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Saturday, February 6, 2016

mere non mentioning of two of the names in the F.I.R cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution.=“149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object: If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence”.=when we examine the case on hand, the motive for the alleged assault is the grudge of the accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das who contested in the college student election in which P.W.8 also contested, who stated to have ultimately won the elections. According to the case of the prosecution, all the appellants gathered under a mango tree and the recoveries made at that spot disclose, whisky bottles etc., to show that they were waiting at the place of occurrence. The recovery of bhujali and the cover at the place of occurrence as disclosed in the inquest report supported by the version of P.W.13, investigating officer, clearly proved that the assailants while waiting at the spot, shared their common object. The common object shared by them resulted in the assault on P.W.8. We can deduce from the evidence of P.W.8 that at the spot, he could notice the accused making their appearance from behind a mango tree with each one of them holding a deadly weapon. According to P.W.8, accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das was holding a sword; A1 was holding a Bhujali and rest of the accused were holding cycle chains. On seeing their sudden appearance, while riding the motor cycle, P.W.11 apparently lost control and in that process, it is narrated by P.W.8 and 11 that accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das gave a sword blow to P.W.8 on his face and when P.W.11 fell down from the motorcycle along with P.W.8, A3 and A4 stated to have held the deceased while accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das dealt a sword blow on the backside of the head of the deceased, who cried for help. A1, stated to have inflicted Bhujali blow on the left scapula of the deceased and when A1 attempted to inflict another blow with the bhujali, the deceased stated to have attempted to catch hold of the bhujali and sustained injuries on his left hand. While the accused were thus inflicting injuries on P.W.11, P.W.8 they made an attempt to flee, when accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das dealt a sword blow on the left chest of P.W.8. When P.W.11, attempted to run away, A2 Pitambar kicked more than thrice and on seeking a Trekker moving in that direction, the appellants stated to have ran away, which was noticed by P.W.7 who was crossing that side along with one Debendra Padhi who was not examined. In the evidence of P.W.7, 8 and 11, it is clearly noted that the appellants participated in the crime and all five of them ran away from the place of occurrence after causing severe injuries on the deceased as well as P.Ws.8 and 11. Having regard to the said evidence, as spoken to by P.Ws.7, 8 and 11, there can be no room for doubt about the presence of all the five appellants at the place of occurrence.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.244 OF 2009

Susanta Das & Ors.                                 …Appellants

                                   VERSUS

State of Orissa                                    …Respondent

                                    With

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1523 of 2015

Ashok Das alias Gopal Das                          …Appellant

                                   VERSUS

State of Orissa                                    …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T

FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA

These two appeals arise out of a common judgment  dated  15.10.2008,  passed
in Criminal Appeal No.251 of 1997 preferred by the accused-Ashok  Das  alias
Gopal Das and Government Appeal No.20 of 1999 as against  the  acquittal  of
accused Nos.1   to 4.


As per the case of the prosecution on 03.04.1996, at about 04.00  p.m.  when
P.Ws.8, 11 and the deceased Padma Lochan Jena were proceeding  from  Bhadrak
to Agarapada  in  a  Rajdoot  Motorcycle,  about  half  a  kilometer  before
Kadabaranga Chhaka, the accused numbering five, each one of them armed  with
deadly weapons obstructed them and when the three persons tried  to  escape,
the accused chased them and assaulted them with the aid of the weapons  held
by them.  At that point of time, a trekker passed through the  road  and  on
seeing the same, the accused persons fled away.   The  trekker  however  did
not stop, but P.W.7 along with one Debendra Padhi who were  also  proceeding
on that road in a motorcycle stopped at the place of occurrence, helped  the
deceased as well as P.Ws.8 and 11 who were also injured by shifting them  to
a hospital in a mini bus called  Santoshi  coming  on  that  road  and  that
before they could reach the hospital the deceased Padma Lochan succumbed  to
the injuries.


At the hospital P.W.1,  the  uncle  of  the  deceased,  who  rushed  to  the
hospital on hearing the news of the death of the deceased,  after  gathering
the information from P.Ws.8 and 11 as to how the  deceased  along  with  the
injured eye witnesses were assaulted  by  the  accused,  lodged  the  F.I.R.
(Ex.1) by around 5.45 p.m. The injured were attended by  P.W.12  Doctor  who
issued the injury reports (Exs.7 & 8).  P.W.9, Dr.  S.  N.  Panda  conducted
autopsy on the body of  the  deceased  and  issued  Ex.6,  the  post  mortem
report.  Though P.W.10, the passenger in the Trekker was cited and  examined
as an eye witness to the  occurrence,  did  not  support  the  case  of  the
prosecution. P.Ws.13 and 14 were the investigating officers  and  the  major
portion of the investigation was conducted by  P.W.13.  P.W.13  recovered  a
Bhujali and the cover of  the  Bhujali  (M.Os.II  &  III)  and  the  wearing
apparels of the injured and the deceased (M.Os.IX & XI).  M.O.I  is  a  pair
of chappal, which  was  also  recovered  along  with  other  articles  viz.,
plastic comb, plastic glass, whisky and rum bottles. Ex.2  was  the  inquest
report and Ex.10 was the dead body challan. Exs.3  to  5  and  12  were  the
different seizure lists.  Ex.9 was the crime detailed form while  Exs.14  to
18 are the documents in support of  sending  M.Os.  to  the  State  Forensic
Science Laboratory and the report received therefrom.


On behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 14 were examined and on the side  of
the defence, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.D & D/1 were  marked.   The  accused
were arrested on  different  dates.   The  first  accused  was  arrested  on
06.04.1996, the second accused was arrested on  11.04.1996,  the  third  and
fourth  accused  surrendered  before  Court  on  12.07.1996  and  19.07.1996
respectively. Accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das was arrested on  19.03.1997.
 The wearing apparels of the first accused was recovered which  was  stained
with blood, but the same was not sent for chemical analysis.


The appellants were charged for the offences under Sections 147,  148,  341,
326, 307, 302 r/w Section 149 I.P.C.  The accused  denied  the  charges  and
were tried by the Sessions Court.  Though the accused were charged  for  the
offence under Section 149, the Trial Court  while  analyzing  the  evidence,
both the eye witnesses account, medical  evidence,  as  well  as  the  other
evidence, took the view that there was no clinching evidence to support  the
individual role played by each  of  the  accused  except  accused-Ashok  Das
alias Gopal Das and consequently  while  acquitting  A1  to  A4,  ultimately
convicted the accused-Ashok Das  alias  Gopal  Das  for  the  offence  under
Section 302 I.P.C. for the killing of the deceased  Padma  Lochan  Jena  and
for causing grievous hurt on P.W.8, convicted  him  for  the  offence  under
Section 326 I.P.C.   He  was  acquitted  of  the  offence  under  the  other
Sections by granting the benefit of doubt.  Ultimately, he was imposed  with
the punishment of imprisonment for life for the offence  under  Section  302
I.P.C and three years R.I for the  offence  under  Section  326  I.P.C.  and
directed the punishment to run concurrently.


As against the said  conviction  and  sentence  imposed,  accused-Ashok  Das
alias Gopal Das preferred Criminal Appeal No.251 of 1997 while the State  of
Orissa preferred Government Appeal No.20 of 1999 against  the  acquittal  of
A1 to A4.  As stated earlier, the High Court by the impugned judgment  while
reversing the acquittal of A1 to A4 found them guilty of the offences  under
Section 302 r/w 149 I.P.C., Sections 148,  326  r/w  149,  307  r/w  149  of
I.P.C. and imposed them with the sentence of imprisonment for life  for  the
offence under Section 302 r/w 149 I.P.C. and they were acquitted of  offence
under Section 307 r/w 149 of I.P.C. Thus, convicting them for offence  under
Section 302 r/w 149 did not impose  a  separate  sentence  for  the  offence
under Section 326 r/w 149 and 148 I.P.C.  The appeal preferred  by  accused-
Ashok Das alias Gopal Das was dismissed. It is as against the  above  common
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, the appellants are  before
us.


We heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel  for  the  appellants  in
Crl.A.No.244  of  2009,  Mr.Anup  Kumar,  learned  Amicus  Curiae  for   the
appellant in Crl.A.No.1523 of 2015 and we also heard  Mr.  Ashok  Panigrahi,
learned counsel for the respondent State.


Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants,  after  taking
us through the evidence of P.Ws.1, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13 as well as Ex.7/1  and
8/2 and certain other documents  and  also  the  conclusions  drawn  by  the
learned Trial Judge and the analysis made by the Division Bench of the  High
Court, submitted that the offence under Section 302 as well as 326  r/w  149
was not made out in as much as though P.Ws.8 and 9 claim to be  injured  eye
witnesses, their evidence did not support the case of  the  prosecution  for
invoking Section 149 of I.P.C.


According to the learned Senior Counsel,  though  Ex.1,  F.I.R  came  to  be
lodged at 5.45 p.m. at the instance  of  P.W.1,  who  lodged  his  complaint
based on the information furnished by  P.Ws.8  and  11,  significantly,  the
names of all the accused were not mentioned in the F.I.R  and  even  in  the
Section 161 statement of P.W.8 and 11, the names of  all  the  accused  were
not mentioned.  The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that  in  none  of
the contemporaneous documents either  prepared  by  P.W.13  or  the  medical
reports, there was any specific reference to the names of all  the  accused,
in particular, the appellants for whom he appeared, in a  consistent  manner
in order to implicate  them  either  for  the  offence  of  killing  of  the
deceased or for causing any injury on P.Ws.8 and  11.   The  learned  Senior
Counsel therefore contended that in the light of the said  fact  viz.,  lack
of  necessary  evidence  to  show  the  participation  of  all  the  accused
together, the invocation of Section 149 I.P.C to rope in the appellants  for
whom he appeared was not made out and  consequently,  the  reversal  of  the
judgment of the Trial Court by the High Court  was  not  justified  and  the
appellants in Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2009 viz., A1  to  A4  were  rightly
acquitted by the Trial Court giving them the benefit of doubt.


Mr. Anup Kumar, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant in Crl.A.No.1523  of
2015 in his submissions contended that he was alleged to have used  a  sword
in the occurrence, which was neither seized  nor  recovered;  there  was  no
blood stained cloth of the said accused recovered of  him;  that  there  was
delay in forwarding the F.I.R to  the  learned  Magistrate;  that  the  non-
examination of the person who accompanied P.W.7 was fatal  to  the  case  of
the prosecution; that the so called eye witness P.W.10 who claimed  to  know
two of the accused viz.,  A1  and  A2  did  not  support  the  case  of  the
prosecution and therefore on that ground as well, the conviction  is  liable
to be set aside.  The learned counsel also submitted that  no  reliance  can
be placed upon the version of  P.W.11  against  whom  a  criminal  case  was
pending.


As against the above submissions of the learned  counsel  for  the  accused,
the learned standing counsel for the respondent State argued that there  was
specific reference about each of the accused  in  the  evidence  which  came
into existence at the earliest point of  time.   According  to  the  learned
counsel, the reference to involvement of A1  to  A4  and  accused-Ashok  Das
alias Gopal Das along with two others was specifically  mentioned  by  P.W.1
in his complaint, which came to be noted in the F.I.R  (Ex.1)  and  that  in
the Section 161 statement of P.W.8  the  names  of  A1  and  A3  along  with
accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das was  specifically  referred.   Though  the
learned standing counsel fairly submitted that there  was  no  reference  to
the role played by A2 in any of the reports or statements, which  came  into
existence at the earliest  point  of  time,  the  learned  standing  counsel
contended that the statement of P.Ws.1, 8 and the F.I.R amply  disclose  the
involvement of A1, A3, A4 and accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das  apart  from
the fact  that  the  medical  evidence  fully  supported  the  case  of  the
prosecution.  The  learned  standing  counsel  placed  reliance   upon   the
decisions reported in Rotash Vs. State of Rajasthan  -  (2006)  12  SCC  64,
Mritunjoy Biswas Vs. Pranab alias Kuti Biswas and another -  (2013)  12  SCC
796 and Bishna alias Bhiswadeb Mahato and others Vs. State of W.B. -  (2005)
12 SCC 657. On behalf  of  the  appellants  reliance  was  placed  upon  the
decision reported in Ajit Savant Majagvai Vs. State of Karnataka - (1997)  7
SCC 110.


Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned  counsel
for the respondent State and having bestowed our  serious  consideration  to
the materials placed before us and the judgments  of  the  Trial  Court  and
that of the High Court, we are convinced that no interference is called  for
with the impugned judgment.


While discussing about the various  contentions  raised  on  behalf  of  the
appellants, since we are  concerned  with  the  conviction  imposed  on  the
appellants, for the offence  under  Section  302  I.P.C.  with  the  aid  of
Section 149 I.P.C., it will be necessary to clearly set out  the  nature  of
offence detailed in Section 149 I.P.C. Section 149 reads as under :


“149. Every member of unlawful  assembly  guilty  of  offence  committed  in
prosecution of common object: If an offence is committed by  any  member  of
an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of  that  assembly,
or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely  to  be  committed
in prosecution of that  object,  every  person  who,  at  the  time  of  the
committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is  guilty  of
that offence”.





When  we  read  Section  149,  since  at  the  very  outset  it  refers   to
participation of  each  member  of  an  unlawful  assembly,  it  has  to  be
necessarily shown that there was an assembly of five or more persons,  which
is designated as unlawful assembly under  Section  149  I.P.C.   When  once,
such a participation of five or more persons is shown,  who  indulge  in  an
offence as a member of  such  an  unlawful  assembly,  for  the  purpose  of
invoking Section 149, it is not necessary that there must be specific  overt
act played by each of the  member  of  such  an  unlawful  assembly  in  the
commission of an offence. What is required to be shown is the  participation
as a member in pursuance of a common object  of  the  assembly  or  being  a
member of that assembly, such person  knew  as  to  what  is  likely  to  be
committed in prosecution of any such common object.  In  the  event  of  the
proof of showing of either of the above conduct of a member of  an  unlawful
assembly, the offence, as stipulated in Section 149, will stand proved.   In
fact,  the  said  prescription  contained  in  Section  149  has  been  duly
understood by the Division Bench by making reference to some of the  earlier
decisions of this Court.  In this  context,  the  Division  Bench  chose  to
follow the decisions of this Court reported in  Rajendran  and  another  Vs.
State of T.N.  –  (2004)  10  SCC  689  and  Bishna  (supra),  wherein,  the
description contained in Section 149 I.P.C and in what  cases,  and  against
whom, the said provision can be applied has been clearly set out.


Keeping the above legal position pertaining to application of  Section  149,
when we examine the case on hand, the motive for the alleged assault is  the
grudge of the accused-Ashok  Das  alias  Gopal  Das  who  contested  in  the
college student election in which P.W.8 also contested, who stated  to  have
ultimately won the elections. According to the case of the prosecution,  all
the appellants gathered under a mango tree and the recoveries made  at  that
spot disclose, whisky bottles etc., to show that they were  waiting  at  the
place of occurrence. The recovery of bhujali and the cover at the  place  of
occurrence as disclosed in the inquest report supported by  the  version  of
P.W.13, investigating officer, clearly  proved  that  the  assailants  while
waiting at the spot, shared their common object.  The common  object  shared
by them resulted in the assault on P.W.8.  We can deduce from  the  evidence
of P.W.8 that at  the  spot,  he  could  notice  the  accused  making  their
appearance from behind a mango tree with each one of them holding  a  deadly
weapon.  According to P.W.8, accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das  was  holding
a sword; A1 was holding a Bhujali and  rest  of  the  accused  were  holding
cycle chains.  On seeing their sudden appearance,  while  riding  the  motor
cycle, P.W.11 apparently lost control and in that process,  it  is  narrated
by P.W.8 and 11 that accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das gave a sword blow  to
P.W.8 on his face and when P.W.11 fell down from the motorcycle  along  with
P.W.8, A3 and A4 stated to have held the deceased  while  accused-Ashok  Das
alias Gopal Das dealt a sword blow on  the  backside  of  the  head  of  the
deceased, who cried for help. A1, stated to have inflicted Bhujali  blow  on
the left scapula of the deceased and when A1 attempted  to  inflict  another
blow with the bhujali, the deceased stated to have attempted to  catch  hold
of the bhujali and sustained injuries on his left hand.


While the accused were thus inflicting injuries on P.W.11, P.W.8  they  made
an attempt to flee, when accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal  Das  dealt  a  sword
blow on the left chest of P.W.8.  When P.W.11, attempted  to  run  away,  A2
Pitambar kicked more than thrice and on seeking a  Trekker  moving  in  that
direction, the appellants stated to have ran  away,  which  was  noticed  by
P.W.7 who was crossing that side along with one Debendra Padhi who  was  not
examined. In the evidence of P.W.7, 8 and 11, it is clearly noted  that  the
appellants participated in the crime and all five of them ran away from  the
place of occurrence after causing severe injuries on the  deceased  as  well
as P.Ws.8 and 11.  Having regard to the  said  evidence,  as  spoken  to  by
P.Ws.7, 8 and 11, there can be no room for doubt about the presence  of  all
the five appellants at the place of occurrence.


It must be stated that P.Ws.8 and  11  while  undergoing  treatment  at  the
hospital, immediately after the occurrence  viz.,  between  04.00  p.m.  and
05.45 p.m. informed P.W.1, the  uncle  of  the  deceased,  who  reached  the
hospital. P.W.1 who gathered the information from P.Ws.8 and 11  as  to  how
and in what manner and by whom the injuries came to  be  inflicted,  in  his
complaint which he lodged at 5.45 p.m. made  a  specific  reference  to  the
names of A1, A4 and accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das along with two  others
who were armed with bhujalis, swords and cycle chain caused the injuries  on
the deceased and P.Ws.8 and  11.   Similarly,  the  immediate  statement  of
P.W.8, disclose the specific mention of A1, A3 and accused-Ashok  Das  alias
Gopal Das and the serious injuries  inflicted  by  accused-Ashok  Das  alias
Gopal Das on the deceased  as  well  as  P.Ws.8  &  11.  Similarly,  in  the
immediate statement of P.W.11, he specifically referred to the names of  A1,
A3 and accused-Ashok Das alias  Gopal  Das  and  the  manner  in  which  the
injuries were inflicted upon them.


A cumulative consideration of the evidence of P.Ws.1,  7,  8  and  11  amply
disclose that there were five who were involved  in  the  occurrence,  viz.,
accused 1 to 4 and  accused-Ashok  Das  alias  Gopal  Das,  apart  from  the
specific role played by each one  of  them.  Having  regard  to  the  motive
related to which the appellants stated to have nurtured  a  grievance  which
resulted in the assault on the deceased and P.Ws.8 and 11 and  all  of  whom
being known to the injured eye witnesses and accused-Ashok Das  alias  Gopal
Das being known to P.W.7, there is no reason to  disbelieve  their  version.
Therefore,  the  involvement  and  the  extent  of  participation   by   the
appellants has been sufficiently established by  the  prosecution  with  the
required evidence.


As far as the injuries sustained by the deceased as well as P.Ws.8  and  11,
the High Court has noted specifically about the injuries  as  was  noted  by
P.W.9 in the Post Mortem report, which was inflicted on the deceased at  the
time of the occurrence which when compared with the oral evidence spoken  to
by P.W.8, the High Court has found that the  same  fully  tallied  with  the
oral evidence of P.W.8. In paragraph  14,  the  High  Court  has  noted  the
various injuries and the evidence of P.W.8 in support of the said injuries.


Similarly in paragraphs 15 and 16,  the  High  Court  has  referred  to  the
injuries sustained by P.Ws.8 and 11, which were spoken  to  by  P.W.12,  who
attended on them and has found that the evidence of P.Ws.8 and 11 was  fully
corroborated by the medical evidence and thus there was no  scope  to  doubt
their version as to the manner in which the injuries were inflicted  on  the
deceased as well as the injured P.Ws.8 and  11.   Thus,  we  find  that  the
appreciation of evidence  of  the  eye  witnesses  account,  the  supporting
version of the other witnesses read along with the expert  medical  opinion,
again supported by the Post Mortem report and the injury  report,  there  is
no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the  Division
Bench in the impugned judgment.


When we consider the submission of the appellants, in the  first  place,  it
was contended that the participation of the five accused was not  duly  made
out.  As far as the said contention is concerned, we have noted  extensively
the evidence both oral as well as documentary to show  as  to  how  all  the
five accused were duly present at the  place  of  occurrence,  in  order  to
attract Section 149 I.P.C. We have also found  that  based  on  the  medical
evidence as well as the injured  eye  witnesses  account  to  show  how  the
appellants  revealed  their  common  object   in   the   course   of   their
participation when the deceased and the  injured  witnesses  were  inflicted
with serious injuries with the aid of deadly weapons and  consequently  none
of the accused could escape from the invocation of  Section  149  I.P.C.  in
the murder of the deceased falling under Section 302 I.P.C. as well  as  the
grievous injuries caused on P.Ws.8 and 11.


The attempt of the learned Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  by  making
reference to Exs.7, 1, 8 and 2 wherein, there was  some  omission  to  refer
the names of some of the appellants, are  so  trivial  as  compared  to  the
overwhelming evidence both oral as well as documentary to  reject  the  said
contention.  Though the  learned  senior  counsel  attempted  to  show  some
contradiction in the evidence of P.Ws.1, 7, 8 and 11,  having  gone  through
the evidence in detail and the appreciation made by the  Division  Bench  of
the High Court, we find no serious dent in the evidence of  those  witnesses
which was otherwise supported by the expert medical evidence in the form  of
oral version of P.Ws.9 and 12 supported by injury  report  and  post  mortem
report.  We are not therefore persuaded to take a different view  than  what
has been taken by the  High  Court.   Since  the  Trial  Court  doubted  the
presence of all the accused and had proceeded to hold only  as  against  the
accused-Ashok Das alias Gopal Das by relying upon  the  specific  overt  act
alleged  against  him,  while  the  evidence  rendered  on  behalf  of   the
prosecution fully establish the participation of  all  the  accused  in  the
offence, we are convinced that the principles laid  down  in  the  decisions
referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel  for  the  appellants  in
such situations did show that the conclusions drawn by  the  Division  Bench
in the impugned judgments was fully justified and it has  duly  applied  the
principles set  out  in  the  decision  reported  in  Ajit  Savant  Majagvai
(supra). In paragraph 16 of the said judgment this Court has spelt  out  the
principles while hearing an appeal by the High Court against  the  order  of
acquittal passed by the trial Court, as to in what manner  the  appreciation
of evidence could be made and the conclusions can be drawn.


That apart, we find the  decisions  relied  upon  by  the  learned  standing
counsel for the State as reported in Rotash  (supra)  and  Mritunjoy  Biswas
(supra) duly supported the submissions. In the decision reported  in  Rotash
(supra), in paragraph 14, this Court has held as under:


“14. The first information report, as is well known, is not an  encyclopedia
of the entire case. It need  not  contain  all  the  details.  We,  however,
although did not intend to ignore the importance of naming of an accused  in
the first information report, but herein we  have  seen  that  he  had  been
named in the earliest possible opportunity. Even  assuming  that  P.W.1  did
not name him in the first information report, we do not find any  reason  to
disbelieve the statement of Mooli Dev, P.W.6. The question is as to  whether
a person was implicated by way of an afterthought  or  not  must  be  judged
having regard to the  entire  factual  scenario  obtaining  in  the  case……”
(Emphasis added)





In the decision reported in Mritunjoy Biswas (supra) in  paragraphs  22  and
23, this Court by referring to the earlier decisions  has  noted  the  legal
principles as to how a person not named in the F.I.R when proceeded  against
can be considered.  Paragraphs 22 and 23 can  be  usefully  referred,  which
are as under:-


“22. In Mulla v. State of U.P. the accused persons were  not  named  in  the
FIR. Taking into consideration the material brought  on  record,  the  Court
observed that though none was named in the FIR, yet subsequently  the  names
of the appellants had come into light during investigation and, hence,  non-
mentioning the names of the accused  persons  would  not  be  fatal  to  the
prosecution case.


23. In Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. , after referring  to  the  authorities
Rotash, Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., Pedda  Narayana  v.  State  of  A.P.,
Sone Lal v. State of U.P.,  Gurnam  Kaur  v.  Bakshish  Singh  and  Kirender
Sarkar v. State of Assam, the Court opined that:  (Ranjit  Singh  case,  SCC
p.344, para 14)


“14….in case the informant fails to name a particular accused  in  the  FIR,
and the said accused  is  named  at  the  earliest   opportunity,  when  the
statements of witnesses are recorded, it cannot tilt the balance  in  favour
of the accused.”


   (Emphasis added)





When we apply the above principles  to  the  facts  of  this  case,  we  are
convinced that the  implication  of  all  the  five  accused  was  perfectly
justified and was supported by legal  evidence  as  was  spoken  to  by  the
relevant witnesses which was duly  corroborated  by  the  medical  evidence.
Therefore, mere non mentioning of two of the names in the  F.I.R  cannot  be
fatal to the case of the prosecution.


As far as the submission made on the ground that some of  the  weapons  were
not recovered,  expert  opinion  relating  to  blood  stain  and  the  delay
involved in forwarding the F.I.R to the Magistrate, non examination  of  the
person who accompanied P.W.7, the hostility displayed by P.W.10,  where  all
though sought to be relied upon heavily on behalf of the  accused,  we  find
that those facts do not materially affect the case of the prosecution.


In so far as the alleged delay in forwarding the F.I.R  to  the  Magistrate,
we find that the High Court was conscious of the said fact and  has  made  a
specific reference to  the  said  fact  in  paragraph  24  of  the  impugned
judgment wherein, it ultimately held that there was no  material  on  record
to show or suggest that the F.I.R was tampered or it  was  fabricated  at  a
later date by antedating it or the delay in sending the F.I.R  by  P.W.3  or
the delay in placing it before SDJM by the Sub Inspector of  Police  or  the
delay in signing the F.I.R by SDJM on 06.04.1996 was so very vital to  doubt
the case of the prosecution.  We fully concur with the said  view  expressed
by the Division Bench.


Having regard to our above conclusion, we do  not  find  any  merit  in  the
appeals, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed.


Having regard to the able assistance rendered by the learned  Amicus  Curiae
Mr. Anup Kumar, we recommend a fee of Rs.10,000/- to be paid to him.





                                                 ……………………………………………………………….J.


                                          [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]











                                                 ………….………………………………………………….J.


                                                          [Uday Umesh Lalit]


New Delhi


January 06, 2016

Hindi Vidyapeeth Deoghar wherein it has been mentioned that any recognition given to such degrees including Sahityaalankar is only for the purpose of Hindi examination and not at par with graduation or equivalence = the validity of Sahityaalankar degree from the Hindi Vidyapeeth Deoghar and its equivalence with the graduation degree has been considered in detail by the Patna High Court in subsequent decisions filed by the State of Bihar in CWJC No.13343/2011 and several other connected matters. It is submitted that in the above batch matters, High Court has rejected the claim of the petitioners thereon that the Degree of Sahityaalankar is equivalent to graduation degree and the State of Bihar heavily relies upon the said judgment in CWJC No.13343/2011 and batch matters. It was also submitted that the letter dated 11.01.1991 should be read in consonance with earlier circular with respect to Hindi Vidyapeeth Deoghar wherein it has been mentioned that any recognition given to such degrees including Sahityaalankar is only for the purpose of Hindi examination and not at par with graduation or equivalence and in this regard reliance is placed upon Press Note dated 05.05.1988 issued by the Central Government. Having regard to the stand of the appellants and reliance placed upon order dated 25.11.2008 and the Press Note dated 05.05.1988 and the subsequent decision in CWJC 13343/2011 etc. and in the interest of justice without commenting on the merit of the case, we deem it necessary to remit the matter back to the High Court for consideration afresh.

                                         NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

            CIVIL APPEAL NO.4274 OF 2014

State of Bihar & Ors.                                        ..Appellants
                                   Versus
Sanjay Kumar
..Respondent
                                    WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4273 OF 2014

State of Bihar & Ors.                                      ...Appellants
                                   Versus
Azad Kumar Singh                                     ...Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

      R. BANUMATHI, J.

            These appeals have been filed challenging  the  common  impugned
order dated 17.11.2009 passed by the Patna  High  Court  allowing  the  writ
petitions in CWJC Nos. 5129/2009 and 18039/2009  filed  by  the  respondents
herein and directing  the  appellant-State  of  Bihar  to  redo  the  entire
selection process for the post of Librarian  considering  the  case  of  the
respondents also and further restraining the State from issuing  appointment
letters to other selected candidates.
2.          Brief facts giving rise to these appeals are  as  under:-  State
of Bihar  framed  Bihar  District  Council,  Secondary  &  Higher  Secondary
Teacher (Employment & Service Conditions) Manual  2006  under  Article  243G
and Section 73 read with Section 146 of  Bihar  State  Panchayat  Raj   Act,
2006.  Rule 4(k) (vii) (a) of the said Rules was amended in 2008.  The  said
amendment  prescribes  an  essential  qualification  for   appointments   of
teachers and librarians in the schools  and  also  regulating  appointments.
As  per  amended  Rule  4  for  appointment  as   teachers/librarians,   the
candidates  must  possess  the  graduation  degree   from   any   recognized
university   with   minimum   45%   marks.    An    advertisement    bearing
No.11/employment1-13/91(Part-II)-1337  dated  25.08.2008   was   issued   by
Government  of  Bihar,  Human  Resources  and  Development  Department   for
appointment to the post of Librarian and Teacher in different schools  under
Zila  Parishad  and  Nagar  Nikaya  in  the  State  of  Bihar.    The   said
advertisement specifically referred to Recruitment Rules 2006  although  the
qualification or eligibility criteria was not specifically mentioned.
3.          Respondents herein applied for the  posts  of  Librarian.  After
the advertisement was issued,  the  Department  issued  order  No.  11/Ma.1-
01/2008  on  27.08.2008  containing  exhaustive   list   of   twenty   eight
colleges/universities/degrees  that  were  not  then   recognized   by   the
Government of Bihar for the purpose of the Recruitment Rules  2006  and  the
advertisement  dated  25.08.2008  and  those  degrees  were  not  valid  for
employment of  teachers.   The  Department  issued  another  Order  No.11/M-
44/2008-1968 (Annexure P/5) on  25.11.2008  declaring  that  the  degree  of
Sahityaalankar awarded by Deoghar Vidyapeeth is not  valid  for  employment.
The State Government issued a letter dated 27.07.2007 clarifying  the  stand
of the State regarding the degree of Sahityaalankar  awarded  by  Vidyapeeth
Deoghar is not equivalent  to  degree  of  graduation  for  the  purpose  of
appointment under Bihar Education District  Council,  Secondary  and  Higher
Secondary Teachers (Employment/  Services)  Rules  2006.  The  letter  dated
27.07.2007 was subject matter of challenge in  Writ  Petition  No.  15237/07
titled Pramod Paswan vs. State of Bihar and in the said Writ  Petition,  the
State was directed to take  a  fresh  decision  on  the  same.    The  State
Government examined the matter and vide  Memo  No.  11/M-44/2008-1968  dated
25.11.2008, it was declared that the degree  of  Sahityaalankar  awarded  by
Deoghar  Vidyapeeth  is  not  valid  for  employment.  On   13.12.2008,  the
Government of Bihar, Human Resources Development Department,  issued  letter
No.11/Na.1-9/2008-2053 wherein  inter–alia  it  was  specifically  mentioned
that the degree of Sahityaalankar awarded by Deoghar  Vidyapeeth  cannot  be
attached to merit  list of candidates.
4.          Pursuant to the said advertisement, respondents applied for  the
post of Librarian.  The respondents possessed the degree  of  Sahityaalankar
awarded by Deoghar  Vidyapeeth.   Challenging  the  validity,  legality  and
correctness of the amendment of Rule  4(k)  (vii)  (a)  of  the  Recruitment
Rules 2006 as amended in 2008, respondents filed two writ petitions  bearing
Nos.5129/2009 and 18039/2009. The  Patna  High  Court  vide  impugned  order
dated 17.11.2009  allowed  the  writ  petitions  filed  by  the  respondents
directing the State of Bihar to redo the entire selection process  as  above
mentioned.   Aggrieved by the same, State of Bihar has filed  these  appeals
assailing the impugned order.
5.          Mr. Gopal Singh, learned counsel for  the  appellants  submitted
that State of Bihar has issued order dated  27.08.2008  containing  list  of
twenty eight institutions which were not recognized  under  the  recruitment
rules. It was submitted that the State has considered the matter at  several
occasions and has decided not to grant  benefits  to  un-recognized  degrees
and accordingly the degree of Sahityaalankar awarded by  Deoghar  Vidyapeeth
is  not  equivalent  to  graduation  degree  and  the  High  Court  has  not
considered the matter in the  light  of  order  dated  25.11.2008  (Annexure
P/5).
6.          Per contra, Mr. N. Rai  and  Mr.  S.B.  Sanyal,  learned  Senior
Counsel for the respondents contended  that  the  degree  of  Sahityaalankar
makes the person eligible for  appearing  in  the  competitive  examinations
conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission and it would  be  arbitrary
to say that  degree of Sahityalankar does not make a person eligible as  per
 Bihar District Council, Secondary & Higher Secondary  Teacher   (Employment
&  Service Conditions) Manual 2006 as  amended  in  2008  and  the  same  is
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
7.          We have considered the rival contentions  of  both  the  parties
and perused the material on record.
8.          The issue involved  in  these  appeals  is  concerned  with  the
interpretation of provisions in Rule 4  (k)  (vii)  (a)  of  Bihar  District
Council,  Secondary  &  Higher  Secondary  Teacher  (Employment  &   Service
Conditions) Manual 2006 as  amended  in  2008.   As  noticed  earlier,  Rule
4(k)(vii)(a) prescribes that  the  candidate  must  have  passed  graduation
examination with minimum 45% marks from any recognized  university.   It  is
the contention of  the  State  that  the  respondents  do  not  fulfill  the
eligibility criteria  as  they  possessed  graduation  degree  from    Hindi
Vidyapeeth Deoghar which is not a recognized university.  As noticed  above,
as per the direction of the Patna High  Court  in  CWJC  No.15237/2007,  the
State of Bihar examined the matter and by an  order  dated  25.11.2008  held
that degree of Sahityaalankar cannot be a valid degree  for  appointment  as
teacher.  Para 6 of the said order reads as under:-
      “In  Bihar  District  Council/Urban  Body  Secondary/Higher  Secondary
(Employment and Service Conditions) Manual, 2006, there is no  provision  to
employing on any equivalent  degree.   Besides  it,  for  employment,  after
deciding the all phases, the degree of  “Sahityaalankar”  given  by  Deoghar
Vidyapeeth and  other  many  degrees  have  not  been  decided  recognized.”
Mainly, the holder of  Sahityaalankar Degree appear only  at  exam  of  some
Sahitya papers while general B.A.  pass  the  exam  of  graduation  in  many
papers, which is more useful for education, due to this  reason  the  degree
of Sahityaalankar from Deoghar  Vidyapeeth is not valid for employment.”

Contention of the appellants is that pursuant to the above, the  State  sent
instructions to all the districts  vide  Order  dated  13.12.2008  directing
them to have appointment of  teachers  and  librarians  in  accordance  with
Recruitment Rules 2006 as amended in 2008  and  notification  governing  the
validity of  degrees.
9.          On behalf of  the  State,  it  is  further  submitted  that  the
validity of Sahityaalankar degree from the Hindi Vidyapeeth Deoghar and  its
equivalence with the graduation degree has been considered in detail by  the
Patna High Court in subsequent decisions filed by  the  State  of  Bihar  in
CWJC No.13343/2011 and several other  connected  matters.  It  is  submitted
that in the above batch matters, High Court has rejected the  claim  of  the
petitioners thereon that the  Degree  of  Sahityaalankar  is  equivalent  to
graduation degree and the State  of  Bihar  heavily  relies  upon  the  said
judgment in CWJC No.13343/2011 and batch matters.   It  was  also  submitted
that the letter dated 11.01.1991 should be read in consonance  with  earlier
circular with respect to  Hindi  Vidyapeeth  Deoghar  wherein  it  has  been
mentioned  that  any   recognition   given   to   such   degrees   including
Sahityaalankar is only for the purpose of Hindi examination and not  at  par
with graduation or equivalence and in this regard reliance  is  placed  upon
Press Note dated 05.05.1988 issued by the Central Government.
10.         Having regard to  the  stand  of  the  appellants  and  reliance
placed upon order dated 25.11.2008 and the Press Note dated  05.05.1988  and
the subsequent decision in CWJC 13343/2011  etc.  and  in  the  interest  of
justice without commenting on the merit of the case, we  deem  it  necessary
to remit the matter back to the High Court for consideration afresh.
11.         In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order  is
set aside and the same is remitted back to the High Court for  consideration
of the matter afresh after affording  sufficient  opportunity  to  both  the
parties.    Liberty   granted   to   the   parties   to   file    additional
documents/pleadings. We request the High Court to dispose of the  matter  as
expeditiously  as  possible.   The  appeals  are  disposed  of  accordingly.
Consequently, intervention application stands disposed of  granting  liberty
to the interveners to approach the High Court in accordance with  law.    In
the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

                                     ….…………………..CJI.
        (T.S. THAKUR)



                               .….……………………..J.
                                                                    (R.
BANUMATHI)
New Delhi;
January  06, 2016

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

“415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”The ingredients required to constitute the offence of Cheating have been discussed by this Court in the case of Ram Jas v.State of U.P.[1] as under: “(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him; (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act or omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property.” A careful reading of evidence on record clearly shows that there is no evidence against the appellant from which it can be conclusively inferred by this Court that there was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement of the prosecutrix by the appellant to constitute an offence under Section 415 of IPC. For conviction of the Appellant for above said offence, it is important that all the necessary ingredients constituting an offence under the said Section must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 417 of IPC as the prosecution has failed to prove all ingredients of the said offence beyond reasonable doubt. 22. Further, Section 506 of IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503 of IPC. Section 503 of IPC reads thus: “503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.” A reading of evidence on record in the light of aforesaid legal provision shows the insufficiency of evidence to hold the conviction of the appellant for the offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 part I of IPC. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the evidence of the prosecution is neither believable nor reliable to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant. We are of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not based on a careful re-appraisal of the evidence on record by the High Court and there is no material evidence on record to show that the appellant is guilty of the charged offences i.e., offence of cheating punishable under Section 417 of IPC and offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 part I of IPC.


|Non-REPORTABLE           |



               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 13  OF 2016
            (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.4896 of 2015)



TILAK RAJ                         … APPELLANT

                            Versus


THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH     … RESPONDENT




                       J U D G M E N T



V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.


      Leave granted.


This criminal appeal is directed against the  impugned  judgment  and  order
dated 06.01.2015 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at  Shimla  in
Criminal Appeal No. 369 of 2012 whereby  it  has  partly  allowed  the  said
Criminal Appeal filed by the respondent-State and has upheld  the  acquittal
order passed by the trial court in favour of the appellant  herein  for  the
offence punishable under  Section  376  of  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short
“IPC”). However, it has convicted  the  appellant  for  offences  punishable
under Sections 417 and 506 part I of IPC but instead  of  imposing  sentence
on the appellant for the aforesaid offences,  vide  order  dated  17.03.2015
the High Court has  released  him  under  Section  4  of  the  Probation  of
Offenders Act, 1958 on his entering into a personal bond in the sum  of  Rs.
25,000/- with two sureties in the like amount.

Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder to appreciate the  rival  legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties:
On 06.01.2010, the Assistant Sub-inspector of Police  (ASI),  Chamba  (H.P.)
received  a  complaint  from  prosecutrix  through  the  office  of   Deputy
Superintendent of Police (DSP), Shri. K.D.  Sharma,  Chamba  (H.P).  In  the
said complaint, it was alleged by her that on 01.01.2010 she was  raped  and
physically assaulted by the appellant. It was also alleged by her that  when
she went to the police station  to  register  her  complaint  regarding  the
offence of rape she was threatened with dire consequences by  the  appellant
on phone. Allegation of sexual exploitation on the pretext of  marriage  was
also made by her in the said complaint.

On the basis of said written complaint FIR No. 6 of 2010 was  registered  by
the ASI under Sections 376,  417  and  506  of  IPC  and  investigation  was
conducted by the investigation officer. After investigation a  report  under
Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was filed.


The case of the prosecution is that the appellant  developed  intimacy  with
the prosecutrix (PW 2) about two years prior to the  incident.   He  allured
her on the  pretext  of  marriage.  On  01.01.2010  the  appellant  sexually
violated the person of  prosecutrix  in  her  residential  accommodation  in
Karian, Chamba. At the  same  time,  he  not  only  ravished  her  but  also
physically assaulted her by slapping her and twisting her arm.

On the next day i.e., on 02.01.2010, the  prosecutrix  decided  to  approach
the Police Station, Chamba to get FIR registered against the  appellant  for
the offence of rape. However, at about 6 AM when  she  reached  near  Police
Station the appellant threatened her against making any complaint or  report
about him to the police officials otherwise he would kill  the  prosecutrix.
Thereafter, she did not make any complaint.

On the same day, the appellant met prosecutrix near the  Regional  Hospital,
Chamba and offered to take her to his home. He persuaded her  not  to  lodge
FIR against him and even promised in writing to marry her.  He  assured  her
that both of them would stay  as  husband  and  wife.  However,  instead  of
taking her to his house he dropped her at her residence with a promise  that
he would return soon. The  appellant  did  not  return  thereafter.  Feeling
cheated thereby, on the same day,  she  reported  the  matter  to  Sh.  K.D.
Sharma, DSP, Chamba.

On 05.01.2010, both the appellant and the prosecutrix  were  called  in  the
office of DSP, wherein the appellant agreed in presence of DSP,  Chamba  and
one Yoginder Mohan (PW 3) to marry the prosecutrix the  next  day  i.e.,  on
06.01.2010. On 06.01.2010, when the prosecutrix along with her  family  came
forward for solemnization of marriage, the appellant did not  turn  up.  The
same day FIR No. 06 of 2010 was registered against  the  appellant.  He  was
booked for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 417 and 506 of IPC.

The Court of Sessions, Chamba in  sessions  trial  no.  40  of  2010,  after
examination of the evidence on record, vide its  judgment  and  order  dated
30.04.2012 acquitted the  appellant-accused  of  all  the  charges  levelled
against him by giving him a benefit of doubt.

Aggrieved  by  the  decision  of  the  trial  court,  the   respondent-State
preferred Criminal Appeal No. 369 of 2012 before the High Court of  Himachal
Pradesh, at Shimla urging various grounds and prayed for setting  aside  the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the  trial  court  and  prayed  to
convict and sentence the accused-appellant for the charges levelled  against
him.

The High Court partly allowed  the  said  Criminal  Appeal.  It  upheld  the
acquittal order passed by the trial court in favour  of  the  appellant  for
the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. However, it  convicted  him
for the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 506 part I of  IPC.   The
High Court instead of imposing sentence on the appellant for  the  aforesaid
offences released him under Section 4 of the  Probation  of  Offenders  Act,
1958 on his entering into a personal bond in the sum of  Rs.  25,000/-  with
two local sureties in the like amount. Hence, this appeal.

Mr. Aditya Dhawan, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that  the
High Court has failed to appreciate the facts of  the  case  in  actual  and
correct perspective and its judgment is based on surmises  and  conjectures.
Therefore, the order of conviction and sentence is liable to  be  set  aside
by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

He further contended that the High Court has partly  set  aside  a  reasoned
judgment passed  by  the  trial  court  without  proper  re-appreciation  of
evidence on record and facts and circumstances of the case in hand.  It  was
further  submitted  by  him  that  in  an  appeal  against  acquittal,   the
interference by the Appellate Court is  not  warranted  in  the  absence  of
perversity of the finding of fact  in  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court.
Furthermore, it is well settled position of law that if two plausible  views
are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate  court  shall
not exercise its appellate jurisdiction to set aside the order of  acquittal
unless the findings of the trial court  on  the  charge  of  offences  under
Sections 417 and 506 Part I of IPC are found erroneous.

It was further contended by him that the High Court has failed to take  note
of important fact that there is a  considerable  and  unexplained  delay  of
five days in lodging the  FIR  against  the  appellant.  Further,  the  non-
examination of crucial witness namely Sh. K.D.Sharma, DSP,  Chamba  to  whom
the alleged incidence  was  first  reported  by  the  prosecutrix  certainly
rendered the prosecution case doubtful. In view of the above,  he  submitted
that the prosecution ought to have examined Sh. K.D.Sharma, DSP, Chamba  who
was a material witness. He further contended that the High Court has  failed
to appreciate  that  the  trial  court  was  right  in  drawing  an  adverse
inference from non-examination of a crucial witness in the case.

He  further  vehemently  contended  that  the  High  Court  has  failed   to
appreciate certain facts, namely, the age of the prosecutrix at the time  of
incident was about 40 years i.e., approximately 10 years more than  that  of
the appellant. Further,  she  was  a  government  servant  at  the  time  of
incident and in number of cases she  was  appointed  as  protection  officer
under the Protection of Women from Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005.  Further,
the prosecutrix was in relationship with the appellant for about  two  years
prior  to  the  alleged  incident.  All  the  aforesaid  facts  render   the
prosecution version completely unbelievable that the  appellant  established
physical intimacy with the prosecutrix on the  false  pretext  of  marriage.
Therefore, the impugned judgment and order is liable  to  be  set  aside  by
this Court.

It was further contended by him that the evidence of the prosecutrix is  not
clear and specific and the same is suffering from  material  inconsistencies
and contradictions with other evidence on record. He further submitted  that
the discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecutrix  is  incompatible  with
the credibility of his version is liable to be outrightly rejected  by  this
Court.

While concluding his submissions the learned counsel  submitted  that  there
is no evidence on record to suggest that the appellant on the false  pretext
of marriage with the prosecutrix and in furtherance of  his  intention  from
the very beginning induced her to surrender to him for  sexual  intercourse.
Further, the conviction of the appellant is based only on the  testimony  of
the prosecutrix (PW 2), which in itself could not have been relied  upon  by
the High Court in absence of any corroboration. Thus, the impugned  judgment
and order of the High Court is vitiated in law and is  required  to  be  set
aside by this Court.

Per  contra,  Mr.  Suryanarayana  Singh,  the  learned  Additional  Advocate
General on behalf of the respondent-State sought  to  justify  the  impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court on the ground that the  same  is
well founded and is not vitiated in law.  Therefore,  no  interference  with
the impugned Judgement and Order of this Court is required  in  exercise  of
its appellate jurisdiction.

We have carefully heard both the parties at length and have also  given  our
conscious thought to the material on record and relevant provisions  of  The
Indian  Penal  Code  (in  short  “the  IPC”).  In  the  instant  case,   the
prosecutrix was an adult and mature lady of around 40 years at the  time  of
incident. It is admitted by the prosecutrix  in  her  testimony  before  the
trial court that she was in relationship with the  appellant  for  the  last
two years prior to the incident and the appellant used to stay overnight  at
her residence. After a perusal of copy of FIR and  evidence  on  record  the
case  set  up  by  the  prosecutrix  seems  to  be  highly  unrealistic  and
unbelievable.

The evidence as a whole including FIR,  testimony  of  prosecutrix  and  MLC
report prepared by medical practitioner clearly indicate that the  story  of
prosecutrix regarding sexual intercourse on false pretext  of  marrying  her
is concocted and not believable. In fact, the  said  act  of  the  Appellant
seems to be consensual in nature. The trial court has rightly held thus:
“23. If the story set up by the prosecutrix herself in the court  is  to  be
believed, it does come to the fore that the two were in a  relationship  and
she  well  knew  that  the  accused  was  duping  her  throughout.  Per  the
prosecutrix, she had not succumbed to the proposal of  the  accused.  Having
allowed access to the accused to her residential quarter, so much  so,  even
having allowed him to stay overnight, she knew the  likely  outcome  of  her
reaction. Seeing the age of the prosecutrix which is  around  40  years,  it
can be easily inferred that she knew  what  could  be  the  consequences  of
allowing a male friend into her bed room at night.

24. The entire circumstances discussed above and  which  have  come  to  the
fore from the testimony of none else but the prosecutrix, it cannot be  said
that the sexual intercourse was without her consent. The  act  seems  to  be
consensual in nature.

25. It is also not  the  case  that  the  consent  had  been  given  by  the
prosecutrix  believing  the  accused’s  promise  to  marry  her.  For,   her
testimony itself shows that the entire story of marriage has unfolded  after
05.01.2010 when the accused was stated to have been summoned to  the  office
of the Dy. S.P. Prior to 05.01.2010, there is  nothing  on  record  to  show
that the accused had been pestering the prosecutrix for  any  alliance.  The
prosecutrix has said a line in  her  examination-in-chief,  but  her  cross-
examination shows that no doubt  the  two  were  in  relationship,  but  the
question of marriage apparently had not been deliberated upon by any of  the
two. After the sexual contact, come  talk  about  marriage  had  cropped  up
between the two. Thus, it also cannot be said that the  consent  for  sexual
intercourse had been given by the prosecutrix under  some  misconception  of
marriage.”


As far as conviction of the appellant under Sections 417 and 506 part  I  of
IPC is concerned, a close scrutiny of evidence of  the  prosecutrix  (PW  2)
along with other prosecution  witnesses  is  done  by  this  Court.  Section
417 of IPC prescribes punishment for the  offence  of  Cheating  as  defined
under Section 415 of IPC. Section 415 of IPC reads thus:

“415.  Cheating.—Whoever,  by  deceiving   any   person,   fraudulently   or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any  property  to  any
person, or to  consent  that  any  person  shall  retain  any  property,  or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit  to  do  anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which  act  or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage  or  harm  to  that  person  in
body, mind, reputation or  property,  is  said  to  “cheat”.  Explanation.—A
dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within  the  meaning  of  this
section.”


The ingredients required to constitute the offence  of  Cheating  have  been
discussed by this Court in the case of Ram Jas v.State of U.P.[1] as under:
“(i) there should be fraudulent or  dishonest  inducement  of  a  person  by
deceiving him;
(ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property  to
any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit  to
do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act or omission should be  one  which
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced  in  body,
mind, reputation or property.”

A careful reading of evidence on record  clearly  shows  that  there  is  no
evidence against the appellant from which it can  be  conclusively  inferred
by this Court that there was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement  of  the
prosecutrix by the appellant to constitute an offence under Section  415  of
IPC. For  conviction  of  the  Appellant  for  above  said  offence,  it  is
important that all the necessary ingredients constituting an  offence  under
the said Section must be proved beyond  reasonable  doubt.  In  the  instant
case, the  appellant  cannot  be  convicted  for  the  offence  of  cheating
punishable under Section 417 of IPC as the prosecution has failed  to  prove
all ingredients of the said offence beyond reasonable doubt.

22. Further, Section 506 of IPC prescribes punishment  for  the  offence  of
criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503 of IPC.  Section  503  of
IPC reads thus:
“503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with  any  injury  to
his person, reputation or property, or to the person or  reputation  of  any
one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause  alarm  to  that
person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally  bound
to do, or to omit to do any act which that person  is  legally  entitled  to
do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits  criminal
intimidation.  Explanation.—A  threat  to  injure  the  reputation  of   any
deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within  this
section.”

A reading of evidence on record in the light of  aforesaid  legal  provision
shows the insufficiency of evidence to hold the conviction of the  appellant
for the offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section  506  part
I of IPC.

23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the evidence of the prosecution  is
neither believable nor reliable to bring home the  charges  leveled  against
the appellant. We are of the view  that  the  impugned  judgment  and  order
passed by the High Court is not based  on  a  careful  re-appraisal  of  the
evidence on record by the High Court and there is no  material  evidence  on
record to show that the appellant is guilty of the  charged  offences  i.e.,
offence of cheating punishable under Section  417  of  IPC  and  offence  of
criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 part I of IPC.

24. For the reasons stated supra, this appeal is allowed and  we  set  aside
the impugned judgment and  order of conviction and sentence  passed  by  the
High Court against the appellant for the offences punishable under  Sections
417 and 506 part I of IPC. The appellant is acquitted  of  all  the  charges
levelled against him.
                              ……………………………………………………CJI.
                           [T.S. THAKUR]


                           …………………………………………………………J.
                   [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi,
January 6, 2016
-----------------------
[1]
      [2]  (1970) 2 SCC 740

demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification is a condition precedent for constituting an offence under the Act, = In M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala this Court in somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the same and said that it was put in the drawer without his knowledge, held as under: (SCC pp. 723-24, para 8) ‘8. … It is in this context the courts have cautioned that as a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are important. Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly, there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other aspect, namely, acceptance is very important and when the accused has come forward with a plea that the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been put in the drawer as an illegal gratification.’…” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the trial court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) by the appellant though there is no substantive evidence in this regard and the appellant was erroneously convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made by the appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2), which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside. For the reasons stated supra, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court as well as the trial court are set aside. The appeal is allowed.

Non-                                                              Reportable







               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 14 OF 2016
            (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.703 of 2015)


KRISHAN CHANDER                          …APPELLANT

                            Versus


STATE OF DELHI                          …RESPONDENT

                       J U D G M E N T


V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.


      Leave granted.


This criminal appeal is directed against the  impugned  judgment  and  order
dated 7.11.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in       Crl.
Appeal No. 634 of 2008 wherein the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  appeal
filed by the appellant and upheld  the  order  of  conviction  and  sentence
passed against the appellant by the  court  of  Special  Judge,  Delhi  (for
short the “trial court”) in CC No. 21 of 2005.  The  trial  court  convicted
the appellant vide its judgment dated 14.7.2008 for the offences  punishable
under Sections  7  and  13(1)(d)  read  with  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act,  1988  (for  short  “the  PC  Act”)  and  vide  order  dated
15.7.2008 sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years  with
fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC  Act
and in default to undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  two  months.  For  the
offences punishable under Section 13(2)  of  the  PC  Act,  he  was  further
sentenced to undergo rigorous  imprisonment  for  two  years  with  fine  of
Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo simple  imprisonment  for  two  months.
Both the sentences imposed upon him for the above said offences were to  run
concurrently.

Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder to appreciate the  rival  legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties:-

The prosecution case before the trial court was that on  29.7.2004,  an  FIR
No. 662 of 2004 was registered  at  Police  Station,  Nangloi,  Delhi  under
Sections 279 and 337 of Indian Penal Code  (for  short  “IPC”)  against  one
Krishan Kumar (PW-9), the brother of  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  (PW-2).
Krishan Kumar was arrested on  29.7.2004  in  connection  with  the  alleged
offences referred to in the above said FIR.

The complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) had  approached  Assistant  Sub-Inspector
(ASI) Ranbir Singh (PW-11), the Investigating Officer of the said  case  for
release of Krishan Kumar on bail. The Investigating  Officer  is  stated  to
have accepted the bail bond for release of Krishan Kumar  and  directed  the
appellant (a constable at the said Police Station) to release  him  on  bail
in connection with the alleged offences referred to supra.

The appellant alleged to  have  demanded  a  bribe  of  Rs.5000/-  from  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan for releasing his brother Krishan Kumar on bail.  It
is alleged that under duress, complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) paid Rs.4,000/-
 as bribe to the appellant. Thereafter, Krishan Kumar  (PW-9)  was  released
on bail and the appellant asked the complainant-Jai Bhagwan to pay  him  the
balance amount of Rs.1,000/- on 30.7.2004 between 6.00 p.m.  and  7.00  p.m.
at Ditchau Kalan Bus Stand, Najafgarh.

The complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) approached the office of Anti  Corruption
Branch on 30.07.2004 and made a written complaint regarding  the  demand  of
bribe by the appellant from him. The said written complaint was recorded  by
Sunder Dev     (PW-12) in presence of Anoop Kumar Verma (PW-6).

The complainant-Jai Bhagwan took with  him  two  Government  Currency  notes
(for short the “GC notes”) in the denomination of Rs.500/- each  and  handed
over the same to Inspector Sunder Dev (PW-12)  who  noted  down  the  serial
numbers of  the  said  GC  notes.  Thereafter,  phenolphthalein  powder  was
applied to the said GC notes and recorded in the  pre-raid  proceedings  and
its effect was  demonstrated.  The  tainted  GC  notes  were  given  to  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan, who kept the same in the left pocket of his shirt.

As per the  instructions,  panch  witness-  Anoop  Kumar  Verma  (PW-6)  was
directed  to  remain  close  to  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  to  overhear  the
conversation between the complainant-Jai Bhagwan and the appellant.  He  was
further instructed to give a signal to the  raiding  party  by  hurling  his
hand over his head  when  bribe  amount  had  actually  been  given  by  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan.

On 30.07.2004, at around  4.30  p.m.,  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan,  panch
witness- Anoop Kumar Verma,  Inspector  Sunder  Dev  (PW-12),  Sub-Inspector
B.S. Yadav (PW-10)  and  Constable  Rajiv  Kumar  (PW-5)  along  with  other
members of the  raiding  party  left  for  Ditchau  Kalan  Bus  Stand  in  a
government vehicle and reached the spot at around 5.45 p.m. At  around  7.00
p.m., appellant reached the spot and had conversation  with  complainant-Jai
Bhagwan. Both the complainant  and  the  appellant  moved  towards  a  water
trolley, had water and again continued their  conversation.  Panch  witness-
Anoop  Kumar  Verma  followed  them.  After  sometime,  the  complainant-Jai
Bhagwan took out the tainted GC notes from the left pocket of his shirt  and
gave them to the appellant which he took with his right hand  and  kept  the
same in the left pocket of his  shirt.  Soon  after  the  said  transaction,
panch witness- Anoop Kumar Verma  gave  the  pre-determined  signal  to  the
raiding team upon which the team rushed to the spot.

Anoop Kumar Verma informed the raiding team that the appellant had  demanded
and accepted the bribe money of Rs.1000/- from the complainant-Jai  Bhagwan.
Inspector Sunder Dev introduced himself as Inspector  from  Anti  Corruption
Branch to the appellant upon which he immediately took out  the  tainted  GC
notes from the pocket of his shirt with his left hand and threw the same  on
the ground. The said GC notes were then picked up from the ground  by  panch
witness-Anoop Kumar Verma on the instructions of Inspector-Sunder  Dev.  The
serial numbers of the recovered GC notes were matched with  those  noted  in
the pre-raid proceedings. The wash of right and left hand of  the  appellant
as well as the wash of left pocket of  his  shirt  was  taken  in  colorless
solution  of  sodium  carbonate  which  turned  pink.   The   solution   was
transferred  into  clean  glass  bottles  which  were  sealed  and  labeled.
Thereafter,  the  appellant  was  arrested  and  FIR  No.  36  of  2004  was
registered against him for the offences  punishable  under  Sections  7  and
13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act.

The learned Special Judge after examining the evidence on  record  convicted
the appellant vide its judgment dated 14.7.2008 for the offences  punishable
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of  the  PC  Act  and
vide order dated 15.7.2008 sentenced him to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment
for two years with fine of  Rs.5,000/-  for  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 7 of the PC Act and in default to undergo  simple  imprisonment  for
two months. For the offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act  he
was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  two  years  with
fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo  simple  imprisonment  for  two
months. Both the sentences imposed upon him  for  the  above  said  offences
were to run concurrently.

Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Special Judge, the appellant  filed
Crl. Appeal No.634 of 2008 before the High  Court  of  Delhi  at  New  Delhi
urging various grounds. The High Court vide its  judgment  and  order  dated
07.11.2014  upheld  the  decision  of  the  learned   Special   Judge.   The
correctness of  the  same  is  questioned  in  this  appeal  urging  various
grounds.

 Mr. Sidharth Luthra, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the  appellant
contended that the High  Court  has  failed  to  appreciate  the  fact  that
Krishan Kumar (PW-9) at the time of occurrence was already released on  bail
in connection with the case registered  in  FIR  No.  662  of  2004  by  the
appellant as per the directions of Ranbir  Singh,  ASI  (PW-11).  Thus,  the
demand of bribe money of Rs.1000/- by the appellant  from  the  complainant-
Jai Bhagwan is highly improbable.



It was further contended by him that the demand of illegal gratification  by
the accused is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under  Sections
7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. A mere  production  of
the tainted money recovered from the appellant along  with  positive  result
of phenolphthalein test, sans the proof of demand of bribe is not enough  to
establish the guilt of the charge made against appellant. In support of  the
above legal submission, he placed reliance upon the judgments of this  Court
in the cases of B. Jayaraj v. State  of  Andhra  Pradesh[1],  A.  Subair  v.
State of Kerala[2] and State of Kerala & Anr. v. C.P. Rao[3],  wherein  this
Court, after interpreting Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC  Act,  has  held
that the demand of bribe money made by the accused in a corruption  case  is
a sine qua non to punish him  for  the  above  said  offences.  The  learned
senior counsel has also placed reliance upon the three Judge Bench  decision
of this Court in the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. The Dist.  Inspector
of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.[4], in which  I  was  one  of  the
companion Judges, wherein this Court, after referring to the  aforesaid  two
Judge Bench judgments on the question of necessity of demand of bribe  money
by the accused, has reiterated the view stated supra.

It was  further  contended  by  him  that  the  High  Court  has  failed  to
appreciate the fact that the complainant-Jai Bhagwan turned  hostile  during
his examination before the trial court and did not support  the  prosecution
case that the demand of Rs.1000/- as illegal gratification was made  by  the
appellant from him for release of Krishna Kumar (PW-2) on bail.



It was further contended by the learned senior counsel that the  High  Court
has failed to re-appreciate the  evidence  on  record  that  Panch  witness-
Anoop Kumar Verma was directed by the official of Anti Corruption Branch  to
remain  close  to  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  in  order  to   hear   the
conversation  and  see  the  transaction  between  the  appellant  and   the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan. He  further  submitted  that  the  learned  Special
Judge as well as the  High  Court  have  arrived  at  an  erroneous  finding
without considering the fact that the  appellant  after  reaching  the  spot
walked with the complainant-Jai Bhagwan for  about  15  to  20  steps  while
conversing with each other. Thereafter, both  moved  towards  water  trolley
and after taking water proceeded ahead. Around that  time  the  complainant-
Jai Bhagwan took out the tainted GC notes from his pocket  and  gave  it  to
the appellant. From the said evidence,  it  is  clear  that  panch  witness-
Anoop Kumar Verma did not hear the conversation between  the  appellant  and
the complainant-Jai Bhagwan. Therefore, there was no occasion to  reach  the
conclusion that the appellant demanded any bribe  from  the  complainant-Jai
Bhagwan.

He further contended that Ranbir Singh, ASI who  was  Investigating  Officer
in the case in which the arrest of Krishan  Kumar  was  made,  accepted  his
bail bond and directed the appellant to release him. It is an admitted  fact
that Krishan Kumar was released on bail in the presence of and  as  per  the
directions of Ranbir Singh, ASI. Therefore, there was no  occasion  for  the
appellant to demand any bribe money from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan.

It was further contended that the High Court has failed  to  appreciate  the
fact that the alleged demand and the acceptance of amount of Rs.  1000/-  is
not corroborated by any  independent  witness  despite  the  fact  that  the
transaction alleged to have taken in a public place.

On the other hand, Mr.  P.S.  Patwalia,  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General (ASG), on behalf of  the  respondent-State  sought  to  justify  the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High  Court  which  is  on  proper
appreciation of evidence on record and it is  well  reasoned  and  therefore
not vitiated in law. Hence, he would submit that no  interference  with  the
same is required by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

He has  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly  re-appreciated  the
evidence of the complainant-Jai Bhagwan and other prosecution witnesses  and
concurred with  the  findings  recorded  on  the  charges.  Further  it  was
submitted by him that the trial court while  appreciating  the  evidence  of
the complainant-Jai Bhagwan relied upon the decision of this  Court  in  the
case of Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration[5], paragraphs 41 and 51  of  which
decision in recording the finding on the charges against the appellant,  are
extracted hereunder:
“41. The fallacy underlying this view stems from  the  assumption  that  the
only purpose of cross-examination of a  witness  is  to  discredit  him;  it
ignores the hard truth that  another  equally  important  object  of  cross-
examination is to elicit admissions of facts  which  would  help  build  the
case of the cross-examiner. When a  party  with  the  leave  of  the  court,
confronts his witness with his previous inconsistent statement, he  does  so
in the hope that the witness might revert to what he had stated  previously.
If the departure from the prior statement is not deliberate but  is  due  to
faulty memory or a like cause, there is every  possibility  of  the  witness
veering round to his  former  statement.  Thus,  showing  faultness  of  the
memory in the case of such a witness  would  be  another  object  of  cross-
examining and contradicting him by a party calling the  witness.  In  short,
the rule prohibiting a party to  put  questions  in  the  manner  of  cross-
examination or in a leading form to his own witness is relaxed  not  because
the witness has already forfeited all right to credit but because  from  his
antipathetic altitude or otherwise, the court feels that for doing  justice,
his  evidence  will  be  more  fully  given,  the  truth  more   effectively
extricated and his credit more adequately tested by questions put in a  more
pointed, penetrating and searching way.
    xx                                 xx               xx

51. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear  that  even  in  a  criminal
prosecution when a witness  is  cross-examined  and  contradicted  with  the
leave of the court, by the party calling him,  his  evidence  cannot,  as  a
matter of law, be treated as washed off the record  altogether.  It  is  for
the Judge of fact to consider in each case  whether  as  a  result  of  such
cross-examination  and  contradiction,   the   witness   stands   thoroughly
discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of  his  testimony.
If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the  witness  has  not
been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering  the  evidence
of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the  light
of the other evidence on the record, that part of  his  testimony  which  he
finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the  whole  of
the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the  process,  the  witness
stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as  a  matter  of
prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”


It was further submitted that the trial court by placing reliance  upon  the
Sat Paul’s case (supra)  found  a  part  of  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan’s
testimony reliable and held that the demand of bribe money by the  appellant
from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan to release his brother Krishan  Kumar  (PW-
9) can be said to be  proved.  He  has  placed  reliance  on  the  following
finding and reasons recorded by the  trial  court,  which  relevant  portion
from para 16 reads thus:
“16…It is true that complainant has not testified entirely in terms  of  his
statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C and he was declared hostile and was  cross
examined with the leave of the court. But simply because he did not  testify
strictly as per the prosecution case does not mean  that  his  statement  is
altogether effaced from the record.”

Therefore, he would submit that the decision  of  the  trial  court  on  the
charges framed against the appellant is based on proper  evaluation  of  the
evidence on record which has  been  rightly  accepted  by  the  High  Court.
Therefore, the same cannot be termed as erroneous in law  and  need  not  be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

It was further contended by him  that  though  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan
turned hostile witness and he has deposed before the trial court by  stating
that he had inserted the tainted GC notes in the left pocket of  appellant’s
shirt. The trial court has held that  evidence  of  Anoop  Kumar  Verma  and
inspector-Sunder Dev have supported the case of  the  prosecution  who  have
demolished the version given by the complainant-Jai Bhagwan  (PW-2)  in  his
examination-in-chief.

 He has further submitted that as far as proof of  demand  of  Rs.1000/-  as
illegal gratification made by the appellant is concerned,  the  trial  court
has rightly recorded the finding of fact  holding  that  the  appellant  was
caught red-handed accepting the bribe money at the Ditchau Kalan  Bus  Stand
at Najafgarh and this evidence  was  sufficient  enough  to  show  that  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) was asked by the appellant to bring the  said
amount as illegal gratification for having released Krishan Kumar (PW-9)  on
bail.


 We have carefully heard Mr. Sidhartha Luthra, the  learned  senior  counsel
on behalf of  appellant  and  Mr.  P.S.  Patwalia,  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General on behalf of respondent-State. On  the  basis  of  factual
and legal aspects of the case and evidence on record produced in  the  case,
it is clear that the High Court has recorded the concurrent findings on  the
charges framed against the Appellant in the impugned judgment and order.  It
has also failed  to  re-appreciate  the  evidence  on  record  properly  and
consider the law on the relevant aspect of the  case.  Therefore,  the  said
findings are not only erroneous in law but also suffer from  error  in  law.
Hence, the same is liable to be set aside.

 We are of the view that as the complainant-Jai Bhagwan in his  examination-
in-chief before the trial court has categorically stated that it was  Ranbir
Singh, ASI (PW-11) who  demanded  Rs.5000/-  for  release  of  his  brother,
Krishan Kumar (PW-9) in connection with the offences registered against  him
in FIR No.662 of 2004, the trial  court  has  wrongly  accepted  a  part  of
testimony of the complainant-Jai Bhagwan while recording  such  findings  on
the charges to convict the appellant when there  is  nothing  on  record  to
show that it is  the  appellant  who  had  demanded  bribe  money  from  the
complainant-Jai  Bhagwan.  In  his  examination-in-chief  before  the  trial
court, he categorically stated thus :-
“……One Police Officer who was in civil uniform,  who  was  the  IO  of  that
case, met me in the Police station told  me  that  I  would  have  to  spend
Rs.5000/- for the bail of my brother……On the directions of that  IO,  I  had
given Rs.4000/- to accused Krishan on account of duress. That  IO  asked  me
that he would send accused Krishan to collect balance  amount  of  Rs.1000/-
to Najafgarh.”


During the trial, the said witness did not support the  prosecution  version
and therefore he was declared as hostile  witness  and  thereafter,  he  was
cross-examined by Mr. Alok Saxena, the learned Additional Public  Prosecutor
to the following effect:
“I did not  mention  in  my  complaint  that  one  ASI  Ranbir  Singh  asked
Constable Krishan Kumar to release my brother and he himself went  for  some
other work and I requested Constable Krishan Kumar  to  release  my  brother
and he demanded  Rs.5000/- from me  for  releasing  my  brother  (confronted
with portion A to A of his complaint Ex. PW2/A……It is incorrect  to  suggest
that accused Krishan Kumar had demanded Rs.5000/- from me  and  today  I  am
giving a false exception that one IO  had  demanded  Rs.5000/-  from  me  in
order to save  the  accused……I  did  not  tell  to  the  police  that  after
receiving signal from the panch witnesses, Raid Officer  came  near  me  and
challenged the accused that he had taken  Rs.1000/-  as  bribe  from  me  on
which accused became perplexed and he took out those treated GC  notes  from
his pocket and threw the same on the ground (confronted with portion B to  B
of his statement-ExPW-2/H recorded).


He has further stated that:

“It is wrong to suggest that accused Krishan had accepted bribe from  me  in
his right hand and kept the same in his  pocket  and  after  seeing  raiding
party. It is further wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely.”



The High Court has also erroneously appreciated the same and held thus:
“23. …As regards the demand of bribe of Rs.1000/- its  conscious  acceptance
by the appellant, as already noticed, has been  proved  by  PW-6  and  fully
corroborated by PW-12.”


Adverting  to  the  evidence  of  Ranbir  Singh,  ASI  (PW-11)  who  is  the
Investigation Officer in the above case registered  against  Krishan  Kumar;
in his examination-in-chief before the trial court, he stated as under :-
“……After getting Sri Kishan medically examined, the accused brought  him  to
PS Nangloi. No surety of Sri Kishan was present in  the  PS  at  that  time.
After about one hour one Jai Bhagwan brother of  Sri  Kishan  came  to  P.S.
Nangloi and presented the bail bond of his brother Sri Krishan.  I  accepted
the bail bond of Sri Kishan at 10.00 pm and gave instruction to the  accused
to release Sri Kishan. I reported back at P.S. Nangloi at 11.55 pm and  made
the entry vide DD NO. 29/A  dated  29.7.2004.  I  also  recorded  about  the
arrest and release of Sri Kishan in this very DD, although  I  accepted  the
surety bond of Sri Kishan in this very DD, although I  accepted  the  surety
bond of Sri Kishan at 10.00 PM on 29.7.2004.”

From the aforesaid admitted facts stated in his statement  of  evidence,  it
is very clear that it was Ranbir Singh, ASI, who directed the  appellant  to
release Krishan Kumar. Therefore, at the time  of  his  releasing  on  bail,
there was no occasion for the appellant  to  demand  bribe  money  from  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan as he was already released  on  bail  in  the  above
criminal case by Ranbir Singh, ASI, (PW-11).

We are unable to agree with the above contentions urged by the  learned  ASG
that the complainant-Jai Bhagwan turned hostile witness in the  case  before
the trial court, however, the statement of evidence  of  Anoop  Kumar  Verma
(PW-6) and inspector-Sunder Dev (PW-12) was sufficient to support  the  case
of the prosecution  with  regard  to  acceptance  of  bribe  amount  by  the
appellant from Jai Bhagwan (PW-2). This Court is of the view  that  whenever
a prosecution witness  turns  hostile  his  testimony  cannot  be  discarded
altogether. In this regard, reliance is placed by the ASG  on  the  decision
of this court in the case of Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of  Orissa[6].  The
relevant para 12 of the aforesaid case reads thus:

“12. It is also clearly well settled that the mere fact that  a  witness  is
declared hostile by the party calling him and allowed to  be  cross-examined
does not make him an unreliable witness so as to exclude his  evidence  from
consideration altogether. In Bhagwan Singh v.  State  of  Haryana  Bhagwati,
J., speaking for this Court observed as follows:

“The prosecution could have even avoided requesting for permission to cross-
examine the witness under Section 154 of the  Evidence  Act.  But  the  fact
that the court gave permission to the prosecutor to  cross-examine  his  own
witness, thus  characterising  him  as,  what  is  described  as  a  hostile
witness, does not completely  efface  his  evidence.  The  evidence  remains
admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction  upon
his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence.”
                          (emphasis supplied)

However, in the instant case, from the  material  on  record,  it  is  amply
clear that the complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  turned  hostile  on  two  important
aspects namely, demand and acceptance of bribe by  the  appellant  which  is
sine qua non for constituting the  alleged  offence  under  Sections  7  and
13(1)(d) read with  13(2)  of  the  PC  Act  convicting  the  appellant  and
sentencing him for the period and fine as mentioned above.

As far as the evidence  of  Panch  witness-  Anoop  Kumar  Verma  (PW-6)  is
concerned, in his examination-in-chief, he stated thus:

“…Thereafter, the complainant and the accused walked  for  15-20  steps  and
had some talk with the complainant and the complainant  took  out  those  GC
notes from his pocket and gave in the right hand of accused  which  he  kept
in the left pocket of his shirt…”

Anoop Kumar Verma (PW-6) in his examination-in-chief has not deposed  as  to
the exact conversation  that  took  place  between  the  appellant  and  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan at the time when  he  had  approached  him  to  give
bribe money. He has simply mentioned  about  “some  talk”  had  taken  place
between them but has failed to bring to light the factum of demand of  bribe
money by the appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan. Thus, it  is  amply
clear that panch witness- Anoop Kumar Verma did not  hear  the  conversation
between the appellant and the complainant-Jai Bhagwan. Therefore, there  was
no occasion for both the courts below  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  the
appellant demanded any bribe from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan.

The Investigation Officer (PW-10) in his evidence, has not at all spoken  of
the contents  of  the  statement  of  the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  (PW-2),
recorded by him under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Further, PW-2 in the  light
of the  answers  elicited  from  him  in  the  cross-examination  by  Public
Prosecutor, with regard to the contents  of  161  statement  which  relevant
portions are marked in his cross-examination and the  said  statements  were
denied by him, the prosecution was required to prove the said statements  of
the PW-2 through the Investigating Officer to show the fact  that  PW-2  Jai
Bhagwan in his evidence has given contrary statements to  the  Investigation
Officer at the  time  of  investigation  and,  therefore,  his  evidence  in
examination-in-chief has no evidentiary value.  The  same  could  have  been
used by the prosecution after it had strictly complied with Section  145  of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, the I.O.  should  have  spoken  to
the  above  statements  of  PW2  in  his  evidence  to  prove  that  he  has
contradicted in his earlier Section 161  statements  in  his  evidence  and,
therefore, his evidence cannot be discarded to prove the prosecution case.

It becomes amply clear from the perusal of the evidence of  PW-10,  I.O.  in
the case that the same has not been  done  by  the  prosecution.  Thus,  the
statements of PW-2  marked  from  Section  161  of  Cr.P.C.  in  his  cross-
examination cannot be said to be proved in the case to place  reliance  upon
his evidence to record the findings on the charge. The position  of  law  in
this regard is well settled by this Court in the  case  of  V.K.  Mishra  v.
State of Uttarakhand[7]. The relevant paras are extracted hereinbelow:
“16. Section 162 CrPC bars use of statement of  witnesses  recorded  by  the
police except for the limited purpose of contradiction of such witnesses  as
indicated there. The statement made by a witness  before  the  police  under
Section 161(1) CrPC can be used only for the purpose of  contradicting  such
witness on what he has stated at the trial as laid down in  the  proviso  to
Section 162(1) CrPC. The statements under Section 161 CrPC  recorded  during
the investigation are not substantive pieces of evidence  but  can  be  used
primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of contradicting such witness  by  an
accused under Section 145 of the Evidence Act;  (ii)  the  contradiction  of
such witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of  the  Court;  and
(iii) the re-examination of the witness if necessary.

17. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to  police  not  proved
and ask questions with reference to them which  are  inconsistent  with  the
testimony of the witness in the court. The words in  Section  162  CrPC  “if
duly proved” clearly show that the record  of  the  statement  of  witnesses
cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway nor can be looked into but  they
must be duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting  admission
from the  witness  during  cross-examination  and  also  during  the  cross-
examination  of  the  investigating  officer.  The  statement   before   the
investigating officer can be used for contradiction but  only  after  strict
compliance with  Section  145  of  the  Evidence  Act  that  is  by  drawing
attention to the parts intended for contradiction.

18. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

‘145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness  may
be cross-examined as to previous  statements  made  by  him  in  writing  or
reduced into writing, and relevant to  matters  in  question,  without  such
writing being shown to him, or being proved;  but,  if  it  is  intended  to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before  the  writing  can
be proved, be called to those parts of it which  are  to  be  used  for  the
purpose of contradicting him.’

19. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to  contradict
the witness by his previous statement reduced into  writing,  the  attention
of such witness must be called to those parts of it which  are  to  be  used
for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used.  While
recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes  the  duty  of  the  trial
court to ensure that the part of the  police  statement  with  which  it  is
intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of  the  witness
in his cross-examination. The attention of witness is  drawn  to  that  part
and this must reflect in his cross-examination by  reproducing  it.  If  the
witness admits the part intended to contradict him,  it  stands  proved  and
there is no need to further proof of  contradiction  and  it  will  be  read
while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part  of  the
statement, his attention must  be  drawn  to  that  statement  and  must  be
mentioned in the deposition. By this process  the  contradiction  is  merely
brought  on  record,  but  it  is  yet  to  be   proved.   Thereafter   when
investigating officer is examined in the  court,  his  attention  should  be
drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of contradiction, it  will  then
be proved in the deposition  of  the  investigating  officer  who  again  by
referring to the police statement will depose about the witness having  made
that  statement.  The  process  again  involves  referring  to  the   police
statement and culling out that part with which the maker  of  the  statement
was intended to be contradicted. If the  witness  was  not  confronted  with
that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict  him,
then the court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police  not  proved
in compliance with Section 145 of the  Evidence  Act  that  is,  by  drawing
attention to the parts intended for contradiction.”
                   (emphasis laid by this Court)

Thus, the contradiction of evidence of the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  (PW-2)
does not prove the factum of demand of  bribe  by  the  appellant  from  the
complainant-Jai Bhagwan as the  statement  recorded  under  Section  161  of
Cr.P.C. put to him in his cross-examination was not  proved  by  B.S.  Yadav
(PW-10) by speaking to those statements in his evidence and  therefore,  the
evidence of PW-2 is not contradicted and proved his  Section  161  statement
in the case.

Further, the appellant in his examination  under  Section  313  of  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973  has, inter alia, stated thus:

“Q 4: it is in evidence against you that  on  28.07.2004  you  demanded  Rs.
5000/- as bribe from complainant Jai Bhagwan and you accepted Rs. 4000/-  as
bribe from him and asked the complainant to bring Rs. 1000/-  on  30.07.2004
near Dichau Kalan bus stand, Najafgarh. What you have to say?

Ans. It is incorrect.

      XXX        XXX          XXX

Q 14: It is evidence against you that at about 7:00 p.m. you  came  and  you
met with complainant and moved towards one water rairi and you demanded  and
accepted Rs. 1000/- as bribe from the complainant in the presence  of  panch
witness with your right hand and kept  the  same  in  left  pocket  of  your
shirt. What you have to say?

Ans. It is incorrect.

Q 15: It is in further evidence against  you  that  in  the  meantime  panch
witness gave pre-determined signal and thereafter  the  members  of  raiding
party came and you were apprehended  and  panch  witness  told  the  raiding
officer that you had demanded and accepted the bribe of Rs. 1000/- from  the
complainant (PW-2) with your right hand and  kept  the  same  in  your  left
pocket of your shirt. What you have to say?

Ans. It is incorrect.”


After a careful reading of the evidence of the complainant-Jai Bhagwan  (PW-
2), statements made by the appellant in his examination  under  Section  313
of Cr.P.C. as  well  as  the  evidence  of  Anoop  Kumar  Verma  (PW-6)  and
inspector-Sunder Dev (PW-12), it is clear that there was no demand of  bribe
money by the appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan.

It is well settled position of law that the demand for the  bribe  money  is
sine qua non to convict  the  accused  for  the  offences  punishable  under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of  the  PC  Act.  The  same
legal principle has been held by this  Court  in  the  case  of  B.  Jayaraj
(supra), A. Subair (supra) and P. Satyanarayana Murthy  (supra)  upon  which
reliance is rightly placed by the learned senior counsel on  behalf  of  the
appellant. The relevant paragraph 7  from  B.  Jayaraj  case  (supra)  reads
thus:
“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned,  it  is  a  settled
position in law that demand of illegal gratification  is  sine  qua  non  to
constitute the said offence and  mere  recovery  of  currency  notes  cannot
constitute the offence under Section  7  unless  it  is  proved  beyond  all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing  it
to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down  in  several
judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference  may  be  made  to
the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI.”
                          (emphasis supplied)
In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra), it was held  by  this  Court
as under:
“21. In State of Kerala and another vs. C.P. Rao,  this  Court,  reiterating
its earlier dictum, vis-à-vis the same offences, held that mere recovery  by
itself, would not prove the charge against the accused  and  in  absence  of
any evidence to prove payment of bribe or  to  show  that  the  accused  had
voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot  be
sustained.

22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to  discern  the  imperative  pre-
requisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has  been  underlined  in  B.
Jayaraj in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of  currency
notes from an accused  without  proof  of  demand  would  not  establish  an
offence under Sections 7 as well as 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii)  of  the  Act.  It  has
been propounded that in the absence of  any  proof  of  demand  for  illegal
gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of  position  as
a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage  cannot
be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has  been  held  to  be  an
indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for  an  offence  under
Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the  Act,  which  permits  a
presumption as envisaged  therein,  it  has  been  held  that  while  it  is
extendable only to an offence  under  Section  7  and  not  to  those  under
Section 13(1)(d) (i)&(ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the  proof
of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or  forbearing  to  do  any
official act. Such proof of acceptance  of  illegal  gratification,  it  was
emphasized, could follow only if there was proof of  demand.  Axiomatically,
it was held that in absence of  proof  of  demand,  such  legal  presumption
under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise.

23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the  gravamen  of
the offence under Sections 7  and  13(1)  (d)(i)&(ii)  of  the  Act  and  in
absence  thereof,  unmistakably  the  charge  therefore,  would  fail.  Mere
acceptance of any amount  allegedly  by  way  of  illegal  gratification  or
recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not  be
sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act.  As
a corollary, failure of the prosecution to  prove  the  demand  for  illegal
gratification would be fatal and  mere  recovery  of  the  amount  from  the
person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the  Act  would  not
entail his conviction thereunder.”
                        (emphasis supplied)








Further, in the case of Satvir Singh v. State of Delhi[8],  this  Court  has
held thus:

“34. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga  case  has  held  that  the  demand  and
acceptance of the amount of  illegal  gratification  by  the  accused  is  a
condition precedent to constitute an  offence,  the  relevant  paragraph  in
this regard from the abovesaid decision is  extracted  hereunder:  (SCC  pp.
740-41, para 39)

“39. Keeping in view that  the  demand  and  acceptance  of  the  amount  as
illegal gratification is a condition precedent for constituting  an  offence
under the Act, it is to be noted  that  there  is  a  statutory  presumption
under Section 20 of the Act  which  can  be  dislodged  by  the  accused  by
bringing on record some evidence,  either  direct  or  circumstantial,  that
money was accepted other than for the motive or  the  reward  as  stipulated
under Section 7 of the Act. When some explanation is offered, the  court  is
obliged to consider the explanation under Section 20  of  the  Act  and  the
consideration  of  the  explanation  has  to  be  on   the   touchstone   of
preponderance of probability. It is not to be proven beyond  all  reasonable
doubt. In the case at hand, we are disposed to think  that  the  explanation
offered by the accused does not deserve any acceptance and, accordingly,  we
find that the finding recorded on that score by the learned trial Judge  and
the stamp of approval given  to  the  same  by  the  High  Court  cannot  be
faulted.”
                                            (emphasis supplied)

35. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has  also  placed  reliance
upon the case of Banarsi Dass referred to supra wherein it  was  held  that:
(SCC pp. 456-57, para 24)

“24. In M.K. Harshan v. State of  Kerala  this  Court  in  somewhat  similar
circumstances, where the tainted  money  was  kept  in  the  drawer  of  the
accused who denied the same and said that it was put in the  drawer  without
his knowledge, held as under: (SCC pp. 723-24, para 8)

‘8. … It is in this context the courts have cautioned  that  as  a  rule  of
prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all  such  type  of  cases  of
bribery, two aspects are important. Firstly, there  must  be  a  demand  and
secondly, there must be  acceptance  in  the  sense  that  the  accused  has
obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not  sufficient
to establish the offence. Therefore, the other  aspect,  namely,  acceptance
is very important and when the accused has come forward  with  a  plea  that
the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then  there
must be clinching evidence to show that it was with the  tacit  approval  of
the accused that the money  had  been  put  in  the  drawer  as  an  illegal
gratification.’…”
              (emphasis supplied)


In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the trial  court  and
the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the courts have relied  upon
the evidence  of  the  prosecution  on  the  aspect  of  demand  of  illegal
gratification from the  complainant-Jai  Bhagwan  (PW-2)  by  the  appellant
though there is no substantive evidence in this  regard  and  the  appellant
was  erroneously  convicted  for  the  charges  framed  against   him.   The
prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made  by
the appellant from the complainant-Jai Bhagwan (PW-2),  which  is  the  sine
qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7  and
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned  judgment
and order of the High Court is not only  erroneous  but  also  suffers  from
error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside.

For the reasons stated supra, the impugned judgment and order  of  the  High
Court as well as the trial court are set aside. The appeal is  allowed.  The
Jail Superintendent is directed to release the appellant forthwith from  the
Jail if he is not required in connection with any other case.  The  Registry
is directed to communicate the above portion of the order to  the  concerned
Jail Superintendent to comply with the directions issued to him.

                       ……………………………………………………CJI.
                       [T.S. THAKUR]



                                …………………………………………………………J.
                                [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi,
January 6, 2016
-----------------------
[1]    (2014) 13 SCC 55
[2]    (2009) 6 SCC 587
[3]    (2011) 6 SCC 450
[4]     (2015) 10 SCC 152
[5]    AIR 1976 SC 294
[6]    (1976) 4 SCC 233
[7]     (2015) 9 SCC 588
[8]     (2014) 13 SCC 143