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Thursday, August 4, 2016

Service Matter - sought quashing of orders granting extension of tenure to Respondent No.4 Ms. Anju Banerjee as Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Educational Consultants India Limited, for a period of 5 years i.e., upto 28.11.2015.= The Committee found no merit in any of the allegations. The entire matter was thereafter placed before the Competent Authority who after considering all the issues approved extension of tenure of Respondent No.4 for a period of five years. The record is clear that at the initial stage when the response from CVC was awaited, an extension was granted only for three months and when the letter from CVC was received, the matter was not only clarified immediately but the allegations in the complaint referred to in the letter of CVC were also looked into by the Committee. The stand of CVC as evident from its letter dated 09.11.2011 is that after having brought the relevant facets of the matter to the notice of the Competent Authority vide letter dated 02.12.2010, CVC had no further role in the matter. The record further shows that right from 06.01.2011 every development was communicated to CVC. We, therefore, find nothing wrong in the decision making process in the present matter nor do we find any infraction in securing and acting in terms of the comments of CVC. We, therefore, reject the challenge to the orders granting extension to Respondent No.4.

                                                              Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7221  OF  2016
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.14406 of 2012)



Educ. Cons. (I) Ltd. SC/ST Empl. Wel. Asso.               …… Appellant

                                   Versus

Union   of   India   &    Others                                          ……
Respondents


                             JUDGMENT



Uday Umesh Lalit


Leave granted.

This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated  07.12.2011
passed by the High Court of Delhi dismissing Writ Petition  (Civil)  No.7577
of 2011,  which had  questioned  and  sought  quashing  of  orders  granting
extension of tenure to Respondent No.4 Ms. Anju  Banerjee  as  Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Educational Consultants India Limited, for a period of  5
years i.e., upto 28.11.2015.

3.     Educational  Consultants  India  Limited  (Ed.CIL,  for  short)   was
conceived and incorporated as a Public Sector Enterprise by  the  Government
of India in 1981 under the Ministry of Education and Culture  (reconstituted
as the Ministry of Human  Resource  Development  since  then).   The  Ed.CIL
offers consultancy and technical services in different  areas  of  Education
and Human Resource Development not only  within  the  Country  but  also  on
global  basis.   The  Ed.CIL  is  category   ‘C’   Central   Public   Sector
Undertaking.   The  procedure  with  regard  to  appointments  to  posts  in
categories ‘C’ and ‘D’ of Public Sector Enterprises has been  prescribed  by
Office Memorandum dated 03.04.2001, whereby the  Appointments  Committee  of
Cabinet  has  delegated  its  power  in  relation   to   appointments,    to
Administrative   Ministries/Departments    Public    Sector    Undertakings.
According to the procedure prescribed, Public  Enterprises  Selection  Board
(hereinafter referred to as PESB) a high powered  body  constituted  by  the
Government of  India  to  advise  the  Government  on  appointments  to  top
managerial posts, is involved in the selection process. The  policy  of  the
Government of India is  to  appoint  outstanding  professional  Managers  to
levels 1 and 2 posts and such other posts as the Government may decide  from
time to time, through a fair and objective selection procedure.

4.    Respondent No.4, who was  then  holding  the  post  of  Group  General
Manager, HRD, Indian Railway Catering and  Tourism  Corporation,  New  Delhi
was appointed  as  Chairman-cum-Managing  Director  (‘CMD’  for  short)   of
Ed.CIL vide order dated 04.10.2005 for five  years w.e.f.  30.11.2005  after
following due procedure.   The tenure of five years of  Respondent  No.4  as
CMD of  Ed.CIL was to  expire  on  29.11.2010  and  the  Ministry  of  Human
Resource and Development (‘HRD’ for short) took up the matter with  PESB  on
the proposal of extension to be granted to Respondent  No.4.   The  proposal
was  considered  by  PESB  in  its  meeting  held  on  26.10.2010  and   the
recommendations were then forwarded to  the  Ministry  of  HRD  vide  letter
dated 27.10.2010 as under:-

          “PUBLIC ENTERPRISES SELECTION BOARD
      (Ministry of Personnel Public Grievances & Pensions)


Sub:  Extension  of  tenure  or  otherwise  of  Ms.  Anju   Banerjee,   CMD,
Educational Consultants India Ltd. beyond 29.11.2010.

  The Board considered the  proposal  of  the  Ministry  of  Human  Resource
Development regarding extension of tenure or otherwise  Ms.  Anju  Banerjee,
CMD, Educational Consultants India Ltd. beyond 29.11.2010  as  contained  in
letter   No.F.20-19/2010/TS-VIII(Pt.)   dated   14.9.2010,   24.09.2010    &
20.10.2010.

  As per the procedure laid down by the PESB vide their  O.M.  No.  5/16/96-
PESB dated 21.11.1996, the case  of  extension/non-extension  of  tenure  of
Board level appointees are required to be considered by  the  Board  in  the
light of his performance as reflected in the documents like the  data  based
performance report, the special performance report and the ACRs  along  with
the inputs given by the Secretary of the Administrative Ministry etc.

  Against this background, the proposal of the Ministry  of  Human  Resource
Development  regarding  extension  of  tenure  or  otherwise  of  Ms.   Anju
Banerjee, CMD, Educational Consultants India Ltd.  beyond   29.11.2010,  was
considered by the Board in its meeting held  on  6.10.2010  when  Secretary,
HRD apprised the Board that no ACRs  of  the  officer  were  available.  The
Board decided to await for the ACRs before taking a  decision.  As  per  the
standard practice Ms. Anju Banerjee was also called to meet the Board.

  The Board noted that on the  recommendation  of  the  PESB  and  with  the
approval of the competent authority, Ms.  Anju  Banerjee  was  appointed  as
CMD, Educational Consultants India Ltd.  w.e.f.  30.11.2005  and  she  would
complete  her  five  years  on  29.11.2010.  She  will  attain  the  age  of
superannuation on 31.1.2017, her date of birth being 24.1.1957.

  On receipt of ACRs the Board  considered  the  proposal  in  its  internal
meeting on 26.10.2010. Taking into account  the  totality  of  circumstances
including her performance as reflected in the  documents  forwarded  by  the
Administrative Deptt. like the data based performance  report,  the  special
performance  report,  the  available  ACRs  and  the  inputs  given  by  the
Secretary, HRD  the  Board  after  consideration  recommended  extension  of
tenure of Ms. Anju Banerjee, CMD, Educational Consultants India Ltd.  beyond
29.11.2010 to 29.11.2015.

  The ACR dossiers of Ms. Anju Banerjee  (For  the  period  from  1.4.09  to
31.10.09 and November 2009 to 31.3.2010) are enclosed for necessary  action.
For expediting Vigilance Clearances a photo-copy of the pro-forma filled  in
by the candidate is also enclosed for necessary action.

The case may kindly be processed further for obtaining the approval  of  the
competent authority for extension of  tenure  of  Ms.  Anju  Banerjee,  CMD,
Educational Consultants India Ltd. beyond 29.11.2010 upto 29.11.2015.

  A copy of the order when issued may please be sent to us  for  information
of the Board.

                                                             (VEDANTAM GIRI)
                                                                    DIRECTOR

(Ministry of Human Resource Development Ms. Vibha Puri Das.  Secretary)  New
Delhi
PESB U. O .No. 9/15/2010-PESB dated 27/10/2010”


5.    The proforma for seeking Vigilance Clearance was enclosed  along  with
the aforesaid recommendation and the  relevant  papers  were  sent  by  PESB
directly to Central Vigilance Commission (‘CVC’  for  short).   CVC  by  its
letter dated 01.11.2010 requested the Ministry of HRD  to  provide  complete
information  in  respect  of  Respondent  No.4  in  the  prescribed  format.
Accordingly, by letter dated 09.11.2010 the Government  of  India,  Ministry
of HRD,  Department  of  Higher  Education  forwarded  complete  details  of
Respondent No.4 to CVC stating inter-alia that  Respondent  No.4  was  clear
from Vigilance angle.  It was stated  in  the  letter  that  the  tenure  of
Respondent No.4 as CMD, Ed.CIL was due to expire on 29.11.2010 and  as  such
Vigilance Clearance may be communicated to the Ministry by 26.11.2010.


6.    This was followed by letter dated 23.11.2010 in which  the  Government
of India, Ministry of HRD, Department of Higher Education requested  CVC  to
expedite the matter and forward the  Clearance  before  26.11.2010.   As  no
communication was  received  from  CVC,  the  file  was  placed  before  the
Competent Authority which took following  decisions:-
“(a)  In the event of Vigilance Clearance from CVC not  being  available  by
26.11.2010, the present CMD, Smt.Anju Banerjee may be  allowed  to  continue
for a period of three months beyond  29.11.2010  for  until  further  order,
whichever is earlier.

(b)   If the Vigilance Clearance from CVC is received,  extension  for  full
five years would be issued.”


7.    Since no response was received from  CVC,  the  Government  of  India,
Ministry of HRD,  Department  of  Higher  Education  vide  its  order  dated
29.11.2010 granted extension of tenure to Respondent No.4  as  Chairman-cum-
Managing  Director,  Ed.CIL  for  an  initial  period  of  3  months  beyond
29.11.2010 or  until  further  orders.   On  02.12.2010  CVC  wrote  to  the
Government of India, Ministry of HRD to the following effect:-
“Telegraphic Address
‘SATARKTA’, New Delhi
E-Mail Address
cewnvigil@nic.in
Website
www.cvc.nic.in       CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION
EPABX
24651001-07
QSDI/Fax:2461286
                             Satarkta Bhavan G.P.O. Complex
                             Block A, INA, New Delhi-110023
                                  005-VGC-151
                                                          La-/No…………………………..
                                                    Fnukad/Dated   2.12.2010
Shri Amit Khare,
Jt. Secy & CVO
Ministry of HRD,
D/o Higher Education
New Delhi.

Sub: Vigilance Clearance in respect of Ms. Anju  Banerjee  CMD,  Educational
Consultants India Ltd.

Please refer to your letter No. F.C. 19011/2/2010-Vig.  Dated  9.11.2010  on
the above subject.

As the Ministry of HRD is aware, there have  been  a  series  of  complaints
against Ms. Banerjee in the recent past including repeated  complaints  made
under Whistleblower’s Act, from a Deputy Manager of  EdCIL  leveling,  inter
alia,    allegations     of     harassment,     of     irregularities     in
promotions/appointments etc. the ministry is also aware that some  of  these
allegations have been found  on  investigation,  to  be  prima  facie  true.
Further when the Commission took up the case of protection  of  the  whistle
blower, Ms. Banerjee not  only  put  pressure  on  the  CVO  but  also  got,
eventually the CVO’s post abolished,  Attention  of  the  Ministry  is  also
invited, in this connection, to the ex-CVO/EdCIL’S letter dated  05.02.2010,
Commission’s letters dated  11.02.2010,  05.04.2010  etc.  as  well  (copies
enclosed).

The commission has, therefore, advised that the above facts  may  be  placed
before the competent authority while it considers Ms.  Banerjee’s  case  for
extension of tenure.

                                                            Yours faithfully

                                                                (P.M.Pillai)
                                                                    Director
                                                           Telefax- 24651013

Encl: As above”


8.    In reply,  the  Government  of  India  vide  letter  dated  06.01.2011
clarified the issues raised in letter dated 02.12.2010.  It stated that  the
concerned Deputy Manager was charge-sheeted prior to his  filing  complaints
and that such complaint was not whistleblower’s complaint.  The  letter  was
as under:-
    “No. F.C. 19011/2/2010-VIG.
Government of India
Ministry of Human Resource Development
Department of Higher Education
Vigilance Wing

                                      New Delhi, dated the 6th January, 2011

To,
Shri P.M. Pillai
Director
Central Vigilance Commission
Satarkta Bhawan, GPO Complex,
Block-A, INA,
New Delhi.

Sub: Vigilance Clearance in respect of Ms. Anju Banerjee,  CMD,  Educational
Consultants India Ltd.


Sir,

Please refer to your letter No. 005-VGC-151/110692 dated 02.12.2010  on  the
subject mentioned above. While  in  pursuance  of  Commission’s  advice,  we
would be placing before the competent authority, the  issue  raised  by  the
Commission in the subject letter, I am desired to apprise the Commission  of
the status of these issues.

In so far as the complaints made under  the  Whistleblowers  Act  by  Deputy
Manager of Ed.CIL against Ms.Anju Banerjee are  concerned,  we  had  earlier
vide our letter dated 24.05.2010, apprised the Commission  of  the  sequence
of events about the initiation of disciplinary proceeding against  the  said
Deputy Manager by Ed.CIL  and  his  filing  the  PIDPI  complaint  with  the
Commission.  On the aforesaid reference from the Ministry,  this  issue  was
examined by the Commission and  the  Commission  had  intimated  vide  their
letter No.006/EDN/057 (Pt.)/89868 dated 09.06.2010 that they had  noted  the
position brought out by the  Ministry  that  the  said  Deputy  Manager  was
charge-sheeted prior to his filing the PIDPI complaint.  In  view  of  this,
obviously the complaint was not a whistleblower’s complaint.

As regards the abolition of the CVO’s post by Ed.CIL, the fact is  that  the
post  was  abolished  by  the  Ed.CIL  Board  which  decision,   after   due
consideration, was subsequently endorsed by the Ministry  and  the  position
in this regard was also apprised to the Commission and to the Department  of
Personnel  &  Training   vide   letter   No.C-34014/1/2008-Vigilance   dated
11th/15th March,  2010  and  No.C-34014/1/2008-Vig  dated  1st  April,  2010
respectively.

                                                            Yours faithfully
                                                                (AMIT KHARE)
                                                      Joint Secretary & CVO”


The record indicates that in order to get factual  position  in  respect  of
allegations in the complaint  referred to in the   letter  dated  02.12.2010
examined, the Education Secretary, Department of Higher Education,  Ministry
of HRD, Government of India vide her Note dated  02.02.2011  commended  that
the said matters be jointly examined by two  senior  most  officers  of  the
Department. Accordingly all  the  allegations  contained  in  the  complaint
referred to in letter dated 02.12.2010 were looked into by  a  Committee  of
two senior most officers of the Department namely Shri  Ashok  Kumar  Thakur
and Shri Sunil Kumar on the basis  of  the  concerned  file.  The  Committee
submitted its report in the  form  of  tabulated  statement  indicating  the
allegations, response of Ed. CIL and conclusions reached  by  the  Committee
with respect to those allegations. The Committee found no merit  in  any  of
the allegations and concluded that no case was made out for  denial  of  re-
appointment of Respondent No.4.  The entire matter was  then  placed  before
the Competent Authority  who  after  considering  all  the  issues  approved
extension of  tenure  of  Respondent  No.4  for  a  period  of  five  years.
Accordingly the Government of India, Ministry of HRD, Department  of  Higher
Education vide its letter dated 22.02.2011 granted extension  to  Respondent
No.4 for five years.

10.   Thereafter Joint Secretary/CVO of the  Government of  India,  Ministry
of  HRD,  Department  of  Higher  Education  vide  letter  dated  16.03.2011
forwarded report of the Committee to CVC and  informed  that  the  Committee
did not find any merit in the allegations leveled in the complaint  referred
to in letter dated 02.12.2010 of CVC. He further stated that he agreed  with
the recommendations of the Committee and was of  the  considered  view  that
the matter be closed and suggested that CVC may  also  consider  closure  of
the matter.  Said letter dated 16.3.2011 was to the following effect:-
            “No. C-13012/14/2010-Vigilance
                 Government of India
Ministry of Human Resource Development
        Department of Higher Education
                               Vigilance Wing

                                         R.No. 231, C Wing, Shashtri Bhawan,
                                           New Delhi, dated 16th March, 2011

Subject:- Complaint against Smt. Anju Banerjee CMD Ed. CIL

Central   Vigilance   Commission   may   kindly   refer    to    their    OM
Nos.010/EDN/065/96501 dated 10.08.2010, 010/EDN/065/ 9741 dated  10.08.2010,
010/EDN/064/96104     dated     29.07.2010,     010/EDN/065/102883     dated
23.09.2010,010/EDN/065/116320  dated  17.01.2011  on  the  above   mentioned
subject. These complaints were referred to a Committee  consisting  of  Shri
Ashok Thakur, Special Secretary and Shri Sunil Kumar,  Additional  Secretary
in the Ministry. The Committee  did  not  find  any  merit  in  any  of  the
allegations leveled in the complaints.

2. The Report has been accepted by the Central Govt. in the Ministry.

3. I fully agree with the recommendations of the Committee  and  am  of  the
considered view that this matter should now  be  closed.  Central  Vigilance
Commission may, therefore, consider closure of the same.

                                                (Amit Khare)
                                                      JS CVO
Secretary,
Central Vigilance Commission
Satarkata Bhavan, GPO Complex
(Attention:Shri Prabhat Kumar, Director)
Block A, INA New Delhi-110023
Encl: As above”


11.   In the  meantime,  the  appellant  had  filed  Writ  Petition  (Civil)
No.8032 of 2010 on 23.11.2010 in the High Court of Delhi praying inter  alia
for quashing of the proposal to grant extension to Respondent No.4  as  CMD,
Ed. CIL for a fresh term of five years.  After the orders  dated  29.11.2010
and 22.02.2011 granting extension to Respondent No.4 were issued,  the  High
Court permitted the appellant to withdraw said  Writ  Petition  and  file  a
comprehensive   Writ   Petition   incorporating   the   subsequent   events.
Accordingly  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  No.7577  of  2011  was  filed  by  the
appellant on 09.09.2011 seeking quashing  of  orders  dated  29.11.2010  and
22.02.2011 whereby Respondent No.4 was  granted  extension  of  five  years.
The High Court by its  order  dated  19.10.2011  issued  Notice  to  CVC  to
clarify whether specific clearance of CVC was  required  for  extending  the
term of Respondent No.4 for a  period  of  five  years  as  CMD  Ed.CIL  and
whether CVC had no  further  role  to  play  in  the  matter  after  it  had
addressed communication dated 02.12.2010.

12.   In response, an affidavit in reply was filed on behalf of Ministry  of
HRD,   Department   of   Higher   Education   placing   all   the   relevant
correspondence.  The affidavit also placed on record, the  report  submitted
by the Committee of Mr. Ashok Thakur and Mr. Sunil Kumar  dated  15.02.2011.
During  the  course  of  hearing  of  the  matter,  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General also placed on record, letter  dated  09.11.2011  sent  by
CVC to the Ministry of HRD, informing that CVC had no  role  after  issuance
of communication  dated  02.12.2010  regarding  Vigilance  Clearance.   Said
letter dated 09.11.2011 was as under:-
                                                             “MOST IMMEDIATE
                                                                COURT MATTER

No.010/LEGAL/083/153071
CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION

                                                             Satarkta Bhavan
                                                        GPO Complex. Block-A
                                                      INA, New Delhi 110 023
                                                         Dated the 9.11.2011
To,
Shri K.S. Mahajan
Under Secretary(Vig.)
Ministry of Human Resource Development
Shastri Bhawan
New Delhi 110 001

Sub: CWP No. 7577 of 2011 titled “Educational Consultants India Ltd. vs.
UOI & Ors.”  Filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.

Sir,

      Please refer to Ed.CIL’s  letter  No.  Ed.CIL/Legal/51-2010-Hr.  dated
24.10.2011 on the above subject.  Copy of letter enclosed.

2.    A perusal of the  HC’s   order  dated  19.10.2011   reveals  that  the
Hon’ble Division Bench has sought the response  of  the  Commission  on  the
following issues:

Whether specific clearance of CVC was required for extending  the  terms  of
CMD,  Ed.CIL for another five years.
Whether CVC has no  further  role  to  play  in  the  matter  after  it  had
addressed  communication  dated  02.12.2010  i.e.  the  Vigilance  Clearance
granted by CVC.

3.    It is stated on the basis of records that as regards point No.I,   the
relevant circulars/instructions issued by DoPT (copy  enclosed)  may  please
be referred.    Regarding point No.ii, it is hereby informed that  there  is
no role of the Commission after issue of  Commission’s  communication  dated
02.12.2010 regarding Vigilance Clearance.  It is  requested  that  effective
steps may please be taken to defend  the interests of  the  Commission  also
before the Hon’ble High Court.

                                                           Yours faithfully,

                                                                (R.N. Nayak)
                                                                 OSD (Admn.)
                                                              Tel.: 24643592

Encl.: As above

 Copy to: Shri N.S. Padmananbhan,  Chief General Manager
        (HR/Admn.), Ed.CIL(India) Ltd.,  10-B, IP Estate, New Delhi 110 002.


                                                                (R.N. Nayak)
                                                                OSD (Admn.)”

13.   The High Court by its order dated 07.12.2011 dismissed  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.7577/2011 as it found no merit in the petition.  It  referred  to
the communications dated  16.03.2011  and  09.11.2011  in  its  order.   The
relevant portion of the order of the High Court is quoted hereunder:-
“5.   In compliance of the order  dated  19th  October,  2011  (supra),   an
affidavit has been filed enclosing inter  alia  letter  dated  6th  January,
2011 of the Ministry of Human Resource Development,  Government of India  to
the Respondent No.3 CVC informing that  the complaint of the Deputy  Manager
was  motivated as a  charge sheet had  been  issued  to  him  prior  to  his
making the complaint; that he  thus did not even stand in the position of  a
whistle blower and that the abolition of the CVO’s post  in  Ed.CIL  (India)
Ltd. was with the sanction of the Ministry.    The affidavit  also  encloses
other documents to show  that  the  decision  to  extend  the  term  of  the
Respondent No.4 as CMD was taken after due consideration of all  the  facts.
The affidavit also encloses  the  letter  dated  16th  March,  2011  of  the
Ministry of  Human Resource Development to the Respondent No.3  CVC  closing
the complaints against the Respondent No.4.

6.    The learned Additional  Solicitor  General  has  during  the   hearing
today also handed over a copy of the letter dated 9th November, 2011 of  the
 Respondent No.3 CVC to the Ministry informing that the Respondent No.3  CVC
had no role after issuance of the communication  dated  2nd  December,  2010
regarding Vigilance Clearance.

7.    We are thus satisfied that there is no merit in the allegation in  the
petition of the extension of the term of the Respondent No.4  being  without
the CVC clearance.  We are also satisfied that there is no other  illegality
in the CVC clearance.”


14.   In this appeal challenging the aforesaid decision of the  High  Court,
certain additional  documents  were  placed  on  record  which  are  replies
received to queries under the Right to  Information  Act.  These  additional
documents include communication dated 03.06.2011  from  CVC  to  the  effect
that a direct enquiry under Sections 8 and 11 of the Central Vigilance  Act,
2003 relating to  complaints  in  file  No.010/EDM065  and  010/EDM/064  was
entrusted to Shri Amar Mudi.  Subsequently, by way of  I.A.  No.6  two  more
documents were placed  on  record  including  “Draft  Inspection  Report  on
Contracts awarded by Ministry of HRD during 2007-08 to  2009-10  to  Ed.CIL”
by CAG, Director General of Audit (Central Expenditure).

15.   Along with affidavit in reply filed on behalf of Ministry of HRD,  the
entire correspondence in the matter was placed  on  record.   The  affidavit
also referred to the proceedings  initiated  against  the  concerned  Deputy
Secretary and stated  that  he  was  charge-sheeted  vide  memorandum  dated
05.10.2007 and 19.08.2008 purely on  administrative  grounds  for  omissions
committed by him in the year 2003-2004 and 2005-2008, which was much  before
the decision of CVC considering him as a whistleblower;  the  fact  that  he
was so charge-sheeted before he was given whistleblower status was noted  by
CVC vide its letter dated 09.06.2010; the  concerned  Deputy  Secretary  had
filed a Writ Petition challenging said charge-sheets which was dismissed  by
the High Court; thereafter disciplinary proceedings culminated in  an  order
of dismissal of that Deputy Secretary; and the  entire  sequence  of  events
was intimated to CVC who had remarked that since an appeal would lie  before
Appellate Authority it had decided not to interfere in the matter.

16.   We heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned Advocate appearing  in  support
of the  petition  and  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  learned  Solicitor  General  for
Respondents No.1, 2 and 3.   After  hearing  the  counsel,  the  matter  was
reserved for judgment and the learned Solicitor General was  asked  to  file
additional affidavit on behalf of CVC indicating current  position  and  the
format according to which clearances, if any, are either granted, denied  or
deferred by CVC.

17.   Accordingly, the Additional Secretary, CVC filed additional  affidavit
referring to  Office  Memorandum  dated  4.08.1988  and  placing  on  record
Guidelines dated  29.10.2007  and  14.12.2007,  Circular  dated  12.07.1999,
Instructions dated 22.10.2014 and 30.10.2014, letter  dated  02.12.2010  and
Formats of clearances  of  CVC.   An  additional  affidavit  was  thereafter
filed by the appellant seeking to bring on  record  certain  new  facts  and
alleging that the action against the whistleblower appeared to be mala  fide
and arbitrary.  It was submitted that though CVC had  come  up  with  format
and procedure for Vigilance Clearance vide its last affidavit,  the  earlier
PESB Rules and Guidelines for Vigilance Clearance were not adhered to.

18.   Affidavit filed by  the  Additional  Secretary,  CVC  makes  following
assertions:
 “….It is submitted that Vigilance Clearance as such is to be  granted  only
by the concerned Cadre  authorities  and  therefore  maintenance  of  career
profile and vigilance history of the officers  falls  within  their  domain.
The Commission considers  the  vigilance  profile  furnished  by  the  cadre
authorities, duly signed by the CVO.  The inputs are also obtained from  CBI
and  the  concerned  Branches  in  the  Commission.   Based  on   the   said
information, the Commission offers  its  comments  as  to  whether  anything
adverse is available on its records against the officer under  consideration
for empanelment/ selection…..…………

“…As far as the case of Ms.Anju Banerjee is concerned, the  Commission  had,
in view of the circumstances of the case,  vide  its  Letter  No.005-VGC-151
dated 2nd December 2010,  furnished  a  self-contained  note,  bringing  the
available  inputs  to  the  notice  of  the  Ministry  of   Human   Resource
Development.  Letter No.005-VGC-151 dated 2nd December 2010 was sent on  the
basis of the  views  of  the  Commission  at  that  time,  which  were  duly
communicated to the Ministry of Human Resource Development and advised  that
the facts may be placed before the competent authority  while  it  considers
her case for extension of tenure………”


19.    This  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  CVC  adverted  to   following
circulars/guidelines/instructions:-
(a)    Office  memorandum  dated  4.08.1988  pertaining   to   scrutiny   of
antecedents of persons recommended for Board level posts  in  Public  Sector
Enterprises  providing, inter alia:-
“It  would   be   the   primary   responsibility   of   the   Administrative
Ministry/Department  concerned  to  ensure  that   the   candidates,   whose
appointment as Functional Director/CMDs  in  public  sector  enterprises  is
recommended for  being  considered  by  the  ACC,  should  be  cleared  from
vigilance angle and that  the  Ministry/Department  concerned  should  bring
this fact specifically to the notice of the  Minister-in-charge  in  respect
of those persons, who are already holding  Board  level  positions  and  who
have been recommended  for  higher  Board  level  positions,  the  Vigilance
Clearance may be  ascertained,  besides  other  sources,  from  the  Central
Vigilance Commission.”

 (b)  CVC circular dated  12.07.1999  which  had  issued  instructions,  the
relevant part being:
“Vigilance Clearance should be obtained from the Commission  in  respect  of
all candidates/officers recommended by  the  PESB  for  appointment  to  any
Board level position in PSEs, irrespective of their holding  a  board  level
or below board level post at that point of time.”

(c)   Guidelines dated  29.10.2007  issued  by  Ministry  of  Personnel  and
Public  Grievances  &  Pensions  (Department  of  Personnel  and   Training)
pertaining to “Vigilance Clearance” to  All  India   Service  Officers,  the
relevant part being:-
“While considering cases for grant of Vigilance Clearance  for  the  purpose
of empanelment  of  AIS  officers  of  a  particular  batch,  the  Vigilance
Clearance/status will continue to be ascertained from the  respective  State
Government in respect of officers serving in connection with the affairs  of
the Central Government, the  vigilance  status/clearance  will  be  obtained
from the respective Ministry.  In all cases, the comments of  the  CVC  will
also be obtained.”

(d)   Guidelines dated  14.12.2007  issued  by  Ministry  of  Personnel  and
Public  Grievances  &  Pensions  (Department  of  Personnel  and   Training)
pertaining to grant of Vigilance  Clearance  to  members  of  Central  Civil
Services/Central Civil Posts providing, inter alia:-
“While considering cases for grant of Vigilance Clearance  for  the  purpose
of empanelment of members of the Central Civil Services/Central Civil  posts
of a particular batch, the Vigilance Clearance/status will  continue  to  be
ascertained from the respective Cadre Authority   In  all  such  cases,  the
comments of the Central Vigilance Commission will be obtained.”


20.   The affidavit further sets out that presently following three  options
are being exercised by CVC while  conveying  its  inputs  on  the  vigilance
status of the concerned officer:
“(A)  In respect of cases where there is no adverse input available  in  the
data  base  of  the  Commission,  feedback  of  CBI  and  vigilance  profile
furnished by the concerned Department, it is conveyed that there is  nothing
adverse on the records of the Commission. (emphasis added)

(B)   In respect of cases where there is any adverse input from  CBI  (viz.,
prosecution launched against the officer, regular case under  investigation,
etc.,)
                                     Or
            Vigilance profile furnished  by  the  Department  indicates  any
disciplinary proceeding in progress or currency of penalty imposed is  still
in force
                                     Or
Data base of the Commission indicates any advice tendered by the  Commission
for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the officer  is  pending,
denial of clearance is conveyed by the Commission. (emphasis added)

(C)   In respect of cases where there are complaints/cases  pending  at  the
end of the concerned Department, (i.e., where the officer is not clear  from
vigilance angle as per records of the Department),  the  Commission  advises
that the complaints/cases pending at the end of the Department may be  taken
to their logical conclusion and thereafter the Commission may be  approached
for Vigilance Clearance with updated vigilance profile of the officer.   The
Department is therefore intimated that clearance in respect of  the  officer
cannot be considered by the Commission at this stage;”  (emphasis added)


21.   Guidelines dated 29.10.2007 and 14.12.2007,  Office  Memorandum  dated
04.08.1988  and  CVC  Circular  dated  12.07.1999  were  in  existence   and
applicable when the case for grant of extension to Respondent No.4  came  up
for consideration.  The record indicates that the letter dated 2.12.2010  of
CVC made two points namely that there  were  complaints  against  Respondent
No.4 from a Deputy Manager and that Respondent No.4 not  only  put  pressure
on the CVO but also got the post  of  CVO  abolished.     This  letter  then
advised that those facts be placed  before  the  Competent  Authority  while
considering the case of  Respondent  No.4  for  extension  of  tenure.   The
immediate response by letter dated 06.01.2011 was that the concerned  Deputy
Manager was charge-sheeted  prior  to  his  filing  the   complaint  against
Respondent  No.4  and  that  the  complaint   was  not   a   whistleblower’s
complaint.   It was further stated that the post of  CVO  was  abolished  by
the Ed. CIL Board which decision was subsequently endorsed by  the  Ministry
and the position in that regard was communicated to CVC.   In any case,  the
allegations contained in the complaint of the concerned Deputy Manager  were
looked  into  by  a  Committee  of  the  two  senior-most  Officers  of  the
Department which submitted its report and conclusions in respect of each  of
the allegations in the complaint.   The Committee found no merit  in any  of
the allegations.   The  entire  matter  was  thereafter  placed  before  the
Competent Authority who after considering all the issues approved  extension
of tenure of Respondent No.4 for a period of  five  years.   The  record  is
clear that at the initial stage when the  response  from  CVC  was  awaited,
an extension was granted only for three months and  when  the   letter  from
CVC was received,  the matter was  not only clarified  immediately  but  the
allegations in the complaint referred to in  the letter of  CVC   were  also
looked into by the Committee.  The stand of CVC as evident from  its  letter
dated 09.11.2011 is that after having brought the relevant  facets  of   the
matter  to  the  notice  of  the  Competent  Authority  vide  letter   dated
02.12.2010,  CVC  had no further role  in the matter.   The  record  further
shows that right from 06.01.2011 every development was communicated to  CVC.
 We,  therefore,  find nothing wrong in the decision making process  in  the
present matter nor do we find any infraction  in  securing   and  acting  in
terms of the comments of CVC.  We, therefore, reject the  challenge  to  the
orders granting extension to Respondent No.4.

22.   Affirming the view taken by the High Court, we  dismiss  this  appeal.
No order as to costs.

                               ….………………………..CJI
                                              (T.S. Thakur)



                               ..……………………………J.
                            (R. Banumathi)


                                                            ...……………………………J.
                                                     (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
August 02, 2016.

manufacturing defect.= Defective Tiles were affixed on the Walls of building - liable to compensate = The appellant-Society is a charitable institution running a girls hostel at Surat for the benefit of Adiwasi children. On 02.02.2000, the appellant-Society purchased vitrified glazed floor tiles from respondent no.5 (since deleted from the array of parties vide Court’s order dated 01.04.2015) who was a local agent of respondent no.1-Company for a sum of Rs.4,69,579/-. The said tiles, after its fixation in the premises of the hostel, gradually developed black and white spots. The appellant no.1 wrote several letters to respondent no.4 i.e., Sales Executive of respondent no.1-company, informing about the inferior and defective quality of the tiles. Thereafter, the respondent no.5-local agent visited the spot but failed to solve the issue. An architect J.M. Vimawala was appointed by the appellant-Society to assess the damage caused due to defective tiles. The architect assessed the loss to the tune of Rs.4,27,712.37 which included price of the tiles, labour charges, octroi and transportation charges. = the appellant-Society is not a commercial establishment rather a registered society helping the adivasi students in their education by providing hostel facilities. The charges, if any, for accommodation in the hostel are for maintaining the hostel and not for making profit. Thus, the appellant-Society is consumer within the meaning of the term ‘consumer’ under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.= The National Commission has reversed the order passed by the State Commission by wrongly applying the decision of M/s Kusumam Hotels Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) to the set of facts in the present case. Therefore, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the District and the State Commission has been erroneously interfered with by the National Commission by passing the impugned order, which is liable to be set aside. For the reasons stated supra this appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the National Commission is hereby set aside and we restore the order of the District Forum which is affirmed by the State Commission. The matter has been under litigation for the last fourteen years, we direct the respondents to pay or deposit the amount so awarded by the District Forum along with interest @9% p.a. within six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. The costs of Rs.50,000/- of these proceedings are also awarded in favour of the appellant-Society.

NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7223 OF 2016
                  (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 36918 OF 2013)


  LOURDES SOCIETY SNEHANJALI GIRLS
  HOSTEL AND ANR.                         ……APPELLANTS

                                     Vs.

M/S H & R JOHNSON (INDIA) LTD. & ORS.  ……RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.
This civil  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  the  impugned
judgment  and  order  dated  23.09.2013  passed  by  the  National  Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Revision Petition  No.  4047  of
2006 whereby it has allowed the revision petition filed by  respondent  nos.
1-4 and set aside the order dated 12.10.2006 passed  by  the  Gujarat  State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,  Ahemdabad  in  Appeal  No.  741  of
2006.
The brief facts of the case in nutshell are as under:-
The appellant no.1-Lourdes Society Snehanjali  Girls  Hostel  is  a  society
registered under the Societies Registration Act  vide  society  registration
no.Guj/525/Surat and also a trust registered, vide  its  Trust  registration
no. F/430/Surat. The appellant-Society is a charitable  institution  running
a girls hostel at Surat for the benefit of Adiwasi children. On  02.02.2000,
the  appellant-Society  purchased  vitrified   glazed   floor   tiles   from
respondent no.5 (since deleted from the array of parties vide Court’s  order
dated 01.04.2015) who was a local agent of  respondent  no.1-Company  for  a
sum of Rs.4,69,579/-. The said tiles, after its fixation in the premises  of
the hostel, gradually developed black and white spots.  The  appellant  no.1
wrote  several  letters  to  respondent  no.4  i.e.,  Sales   Executive   of
respondent no.1-company, informing about the inferior and defective  quality
of the tiles. Thereafter, the respondent no.5-local agent visited  the  spot
but failed to solve the issue.
An architect J.M. Vimawala was appointed by the appellant-Society to  assess
the damage caused due to defective tiles. The architect  assessed  the  loss
to the tune of Rs.4,27,712.37 which included  price  of  the  tiles,  labour
charges, octroi  and  transportation  charges.  Thereafter,  the  appellant-
Society served a legal notice dated 12.08.2002 to the respondents  making  a
demand of the said amount but no response was shown by the respondents.
The said inaction on the part of the respondents made the  appellant-Society
to file a Consumer Complaint No. 743 of 2002 against the respondents  before
the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum  at  Surat  (for  short  “the
District Forum”) for claim of the said amount.
The District Forum appointed a Court Commissioner to examine  and  find  out
the manufacturing defects in the tiles as claimed by the  appellant-Society.
After  examination,  the  Court  Commissioner  submitted  a   report   dated
21.09.2004 stating therein that the tiles were having manufacturing defect.
The District Forum vide its order  dated  31.12.2005  held  that  the  tiles
supplied by  the  respondents  had  manufacturing  defect.  The  respondents
committed an unfair trade practice by supplying  such  defective  tiles.  By
holding the respondents jointly and severally  liable,  the  District  Forum
directed the respondents to pay to the appellants  a  sum  of  Rs.2,00,000/-
along with interest @9% p.a. from the date  of  complaint  i.e.,  31.10.2002
till its recovery. The respondent no.1 was directed to pay the above  amount
to the appellant within a period of 30 days from the date of  order  of  the
District Forum.
Being Aggrieved, the respondents filed First Appeal No. 741 of  2006  before
Gujarat State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission,  Ahmedabad  (for  short
“the State Commission”) challenging the said order of District Forum  urging
various grounds.
The State Commission dismissed the said First Appeal of the  respondents  by
its order dated 12.10.2006 and confirmed the order passed  by  the  District
Forum.
Having become unsuccessful before  the  State  Commission,  the  respondents
filed Revision Petition No.  4047  of  2006  before  the  National  Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred  to  as  “the
National Commission”) questioning the validity and correctness of the  order
passed by the District Forum and the State Commission.
On 12.03.2012, the appellant-Society also made  an  application  being  I.A.
No.1847 of 2013 in Revision Petition  No.  4047  of  2006  to  the  National
Commission for invoking the powers under Sections 14(d) and  14(hb)  of  the
Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  and  for  awarding  sufficient  amount  of
compensation in addition to amount already awarded by the District Forum.
The National  Commission  vide  its  order  dated  23.09.2013  reversed  the
findings of the District Forum and the State  Commission  holding  that  the
appellant-Society has failed to establish that it is a consumer  within  the
meaning of Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
In support of their case, the learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of  both
the parties made the following submissions.
Mr. Ashok Panigrahi, the learned counsel on behalf of the  appellant-Society
contended  that  the  National  Commission  has  erred  in  coming  to   the
conclusion that the appellant-Society  is  a  commercial  establishment  and
thus, not covered by the definition of the  term  ‘consumer’  under  Section
2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It was further submitted  by  him
that it is unjustified on the part of the National Commission to  hold  that
the Memorandum of Association and byelaws  of  the  appellant-society  which
show  that  it  is  a  charitable  institution  and   not   any   commercial
establishment were not filed before the District  Forum  but  filed  at  the
stage of Revision before the National Commission. It was  further  submitted
by the learned counsel that the District  Forum  and  the  State  Commission
have  gone  through  the  registration   certificate   and   Memorandum   of
Association of the appellant-Society.
He further submitted that the National Commission has erred in holding  that
the case M/s Kusumam Hotels  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  M/s  Neycer  India  Ltd.[1]  is
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
It was further contended by him that both the District Forum as well as  the
State Commission have held that the appellant-Society cannot be regarded  as
a commercial establishment. It is completely unjustified on the part of  the
National Commission to hold that the appellant-Society  being  a  commercial
establishment is not a consumer within the meaning of  the  term  ‘consumer’
under Section  2(d)  of  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  in  complete
ignorance of the Memorandum of Association and the byelaws of the appellant-
Society.
On the contrary, Mr. Sudhir K. Makkar, the learned counsel on behalf of  the
respondents sought to  justify  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  of  the
National Commission contending that the same is  based  on  sound  reasoning
without error and therefore, the same need not be interfered  with  by  this
Court.
It is further contended by  him  that  the  District  Forum  and  the  State
Commission have erred in relying on the report  dated  21.09.2004  given  by
the Court Commissioner as his qualification was not stated  in  the  report.
The report was based on visual inspection. Further, both the District  Forum
as well as the State Commission have  erred  in  not  considering  the  test
certificate produced by respondent no.1 as the  same  was  based  on  modern
tile testing  technology  in  its  laboratory.  In  the  absence  of  expert
evidence, it was wrong on the part of the District  Forum  as  well  as  the
State Commission to hold that tiles had manufacturing defect.
After hearing the learned counsel for  both  the  parties  we  come  to  the
following conclusion:
The National Commission has exceeded  its  jurisdiction  in  exercising  its
revisional power under Section 21(b) of the Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986
by setting aside the concurrent  finding  of  fact  recorded  by  the  State
Commission in  First  Appeal  No.  741  of  2006  vide  its  judgment  dated
12.10.2006 wherein the finding of fact recorded by the  District  Forum  was
affirmed.
The facts of the instant case clearly reveal that  the  National  Commission
has  erred  in  observing  that  the  appellant-Society  is   a   commercial
establishment by completely  ignoring  the  Memorandum  of  Association  and
byelaws of the appellant-Society. Both the District Forum  as  well  as  the
State  Commission  have  rightly  held  that  the  appellant-Society  is   a
charitable institution and not a commercial entity. The relevant portion  of
the order passed by the District Forum reads thus:
“6. ……It is not in dispute that complainants are  running  girls  hostel  in
the name of Complainant no.1. Commercial purpose  is  also  explained  under
the provisions of the Act. So far as  activities  of  the  complainants  are
concerned,  they  are  running  girls  hostel  and  receive  fees  from  the
students. The complainants  are  not  carrying  out  commercial  activities.
Purchase of goods namely tiles are for the purpose of their  hostel  and  it
cannot be said that tiles is subject matter of their business. Whenever  any
person purchases goods for carrying  out  business  for  commercial  or  for
livelihood then only question regarding purchase of goods  or  availing  any
activities from trader or professional  arises.  The  complainants  are  not
carrying on business of  purchase  from  opponents.  Otherwise  also  hostel
premises can  be  constructed  and  there  is  no  direct  relation  between
commercial activity. Therefore, the defence of opponents  that  complainants
are carrying  on  business  activities  and  thereby  complainants  are  not
consumer is not acceptable. Hence, we hold that  complainants  are  consumer
of opponents and defence of opponents is rejected.”
                         (emphasis supplied)

The National Commission has erred by applying the decision  in  M/s  Kusumam
Hotels Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) in holding that the appellant-Society  is  not
a consumer in terms of the definition under Section  2(d)  of  the  Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 as the purchase of tiles and laying in the same in  the
rooms of the girl’s hostel run by the appellant-Society is clearly  not  for
any commercial purpose. The decision in M/s Kusumam Hotels  Pvt.  Ltd.  case
(supra) has no application to the present  fact  situation  for  the  reason
that in the said case complainant was a hotel and  the  tiles  purchased  by
the hotel were for commercial purpose as the  hotel  business  involves  the
act of profit making, whereas in the  instant  case  the  girl’s  hostel  in
question  is  run  by  the  appellant-Society  as  one  among  its   various
charitable activities for the benefit of adivasi  students.  The  appellant-
Society is supporting adivasi/tribal girls  to  pursue  their  education  by
providing hostel facilities. The expenses for the food and  electricity  are
being  paid  by  the  inmates  of  the  hostel.  The  appellant-Society   is
maintaining the hostel free of cost and no charges  in  the  form  of  rent,
repairs and maintenance are collected from the inmates. Thus, the appellant-
Society cannot be considered as any commercial  establishment  striving  for
profit.
Further, the National  Commission  while  passing  the  impugned  order  has
ignored certain facts which throws light on callous attitude on the part  of
the respondents viz., when the defect in  the  tiles  were  brought  to  the
notice of the respondents by sending various letters, there  was  no  action
on their part. Later a local agent on behalf of the respondent  no.1-Company
visited the premises of the girl’s hostel and verified that the  said  tiles
were defective and damaged. However, no proper attention  was  paid  by  the
respondents towards the issue. Further, to assess the damage caused  to  the
appellant-Society by the use of  the  said  defective  tiles,  a  registered
architect and interior designer, J.M. Vimawala was hired by  the  appellant-
Society, who in his report declared the tiles to be defective  and  assessed
the  damage  to  the  appellant-Society  to  the  tune  of   Rs.4,27,712.37.
Thereafter, the appellant-Society made  a  demand  of  the  said  amount  as
damages from the respondents vide legal notice  dated  12.08.2002.  But  the
respondents did not pay any heed to the said  notice  as  well.  Because  of
such irresponsible and indifferent attitude on the part of the  respondents,
the appellant-Society was compelled to file Consumer Complaint  No.  743  of
2002 before the District Forum.
The District Forum, after appreciating the pleadings and evidence on  record
has rightly awarded Rs. 2 lakhs as damages to the appellant-Society  towards
defective tiles supplied by the respondents along with compensation  towards
mental harassment and cost of present proceedings  with  interest  @9%  p.a.
from the date of  complaint  till  its  recovery.  In  concurring  with  the
findings of the District Forum,  the  State  Commission,  after  proper  re-
appreciation of the facts and evidence on record has rightly  exercised  its
jurisdiction by dismissing the  appeal  of  the  respondents.  The  National
Commission should not have interfered with the concurrent findings  of  fact
recorded in the judgment impugned before it particularly  having  regard  to
the nature of the jurisdiction conferred  upon  it  by  Section  21  of  the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Section 21 of the aforesaid Act reads thus:
“21.  Jurisdiction  of  the  National  Commission.—Subject  to   the   other
provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction—
(a) to entertain—
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or  services  and  compensation,
if any, claimed exceeds rupees one crore; and
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; and
(b) to call for the records and pass  appropriate  orders  in  any  consumer
dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State  Commission
where it appears to the National Commission that such State  Commission  has
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to  exercise
a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of  its  jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity.”

The National Commission has to exercise the jurisdiction vested in  it  only
if the State Commission or the District Forum has either failed to  exercise
their jurisdiction or exercised when the same was  not  vested  in  them  or
exceeded  their  jurisdiction  by  acting   illegally   or   with   material
irregularity. In the instant case, the  National  Commission  has  certainly
exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent  finding  of  fact
recorded in the order passed by the State Commission  which  is  based  upon
valid and cogent reasons. The National Commission  has  reversed  the  order
passed by the State Commission by  wrongly  applying  the  decision  of  M/s
Kusumam Hotels Pvt. Ltd. case (supra) to the set of  facts  in  the  present
case. In the said case, the complainant was a hotel, it  was  considered  to
be a commercial entity and therefore, it was kept out of the purview of  the
definition of ‘consumer’ under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection  Act,
1986. However, the National Commission has failed  to  appreciate  the  fact
that in  the  present  case,  the  appellant-Society  is  not  a  commercial
establishment rather a registered society helping the  adivasi  students  in
their education by providing hostel facilities. The  charges,  if  any,  for
accommodation in the hostel are for  maintaining  the  hostel  and  not  for
making profit. Thus, the appellant-Society is consumer  within  the  meaning
of the term ‘consumer’ under Section 2(d) of the  Consumer  Protection  Act,
1986. The National Commission has erroneously accepted the contention  urged
on behalf of the respondents in the revisional proceedings  that  supply  of
tiles to the appellant-Society by respondent no. 1 through its  local  agent
is for commercial purpose. The said finding is based on the decision in  M/s
Kusumam Hotels  Pvt.  Ltd.  case  (supra),  which  case  absolutely  has  no
application to the fact situation.
Therefore, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the District  and  the
State Commission has  been  erroneously  interfered  with  by  the  National
Commission by passing the impugned order, which is liable to be  set  aside.
For  the  aforesaid  reasons,  the  appeal  of  the  appellant-Society  must
succeed.
For the reasons stated supra this appeal is allowed, the impugned  order  of
the National Commission is hereby set aside and we restore the order of  the
District Forum which is affirmed by the State  Commission.  The  matter  has
been  under  litigation  for  the  last  fourteen  years,  we   direct   the
respondents to pay or deposit the amount so awarded by  the  District  Forum
along with interest @9% p.a. within six weeks from the date  of  receipt  of
the copy of this judgment. The costs of  Rs.50,000/-  of  these  proceedings
are also awarded in favour of the appellant-Society.


……………………………………………………………CJI
[T.S. THAKUR]


………………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]


                                     ………………………………………………………………J.
[R. BANUMATHI]


New Delhi,
2nd August, 2016
-----------------------
[1]     III (1993) CPJ 333 (NC)

Tuesday, August 2, 2016

whether the suit filed by the appellant Madina Begum was barred by limitation in terms of the first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act, 1963 = the agreement between Gulab Bai and Madina Begum did not specify a calendar date as the date fixed for the performance of the agreement. Consequently, the view expressed in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi on the first part of Article 54 clearly applies to the facts of the case. In taking a contrary view, ignoring the absence of a specified date for the performance of the agreement and reversing the Trial Court, the High Court has fallen in error.; whether the High Court was right in merely deciding the issue of limitation in a first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure without going into the merits of the case. Quite recently, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar[3] this Court had occasion to consider the issue whether, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate court ought to decide all the issues before it or not.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6687 OF 2016

Madina Begum & Anr.                           .…Appellants
  versus
Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors.                   .…Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.     The two questions for our consideration are whether  the  suit  filed
by the appellant Madina Begum was barred  by  limitation  in  terms  of  the
first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  and
whether the High Court ought to have  decided  the  first  appeal  filed  by
Madina Begum not only on the preliminary issue of  limitation  but  also  on
all other issues.  As far as the first question is concerned our  answer  is
in the negative and as far as the  second  question  is  concerned,  in  our
opinion, the High Court ought to have  considered  all  the  issues  in  the
first appeal rather than only the preliminary issue of limitation.
2.     The land in dispute in this appeal  is  1.63  acres  of  agricultural
land bearing khasra nos. 438, 439,  440  and  456  (total  area  being  2.13
acres) in Patwari Halka No. 26 Gram Amkhera, Tehsil and District Jabalpur.
3.     There was a dispute about the title of the entire aforesaid land  and
to resolve that  dispute,  Gulab  Bai  claiming  to  be  the  owner  and  in
possession of the entire land, filed Suit No. 479A of 1994 in the  Court  of
the Additional District Judge in Jabalpur.  The defendants in the suit  were
Amar Singh and Jaswant Singh.  The prayer made by Gulab Bai  in  her  plaint
was for a declaration with regard to her title  and  possession.   She  also
prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants Amar Singh  and  Jaswant
Singh from interfering with her possession.
4.     On 2nd August, 2001 the suit was decreed in favour of Gulab  Bai  and
thereafter on 3rd September, 2001 she entered  into  an  agreement  to  sell
1.63 acres of agricultural  land  being  the  disputed  property  to  Madina
Begum.  The consideration for the sale was Rs. 4,89,000/- out  of  which  an
advance of Rs. 1,25,000/- was paid by Madina Begum to Gulab Bai.  This  fact
is recorded in the agreement to sell.
5.     What we are concerned with in this appeal is  the  interpretation  of
Clause 3 of the agreement to sell which reads as follows:-

“3 That Party no. 1 has sold 1.63 acres land at the rate of  Rs.  3,00,000/-
(Rs. Three lakh) per acre and  Party  no.  1  Gulab  Bai  has  obtained  Rs.
1,25,000/- (One lakh twenty five thousand) as  advance.   The  rest  of  the
amount of Rs. 3,64,000/- (Rs. Three lakh sixty four thousand) would be  paid
by Party no. 2 to Party no. 1 within the period  of  six  months  from  this
date and having received it the party no. 1 will execute Benama Registry  in
favour of Party no. 2 or any such person specified by party  no.  2  in  one
part or many parts.”

6.     Apparently on coming to know that Gulab Bai had agreed  to  sell  the
disputed land to Madina Begum an appeal being F.A. No.399 of 2001 was  filed
by Amar Singh and  Jaswant  Singh  in  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh
challenging the decree dated  2nd  August,  2001.   An  interim  application
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  was  filed
along with the appeal. The application was taken  up  for  consideration  on
22nd September, 2001 and while issuing notice  in  the  application  it  was
directed as follows:-
“In the meanwhile till the disposal of M(C) P.  No.  3231/2001,  status  quo
regarding possession over the suit property  shall  be  maintained  and  the
respondent shall not alienate the suit property.”

7.     On  16th  November,  2001  Gulab  Bai  executed  a  Will  (which  was
registered) in which she categorically mentioned  that  she  had  negotiated
the sale of 1.63 acres of land to Madina  Begum  and  had  given  possession
thereof to her but  the  remaining  amount  and  registration  of  the  sale
remained to be completed.  In her  Will,  Gulab  Bai  appointed  Shiv  Murti
Prasad Pandey  and  Devendra  Prasad  Pandey  (respondents  herein)  as  her
executors.  The Will mentioned that upon her demise, her  agricultural  land
except 1.63 acres will devolve on Shiv  Murti  Prasad  Pandey  and  Devendra
Prasad Pandey and in the event of her death before the registration  of  the
sale deed it would be their responsibility to execute and register the  sale
deed in favour of Madina Begum. Unfortunately, Gulab Bai passed away on  2nd
January, 2002.
8.     Thereafter, F.A. No. 399 of 2001 filed  by  Amar  Singh  and  Jaswant
Singh was heard by  the  High  Court  and  came  to  be  dismissed  on  28th
September, 2006.  We are told that the decree passed by the High  Court  has
attained finality.
9.     Upon the dismissal of the aforesaid appeal, it  appears  that  Madina
Begum required Shiv Murti  Prasad  Pandey  and  Devendra  Prasad  Pandey  to
execute the sale deed but apparently they did not take  any  steps  in  this
regard.  On the contrary, it appears that on or about 2nd August,  2008  the
land in dispute was mutated in the name of Anita Jain  pursuant  to  a  sale
made in her favour by Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey.
10. When Madina Begum came to know of the transfer  of  the  disputed  land,
she sent a notice to Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey  on
13th August, 2008 calling upon them to execute the sale  deed  in  terms  of
the agreement to sell dated 3rd September, 2001 and  the  Will  executed  by
Gulab Bai on 16th November, 2001.  The notice was replied to by  Shiv  Murti
Prasad Pandey and Devendra Prasad Pandey and we are told that they  declined
to execute the sale deed.  This led to Madina Begum  filing  a  suit,  inter
alia, for specific performance of the agreement being Suit No. 17A  of  2008
(perhaps renumbered later as 41A of 2010) in the  Court  of  the  Additional
District Judge, Jabalpur.
11. The defendants in the suit namely Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and  Devendra
Prasad Pandey and Anita Jain filed their written statement and  one  of  the
contentions raised was that the suit was barred by  limitation  having  been
instituted more than three years beyond the date specified in the  agreement
to sell dated 3rd September, 2001. It was also submitted that  Madina  Begum
had given an advance of only Rs. 90,000/- which had since been  returned  to
her and that on 19th November, 2001 the agreement to sell between Gulab  Bai
and Madina Begum was cancelled.
12. On the pleadings, one of the issues framed by the Trial Court was  issue
No. 8: Whether the suit is time barred?
13. The Trial Court considered the issue whether the suit  filed  by  Madina
Begum was barred by time and answered it in the negative.  It  was  held  in
paragraph 38 of the decision rendered on 1st February, 2011 as follows:-

“38. On perusal of the record it is gathered  that  agreement  Ex.  P-1  was
executed on 03.09.2001 and thereafter stay has been granted by Hon’ble  High
Court in first appeal  on  22.09.2001  but  the  first  appeal  was  finally
decided on 28.09.2006 vide Ex. P-5  since  it  was  dismissed  and  in  this
manner, the stay order had become ineffective  on  28.09.2006.   Thereafter,
the plaintiffs have sent notice to the defendants in August 2008 i.e.  after
two years from the date of decision in the first appeal which was  dismissed
on 28.09.2006 which was  done  within  prescribed  period  of  three  years.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had filed the  suit  beyond
the period of limitation with  a  view  to  harass  the  defendants.   Thus,
issues No. 8 and 9 are being answered against the defendants.”

14. Even though the issue of limitation was decided in her favour, the  suit
filed by Madina Begum was dismissed on  merits.  Feeling  aggrieved  by  the
dismissal of the suit on merits Madina Begum preferred First Appeal No.  175
of 2011 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and that  led  to  the  impugned
judgment and order dated 16th August, 2013.  The Division Bench hearing  the
appeal did not go into the merits of the dispute  between  the  parties  but
only adverted to the issue of limitation and since it  was  found  that  the
institution of the suit was barred by time (contrary to  the  conclusion  of
the Trial Court) there was no necessity of considering  the  merits  of  the
case.
15. In coming to the conclusion that the suit was barred by time,  the  High
Court considered Article 54 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act,  1963  (for
short, “the Act”).  The  discussion  thereon  was  brief  and  it  reads  as
follows:-

    “Under Article 54 of  the  Limitation  Act,  the  prescribed  period  of
limitation for filing a suit of specific performance of a contract is  three
years and the period of three years  has  to  be  calculated  based  on  two
contingencies i.e. the date fixed for performance of the contract or  if  no
such date is fixed, the date when the plaintiffs had  notice  about  refusal
of the performance by the defendants.  In this case, admittedly, a date  for
performance is fixed i.e. six months from  the  date  of  execution  of  the
contract and, therefore, as a specific period for performance is fixed,  the
period of limitation would be three years w.e.f.  3.03.2002  i.e.  the  date
when the period of six months for execution of the sale-deed lapsed.”

16. The High Court held that since the suit was barred  by  limitation,  the
Trial Court committed a grave error in recording a  finding  that  the  suit
was within limitation.
17. The interpretation of the first part of Article 54 of Schedule 1 of  the
Act is no longer res-integra. Article 54 reads as follows:-
|“54. |For specific performance of |Three years|The date fixed for the |
|     |a                           |           |performance, or, if no |
|     |contract                    |           |such date is fixed,    |
|     |                            |           |when the plaintiff has |
|     |                            |           |notice that performance|
|     |                            |           |is refused.”           |


18. In Ahmadsahab  Abdul  Mulla  (2)  (Dead)  v.  Bibijan  and  Ors.[1]  the
following question was considered by a three  judge  Bench  of  this  Court:
“Whether the use of  the  expression  “date”  used  in  Article  54  of  the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”) is  suggestive  of
a specific date in the calendar?”
19. While answering this question on a reference made  to  the  three  judge
Bench, this Court considered the meaning of  the  word  “date”  and  “fixed”
appearing in Article 54.  Upon such consideration, this Court held that  the
expression “date fixed for the performance” is a crystallized notion.   When
a date is fixed it means  there  is  a  definite  date  fixed  for  doing  a
particular act.   Therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  finding  out  the
intention from other circumstances.  It was reiterated that  the  expression
“date” is definitely  suggestive  of  a  specified  date  in  the  calendar.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Report in this  regard  are  of  importance  and
they read as follows:-

“11. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression “date  fixed  for  the
performance” is a crystallized notion.  This is clear  from  the  fact  that
the second part “time from which period begins to  run”  refers  to  a  case
where no such date is fixed.  To put it differently, when date is  fixed  it
means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act.   Even
in the second part the stress is on “when  the  plaintiff  has  notice  that
performance is refused”.  Here again, there is a  definite  point  of  time,
when the plaintiff notices the refusal.  In that sense both the parts  refer
to definite dates.  So, there is no question of  finding  out  an  intention
from other circumstances.

12. Whether the date  was  fixed  or  not  the  plaintiff  had  notice  that
performance is refused and the date  thereof  are  to  be  established  with
reference  to  materials  and  evidence  to  be  brought  on  record.    The
expression “date” used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the  Act  definitely
is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar.  We answer the  reference
accordingly.  The matter shall now be placed before the Division  Bench  for
deciding the issue on merits.”

20.    Quite independently and without reference to the aforesaid  decision,
another  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Rathnavathi  and  Another   v.   Kavita
Ganashamdas[2] came to the same conclusion.  It was held in paragraph 42  of
the Report that a mere reading of Article 54 would show that if the date  is
fixed for the performance of an  agreement,  then  non-compliance  with  the
agreement on the date would give a cause  of  action  to  file  a  suit  for
specific performance within three years from the date so  fixed.   But  when
no such date is fixed, the limitation of three years would  begin  when  the
plaintiff has notice that the defendant has refused the performance  of  the
agreement.  It was further held, on the facts of the case that  it  did  not
fall in the first category of Article 54 since no  date  was  fixed  in  the
agreement for its performance.
21.    The Clauses of the agreement for consideration  in  Rathnavathi  were
Clauses 2 and 3 and they read as follows:-

 “2. The purchaser shall pay a sum of  Rs.  50,000  (Rupees  fifty  thousand
only) as advance to the seller at the time of signing  this  agreement,  the
receipt of which  the  seller  hereby  acknowledges  and  the  balance  sale
consideration amount shall be paid within 60 days from the  date  of  expiry
of lease period.
3.  The seller covenants with the purchaser that efforts will be  made  with
the Bangalore  Development  Authority  for  the  transfer  of  the  schedule
property in favour of the purchaser after paying penalty.   In  case  it  is
not possible then the time stipulated herein for  the  balance  payment  and
completion of the sale transaction  will  be  agreed  mutually  between  the
parties.”

22.    As far as the present appeal  is  concerned,  the  agreement  between
Gulab Bai and Madina Begum did not specify  a  calendar  date  as  the  date
fixed  for  the  performance  of  the  agreement.  Consequently,  the   view
expressed in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi on  the  first  part  of
Article 54 clearly applies to the facts of the case. In  taking  a  contrary
view, ignoring the absence of a specified date for the  performance  of  the
agreement and reversing the Trial  Court,  the  High  Court  has  fallen  in
error.
23. It is not necessary for  us  to  multiply  authorities  on  the  subject
particularly when the issue has been conclusively  settled  by  a  Bench  of
three learned judges of this Court in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and we  see  no
reason to take a different view.
24. The second question that requires  consideration  is  whether  the  High
Court was right in merely deciding  the  issue  of  limitation  in  a  first
appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure  without  going
into  the  merits  of  the  case.   Quite  recently,  in  Vinod   Kumar   v.
Gangadhar[3] this Court had occasion to consider the  issue  whether,  under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate  court  ought
to decide all the issues before it or not.  Reference was  made  to  a  very
large number of decisions rendered by  this  Court  and  it  was  concluded,
particularly relying upon Madhukar v.  Sangram[4]  decided  by  a  Bench  of
three learned judges of this Court that sitting as a court of  first  appeal
it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the  issues  and  evidence
led by the parties before recording its findings.
25. In so far as the present  appeal  is  concerned,  the  High  Court  only
considered the issue of limitation and did not consider the other issues  in
the appeal. This was impermissible. The result  is  that  since  we  do  not
agree with the view taken by the High Court  on  the  issue  of  limitation,
there is no option but to set aside the view expressed  by  the  High  Court
and following the decisions of this Court, remand the  matter  to  the  High
Court to decide the  remaining  issues  in  the  first  appeal  filed  under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
26. It is a little unfortunate that the  parties  have  to  undergo  another
round of litigation which could easily have  been  avoided  if  the  settled
legal principles laid down by this Court from time to time were followed  in
regard to the requirements of Section 96 of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.
This is quite apart from the delay caused in the resolution of  the  dispute
between the parties.
27. In view of our discussion,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 16th August, 2013  is  set  aside
and the matter is remanded to the High  Court  for  deciding  the  remaining
issues in the appeal on merits.


      ...………………….J                                                 (Madan B.
                                                                      Lokur)



                                                                 ..………………….J

New     Delhi;                                                         (R.K.
Agrawal)
August 1, 2016
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[1]  (2009) 5 SCC 462
[2]  (2015) 5 SCC 223
[3]  (2015) 1 SCC 391
[4]  (2001) 4 SCC 756