in connection with the instant
subject matter, goes to show that the consideration and approval of the
Government under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was rendered on the said date
i.e. 15th April, 2006 which is well after the date of the
notification/declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act. The said fact,
according to the learned counsels, has been admitted in the counter
affidavit of the State before the High Court.
9. It is further contended by the learned counsels for the land-
owners that for the first time before this Court some records had been
placed by means of an I.A. (I.A. No.6) to show that it is on 14th March,
2005 that the approval of the Government to the report of the Collector was
accorded. However in the said record the Authority who had taken the
decision is not mentioned. The said defect is sought to be rectified by
placing the same document showing the name of the Departmental Secretary by
means of another I.A. (I.A. No.8). According to the learned counsel, the
said facts should not inspire the confidence of the Court in veracity of
the record produced. Furthermore, according to the learned counsel, the
fact that alleged approval to the report of the collector and the Section 6
notification is of the same day i.e. 14th March, 2005 is another
significant fact that the Court must consider in adjudging the
acceptability of the stand taken.

10. It has also been submitted by the learned counsels that Shri Sandhu
was not duly authorized to consider the report of the Collector and to
approve the same. Under Section 6 of the L.A. Act the report was required
to be considered and satisfaction arrived at by the State Government. There
is no mention that the consideration of the report and the approval thereto
by Shri Sandhu was in the name of the Governor as required under
Article 166 of the Constitution of India.

11. Additionally, it has been contended on behalf of the land owners that
the urgency clause invoked in the notification under Section 4 of the L.A.
Act having been subsequently waived and the objections of the land-owners
having been heard, the State could not have, once again, reverted to invoke
the provisions of Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act. Possession of the land
prior to the passing of the Award could not have been taken and that too by
payment of 80% of the estimated compensation at a point of time subsequent
to the taking over of possession. In this regard, it has also been
contended that taking over of possession of the land on 17th March, 2016
was without adequate notice and furthermore that the possession taken over
was only symbolic/paper possession. It has also been contended on behalf
of the land-owners that the land is lying unutilized till date and, in
fact, in a recent meeting of the Government convened by the Chief Secretary
of the State it was expressed that the impugned acquisition need not be
proceeded with any further.

12. We have perused the records in original placed before us by the
appellant-State. The note-sheets contained in I.A. Nos.6-7 and I.A. Nos.8-9
are translated copies of the relevant portions of the decision making
process contained in the said Original Records. Having perused the said
records we find no difficulty in accepting the same and in holding that the
contents thereof reflect a true and correct account of the manner in which
the decision had been arrived at. The decision to approve the report of
the Collector was taken on 14th March, 2005 by one Shri S.S.Sandhu who was,
at that time, the Departmental Secretary (P.W.D. Secretary). The detailed
note-sheet would go to show a consideration of the grounds urged by the
land-owners and the reasons for the rejection of the said objections
raised. The decision making process involved a multi-tier process
culminating in the final decision of Shri Sandhu, the Departmental
Secretary. If the above is what is disclosed by a consideration of the
records in-original, we do not see how any fault can be found in the manner
in which the decision has been arrived. Looking into the reasons cited we
do not find any infirmity in the merits of the decision either. The fact
that the final order in the file was passed by the Departmental Secretary
on 14th March, 2005 on which very date the declaration/notification under
Section 6 of the L.A. Act was also issued cannot lead the Court to any
adverse conclusion so as to invalidate either the decision taken or the
notification issued. Insofar as the jurisdiction of the Departmental
Secretary to take the decision in question is concerned, all that is
required to be noticed is that under the Rules of executive business it
cannot be denied that Shri Sandhu as the Departmental Secretary (P.W.D.)
would be competent to take a decision on behalf of the State. When a
decision is taken in the file, the same obviously would not be in the name
of the Governor. However, in the formal notification dated 14th March, 2005
the above decision is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor of
the State. In such a situation, the Court will find no fault with the
notification/declaration dated 14th March, 2005 on the ground that it is
contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of Article 166 of the
Constitution of India.

13. The above facts coupled with the text of the Notification dated 15th
April, 2006 would make it clear that the said Notification does not detract
from the above position as has been sought to be contended on behalf of the
land-owners. The contents of the State’s affidavit before the High Court,
in the light of what is disclosed by the original records, would not be
determinative of the issue.

14. There can be no doubt that the statute under which the
acquisition was made is an expropriatory legislation and, therefore, must
be strictly construed. This has been the consistent view of this Court.
Illustratively we may refer to Essco Fabs Private Limited and another vs.
State of Haryana and another[1]. In the instant case in the Notification
dated 5th May, 2004 under Section 4 of the L.A. Act the provisions of
Sections 17(1) and 17(4) were invoked. Objections of the land-owners under
Section 5A were dispensed with. The said position was subsequently altered
and objections were allowed to be filed and all such objections were
considered by the Collector. Thereafter the report of the Collector was
duly considered by the State Government and the Notification under Section
6 was issued. The objections of the land- owners in this regard have not
been found acceptable by us for reasons indicated above.

15. In the light of the above, the alternative/additional contention
advanced on behalf of the land-owners may now be considered. It is urged
that the provisions of Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act having been initially
invoked but subsequently abandoned and objections having been allowed to
be filed, the State cannot turn back and take possession of the land under
Section 17(1) of the Act.

16. Sections 17(1) and Section 17(2) vest power and jurisdiction in the
State to take possession of the land even prior to the passing of the
award. Section 17(4) enables the State to take such possession even by
dispensing with the requirement of the opportunity contemplated under
Section 5A of the Act. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) on the one hand and
Section 17(4) operates in two different fields. It is extent of urgency or
emergency that would determine the application of the respective
clauses/sub-sections of Section 17 of the L.A. Act. In other words, even
though the urgency clause under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) may be
invoked in a given case, the opportunity of filing objections under Section
5A of the L.A. Act need not be dispensed with and can still be afforded.
However, if the provisions of Section 17(4) are invoked, the State would
be empowered to dispense with the requirement of affording opportunity
under Section 5A and take possession prior to making of the award. The
dispensation of the opportunity contemplated by Section 5A by invoking
Section 17(4) is not an invariable consequence of the invocation of
Sections 17(1) or (2). This is what has been held in Nageshwar Prasad and
others vs. U.P. Government and others etc.[2]; Union of India and others
vs. Mukesh Hans[3] and Essco Fabs Private Limited and another vs. State of
Haryana and another (supra).

17. What has happened in the present case is that even though the
State had departed from its initial stand of invoking Section 17(4) of the
Act and had given to the land-owners the opportunity contemplated by
Section 5A, it had taken possession of the land prior to the passing of the
award by invoking the provisions of Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act. It has
already been elucidated in details why it was permissible for the state to
do so.
18. While there can be no manner of doubt that in the present case
compensation under Section 17(3A) was paid (on 18th April, 2006) after the
date of taking over of possession (on 17th March, 2006), time and again, it
has been held by this Court that the said fact by itself would not
invalidate the acquisition. Reference to Tika Ram and others vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others[4] will suffice. Several earlier decisions of this
Court on the above issue have been referred to in paragraph 95 of the
report in Tika Ram (supra), details of which need not be repeated herein.

19. So far as the taking over of possession without notice is concerned,
we do not find the said ground to be substantiated by the records placed
before the Court in I.A. No.17. Notice to handover possession was issued on
10th March, 2006 and report of service of such notice(s) was submitted to
the concerned authority on 16th March, 2006. Thereafter, possession was
taken on 17th March, 2006. From the Possession Certificates, which are also
on record, we do not find the contention of the land-owners that taking
over of such possession was symbolic to be substantiated in any manner.
Consequently, the reliance placed on the decision of this Court in Raghbir
Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana and others[5] is not of any
consequence.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot agree with the conclusion
of the High Court that the impugned acquisition suffers from any
fundamental flaw or illegality which would require the same to be struck
down as has been done by the High Court in Writ Petition No.196 of 2006
(impugned in Civil Appeal No.6900/2009). Consequently, we allow the appeal
filed by the State, namely, Civil Appeal No.6900 of 2009 and set aside the
order of the High Court dated 1st March, 2007 passed in Writ Petition
No.196 of 2006. The natural corollary of above would be to dismiss Civil
Appeal No.6901 of 2009 which we hereby do.

21. As we have expressed no opinion on the entitlement of the any
of the parties to apportionment of the compensation no order will be called
for in this regard except that compensation for the acquisition will now be
determined in accordance with the provisions of The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013.

22. The appeals as also all the pending applications including the
contempt petition are disposed of in the above terms.

.................
[RANJAN GOGOI, J]

....................
[PRAFULLA C. PANT,J]

PLACE : NEW DELHI
DATED : 10th AUGUST, 2016.

-----------------------
[1] (2009) 2 SCC 377
[2] [AIR 1964 SC 1217]
[3] [(2004) 8 SCC 14]
[4] (2009) 10 SCC 689
[5] (2012) 1 SCC 792

The CBI filed several charge sheets, including a charge sheet in respect of offences not covered by the PC Act in the case of Dr. Vijai Tripathi (appellant in SLP (Crl.) No.1418 of 2016) and others. Since the Special Judge declined to entertain the said charge sheet, on application of the CBI, the High Court held that the Special Judge was to deal with “all cases relating to the scam”, even though the offences were not under the PC Act.[1] = The public servant was no more and the trial had not commenced. In view of the relied upon judgment in absence of PC Act charge, the appellants may not be liable to be tried before the Special Judge. However, we find two difficulties in accepting the submission of Shri Singh as follows: As observed by the High Court, the charge is yet to be framed and the framing of charge under the PC Act from the material placed on record was not ruled out. Thus, the argument at this stage is pre-mature; and The Special Judge was authorized not only to deal with the cases under the PC Act as was the position in the case before this Court in Jitender Kumar Singh (supra) but also for other offences. This course was permissible in view of law laid down by this Court in M/s. Essar Teleholdings Limited (supra). In the present case, the Special Court in question has been constituted not only to deal with the cases of PC Act but also other cases relating to the NRHM scam. Procedure of Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable to trial before Special Judge and there is no prejudice to trial that is taking place before Special Judge duly appointed to deal with non PC cases when the object of doing so was to try connected cases before same court. Undoubtedly, while Special Judge alone could deal with cases under the PC Act, non- PC Act could also be allowed to be tried by the Special Judge under Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no legal bar to do so, as held by this Court in M/s. Essar Teleholdings Limited (supra).

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
criminal APPELLATE JURISDICTION

criminal APPEAL NO. 751 OF 2016
(arising out of S.l.p. (crl.) no. 4338 of 2015)

M/s. hcl infosystem ltd. …APPELLANT

VERSUS

central bureau of investigation ...RESPONDENT

w i t h

criminal APPEAL NO. 752 OF 2016
(arising out of S.l.p. (crl.) no.1418 of 2016)

Dr. Vijai tripathi …APPELLANT

VERSUS

central bureau of investigation
and another ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted. These appeals have been preferred against the
orders of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 1st May, 2015 and
22nd January, 2016 in APP No. 6623 of 2015 and Application u/s
482/378/407 No. 3823 of 2014 respectively.
2. The question for consideration relates to the jurisdiction of
the Special Judge appointed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(the “PC Act”) to try a person other than a public servant if the public
servant dies before the commencement of the trial. Further question is
whether the Special Judge can try a non PC Act case when his appointment is
to try all cases of the category which covers the present case.

3. The Central Bureau of Investigation (the “CBI”) conducted
investigation in what is known as “National Rural Health Mission Scam”
(“NHRM Scam”). According to the said investigation, NRHM funds to the tune
of Rs. 9,000 crores, which were allocated to the State of Uttar Pradesh for
the period 2005-2006 by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government
of India, were diverted and allegedly misappropriated on a large scale.
The CBI enquiry was ordered by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court on 15th
November, 2011. It also came to light that two Chief Medical Officers were
shot dead as a result of the said scam. One Deputy Chief Medical Officer
was arrested by the local police, but he was found dead in jail on 22nd
June, 2011. One Sunil Verma, who was named as one of the accused,
allegedly committed suicide on 23rd January, 2012. One Mahender Kumar
Sharma, who was a clerk in the office of Chief Medical Officer, Lakhimpur
Kheri was found murdered on 15th February, 2012. The CBI conducted
searches of more than 150 places across the State and arrested a number of
accused persons suspected to be involved in the embezzlement of NHRM funds.

4. A single court was designated as the trial court to facilitate
the progress of the trial vide order of the Chief Justice of the High Court
dated 16th May, 2012. Vide order of the State Government dated 28th
August, 2012 the said notification designated the Special Judge, CBI,
Ghaziabad for dealing with “NRHM scam matters” for whole of the Uttar
Pradesh State and was in addition to notification dated 10th March, 2011
issued earlier for appointment of Special Judge for trial of offences under
Section 3(1) of the PC Act.

5. The two notifications are as follows :

“ Notification
Miscellaneous
No.U.O.-24/6-P-9-2011-167G/09TC-Nyaya-2
Lucknow : dated March 10, 2011

In exercise of the powers under sub-section (1) of section 3 and
sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act
No. 49 of 1988) read with section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act
no.X of 1897) and in supersession of all other notifications issued in this
behalf, the Governor is pleased to appoint from the date of his taking over
charge the Additional District Judge mentioned in Column 2 of the Scheduled
below, as Special Judge for the areas mentioned in Column 4 for trial for
such offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the aforesaid
Act no.49 of 1988 in which hereinafter charge sheet are filed in his court
by Special Police Establishment of the Government of India and to direct
that such other cases arising within the said areas, in which charge sheets
have already been filed before any other Special Judge appointed under the
said Act and also such other cases arising within the said area relating to
the said Special Police Establishment which are pending before such Special
Judge, shall also be tried and disposed off by him and his court shall be
designated as specified in column-3 of said Schedule with headquarters at
Ghaziabad.

Schedule

|Sl.|Name of the Judge |Name of the |Areas of |
|No.| |Court |Jurisdiction |
| | | |(District) |
|1 |2 |3 |4 |
|1 |Shri Shyam Lal-II, |Special |G.B. Nagar, Meerut,|
| |Additional District|Court, Anti |Aligarh, Rampur, |
| |and Sessions Judge,|Corruption, |Mainpuri, |
| |Ghaziabad |CBI, |Firozabad. |
| | |Ghaziabad | |
|2 |Dr. Ashok Kumar |Special |Ghaziabad, |
| |Singh-IV, Special |Court |Moradabad, |
| |Judge Anti |C.B.I., |Bulandshahar, |
| |Corruption C.B.I., |Court No.1, |Bijnor, Hathras |
| |Ghaziabad |Ghaziabad | |
|3 |Sri M.S. Wadhwa, |Special |Saharanpur, Agra, |
| |Additional District|Court |Muzaffarnagar, J.P.|
| |and Sessions Judge,|C.B.I., |Nagar, Etah, |
| |Muzaffarnagar |Court No.2, |Baghpat, Mathura. |
| | |Ghaziabad | |

By order
Deepak Kumar
Secretary

Government of Uttar Pradesh
Home (Police) Section-9
No. U.O.49/Six-P-12-167 G/09 T.C. Justice-2
Lucknow, Dated: 28th August, 2012

Exercising the powers conferred under section 2 of General Clauses Act,
1897 (Act No.10 of 1897) read with sub-section (1) of section 73 and sub-
section (2) of section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act No.49
of 1988) and besides Notification No.U.O.24/Six-P-9-2011-167G/09 T.C. –
Justice-2, dated 10th March, 2011 issued for this purpose, the Governor do
hereby appoint Sri Shyam Lal–Second. Special Judge, Anti
Corruption, CBI, Ghaziabad, for disposing of National Rural Health Mission
(NRHM) Scam matters of whole of Uttar Pradesh, besides the matters
mentioned in previous Notification, with immediate effect.
By the order
Kamal Saxena
Secretary ”
(emphasis added)

6. The CBI filed several charge sheets, including a charge sheet
in respect of offences not covered by the PC Act in the case of Dr. Vijai
Tripathi (appellant in SLP (Crl.) No.1418 of 2016) and others. Since the
Special Judge declined to entertain the said charge sheet, on application
of the CBI, the High Court held that the Special Judge was to deal with
“all cases relating to the scam”, even though the offences were not under
the PC Act.[1]
7. Vide notification dated 29th May, 2014 in place of Shri Shyam Lal-II,
Shri Atul Kumar Gupta was posted for CBI Court, Ghaziabad. He was to look
after all cases of NRHM as notified earlier, as the notification dated 28th
August, 2012 was not rescinded, even though. The notification dated 29th
May, 2014 was in supersession of all other notifications. This aspect, as
noted in the impugned judgment of the High Court, was clarified on the
administrative side of the High Court. Cases of the appellants are being
dealt with by the said court. Charge is yet to be framed.
8. The appellant in SLP (Crl.) No.4338 of 2015 is named as co-
accused inter alia for offence of conspiracy along with a public servant
who was charged under the PC Act. It approached the High Court with the
plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Special Judge to deal with the case
against it after the death of the public servant. The High Court repelled
the said contention and dismissed the petition. The High Court relied upon
the judgment of this Court in M/s. Essar Teleholdings Limited Vs. Registrar
General, Delhi High Court and Others[2] wherein it was held that the
Special Judge having been appointed to deal with “all 2G scam” cases, could
also deal with cases involving other offences under the PC Act. This is
clear from the following discussion in the judgment :
xxx
xxx

11. Subsequently, the CBI filed second supplementary charge sheet on
12.12.2011 against the Petitioner(s) and other accused persons for the
alleged commission of offences under Section 420/ 120-B Indian Penal Code.
No offences under the PC Act have been alleged against the Petitioner(s)
and other accused persons arraigned in the second supplementary charge
sheet. Based on the same, the learned Special Judge by impugned order dated
21.12.2011 was pleased to take cognizance of the second supplementary
charge sheet dated 12.12.2011 and the Petitioner(s) and others were
summoned.

12. According to the Petitioner(s), the CBI in its charge sheet dated
12.12.2011 admits that the charge sheet is being filed " regarding a
separate offence" under Section 420/ 120-B Indian Penal Code. In paragraphs
73 and 74 of the said charge sheet whilst admitting that the offences
alleged in the charge sheet are triable by a Magistrate, the CBI relying on
the notification dated 28.3.2011 requested the Special Judge to take
cognizance of the matter. Paragraphs 73 and 74 of the charge sheet read as
under:

73. This final report under Section 173(8) Code of Criminal Procedure is
being filed regarding a separate offence which came to notice during
investigation of the FIR No. RC DAI 2009 A 0045 (2G Spectrum Case), which
is pending before Hon'ble Special Judge (2G Spectrum Cases), Patiala House
Courts, New Delhi and a final report dated 02.04.2011 and supplementary
final report dated 25.04.2011 were earlier filed in the same FIR.

74. In terms of the Notification No. 6/05/2011-Judl./363-367 dated
28.03.2011 issued by Govt. of NCT of Delhi this Hon'ble Court has been
designated to undertake the trial of cases in relation to all matters
pertaining to 2G Scam exclusively in pursuance of the orders of the Supreme
Court, although offences alleged to have been committed by accused persons
sent up for trial are triable by the Magistrate of first class. It is,
therefore, prayed that cognizance of the aforesaid offences may be taken or
the final report may be endorsed to any other appropriate court as deemed
fit and thereafter process may be issued to the accused persons for their
appearance and to face the trial as per Law.

13. The learned Special Judge, thereafter, took cognizance vide impugned
order dated 21.12.2011. The relevant portion of the said impugned order
reads as under:

“2. Ld. Spl. PP further submits that the accused have been charged with the
commission of offence, which are triable, by the Court of Metropolitan
Magistrate. It is further submitted that this second supplementary charge
sheet also arises from the aforesaid RC bearing No.
DAI2009A0045/CBI/ACB/ND, titled as CBI v. A. Raja and Ors., arose and is
pending trial. He further submits that since this case also arises from the
same FIR, it is to be tried by this Court alone. He has further invited my
attention to an order dated 15.03.2011, passed by the Hon'ble High Court,
whereby the undersigned was nominated as Special Judge by the Hon'ble High
Court to exclusively try cases of 2G Scam.

3. Accordingly, the trial of this second supplementary charge sheet shall
be held in this Court. A copy of the order dated 15.03.2011 be placed on
the file.”

14. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner(s) assailed the impugned
Administrative Order passed by the Delhi High Court dated 15.3.2011 and the
Notification dated 28.3.2011 issued by the Government of NCT Delhi on the
following grounds:

14.1 The impugned notification travels beyond the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that offences
under the Indian Penal Code ought to be tried as per its provisions.

14.2 It has been held by this Hon'ble Court in the case of CBI v. Keshub
Mahindra that: (SCC p. 219, para 11)

“No decision by any court, this Court not excluded, can be read in a manner
as to nullify the express provisions of an Act or the Code..."

(emphasis in original)

Thus, the Administrative order and Notification are contrary to the well-
settled provisions of law and ought to be set aside in so far as they
confer jurisdiction on a Special Judge to take cognizance and hold trial of
matters not pertaining to PC Act offences.

14.3 If the offence of Section 420 Indian Penal Code, which ought to be
tried by a Magistrate, is to be tried by a Court of Sessions, a variety of
valuable rights of the Petitioner would be jeopardised. This would be
contrary to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, wherein it was
acknowledged that the right to appeal is a valuable right and the loss of
such a right is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

15.4 The Second Supplementary charge-sheet which makes out offences against
the present accused arises out of FIR No. RC DAI 2009 A 0045 registered by
the CBI on 21.10.2009, out of which the earlier charge-sheets have been
filed, and cognizance taken by the Special Court. An anomalous situation
would be created if various accused charged with offences arising out of
the same FIR were to be tried by different courts on the flimsy ground that
some of them are only charged of offences arising out of the Indian Penal
Code and not the special statutes under which other charges are laid.

15.5 Higher courts can try an offence in view of Section 26 of Code of
Criminal Procedure and no prejudice should be caused if the case is tried
by a Special Judge. By virtue of Administrative Order passed by the Delhi
High court and Notification issued by the Government of NCT, Delhi, the
learned Special Judge is not divested of his jurisdiction which he
otherwise possesses under Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
try offence under Indian Penal Code. The Section reads as follows:

“26. Courts by which offences are triable.- Subject to the other provisions
of this Code,-

(a) Any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by-

(i) The High Court, or
(ii) The Court of Session, or
(iii) Any other court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule
to be triable;
(b) Any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in
this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no court is so
mentioned, may be tried by-
(i) The High Court, or
(ii) Any other court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule
to be triable.”

16. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned Counsel for the CPIL, submitted that a
Special Judge has the power to try offences under the Indian Penal Code and
no challenge can be made against this power. It was further submitted that
in view of the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case, it is not open
to the Petitioners to approach any other Court to commence the trial.

xxx
xxx

24. From the aforesaid second charge-sheet it is clear that the offence
alleged to have been committed by the Petitioners in the course of 2G Scam
Cases. For the said reason they have been made accused in the 2G Scam Case.

25. Admittedly, the co-accused of 2G Scam case charged under the provisions
of Prevention of Corruption Act can be tried only by the Special Judge. The
Petitioners are co-accused in the said 2G Scam case. In this background
Section 220 of Code of Criminal Procedure will apply and the Petitioners
though accused of different offences i.e. under Section 420/ 120-B Indian
Penal Code, which alleged to have been committed in the course of 2G
Spectrum transactions, under Section 223 of Code of Criminal Procedure they
may be charged and can be tried together with the other co-accused of 2G
Scam cases.

30. On the question of validity of the Notification dated 28th March, 2011
issued by the NCT of Delhi and Administrative Order dated 15th March, 2011
passed by the Delhi High Court, we hold as follows:

30.1. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the PC Act the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special
Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas or for such case or group
of cases as may be specified in the notification to try any offence
punishable under the PC Act. In the present case, as admittedly, co-accused
have been charged under the provisions of the PC Act, and such offence
punishable under the PC Act, the NCT of Delhi is well within its
jurisdiction to issue Notification(s) appointing Special Judge(s) to try
the 2G Scam case(s).

30.2. Article 233 and 234 of the Constitution are attracted in cases where
appointments of persons to be Special Judges or their postings to a
particular Special Court are involved. The control of High Court is
comprehensive, exclusive and effective and it is to subserve a basic
feature of the Constitution i.e., independence of judiciary. [See High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal and High Court of
Orissa v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy. The power to appoint or promote or post a
District Judge of a State is vested with the Governor of the State under
Article 233 of the Constitution which can be exercised only in consultation
with the High Court. Therefore, it is well within the jurisdiction of the
High Court to nominate officer(s) of the rank of the District Judge for
appointment and posting as Special Judge(s) under Sub-section (1) of
Section 3 of the PC Act.

30.3. In the present case, the Petitioners have not challenged the
nomination made by the High Court of Delhi to the NCT of Delhi. They have
challenged the letter dated 15th March, 2011 written by the Registrar
General, High Court of Delhi, New Delhi to the District Judge-I-cum-
Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi and the District Judge-IV-cum-
Addl. Sessions Judge, I/C, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New
Delhi whereby the High Court intimated the officers about nomination of Mr.
O.P. Saini, an officer of Delhi Higher Judicial Service for his appointment
as Special Judge for 2G Scam Cases.

31. In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the
Petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In
absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is
called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence
against the Petitioners.

9. In the impugned judgment, the High Court dealing with the powers of
the Chief Justice of the High Court to permit non-PC Act cases also being
dealt with by the Special Judge observed:
“ The powers of the Chief Justice to do so are unquestionable keeping in
view the provisions of Rule 4(A) of Chapter III of the Allahabad High Court
Rules which includes the powers of the Chief Justice in matters of Mid-term
posting and transfers and all residuary matters not allotted to any
Committee or Administrative Judges. This being the legal position and
there being no indication of any prejudice or failure of justice, the
notification dated 29.5.2014 read with the notification dated 28.8.2012/
1.9.2012 and the order of the Chief Justice mentioned hereinabove dated
13.2.2014 clearly continues the authority of Sri Atul Kumar Gupta to
exercise powers exclusively over NRHM cases at Ghaziabad. From the
administrative file of the High Court relating to the issuance of such
notifications it also appears that steps have been initiated and the
Government has already been communicated with the approval of Hon’ble the
Chief Justice, that the said omission in the notifications dated 29.5.2014
specifically about NRHM cases be rectified. There is, therefore, a
substantial compliance of procedure in relation to the conferment of the
posting and jurisdiction of Sri Atul Kumar Gupta as successor in office of
Sri Shyam Lal-II who was already notified to exclusively try NRHM cases.
In the light of the above, a ministerial omission either by the registry of
the High Court or by the State Government will not dissolve the conferment
of authority on the successor in office.
xxx
xxx

In my considered opinion as well, the aforesaid approach of getting the
scam tried in one particular court does not suffer from any administrative
or judicial infirmity and rather the same would advance the cause of
justice with the entire scam being looked into by one particular court
instead of a variety of courts spread over differently as it would result
in a likelihood of conflict of appreciation of evidence and obviously might
result in a conflict of opinion. The nature of the offences being tried
simultaneously by one court relate to the diversion, misappropriation and
misutilization of the funds of the National Rural Health Mission that
according to the charge sheet and the FIRs as well as the evidence
collected indicate a concerted effort through a deep-routed conspiracy to
siphon off the funds of the NRHM scam. In such a situation it would not be
inappropriate to invoke the principle “extraordinary situations require
extra ordinary remedies” for retaining the jurisdiction with the learned
Special Judge in the facts of the present case. “

10. As already stated, the High Court held that the Special Judge could
continue proceedings against the appellants even after the death of public
servant and even if there was no charge under the PC Act. The High Court
duly considered the effect of death of the sole public servant. The
contention raised by the appellant in the first case was that the charges
against it were under Section 120B read with Sections 409 and 420 IPC and
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. There is no
independent PC Act charge against it. Thus, only for non PC Act charges,
proceedings could not continue before the Special Judge. On this aspect,
it was observed that the charge could be amended and challenge was pre-
mature apart from the fact the Special Judge was competent to deal with non
PC Act cases relating to NRHM scam. The relevant observations in this
regard are :
“ There is one thing which deserves mention at this very stage is that the
possibility of amendment in the charges and addition thereto keeping in
view the nature of the allegations cannot be ruled out in future. This,
therefore, would be a premature stage to presume that no other offence can
be tried by the Special Court. The offences in relation to a non-
government servant which connect him with the conspiracy of
misappropriation of public funds with the aid of a government servant,
would not vanish merely because the government servant has died. This
would clearly depend upon the evidence and the facts of the case that would
ultimately determine the framing of the charge and its consequential trial.
Not only this, the Court has ample powers to add charges even during the
course of the trial.
From a perusal of the FIR, charge sheet and cognizance order, it may not be
said at this stage that no offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act
has been committed by the applicant. The cognizance is taken of the
offence and not of the person. The charges are framed in relation to the
offence committed which are tried. The question is of the link of a non-
government servant to such an offence which may be relatable to the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the instant case the material on
record does indicate prima facie such connection whereas in the case of
State Vs. Jitender Kumar Singh (supra) which has been relied upon by the
learned counsel for the applicant, the Apex Court came to a conclusion that
there was no offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act for being tried
as against the non-government servants involved therein that arose out of
the Bombay case as discussed in the said judgment. In the circumstances,
it would be absolutely premature to presume on the facts of the present
case of there being no evidence or linkage as suggested by the learned
counsel for the petitioner when prima facie a charge sheet and the
cognizance order do disclose such links.
xxx
xxx
Applying the aforesaid principles on the facts of the present case, it is
clear that there are clear allegations and also evidence prima facie
collected to indicate conspiracy that connect the acts and omissions of
Late Sri G.K. Batra, the government servant, with the applicant-company and
its officials and agents who got themselves introduced in the manner
indicated in the charge sheet along with the active aid of Late Sri G.K.
Batra. Consequently, all arguments that have been advanced by Sri
Chaturvedi on the strength of the judgment in the case of State Vs.
Jitender Kumar Singh (supra) do not come to his aid as the facts of the
present case are not identical except for the similarity of the death of
the government servant. Consequently, the second argument also does not
hold water.
In view of the conclusions drawn hereinabove, the order impugned dated
28.2.2015 is upheld and the proceedings before Sri Atul Kumar Gupta are
treated to be well within his jurisdiction in all NRHM cases. In order to
remove any doubt in this regard it is further directed that Sri Atul Kumar
Gupta would continue to have jurisdiction over such cases till his
successor joins on the said post. It may also be put on record that
according to the annual list of transfer and posting Sri Atul Kumar Gupta
is under orders of transfer, but on account of no fresh notification for
the court occupied by him, his transfer order is under abeyance till his
successor joins. “

11. The only contention raised by Shri C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel
for the appellant is that public servant having died before framing of the
charge, the appellant could not be tried by the Special Judge. He did not
challenge any other finding in the impugned order except those relevant to
this contention. Shri Singh submits that the case of the appellant-M/s.
HCL Infosystem Limited is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in
State through Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi Vs. Jitender Kumar
Singh[3]. Particular reliance was placed on paragraph 46 of the judgment.
It was submitted that the trial in a warrant case commenced on framing of
the charge which has not yet happened and the public servant had died. The
appellant could be tried only during the lifetime of the public servant.
Having regard to the fact that the public servant has died before the
framing of the charge, this Court upheld the view of the High Court in
forwarding the papers of the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
12. His main reliance is on paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment which
are as follows :
“ xxx

46. We may now examine Criminal Appeal No.161 of 2011, where the FIR was
registered on 2-7-1996 and the charge-sheet was filed before the Special
Judge on 14-9-2001 for the offences under Sections 120-B, 420 IPC read with
Sections 13(2) and 13(1) of the PC Act. Accused 9 and 10 died even before
the charge-sheet was sent to the Special Judge. The charge against the
sole public servant under the PC Act could also not be framed since he died
on 18-2-2005. The Special Judge also could not frame any charge against
non-public servants. As already indicated, under sub-section (3) of
Section 4, the Special Judge could try non-PC offences only when “trying
any case” relating to PC offences. In the instant case, no PC offence has
been committed by any of the non-public servants so as to fall under
Section 3(1) of the PC Act. Consequently, there was no occasion for the
Special Judge to try any case relating to the offences under the PC Act
against the appellant. The trying of any case under the PC Act against a
public servant or a non-public servant, as already indicated, is a sine qua
non for exercising powers under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the PC Act.
In the instant case, since no PC offence has been committed by any of the
non-public servants and no charges have been framed against the public
servant, while he was alive, the Special Judge had no occasion to try any
case against any of them under the PC Act, since no charge has been framed
prior to the death of the public servant. The jurisdictional fact, as
already discussed above, does not exist so far as this appeal is concerned,
so as to exercise jurisdiction by the Special Judge to deal with non-PC
offences.
47. Consequently, we find no error in the view taken by the Special
Judge, CBI, Greater Mumbai in forwarding the case papers of Special Case
No.88 of 2001 in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for trying
the case in accordance with law. Consequently, the order passed by the
High Court is set aside. The competent court to which Special Case No.88
of 2001 is forwarded, is directed to dispose of the same within a period of
six months. Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 2011 is allowed accordingly.”

13. Learned counsel for the CBI supports the impugned order by submitting
that the cognizance had already been taken and the matter should be allowed
to proceed before the Special Judge in view of the impugned order of the
High Court.

14. While we do find that the observations of this Court in Jitender
Kumar Singh (supra) in paragraphs 46 and 47 quoted above support the
contention of Shri Singh that the Special Judge, under Section 4(3), could
not try an offence other than that specified under Section 3. The public
servant was no more and the trial had not commenced. In view of the relied
upon judgment in absence of PC Act charge, the appellants may not be liable
to be tried before the Special Judge. However, we find two difficulties in
accepting the submission of Shri Singh as follows:
As observed by the High Court, the charge is yet to be framed and the
framing of charge under the PC Act from the material placed on record was
not ruled out. Thus, the argument at this stage is pre-mature; and

The Special Judge was authorized not only to deal with the cases under the
PC Act as was the position in the case before this Court in Jitender Kumar
Singh (supra) but also for other offences. This course was permissible in
view of law laid down by this Court in M/s. Essar Teleholdings Limited
(supra).

15. In the present case, the Special Court in question has been
constituted not only to deal with the cases of PC Act but also other cases
relating to the NRHM scam. Procedure of Code of Criminal Procedure is
applicable to trial before Special Judge and there is no prejudice to trial
that is taking place before Special Judge duly appointed to deal with non
PC cases when the object of doing so was to try connected cases before same
court. Undoubtedly, while Special Judge alone could deal with cases under
the PC Act, non- PC Act could also be allowed to be tried by the Special
Judge under Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no
legal bar to do so, as held by this Court in M/s. Essar Teleholdings
Limited (supra).

16. In view of above distinguishing feature in the present case from the
case of Jitender Kumar Singh (supra), we do not find any merit in these
appeals and the same are dismissed.

………………………………………………J.
( V. GOPALA GOWDA )

………………………………………………J.
( ADARSH KUMAR GOEL )
New Delhi;
August 09 , 2016.

1B-FOR JUDGMENT COURT NO.13 SECTION II

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CRL.A. No.751/2016
(@ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 4338/2015)

M/S HCL INFOSYSTEM LTD Appellant(s)

VERSUS

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Respondent(s)

WITH
CRL.A. No.752/2016
(@ SLP(Crl) No. 1418/2016)

Date : 09/08/2016 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of
JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s)
Mr. P. V. Dinesh,Adv.

Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra,Adv.
Mr. Uma Kant Mishra, Adv.
Mr. Niranjan Sahu, Adv.

For Respondent(s)
Mr. M. Rambabu, Adv.
Mukesh Kumar Maroria,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the judgment
of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda and His
Lordship.
Leave granted.

The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed Reportable
Judgment.

VINOD KUMAR JHA SUMAN JAIN
AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER

| | | |

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

-----------------------
[1] [2] Order dated 23.09.2013 in Criminal Misc. Application U/s 482
No.33050 of 2013
[3] [4] 2013 (8) SCC 1
[5] [6] (2014) 11 SCC 724

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