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Wednesday, October 21, 2015

One Ms. Pushpa Verma, an unmarried lady, after retiring from her job as Head Mistress in the year 1993, was residing at Karnal. She had set up a marriage bureau and also used to work as a property dealer. Her two married sisters were also residing at Karnal. Two sons of one of the sisters were practicing advocates. Brother of Pushpa Verma named Chander Prakash had retired as Executive Engineer and was residing at Hissar. Pushpa Verma owned properties at Panipat and Gurgaon allotted through Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA for short).= the recovery of gold ring with inscription ‘PV; recovered from the house of the appellant is definitely a relevant circumstance. The ring after recovery was given under a panchnama to Abhishek Dewan, son of Chander Prakash. No explanation has been given as to how the appellant came into possession of said gold ring. As regards the extra judicial confession made to PW 16 Sunil Rana, the documents allegedly executed by Pushpa Verma and the progression of events including the transactions completely substantiate the case and we have no hesitation in accepting the evidence in that behalf.= It is impossible and inconceivable that a lady who had retired as head mistress would mis-spell her own name while putting signatures. The flow of signature as evident from the admitted source is completely of a different nature. The signatures on the documents in question, to a naked eye, cannot be that of Pushpa Verma. Further, there is no reason why a lady who has two sisters and two Advocate nephews staying in same town, would give power of attorney and execute a Will in favour of a total stranger. These circumstances are clinchingly against the appellant. His assertion that he had made over the payments received in cash to Pushpa Verma is not supported by any material on record. In fact, the appellant kept receiving payments even in the month of March, 2003. None of the payments are reflected in the account of Pushpa Verma. Receipt of Rs.1,00,000/- by way of cheque in the name of appellant himself is also a circumstance against the appellant. The evidence thus shows that the appellant had fabricated the documents in question and was attempting to defraud Pushpa Verma, as stated in the extra judicial confession. Further, by Ext. PH addressed to Pushpa Verma, a copy of which was sent to the appellant, she was asked to remain personally present in the office of HUDA. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant had undertaken any attempt, if he was genuinely acting as power of attorney on her behalf. We are satisfied that the circumstances on record, even if we were to disregard that relating to the recovery of Voter Identity Card Ext.P-12, do suggest only one hypothesis and that is the guilt of the appellant. The defence set up by the appellant does not inspire any confidence and merits rejection. The appeal, therefore fails and is dismissed. 14. Before we part, we must deal with the conduct of PW10 S.P. Meena. As Sub-Registrar, it was expected of him and was fundamental part of his duty to see that the persons who are entering into transactions must appear before him in person and the documents would be registered only after the essential formalities were undertaken. His evidence in the present case shows rank dereliction of duty. Add to it, his attempt to strike a different chord in the private proceedings is also questionable. He appeared as witness for the appellant and took a contradictory stand on oath. Such conduct must be dealt with strictly so that the matters of registration continue to have confidence in the eyes of people. We therefore recommend suitable action against said PW10 S.P. Meena and direct the authorities to initiate proceedings in that behalf. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Supervisors in the office where he was working as Sub-Registrar, Pitampura, Delhi. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-mentioned terms.

Non-reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1098 OF 2012




      RAJVINDER SINGH                            …. Appellant


                                   Versus


      STATE OF HARYANA                        …. Respondent






                               J U D G M E N T




      Uday Umesh Lalit, J.




      1.    This appeal by special leave challenges the judgment  and  order
      dated 12.12.2011 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana
      dismissing Criminal Appeal No.800-DB of 2007  and  thereby  confirming
      the conviction and sentence of the appellant for  the  offences  under
      Sections 364, 302 and 201 of the I.P.C.


      2.     One Ms. Pushpa Verma, an unmarried lady,  after  retiring  from
      her job as Head Mistress in the year 1993,  was  residing  at  Karnal.
      She had set up a marriage bureau and also used to work as  a  property
      dealer.  Her two married sisters were also residing  at  Karnal.   Two
      sons of one of the sisters  were  practicing  advocates.   Brother  of
      Pushpa Verma named Chander Prakash had retired as  Executive  Engineer
      and was residing at Hissar.  Pushpa Verma owned properties at  Panipat
      and Gurgaon allotted through Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA
      for short).


      3.    The appellant stands convicted for the  offences  of  kidnapping
      Pushpa Verma and thereafter  murdering  her  and  for  destroying  the
      evidence by throwing her body in a canal.  He  is  sentenced  to  life
      imprisonment and payment of fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence  under
      Section 302 I.P.C. and to rigorous imprisonment  for  five  years  and
      payment of fine of Rs.5,000/- in default whereof  to  undergo  further
      rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 364 I.P.C.  and  to
      rigorous imprisonment for five years and payment of fine of Rs.5,000/-
      , in default whereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for  six
      months under  Section  201  I.P.C.   All  the  sentences  are  to  run
      concurrently.   The conviction and sentence as recorded by  the  trial
      court has been affirmed by  the  High  Court  in  the  judgment  under
      appeal.


      4.    The instant matter has genesis in Daily Diary Report  (Ext.  PA)
      lodged with Police Post, Sector 13,  Karnal,  by  Chander  Prakash  on
      16.03.2003 giving “missing report”  about  his  sister  Pushpa  Verma.
      According to the report, she was missing since 20/22 January, 2003 and
      had not been receiving any calls since then.  The follow-up action  on
      this report indicates that information was sent to all  the  districts
      and all the police  stations  were  intimated  through  wireless.   On
      18.05.2003  Chander  Prakash  moved  an  application  (Ext.  PC)   for
      registration of an offence  against  the  appellant  stating  that  he
      suspected that the appellant wanted to grab her plots at  Panipat  and
      Gurgaon by preparing forged documents and that he had kidnapped her or
      murdered her.  This reporting led to registration of FIR No.144  dated
      18.05.2003 with Police Station Civil Lines, Karnal under  Section  364
      I.P.C. against the appellant.

      5.    After due investigation,  charge-sheet  was  filed  against  the
      appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and  201
      I.P.C. in the Court of  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Karnal  and  the
      appellant was tried for aforesaid offences in Sessions Case  No.53  of
      2005.  During investigation the body of  Pushpa  Verma  could  not  be
      recovered  nor  was  there  any  eye-witness  to  the  actual  act  of
      kidnapping or murder.  The prosecution mainly  relied  upon  following
      circumstances to bring home the charges against the accused:


      A.    The documents  pertaining  to  properties  of  Pushpa  Verma  at
           Panipat and Gurgaon showed that general powers of  attorney  were
           allegedly executed in favour of the appellant, on  the  basis  of
           which he had entered into transactions in respect  of  properties
           at Panipat and Gurgaon and had pocketed the  consideration.   The
           transactions as placed on record were as under:-
        a.   On 26.09.2002 a  general  power  of  attorney  Ext.  PF-1  was
           allegedly executed by Pushpa Verma in favour of the appellant in
           respect of her property at Panipat.  Though she was resident  of
           Karnal and the property was at Panipat, this  general  power  of
           attorney was executed and registered with the office of the Sub-
           Registrar at Delhi.  This document empowered the appellant  with
           all rights  including  power  to  dispose  of  the  property  at
           Panipat.


        b. On 08.11.2002 the appellant sold away the  property  at  Panipat
           for Rs.12.5 Lakhs.  The property was an industrial plot of  1050
           square meters  at  Panipat  and  the  entire  consideration  was
           received by the appellant in cash.  It appears that  there  were
           dues in respect of  penalty  for  not  having  constructed  upon
           within the prescribed period, which  were  got  cleared  by  the
           appellant.

        c. On 12.11.2002 a Will (Ext. PG-1) was allegedly executed by  said
           Pushpa Verma in favour  of  the  appellant  in  respect  of  her
           Gurgaon property.  On the next day  i.e.  13.11.2002  a  general
           power of attorney was allegedly executed with respect to Gurgaon
           property in favour of the appellant.  The Will and  the  general
           power of attorney were also executed  and  registered  with  the
           office of the Sub-Registrar at Delhi.

        d. On 24.01.2003 an agreement (Mark  PH)  was  entered  into  under
           which the appellant  agreed  to  transfer  Gurgaon  property  in
           favour of prospective purchasers and received part consideration
           of Rupees 2.5 Lakhs (Rupees 1.5 Lakhs in cash while  Rupees  One
           Lakhs by way of a cheque in the name of the appellant  himself).
           On 24.03.2003, further sum of Rupees Three Lakhs was received by
           the appellant and endorsement to that effect  was  made  on  the
           agreement itself.

        e. On 31.03.2003 a demand draft of Rupees Five Thousand towards the
           fees for seeking permission to  transfer  Gurgaon  property  was
           taken out and enclosed along  with  the  application  (Ext.  PJ)
           seeking permission to transfer that property.  This  application
           was preferred by the appellant in his capacity as general  power
           of  attorney  and  was  received  in  the  office  of  HUDA   on
           03.04.2003.

        f. It appears that the signatures of Pushpa Verma  on  the  general
           power of attorney submitted by the appellant did not tally  with
           her original signatures available on  record  with  HUDA  and  a
           letter to that effect was dispatched on  07.04.2003.   This  was
           followed by another letter dated 24.04.2003 (Ext.  PH)  by  HUDA
           addressed to Pushpa Verma with a copy to  the  appellant  asking
           her to remain present personally in  the  office  in  connection
           with her application seeking permission to transfer.




      B.    PW 22 Harsh Vardhan, Handwriting expert was examined who  opined
           that the signatures of Pushpa Verma on aforementioned  documents
           do not  tally  with  the  specimen  signatures  taken  from  the
           available record with her bank.


      C.     The  consideration  received  in  respect  of   the   aforesaid
           transactions was never credited to the account of Pushpa  Verma.




      D.    S.P. Meena, Sub-Registrar, Delhi was examined  as  PW  10.   The
           relevant portion of his testimony is as under:
                 “After the document is written the receipt for the fee  is
           issued by the clerk concerned the document is  presented  before
           another clerk who verifies the document and the  attestation  of
           the witnesses and  parties  and  initials  the  photographs  and
           affixes seals and fills in the blanks in the seal, the  document
           after his signature is presented before me.  Thereafter  I  sign
           the documents on the faith of the  clerk  concerned.   Documents
           Ext. PG and Ext. PG/1 is power of attorney and will respectively
           were presented before me by Naresh Kumar, Clerk after initialing
           at point ‘A’ in Ext. PG and at point  ‘B’  in  Ext  PG/1  signed
           these documents.


            Thereafter the documents were entered in  the  register  of  the
           registration  maintained  in  our  office.   I  have   seen   my
           signatures at points ‘B’ and Ext. PG and at points ‘C’  in  Ext.
           PG/1.  These signatures are mine.  The person who  executes  the
           document and in whose favour it is executed do not appear before
           me.  I have been working  in  this  manner  from  26.07.2000  to
           13.11.2002 as Sub-Registrar and attested the documents.”


      E.    On 21.05.2003 the appellant made an extra judicial confession to
           PW16 Sunil Rana advocate who later took  the  appellant  to  the
           police and caused his arrest.    The  appellant  confessed  that
           Pushpa Verma was known to him for more  than  a  year,  that  he
           started meeting her often, that she started treating him as  her
           son, that having come to  know  that  she  owned  properties  at
           different places he had become greedy, that  he  had  given  her
           some sedative in her  tea,  taken  her  to  Delhi  and  got  her
           signatures on the General power of attorney, that he  sold  away
           property at Panipat but kept all the money with himself and that
           he again took her to Delhi and  got  another  general  power  of
           attorney executed in respect of Gurgaon plot.   It  was  further
           confessed that in the month of January the appellant  felt  that
           Pushpa  Verma  suspected  some  foul  play  and  therefore   the
           appellant plotted a scheme to finish  her.   On  23.01.2003  she
           expressed desire to visit Haridwar, on which pretext he took her
           in a car and after having administered a sedative, throttled her
           and while she was unconscious near Roorkee, threw her body in  a
           canal known as Gang Canal  in  between  villages  Liverheri  and
           Mangalore.


      F.    After the arrest of the appellant, voter identity card Ext. P-12
           of Pushpa Verma was recovered from the bushes  near  Gang  Canal
           where her dead body was thrown.  Such recovery was in  pursuance
           of the disclosure statement of the appellant under Section 27 of
           the Evidence Act.  In order to prove this part, the  prosecution
           relied upon the testimony of PW 12 Mahir  Hussain,  Photographer
           and the testimony of PW 19 Investigating Officer Vijay Anand.


      G.    Pursuant to the disclosure statement of the  appellant,  a  gold
           ring bearing inscription “PV” was also recovered from the  house
           of the appellant.  The evidence in  that  behalf  was  available
           through PW5 Muktiyar Singh and PW6 Ashok Sharma.


      6.    In defence, the  appellant  examined  four  witnesses.   It  was
      projected that an unidentified dead body of a woman was found  in  the
      agricultural fields in District Muzaffar Nagar,  U.P.  on  22.01.2003.
      The photograph of the dead body taken by the police  was  produced  in
      this trial and marked  as  DB.   One  Brahmpal  Singh,  Sub-Inspector,
      Saharanpur was also examined as Defence witness who stated that he had
      prepared Inquest proceedings regarding the dead  body  and  thereafter
      the investigation was  conducted  by  SSI  Rajinder  Beer  Singh.   By
      examining these witnesses it was submitted that the dead body so found
      in Muzaffar Nagar on 22.01.2003 was in fact that of Pushpa Verma.  The
      trial court rejected this defence.  Relying upon the circumstances  as
      culled out hereinabove, the trial court found that  the  case  against
      the appellant was completely proved by  the  prosecution.   The  trial
      court, thus, awarded the sentence as stated hereinabove.


      7.    The appellant carried the  matter  further  by  filing  Criminal
      Appeal No.800-DB/2007 in the High Court.   During the pendency of this
      appeal, the appellant filed CRM No.52692 of 2008 along with  documents
      pertaining to a case registered against one Suresh under Section 25 of
      the Arms Act.  Copy of the General Diary pertaining  to  investigation
      of said crime was also filed which contained statement of said accused
      Suresh according to which Suresh and  one  Baljeet  had  taken  Pushpa
      Verma from Karnal in a car, that Baljeet had strangulated her and that
      thereafter they both had thrown her dead body  in  sugar-cane  fields.
      The record as filed did not indicate whether any  case  under  Section
      302 IPC was registered against said Baljeet and Suresh.  The appellant
      also filed a report of a privately  engaged  Forensic  Expert  stating
      that the photograph of the dead body of the  lady  found  in  Muzaffar
      Nagar was that of Pushpa  Verma.   Relying  on  these  materials,  the
      appellant submitted an application under Section 391  Cr.P.C.  praying
      that additional evidence be recorded at the appellate stage.  The High
      Court directed that these applications be considered  along  with  the
      appeal itself.


      8.    The High Court considered  the  matter  and  the  circumstantial
      evidence placed on record.  It found that  the  signatures  of  Pushpa
      Verma on the documents in question were a crude attempt  at  imitation
      and in one of the documents, namely, Will Ext. PG-1, the signature was
      “Puspha Verma” instead of normal signature being “Pushpa Verma”.   The
      High Court found that the case against the appellant stood  completely
      established.  As regards application under Section 391 Cr.P.C., it was
      observed that the appellant had taken the defence that the  dead  body
      recovered in Muzaffar Nagar was actually that of Pushpa Verma  and  in
      such circumstances it was imperative for  him  to  have  examined  the
      expert in his defence at the trial court stage  itself  and  that  the
      report of the privately engaged Forensic Expert at such belated  stage
      could not be allowed to be taken  on  record.   The  High  Court  thus
      dismissed the appeal affirming the  conviction  and  sentence  of  the
      appellant.


      9.    This judgment of the High Court is presently under appeal.  Crl.
      Miscellaneous Petition No.10525 of  2012  was  filed  in  the  present
      matter seeking leave to bring on  record  additional  documents  which
      include the order of conviction in so far as aforementioned Suresh  is
      concerned under Section 25 of the Arms Act as well  as  deposition  of
      the very same Sub Registrar S.P. Meena in Civil Suit No.142  of  2009.
      Said Civil Suit was filed  by  Chander  Prakash  against  the  present
      appellant seeking to invalidate  the  transactions  allegedly  entered
      into by Pushpa Verma.  In that suit S.P.  Meena,  Sub-  Registrar  was
      examined as his witness by the appellant.   His deposition now  states
      that he had read over the contents of the general  power  of  attorney
      and the Will to Pushpa Verma and after understanding the same she  had
      signed in the presence of said S.P. Meena.

      10.   Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for  the
      appellant submitted that none  of  the  aforesaid  circumstances  were
      proved and in any event these circumstances do  not  form  a  complete
      chain excluding  every  other  hypothesis  except  the  guilt  of  the
      appellant.  It was submitted that the dead body of  Pushpa  Verma  was
      never recovered from Gang Canal or thereabouts.  On the other  hand  a
      dead body of an unidentified female was found in  agricultural  fields
      in District Muzaffar Nagar and FIR No.427-12 of  2003  was  registered
      against unknown persons at Police Station Nai Mandi,  Muzaffar  Nagar.
      It was submitted that the High Court ought to have allowed the  prayer
      for leading  additional  evidence  at  the  appellate  stage.  It  was
      accepted that the documents referred to above had given the  appellant
      full authority to dispose of the properties of Pushpa Verma  and  that
      the appellant had entered  into  transactions  in  question.   It  was
      however submitted that all the payments that he had received were made
      over to Pushpa Verma and that an attaché kept with one Ram Kishore was
      taken by son of the complainant.  The attaché used to contain valuable
      securities of  Pushpa  Verma  and  was  kept  with  Ram  Kishore  with
      instructions to hand over to her relations in case  anything  were  to
      happen to her.  It was suggested that the money received in cash  must
      have been kept in that attaché.  Mr.  Devender  Kumar  Saini,  learned
      Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submitted that the
      concurrent view taken by the trial court and the High  Court  did  not
      call for any interference and the appeal be dismissed.


      11.   At  the  outset,  we  must  deal  with  submissions  as  regards
      application for leading additional evidence at  the  appellate  stage.
      It has been the consistent defence of the appellant that the dead body
      found in agricultural fields in District Muzaffar Nagar  was  that  of
      Pushpa Verma and he went to the extent of producing photograph of  the
      dead body in the present trial.  He also examined Brahm Pal Singh, Sub-
      Inspector and other witnesses.  It was certainly possible  to  examine
      Forensic Expert at the trial court stage itself and the High Court was
      right and  justified  in  rejecting  the  prayer  to  lead  additional
      evidence at the appellate stage.  Nonetheless, we  have  gone  through
      the report of said Forensic Expert  engaged  by  the  appellant.   The
      exercise undertaken by that expert  is  to  start  with  the  admitted
      photograph of Pushpa Verma on a computer, then remove the  “bindi”  by
      some process  on  the  computer,  then  by  same  process  remove  her
      spectacles and by computer imaging change the image as it  would  have
      looked if the lady was  lying  down  in  an  injured  condition.   The
      computer image so changed was then compared with the photograph of the
      dead body.   We have seen both the images and we are not convinced  at
      all about any element of similarity.  We  do  not  therefore  see  any
      reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court.


      12.   In the submissions  of  Mr.  Brijender  Chahar,  learned  Senior
      Advocate the circumstances E, F and G as culled  out  in  paragraph  5
      hereinabove  were  not  proved  at  all  and  the  transactions   were
      completely genuine.  It was submitted that it is impossible to believe
      that the Voter Identity Card of Pushpa Verma could be  recovered  from
      the bushes four months after the incident.  Similarly the recovery  of
      gold ring was also questioned.  Further, it was submitted  that  there
      was no evidence that the ring in question was that  of  Pushpa  Verma.
      Mr. Chahar may be right so far as recovery of Voter Identity  Card  is
      concerned  but  the  recovery  of  gold  ring  with  inscription  ‘PV;
      recovered from the house of the appellant  is  definitely  a  relevant
      circumstance.  The ring after recovery was given under a panchnama  to
      Abhishek Dewan, son of Chander Prakash.  No explanation has been given
      as to how the appellant came into possession of said  gold  ring.   As
      regards the extra judicial confession made to PW 16  Sunil  Rana,  the
      documents allegedly executed by Pushpa Verma and  the  progression  of
      events including the transactions completely substantiate the case and
      we have no hesitation in accepting the evidence in that behalf.


      13.   The transactions as referred to above have been admitted by  the
      appellant.  We have seen the signatures alleged to have  been  put  by
      Pushpa Verma on said documents.  We have compared the  signatures  and
      find the view taken by the High Court in that behalf  to  be  correct.
      It is impossible and inconceivable that a lady who had retired as head
      mistress would mis-spell her own name while putting  signatures.   The
      flow of signature as evident from the admitted source is completely of
      a different nature.  The signatures on the documents in question, to a
      naked eye, cannot be that of  Pushpa  Verma.   Further,  there  is  no
      reason why a lady who has two sisters and two Advocate nephews staying
      in same town, would give power of  attorney  and  execute  a  Will  in
      favour of a  total  stranger.   These  circumstances  are  clinchingly
      against the appellant.  His  assertion  that  he  had  made  over  the
      payments received in cash to Pushpa Verma  is  not  supported  by  any
      material on record.  In fact, the appellant  kept  receiving  payments
      even in the month of March, 2003.  None of the payments are  reflected
      in the account of Pushpa Verma.  Receipt of Rs.1,00,000/-  by  way  of
      cheque in the name of appellant himself is also a circumstance against
      the appellant.   The  evidence  thus  shows  that  the  appellant  had
      fabricated the documents in question and  was  attempting  to  defraud
      Pushpa Verma, as stated in the extra judicial confession.  Further, by
      Ext. PH addressed to Pushpa Verma, a copy of which  was  sent  to  the
      appellant, she was asked to remain personally present in the office of
      HUDA.  There is nothing on record  to  show  that  the  appellant  had
      undertaken any attempt,  if  he  was  genuinely  acting  as  power  of
      attorney on her behalf.  We are satisfied that  the  circumstances  on
      record, even if we were to disregard that relating to the recovery  of
      Voter Identity Card Ext.P-12, do suggest only one hypothesis and  that
      is the guilt of the appellant.  The defence set up  by  the  appellant
      does not inspire any confidence  and  merits  rejection.  The  appeal,
      therefore fails and is dismissed.


      14.  Before we part, we must deal with the conduct of PW10 S.P. Meena.
      As Sub-Registrar, it was expected of him and was fundamental  part  of
      his duty to see that the persons who are  entering  into  transactions
      must appear before him in person and the documents would be registered
      only after the essential formalities were undertaken.  His evidence in
      the present case shows rank dereliction  of  duty.   Add  to  it,  his
      attempt to strike a different chord in the private proceedings is also
      questionable.  He appeared as witness for the  appellant  and  took  a
      contradictory stand on oath.  Such conduct must be dealt with strictly
      so that the matters of registration continue to have confidence in the
      eyes of people.  We therefore recommend suitable action  against  said
      PW10 S.P. Meena and direct the authorities to initiate proceedings  in
      that behalf.  A copy of this judgment be sent to  the  Supervisors  in
      the office where he was working as Sub-Registrar, Pitampura, Delhi.


      15.   The appeal is disposed of in the afore-mentioned terms.







                        ………………………………..……J.
                                   (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla)




                                   ………………………………..……J.
                                   (Uday Umesh Lalit)


      New Delhi,
      October 16, 2015

Not a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder - the assault was Deliberate & Designed to achieve the purpose = PW 16 Dr. Sunder Rajan found 16 cut injuries on the person of Sultan and stated that lot of blood must have been lost as a result of such injuries. Injury No.1 states that carotid artery and jugular vein were cut. Though he did not specifically say that injury No.1 singularly or all the injuries collectively were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to have caused the death, the material on record is fully indicative of this facet. In his cross-examination he stated that a cut to the carotid artery would affect supply of oxygen to the brain and a person may lose consciousness within three minutes. In Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat [1]a cut of the size of 2” x 1”x 2 ¼” on carotid artery of the victim was considered by this Court to be indicative that the victim had profusely bled and could not have remained alive for more than 10-15 minutes. In the instant case both the carotid artery and jugular vein were found cut and Sultan had soon thereafter lost consciousness. These features are clearly indicative that injury No.1 was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to have caused the death. Additionally Dr. Sunder Rajan had also stated that lot of blood should have been lost as a result of 16 stab wounds. In our considered view, this is not a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The assault was deliberate and designed to achieve the result namely the death of Sultan. The courts below were therefore right and justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 302, 506 (ii) IPC.

Non-reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.786 of 2008




        KAMAL @ POORIKAMAL & ANR.                      …. Appellants


                                   Versus


         STATE OF TAMIL NADU                          …. Respondent






                               J U D G M E N T






      Uday Umesh Lalit, J.




      1.    This appeal by Special Leave challenges the judgment  and  order
      dated 28.06.2006 passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras
      dismissing Criminal Appeal No.572 of 2003 preferred by the  appellants
      herein and thereby affirming  the  conviction  and  sentence  recorded
      against them by the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore  in  Sessions
      Case No.344 of 2002.


      2.    One Sultan Meeran hereinafter referred to as Sultan, resident of
      Coimbatore fell in love with a Hindu girl, converted her to Islam  and
      married her.  Thereafter he converted another Hindu girl to Islam  and
      married her as well.  This conduct on the part of Sultan, according to
      the prosecution, enraged the first appellant who one  month  prior  to
      the incident in question had gone to the house of  the  deceased.   He
      called Sultan and stated that he was converting Hindu girls  to  Islam
      and marrying them and that there was danger to Hindu Religion  because
      of him and that if he were to continue  such  conversions  the  things
      would become different and that he must save his  life,  if  possible.
      At that time the father of Sultan,  i.e.  PW  8  Abdul  Ajeezkhan  was
      present in the house.


      3.    On 26.03.2002 the car  belonging  to  Sultan  had  gone  to  the
      workshop of PW-11 Venu Gopal for repairs.  After the car was ready  to
      be picked up, Sultan along with his younger brother PW-1 Abdul  Kadhar
      went to the workshop on the motor-cycle of said PW-1.  Sultan had told
      his elder brother PW 9 Abudhaheer that he and PW-1 would return  after
      having dinner at Galaxy Restaurant.  After  picking  up  the  vehicle,
      Sultan and PW-1 had their dinner in the Restaurant and when they  came
      out around 10:35 p.m., Sultan suggested that  they  would  go  to  the
      adjoining club named Snooker World.


      4.     As they entered, they found the appellants sitting there.   The
      first appellant called Sultan and spoke  to  him.   Thereafter  Sultan
      told PW-1 that they should go home and they came out of  the  club  by
      about 10:45 p.m.  PW-1 then started his motorcycle  while  Sultan  was
      getting into his car.  At that time the appellants came out and  asked
      him to stop the car.  The second appellant opened the door and sat  in
      the back seat of the car of Sultan.  He held both  the  hands  of  the
      deceased backwards and the first appellant who was  standing  outside,
      took out a knife from his trouser and repeatedly stabbed Sultan on the
      head and neck, stating that he had converted two Hindu girls to  Islam
      and there was danger to Hindu Religion from him.  The first  appellant
      no.1 held the neck of Sultan and pulled him, at which point the second
      appellant came out, took  another  knife  from  his  pocket  and  also
      stabbed him.  According to the prosecution, at that stage PW-2  Ismail
      and PW-3 Sarvan Kumar had also reached the  place  of  occurrence  and
      witnessed the incident.  When PWs 1, 2 and 3 tried  to  apprehend  the
      appellants they were threatened that they would meet the same fate  as
      that of Sultan and the appellants fled away.


      5.   Sultan in that injured condition drove the car and while  he  was
      near Raj Laxami Clinic he lost control over the vehicle  and  the  car
      went into a ditch and stopped.  PW-1 who  was  following  him  on  his
      motor-cycle  saw  Sultan  being  unconscious.   At  that  point,  PW-9
      Abudhaheer also came there.  They managed to procure an ambulance  and
      PW-9 took Sultan in the ambulance, followed  by  PW-1  on  his  motor-
      cycle. They reached Government Hospital at about 11:40 p.m.  The  duty
      doctor after examining Sultan declared him to be dead.  After  putting
      the dead body in the mortuary, PW-1 went home, wrote  down  complaint,
      Ext. P-1 and thereafter reached B-2 Police  Station,  R.S.  Puram  and
      lodged the complaint at about 00:30 hours on 27.03.2002.  Crime No.389
      of 2002 was  accordingly  registered  for  offences  punishable  under
      Sections 341, 302, 506  (ii)  of  the  I.P.C.   The  FIR  reached  the
      Magistrate at 11:30 a.m. on 27.03.2002.


      6.    On 27.03.2002 the post mortem on the dead  body  of  Sultan  was
      conducted at 11:45 a.m. by PW 16 Dr. Sunder Rajan.  He found following
      ante mortem injuries:
           “1. Transversely oblique stab wound on  the  lateral  aspect  of
           neck measuring 5 cms x 2 cms x 6 cms deep. The lower medial  and
           of the wound is 2 cms below right angle of mandible.  Both  ends
           of the wound are pointed and  margins  is  regular.  This  wound
           passes downwards, backwards and medially and end as a point.  On
           dissection, the wound found cutting the  common  carotid  artery
           and internal jugular vein on the right  side.  Surrounding  area
           contained extravasted blood clots.


           2. Transversely oblique stab wound on the right  lateral  aspect
           of neck measuring 2 cms x 1 cm x 3 cms deep in the muscle plane.
           The upper lateral end of the wound is 5 cms below right mastoid.
           Both ends pointed. Margins regular. The wound passes  downwards,
           backwards and medially.


           3. Transversely oblique stab wound on the right  lateral  aspect
           of neck measuring 1 cm x 0.5 cm x 1.5 cms  deep  in  the  muscle
           plane. Both end pointed. Margins regular. The lower inner end of
           the wound is 8 cms below right  angle  of  mandible.  The  wound
           passes downwards, backwards and medially.


           4. A stab wound on the right supraclavicular region measuring 10
           cm x .5 cmx 1.5 cm in the muscle plane above and lateral to  the
           inner end of clavicle. Both ends pointed.  Margin  regular.  The
           wound passes backwards and medially.


           5. Oblique out injury on the right side of fore head 4 cms above
           the inner end of the right eye-brow measuring 2 cms x 1.5 cms  x
           bone deep.


           6. Vertically oblique incised wound involving the right temporal
           region of the scalp and right side upper part of the  face  just
           in front of right pinna measuring 12 cms x 1.5 cms x muscle deep
           with tailing in the lower end. The lower end of the wound  is  2
           cms about right angle mandible.


           7.  Vertically oblique  incised  wound  in  the  right  temporal
           partito occipital region measuring 10 cms x  1  cm  muscle  deep
           with tailing in the lower end. The middle of the wound is 3  cms
           posterior to right mastoid.


           8.  Oblique stab wound on the right side of chin involving right
           side of lower lip also measuring 5 cms x 2 cms in the  chin  and
           exiting out thrown in buccal surface of the right  side  of  the
           lower lip measuring 4cms x 1 cm. both  ends  of  the  wound  are
           pointed and the margins are regular.


           9. Transversely oblique stab wound on the right  lateral  aspect
           of chest measuring 3 cms x 2 cms x 3.5 cms deep  in  the  muscle
           plane. Both ends pointed. Margins regular. The  posterior  upper
           end of the wound is 14 cm right to the middle of T 10  vertebra.
           The wound passes downwards, backwards and medially.


           10. Oblique, cut injury on the back of lower third or left  fore
           arm measuring 4 cms x 2 cms x 53 neon deep. The lower radial end
           of the wound is 3 cms about left wrist.


           11.  Transversely oblique cut injury over the flexor  aspect  of
           left forearm measuring 5 cms x 2 cms  tendon  deep.  The  medial
           distal end of the wound is 9 cms above left wrist.


           12. Oblique cut injury front of left forearm 7 cms.  Above  left
           wrist measuring 2 cms x 1 cm tendon deep.


           13. An oblique incised wound 1 cm lateral to the previous  wound
           number 13 measuring 1 cm x 0.5 cm skin deep.


           14. Oblique cut injury in the ulna aspect of left palm measuring
           6 cms x 2 cmx bone deep. The wound is 4 cms below left wrist.


           15. Oblique cut injury on the back of ulnar side  of  left  hand
           wrist measuring 2.5 cms x 2 cms x tendon deep.
           16. Four oblique skin deep incised wounds measuring 3 cms  x  .5
           cms, 2 cms x .5 cm, 3 cms x .5 cm and 2 cms x .5 cm on the  back
           of left wrist.”


           He also found following injuries:-
            1.   2 cms x .5 cm over left side of fore head.
           2.    1 cm x.5 cm in the right side of front of lower neck.
            3.   5 cms x 3 cms back of right shoulder.
           4.    3 cms x 2 cms over right deltoid region.
           5     5 cms x 2 cms, 3 cms x 1 cm, 1 cm x .5 cm , .5 cm x .5  cm
           over lateral aspect of middle third of left arm.”




             PW-16  doctor  Sunder  Rajan  issued  Ext.  P-14  post   mortem
      certificate  and  letter  Ext.  P-16  being  the   final   certificate
      specifying the reasons for death.  According to him Sultan Meeran  had
      died  of  hemorrhage  due  to  injury   no.1   “stabbed   injury   and
      corresponding internal injury to neck vessels.”


      7.    The first appellant surrendered on 28.03.2002 while  the  second
      appellant was arrested on  31.03.2002.   Pursuant  to  the  disclosure
      statement made by the second  appellant,  M.O.  No.1  namely  a  blood
      stained knife with rubber handle  was  recovered  on  31.03.2002.   On
      02.04.2002 M.O. No.2 being a blood stained knife  with  wooden  handle
      was recovered pursuant  to  the  disclosure  statement  of  the  first
      appellant.  After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was  filed
      against the appellants and they were tried for the offences punishable
      under Sections 341, 302, 506 (ii)  of  the  I.P.C.  in  Sessions  Case
      No.344 of 2002.


      8.    The prosecution examined 19 witnesses in support  of  its  case.
      Eye-witness account was unfolded through the testimony of PWs 1,2  and
      3.  PW1 deposed to the incident reiterating the narration as stated in
      complaint Ext.P1.  PWs 2 and 3 supported the  version  of  PW1.   PW8,
      father of Sultan deposed to the incident when the first appellant  had
      come to the house of Sultan.  PW9 stated about the shifting of  Sultan
      in ambulance to Government Hospital.  Medical evidence on  record  was
      in the form of depositions of  PW15  Dr.  Natrajan  who  had  declared
      Sultan dead when he was brought to the hospital and of PW16 Dr. Sunder
      Rajan  who  had  conducted  the  post-mortem.   Though  PW16  did  not
      specifically state that injury No.1 was  sufficient  in  the  ordinary
      course of nature to cause the death, in response  to  queries  in  the
      cross-examination he stated as under:


           “Carotid artery carries the blood to brain with the oxygen.   If
           the pure blood is not carried to the brain, then the brain would
           not function for more than 3 minutes.  A  lot  of  blood  should
           have been oozed when there were 17  stab  wounds.   …..  If  the
           blood is not carried to brain, consciousness may  not  be  there
           beyond 2 or 3 minutes.  Thereafter, a  person  would  loose  his
           consciousness.”




      9.    The first appellant took the defence of right of private defence
      and examined one Suresh Babu as DW1.  It was the  case  of  the  first
      appellant that as he came out of the club Sultan and one  more  person
      tried to drag him into the car of Sultan, that there was a dagger kept
      in the car which was used by the first appellant in self defence, thus
      suggesting that the injury on the person of Sultan could have been the
      result of the scuffle between them.  But there was not a single injury
      on the person of the first appellant whereas Sultan  had  suffered  16
      injuries.    The  second  appellant  took   the   defence   of   false
      implication.


      10.   The trial court after considering the  material  on  record  and
      rival submissions found the case of the prosecution completely  proved
      and  by  its  judgment  and  order  dated  20.02.2003  convicted   the
      appellants under Section 302 IPC and sentenced them  to  undergo  life
      imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-,  in  default  whereof  to
      undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.  It also found them guilty
      under Section 506 (ii) I.P.C. and sentenced them to  undergo  rigorous
      imprisonment for 6 months.  It however acquitted them of  the  offence
      under  Section  341  I.P.C.   The  sentences  were  directed  to   run
      concurrently.


      11.   The appellants being aggrieved, filed Criminal Appeal No.572  of
      2003 in the High Court which was dismissed by the High  Court  by  its
      judgment under appeal, thereby affirming the  judgment  of  conviction
      and order of sentence as recorded by the trial court.  This appeal  by
      special leave challenges the said judgment of the High Court.


      12.   Mr.  R.  Basant,  learned  Senior  Advocate  appearing  for  the
      appellants made following submissions:
           1.    Complaint Ext. P-1 was received in the police  station  at
           00:30 hours but reached the Magistrate only  at  11:30  a.m.  on
           27.03.2002.  The  time  so  taken  shows  that  the  period  was
           utilized to prepare the complaint after due deliberation and  as
           such the complaint Ext. P-1 does not inspire evidence.


           2.    PWs 2 and 3 alleged eye witnesses were not present at  the
           scene of occurrence and their version is completely unreliable.


           3.   Though PW-1 was with the deceased, his version  now  before
           the Court was completely exaggerated and as such not trustworthy
           at all.


           4.   The plea of private defence as taken by the first appellant
           raises doubts about the prosecution case which doubts  were  not
           discharged at all.


           5.   The medical opinion on record nowhere  states  that  injury
           no.1 was sufficient in the ordinary course  of  nature  to  have
           caused the death and as such the offence, if at  all,  could  be
           that of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.


      13.    Mr. Yogesh Kanna, learned  Advocate  appearing  for  the  State
      submitted that the material on record clearly indicated that the  plea
      of self-defence was totally false.  In his submission the  case  stood
      completely proved against both the appellants.  He  further  submitted
      that there was sufficient material on record to conclusively establish
      that carotid artery and jugular vein were cut. Such an injury  in  the
      ordinary course of nature would certainly have caused the death and in
      any case the matter would come under the first clause of  Section  300
      IPC and not under the third clause of 300 IPC as suggested.


      14.    We  have  gone  through  the  record   and   considered   rival
      submissions.  The evidence of PW1 is fully consistent with the medical
      evidence on record and is quite cogent and trustworthy.  The  presence
      of PW1 along with the deceased is established through the testimony of
      PW11 Venu Gopal and such presence was not seriously challenged by  Mr.
      Basant at all.  What was submitted was that  there  were  elements  of
      exaggeration  which  would  create  doubts  about  the  case  of   the
      prosecution.  In our view, there was no exaggeration at all.  Further,
      merely because PW1 a young boy of 17  years  had  first  gone  to  his
      house, prepared  the  complaint  and  thereafter  reached  the  police
      station would  not  be  sufficient  to  discard  his  testimony.   The
      complaint in question was  received  at  0030  hrs.,  the  police  had
      immediately swung into action, prepared inquest panchnama and sent the
      body of Sultan for post-mortem.  Though the FIR reached the Magistrate
      at about 11:30 am, the post-mortem itself was conducted  at  11.45  am
      and it would not be correct to assume that the FIR was so  tailor-made
      to suit any finding in the post-mortem.  To us, there was no delay  in
      the FIR reaching the Magistrate.  Moreover, the defence of  the  first
      appellant itself accepts his presence at the time and place as alleged
      by the prosecution.  We therefore find the evidence  of  PW1  reliable
      and trustworthy, which is supported by the testimony of PWs 2 and 3 as
      well. According to the medical evidence on record  two  sharp  cutting
      weapons were used for inflicting the injuries found on the  person  of
      Sultan and that  the  injuries  were  possible  by  MO.  Nos.1  and  2
      recovered from the appellants. The involvement of both  the  appellant
      thus stands proved.


      15.   PW 16 Dr. Sunder Rajan found 16 cut injuries on  the  person  of
      Sultan and stated that lot of blood must have been lost as a result of
      such injuries.  Injury No.1 states that  carotid  artery  and  jugular
      vein were cut.  Though he did not specifically say  that  injury  No.1
      singularly or all the injuries collectively  were  sufficient  in  the
      ordinary course of nature to have caused the death,  the  material  on
      record is fully indicative of this facet.  In his cross-examination he
      stated that a cut to the carotid artery would affect supply of  oxygen
      to the brain and a person may lose consciousness within three minutes.
       In Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat [1]a cut of  the
      size of 2” x 1”x 2 ¼” on carotid artery of the victim  was  considered
      by this Court to be indicative that the victim had profusely bled  and
      could not have remained alive for more  than  10-15  minutes.  In  the
      instant case both the carotid artery and jugular vein were  found  cut
      and Sultan had soon thereafter lost consciousness.  These features are
      clearly indicative that injury No.1 was  sufficient  in  the  ordinary
      course of nature to have caused the death.   Additionally  Dr.  Sunder
      Rajan had also stated that lot of blood should have  been  lost  as  a
      result of 16 stab wounds. In our considered view, this is not  a  case
      of culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder.   The  assault  was
      deliberate and designed to achieve the  result  namely  the  death  of
      Sultan.  The courts  below  were  therefore  right  and  justified  in
      convicting and sentencing the appellants for the  offences  punishable
      under Sections 341, 302, 506 (ii) IPC.


      16.    This appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed.







                       ……………....……………………..J.
                                  (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla)





                       ……………………………………..J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)


      New Delhi,
      October 16, 2015





-----------------------
      [1] 1997 (7) SCC 156

random individual acts done without meeting of minds =For conviction of an offence read with Section 34 IPC, it is necessary that there should be a finding as to the common intention of the participants. Though the High Court has modified the conviction from Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC as Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, the High Court has not recorded any finding as to how the appellants shared the common intention to establish their constructive liability to sustain the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The appellants are said to have attacked Ramesh with sticks on his face. Ramesh sustained nasal bone fracture probably due to the attack on the face. But this cannot be said to be an act in furtherance of common intention to commit the murder of Ramesh along with accused No.1 and 2. They are random individual acts done without meeting of minds and in our view, the appellants can be held liable only for their individual acts.As the appellants have not shared or acted in furtherance of common intention in the attack of the witnesses and therefore the conviction of the appellants as modified by the High Court under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside. Conviction of the appellants Balu (A-4) and Raja(A-5) under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is modified as conviction under Section 325 IPC and they are sentenced to undergo imprisonment to the period already undergone. Their conviction under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC is set aside and the appellants are acquitted of those charges. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 502 OF 2007


BALU @ BALA SUBRAMANIAM & ANR.                             ...Appellants


                                   Versus


STATE (U.T. OF PONDICHERRY)                                   ...Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.

This criminal appeal is filed against the judgment dated  15.07.2005  passed
by the High Court of Judicature at  Madras  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.113  of
1999, whereby the High Court, while maintaining the sentence,  modified  the
conviction recorded by the trial court qua the accused  namely  Giri-accused
No.1, Seenu @ Srinivasan-accused No.2, Balu @  Bala  Subramaniam  (Appellant
No.1-Accused No.4) and Raja @ Kotti Raja (Appellant No.2-Accused  No.5)   as
conviction under Section 302 read with Section  34  IPC,  Section  326  read
with Section 34 IPC and Section 324 read  with  Section  34  IPC.  The  High
Court acquitted Partheeban-accused No.3 of all the charges.
2.          Briefly stated case of the prosecution  is  that  one  Natarajan
had a quarrel with Seenu @ Srinivasan-accused No.2  in  respect  of  a  chit
transaction and Kannan-PW2 supported  Natarajan  and  fight  ensued  between
Seenu-accused No.2 and  Kannan-PW2  about  a  week  prior  to  the  date  of
incident i.e. 18.05.1997.  In the forenoon, on the day of the incident  i.e.
on 18.05.1997, Kannan-PW2, Ramesh (deceased) and one  Kamalakannan  went  to
the accused in order  to  settle  the  dispute  amicably.   However,  during
settlement talks, fight ensued between PW-2 and Seenu and Balu attempted  to
beat PW-2 and Ramesh intervened and beat Balu. Thereafter both parties  left
the place stating that they could resume settlement talks  in  the  evening.
On the evening at about 6.30  P.M.,  Kannan-PW2,  Saravanan-PW3,  Suresh-PW5
and  Arumugam-PW6  accompanied  by  Nagarajan  went  to  Sakthi   Nagar   at
Uruliyanpet and were having the settlement talks with the accused.   On  the
mid way, the accused persons were informed that their friend  one  Anand  is
being badly cut by the complainant party and the accused questioned them  as
to how they could attack their man even when  settlement  talks  were  going
on.  So saying, the accused ran towards the place and  on  seeing  PW-1  and
Ramesh  coming  in  the  opposite  direction,  Giri-accused  No.1  allegedly
shouted that Ramesh supports Kannan and that he must be killed  and  accused
No.1 and 2 cut Ramesh with knives on his head and  chased  him.   Partheeban
and appellants beat Ramesh on the face with sticks, Giri-accused No.1  again
cut Ramesh with knife and Ramesh fell down.  When PW-2  intervened  to  save
Ramesh, PW-2 was attacked and he sustained injury on his left hand and  PW-2
ran away from the place.  Accused No.1 and 3 chased PW-3  and  accused  No.2
assaulted and inflicted cut  injuries  on  the  head  of  PW-3.   They  also
inflicted cut injury on Muruganathan-PW4, who was taking bath near  a  water
tap.  The witnesses ran away from the place and came back  only  after  some
time and they were informed that injured Ramesh was removed from  the  scene
of occurrence by a police constable.
3.          Based on the complaint lodged by PW-1,  a  case  was  registered
against the accused in Crime No.152/1997 under Sections 147, 148,  307  read
with Section 149 IPC.  Ramesh and other injured witnesses were  examined  by
PW-11-Dr. Baskaran in General Hospital, Pondicherry.  On 21.05.1997,  Ramesh
succumbed to injuries and the case was altered to  Section  302  IPC.  After
due investigation, chargesheet was filed against all the five accused.
4.          To  substantiate  the  charges,  onbehalf  of  the  prosecution,
fifteen witnesses were examined. The trial court held that  the  prosecution
has established guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt  and  convicted
all the five accused under  Section  148  IPC  and  Section  302  read  with
Section 149 IPC and various other offences and  sentenced  them  to  undergo
imprisonment for  life  and  also  imposed  sentences  for  other  offences.
Aggrieved by the verdict of conviction, accused preferred appeal before  the
High Court. Vide impugned judgment dated  15.07.2005,  High  Court  modified
the conviction as aforesaid in para (1)  and  partly  allowed  the  criminal
appeal.  Aggrieved, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
5.          Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the  testimony
of PW-2 who is an injured witness is  not  believable  as  firstly  all  the
injured witnesses were  examined  soon  after  the  incident  in  Government
Hospital and they deposed that  they  were  assaulted  by  unknown  persons.
However, PW-2, who was examined after three days, has  stated  that  he  was
assaulted by accused No.1-Giri and not  attributed  any  overt  act  to  the
appellants-accused No.4 and 5.  It was further submitted that  even  as  per
the prosecution case, the occurrence was due to  a  sudden  fight  and  that
when peace talks were going on  between  the  complainant  and  the  accused
party and on being informed that one Anand belonging to  accused  party  was
cut by the complainant party,  fight ensued between two groups  and  as  the
act was not committed in furtherance  of  the  common  intention,  the  High
Court erred in  convicting  the  appellants  under  Section  302  read  with
Section 34 IPC.
6.          Taking us through  the  evidence  onbehalf  of  the  respondent,
learned Senior Counsel Mr. V. Kanagaraj submitted  that  on  exhortation  by
Giri-accused No.1, the  appellants  and  other  accused  attacked  deceased-
Ramesh and injuries were caused in furtherance of common  intention  of  all
the accused would be liable under Section 302 read with Section 34  IPC  for
the act of committing murder of Ramesh and the appellants have been  rightly
convicted by the courts below.
7.          We have carefully considered the rival  contention  and  perused
the impugned judgment and material on record.
8.          Prosecution has examined fifteen witnesses out of  which  PWs  2
to 4 are injured witnesses. PW-3 Saravanan,  PW-4  Muruganathan  (nephew  of
accused No.3) did not support the  prosecution  case  and  prosecution  thus
relied upon the evidence of PW1-Murgan and PW5-Suresh  and  injured  witness
PW2-Kannan.  In his evidence, PW-1 stated that accused No.1 and  2  attacked
Ramesh on his head with knives and accused No. 3 to  5  attacked  Ramesh  on
his face by stick and Ramesh fell down on the  road.   Suresh-PW5  had  also
stated that the appellants attacked Ramesh  by  stick.  PW2-Kannan,  injured
witness stated that accused  No.1-Giri  and  accused  No.2-  Seenu  attacked
Ramesh by knives on his head.  So far as the overt act  of  the  appellants,
PW2-Kannan stated that Accused No. 4 and 5 took  the  wooden  stick  from  a
bullock cart standing nearby.  PW-2 did not say  anything  about  the  overt
act of the appellants.  Though the appellants denied their presence  at  the
place of incident and pleaded that a false case  has  been  foisted  against
them,  consistent  version  of  PWs  1  and  5  establish  presence  of  the
appellants and that they  attacked  Ramesh  with  sticks.  Presence  of  the
appellants and that they were armed with sticks  is  also  substantiated  by
the evidence of  injured  witness  Kannan-PW2.   Findings  recorded  by  the
courts  below  that  the  appellants  attacked   Ramesh   with   sticks   is
unassailable.
9.          In the facts and circumstances of the  case,  whether  the  High
Court was right in finding that  the  appellants  acted  in  furtherance  of
common intention in committing murder of Ramesh and whether the  High  Court
was right in attributing constructive  liability  to  the  appellants  while
convicting them under Section 302  read with Section 34  IPC  is  the  point
falling for consideration.
10.         To invoke Section 34  IPC,  it  must  be  established  that  the
criminal act was done by more than  one  person  in  furtherance  of  common
intention of all.  It must,  therefore,  be  proved  that:-  (i)  there  was
common intention on the part of  several  persons  to  commit  a  particular
crime and (ii) the crime was actually committed by them  in  furtherance  of
that common intention.  The essence of liability under  Section  34  IPC  is
simultaneous conscious mind of persons participating in the criminal  action
to bring about a particular result. Minds regarding the  sharing  of  common
intention gets satisfied when an overt act is established qua  each  of  the
accused. Common intention implies pre-arranged plan and  acting  in  concert
pursuant to the pre-arranged plan.  Common  intention  is  an  intention  to
commit  the  crime  actually  committed  and  each  accused  person  can  be
convicted of that  crime,  only  if  he  has  participated  in  that  common
intention.
11.         The classic case on the subject is the  judgment  of  the  Privy
Council in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118, wherein it was  held  as
under:-
“…Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability  in  the  doing  of  a
criminal act.  The section does not say “the common intentions of  all”  nor
does it say “an intention common to all”.  Under the  section,  the  essence
of that liability is to be found in the  existence  of  a  common  intention
animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in  furtherance
of such intention.  To invoke the aid of Section 34  successfully,  it  must
be shown that the criminal act complained against was done  by  one  of  the
accused persons in the furtherance of the common intention of all;  if  this
is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed  on  any  one  of  the
persons in the same manner as if the act  were  done  by  him  alone.   This
being the principle, it is clear to their Lordships  that  common  intention
within the meaning of the  section  implies  a  pre-arranged  plan,  and  to
convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should  be  proved
that the criminal act was done  in  concert  pursuant  to  the  pre-arranged
plan.  As has been often observed, it is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to
procure direct evidence to prove the intention of  an  individual;  in  most
cases it has to be inferred from  his  act  or  conduct  or  other  relevant
circumstances of the case.”(Underlining added)
Reiterating the above principles laid down by the Privy  Council  in  Mahbub
Shah’s case, in Shankerlal Kacharabhai and Others vs. State of Gujarat,  AIR
1965 SC 1260, this Court held that the criminal act mentioned in Section  34
IPC is the result of the concerted action of more than  one  person  and  if
the said result was reached in furtherance of  the  common  intention,  each
person is liable for the result as if he had done it himself.
12.         In Ramesh Singh alias photti v. State of  A.P.,  (2004)  11  SCC
305, this Court held as under:-
“12. … As a general principle in a case of  criminal  liability  it  is  the
primary responsibility of the person who actually commits  the  offence  and
only that person who  has  committed  the  crime  can  be  held  guilty.  By
introducing Section 34 in the Penal  Code  the  legislature  laid  down  the
principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The  essence  of  that
liability is to be found in the existence of a common  intention  connecting
the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in  furtherance  of  such
intention. Thus, if the act is the result of a common intention  then  every
person who did  the  criminal  act  with  that  common  intention  would  be
responsible for the offence committed irrespective of  the  share  which  he
had in its perpetration. Section 34 IPC  embodies  the  principle  of  joint
liability in doing the criminal act based  on  a  common  intention.  Common
intention essentially being a state of mind it is very difficult to  procure
direct evidence to prove such intention. Therefore, in most cases it has  to
be inferred from the act like, the conduct of the accused or other  relevant
circumstances of the case. The inference can be gathered from the manner  in
which the  accused  arrived  at  the  scene  and  mounted  the  attack,  the
determination and concert with which the  attack  was  made,  and  from  the
nature of injury caused by one or some of them.  The  contributory  acts  of
the persons who are not responsible for the injury can further  be  inferred
from the subsequent conduct  after  the  attack.  In  this  regard  even  an
illegal omission on the part of such accused can  indicate  the  sharing  of
common intention. In other words, the  totality  of  circumstances  must  be
taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether  the  accused
had the common intention to  commit  an  offence  of  which  they  could  be
convicted. (See Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,
(1970) 1 SCC 696)” (Underlining added)
13.         Common intention is  seldom  capable  of  direct  proof,  it  is
almost invariably to be inferred from proved circumstances relating  to  the
entire conduct of all the persons and  not  only  from  the  individual  act
actually performed. The inference to be drawn from the manner of the  origin
of the occurrence, the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene  and
the concert with which attack was made and from the injuries caused  by  one
or some of them.  The criminal act actually  committed  would  certainly  be
one of the important factor to be taken into consideration  but  should  not
be taken to be the sole factor.
14.         Under Section 34 IPC, a pre-concert in the sense of  a  distinct
previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common intention  to  bring
about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between  a  number
of persons, with reference to the facts of the  case  and  circumstances  of
the situation.  The question whether there was any common intention  or  not
depends  upon  the  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  proving  facts  and
circumstances of each case.  The  totality  of  the  circumstances  must  be
taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether  the  accused
had a common intention to  commit  an  offence  with  which  they  could  be
convicted.
15.         In the light of the above principles,  considering  the  present
case, in our view, the facts and circumstances do not  indicate  that  there
was common intention to commit murder  of  Ramesh.   On  18.05.1997  in  the
forenoon,  there  were  settlement  talks  which  did  not  materialise  and
therefore they left the place stating  that  they  could  resume  settlement
talks in the evening. On the evening at about 6.30  P.M.,  PW2-Kannan,  PW3-
Saravanan, PW5-Suresh, Arumugam and  Nagarajan  went  to  Sakthi  Nagar  and
resumed settlement talks.   At  that  time,  one  person  belonging  to  the
accused party came and informed that at the corner of lane, Anand-friend  of
the accused party was cut by the person who came for the  settlement  talks.
On hearing the same, Giri-Accused No.1  and  Seenu-Accused  No.2  questioned
the complainant party as to how  they  could  attack  their  man  even  when
settlement talks were going on and so saying accused No.1 and 2  took  their
knives which they were  hiding behind their back and  accused  No.  3  to  5
took sticks from a cart  standing nearby attacked PWs 2, 3 and 5.   At  that
time Ramesh and his uncle PW-1 Murgan were coming in the opposite  direction
and on seeing them  accused  No.1-Giri  pointing  out  to  Ramesh,  exhorted
others saying that Ramesh belonged to Kannan party and that he  be  cut  and
by so saying accused No.1-Giri cut Ramesh on his head with knife and  Seenu-
Accused No.2 also attacked Ramesh with knife. The appellants and Partheeban-
Accused No.3 have also attacked Ramesh with sticks on his face.
16.         Facts and circumstances of the case show  that  the  attack  was
not a premeditated one nor was there a prior concert.  Initially  settlement
talks were on and fight started only when the accused party was informed  by
their person that Anand was cut by complainant party and thus  the  incident
arose suddenly.  No doubt, common intention could develop even at  the  spur
of the moment; but in the present case, the way the  occurrence  took  place
as depicted by the prosecution, there could not have been  common  intention
between the accused. The totality of the circumstances must  be  taken  into
consideration in order to arrive at a conclusion that the appellants  had  a
common intention to commit the offence under which they were convicted.  The
appellants were not armed and admittedly  they  are  said  to  have  removed
sticks from the bullock cart standing  nearby  and  on  the  exhortation  by
accused No.1-Giri, the  appellants  have  attacked  Ramesh.   There  may  be
similar intention in the minds of the assailants to attack;  but  it  cannot
be said that the appellants have acted in furtherance  of  common  intention
to attract constructive liability  under  Section  34  IPC.  The  facts  and
circumstances, in our view, do  not  give  rise  to  an  inference  of  pre-
concert.
17.         For conviction of an offence read with Section  34  IPC,  it  is
necessary that there should be a finding as to the common intention  of  the
participants. Though  the  High  Court  has  modified  the  conviction  from
Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC as Section 302 read  with  Section  34
IPC, the High Court has not recorded any finding as to  how  the  appellants
shared the common intention to establish  their  constructive  liability  to
sustain the conviction under Section 302  read  with  Section  34  IPC.  The
appellants are said to  have  attacked  Ramesh  with  sticks  on  his  face.
Ramesh sustained nasal bone fracture probably  due  to  the  attack  on  the
face.  But this cannot be said  to  be  an  act  in  furtherance  of  common
intention to commit the murder of Ramesh along  with  accused  No.1  and  2.
They are random individual acts done without meeting of  minds  and  in  our
view, the appellants can be held liable  only  for  their  individual  acts.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, conviction of the  appellants
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained and the  same
is modified as the conviction under Section 325  IPC  and  the  sentence  is
modified to the period of imprisonment already undergone.
18.         For attacking the  witnesses  PW2-Kannan,  PW4-Muruganathan  and
PW5-Suresh, the appellants were convicted by the trial court  under  Section
326 read with Section 149 IPC and under Section 324 read  with  Section  149
IPC which was modified  by  the  High  Court.   No  specific  overt  act  is
attributed to the appellants in attacking the  prosecution  witnesses  2,  4
and 5.  As the appellants have not shared or acted in furtherance of  common
intention in the attack of the witnesses and  therefore  the  conviction  of
the appellants as modified by the High Court under  Section  326  read  with
Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 read with  Section  34  IPC  cannot  be
sustained and the same is liable to be set aside.
19.         Conviction of the appellants Balu  (A-4)  and  Raja(A-5)   under
Section 302 read with  Section  34  IPC  is  modified  as  conviction  under
Section 325 IPC and they  are  sentenced  to  undergo  imprisonment  to  the
period already undergone. Their  conviction  under  Section  326  read  with
Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC is  set  aside
and the appellants are acquitted of those  charges.  The  appeal  is  partly
allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellants are  on  bail.   Their
bail bonds shall stand discharged.


                             ..……..…………………………J.
                                           (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)


                             ..……..…………………………J.
                                           (R. BANUMATHI)
New Delhi;
October  16, 2015

Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- the petitioners allege deliberate violation by the respondents of the judgment and order dated 22nd April, 2010 passed by this Court in N. Suresh Nathan and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2010) 5 SCC 692= whether the practice adopted by the Government of Pondicherry of counting the service of Section Officers/Junior Engineers who have qualified as graduates while in service only from the date they passed the degree or equivalent examination for purposes of promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers under Rule 11(1) of the Government of Pondicherry Assistant Engineers (including Deputy Director of Public Works Department) Group ‘B’ (Technical) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1965 (for short ‘Recruitment Rules’) was legally sound. Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules provide for the method of appointment as Assistant Engineer to be by ‘selection’ and reads as: “5. Whether Selection post or: Selection” Non-Selection Post:Having said so, there is, in our opinion, no deliberate or contumacious breach of the directions of this Court to warrant punitive action against those responsible for taking the said decision. The error it appears has occurred more because of an erroneous perception on the part of the government and the review DPC that the method adopted by them was sanctioned by law and the orders of this Court. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary to pass any orders of punishment against the respondent on that score although we would expect them to be more careful and circumspect in future. With the above observation we dispose of these contempt petitions with a direction to the respondent-State to redo the exercise in terms of the directions of this Court in N. Suresh Nathan (supra) keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. No costs.

                                             REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.339 OF 2013

                                     IN
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8468 OF 2003


C. Chakkaravarthy and Ors.              …Appellants

Versus

Tmt. M. Satyavathy, IAS
and Ors.                                      …Respondents/Contemnors


                                    WITH

                  CONTEMPT PETITION (/CIVIL) NO.340 OF 2013
                                     IN
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8468 OF 2003


J. Lucien Pedro Kumar and Anr.           …Appellants

Versus

Tmt. M. Satyavathy, IAS
and Ors.                                      …Respondents/Contemnors





                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    In this petition under Article 129 of the Constitution of  India  read
with Section 12 of Contempt of  Courts  Act,  1971  the  petitioners  allege
deliberate violation by the respondents of  the  judgment  and  order  dated
22nd April, 2010 passed by this Court in N. Suresh Nathan and Ors. v.  Union
of India & Ors. (2010) 5 SCC 692.  The question that fell for  consideration
therein was whether the practice adopted by the  Government  of  Pondicherry
of counting the  service  of  Section  Officers/Junior  Engineers  who  have
qualified as graduates while in service only from the date they  passed  the
degree or equivalent examination for purposes of promotion to  the  post  of
Assistant Engineers under  Rule  11(1)  of  the  Government  of  Pondicherry
Assistant Engineers (including Deputy Director of Public  Works  Department)
Group  ‘B’  (Technical)  Recruitment  (Amendment)  Rules,  1965  (for  short
‘Recruitment Rules’) was legally sound. Rule  5  of  the  Recruitment  Rules
provide for the method  of  appointment  as  Assistant  Engineer  to  be  by
‘selection’ and reads as:

“5. Whether Selection post or:    Selection”
     Non-Selection Post:


2.    Reference may also be made to Rule 11 of the said rules  which  is  as
under:

|“11. |In case of           |:|Promotion               |
|     |recruitment by       | |                        |
|     |promotion/deputation/| |Section Officer         |
|     |transfer grades from | |possessing a recognised |
|     |which                | |degree in Civil         |
|     |promotion/deputation/| |Engineering or          |
|     |transfer to be made  | |equivalent with 3 years |
|     |                     | |service in the grade    |
|     |                     | |failing which Section   |
|     |                     | |Officers holding diploma|
|     |                     | |in Civil Engineering    |
|     |                     | |with 6 years service in |
|     |                     | |the grade – 50%.        |
|     |                     | |Section Officers        |
|     |                     | |possessing a recognised |
|     |                     | |diploma in Civil        |
|     |                     | |Engineering with 6 years|
|     |                     | |service in the grade –  |
|     |                     | |50%                     |
|     |                     | |                        |
|     |                     | |... ... ...”            |




This Court on a consideration of the rival submissions urged before  it  and
the decisions of this Court relied upon by the parties in support  of  their
respective submissions held that the practice adopted by the  Government  of
Pondicherry of placing the Junior Engineers qualified as  graduates  in  the
order of seniority according to the date on which  they  passed  the  degree
examination was contrary to Rule 5 of the Recruitment  Rules.   Having  said
that this Court held that the directions issued by the High Court  directing
that the entire service of a  person  should  be  counted  for  purposes  of
seniority and promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer was also  contrary
to the provisions of Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules (supra). The  following
passage appearing in  the  judgment  of  this  Court  is,  in  this  regard,
apposite:

“41. The practice adopted by the Government of Pondicherry  in  consultation
with UPSC of counting the services of Section Officers or Junior  Engineers,
who qualified as graduates while in service from the date  they  passed  the
degree or equivalent examination and placing  them  in  order  of  seniority
accordingly for the purpose of consideration for promotion to  the  post  of
Assistant Engineer under Clause 1 of Rule 11 of  the  Recruitment  Rules  is
contrary to Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules.  Similarly,  the  direction  of
the High Court in the impugned  judgment  and  order  to  count  the  entire
service of  a  person  concerned  even  before  acquiring  degree  in  Civil
Engineering for the purpose of  seniority  and  promotion  to  the  post  of
Assistant Engineer under Clause 1 of Rule 11 of  the  Recruitment  Rules  is
contrary to Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules.”


This Court then proceeded  to  declare  that  recruitment  to  the  post  of
Assistant Engineers was by way of selection meaning thereby  that  seniority
in  the  cadre  of  Section  Officers/Junior  Engineers  was  not  of   much
significance.  Selection for promotion to the post  of  Assistant  Engineers
was, declared this Court, to be made only on the basis of comparative  merit
of eligible candidates in which persons found most meritorious  were  to  be
selected for appointment.  Such a method of selection  would,  according  to
this Court, not only be consistent with Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules  but
also satisfy the demands of equality of opportunity contained in Article  16
of the Constitution. This Court observed:

“48. As we have seen, Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules in  the  present  case
states that the post of Assistant Engineer  is  a  selection  post  and  the
Recruitment Rules nowhere provide  that  seniority-cum-merit  would  be  the
criteria for promotion. In the absence of any indication in the  Recruitment
Rules that seniority in the grade of Section Officers/Junior Engineers  will
be counted for the purpose of promotions to the post of Assistant  Engineer,
consideration of all Section Officers/Junior Engineers  under  Clause  1  of
Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules who are  eligible  for  such  consideration
has to be done on the basis of assessment of the comparative  merit  of  the
eligible candidates and the most suitable or meritorious  candidate  has  to
be selected for the post of Assistant Engineer. Such a method  of  selection
will be consistent with Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules and  Article  16  of
the Constitution which guarantees to all citizens  equality  of  opportunity
in matters of public employment.”

Having said so, this Court set aside  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High
Court and directed the Government of Pondicherry to consider  the  cases  of
Section Officer/Junior Engineer who have completed 3 years  service  in  the
grade of   Section Officers/Junior Engineers for promotion to the  vacancies
in the post of Assistant Engineers, Public Works Department,  Government  of
Pondicherry on the basis of their inter se merit.  The operative portion  of
the order passed by this Court runs as under:

“50. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned  judgment  of  the
High Court and direct the Government of Pondicherry to  consider  the  cases
of all Section Officers  or  Junior  Engineers,  who  have  completed  three
years’ service in the grade of Section Officers  or  Junior  Engineers,  for
promotion to the vacancies in the post of Assistant Engineer,  Public  Works
Department, Government of Pondicherry, in accordance with  their  merit.  We
make it clear that the promotions to the post of Assistant Engineer  already
made pursuant to the judgment and order  of  the  High  Court  will  not  be
disturbed until the exercise is carried  out  for  promotion  in  accordance
with merit as directed in this judgment and on completion of such  exercise,
formal orders of promotion to  the  vacancies  in  the  posts  of  Assistant
Engineer which arose during the pendency of the cases before this Court  are
passed in case of those who  are  selected  for  promotion  and  after  such
exercise only those who are not selected for promotion may  be  reverted  to
the post of Section Officer or Junior Engineer.”


Considering  the  fact  that  the  number   of   candidates   eligible   for
consideration will be large, this Court reserved liberty to  the  Government
to issue executive  instructions  as  to  the  method  to  be  followed  for
consideration of such eligible candidates for promotion.  This Court said:

“Where,  therefore,  there  are  a  large  number  of  eligible   candidates
available  for  consideration  for  promotion  to  a  selection  post,   the
Government can issue executive instructions consistent  with  the  principle
of merit on  the  method  to  be  followed  for  considering  such  eligible
candidates for promotion to the selection post.”


Pursuant to the liberty so reserved, the review DPC appears  to  have  taken
note of certain pre-existing Government of India Order  dated  6th  January,
2006 issued by the Department of Personnel and  Training,  for  purposes  of
selecting suitable officers for promotion on  the  basis  of  ‘Merit’.   The
said order set out guidelines to be followed for restricting  the  field  of
selection to a manageable number of candidates in cases where the number  of
such  candidates  was  large.    The  case  of   the   respondent-State   of
Pondicherry is that the review DPC evolved a procedure keeping in  mind  the
observations made by this Court as also  the  DoPT  guidelines  referred  to
above for identifying the field of selection and applying the  criteria  for
determination of inter se merit of the candidates. The procedure so  evolved
comprised six  steps  which  the  respondent-state  has  identified  in  the
counter affidavit filed by it in the following words.
“A. Identify the available vacancies of Asst.  Engineers  for  the  relevant
year.

B. Make a list of  eligible  candidates  based  on  the  date  of  attaining
eligibility in terms of the Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules.

C. In view of the large number of  candidates  available  for  selection  to
less number of available posts, identify the Field of  Selection  using  the
DoPT prescribed formula of 2 x Available Vacancies + 4.  For example for  10
vacancies, the field of selection would be 24.

D. Fix the benchmark.  In the present case it is ‘good’.

E. In the field of Selection, the grading is marked.

F. Prepare the Select List of the most meritorious candidates  in  terms  of
this Hon’ble Court’s criterion in paras 39 to  42  of  Judgment  in  CA  No.
8468/2003 and batch, and listing of the successful candidates in  accordance
with their merit with reference to the entries given in Annual  Confidential
Reports,  which  inter  alia  included  all  or  most  of  the   ingredients
constituting merit as enunciated by this Hon’ble Court in  Para  42  of  the
judgment,  and  not  in  accordance  with  seniority,  for  that   year   of
selection.”


A new list of promotees was, on the above  basis,  prepared  by  the  review
DPC, which according to the respondents was based on the inter se  merit  of
the candidates. The petitioners find fault  with  the  above  procedure  but
only to the  extent  para  ‘B’  reproduced  above  determines  the  zone  of
consideration, based on the date the candidates acquired  their  eligibility
in terms of Rule 11  of  the  Recruitment  Rules.    The  grievance  of  the
petitioner is that this action of the respondent has totally  distorted  the
picture and denied to persons who were  otherwise  eligible  and  senior  in
terms of their length of service, an opportunity to compete  for  promotion.
It is argued on their behalf  that  the  process  of  preparing  a  list  of
eligible candidates on the basis of the date  of  obtaining  eligibility  is
totally wrong, unfair and discriminatory.  The date  on  which  a  candidate
acquires his eligibility would depend upon the date on  which  he  completes
three years after obtaining the  degree  qualification.   The  obtaining  of
degree qualification would,  in  turn,  depend  upon  several  imponderables
beyond the control of the candidates including whether the  candidates  were
working on a hard  or  soft  posting  over  which  the  candidates  have  no
control.   It  was  urged  that  while  length  of   service   of   Sections
Officers/Junior Engineers may not count for purposes  of  determining  their
inter se merit, the same was the only sound basis for identifying  the  zone
of consideration.  Inasmuch as the Government  has  ignored  the  length  of
service of the candidates and departed from the principle  of  seniority  of
candidates who served in the same cadre while  drawing-up  of  the  list  of
eligible candidates, it has committed a mistake that needs to be  corrected.




There is, in our opinion, considerable  merit  in  that  submission  of  the
petitioners.  There is no  gainsaying  that  this  Court  has  unequivocally
declared that promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers  in  the  service
shall be on the basis of merit and merit alone and  that  seniority  of  the
candidates cannot be taken as an input for  determining  such  merit.   This
Court  has  also  very  clearly  rejected  the  procedure  followed  by  the
Government whereby the date on which the candidate had acquired  his  degree
qualification was taken as a determining factor.  That being so,  and  given
the large number of candidates eligible  for  consideration  the  Government
was entitled to adopt the method of restricting the  zone  of  consideration
based on the number of vacancies.   Inasmuch as the Government  relied  upon
the DoPT guidelines for achieving that  objective  it  committed  no  fault.
The question, however, is whether the Government could  draw-up  a  list  of
eligible candidates not by reference to the length of service in  the  cadre
but  by  reference  to  the  date  on  which  the  candidates  acquired  the
eligibility which, as noticed earlier, was itself dependent  upon  the  date
on which the candidate acquired the degree qualification.   Since,  however,
the acquisition of a degree  qualification  itself  was  not  based  on  any
consistently uniform criterion, test or procedure, the date on which such  a
qualification was acquired and resultantly the date on which  the  candidate
attained their eligibility was also bound to be  anything  but  uniform  and
non-discriminatory.   As between the date of acquiring eligibility  and  the
date of entering service as a Section  Officer/Junior  Engineer  the  latter
was, in our opinion, a more intelligible, fair and reasonable  yardstick  to
be applied for drawing-up the list of  eligible  candidates  by  the  review
DPC.  Inasmuch  as  the  review  DPC  relied  upon  the  date  of  acquiring
eligibility  as  the  basis  for  preparation  of  the  list   of   eligible
candidates, it committed a mistake which needs to be corrected.


Having said so, there is, in our  opinion,  no  deliberate  or  contumacious
breach of the directions of this Court to warrant  punitive  action  against
those responsible for taking the said decision. The  error  it  appears  has
occurred more because  of  an  erroneous  perception  on  the  part  of  the
government  and  the  review  DPC  that  the  method  adopted  by  them  was
sanctioned by law and the orders of  this  Court.   We  do  not,  therefore,
consider  it  necessary  to  pass  any  orders  of  punishment  against  the
respondent on that score although we would expect them to  be  more  careful
and circumspect in future.  With the above observation we dispose  of  these
contempt petitions with a direction to  the  respondent-State  to  redo  the
exercise in terms of the directions  of  this  Court  in  N.  Suresh  Nathan
(supra) keeping in view the observations made hereinabove.  No costs.

                                                      ……………………………………….…..…J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)






                                                     ………………………… …………….…..…J.
                                                           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

New Delhi
October 16, 2015