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Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Whether, for the purposes of Wealth Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), the market value of the vacant land belonging to the assessee should be taken at the price which is the maximum compensation payable to the assessee under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1962? = When the asset is under the clutches of the Ceiling Act and in respect of the said asset/vacant land, the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act had already determined the maximum compensation of Rs.2 lakhs, how much price such a property would Government and is awaiting notification under Section 10 of the Act for fetch if sold in the open market? We have to keep in mind what a reasonably assumed buyer would pay for such a property if he were to buy the same. Such a property which is going to be taken over by the this purpose, would not fetch more than Rs.2 lakhs as the assumed buyer knows that the moment this property is taken over by the Government, he will receive the compensation of Rs.2 lakhs only. We are not oblivious of those categories of buyers who may buy “disputed properties” by taking risks with the hope that legal proceedings may ultimately be decided in favour of the assessee and in such a eventuality they are going to get much higher value. However, as stated above, hypothetical presumptions of such sales are to be discarded as we have to keep in mind the conduct of a reasonable person and “ordinary way” of the presumptuous sale. When such a presumed buyer is not going to offer more than Rs.2 lakhs, obvious answer is that the estimated price which such asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date(s) would not be more than Rs.2 lakhs. Having said so, one aspect needs to be pointed out, which was missed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal as well while deciding the case in favour of the assessee. The compensation of Rs.2 lakhs is in respect of only the “excess land” which is covered by Sections 3 and 4 of the Ceiling Act. The total vacant land for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act is not only excess land but other part of the land which would have remained with the assessee in any case. Therefore, the valuation of the excess land, which is the subject matter of Ceiling Act, would be Rs.2 lakhs. To that market value of the remaining land will have to be added for the purpose of arriving at the valuation for payment of Wealth Tax. The question formulated is answered in the aforesaid manner. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6873-6881 OF 2005


|SRI S.N. WADIYAR (DEAD) THROUGH LR         |.....APPELLANT(S)           |
|VERSUS                                     |                            |
|COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, KARNATAKA      |.....RESPONDENT(S)          |

                                   W I T H

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6882 OF 2005

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1338 OF 2006

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7251 OF 2015
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18960 OF 2006)
                                    A N D

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7377-7378 OF 2005



                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
      Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 18960 of 2006.



The question of law that falls for determination  is  common  to  all  these
appeals, which is the following:
      Whether, for the purposes of Wealth Tax Act (hereinafter  referred  to
as the 'Act'), the  market  value  of  the  vacant  land  belonging  to  the
assessee should be taken at the price  which  is  the  maximum  compensation
payable to the assessee under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1962?

For the  purposes  of  understanding  the  circumstances  under  which  this
question has arisen, we are taking note of the facts of  Civil  Appeal  Nos.
6873-6881/2005:
      The appellant herein is assessed to wealth tax  under  the  Act.   The
Assessment  Years  in  these  appeals  are  1977-1978  to  1986-1987.    The
valuation of the property which is the subject matter of  wealth  tax  under
the Act is the urban  land  appurtenant  to  Bangalore  Palace  (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Property').  The total extent of  the  property  is  554
acres or 1837365.36 sq.  mtr.   It  comprises  of  residential  units,  non-
residential  units  and  land  appurtenant  thereto,  roads   and   masonary
structures along the contour and the vacant land.  The vacant land  measures
11,66,377.34 sq. mtr.  The aforesaid Property was the  private  property  of
late Sri Jaychamarajendra Wodeyar, the former ruler of  the  princely  state
of Mysore.  He died on 23.09.1974.  There were disputes with regard  to  the
wealth tax assessments pertaining to the Assessment Years 1967-1968 to 1976-
1977.  After the  death  of  Sri  Jayachamarajendra  Wodeyar,  his  son  Sri
Srikantadatta Wodeyar, the assessee applied to Settlement Commission to  get
the  dispute  settled  with  regard  to  valuation  of  Property  and  lands
appurtenant thereto for Assessment Years 1967-1968 to 1976-1977. While  this
application was still pending, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act,
1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ceiling Act') came into  force  w.e.f.
17.02.1976.  It was adopted by the State of Karnataka.   The  property  area
is within the Bangalore Urban Agglomeration, hence fell within  the  purview
of the Act.  The assessee filed statement as required under Section 6(1)  of
the Ceiling Act on 10.09.1976.   On  16.09.1976,  he  filed  an  application
under Section 20 of the Act for exemption of his  lands  under  the  Ceiling
Act to the State Government.

From the aforesaid, it is clear that the Property in question,  namely,  the
Bangalore Palace came within the purview of the Ceiling Act.

The application of the assessee before the  Settlement  Commission  for  the
Assessment Years 1967-1968 to  1976-1977  was  disposed  of  on  29.09.1988,
laying down norms for valuation of the property.   The  Wealth  Tax  Officer
adopted the value as per Settlement Commission for  Assessment  Years  1976-
1977, 1977-1978  and  1978-1979  at  Rs.13.18  crores  (for  both  land  and
buildings).  For the Assessment Year 1979-1980, since there  was  no  report
of the Valuation Officer, the Commissioner of Appeals worked out  the  value
of the Property at Rs.19.96 crores for the Assessment Year 1979-1980,  which
was adopted by Wealth Tax Officer for Assessment  Year  1980-1981  as  well.
For the Assessment Years 1981-1982, 1982-1983 and 1983-1984, the Wealth  Tax
Officer fixed the value of land and building at  Rs.18.78  crores,  Rs.29.85
crores and Rs.29.85 crores respectively.   For  Assessment  Year  1984-1985,
the Wealth Tax Officer took the value at Rs.31.22 crores  on  the  basis  of
the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) for earlier years.

On the other hand, in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act,  the  Competent
Authority  passed  an  order   No.ULC(A)(Z)   440/85-86   dated   27.07.1989
determining vacant land in excess of the ceiling limits, and ordered  action
be taken to acquire excess land under the Karnataka Town & Country  Planning
Act,  1961.   In  accordance  with  Section  30  of  the  Ceiling  Act,  the
declaration dated back to 17.02.1976 on  which  date  the  Ceiling  Act  was
promulgated in Karnataka.  The Bangalore Development  Authority  prepared  a
master plan and the planning report for  development  of  District  No.1  in
which the property area is included.  As per this proposal no  part  of  the
vacant area could be commercially exploited nor  colonised  for  residential
purposes.  The vacant land area was also not  transferable  under  the  Act.
Any sale was null and void.  As per Section 11(6) of the Urban Land  Ceiling
Act, the maximum compensation that could be received  by  the  assessee  was
Rs.2 lakhs.

Before any Notification could be issued under Section 10(1) of  the  Ceiling
Act, the assessee questioned the aforesaid order  passed  by  the  Competent
Authority under Sections 8 and 9 of the Ceiling  Act  before  the  Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal.

Simultaneously, the orders of the Wealth Tax Officer passed  under  the  Act
fixing the value of the land for different Assessment Years for the  purpose
of  Act  was  also  challenged  by  the  assessee  before  the  Commissioner
(Appeals). In these appeals, the contention of the  assessee  was  that  the
value of the property was covered by  the  Ceiling  Act  for  which  maximum
compensation that could be received by the assessee  was  only  Rs.2  lakhs.
The appeals filed for the Assessment  Years,  namely,  1980-1981,  1982-1983
and 1983-1984 were disposed off by the Commissioner of Income Tax  (Appeals)
by a common order dated 09.01.1990 in which he made slight modifications  to
value adopted for Assessment Years 1981-1982 and confirmed the valuation  of
Wealth Tax Officer for Assessment Years 1982-1983 and  1983-1984.   However,
in respect of appeals relating to Assessment Years 1977-1978  to  1980-1981,
the Commissioner (Appeals) passed  the  orders  dated  31.07.1990  accepting
that the urban land appurtenant to  Property  be  valued  at  Rs.2,00,000/-.
Similar orders  came  to  be  passed  by  the  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax
(Appeals) for the Assessment Years 1984-1985 and  1985-1986  also.   Against
these orders of Commissioner  (Appeals)  dated  09.06.1990,  31.07.1990  and
14.08.1990, both the assessee as well as the Revenue/Department went  up  in
appeals  before  the  Income  Tax  Appellate  Tribunal,   Bangalore   Bench,
Bangalore.   The appeals filed by the assessee and  the  Revenue  Department
were heard together by the Tribunal.

The issue before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was only with  regard  to
valuation of vacant land attached to the Property, since  the  assessee  had
accepted  the  valuation  in  regard  to  residential  and   non-residential
structures within the said property area and appurtenant land thereto.

The  Income  Tax  Appellate  Tribunal,  Bangalore  passed  the  order  dated
02.11.1993 directing the vacant land be valued at Rs.2 lakhs for  each  year
from Assessment Years 1977-1978 to 1985-1986.  Its reasoning  was  that  the
Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act had passed  an  order  determining
that the vacant land was in excess of the ceiling  limit,  and  had  ordered
that action be taken to acquire the excess land  under  the  Karnataka  Town
and Country Planning Act, 1901.  And under the Land Ceiling Act, an  embargo
was placed on the assessee to  sell  the  subject  land  and  exercise  full
rights.  The assessee was only eligible  to  maximum  compensation  of  Rs.2
lakhs under the Ceiling Act.  Hence given these facts and circumstances  the
subject land could only be valued at Rs.2 lakhs for wealth tax  purposes  on
the valuation date for the Assessment Years 1977-1978 to 1985-1986.

Against the order of the Tribunal, the Commissioner  of  Wealth  Tax  sought
reference before the Karnataka High Court in respect  of  Assessment  Years,
namely, 1977-1978 to 1985-1986 arising out of the consolidated order of  the
Tribunal in WTA Nos.315 to 317 and 485 to 490/1990  dated  02.11.1993.   The
Tribunal made a Statement for reference to the  High  Court.   The  question
that was raised for adjudication before the High Court was  whether  on  the
facts and in the circumstances of  the  case,  the  Tribunal  was  right  in
holding that the value of the vacant  land,  appurtenant  to  the  Property,
should be taken at Rs.2 lakhs for the purpose of wealth tax  assessment  for
the years in question, as having regard to the provisions of the Urban  Land
Ceiling Act, the maximum amount of compensation payable to the  assessee  is
only Rs.2 lakhs.

When the aforesaid reference was pending adjudication  by  the  High  Court,
certain important developments took place in  relation  to  the  proceedings
under the Ceiling Act.  The appeal which was filed by  the  assessee  before
the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal against the order dated  27.07.1989  passed
by the Competent Authority under  the  Ceiling  Act  was  dismissed  by  the
Tribunal on 15.07.1998.  The assessee took up the matter further before  the
High Court in the form of a writ  petition.   In  this  writ  petition,  the
assessee also challenged the constitutional validity of  the  provisions  of
the Ceiling Act and made an  interim  prayer  to  the  effect  that  pending
disposal of the writ  petition  notification  under  Section  10(1)  of  the
Ceiling Act be not issued.  Fact of the matter is that such  a  Notification
was not issued by  the  Government.   When  this  writ  petition  was  still
pending, the Ceiling Act was repealed by Legislature with the  enactment  of
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Act 15  of  1999).


The factual position which existed at the  time  when  the  reference  cases
were to be decided by the High Court under the Act is recapitulated below:
(i)  The Assessment Years in respect of which question was to be  determined
were 1977-1978 to 1986-1987.
(ii)  Ceiling  Act  had  come  into  force  w.e.f.  17.02.1976  and  was  in
operation during the aforesaid Assessment Years.
(iii)  The Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act had  passed  orders  to
the effect that as per  Section  11(6)  of  the  Ceiling  Act,  the  maximum
compensation that could be received by the  assessee  was  Rs.2  lakhs.   In
accordance with Section 30 of the Ceiling Act, the  declaration  dates  back
to 17.02.1976 on which date the Ceiling Act was promulgated in Karnataka.
(iv)  The order of the Competent Authority was challenged  by  the  assessee
by filing appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.  This appeal  was,
however, dismissed on 15.07.1998. Against  that  order,  writ  petition  was
filed wherein provisions of the Ceiling Act were also  challenged.   Because
of  the  pendency  of  these  proceedings  or  due  to  some  other  reason,
notification under Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act was not passed.
(v)  In the year 1999, Ceiling Act was repealed.  At that  stage,  the  writ
petition filed by the assessee  was  still  pending.   The  effect  of  this
Repealing Act was that the Property in question remained with  the  assessee
and was not taken over by the Government.

We may remind ourselves that there is no dispute with  regard  to  valuation
in respect of residential and non-residential  structures  within  the  said
Property and appurtenant land thereto. The assessee has paid the wealth  tax
accepting the valuation. The dispute  of  valuation  has  arisen  only  with
regard to valuation of the vacant land attached to the  Property  which  had
come within the mischief of the Ceiling Act.

In the aforesaid factual background, the reference was answered by the  High
Court vide  impugned  order  dated  13.06.2005  holding  that  although  the
prohibition and restriction contained in the Ceiling Act had the  effect  of
decreasing the value of the Property still the value of the land  cannot  be
the maximum compensation  that  is  payable  under  the  provisions  of  the
Ceiling Act.  Thus, the question referred  has  been  answered  against  the
assessee.

The High Court, in its impugned order, took note of the aforesaid facts  and
accepted the position that the Property in  question  which  is  within  the
Bangalore urban agglomeration  was  covered  by  the  Ceiling  Act  and  the
provisions of the said Act applied to this Property.  It also noted that  by
virtue of Section 4 of the Repeal Act, all legal proceedings  pending  under
the Ceiling Act immediately before the commencement of the Repeal Act  stood
abated except those proceedings which are relatable to the  land  possession
whereof  has  been  taken  over  by  the  State  Government  or  any  person
authorized by the State Government or by the  Competent  Authority.   Since,
in the instant  case,  admittedly  possession  had  not  been  taken,  which
remained with the assessee for want of notification under  Section  10,  the
proceedings abated and the said vacant  land  remained  with  the  assessee.
Thereafter, the High Court took note of certain relevant provisions  of  the
Act and we may also capture the position contained in those provisions:
      Section 2(e) of the Act defines the meaning of the expression  'asset'
to include property  of  every  description,  both  movable  and  immovable,
except the few kinds of  property  specified  therein  for  the  purpose  of
ascertaining the net wealth of an individual.
      Section 2(m) of the Act defines the meaning  of  the  expression  'net
wealth' to mean  the  amount  by  which  the  aggregate  value  computed  in
accordance with the provisions of this  Act  of  all  the  assets,  wherever
located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date.
      Section 2(q) of the Act defines 'valuation date' in  relation  to  any
year for which an assessment is to be made under this Act,  means  the  last
day of the previous year as defined in Section 3 of the Income Tax  Act,  if
an assessment were to be made under that Act for that year.
      Section 3  of  the  Act  is  the  charging  Section  which  imposes  a
liability to pay wealth tax on the net wealth as on the  valuation  date  of
every individual and Hindu Undivided Family.
      Section 7 of the Act is  a  machinery  provision  and  lays  down  the
method of valuation of an asset  for  the  purpose  of  computation  of  net
wealth of an assessee.  Sub-sections (1) and  (2)  provide  two  methods  of
valuation of assets.  To our  purpose,  provisions  of  sub-section  (1)  of
Section 7 of the Act is relevant and Section 7(1) of the Act  prior  to  its
substitution by the Direct Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 w.e.f. 01.04.1989  was
as under:
“Section 7: Value of assets how to be determined:-(1) Subject to  any  rules
made in this behalf, the value of  any  asset,  other  than  cash,  for  the
purpose of this Act, shall be  estimated  to  be  the  price  which  in  the
opinion of the Assessing Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open  market
on the valuation date.”

      Explanation to sub-section (1) was inserted  by  Finance  (No.2)  Act,
1980 w.e.f. 01.04.1980.  The explanation is as under:
“Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it  is  hereby  declared  that  the
price or other consideration for which any property may be  acquired  by  or
transferred to any person under the terms of a deed of trust or  through  or
under any restrictive covenant  in  any  instrument  of  transfer  shall  be
ignored for the purpose of determining the price such property  would  fetch
if sold in the open market on the valuation date.”

Section 3 of the Act is the charging Section, whereas Section 7 of  the  Act
is the machinery provision which provides for procedure for determining  the
value of assets that are subject to wealth  tax.  The  High  Court  observed
that as per Section 7 of the Act, the value of the asset shall be  estimated
to the price, which in the opinion of the  Wealth  Tax  Officer,  the  asset
would fetch if sold in the open market on the  valuation  date.   The  words
“price it would fetch if sold in the open market” do not contemplate  actual
sale or the actual state of the market, but only enjoins that it  should  be
assumed that there is an open market and the property can  be  sold  in  the
open market and, on that basis, the value has to be found  out.   The  Court
noted that though the rules, namely, Wealth Tax  Rules,  1957  were  framed,
they did not provide for valuation of urban land and, therefore,  the  asset
must be valued in the ordinary way by determining what it would fetch if  it
were sold in the assumed market and what willing  purchaser  would  pay  for
it. The Court also accepted that in view of Ceiling Act coming  into  force,
the restrictions and prohibitions contained in the Ceiling  Act  would  have
the effect of depressing the value which the lands would fetch if they  were
free from  the  said  restrictions  and  prohibitions.   Thus,  the  willing
purchaser would definitely take these  factors  into  account,  which  could
affect the price of such  an  asset.   Therefore,  the  Wealth  Tax  Officer
cannot ignore such restricted provisions contained in the  Ceiling  Act  and
it is for him to find out what price the asset would fetch if it is sold  in
the  open  market  on  the  valuation  date,  keeping   in   view,   certain
restrictions in the Ceiling Act which will have  depressing  effect  on  the
value of the asset.

Having said so, which legal position even the  assessee  accepts,  the  High
Court went on to observe that it would not mean that the  valuation  has  to
be the compensation which the assessee would  be  getting  inasmuch  as  the
valuation as per Section 7 has to be the  price  which  the  property  would
fetch if sold in the open market.  Significantly, the High Court also  noted
the effect of Ceiling Act in the context of the present case and  the  legal
proceedings which had been initiated pursuant thereto whereby orders  passed
by the Competent Authority under Sections 8 and 9  were  challenged  and  no
Notification under Section 10 had been issued.  In this regard, it  observed
as under:
“29.  … It is not in dispute,  that  in  the  present  case,  the  competent
authority has neither issued any notification under Section 10(1) nor  under
Section 10(3) of the Act.  It is relevant at this  stage  itself  to  notice
that between the period of first notification under  Section  10(1)  of  the
Act and the second notification under Section 10(3) of the  Act,  the  owner
of the land can neither alter the use, nor transfer the land,  if  any,  and
if it is done, the same would be void.  After the publication of the  second
notification, the land is deemed to have been  acquired  by  the  Government
and what the assessee owns is the right to compensation  and  the  right  to
compensation will be assessed as a movable asset  and  maximum  compensation
payable under Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act is Rs.2,00,000/- only.”

It also categorically accepted that after coming into force of  the  Ceiling
Act, since the vacant land was covered by the said Act, it was not  open  to
the assessee to sell the land in the open market, and whenever there is  any
restriction on the transfer of any land, it is  common  knowledge  that  the
value of the property or the land, as the case may  be,  would  normally  be
reduced.  However, it did not accept that  since  it  is  not  open  to  the
assessee to sell the land, therefore, the value of the  land  could  not  be
more than what the Government  was  to  offer  to  the  assessee  under  the
provisions of the Ceiling Act.  The High Court concluded its answer  in  the
penultimate para as under:
“36.  Before we conclude, we once again emphasise that it sale of  the  land
or  the  property  is  subject  to  restrictions  under  Central  or   State
legislation's such as the Urban Land Ceiling  Act,  Karnataka  Land  Reforms
Act, etc., the property or the land has to be valued only after taking  note
of  the  restrictions  and  prohibitions  which  will  have  the  effect  of
depressing the value, which the land would  fetch  if  sold  free  from  any
restrictions  and  prohibitions,  for  the  reason,  if   there   are   such
restrictions, the value of  the  property  or  land  would  be  normally  be
reduced, but at the same time, it cannot be said that it  would  fetch  only
the maximum compensation payable under  the  urban  Land  Ceiling  Act.   As
stated earlier, Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, assumes  that  there  is  a
hypothetical  open  market  and  there  are  hypothetical   purchasers   and
hypothetical bids and hypothetical sale to a person  prepared  to  give  the
highest value, subject to all such restrictions and  prohibitions  contained
in the Ceiling Act.”

Challenging the aforesaid approach of the  High  Court,  it  was  argued  by
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in  these  appeals  that
once it is accepted that the property is covered by the Ceiling Act  and  it
would depress the value of the property, then the value could  not  be  more
than Rs.2 lakhs  which  was  the  maximum  compensation  payable  under  the
Ceiling Act.  It was also argued that provisions of the Ceiling Act did  not
impose only 'restrictions' but  there  was  categorical  'prohibition'  from
selling the land.  This land, therefore, had to be treated as  not  saleable
on the 'valuation date' and, therefore, as on that date, the price it  could
fetch would not be more  than  Rs.2  lakhs.   Learned  senior  counsel  also
referred extensively to the orders  passed  by  the  Commissioner  (Appeals)
under the Act giving detailed reasons while accepting the valuation  of  the
property at Rs.2 lakhs and submitted that there was  no  reason  to  take  a
contrary view by the High Court.

Learned counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, emphasized  the  reasons
which have been given by the High  Court  in  support  of  its  opinion  and
submitted that no case was made out to interfere with the said proceedings.

We have considered the respective submissions by giving  our  deep  thoughts
thereto with reference to the record of the case.   It  is  clear  that  the
valuation of the asset in question has to be in the  manner  provided  under
Section 7 of the Act.  Such a valuation has to  be  on  the  valuation  date
which has reference to the last day of the previous year  as  defined  under
Section 3 of the Income Tax Act if an assessment was to be made  under  that
Act for that year.  In other words, it is 31st March  immediately  preceding
the assessment year.  The valuation arrived at as on that date of the  asset
is the valuation on which wealth tax is assessable.  It is  clear  from  the
reading of Section 7 of the Act that  the  Assessing  Officer  has  to  keep
hypothetical situation in mind, namely, if the asset in question  is  to  be
sold in the open market, what price it would fetch.  Assessing  Officer  has
to form an opinion about the estimation of such a price that  is  likely  to
be  received if the property were to be sold.  There is no actual  sale  and
only a hypothetical situation of  a  sale  is  to  be  contemplated  by  the
Assessing Officer.  It is so held by this  Court  in  Ahmed  G.H.  Ariff  v.
Commissioner of Wealth Tax[1] in the following words:
“...it does not contemplate actual sale or the actual state of  the  market,
but only enjoins that it should be assumed that there is an open market  and
the property can be sold in such a market and, on that basis, the value  has
to be found out. It is a hypothetical case, which is contemplated,  and  the
Tax Officer must assume that there is an open market in which the asset  can
be sold.  It is well settled that where the legislature uses a  legal  term,
which has received judicial interpretation, the Courts must assume that  the
term has been used in the sense, in which has been judicially interpreted.”


Following guidelines provided in the case of Commissioner of Wealth  Tax  v.
Prince Muffkham Jah Bahadur Chamlijan[2]  also  needs  to  be  noted  as  it
becomes very handy for our purposes:
“...in the absence of  a  rule  which  can  apply  to  the  valuation  of  a
particular asset, that  asset  must  be  valued  in  the  ordinary  way,  by
determining what it would fetch if it were sold in an  assumed  market,  the
value being what an assumed willing purchaser would pay for it.”


Thus, the Tax Officer has to form an opinion about the  estimated  price  if
the asset were to be sold in the assumed  market  and  the  estimated  price
would be the one which an assumed willing purchaser would pay  for  it.   On
these reckoning, the asset has to be valued in the ordinary way.

The High Court has accepted, and rightly so,  that  since  the  Property  in
question came  within  the  mischief  of  the  Ceiling  Act  it  would  have
depressing effect insofar as the price which the assumed  willing  purchaser
would pay for such property.

However, the question is as to what price the willing purchaser would  offer
in such a scenario?

In order to provide an answer to this question, we may take note of  certain
relevant provisions of the Ceiling Act, which, are even noticed by the  High
Court.  We will reproduce here Sections 3, 5, 10(1) and  10(3)  and  narrate
the scope of the other relevant  provisions  without  reproducing  the  text
thereof.
3.  Persons not entitled to hold  vacant  land  in  excess  of  the  ceiling
limit.—  Except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Act,  on  and  from  the
commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled  to  hold  any  vacant
land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories  to  which  this  Act
applies under sub-section (2) of section 1.


5.  Transfer of vacant land.—
(1)  In any State to which this Act applies in  the  first  instance,  where
any person who had held vacant land in excess of the ceiling  limit  at  any
time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending  with  the
commencement of this Act, has transferred such land or part thereof  by  way
of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise,  the  extent  of  the  land  so
transferred shall also be taken into account in calculating  the  extent  of
vacant land held by such person and the excess vacant land  in  relation  to
such person shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be selected out of  the
vacant land held by him after such transfer and in case  the  entire  excess
vacant land cannot be so selected, the balance, or where no vacant  land  is
held by him after the transfer, the entire  excess  vacant  land,  shall  be
selected out of the vacant land held by the transferee:
Provided that where such person has transferred  his  vacant  land  to  more
than one person, the balance, or, as the case  may  be,  the  entire  excess
vacant land aforesaid, shall be selected out of  the  vacant  land  held  by
each of the transferees in the same proportion as the  area  of  the  vacant
land transferred to him bears to the total area of the land  transferred  to
all the transferees.
(2)  Where any excess vacant  land  is  selected  out  of  the  vacant  land
transferred under sub-section (1), the transfer of the  excess  vacant  land
so selected shall be deemed to be null and void.
(3)  In any State to which this Act applies in the  first  instance  and  in
any State which adopts this Act under clause  (1)  of  article  252  of  the
Constitution, no person holding vacant land in excess of the  ceiling  limit
immediately before the commencement of this  Act  shall  transfer  any  such
land or part thereof by way of sale,  mortgage,  gift,  lease  or  otherwise
until he has furnished a  statement  under  section  6  and  a  notification
regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published  under  sub-
section (1) of section 10; and any such transfer made  in  contravention  of
this provision shall be deemed to be null and void.

10.  Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. -  (1)  As  soon
as may be after the service of the statement under section 9 on  the  person
concerned, the competent authority shall cause  a  notification  giving  the
particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the  ceiling
limit and stating that—
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the  concerned  State  Government;
and
(ii)  the claims of all person interested in such vacant land  may  be  made
by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of  the  nature  of
their interests in such land,
to be published for the information of the general public  in  the  Official
Gazette of  the  State  concerned  and  in  such  other  manner  as  may  be
prescribed.
(3)  At any time after  the  publication  of  the  notification  under  sub-
section (1) the competent authority may, by notification  published  in  the
Official Gazette of the State concerned,  declare  that  the  excess  vacant
land referred to in the notification published under sub-section (1)  shall,
with effect from such date as  may  be  specified  in  the  declaration,  be
deemed  to  have  been  acquired  by  the  State  Government  and  upon  the
publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed  to  have  vested
absolutely in the State Government free from all  encumbrances  with  effect
from the date so specified.”

Section 3 of the Ceiling Act, as is clear from its  reading,  is  the   main
provision.   It   categorically  provides  that  the  person  shall  not  be
entitled to hold any vacant land in excess  of  the  ceiling  limit  in  the
territories to which this Act applies, except as  otherwise  provided  under
the Act itself, from the date of commencement of the  Act.   Act  came  into
force on 17.02.1976.  The effect of  this  Section  was  that  on  and  from
17.02.1976, the assessee was  not  entitled  to  hold  the  vacant  land  in
question, which was in excess of the ceiling limit.  Section 4  of  the  Act
provides for the manner in which the ceiling limit of the person  is  to  be
ascertained.
      Section 5(1) of the Ceiling Act deals  with  transfer  of  the  vacant
land in  excess  of  the  ceiling  limit  at  any  time  during  the  period
commencing on the appointed day i.e. 28th January 1976 and, ending with  the
commencement of this  Act,  i.e.  17th  February,  1976.   Under  this  sub-
section, if any person has transferred such land, the extent of the land  so
transferred shall also be taken into account in calculating  the  extent  of
vacant land held by such person.   Sub-section  (3)  of  Section  5  of  the
Ceiling Act contains a prohibition to transfer any vacant  land  held  by  a
person in excess of the ceiling limit immediately  before  the  commencement
of the Act till a statement under Section 6 is furnished and a  notification
regarding excess land has been published under Section  10(1)  of  the  Act.
Any transfer made in contravention of this sub-section shall  be  deemed  to
be null and void.
      Section 6(1) of the  Ceiling  Act  statutorily  obligates  that  every
person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit  as  on  or  after
the 17th  day  February  1976  is  required  to  file  a  statement  in  the
prescribed form, specifying the vacant land within the ceiling  limit  which
he desires to retain.  The first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Ceiling  Act
makes the operation of the Act retrospective in fixing 17th  February  1975,
as the date to determine whether a person holds vacant  land  in  excess  of
the ceiling limit.  If for any reason, the statement is  not  filed  by  the
person holding vacant land in excess of the  ceiling  limit,  the  competent
authority may direct him to file such statement within a fixed period.
      Under Section 8 of the Ceiling Act, on  the  basis  of  the  statement
filed under Section 6 of the Ceiling Act, a draft statement is  prepared  by
the competent authority and the same is served on the applicant/person,  who
is given an opportunity to file his objections, if any.   After  considering
the objections that may be filed within the time prescribed,  the  competent
authority shall determine the vacant land held by the  person  concerned  in
excess of the ceiling limit and serve the draft statement so altered on  the
person concerned.  The altered  draft  statement  is  also  known  as  final
statement under the Act.
      Section 10 of the Ceiling Act provides for acquisition of vacant  land
in excess of the ceiling limit.  Section 10(1) of  the  act  envisages  that
the competent authority as soon as possible after  the  final  statement  is
served  on  the  concerned  person,  to  issue  a  notification  giving  the
particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the  ceiling
limit, and further notify that such vacant land is to  be  acquired  by  the
concerned State Government and invite claims from all persons interested  in
such land, giving particulars of the nature of their interest in such  land.
 The notification requires to be published in the official  gazette  of  the
state concerned and also in such  other  manner  prescribed  in  the  rules.
Under sub-section (2), the competent authority is expected to  consider  any
claims that may be filed by  the  persons  interested  in  the  vacant  land
notified under sub-section (1) and determine the nature and extent  of  such
claims and pass such Order as he deems fit.
      Sub-section (3)  of  Section  10  of  the  Ceiling  Act  provides  for
issuance of notification vesting vacant land in the  State  Government  free
from all encumbrances.  Under  this  sub-section,  the  competent  authority
after the publication of notification in  the  official  gazette  concerned,
declare that excess vacant land  referred  in  sub-section  (1)  shall  with
effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be  deemed  to
have  been  acquired  by  the  State  Government.   Once   notification   is
published, and declaration is made,  such  land  shall  be  deemed  to  have
vested absolutely in the State Government free from  all  encumbrances  with
effect from the date specified.
      Sub-section (4)  of  Section  10  of  the  Ceiling  Act  provides  for
maintenance of status quo in respect of excess vacant land  proposed  to  be
acquired during the period commencing on the date of publication under  sub-
section (1) and ending with the  date  specified  in  the  declaration  made
under sub-section (3).
      Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Ceiling  Act  provides  that  the
competent authority shall issue a notice in writing to any  person  who  may
be in position to surrender or deliver possession to  the  State  Government
or to the person duly authorised in this behalf.  The  person  to  whom  the
notice is issued is given 30 days time to comply  with  the  notice.   Under
sub-section (6), if  a  person  fails  to  deliver  possession  within  that
period,  the  competent  authority  will  take  necessary  steps   to   take
possession itself.
      Sections 11 and 14 of the Ceiling Act  provide  for  determination  of
the amount payable to the person concerned for the vacant land acquired  and
for the mode of payment of the amount to such person.
      Section 18 of the Ceiling Act  lays  down  the  penalty  that  may  be
imposed for concealment of particulars in the statement filed under  Section
6 of the Act.
      Section 20 of the Ceiling Act confers  on  the  State  Government  the
power to exempt any person holding vacant land  in  excess  of  the  ceiling
limit from the provisions of the Act.
      Under Section 33 of the Ceiling Act, any person aggrieved by an  Order
passed by the competent authority under the Act may file an appeal before  a
forum created under the Act, except against those Orders made under  Section
11 or an Order made under sub-section (1) of Section 30.

The combined effect of the aforesaid provisions, in the context  of  instant
appeals, is that the  vacant  land  in  excess  of  ceiling  limit  was  not
acquired by the State Government as notification under Section 10(1) of  the
Ceiling Act had not been issued.  However, the process had  started  as  the
assessee had filed statement in the prescribed form as  per  the  provisions
of Section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act and  the  Competent  Authority  had  also
prepared a draft statement under Section 8 which was duly  served  upon  the
assessee.  Fact remains that so long as the Act was operative, by virtue  of
Section 3 the assessee was not entitled to hold any vacant  land  in  excess
of the ceiling limit.  Order was also passed to the effect that the  maximum
compensation payable was Rs.2 lakhs.  Let us keep these factors in mind  and
on that basis apply the provisions of Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act.

The Assessing Officer took into consideration the price which  the  property
would have fetched on the valuation date, i.e. the market price,  as  if  it
was not under the rigors of Ceiling  Act.   Such  estimation  of  the  price
which the asset would have fetched  if  sold  in  the  open  market  on  the
valuation date(s), would clearly be  wrong  even  on  the  analogy/rationale
given by the High Court as it accepted that  restrictions  and  prohibitions
under the Ceiling Act would have depressing  effect  on  the  value  of  the
asset.  Therefore, the valuation as done by the Assessing Officer could  not
have been accepted.

Let us proceed on the same lines  as  delineated/drawn  by  the  High  Court
itself, namely, one has to assume that the property in question is  saleable
in the open  market  and  estimate  the  price  which  the  assumed  willing
purchaser would pay for such a  property.   When  the  asset  is  under  the
clutches of the Ceiling Act and in respect of the  said  asset/vacant  land,
the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act  had  already  determined  the
maximum compensation of Rs.2 lakhs, how much price  such  a  property  would
Government and is awaiting notification under Section  10  of  the  Act  for
fetch if sold in  the  open  market?   We  have  to  keep  in  mind  what  a
reasonably assumed buyer would pay for such a property if  he  were  to  buy
the same.  Such  a  property  which  is  going  to  be  taken  over  by  the
this purpose, would not fetch more than Rs.2  lakhs  as  the  assumed  buyer
knows that the moment this property is taken  over  by  the  Government,  he
will receive the compensation of Rs.2 lakhs only.  We are not  oblivious  of
those categories of buyers who  may  buy  “disputed  properties”  by  taking
risks with the hope that legal proceedings  may  ultimately  be  decided  in
favour of the assessee and in such a eventuality they are going to get  much
higher value.  However, as stated above, hypothetical presumptions  of  such
sales are to be discarded as we have to  keep  in  mind  the  conduct  of  a
reasonable person and “ordinary way” of the presumptuous sale.  When such  a
presumed buyer is not going to offer more than Rs.2  lakhs,  obvious  answer
is that the estimated price which such asset would  fetch  if  sold  in  the
open market on the valuation date(s) would not  be  more  than  Rs.2  lakhs.
Having said so, one aspect needs to be pointed out, which was missed by  the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal as well while deciding the  case  in
favour of the assessee. The compensation of Rs.2  lakhs  is  in  respect  of
only the “excess land” which is covered by Sections 3 and 4 of  the  Ceiling
Act.  The total vacant land for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act  is  not  only
excess land but other part of the land which would have  remained  with  the
assessee in any case.  Therefore, the valuation of the  excess  land,  which
is the subject matter of Ceiling Act, would be Rs.2 lakhs.  To  that  market
value of the remaining land will  have  to  be  added  for  the  purpose  of
arriving  at  the  valuation  for  payment  of  Wealth  Tax.   The  question
formulated is answered in the aforesaid manner.
In the result, the appeals succeed and are  hereby  allowed.   There  shall,
however, be no order as to costs.
                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)

                             .............................................J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 21, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]   76 ITR 471
[2]   247 ITR 351

Friday, September 25, 2015

Whether a defendant in a suit for partition can be permitted to withdraw an admission made in the written statement after a pretty long period, is the issue arising for consideration in these cases.?- Admission can not be withdrawn but can be clarified or explained by way of amendment = We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas (supra) and as endorsed in Gautam Smiarup (supra) that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be pertted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra), does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled. However, the admission can be clarified or explained by way of amendment and the basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive proceedings. In this context, we are also mindful of the averment in the application for amendment that: “11. …. Mahabir Prasad Kajaria died at age of 24 years on 7th May, 1949 when the defendant No. 5 was only 2 years and the defendant No. 12 was only 21 years. Till the death of Mahabir and even thereafter, the petitioners had been getting benefits from income of the joint properties. The defendant No.5 and his two sisters, namely, Kusum and Bina were brought up and were maintained from the income of the joint family properties. The petitioners after the death of Mahabir, they continued to live in the joint family as members and till now members of the joint family. In the marriage of the two sisters of the defendant no.5 Kusum and Bina (now after marriage Smt. Kusum Tulsian and Smt. Bina Tulsian) the expenses were wholly borne out from the incomes of the joint family properties. The said facts are well known to all the family members and their relations.” In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 have stated as follows: “The alleged letter of 1956 allegedly issued by the widow of Mahabir Prasad used in the arbitration proceedings where she was not a party admitting relinquishment of the share of her husband and thereafter admitting such letter in the original pleading is not what the answering respondents want to resile and/or withdraw from but by the present amendment had only ought to explain the circumstances in which such letter has been written.” In the above circumstances, we do not intend to make the suit filed in the year 2005 otherwise infructuous. The application for amendment withdrawing the admissions made in the written statement on relinquishment of the claim to the suit property by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 is rejected. However, we, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are of the view that Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 should be given an opportunity to explain/clarify the admissions made in the written statement. Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 are permitted to file an application within one month from today limiting their prayer only to the extent of explaining/clarifying the disputed admissions in the written statement which will be considered on its merits and in the light of the observations made herein above.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

Whether a defendant in a suit for partition can be permitted to withdraw an admission made in the written statement after a pretty long period, is the issue arising for consideration in these cases.?- Admission can not be withdrawn but can be clarified or explained by way of amendment = We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas (supra) and as endorsed in Gautam Smiarup (supra) that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be pertted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava (supra), does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled. However, the admission can be clarified or explained by way of amendment and the basis of admission can be attacked in a substantive proceedings. In this context, we are also mindful of the averment in the application for amendment that: “11. …. Mahabir Prasad Kajaria died at age of 24 years on 7th May, 1949 when the defendant No. 5 was only 2 years and the defendant No. 12 was only 21 years. Till the death of Mahabir and even thereafter, the petitioners had been getting benefits from income of the joint properties. The defendant No.5 and his two sisters, namely, Kusum and Bina were brought up and were maintained from the income of the joint family properties. The petitioners after the death of Mahabir, they continued to live in the joint family as members and till now members of the joint family. In the marriage of the two sisters of the defendant no.5 Kusum and Bina (now after marriage Smt. Kusum Tulsian and Smt. Bina Tulsian) the expenses were wholly borne out from the incomes of the joint family properties. The said facts are well known to all the family members and their relations.” In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 have stated as follows: “The alleged letter of 1956 allegedly issued by the widow of Mahabir Prasad used in the arbitration proceedings where she was not a party admitting relinquishment of the share of her husband and thereafter admitting such letter in the original pleading is not what the answering respondents want to resile and/or withdraw from but by the present amendment had only ought to explain the circumstances in which such letter has been written.” In the above circumstances, we do not intend to make the suit filed in the year 2005 otherwise infructuous. The application for amendment withdrawing the admissions made in the written statement on relinquishment of the claim to the suit property by Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 is rejected. However, we, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are of the view that Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 should be given an opportunity to explain/clarify the admissions made in the written statement. Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 5 and 12 are permitted to file an application within one month from today limiting their prayer only to the extent of explaining/clarifying the disputed admissions in the written statement which will be considered on its merits and in the light of the observations made herein above.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

Maintainability of suit and exparte interim injunction -The appeals of the appellant Housing Board are allowed by holding that ex parte interim order of temporary injunction passed on 16.06.2006 by the learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore in Title Suit No. 121 of 1962 in respect of the property in question purchased from the legal heirs of the late Gangadas Pal who are declared as intermediaries under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 and therefore the same are not binding on this appellant as it is not a party to the proceedings and the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the said property, as per Section 57 B (2) (a), (b) and (c) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act of 1953. Since the interim order of temporary injunction is not binding on the appellant Housing Board and cannot be operated against them, therefore the question of enforcing the same against the appellant Housing Board or its agents or any person claiming through it, through the jurisdictional police to help the plaintiffs-respondents as has been granted by the learned Subordinate Judge by his orders dated 03.07.2006 and 13.01.2010 at the request of the plaintiffs-respondents, does not arise. In view of the appeals of the appellant Housing Board being allowed, the appeals filed by the Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. are disposed of as they are unnecessary. All Interlocutory Applications are disposed of.

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7209-7210  OF 2015
               (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.5902-5903 of 2015)

BENGAL AMBUJA HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT LTD.                    … APPELLANT
                                     Vs.

PRAMILA SANFUI AND ORS.              …RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7211-7212  OF 2015
               (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.5906-5907 of 2015)

WEST BENGAL HOUSING BOARD           ……APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

PRAMILA SANFUI AND ORS.              …RESPONDENTS



                                 J U D G M E N T



V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.



    Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.



The present appeals, filed separately, arise from the impugned judgment  and
order dated 21.11.2014 passed in R.V.W.  No.78  of  2013  and  judgment  and
final order dated 19.12.2012 passed in C.O. No.709/2010 by  the  High  Court
of judicature at Calcutta, whereby the High Court refused to interfere  with
the impugned judgments therein.  The  appeals  arising  out  of  S.L.P.  (C)
Nos.5902-5903 of 2015 have been  preferred  by  the  Bengal  Ambuja  Housing
Development Ltd., whereas the appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C)  Nos.  5906-
5907 of 2015 have been preferred by the  West  Bengal  Housing  Board.  Both
sets of appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment.



As the facts in both the appeals are common, for the  sake  of  convenience,
we refer to the facts of the appeals arising out of S.L.P.  (C)  Nos.  5906-
5907 of 2015, which are stated in brief hereunder:



     The appellant, West Bengal  Housing  Board  (hereinafter  “the  Housing
Board”) is a statutory body constituted under the West Bengal Housing  Board
Act, 1972 with the objective of providing affordable housing  in  the  State
of West Bengal. The appellant is the current owner of the suit  property  in
question  in  the  present  appeals.  The  predecessor-in-interest  of   the
appellant, late Gangadas Pal was the owner of  suit  land  measuring  20.184
acres of land. A suit for partition being Title Suit  No.  43  of  1956  was
instituted in the land  adjacent  to  the  said  land  among  the  co-owners
namely, Sanfui, Naskar, Mondal and Sardar family in  the  year  1956  before
the learned Civil Judge  (Senior  Division),  Alipore,  the  said  suit  was
renumbered subsequently as Title Suit No. 121 of 1962. Gangadas Pal was  not
a party to the said suit at its inception. He  was  impleaded  as  Defendant
No. 54 vide order of the learned Trial Court dated 14.08.1957. Gangadas  Pal
died in June 1958. One  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar  Ganguly  was  appointed  as  the
Receiver over the said suit properties and he took possession of the  entire
suit  properties  on  November  30,  1958.  After  Gangadas  Pal  died,  the
defendant No.1 in the suit No. 121 of 1962, filed an application before  the
learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore, intimating that among others,  defendant
no. 54 (Gangadas Pal) had died during the pendency of  the  suit,  following
which the suit had abated against them,  as  per  the  provisions  of  Order
XXII, Rules 3 and 4, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The learned  Subordinate
Judge, vide order and judgment dated 30.11.1973 dismissed  the  entire  suit
under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 holding that the  suit
had abated as against the deceased defendants (including Gangadas  Pal)  and
the right to sue did not survive as against the other surviving  defendants.
The learned Subordinate Judge held as under:



“There is authority to hold that no formal order of abatement need  be  made
as a suit or appeal abates automatically if no application for  substitution
is made within the prescribed time, i.e. within ninety days  from  the  date
of death and not from the date of knowledge. In that  view  of  the  matter,
the order of abatement as recorded above by order  no.  337,  dated  15.9.73
was a mere formality. Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 4 of Order  22  CPC  provides  that
the  suit  shall  abate  as  against  the  deceased  defendant  in  case  no
application is made under  Sub-Rule  1  within  the  time  allowed  by  law.
Abatement takes place by operation of law and it is this crystal clear  that
the   suit   has   abated   against   the   deceased   defendant   nos.   9,
39,54,55,57,60,62,63 in due course of law....”





    Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs therein  filed  Title  Appeal  No.
117 of  1974  before  the  learned  District  Judge,  Alipore.  The  learned
District Judge, vide order dated 20.09.1977 held that the  order  passed  by
learned Subordinate Judge was improper and not justified, and  remanded  the
matter back to be considered afresh. The learned  Civil  Judge  (Sr.  Divn.)
after considering the matter afresh held that the plaintiffs  had  not  made
out any sufficient ground for the delay in filing  of  the  application  and
refused to condone the delay and rejected the application of the  plaintiffs
therein. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) held as under:

“It is an established principal of law that the suit abates on and from  the
date of death of a party to the suit. From the order no. 315 dated  28.02.73
it is seen that the petition giving the information  of  the  death  of  the
defendants in question. The petitioners waited without any  lawful  exercise
upon 4.4.73. On 4.4.73 they asked for  letter  particulars  on  the  grounds
mentioned in the  Petition.  By  order  no.  329  dated  18.3.73  the  court
directed the defendant no.1 to furnish particulars as regards the names  and
addresses of the deceased defendants nos. 9,39,40,54,55,57,60,62 and  63  by
11.6.73. From order no. 330 dated 4.6.73, it  is  seen  that  the  defendant
no.1  complied  wih  the  direction  of  the  court,  From  all   of   these
developments, it is palpably clear that the petitioners were in the know  of
the death of the defendants in question right  from  28.2.73.  At  any  rate
when all particulars were furnished to  them  on  11.6.73,  the  petitioners
ought to have filed the application  for  setting  aside  the  abatement  at
least within 60 days from the date of abatement or order  of  the  dismissal
in terms of provisions of articles 171 and 172 of the  old  Limitation  Act.
They filed the petition on 13.11.73 for the lapse of 90 days  plus  60  days
even the period is calculated, from 11.6.73.”





This order of  abatement  has  attained  finality  as  no  appeal  has  been
preferred by the parties against the same.



In the meanwhile, the land of late Gangadas Pal was acquired  by  the  State
Government, and came to be vested  in  them,  vide  order  dated  16.09.1971
passed in Big Raiyat Case No.5 of 1967. In 1991, the order  of  vesting  was
challenged by the heirs of Gangadas Pal, by way of a Writ Petition C.O.  No.
11731 (W) of 1991. The learned single judge allowed the  Writ  Petition  and
quashed the order of  vesting  dated  16.09.1971.  Aggrieved  of  the  order
passed in the above Writ  Petition,  the  State  Government  preferred  Writ
Appeal before the  Hon’ble  Division  Bench  against  the  decision  of  the
learned single judge. The learned Division Bench dismissed  the  appeal  and
affirmed the decision of the learned single judge, vide judgment  and  order
dated 18.04.1996. The State Government then preferred Civil Appeal  No.  442
of 1998 before this Court, which  was  dismissed  vide  judgment  and  order
dated 16.04.2003 in the case of West Bengal Government Employees  (Food  and
Supplies) Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. v. Sulekha Pal  (Dey)  &
Ors. reported in (2003) 9 SCC 253, when this Court held as under:

“21. So far as the case on hand is concerned, it is seen from the  materials
on record that effective, actual and physical possession of  the  properties
appears  to  have  continued  with  the   intermediary   in   question   and
subsequently in the  possession  of  his  heirs  and  the  Collector/Revenue
Officer could not be said to have either dispossessed  them  or  taken  over
physical or khas possession of the estate and the rights  comprised  therein
in the manner statutorily mandated and provided for under Section  10(2)  of
the Act and Rule 7 of the Rules made thereunder. The  learned  Single  Judge
and the Division Bench of the High court  recorded  concurrently  that  khas
possession continued with the intermediary and after him his  heirs  and  we
find nothing contra concretely to disturb the  same.  The  professed  taking
over of possession seems to be a mere entry on paper but not  in  conformity
with  the  mandatory  procedure  necessarily  to  be  observed  before  such
possession could be lawfully carried out. We  are  not  concerned  with  the
internal controversy between the Cooperative Housing Society  of  its  claim
to have been given with possession pursuant to the agreement of  sale  since
for  the  purposes  of  the  Act,   it   is   the   dispossession   by   the
Collector/Revenue  Officer  in  the  manner  envisaged  in   the   statutory
provisions  under  the  Rules  made  thereunder   that   alone   could   get
legitimatised for determining  the  rights  of  parties.  Consequently,  the
order of the learned Single Judge as well  as  the  order  of  the  Division
Bench, insofar as they sustained the right  in  the  respondents  herein  to
express their choice of  retention,  cannot  be  said  to  suffer  from  any
infirmity in law so as to call for our interference. As a  matter  of  fact,
it is seen from the materials placed on record that after the order  of  the
learned Single Judge, on the respondents exercising their choice,  an  order
dated 2.8.1994 came to be passed by the Revenue Officer  allowing  retention
of 25 acres of agricultural land, 10.16 acres of non-agricultural  land  and
0.06 acres of homestead land as per "B" Schedule  to  the  said  proceedings
and declaring that 27.95 acres  of  agricultural  land  and  0.14  acres  of
homestead land as per details contained in the  "C"  Schedule  to  the  said
proceedings stood vested in the State. This order,  which  appears  to  have
been made subject to the result of the appeal has to be  construed  in  that
manner and the rights of parties thereunder could and ought to  be  only  in
terms of and subject to  the  modified  order  of  the  Division  Bench  and
nothing more........ The vesting is total and complete once Notification  is
issued under Section 4 and  got  published  by  the  combined  operation  of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and what is  secured  under  Section  6  is  the
right to hold on to the possession, subject to the limits prescribed in  the
statute by option for retention of the same before khas  possession  of  the
properties have been taken over as envisaged  under  Section  10(3)  of  the
Act.”



The ownership of the plot of land was thus retained by the  legal  heirs  of
Gangadas Pal as intermediaries as provided  under  Section  6  of  the  West
Bengal Estates Acquisition, Act 1953.



 On 08.06.2006, the plaintiff-respondents herein filed an application  under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in Title Suit  No.
121 of 1962, seeking for grant of a  temporary  injunction  restraining  the
parties from alienating, encumbering or creating  third  party  interest  on
the scheduled properties. The learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore vide  order
dated 16.06.2006, allowed the  application  for  temporary  injunction,  and
passed the purported consent order even  though  the  legal  heirs  of  late
Gangadas Pal had not given their consent, directing the parties to  maintain
status quo with respect to the suit properties,  and  restrained  them  from
selling, transferring, alienating inter party or with any third party or  in
any manner whatsoever from changing the nature and  character  of  the  suit
property till disposal of the suit. On 03.07.2006, the learned Trial  Court,
at the instance  of  the  plaintiffs-respondents  directed  the  Officer  in
charge, Purba Jadavpur, Police Station to ensure  compliance  of  the  order
dated 16.06.2006. On 07.07.2006,  the  learned  Subordinate  Judge,  Alipore
allowed the amendment application dated 28.01.2003,  by  which  inter  alia,
the plot of land belonging to the heirs of Gangadas Pal  was  added  to  the
suit schedule properties appended to the plaint. While  passing  the  order,
the learned Subordinate Judge held as under:



“On perusal of  the  instant  applications  under  consideration  and  after
hearing the  submissions  of  the  learned  advocates  court  comes  to  the
conclusion that the amendment is formal in nature and would not  change  the
nature and character of the suit, neither would  it  prejudice  any  of  the
parties. Besides, it is even observed by the Court that,  the  instant  suit
cannot proceed without amendment be allowed.”



It is important to note at this stage that the heirs of  late  Gangadas  Pal
were not heard during the proceedings, as  they  were  not  parties  to  the
suit.

On 19.08.2008,  the  appellant  Housing  Board  acquired  ownership  of  the
property  by  way  of  five  registered  conveyance  deeds  the  title   and
possession of the said 20.184 acres of land from the  successors-in-interest
of the late Gangadas Pal. On 19.12.2009, one of the plaintiffs  (respondents
herein) filed a petition before  the  learned  Subordinate  Judge,  Alipore,
praying that the Superintendent  of  Police,  South  24  Paraganas  and  the
Officer in Charge of Purba Jadavpur be directed to  ensure  compliance  with
the orders of temporary injunction passed by the Trial Court  on  16.06.2006
and  03.07.2006  in  respect  of  the  property  in  dispute.  The   learned
Subordinate Judge vide order dated 13.01.2010, directed  the  Superintendent
of Police to see that the consent order of temporary injunction  granted  by
the Civil Court in favour of  the  plaintiffs-respondents  in  the  original
suit in respect of the suit properties in  dispute  was  maintained  by  the
parties. Aggrieved by the said order the Bengal Ambuja  Housing  Development
Ltd. (appellant herein) filed an application, C.O. No. 709  of  2010  before
the Hon’ble High Court under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India
questioning the correctness of the same. The High Court, vide  its  judgment
and order dated 19.12.2012 dismissed the same. The High Court held that  the
third party (appellant Housing Board) had purchased the  suit  property  lis
pendens, and that no permission was taken  from  the  court  for  the  same.
Thus, the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882
would  govern  the  transaction.  The  High  Court,  while  dismissing   the
application filed by the Bengal Ambuja Housing  Development  Ltd.,  held  as
under:

“The present mater  is  confined  to  the  implementation  of  an  order  of
injunction passed on consent. As  recorded  above,  upon  hearing  both  the
parties, an order of status quo was passed  directing  the  parties  not  to
change the nature and character of the suit  property.  When  the  applicant
tried to intervene in the said order of status quo, the steps for  rendering
police help for the learned Receiver was taken and I think  since  an  order
of status quo was passed in consent was prevailing, the  learned  Court  was
justified  for  giving  necessary  directions  upon  the  concerned   police
authority to take appropriate steps for the preservation and  protection  of
the suit property and the Court was also competent  to  give  directions  to
the police authority to render possible help s that the possession taken  by
the present Receiver, namely, Sri Ashoke Ray be maintained.

From the above facts, it is clear that the  third-party/  petitioner  herein
had purchased the suit property lis  pendens  and  that  no  permission  was
sought for from the Court to purchase the suit property.

So, the principle of lis pendens as provided in Section 52 of  the  Transfer
of Property Act shall govern the issue.

…………………

The learned Trial judge is justified to  pass  the  impugned  order.  Record
does not show that the petitioners had  obtained  any  permission  from  the
Court to purchase a portion of the  suit  property.  They  had  purchased  a
portion of the suit property at their own  risk  while  the  said  suit  was
pending and the property was in the possession of the learned Receiver.”



Aggrieved by the order, the  appellant  Bengal  Ambuja  Housing  Development
Ltd. filed an S.L.P. (C) No. 8049 of 2013 before this Court challenging  the
legality of the said order, which petition was dismissed  as  withdrawn,  by
granting liberty to file the appropriate application before the High  Court.
The abovesaid appellant then filed a Review Application, R.V.W.  No.  78  of
2013 before the  High Court of Calcutta to review  the  judgment  and  order
passed in C.O. No. 709 of 2010 urging  various  tenable  grounds.  The  High
Court by its judgment and order dated 21.11.2014 has  dismissed  the  Review
Application. The High Court held that the grounds urged by the appellant  in
the Review  Petition  did  not  warrant  a  review  of  its  judgment  dated
19.12.2012. The High Court further held that it must be considered that  the
judge who rendered the judgment was no longer available with the  Court  and
that the liberty that a judge has to correct himself upon his mistake  being
brought to his notice, is not available to another judge hearing the  review
and therefore the Review Petition was rejected by passing  the  order  which
is also impugned in this appeal. Hence the present  appeals  were  filed  by
the above appellants.


We have heard the learned senior counsel for both the parties. On the  basis
of the factual evidence on record produced before us, the  circumstances  of
the case and also in the light of the rival legal contentions urged  by  the
learned senior counsel for both the parties,  we  have  broadly  framed  the
following points which require our attention and consideration:-

Whether the appeals filed by the appellant Housing  Board  are  maintainable
in view of the fact that the earlier  SLP  filed  by  the  appellant  Bengal
Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. was dismissed with liberty  accorded  to  it
to file appropriate petition before the High Court?



Whether the order of temporary injunction dated  16.06.2006  passed  by  the
learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore, passed in respect of the  suit  property
without impleading the vendors and the appellant Housing  Board,  which  had
acquired the right, title, interest upon the same can  be  enforced  against
them through the jurisdictional police as has been granted  by  the  learned
Subordinate Judge, Alipore, though the sale deed in favour of the  Board  is
not challenged by the plaintiffs-respondents  and  the  said  order  can  be
enforced against the appellants through jurisdictional police  by  an  order
dated 13.01.2010 passed in the Title Suit?



Whether the inclusion of the property of  the  Housing  Board  to  the  suit
instituted in the Civil Court by way of  an  amendment  by  the  plaintiffs-
respondents which property was  conferred  upon  the  legal  heirs  of  late
Gangadas Pal as intermediary right  holder  under  Section  6  of  the  West
Bengal Acquisition of Estates Act, 1953 and  the  institution  of  suit  for
partition by the contesting respondents  is  barred  by  the  provisions  of
Sections 57 - B (2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act of 1953?



What order?



Answer to Point No. 1



Mr. J.P. Cama, the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  some  of
the plaintiffs-respondents strongly  made  the  submission  that  since  the
earlier SLP of the appellant- Bengal Ambuja  Housing  Development  Ltd.  was
dismissed as withdrawn by an order of this Court  dated  13.02.2013  in  the
case of Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Limited & Anr. v.  Pramila  Sanfui
& Ors., it is no  longer  open  to  the  said  appellant  to  challenge  the
correctness of the original order passed by the High Court by way of  filing
other SLPs again. In support of the above  legal  submissions,  the  learned
senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision  of  this  Court  in  the
case of Kumaran Silk Trade (P.) Ltd. v. Devendra & Ors.[1], wherein  it  has
been held as under:

“Since the petition for special leave to appeal has already  been  dismissed
by this Court, it is no more open to the petitioner  to  seek  challenge  to
challenge the original order in this Court again by invoking Article 136  of
the Constitution of India....

......It is not open to the  petitioner  to  challenge  the  original  order
again in this Court after withdrawing the earlier appeal, reserving  only  a
liberty in itself of seeking a review of the original order.”





  The  learned  senior  counsel  also  contends  that  an  appeal   is   not
maintainable against the decision of  a  court  in  a  Review  Petition.  He
places reliance on the decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Shanker
Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput[2], wherein it  has  been  held
as under:

“This appeal is obviously incompetent. It is against an order of a  Division
Bench of the High Court rejecting the application for review of  a  judgment
and decree passed by a learned Single Judge, who seems to  have  retired  in
the meantime. It is not against the basic judgment. Order 47 Rule 7  of  CPC
bars an appeal against the order of the court rejecting the review. On  this
basis, we reject the appeal.”



This case has been relied upon by this Court in the cases  of  Vinod  Kapoor
v. State of Goa[3] and M.N Haider v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan[4]



 The learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents  submits  that  the
earlier SLP filed by Bengal Ambuja Housing Development  Ltd.  was  dismissed
as withdrawn with liberty to file an appropriate petition  before  the  High
Court to review its order questioned in the earlier SLPs. Since liberty  was
not given to it to challenge that very same impugned  order  once  again  by
filing SLPs in the event of review petition  being  dismissed,  the  appeals
filed by Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. once again  challenging  the
very same order is not legally permissible. This contention  has  been  very
vehemently disputed by learned Attorney General, Mr. Rohatgi,  who  contends
that the impugned order was not challenged by the  appellant  Housing  Board
before this Court, and that the interim order of  temporary  injunction  and
order dated 13.01.2010 directing the jurisdictional police  to  enforce  the
order of temporary  injunction  are  not  binding  and  cannot  be  enforced
against it, as it was not a party to the original suit  proceedings  at  any
point of time. It is further contended that it has acquired  valid  interest
and title upon the property in dispute as the legal heirs of  late  Gangadas
Pal have executed the sale deed of the property in its  favour,  which  land
stood retained by them, in terms of the decision of this Court in  the  case
of Sulekha Pal referred to supra. Thus, the order  of  temporary  injunction
passed in the original suit  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  property  in
dispute without impleading either  the  vendors  of  the  appellant  Housing
Board  or  the  heirs  of  the  late  Gangadas  Pal  to  the  original  suit
proceedings cannot be said  to  have  a  binding  effect  on  the  appellant
Housing Board.  Therefore, the  learned  Subordinate  Judge  ought  to  have
taken this aspect of the  matter  into  consideration  while  directing  the
Superintendent of Police, South 24 Paraganas to enforce  the  interim  order
of temporary injunction against  Bengal  Ambuja  Housing  Development  Ltd.,
which is the lease holder as the Board has granted lease hold rights in  its
favour to develop the property  by  joint  venture  to  provide  residential
accommodation to the economically weaker sections of the society,  which  is
a laudable object of the Board under the statutory provisions  of  the  West
Bengal Housing Board Act, 1972.


Thus, the aforesaid decisions of this Court upon  which  reliance  has  been
placed by the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  some  of  the
plaintiffs-respondents  cannot  be  applied  either  against  the  appellant
Housing Board or its lessee or any other person claiming through it,  as  it
was not a party to the proceedings and it did not challenge the  said  order
earlier before this Court and therefore the Civil Appeals filed  by  it  are
maintainable.



Answer to Point Nos.2 and 3

 The learned Trial Court passed  an  order  of  status  quo  on  16.06.2006,
restraining the defendants  therein  from  selling,  transferring,  creating
third  party  interest  or  otherwise  disposing  of  the   suit   scheduled
properties. The said interim order of temporary injunction  was  purportedly
a consent order. On 07.07.2006, though the legal heirs of late Gangadas  Pal
were not brought on record, the learned Trial Court  allowed  the  amendment
application dated 28.01.2003, to amend the suit schedule properties.



 Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General and Mr. Dushyant Dave,  learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contend that  the  High
Court failed  to  consider  that  neither  the  appellants  herein  nor  the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellants were parties to the Suit  No.  121
of 1962 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore, and thus,  they  were
not aware of the order of temporary injunction that had been passed  in  the
said suit proceedings. The learned senior counsel further contend  that  the
High Court erred in not appreciating the fact that the  said  plot  of  land
was not a part of the suit scheduled  property  originally.  It  appears  to
have been included in the suit schedule as one of the properties  after  the
death of Ganga Das Pal and abatement of the  suit  proceedings  against  him
without bringing his legal heirs on record. The status quo order  passed  in
the original suit sought to be enforced against the  appellants  was  passed
after the suit was abated against late Gangadas  Pal  and  without  bringing
his legal heirs on record. The original  suit  had  abated  against  him  by
order dated 30.11.1973, the suit being Title Suit No. 121 of 1962.  Further,
the land of late Gangadas Pal was only included in the  suit  properties  on
07.07.2006, that too without making  the  heirs  of  late  Gangadas  Pal  as
parties to the said proceedings, or informing them about the  same.  It  was
further contended that by the learned senior counsel  that  the  High  Court
failed to appreciate that neither the appellants, nor their predecessors  in
title and interest (the legal heirs of late Gangadas Pal) upon the  property
involved in these proceedings were made parties to the  suit  and  therefore
the question of  giving  consent  by  them  to  the   interim  orders  dated
16.06.2006 and 13.01.2010 does not and cannot arise, especially in light  of
the fact that the order of abatement of the  original  suit  proceedings  as
against late Gangadas Pal had attained finality. It  was  further  contended
by Mr. Dushyant Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the
appellant, Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. that the  High  Court  had
failed to consider the scope of the principle of lis pendens  under  Section
52 of the Transfer of Property  Act,  1882.  The  property  which  has  been
purchased by the appellant Housing Board was not transferred  by  any  party
to the Title Suit No. 121 of  1962.  The  Information  Slip  issued  by  the
Alipore Court makes it clear that the names of the heirs  of  late  Gangadas
Pal were not included as parties to the Title Suit No. 121 of 1962.



 On the other hand, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of the respondent- Receiver contends that  the  appellants  presently
do not have the locus standi to challenge any subsequent  orders  passed  in
the Title Suit No. 121 of 1962. The property  in  dispute,  upon  which  the
claim is made by them, being a portion of the suit property is  governed  by
the principle of lis pendens as provided  under  the  Transfer  of  Property
Act, 1882. The learned senior counsel further contends that the  High  Court
has righty observed that no serious prejudice has  been  occasioned  to  the
appellants on account of the order passed by the learned  Subordinate  Judge
to  enforce  the  interim  order  of  temporary   injunction   through   the
jurisdictional police. An order of status  quo  had  been  passed  by  Trial
Court as far back as 16.06.2006. The parties were restrained  from  selling,
transferring, alienating or otherwise disposing of the suit property to  any
third party in any manner whatsoever. There was also an order  of  temporary
injunction restraining the parties from changing the  nature  and  character
of the suit property. The property in question being  a  part  of  the  suit
property could not have been transferred in favour of the appellant  Housing
Board during pendency of the restrain order. Therefore, it is urged  by  the
learned senior  counsel  that  no  indulgence  ought  to  be  shown  to  the
appellants in any manner whatsoever to interfere with  the  impugned  orders
by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.



 We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General and Mr.  Dushyant
Dave, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the  appellant  and
Mr. Sanjay Hegde and Mr. J.P. Cama, the learned senior counsel appearing  on
behalf of the respondents and have perused the documents produced before  us
in Civil Appeals in support of  their  respective  claims  to  consider  the
rival legal contentions urged on  behalf  of  the  parties  and  answer  the
points that are framed in these appeals.



 We agree with the  contentions  advanced  by  the  learned  senior  counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants. The original suit instituted  by  the
plaintiff-respondents against late Gangadas Pal had  abated  vide  order  of
the learned subordinate judge, Alipore dated 30.11.1973. The said order  has
attained finality as no appeal has been filed  questioning  the  correctness
of the same. By order dated 07.07.2006 passed  by  the  learned  Subordinate
Judge, the property in question of late Gangadas Pal was added  as  part  to
the suit schedule properties by way of an amendment to  the  plaint  by  the
time his legal heirs had already acquired intermediary rights under  Section
6 of the West Bengal Estates  Acquisition  Act,  1953.  The  heirs  of  late
Gangadas Pal were not made parties to the said Title  Suit  proceedings.  On
03.07.2006,  the  learned  subordinate  judge  passed  an   order   granting
temporary injunction restraining the parties to the suit from alienating  or
transferring the suit property. A perusal of “Annexure P/10”  which  is  the
Information Slip dated 17.02.2010 issued by the office of the learned  Trial
Court in Title Suit No. 121 of 1962, makes it amply clear that the heirs  of
late Gangadas Pal were not made parties to the suit. The  appellant  Housing
Board purchased the land in question from the heirs of late Gangadas Pal  on
19.08.2008, as is evidenced from the conveyance  deed  “Annexure  P-9”.  The
appellant Housing Board was not a party to the Title Suit at  any  point  of
time. It has purchased the land in question from its owners.  This  property
was included in the suit schedule properties by  way  of  amendment  to  the
plaint after an application was  allowed  by  order  dated  07.07.2006.  The
plaintiffs-respondents herein did not have any right to get  the  said  land
included as part of the suit schedule  properties  for  partition,  and  the
learned Subordinate Judge erred in allowing the  application  to  amend  the
suit schedule to include the property in question. The  learned  Subordinate
Judge has erred in passing order of temporary injunction under  Order  XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil  Procedure,  1908,   in  respect  of  the
property in question after it was included to the suit schedule as order  of
temporary injunction can be granted against only the  parties  to  the  suit
property. Further, the grant of police  protection  without  impleading  the
appellants to the original suit proceedings is also not legally  permissible
and the therefore the said order is liable to be set aside. The  High  Court
ought to have considered the relevant fact  that  the  appellants  were  not
parties to the suit, and the suit had abated as against late  Gangadas  Pal.
Thus, the order of temporary injunction passed by  the  learned  Subordinate
Judge on 03.07.2006 does not apply to the land in question  which  was  sold
to the appellant Housing Board.



 Further, in the instant case,  the  order  of  temporary  injunction  dated
03.07.2006 was purportedly granted by consent is  also  not  sustainable  in
law. The question of consent being given by  either  the  appellant  Housing
Board or the predecessors in interest who are its vendors did not  arise  as
they were not parties to the said suit. It is a well  settled  principle  of
law that either temporary  or  permanent  injunction  can  be  granted  only
against the parties to a suit. Further the purported consent order in  terms
of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure is  only  binding  as  against
the parties to the suit. In such a case, the order of the Subordinate  Judge
to grant police protection against the  appellant  Housing  Board  which  is
enjoying the property is erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside.



 The  original  owner  in  the  instant  case,  late  Gangadas  Pal  was  an
intermediary in khas possession of the land in question in terms of  Section
6 of the West Bengal  Estates  Acquisition  Act,  1953.  Thus,  the  learned
Subordinate Judge did not have the jurisdiction to entertain any  suit  with
respect to the said property, in light  of  the  provision  of  Section  57B
(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953,  which
states as under:



“57B. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of certain matters.-



    XXX             XXX           XXX



(2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or  application  concerning  any
land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to---



alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published,  revised,
made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V,



a dispute involving determination of the question, either  expressly  or  by
implication, whether a raiyat, or an intermediary, is or is not entitled  to
retain under the provisions of this Act such land  or  estate  or  right  in
such estate, as the case may be, or



any matter which under any of the provisions of this Act is to be ,  or  has
already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the  State
Government or any authority specified therein.”



In view of the fact that the right, title and  interest  upon  the  disputed
property has been settled in favour of the vendors of the appellant  Housing
Board, who are the legal  heirs  of  the  late  Gangadas  Pal,  who  was  an
intermediary of the land in question in terms  of  Section  6  of  the  West
Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, adding of the property in question  to
the suit schedule property in  dispute  cannot  be  the  subject  matter  of
partition in view of the express  provisions  of  the  West  Bengal  Estates
Acquisition Act, 1953 which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court  in
respect of any rights in such  estate  as  entry  in  record  of  rights  is
published. In the instant case, the names of the heirs of late Gangadas  Pal
were included in the record of rights in pursuance of the  order  passed  in
the Writ Petitions in connection with the Big Raiyat Case  No.  5  of  1967,
which order was affirmed by this Court in the case of Sulekha Pal,  referred
to supra.

The amendment of plaint to include the suit property of the  heirs  of  late
Gangadas Pal was done in pursuance of the order  dated  07.07.2006,  wherein
the learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore added the land in question which  has
been sold to the appellant Housing Board, to the schedule of suit  lands  in
Title Suit No. 121 of 1962. The same is  erroneous  in  law  and  therefore,
liable to be set aside as the said order is not  binding  on  the  appellant
for the reasons stated supra.

Answer to Point No. 4

The order of temporary  injunction  passed  in  favour  of  the  plaintiffs-
respondents is accordingly set  aside  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the
property of the appellant Housing Board  is  concerned  which  property  was
included by way of an amendment to the plaint.



At the end, it was brought to our  notice  by       Mr.  Sanjay  Hegde,  the
learned senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Receiver  that  the
appellant Housing Board has entered into a  Joint  Venture  Settlement  with
Bengal Ambuja Housing  Development  Ltd.  without  following  the  mandatory
procedure of inviting applications to participate in the tender to  get  the
leasehold rights for the joint development of the property  in  question  to
discharge its statutory obligation. It was further contended by the  learned
senior counsel that in not doing so, the action  of  the  appellant  Housing
Board has become  arbitrary,  unreasonable  and  unfair  as  it  amounts  to
conferring largesse upon the appellant  Bengal  Ambuja  Housing  Development
Ltd. The learned senior counsel contended  that  this  is  impermissible  in
law, as has been held in a catena of cases by this Court in relation to  the
property owned by the Central or State Government  or  Statutory  Boards  or
Corporations or Companies owned by either the Central or State  governments,
including the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty  v.  The  International  Airport
Authority of India[5], which was relied upon in the more recent decision  of
Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh[6]. The  learned
senior counsel further contends that this court has laid down the  law  with
reference to Article 14 of the Constitution of India keeping in view  as  to
how to alienate public property by granting reasonable  rates  and  granting
agency of  joint  venture  without  following  the  mandatory  procedure  of
inviting applications from the competent persons so  that  the  persons  may
come forward and participate in the proceedings  to  give  fair  and  better
offer in the interest of public. That has not been  done  by  the  appellant
Housing Board in the instant case. Thus, public interest has been  adversely
affected as a result of the arbitrary and unreasonable action  on  the  part
of the appellant Housing Board in granting leasehold rights  for  the  joint
development of the property in question.  The  learned  senior  counsel  has
prayed that the appellant Housing  Board  be  directed  to  dispose  of  the
property and make good the schemes in the interest of the beneficiaries  and
utilize the same for their benefit.



The above contention of the learned senior counsel cannot be dealt  with  by
us, as the same is not in controversy in the present  case  before  us.  The
aggrieved parties are at liberty to seek the above mentioned  prayer  in  an
appropriate proceeding.



Since we have answered the points formulated in these appeals in  favour  of
the appellant Housing Board by recording the reasons  in  the  judgment,  we
have to allow the appeals of  the  appellant  Housing  Board.  We  pass  the
following order:



The appeals of the appellant Housing Board are allowed by  holding  that  ex
parte interim order of temporary injunction  passed  on  16.06.2006  by  the
learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore in Title Suit No. 121 of 1962 in  respect
of the property in question purchased from  the  legal  heirs  of  the  late
Gangadas Pal who are declared as intermediaries under Section 6 of  the  Act
of 1953 and therefore the same are not binding on this appellant  as  it  is
not a party to the  proceedings  and  the  Civil  Court  did  not  have  the
jurisdiction to deal with the said property, as per Section 57  B  (2)  (a),
(b) and (c) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act of 1953.



Since the interim order of  temporary  injunction  is  not  binding  on  the
appellant Housing Board and cannot be operated against them,  therefore  the
question of enforcing the same against the appellant  Housing Board  or  its
agents or any person claiming through it, through the jurisdictional  police
to help the plaintiffs-respondents  as  has  been  granted  by  the  learned
Subordinate Judge by his orders  dated  03.07.2006  and  13.01.2010  at  the
request of the plaintiffs-respondents, does not arise.

In view of the appeals of the appellant Housing  Board  being  allowed,  the
appeals filed by the Bengal Ambuja Housing Development Ltd. are disposed  of
as they are unnecessary. All Interlocutory Applications are disposed of.




                          …………………………………………………………J.
                          [T.S. THAKUR]




                                       …………………………………………………………J.
                          [V. GOPALA GOWDA]



                                       …………………………………………………………J.
                          [R. BANUMATHI]



New Delhi,
September 18, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    (2007) 12 SCC 549
[2]    (1994) 2 SCC 753
[3]    (2012) 12 SCC 378
[4]    (2004) 13 SCC 677
[5]    AIR 1979 SC 1628
[6]    (2011) 5 SCC 29


Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market Regulations, 2003 =Appellate Tribunal upholding and confirming the order of Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) dated 27th January 2004 directing the appellant to make public announcement in terms of Regulation 11(1) of the Securities & Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares & Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations of 1997). = Hence, SEBI came to a conclusion that the appellant was already holding between 15% to 75% shares of the target company SIL and it could acquire additional shares of this company through creeping acquisition mode, that is, without public announcement only upto 5% of its paid up capital during the period of 12 months ending on 31st March 2000. However, by acquiring 11,36,700 shares of SIL during June 1999 to August 1999 it acquired shares constituting more than 5% of the paid up capital of SIL. For making such acquisition, the appellant was liable to make public announcement as required by Regulation 11(1) of the Regulations of 1997. Since the appellant failed to do so, the Whole Time Member of SEBI held it guilty and issued the following directions on 27th January 2004 : We are in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal on this issue and find no merit in the contentions of the appellant. A careful reading of the aforesaid Regulations discloses that the public announcement should not be delayed beyond four working days of the agreement or decision to acquire the requisite number of shares or voting rights.in case of acquisition of shares or voting rights the appropriate applicable provision is Regulation 14(1) and not Regulation 14(2) which applies only when the acquisition is of other securities including Global Depository Receipts, American Depository Receipts. It is only such securities which require conversion or exercise of option which is contemplated by Regulation 14(2). only Regulation 14(1) is applicable as it covers acquisition of either the shares or the voting rights or both which are the subject matter of Regulation 11(1). - Regulations 10, 11 and 12 of the Regulations of 1997 and in paragraph 102 held them to be mandatory statutory provisions. However this judgment needs no elaborate consideration because no plea has been raised on behalf of appellant that the Regulations are directory or do not require compliance.We find that the plea that the matter at hand relates to Regulation 14(2) was not raised before the original authority or the Tribunal. We also find that it is a plea of desperation and undeserving of acceptance. In the final analysis we find no merit in these appeals and hence they are dismissed with consolidated cost of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the appellant to SEBI within eight weeks.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3219 OF 2006

Kosha Investments Ltd.                         …..Appellant

      Versus

Securities & Exchange Board of India & Anr. …..Respondents

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2132 OF 2007



                               J U D G M E N T



SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.

Both the appeals have been preferred by the  same  appellant  under  Section
15Z of the Securities & Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (for short,  ‘SEBI
Act’).  The main appeal is of 2006 and requires detailed consideration.   It
is directed against order dated 08th August 2005 passed  by  the  Securities
Appellate Tribunal upholding  and  confirming  the  order  of  Securities  &
Exchange Board of  India  (SEBI)  dated  27th  January  2004  directing  the
appellant to make public announcement in terms of Regulation  11(1)  of  the
Securities & Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition  of  Shares  &
Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘the  Regulations
of 1997).  The other appeal is directed against orders passed  by  SEBI  and
confirmed by the Tribunal to impose penalty  upon  the  appellant  for  non-
compliance with the order which is subject matter  of  the  earlier  appeal.
It goes without saying that the latter appeal will follow the  fate  of  the
main appeal.
Before adverting to the issues of law raised on  behalf  of  the  appellant,
the essential facts may be noticed only  in  brief.   The  appellant,  Kosha
Investments Ltd., acquired shares of  another  company  Snowcem  India  Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as ‘SIL’) from one of  the  original  promoters  of
SIL and thus itself became one of the promoters.  An investigation  by  SEBI
covered the period June 1999 to  August  1999  when  there  was  an  initial
upward movement in the price of shares of SIL and also substantial  increase
in the volume of their  trade.   As  a  result  of  such  investigation  the
appellant faced charges in another proceeding  under  SEBI  (Prohibition  of
Fraudulent  and  Unfair  Trade  Practices  relating  to  Securities  Market)
Regulations, 2003 and was  also  served  with  a  show  cause  notice  dated
14.11.2002 for alleged breach of provisions of Regulation 44  and  45(6)  of
the Regulations of 1997 read with provisions of Section 11 and  11B  of  the
SEBI Act.  The proposed action under Regulations  of  1997  was  based  upon
report of investigation showing that appellant had consistently  bought  and
sold shares of SIL prior to June 1999 and also after August  1999.   As  per
record it was holding 21,32,900 shares of SIL constituting 20.29%  of  total
paid up capital of SIL.  The appellant made additional  purchase  of  shares
amounting to  10.81%  of  the  paid  up  capital  of  SIL  in  violation  of
Regulation 11(1) of the Regulations  of  1997  as  it  failed  to  make  the
required public  announcement  in  terms  of  the  said  Regulation.   After
granting personal hearing and considering the appellant’s reply to the  show
cause notice, in the final order SEBI came to a  finding  that  as  on  31st
March 1999 appellant was actually holding only 21,32,900 shares as shown  by
SEBI and not 31,84,228 shares which was claimed  by  the  appellant  on  the
ground that it had already pledged its shares to lenders who had lent  money
to SIL.  The plea of pledge raised by the appellant was  found  without  any
substance and only an attempt to conceal subsequent purchase.   Hence,  SEBI
came to a conclusion that the appellant was already holding between  15%  to
75% shares of the target company SIL and it could acquire additional  shares
of this company through creeping acquisition mode, that is,  without  public
announcement only upto 5% of its paid up capital during  the  period  of  12
months ending on 31st March 2000.  However, by  acquiring  11,36,700  shares
of SIL during June 1999 to August 1999 it acquired shares constituting  more
than 5% of the paid up capital of SIL.  For  making  such  acquisition,  the
appellant was liable to make public announcement as required  by  Regulation
11(1) of the Regulations of 1997.  Since the appellant failed to do so,  the
Whole  Time  Member  of  SEBI  held  it  guilty  and  issued  the  following
directions on 27th January 2004 :

      “15. In view of the findings above  and  in  exercise  of  the  powers
conferred upon me under Section 19 read with Section 11B of  SEBI  Act  read
with regulations, I hereby direct the acquirer viz., Kosha Investments  Ltd.
to make public announcement  in  terms  of  regulation  11(1)  of  the  said
Regulations taking June 29, 1999 as the reference date  for  calculation  of
offer price.  The public announcement  shall  be  made  within  45  days  of
passing of this order.

      16.  ……..  The  Acquirers  are  hereby  accordingly  directed  to  pay
interest @ 15% per annum to the share  holders  for  the  loss  of  interest
caused to the shareholders from October 28, 1999 till  the  date  of  actual
payment of consideration for the shares to be tendered and accepted  in  the
offer directed to be made by the Acquirers.

      17. It is also noted that an order dated  3.12.03  was  passed  by  me
restraining the Kosha Investments Ltd. from buying, selling  or  dealing  in
securities in any manner, directly or indirectly, for a period of two  years
for violating the provisions of SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent  and  Unfair
Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 1995.   However,
I direct the said order dated 3.12.2003 shall not hamper the  implementation
of this order.”


The appellant preferred an appeal before the Securities  Appellate  Tribunal
to challenge the order dated 27th January 2004 passed by Whole  Time  Member
of SEBI.  The main contention  of  the  appellant  before  the  Tribunal  is
recorded in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment and is as follows :

      “Learned counsel for the appellant argued that KIL had been  regularly
purchasing and selling shares of SIL.  He  also  argued  that  KIL  had  not
acquired 5% or more than 5% shares or voting rights in respect of shares  of
SIL at any point of time in the period of 12 months.  He submitted that  out
of 11,36,700 shares which were purchased during June, 1999 to  August,  1999
during the same period KIL also sold number of shares of  SIL.   He  pointed
out that KIL was not holding more than 5% shares of SIL at any point  during
the year and therefore the provisions of Takeover Code did not trigger.   He
further argued that even if SEBI did not take into account  the  repurchases
of pledged shares as return of shares, SEBI should accept that KIL  did  not
acquire 5% or more shares at any point of time since sale  and  purchase  of
shares was being done simultaneously and did not trigger the Takeover  Code.
 He argued that SEBI ought to have taken into account  that  KIL  also  sold
shares during the relevant  period.   He  went  on  to  argue  that  it  was
erroneous to determine the total share holding of KIL at any given point  of
time during the investigation by completely  ignoring  the  sale  of  shares
made by it during the  relevant  period.   He  said  that  such  a  lopsided
interpretation of Takeover Code would be  erroneous  and  not  maintainable.
He said that determining the shareholding of a person  without  netting  off
would give a distorted picture.  He therefore concluded that for the  reason
mentioned above, the provisions of Takeover  Code  were  not  applicable  in
this case and no violation of SEBI Regulations has taken place.”

The Tribunal accepted the counter arguments advanced on behalf of  the  SEBI
to the effect that even during the period  June  1999  to  August  1999  the
appellant had acquired 6,61,800 shares which constituted 6.29% of  the  paid
up capital of SIL which was beyond the permissible limit  of  5%  and  hence
the requirement of making public announcement in terms of  Regulation  11(1)
had to be met by the appellant which the appellant failed to do.
Before the Tribunal as  well  as  before  us  the  main  contention  of  the
appellant is that SEBI failed to consider that the appellant was not only  a
promoter having more than 15% shares of SIL but it was also in the  business
of sale and purchase of shares  which  was  being  done  simultaneously  and
hence exceeding the limit of 5% at any one  point  of  time  was  immaterial
unless on a net accounting it could be found that such  ceiling  of  5%  had
been violated by appellant on account of its retaining more than  5%  shares
of SIL at the end of  a  financial  year.   On  the  other  hand  SEBI  have
reiterated their stand before  the  Tribunal  that  the  ceiling  of  making
acquisition of only up to 5% of the paid up capital of  target  company  was
no doubt to be reckoned during a period of 12 months, that is,  a  financial
year but the requirement of Regulation 11(1) of the Regulations of  1997  of
making a public announcement was triggered not only  on  actual  acquisition
beyond the 5% limit  but  even  on  entering  into  an  agreement  for  such
acquisition or deciding to acquire such volume of shares or  voting  rights,
in view of provisions of Regulation 14(1) of the  Regulations  of  1997.   A
strong emphasis was laid on  Regulation  14(1)  which  requires  the  public
announcement referred to in Regulation 10 or Regulation 11  to  be  made  by
the acquiring company (through its merchant banker),  not  later  than  four
working days of the agreement or decision to acquire  the  requisite  number
of shares or voting rights which  by  itself  triggers  the  requirement  of
Regulation 11. (emphasis added)  Let us conceptualize the case of an  entity
holding 20 per cent of shareholding in a target company on 1st  April  of  a
given year.  If it were to increase its  holding  by  say  3  per  cent  and
subsequently reduce it to 2 per cent.  It  at  that  point  it  intended  to
purchase 4 per cent shares again, whether by way of fractions or  otherwise,
it would cross the threshold of 5 per cent.  It  would  then  have  to  make
compliance with Regulation 11.  We hasten to clarify that if  the  aggregate
percentage of acquisitions at any point of time during  the  financial  year
exceeds 5 per cent, the provision would get triggered. In other  words,  the
provision of Regulation 11 mandating a public announcement will kick  in  at
any stage whence the shareholding of the said entity in the  target  company
would exceed 25 per cent.
It will be relevant at this stage to extract Regulations  11(1),  13,  14(1)
and 14(2) in order to appreciate the submissions.  These read as follows :

“11. (1) No acquirer who, together with persons acting in concert with  him,
has acquired, in accordance with the provisions of law, 15 per cent or  more
but less than fifty five per cent (55%) of the shares or voting rights in  a
company, shall acquire, either by himself or through or with persons  acting
in concert with him, additional shares or voting  rights  entitling  him  to
exercise more than 5 per cent of the voting rights, in  any  financial  year
ending on 31st March unless such acquirer makes  a  public  announcement  to
acquire shares in accordance with the regulations.

…. …. …. ….

Before making any public announcement of offer referred to in regulation  10
or regulation 11 or regulation 12, the acquirer  shall  appoint  a  merchant
banker in Category I holding a certificate of registration  granted  by  the
Board, who is not an associate of or group of the  acquirer  or  the  target
company.

(1) The public announcement referred to in regulation 10  or  regulation  11
shall be made by the merchant banker not later than  four  working  days  of
entering into an agreement for acquisition of shares  or  voting  rights  or
deciding to  acquire  shares  or  voting  rights  exceeding  the  respective
percentage specified therein:

Provided that in case of disinvestment of a Public Sector  Undertaking,  the
public announcement shall be made by the merchant banker not  later  than  4
working days of the acquirer  executing  the  Share  Purchase  Agreement  or
Shareholders Agreement with the Central Government or the  State  Government
as the case  may  be,  for  the  acquisition  of  shares  or  voting  rights
exceeding the percentage of shareholding referred to  in  regulation  10  or
regulation 11 or the  transfer  of  control  over  a  target  Public  Sector
Undertaking.

(2)   In the case of an  acquirer  acquiring  securities,  including  Global
Depository Receipts  or  American  Depository  Receipts  which,  when  taken
together with the voting rights, if any  already  held  by  him  or  persons
acting in concert with him, would entitle him to  voting  rights,  exceeding
the percentage specified in regulation  10  or  regulation  11,  the  public
announcement referred to in sub-regulation (1) shall be made not later  than
four working days before he acquires voting rights on such  securities  upon
conversion, or exercise of option, as the case may be.”

A careful reading of the aforesaid Regulations  discloses  that  the  public
announcement  should  not  be  delayed  beyond  four  working  days  of  the
agreement or decision to acquire the requisite number of  shares  or  voting
rights. We are in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal on  this  issue
and find no merit in the contentions  of  the  appellant.  If  the  plea  of
appellant  will  be  accepted  then  an  acquirer  can  keep  on   violating
Regulation 11(1) with impunity on as  many  occasions  as  he/it  wants  and
avoid  letting  the  public  have  the  required  knowledge  through  public
announcements by simply  making  subsequent  sale  or  transfer  to  another
entity so as to reduce the so-called net acquisition in a financial year  to
within 5%. This interpretation will defeat the purpose of  Regulation  11(1)
and shall also render Regulation 14(1) otiose.  The  concept  of  permitting
creeping acquisitions by permitting not  more  than  5%  of  the  shares  or
voting rights in a company limits the  period  for  such  acquisition  to  a
financial year ending by 31st March. But such concept does  not  dilute  the
requirement of making a public announcement within  the  time  mentioned  in
Regulation 14(1) if the acquisition even if only once made and divested,  is
of more than 5% of shares or voting rights in the target company.  In  other
words, even if such acquisition is followed by sale in  the  same  financial
year,  the  liability  of  making  the  public  announcement  would   remain
unaffected and shall attract action, as in this case.
Hence, the main contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is  found  to
be without any merit. The other contention is that Regulation 14(2)  of  the
Regulations of 1997 postpones the time for required public  announcement  to
acquisition  of  voting  rights  when  purchased  securities  are   actually
converted. According to the contention, only when securities or  shares  are
converted by the acquirer into voting rights by  getting  it  registered  or
upon exercise of option to acquire voting rights, the  liability  of  making
public announcement can be fastened.
Aforesaid plea has been rightly countered by  learned  Senior  Advocate  for
SEBI, Mr. C.U. Singh by pointing out that in case of acquisition  of  shares
or voting rights the appropriate applicable provision  is  Regulation  14(1)
and not Regulation 14(2) which applies  only  when  the  acquisition  is  of
other securities including Global Depository Receipts,  American  Depository
Receipts. It is only such securities which require  conversion  or  exercise
of option which is contemplated by Regulation 14(2).  He  also  pointed  out
that no such plea was raised before the SEBI or  the  Tribunal  and  rightly
because in the present case  only  Regulation  14(1)  is  applicable  as  it
covers acquisition of either the shares or the voting rights or  both  which
are the subject matter of Regulation 11(1). Mr. Singh has also  referred  to
a judgment of this Court in the case of Swedish Match  AB  and  Another  vs.
Securities & Exchange Board of India and Another, (2004) 11  SCC  641.  This
judgment in paragraphs 90 onwards  considered  the  purpose  and  effect  of
Regulations 10, 11 and 12 of the Regulations of 1997 and  in  paragraph  102
held them to be mandatory statutory provisions. However this judgment  needs
no elaborate consideration because no plea has  been  raised  on  behalf  of
appellant that the Regulations are directory or do not require compliance.
We find that the plea that the matter at hand relates  to  Regulation  14(2)
was not raised before the original authority or the Tribunal. We  also  find
that it is a plea of desperation and undeserving of acceptance.
In the final analysis we find no merit in these appeals and hence  they  are
dismissed with  consolidated  cost  of  Rs.  50,000/-  to  be  paid  by  the
appellant to SEBI within eight weeks.


                       …………………………………….J.
                       [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]



                                      …………………………………..J.
                             [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
September 18, 2015.


















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