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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Monday, September 14, 2015

No positive direction has been issued by this Court to start the college. Even otherwise in view of the decisions in Priya Gupta (supra) and Mridul Dhar (supra), other decisions and recent order dated 10.8.2015 passed by this Court in S.L.P. [C] No.22472/2014 – Medical Council of India v. Subharti Medical College, Meerut in which the application for the session 2015-16 was dismissed and the MCI was directed to ensure that necessary inspection for the academic year 2016-17 shall be done within six weeks, it would be appropriate to direct inspection for session 2016-17. 23. Considering the statutory time schedule and that the same is already over and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to direct inspection to be made and thereafter a decision to be taken for the current academic session 2015-16 as that would be in breach of the law laid down in various decisions of this Court which is binding. Thus, we direct that the application which has been submitted by the college for the academic session 2015-16 be considered for the next academic session, subject to fulfilment of other requisite formalities, as may be necessary, and thereafter the MCI shall conduct an inspection well- in-time as per the time schedule fixed under the Regulations of 1999. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid modification. Ordered accordingly. No costs.

                                                                  Reportable



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.15043 OF 2015



Padmashree Dr. D.Y. Patil Medical College          ... Petitioner

Vs.

Medical Council of India & Anr.              ... Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T



ARUN MISHRA, J.



1.    The petitioner has filed the present special leave petition  aggrieved
by the judgment and order dated 5.5.2015 passed by a Division Bench  of  the
High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No.235/2015  thereby  reversing  the  judgment
and order passed by the Single Bench in the matter of increase of seats  for
MBBS course  from  150  to  250  from  the  academic  session  2015-16.  The
petitioner preferred writ petition before  the  Single  Bench  of  the  High
Court of Delhi on being aggrieved by the rejection  of  its  application  by
the Central Government on the ground that essentiality certificate  was  not
filed along with the application form. The petitioner claimed  that  it  had
filed the application for increase in the intake capacity on 30.8.2014.  The
essentiality certificate could not be submitted by the petitioner as it  had
not been issued to it by the Government of Maharashtra.  It  was  issued  on
3.9.2014 and was  submitted  to  the  Central  Government  on  5.9.2014.  On
16.10.2014 the Central Government returned the  application  on  the  ground
that the essentiality certificate and the consent of  affiliation  were  not
submitted by the petitioner along with  the  proposal  dated  1.9.2014.  The
last  date  of  submitting  the  duly  completed  application  was  over  on
31.8.2014. The petitioner was advised to submit a fresh application for  the
academic  year  2016-17.  On  24.10.2014,  the  petitioner   requested   for
condonation  of  delay   in   submitting   the   essentiality   certificate.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a writ application which was  allowed  vide
order dated 8.4.2015 by the Single Bench of the High  Court.  On  17.4.2015,
the Medical Council of India (for short “the MCI”) filed  a  Letters  Patent
Appeal No.235/2015 as against the judgment and order passed  by  the  Single
Bench which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 5.5.2015.  Hence,  the
petitioner has assailed the same in the present special leave petition.

2.    A Division Bench of the High Court has,  inter  alia,  relied  upon  a
decision of this Court in Educare Charitable Trust v. Union of India &  Anr.
 [AIR 2014 SC 902] and held that for the present academic  session  2015-16,
no direction can be issued due to time schedule.

       It  was  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  petitioner  that  once   the
essentiality certificate was submitted by  it,  the  application  could  not
have been returned/rejected in a mechanical  manner  due  to  the  aforesaid
deficiency and the delay ought to have been condoned. In the  circumstances,
as delay was occasioned by the Government of Maharashtra, it was beyond  the
control of the petitioner. Illegality has been committed  in  rejecting  the
petitioner’s prayer to condone the delay on  the  ground  that  essentiality
certificate was not submitted within the  prescribed  time  limit.  Reliance
has been placed on the decisions of this Court in S.L.P.  [C]  No.14838/2015
– Ponnaiyah Ramajayam Institute of Science & Technology Trust v. MCI &  Anr.
decided on 15.7.2015, C.A. No.8054/2013 – Royal  Medical  Trust  (Regd.)  v.
Union of India & Anr. decided on  10.9.2013;  and  W.P.  [C]  No.414/2015  –
Pondicherry Institute of Medical Sciences & Anr. v. Union of  India  &  Anr.
ordered on 7.8.2015.

3.    Per contra, it was contended on behalf of  the  respondents  that  the
MCI is a statutory body and is governed by the Act and the  rules  and  also
by the directions issued by this Court for  strict  adherence  to  the  time
schedule and it has an obligation towards maintenance of  highest  standards
of  medical  education.  Time  schedule  and  regulations  are  binding  and
mandatory. Under section  10A  of  the  Indian  Medical  Council  Act,  1956
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act  of  1956”)  prior  permission  of  the
Central Government for establishing any  medical  college  or  starting  any
higher course of study has to be obtained. Increase in the  intake  capacity
is governed by “The Opening of a New or Higher Course of Study  or  Training
(including Post-graduate Course  of  Study  or  Training)  and  Increase  of
Admission  Capacity  in  any  Course  of  Study  or  Training  (including  a
Postgraduate Course of Study or  Training)  Regulations,  2000  (hereinafter
referred to as “the Regulations  of  2000”).  The  Regulations  require  the
essentiality certificate to  be  necessarily  appended  to  the  application
form.

4.    It is also submitted by the MCI that  the  criteria  set  out  in  the
Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999 is also  required  to  be
fulfilled. The schedule thereof prescribes the time schedule. The  rejection
of the application is  appropriate  as  incomplete  applications  cannot  be
entertained. Time schedule is required to be observed as held by this  Court
in umpteen number of decisions and now if any inspection is ordered, it  can
be only for the academic year 2016-17 and not for the academic session 2015-
16. The  decision-making  process  not  only  involves  inspection  but  the
decision by other competent bodies  of  the  MCI  and,  thereafter,  by  the
Central Government. The decision of the respondents is just and  proper,  no
case for interference is made out in breach of  time-schedule  to  make  the
inspection for the academic session 2015-16.

5.    Section 10A of the  Act  of  1956  mandates  prior  permission  to  be
obtained from the Medical Council of India/Government of India to  establish
new medical colleges/opening of a new or higher course of study/increase  in
the admission capacity. Various  factors  have  been  specified  in  Section
10A(7) which are to be taken into consideration by the MCI while making  its
recommendations to the Central Government.  The  Regulations  of  2000  have
been framed in exercise of power under section 10A read with section  23  of
the Act of 1956. Regulation 1 requires an application  to  be  filed  before
the Central Government with permission of the State  Government.  Regulation
3 deals with  the  qualification  criteria.  Regulation  3(2)  requires  the
permission letter  regarding  desirability  and  feasibility  of  having  an
increase in the  existing  medical  college/institution,  which  has  to  be
obtained  by  the  applicant  from  the  respective  State  Government/Union
Territory  Administration.  Regulations  1,  3,  4  and  6  are    extracted
hereunder :

 “SCHEME FOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE THE  ADMISSION
CAPACITY IN ANY COUSE OF STUDY OR TRAINING (INCLUDING POST  GRADUATE  COURSE
OF STUDY OR TRAINING) IN THE EXISTING MEDICAL COLLEGES/INSTITUTIONS.

?1. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MEDICAL COLLEGE/ INSTITUTION:-

For increasing the number  of  seats  in  the  MBBS,  Post-graduate  Diploma
Degree/Higher Specialty  courses,  the  medical  college/institution  should
conform to the regulations prescribed by the Council.  They should apply  to
the Central Government for this permission  along  with  the  permission  of
State Government, affiliation granted  by  an  University  recognized  under
University Grants Commission  Act  or  State  Act  or  Central  Act  and  in
conformity with  the  Medical  Council  of  India  Regulations,  along  with
documentary evidence to show the additional financial allocation,  provision
for additional space and equipment and other infrastructural facilities  and
provision for recruitment of additional staff as per the Council norms.

                                  ?x x x x x

3. QUALIFICATION CRITERIA:-

The medical college/institution shall qualify to apply  for  increasing  the
number of admission in MBBS/PG  Diploma/Degree/Higher  Specialty  Course  in
the existing medical college/institution if  the  following  conditions  are
fulfilled :-

1. (1) The Medical College/Institution is recognized by the Medical  Council
of India for running MBBS/PG Diploma/PG Degree/Higher Speciality Courses ;

The above Clause has  been  substituted  with  the  following  in  terms  of
Notification published. on 29.12.2009 in the Gazette of India and  the  same
is also annexed at ANNEXURE-III : -

"The medical college/institution must be recognized by the  Medical  Council
of India for running Bachelor  of  Medicine  and  Bachelor  of  Surgery/post
Graduate Course; however, the medical college/institute  which  is  not  yet
recognized by the Medical Council of India for the award of MBBS degree  may
apply for increase of intake in Post Graduate Courses  in  pre-clinical  and
para-clinical subjects of Anatomy, Physiology,  Biochemistry,  Pharmacology,
Pathology, Microbiology, Forensic Medicine & Community Medicine at the  time
of 4th renewal i.e. along with the admission  of  5th  Batch  for  the  MBBS
Course".

Or

(2) Medical College/Institution has received the formal  permission  of  the
Central Government under section 10A of  the  Indian  Medical  Council  Act,
1956 (102 of 1956) and has started the post-graduate  course  in  which  the
increase in admission capacity is sought.

2. The permission letter regarding desirability and  feasibility  of  having
an increase  of  seats  in  the  existing  medical  College/institution  for
aforesaid Courses has been obtained by the  applicant  from  the  respective
State Government or the Union Territory Administration.

3. Letter of University's permission for increasing the  admission  capacity
in any course of study or  training  (including  a  postgraduate  course  of
study or training) in seats in the existing medical college/institution  has
been obtained by the medical  college/institution  from  the  university  to
which it is affiliated.



The Clauses "3.2 and 3.3" have been substituted with the following in  terms
of Notification published on 29.12.2009 in the  Gazette  of  India  and  the
same is· also annexed at ANNEXURE-III :-

"3.2 That the. Essentiality Certificate in the prescribed  format  regarding
no objection of the  State  Government/Union  Territory  Administration  for
opening of New or  Higher  Course  of  Study  or  Training  (Including  Post
Graduate Course of Study or Training) and Increase of Admission Capacity  in
any Course of Study or Training (Including a Post Graduate Course  of  Study
or Training) in. the medical college/institution  and  availability  of  the
adequate clinical  material  as  per  the  Council  Regulations'  have  been
obtained  by  the  applicant  from  the  concerned  State   Government/Union
Territory Administration, as the case may be.

3.3 That Consent of Affiliation in the prescribed  format  with  respect  to
opening of New or  Higher  Course  of  Study  or  Training  (Including  Post
Graduate Course of Study or Training) and Increase of Admission Capacity  in
any Course of Study or Training (Including a Post Graduate Course  of  Study
or Training) has been obtained by the Medical College/institution  from  the
University to which it is affiliated.”

4 . That the medical college/institution  has  a  feasible  and  time  bound
programme to provide additional  equipment  and  infrastructural  facilities
like the number of staff, space, funds, equipment and  teaching  beds  etc.,
for increased  numbers  as  laid  down  in  the  Medical  Council  of  India
Regulations.

5. The ratio of teaching staff and students shall be as  laid  down  in  the
Medical Council of India Regulations on Minimum  Standard  Requirements  for
the Medical College for 50/100/150  Admissions  in  a  medical  college  for
Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS)  and  the  Post-graduate
Medical Education Regulations for post-graduate admissions .

...... . ........................

4. REGISTRATION OF APPLICATION:-

Incomplete application will be returned to the  medica1  college/institution
by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare along with the  enclosures  and
application fee.

Application found complete  in  all  respects  will  be  registered  by  the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and forwarded  to  Council  within  30
days from the date of receiving it all for evaluation  and  recommendations.
Acceptance  of  the  application  will  only  signify  the   acceptance   of
application for evaluation. It will, however, under  no  circumstances  mean
approval of the application for grant of permission.

5.          x x x x x

6. EVALUATION BY MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA :-

The Council shall evaluate the application to accept  the  desirability  and
prima facie  feasibility  for  increasing  the  admission  capacity  at  the
existing medical college/institution  and  the  capability  of  the  medical
college/institution to provide the necessary  resources  and  infrastructure
for the scheme.

While evaluating the application, the Council may seek further  information,
clarification or additional  documents  from  the  applicant  as  considered
necessary  and  shall  carry  out  a  physical  inspection  to  verify   the
information, clarification or additional documents supplied by  the  medical
college. The dates of receipt  of  application  for  increase  in  admission
capacity in postgraduate courses and  processing  dates  are  given  in  the
schedule.  The  dates  of  receipt  of   application   and   processing   of
applications in respect of increase of seats in MBBS course shall be as  per
the schedule included in the Establishment of Medical  College  Regulations,
1999”.

?

6.    Appendix II to format of application is also relevant and the same  is
extracted below :

                                “APPENDIX -II

 FORMAT OF APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE
          THE ADMISSION CAPACITY IN MEDICAL COLLEGES/INSTITUTIONS.



      APPLICATION FOR INCREASE IN ADMISSIONCAPACITY MBBS/ M.D. / M.S./
                             DIPLOMA/D.M./M.Ch./


COURSE......................................................................
..
                      (Specify the name of the Course)


PARTICULARS OF THE APPLICANT



1. NAME OF THE APPLICANT (IN BLOCK LETTERS)



2. ADDRESS (IN BLOCK LETTERS)



3. REGISTERED OFFICE  (NO.,  STREET,  CITY,  PIN  CODES,  TELEPHONE,  TELEX,
TELEFAX)



4.   CONSTITUTION   (STATE   GOVERNMENT/UNION   TERRITORY    ADMINISTRATION/
UNIVERSITY/ AUTONOMOUS BODY, SOCIETY/TRUST)



5. REGISTRATION/INCORPORATION (NUMBER AND DATE)



6. NAME OF AFFILIATING UNIVERSITY



7. NO. OF SEATS APPROVED AND DATE  OF  RECOGNITION  BY  MEDICAL  COUNCIL  OF
INDIA.



SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT NAME AND DESIGNATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGE.



LIST OF ENCLOSURES

1. Attested copy of the Essentiality Certificate issued  by  the  respective
State Government/Union Territory Administration on the prescribed  proforma.


2.  Attested Copy of the Consent  of  Affiliation  issued  by  a  recognised
University.

3.  Authorization  letter  addressed  to  the  Bankers  of   the   Applicant
authorizing  the  Central  Government/Medical  Council  of  India  to   make
independent  enquiries  regarding  the  financial  track   record   of   the
applicant.

4. Attested copy of the letter  from  Medical  Council  of  India  approving
recognition of the college/institution, if any.

Note:  All  the  copies  shall  be  attested  by   any   gazetted   officer.
............. "



      Appendix to format of application for permission makes it  clear  that
an attested copy of essentiality certificate  is  required  to  be  enclosed
with the application form so as to make it complete.  It  is  also  apparent
from Regulation 6 that the time schedule included in  the  Establishment  of
New Medical College Regulations, 1999 (for short “the 1999 Regulations”)  is
applicable for increase in the intake capacity also.

7.    The 1999 Regulations, as amended in 2012,  prescribe  different  dates
in its time schedule which are extracted below :

“1.   (i)   These Regulations may be called the  “Establishment  of  Medical
College Regulations (Amendment), 2012.

(ii)  They shall come into force from the date of their publication  in  the
Official Gazette” .......

6.          In the “ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL COLLEGE REGULATIONS, 1999”,  in
“SCHEDULE FOR RECEIPT  OF  APPLICATION  FOR  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  NEW  MEDICAL
COLLEGES AND PROCESSING OF THE APPLICATIONS BY THE  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  AND
THE MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA”, the following shall be substituted  as  under
:-



?SCHEDULE FOR RECEIPT  OF  APPLICATIONS  FOR  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  NEW  MEDICAL
COLLEGES AND PROCESSING OF  THE  APPLICATIONS  BY  THE  MEDICAL  COUNCIL  OF
INDIA.



|S.        |Stage of processing            |Last Date        |
|No.       |                               |                 |
|1.        |Receipt of applications by the |From 1st August  |
|          |Council                        |to 31st August   |
|          |                               |(both days       |
|          |                               |inclusive) of any|
|          |                               |year             |
|2.        |Issue of Letter of Intent by   |30th April       |
|          |the Council                    |                 |
|3.        |Receipt of reply from the      |31st May         |
|          |applicant by the Council for   |                 |
|          |consideration for issue of     |                 |
|          |Letter of  Permission          |                 |
|4.        |Issue of Letter of Permission  |15th June        |
|          |by the Council                 |                 |


Note :   The time schedule indicate above may be  modified  by  the  Central
Government,  for reasons to be recorded in writing, in respect of any  class
or category of applications.



Note.---(1) The information  given  by  the  applicant  in  Part  I  of  the
application for setting up a medical  college that is information  regarding
organisation, basic infrastructural  facilities,  managerial  and  financial
capabilities of the applicant shall be scrutinised by  the  Medical  Council
of India through an inspection and  thereafter  the  Council  may  recommend
issue of letter of intent by the Central Government.

(2)    Renewal of permission shall not be granted to a  medical  college  if
the above schedule for opening a medical  college  is  not  adhered  to  and
admissions  shall  not  be  made  without  prior  approval  of  the  Central
Government.”



      It is apparent that the application is required  to  be  submitted  to
the  Central  Government  from  1st  to  31st  August  and  thereafter   the
applications, which are in  order,  are  to  be  forwarded  by  the  Central
Government to the MCI   and the MCI,  in  turn,  is  required  to  send  its
recommendations and the Central Government has to issue a Letter  of  Intent
by 30th of April next year. The applicant has to send reply to  the  Central
Government by 31st May. For issue of letter of  permission  by  the  Council
last date was 15.6.2015.

8.    Reliance has been placed by the MCI on  Dental  Council  of  India  v.
S.R.M. Institute of Science & Technology & Anr. [(2004) 9 SCC 676] in  which
this  Court  has  laid  down  that  an  incomplete  application  cannot   be
entertained. This Court held thus :



“10. In this case, the High Court made an  interim  order  to  complete  the
processing of the application including inspection even in  the  absence  of
the permission or essentiality certificate  from  the  State  Government  in
terms of the Regulations framed by the Dental Council of India. The  process
of the courts or the process of law should not be  allowed  to  subvert  the
law. In cases of recognition  of  dental  colleges  or  starting  of  higher
courses, this Court has  in  several  cases  including  Islamic  Academy  of
Education v. State of Karnataka [2003 (6) SCC 697], State of Maharashtra  v.
Indian Medical Assn.  [2002  (1)  SCC  589]  etc.  held  that  they  are  of
mandatory character and have got to be  complied  with.  When  that  is  the
position in law, the High Court ought not to have made an interim  order  to
process  the  application  even  in  the  absence  of  the   permission   or
essentiality certificate  because  the  application  will  not  be  complete
without being accompanied by permission or essentiality certificate  by  the
State  Government  along  with  certain  other  documents.   An   incomplete
application cannot be processed either by  the  Central  Government  or  the
Dental Council. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents will  set
at naught the law that in certain  cases  the  courts  need  not  insist  on
production  of  permission  or  essentiality  certificate   of   the   State
Government, particularly, when the regulations  insist  upon  the  same.  To
decide such a matter even in the absence  of  the  Dental  Council  and  the
State Government as if they have no role to play in the matter  is  only  to
bypass the law, when statutory duties have been assigned  and  each  one  of
those authorities has got a separate role  to  play.  It  may  be  that  the
Government of India takes the ultimate decision in the matter but  to  state
that these authorities only aid the Government of India and hence it is  not
necessary to make them a party to the proceedings is not at all  appropriate
or acceptable to us. However, that would not be the end of  the  matter.  In
the present case, pursuant to the  interim  direction  issued  by  the  High
Court, inspection has taken place and a report  has  been  submitted  by  an
inspection team appointed by the Dental Council of India which is kept in  a
sealed cover by the Dental Council of India. It would  be  more  appropriate
to  process  the  application  on  the  first  respondent   furnishing   the
permission or essentiality  certificate  and  other  relevant  documents  as
provided under the relevant  Regulations  and  the  scheme  framed  for  the
purpose of filing an application for starting a new or higher course in  the
college. On furnishing such  permission  or  essentiality  certificate,  the
Dental Council and the Government of India shall take appropriate  steps  as
provided under the relevant Act and Rules  or  Regulations.  Shri  P.P.  Rao
submits that a time of eight weeks may be granted to furnish the  permission
or essentiality certificate to  the  Government  of  India.  We,  therefore,
direct that if such permission or essentiality  certificate  issued  by  the
State Government is furnished within a period of eight weeks,  the  proposal
of the first respondent for starting new/higher courses shall  be  processed
by the Dental Council of India and the Government of India  and  appropriate
orders made thereon within eight weeks thereafter”.

      This Court has laid down that incomplete applications cannot  even  be
processed by the Central Government or the Dental Council.  The  application
will not be complete without  being  accompanied  by  permission  letter  or
essentiality certificate issued by the State Government.

9.    To contend that compliance with regulations  is  necessary  to  ensure
standard medical education, reliance has also been placed on behalf  of  the
MCI on a decision of this Court in K.S. Bhoir etc. v. State  of  Maharashtra
& Ors. [(2001) 10 SCC 264] which is as follows :



“8. Coming to the first question, since long time past,  establishing  of  a
medical college and medical education therein are  governed  by  the  Indian
Medical Council Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as  “the  Act”)  and  the
Dentists Act, 1948. Despite there being such provisions, it was  experienced
that  a  large  number  of  persons  and  institutions  established  medical
colleges without providing therein the minimum necessary  and  proportionate
infrastructure i.e. teaching and other facilities required for  them.  As  a
result it was found that there was  sharp  decline  in  the  maintenance  of
higher  standard  of  medical  education.  In  order  to  put  a  check   on
unregulated mushroom growth of medical colleges and maintain  high  standard
of medical education, it was thought to bring more stringent  provisions  in
the Act. With the aforesaid view of the matter, in the year  1993,  Sections
10-A, 10-B and 10-C were inserted in the Medical  Council  Act  by  amending
Act 31 of 1993. Similarly, the provisions of Sections 10-A, 10-B  and   10-C
were also incorporated  in  the  Dentists  Act,  1948.  Sub-section  (1)  of
Section 10-A of the Act provides that no person shall  establish  a  medical
college or no medical college shall open a new or higher course of study  or
training or increase its admission  capacity  in  any  course  of  study  or
training except with the  previous  permission  of  the  Central  Government
obtained in accordance with the  provisions  of  the  Act.  Sub-section  (2)
thereof provides that every person or medical college desirous of opening  a
medical college or increase its admission capacity in any  course  of  study
or training, including a postgraduate course  of  study  or  training  shall
submit to the Central Government a scheme prepared in  accordance  with  the
provisions of the Act and  the  Central  Government  shall  refer  the  said
scheme to the Medical Council for its  recommendation.  Sub-section  (3)  of
Section 10-A further provides that on  receipt  of  such  a  scheme  by  the
Council, it  may  obtain  such  other  particulars,  as  may  be  considered
necessary and consider the said scheme having regard to the factor  referred
to  in  sub-section  (7)  of  Section  10-A  of  the  Act   and   send   its
recommendations to the Central Government. Under sub-section (4) of  Section
10-A, the Central Government,  on  receipt  of  the  recommendation  of  the
Medical Council is empowered to either approve or disapprove the scheme.  It
may grant or refuse permission to open a medical  college  or  increase  its
admission capacity. If it is found that the  scheme  is  not  in  conformity
with the provisions of the Act and Regulations  framed  thereunder,  it  may
refuse to accord permission  to  increase  the  admission  capacity  in  any
course of study or training. Section 33 of  the  Act  empowers  the  Medical
Council to make regulations for carrying out the purposes of  the  Act.  The
Medical Council, in exercise of power conferred  by  Section  33  read  with
Section 10-A of the Act, has framed regulations known as “the  Establishment
of New Medical Colleges, Opening of Higher Courses of Study and Increase  of
Admission  Capacity  in  Medical  Colleges  Regulations,  1993”   (hereafter
referred  to  as  “the  Regulations”).  The  said  Regulations  provide  for
eligibility criteria to be complied with even for making an application  and
part of the said Regulations deal with the requirements to be complied  with
when any medical college applies for increase in admission capacity  in  the
college. A  perusal  of  the  provisions  of  Section  10-A  read  with  the
Regulations shows that it is mandatory on the part  of  the  institution  or
management desirous of increasing its admission capacity in  any  course  of
study to submit a scheme complying with the provisions  of  sub-section  (7)
of Section 10-A and the requirements envisaged  under  the  Regulations.  If
any of the infrastructure facilities, as required either  under  sub-section
(7) or under  the  Regulations  are  absent,  it  is  open  to  the  Central
Government to refuse permission for increase in the  admission  capacity  in
any course of study in a medical college.  The  object  of  compliance  with
requirements  mentioned  in  sub-section  (7)  of  Section  10-A   and   the
Regulations is to ensure the maintenance of highest standard  of  education.
In Medical Council of India v. State of Karnataka [1998  (6)  SCC  131]  and
Preeti Srivastava (Dr) v. State of M.P. [1999 (7)  SCC  120],  it  was  held
that the Regulations framed by the Medical Council under Section 33  of  the
Act are mandatory. In Medical Council of India v. State of  Karnataka  [1998
(6) SCC 131], while dealing with the admission  made  in  excess  of  intake
capacity fixed by the Council, this Court observed thus: (SCC p.  157,  para
29)

 “29. A medical student requires gruelling study and that can be  done  only
if proper facilities are available in a medical  college  and  the  hospital
attached to it has to be well equipped and the teaching faculty and  doctors
have to be competent enough that when a medical student  comes  out,  he  is
perfect in the science of  treatment  of  human  beings  and  is  not  found
wanting  in  any  way.  The  country  does  not  want   half-baked   medical
professionals coming out of medical colleges when they  did  not  have  full
facilities of teaching and were  not  exposed  to  the  patients  and  their
ailments during the course of their study.”

The compliance with the requirements  under  the  Act  and  the  Regulations
being mandatory, in the absence of their compliance, no  permission  can  be
granted by the Central Government for increase in admission capacity in  any
course in any medical college. In the present  case,  the  State  Government
sought one-time increase in admission capacity in various  medical  colleges
on the premise that medical colleges possessed all the facilities. This  was
not sufficient. What was required, was that  medical  colleges  desirous  of
one-time increase in admission  capacity  should  have  submitted  a  scheme
prepared in accordance with the Act  and  the  Regulations  to  the  Central
Government. No such scheme was submitted to the Central Government  and  the
Medical Council has no occasion to verify the sufficiency of the  facilities
and other requirements. There being no compliance  with  requirements  under
the Act, the Central Government was justified  in  refusing  the  permission
for one-time increase in the admission capacity in the medical colleges.  We
do  not,  therefore,  find  any  infirmity  in  the  order  of  the  Central
Government when it refused to grant permission to the  State  Government  to
have one-time increase in admission capacity in Medicine  and  Dentistry  in
various medical colleges located in the State of Maharashtra.



10.   The decision in Govt. of A.P. & Anr. v. Medwin Educational  Society  &
Ors. [(2004) 1 SCC 86] regarding  essentiality  certificate  has  also  been
pressed into service by learned counsel for the respondent-MCI which  is  to
the following effect :



“23. It is not in dispute that one of the qualifying criteria to  render  an
association eligible for permission to set  up  a  new  medical  and  dental
college is to the following effect:

“Essentiality certificate regarding  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of
having the proposed medical college/dental college at the proposed  location
has to be obtained by the applicant from the  respective  State  Governments
or the  Union  Territory  Administration  and  that  the  adequate  clinical
material is available as per the Medical Council of India’s requirements.”

24. The statutory requirements as laid down in the Act and  the  Regulations
are, therefore, required to be complied with  before  application  filed  by
the person or association for setting up a medical college is taken  up  for
consideration.”


11.   The time schedule which has statutory force, has been  ordered  to  be
strictly adhered to by this Court in a plethora of decisions. This Court  in
Mridul Dhar (Minor) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [(2005) 2  SCC  65]  has
laid down that for establishment of new medical colleges/increase in  intake
capacity, application should be filed within the prescribed period and  only
such applications which are complete in all  respects,  deserve/have  to  be
treated as applications under section 10A.  The  complete  applications  are
required to be forwarded to the MCI within the time frame that  is  by  30th
September. In Mridul Dhar (supra), it was held as under :


“27. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10-A read  with  Section
33 of the Act, MCI made the establishment of new medical  colleges,  opening
of higher courses of  study  and  increase  of  admission  capacity  in  the
Medical Council of  India  Establishment  of  Medical  College  Regulations,
1999. The Regulations, inter alia, provided as a qualifying  criterion  that
the eligible organisation shall abide by the  Indian  Medical  Council  Act,
1956 as modified from time to time and  the  Regulations  framed  thereunder
and shall qualify to apply for permission to establish new medical  colleges
only if the conditions therein are fulfilled. One of the conditions is  that
essentiality certificate  regarding  the  desirability  and  feasibility  of
having the proposed medical  college  at  the  proposed  location  has  been
obtained and that the adequate clinical material available  as  per  Medical
Council of India requirements has been obtained by the  applicant  from  the
respective State Government or the Union Territory Administration.  It  also
provides that the applicant own and manage a hospital of not less  than  300
beds  with  necessary  infrastructural  facilities  and  capable  of   being
developed into a teaching institution as prescribed by the  Medical  Council
of India, in the vicinity of the proposed  medical  college.  MCI  has  also
made the establishment of the Medical College Regulations, 1999 in  exercise
of powers conferred by Section 10-A and Section 33 of the Act,  inter  alia,
prescribing the form of essentiality certificate as a  qualifying  criterion
to make application for permission to establish  a  medical  college.  These
Regulations stipulate that essentiality certificate in Form 2 regarding  no-
objection of the State Government/Union  Territory  Administration  for  the
establishment of the proposed medical  college  at  the  proposed  site  and
availability of adequate clinical material as per the  Council  Regulations,
have been obtained by the person from the State  Government/Union  Territory
Administration concerned. The form of essentiality  certificate  requires  a
certificate from the competent authority to the following effect:

“It is certified that:
The applicant owns and manages a 300-bedded hospital which  was  established
in….

It is desirable to establish a medical college in the public interest.


  (c)      Establishment  of  a  medical  college  at  …  by  (the  name  of
society/trust) is feasible.

Adequate clinical material as per the Medical  Council  of  India  norms  is
available.

    It is further certified that in  case  the  applicant  fails  to  create
infrastructure  for  the  medical  college  as  per  MCI  norms  and   fresh
admissions are stopped by  the  Central  Government,  the  State  Government
shall take over the responsibility of the students already admitted  in  the
college with the permission of the Central Government.”

                                  x x x x x

30.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  proper  facilities  and   infrastructure
including a teaching faculty and doctors  is  absolutely  necessary  and  so
also the adherence to  time  schedule  for  imparting  teaching  of  highest
standards thereby making available to the community  best  possible  medical
practitioners. It cannot be said that such facilities are not insisted  upon
for Section 10-A seats. No instance has been brought to our notice  where  a
Section 10-A seat in a government college  has  not  been  recognised  under
Section 11. The all-India quota seats  are  applicable  only  to  government
colleges. In many colleges, full-fledged seats for all intent  and  purposes
insofar as medical education is concerned, whether in a new medical  college
or in the increased  intake  in  an  existing  college,  are  continuing  as
Section 10-A seats. Prima facie, we see no reason why such seats  shall  not
be taken into consideration for calculating 15% share  of  all-India  quota.
The 15% quota seats get substantially reduced by  not  taking  into  account
Section 10-A seats. We direct  the  Central  Government,  DGHS  and  MCI  to
examine this aspect in detail and submit a report, on consideration  whereof
we would finally decide the  matter  regarding  inclusion  of  Section  10-A
seats for working out 15% all-India quota.

                                  x x x x x

32. Having regard to the professional courses, it deserves to be  emphasised
that all concerned including Governments, State and Central  both,  MCI/DCI,
colleges  —  new  or  old,   students,   Boards,   universities,   examining
authorities, etc. are required to  strictly  adhere  to  the  time  schedule
wherever  provided  for;  there  should   not   be   midstream   admissions;
admissions should not be in excess  of  sanctioned  intake  capacity  or  in
excess of quota  of  anyone,  whether  State  or  management.  The  carrying
forward of any unfilled seats of one academic year to next academic year  is
also not permissible.

                                  x x x x x

35. Having regard to the aforesaid, we issue the following directions:

1 to 3.                           x x x x x
4.  It  shall  be  the  responsibility  of  all  concerned  including  Chief
Secretaries of each  State/Union  Territory  and/or  Health  Secretaries  to
ensure compliance with the directions  of  this  Court  and  requisite  time
schedule as laid down in the Regulations and non-compliance would make  them
liable for requisite penal consequences.

                                  x x x x x

14. Time schedule for establishment of new college or to increase intake  in
existing college, shall be adhered to strictly by all concerned.

15. Time schedule provided in the Regulations shall be strictly  adhered  to
by all concerned failing which the defaulting party would be  liable  to  be
personally proceeded with.”


12.   This Court in Medical Council of India v. Manas Ranjan Behera  &  Ors.
[(2010) 1 SCC 173] has reiterated the directions issued  by  this  Court  in
Mridul Dhar’s case (supra) which is in terms following :



“2. It may be noticed in Mridul Dhar v. Union of India  [(2005)  2  SCC  65]
this Court directed that all the parties shall comply  with  the  directions
issued by this Court as regards admission of students  in  the  medical  and
dental colleges. In Direction 15 of para 35 of the  judgment,  we  had  also
indicated,

“Time schedule provided in the Regulations shall be strictly adhered  to  by
all concerned failing which the defaulting  party  would  be  liable  to  be
personally proceeded with.”

In view of these directions, the High  Court  should  not  have  passed  the
impugned order.”




13.   This Court in Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh &  Ors.  [(2012)  7
SCC 433] has laid down that every person, officer or authority who  disobeys
directions of this Court of adherence to the time schedule, shall be  liable
to be prosecuted under  the  provisions  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act.
Relevant portions of the directions issued by this Court in  the  said  case
are extracted hereunder :



“40. The schedules prescribed have the force of law, inasmuch as  they  form
part of the judgments of this Court, which are the declared law of the  land
in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and form  part  of  the
Regulations of the Medical Council of India, which also have  the  force  of
law and are binding on all concerned. It is  difficult  to  comprehend  that
any authority can have the discretion to alter these  schedules  to  suit  a
given situation, whether such authority is the  Medical  Council  of  India,
the Government of India,  State  Government,  university  or  the  selection
bodies constituted at the college level for allotment of  seats  by  way  of
counselling. We have no hesitation in clearly declaring that none  of  these
authorities are vested with the power of  relaxing,  varying  or  disturbing
the time schedule, or the  procedures  of  admission,  as  provided  in  the
judgments of this Court and the Medical Council of India Regulations.

41. Inter alia, the disadvantages are:

                                  x x x x x

 (3) The delay in adherence to the schedule, delay in  the  commencement  of
courses, etc. encourage lowering  of  the  standards  of  education  in  the
medical/dental colleges by shortening the duration of the  academic  courses
and promoting the chances of arbitrary and less meritorious admissions.


42. The Medical and Dental  Councils  of  India,  the  Governments  and  the
universities are expected to act in tandem with each other and  ensure  that
the recognition for starting of the medical courses and grant  of  admission
are  strictly  within  the  time-frame  declared  by  this  Court  and   the
Regulations. It has come to the notice of this Court that  despite  warnings
having been issued by this Court and despite the observations made  by  this
Court, that default and non-adherence to the time schedules shall be  viewed
very seriously, matters have not improved. Persistent defaults by  different
authorities and colleges and granting  of  admission  arbitrarily  and  with
favouritism have often invited criticism from this Court.

                                  x x x x x

45. The maxim boni judicis est causas litium dirimere places  an  obligation
upon the Court to ensure that it resolves the causes of  litigation  in  the
country. Thus, the need of the hour is that binding dicta be prescribed  and
statutory regulations be enforced, so that  all  concerned  are  mandatorily
required to implement the time schedule in its true  spirit  and  substance.
It is difficult and not even advisable to keep some windows open to  meet  a
particular situation of exception, as it may pose impediments to the  smooth
implementation of laws and defeat the  very  object  of  the  scheme.  These
schedules have been prescribed upon serious consideration by all  concerned.
They are to be applied stricto sensu and  cannot  be  moulded  to  suit  the
convenience  of  some  economic  or  other  interest  of  any   institution,
especially, in a manner that  is  bound  to  result  in  compromise  of  the
abovestated principles.

                                  x x x x x

47. All these directions shall be complied with by all concerned,  including
the Union of India, Medical Council  of  India,  Dental  Council  of  India,
State Governments, universities and medical  and  dental  colleges  and  the
management of the respective universities or dental  and  medical  colleges.
Any default in compliance with these  conditions  or  attempt  to  overreach
these directions shall, without fail, invite the following consequences  and
penal actions:

47.1. Every body, officer or authority who disobeys or avoids  or  fails  to
strictly comply with these directions stricto  sensu  shall  be  liable  for
action under the provisions of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act.  Liberty  is
granted to any interested party to take out the contempt proceedings  before
the High Court having jurisdiction over such institution/State, etc.

47.2. The person, member or authority found responsible  for  any  violation
shall be departmentally proceeded against and punished  in  accordance  with
the  Rules.  We  make  it  clear  that  violation  of  these  directions  or
overreaching  them  by  any  process  shall  tantamount   to   indiscipline,
insubordination,  misconduct  and  being  unworthy  of  becoming  a   public
servant.

47.3. Such defaulting authority, member or body shall  also  be  liable  for
action by and personal liability to third parties who  might  have  suffered
losses as a result of such default.

                                  x x x x x

78.4. With all the humility at our command, we request the  High  Courts  to
ensure  strict  adherence  to  the  prescribed  time  schedule,  process  of
selection and to the rule of merit. We reiterate what  has  been  stated  by
this Court earlier, that except in very exceptional cases,  the  High  Court
may consider it appropriate to decline interim  orders  and  hear  the  main
petitions finally, subject to the convenience of the Court. We may refer  to
the dictum of this Court  in  Medical  Council  of  India  v.  Rajiv  Gandhi
University of Health Sciences [2004  (6)  SCC  76],  SCC  para  14  in  this
regard.

78.5. We have  categorically  returned  a  finding  that  all  the  relevant
stakeholders have failed to  perform  their  duty/obligation  in  accordance
with law. Where the time schedules have not been complied with, and rule  of
merit has been defeated, there nepotism  and  manipulation  have  prevailed.
The stands of various authorities are at variance with each other  and  none
admits to fault. Thus, it is imperative for  this  Court  to  ensure  proper
implementation of the judgments of this Court and  the  regulations  of  the
Medical Council of India as well  as  not  to  overlook  the  arbitrary  and
colourable exercise of power by the authorities/colleges concerned.”


14.   The MCI  is  required  to  undertake  inspections  and  thereafter  is
required to point out the deficiencies to institutions, invite comments  and
send its recommendations  to  the  Central  Government.  There  are  various
stages which are time-consuming and the schedule has a purpose  of  bringing
uniformity of commencement of academic session at the same time.

15.   In the instant case, the application was  admittedly  incomplete  when
it was filed. Though there is a dispute whether it  was  filed  before  31st
August, 2014. It was submitted on behalf of the MCI that  it  was  filed  on
02.09.2014. Be that as it may.  Even  assuming  that  it  was  filed  before
31.8.2014, admittedly it was an incomplete application as  the  essentiality
certificate issued by the Government of Maharashtra was not  enclosed  along
with the application form due to which application came to be  rejected  and
delay has taken place for which  the  petitioner  has  to  blame  itself.  A
Division Bench of the High Court has relied upon  the  decision  in  Educare
Charitable Trust v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) in which  this  Court  has
laid down thus :

"14. As per the aforesaid time-schedule, the applicant-college  desirous  of
increasing the admission capacity is to  submit  the  application  from  1st
August to 30th September. This was done by  the  petitioner.  However,  what
was found that the petitioner was not meeting the qualifying criteria as  on
that date because with respect to existing admission capacity,  it  had  not
been recognized so far. The applications are to be forwarded by the  Central
Government, once they are found to be in order and  meeting  the  qualifying
criteria laid down in Regulation 19, by  31st  October  in  respect  of  BDS
course. This time was extended upto 31st December in  this  year.  After  an
application is forwarded to the DCI, DCI is supposed to evaluate the  scheme
for increasing  admission  capacity  as  per  the  procedure  laid  down  in
Regulation 21 which lays down that the DCI  is  required  to  ascertain  the
?desirability and  prima  facie  feasibility  for  increasing  the  admission
capacity at the Dental College. It is also required to satisfy itself  about
the capability of the Dental College  to  provide  necessary  resources  and
infrastructure for the scheme. DCI is  even  required  to  conduct  physical
inspection of the college before  forming  an  opinion  as  to  whether  the
applicant  satisfies  the  condition  of  feasibility  of   increasing   the
admission capacity. This process, naturally, is time consuming. As  per  the
time-schedule referred to above, time upto 15th June is given  for  the  DCI
to make recommendation to the Central Government. Such a  report  containing
its recommendation is to be given in terms of  Regulation  22.   Thereafter,
Central Government is required to go into the said recommendation and if  it
is found that applicant-college deserves  the  permission  to  increase  the
admission capacity, Letter of Permission is to  be  issued  by   15th  July.
This time frame is to ensure timely admissions of students.

15. Having regard to the above, it is not possible to accede to the  request
of the petitioner to  change  the  time-schedule  when  the  last  date  for
admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long  ago.  If  the
Central Government forwards the application to the  DCI  at  this  juncture,
DCI shall hardly have any time to look into the feasibility  of  the  scheme
as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. We have to keep in  mind
that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations 2006, six  to  eight  months
time is given to the DCI for this purpose. We are, thus, of  the  view  that
the High Court did not commit  any  error  in  holding  that  in  the  given
circumstances mandamus could not be issued  to  the  Central  Government  to
exercise its discretionary powers in a particular manner to modify the time-
schedule.   Sanctity to the time-schedule has to  be  attached.  It  is  too
late in the day, insofar as present academic session is concerned,  to  give
any direction. This Court has highlighted the importance  of  cut  off  date
for starting the professional courses,  particularly  medical  courses,  and
repeatedly impressed upon that such deadline should be tinkered with.  (See:
Priya Gupta Vs State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa  Vaishno  Devi
Mahila Mahavidyalaya Vs. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC  617)."



      This Court has reiterated the law laid down  in  Priya  Gupta  (supra)
and the sanctity to the time schedule has to be attached.

16.   In W.P. [C] No.705/2014 – Royal Medical  Trust  (Regd.)  and  Anr.  v.
Union of India & Anr. decided on 20.8.2015, this  Court  has  observed  that
the Schedule must take care of following aspects :

“(A)  Initial assessment of  the  application  at  the  first  level  should
comprise  of  checking   necessary   requirements   such   as   essentiality
certificate, consent for affiliation and physical  features  like  land  and
hospital requirement. If an applicant fails to  fulfil  these  requirements,
the application on the face of it, would  be  incomplete  and  be  rejected.
Those who fulfil the basic requirements would  be  considered  at  the  next
stage.

(B)   Inspection should then be conducted by the Inspectors of the  MCI.  By
very nature such inspection must have an  element  of  surprise.  Therefore,
sufficient time of about three to four months ought to be given to  the  MCI
to cause inspection at any time  and  such  inspection  should  normally  be
undertaken latest by January. Surprise  inspection  would  ensure  that  the
required facilities and infrastructure are always in place and not  borrowed
or put in temporarily.

(C)   Intimation of the result or outcome of the inspection  would  then  be
communicated. If  the  infrastructure  and  facilities  are  in  order,  the
concerned Medical College  should  be  given  requisite  permission/renewal.
However if there are any deficiencies or shortcomings,s the MCI must,  after
pointing out the deficiencies, grant to  the  college  concerned  sufficient
time to report compliance.

(D)    If  compliance  is  reported  and  the  applicant  states  that   the
deficiencies stand removed, the MCI must cause compliance  verification.  It
is possible that such compliance  could  be  accepted  even  without  actual
physical  verification  but  that  assessment  be  left  entirely   to   the
discretion of the MCI and the Central  Government.  In  cases  where  actual
physical verification is required, the MCI and the Central  Government  must
cause such verification before the deadline.

(E)   The result of such verification if positive in favour of  the  Medical
College   concerned,   the   applicant   ought   to   be   given   requisite
permission/renewal. But if the deficiencies still persist or  had  not  been
removed, the applicant will stand disentitled so far as that  academic  year
is concerned.”



      It is apparent from the aforesaid decision and  the  regulations  that
the application at the  first  instance  is  required  to  be  complete  and
incomplete applications are liable to be rejected. Thereafter, there has  to
be an inspection and other stages of decision-making process.

17.   In S.L.P. [C] No.7846/2014 – Medical Council of India v. N.K.P.  Salve
Institute of Medical Sciences  &  Anr.  filed  against  the  judgment  dated
24.2.2014 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at  Nagpur,  this
Court vide order dated 14.3.2014 has disposed of the special leave  petition
considering the time-schedule with a direction to consider  the  application
for starting a medical college for the next year  provided  the  respondents
submitted it along with the  relevant  documents  as  per  the  practice  in
vogue.

18.   The MCI has also referred to  decision  of  this  Court  in  W.P.  [C]
No.172/2014 – Singhad Technical Education Society v. Union of India  decided
on 3.5.2014 in which the application  for  the  academic  year  2014-15  was
directed to be considered for the academic year 2015-16.

19.   The MCI has also cited the decision in  C.A.  No.6564/2014  –  Medical
Council of India v. Shree Balaji Medical  College  &  Hospital  &  Anr.,  in
which this Court vide order dated 18.7.2014  directed  the  application  for
academic year 2014-15 to  be  considered  for  next  year  i.e  2015-16.  In
another decision in S.L.P. [C] No.14759/2014 – Medical Council of  India  v.
Society for Advancement of Environmental Sciences & Ors. wherein vide  order
dated 2.7.2014 the pending application for the  academic  year  2014-15  was
ordered to be treated as an application for the academic  year  2015-16  and
the inspection was ordered to be completed by 31.10.2014.

20.   On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions, it is  crystal  clear  that
the time schedule is required to be strictly observed. Hence, it  would  not
be appropriate to issue any  direction  for  consideration  of  petitioner’s
case for the ongoing academic session 2015-16 in which inspection is yet  to
be made. It is too late in the day to  direct  inspection  for  the  session
2015-16 as all the dates fixed in the time schedule are  over  and  fixation
of time schedule has a purpose behind it and  from  a  particular  date  the
session has to commence and part of seats to  be  filled  by  a  competitive
examination held on all-India basis. Any relaxation  in  the  time  schedule
would make holding of examinations  on  an  all  India  basis  a  farce  and
several complications would  arise.  Everything  cannot  be  allowed  to  go
haywire. The entire curriculum would be unsettled in  case  breach  of  time
schedule is permitted.  The power given to Central Government to  relax  can
be exercised in exceptional circumstances and that  too  without  disturbing
the academic session.  The  decision-making  process  after  inspection  has
various steps and it cannot be ordered to be done in haste resulting in sub-
standard education and half-baked doctors.

21.   On behalf of the petitioner, reliance has been placed  on  a  decision
of this Court in S.L.P. [C] No.14838/2015 –  Ponnaiyah  Ramajayam  Institute
of Science and Technology Trust v. Medical Council of India & Anr.  (decided
on 15.7.2015) wherein this Court has directed the inspection to be made  and
to submit the recommendation in a sealed cover  after  four  weeks  to  this
Court. No doubt about it that the application which was filed  was  for  the
academic session 2015-16  but  this  Court  has  not  decided  the  question
whether inspection would enure for  the  benefit  of  the  ongoing  academic
session 2015-16 and in case on inspection it is  decided  to  recommend  the
prayer made whether it would  be  for  academic  year  2016-17  or  for  the
ongoing session 2015-16 and also question of breach of time  schedule.  What
has not been decided, cannot be deduced by inferential process.  What  would
be the ultimate recommendation on inspection, can also not  be  anticipated.
The  requisite  Committee  of  the  MCI  and  Central  Government  have   to
ultimately consider the report/recommendations.  Various  aspects  including
time schedule are required to be taken into consideration  for  issuance  of
any positive direction as to session.

22.   Reliance has also been placed by petitioner  on  a  decision  of  this
Court in Royal Medical Trust (Regd.) v. Union of India  &  Anr.  decided  on
10.9.2013 in which a direction was issued by this Court to  make  inspection
and to decide the fate of the application in accordance with law within  one
month’s time. The rejection of application in a mechanical manner  was  held
to be bad in law. A direction was  issued  to  pass  appropriate  orders  in
accordance with law. No positive direction has been issued by this Court  to
start the college. Even otherwise in view of the decisions  in  Priya  Gupta
(supra) and Mridul Dhar (supra), other  decisions  and  recent  order  dated
10.8.2015 passed by  this  Court  in  S.L.P.  [C]  No.22472/2014  –  Medical
Council  of  India  v.  Subharti  Medical  College,  Meerut  in  which   the
application for the session 2015-16 was dismissed and the MCI  was  directed
to ensure that necessary inspection for the academic year 2016-17  shall  be
done within six weeks, it would be  appropriate  to  direct  inspection  for
session 2016-17.

23.   Considering the statutory time schedule and that the same  is  already
over and in the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  would  not  be
appropriate to direct inspection to be made and thereafter a decision to  be
taken for the current academic session 2015-16 as that would  be  in  breach
of the law laid down in various decisions of this Court  which  is  binding.
Thus, we direct that  the  application  which  has  been  submitted  by  the
college for  the  academic  session  2015-16  be  considered  for  the  next
academic session, subject to fulfilment of other requisite  formalities,  as
may be necessary, and thereafter the MCI shall conduct an  inspection  well-
in-time as per the time schedule fixed under the Regulations  of  1999.  The
Special  Leave  Petition  is  dismissed  with  the  aforesaid  modification.
Ordered accordingly.

No costs.


........................................J.
                                             (M.Y. Eqbal)



New                                                                   Delhi;
......................................J.
August   31, 2015.                                 (Arun Mishra)
















presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, regarding the motive of receiving the gratification unless it is rebutted. In the present case, in our opinion, the presumption does not stand rebutted.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1917  OF 2008


Indra Vijay Alok                             ... Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh                              … Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.


      This appeal is directed against judgment and  order  dated  31.8.2007,
passed by the High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Jabalpur  (Gwalior  Bench),
whereby said Court has dismissed  Criminal  Appeal  No.  102  of  2000,  and
affirmed conviction and sentence recorded against accused Indra  Vijay  Alok
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with  Section  13(2)  of  Prevention  and
Corruption Act, 1988 by the Special Judge, Datiya, in Special Case No. 1  of
1992.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties  and  perused  the  papers  on
record.


Prosecution story, in brief, is that a piece of land in Badoni Khurd was  in
the name of one Badri, younger brother  of  PW-3  Ram  Singh  (complainant).
Appellant Indra Vijay  Alok  was  the  Patwari  of  Halka  area  during  the
relevant period, i.e. in 1987. After death of  Badri,  complainant  and  his
mother Bhagobai sought mutation of their names in the revenue  record.  When
Bhagobai, mother of the complainant, met the appellant in  this  connection,
he demanded Rs. 1900/- out of which she paid  Rs.  900/-.  When  Complainant
(PW-3) came to his village, his mother told him about  the  demand  made  by
the appellant. On this, on 18.05.1987 he (PW-3) himself met  the  appellant,
who clearly told him that unless further  Rs.1000/-  is  paid  to  him,  the
mutation would not be done.  This compelled PW-3 Ram Singh (complainant)  to
make  a  complaint  (Ext.P-3)  on  17.6.1987  to  Superintendent  of  Police
(Vigilance), Gwalior.  A trap was laid, headed by PW-4 B.L. Vashist  (Deputy
Superintendent of Police) in which PW-2 Ashok  Bhargava  (Deputy  Collector)
and one Sahir (DW-6) were panch witnesses.  Before trap, ten currency  notes
of Rs.100/- of the complainant were applied phenolphthalein  powder,  and  a
memorandum (Ext.P-4) was prepared.  As per the  plan,  PW-3  Ram  Singh  and
panch witness Sahir were followed by PW-2 Ashok Bhargav,  Deputy  Collector,
PW-4 B.L. Vashist, Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,  and  PW-6  Inspector
Raghuraj Shastri.  When the team reached  the  house  of  the  appellant  in
Khidki, Distt. Datiya, and the appellant accepted the amount  of  Rs.1000/-,
a signal was given  to  the  police  party,  which  immediately  caught  the
appellant and his hands were washed in water in a bucket, which turned  red.
 Thereafter, the raiding party asked the appellant  to  take  out  Rs.1000/-
accepted by him from PW-3 Ram Singh. The currency  notes  recovered  tallied
with  the  memorandum  (Ext.P-4)   and   fresh   panchnama   was   prepared.
Thereafter, the appellant was arrested  and  crime  was  registered.   After
investigation, the Investigating Officer R.S.  Parihar  (since  died)  filed
the charge sheet against the appellant Indra Vijay Alok  for  his  trial  in
respect of offences punishable under  Sections  7  and  13(1)(d)  read  with
Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.



The trial court, after hearing the parties, appears to  have  framed  charge
against the accused to which the accused pleaded not guilty and  claimed  to
be tried.



On  this,  prosecution  got  examined  PW-1   R.R.-Vishwa  Deva  (clerk   in
Collector’s office), PW-2 Ashok Bhargav (Deputy Collector), PW-3  Ram  Singh
(complainant), PW-4 B.L. Vashisth (Deputy Superintendent  of  Police),  PW-5
S.R. Tiwari (Assistant Grade I), and PW-6 Raghuraj Shastri (Inspector).


Prosecution evidence was put to the accused Indra Vijay Alok,  in  reply  to
which he only admitted that he was Patwari of  the  Halka  at  the  relevant
period, and there was land in the village recorded in  the  name  of  Badri,
but as to the rest of the evidence he denied the same as incorrect.




In defence, the appellant got examined DW-1 Baijnath, DW-2 Ram Swaroop,  DW-
3 Hardas, DW-4 Swami Sharan Saxena, DW-5 Sita Ram Gupta, and DW-6 Sahir.


The trial court, after hearing the parties, found that the evidence of  PW-3
Ram Singh and statement given by PW-2 Ashok Bhargav (Deputy Collector)  read
with the statements  of  other  prosecution  witnesses,  and  the  documents
proved on record, leave no room of doubt that the accused demanded Rs.1000/-
 from PW-3 Ram Singh for getting entered his name and that of his mother  in
place of Badri in the  revenue  record,  and  Rs.1000/-  was  given  to  and
accepted by the accused when the trap was laid, and the same  was  recovered
from the pocket of his pant. Thereafter, the trial court heard  the  accused
on sentence, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of  one
year and  directed  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.1000/-  under  Section  7  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988.   The  accused  was  further  convicted
under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and  sentenced  to
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and directed to pay fine  of
Rs.1000/-.  For each of the defaults in payment of  fine,  the  convict  was
directed to undergo further three months rigorous imprisonment.



Aggrieved by said judgment and order  dated  10.2.2000,  passed  by  Special
Judge, Datiya in Special Case No. 1 of 1992, the convict  Indra  Vijay  Alok
preferred appeal before the High Court  which  was  registered  as  Criminal
Appeal No. 102 of 2000. The High Court,  after  hearing  the  parities,  re-
appreciated the evidence and concurred  with  the  conviction  and  sentence
recorded by the trial court.  Hence this appeal through special leave.



Learned counsel for the appellant argued before us that  the  panch  witness
Sahir has not supported the prosecution case, as such the courts below  have
erred in law in believing the prosecution story.  Having  gone  through  the
papers on record, we do not find substance in the  argument.  The  statement
of PW-3 Ram Singh (complainant) gets corroborated by the statement  of  PW-4
B.L. Vashist (Deputy Superintendent of Police), as well  as  by  PW-2  Ashok
Bhargav, Deputy Collector who is superior officer  of  the  appellant’s  own
department.  As such we find that the courts below have committed  no  error
of law in relying on the testimony of above three witnesses as  trustworthy,
against the statement of DW-6 Sahir, who appears to have been  won  over  by
the defence. We are of the opinion that merely  for  the  reason  that  DW-6
Sahir has  not  supported  prosecution  case,  the  ring  of  truth  in  the
prosecution case is not shaken in the present case, particularly,  when  the
statements of remaining witnesses are credible and trustworthy.


It is also pointed out  by  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  that  the
Investigating Officer R.S. Parihar was  not  examined  by  the  prosecution.
This, in our opinion, has no legs for the reason that it  has  come  on  the
record that the  Investigating  Officer  R.S.  Parihar  had  died  when  the
prosecution evidence was recorded.


Lastly, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that Bhagobai, mother  of
the complainant, from whom demand was allegedly made, was not  examined,  as
such it cannot be said that the amount so recovered from the  appellant  has
anything to do with the  mutation.   We  have  carefully  gone  through  the
deposition of PW-3 Ram Singh in the original record, and found that  he  has
clearly stated that initial demand of Rs.1900/- was made to his mother,  who
paid Rs.900/- to the appellant, but when he came back to  his  village,  his
mother told him that further Rs.1000/- was required to  be  arranged.   PW-3
Ram Singh further told the court that  on  this,  he  himself  went  to  the
appellant and requested not to demand further money, but he (appellant)  did
not relent.  In the circumstances, according to PW-3, he went  to  Lokayukta
Office and made a complaint, but the Office  of  Lokayukta  advised  him  to
reach to Rest House, Datiya.  On this, he went to  the  Rest  House,  Datiya
and made a complaint to the Vigilance Department  and  thereafter  trap  was
laid, and the amount of Rs.1000/- was given by  him  to  the  appellant  and
recovered from him (appellant). Even otherwise,  presumption  can  be  drawn
under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988,  regarding  the
motive of receiving  the  gratification  unless  it  is  rebutted.   In  the
present case, in our opinion, the presumption does not stand rebutted.


Having considered submissions of  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  and
learned counsel for the  State,  and  after  going  through  the  papers  on
record, we do not find any illegality in appreciation  of  evidence  by  the
courts below.  We further agree  with  the  sentence  recorded  against  the
appellant by the trial court and affirmed by  the  High  Court  against  the
appellant.  Sanction of prosecution is also proved on  the  record  by  PW-5
S.R. Tiwari.  The request of learned counsel for  the  appellant  to  reduce
the period of sentence  to  the  period  already  undergone  too  cannot  be
accepted, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.


For the reasons, as discussed above, we are not inclined to  interfere  with
the impugned order passed by the High Court.   Accordingly,  the  appeal  is
dismissed.   The  bail  granted  to  the  appellant  Indra  Vijay  Alok   is
cancelled.  The trial court shall take him into custody  to  serve  out  the
remaining part of the sentence.


                                                           ……………….....…………J.
                                                   [Ranjan Gogoi]


                                                             .……………….……………J.
New Delhi;                         [Prafulla C. Pant]
August 31, 2015.

The respondent was employed as a Chowkidar on daily wage basis and for some reasons he was discontinued in the year 1994. More than 14 years thereafter, he approached the competent authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act and by the Award dated 17.08.2012 passed by the Labour Court,= Looking at the facts of the case and in view of the fact that the respondent was appointed on daily wage basis and had approached the authorities after more than 14 years, we direct that by way of final settlement, instead of reinstatement as a daily wager, the respondent be paid a sum of Rs. 2 lacs, in addition to what has already been paid to him when the notice had been issued. The Award dated 17.08.2012 in Reference Case No. 65/2009/ID Act passed by the Labour Court, Ujjain, M.P. and confirmed by the High Court stands modified accordingly. The aforesaid amount shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 6650 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 27113 of 2014)

STATE OF M.P.                           ... APPELLANT(S)

     VERSUS

MOHAN LAL                               ...RESPONDENT(S)



                       J U D G M E N T


      Leave granted.
      The respondent was employed as a Chowkidar on  daily  wage  basis  and
for some reasons he was discontinued in the year 1994. More  than  14  years
thereafter, he approached the competent  authorities  under  the  Industrial
Disputes Act and by the Award dated 17.08.2012 passed by the  Labour  Court,
it was directed that he should be reinstated in service without back  wages.
The said Award has been upheld by the High Court.

      Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court,  the  appellant
has approached this Court.

      Heard the learned counsel for the parties. In view of the Order  dated
15.09.2014 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 9675 of 2014  titled  as
“State of M.P. & Anr.  vs.  Vinod Kumar Tiwari”, in our considered  opinion,
it is  a  fit  case  where  some  compensation  should  be  awarded  to  the
respondent instead of directing  the  appellant  to  reinstate  him  to  his
position as a daily wage Chowkidar.

      Looking at the facts of the case and in view  of  the  fact  that  the
respondent was  appointed  on  daily  wage  basis  and  had  approached  the
authorities after more than 14  years,  we  direct  that  by  way  of  final
settlement, instead of reinstatement as a daily wager,   the  respondent  be
paid a sum of  Rs. 2 lacs, in addition to what has already been paid to  him
when the notice had been issued.

      The Award dated  17.08.2012  in  Reference  Case  No.  65/2009/ID  Act
passed by the Labour Court, Ujjain, M.P. and confirmed  by  the  High  Court
stands modified accordingly. The aforesaid  amount  shall  be  paid  by  the
appellant to the respondent within eight weeks from the date of  receipt  of
a copy of this Order.

      The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.


                                               ...........................J.
                                        (ANIL R. DAVE)



                                                ..........................J.
                                         (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)
        NEW DELHI,
        AUGUST 28, 2015

The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly used. Only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings. In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is a well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved.= in Vikram Anantrai Doshi’s case, this Court observed that cheating by bank exposits fiscal impurity and such financial fraud is an offence against society at large in para (23), this Court held as under:- “23. …Be it stated, that availing of money from a nationalized bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the chargesheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantingly of civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a “no due certificate” and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceedings on the hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not legally permissible. The Court is expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping in mind that in these kind of litigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding. The court’s principal duty, at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. As we find in the case at hand the learned Single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinize the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashed the criminal proceeding. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the Court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order of the High Court is wholly indefensible”. 13. In this case, the High Court while exercising its inherent power ignored all the facts viz. the impact of the offence, the use of the State machinery to keep the matter pending for so many years coupled with the fraudulent conduct of the respondent. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case at hand in the light of the decision in Vikram Anantrai Doshi’s case, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. 14. The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High court was set aside

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1496 OF 2009


CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION                     ...Appellant


                                   Versus

MANINDER                                                               SINGH
...Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.


This appeal is preferred challenging the order of the High  Court  of  Delhi
in Crl. M.C. No.2083 of 2006 dated 10.02.2009, in and  by  which,  the  High
Court exercising its inherent power under Section 482  Cr.P.C.  quashed  the
criminal proceedings in RC No.3 of 1987 under Sections  420,  467,  468  and
471 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC and all proceedings  consequent  thereto
qua the respondent.
2.          Brief facts which led to the filing of this criminal appeal  are
as under:- The complainant-Chief Vigilance Officer of the New Bank of  India
(presently ‘Punjab National Bank’ for  short  ‘PNB’)  lodged  the  complaint
alleging that two persons  namely  Suresh  Kumar  Puri  and  Maninder  Singh
introduced themselves as proprietors of M/s Fashion  India  and  M/s  Ronney
Exports respectively and opened their current accounts with their branch  at
Miller Ganj in Ludhiana on 08.11.1986.  One Manger  namely  A.K.  Satija  of
IBD Cell of the New Bank of India at Ludhiana allowed advance  amount  worth
Rs.5.31 lakhs each to these two firms on production of Bill  of  Lading,  GR
form and other bills and those  foreign  bills  purchased  by  the  Bank  on
27.11.1986 returned unpaid.  During the enquiry made by the  bank,  Bill  of
Lading presented by the proprietors of the abovesaid two  firms  were  found
forged. Manager-A.K. Satija helped Maninder  Singh  to  avail  advance  upto
Rs.10.62 lakhs by opening two different accounts just  to  ensure  that  the
pecuniary limits allowed may fall under  his  power;  however  according  to
prosecution nature of transactions reveal that  parties  were  one  and  the
same.   Respondent  and  other  co-accused  thus  entered  into  a  criminal
conspiracy during the  period  November-December  1986,  with  intention  to
cheat New Bank of India (PNB) to the tune of Rs.10.62 lakhs.  On  the  basis
of the above complaint, case was registered under  Section  120-B  IPC  read
with Section  420  IPC  and  Section  5(2)  read  with  Section  5(1)(d)  of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and further  substantive  offences  under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC & Section 5 (2) read with Section  5  (1)
of Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947  in  Crime  No.RC.3/87-SIU(X)/CBI/SPE
dated 28.08.1987. After completion of the investigation, a  chargesheet  was
filed on 22.12.1990 in the  Court  of  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Tis
Hazari Court,  Delhi  against  the  accused  persons  collectively  for  the
offences under Section 120-B IPC read with Section 420 IPC  and  substantive
offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC.
3.          Noticeably, on 01.02.1995 i.e. after  four  years  the  accused-
respondent Maninder Singh was arrested by CBI from IGI Airport and  the  CMM
vide order  dated  16.09.1995  framed  charges  against  accused  respondent
Maninder Singh and other accused. In  the  trial,  thirty  nine  prosecution
witnesses were examined. However on 29.01.2005, Maninder Singh arrived at  a
settlement with the New Bank of  India,  Ludhiana  and  on  29.11.2005,  the
respondent-accused filed an application before the CMM for  pleading  guilty
for the offences alleged, but on the date of hearing  i.e.  08.12.2005,  the
accused respondent Maninder Singh did  not  appear  in  the  court  and  his
advocate withdrew the aforesaid application. Respondent herein moved a  Crl.
Misc. Petition bearing No.2083 of  2006  under  Section  482  Cr.  P.C.  for
quashing of the FIR against him on the ground that a settlement  is  arrived
between the parties and amounts are repaid to bank. The High  Court  placing
reliance on Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI & Anr., (2008) 9 SCC 677, vide  impugned
order dated 10.02.2009  allowed  the  petition  and  thereby  directed  that
criminal proceedings in RC No.3 of 1987 and  all  consequential  proceedings
thereto against the  respondent  shall  stand  quashed.   The  appellant-CBI
herein assails the correctness of the order passed by the High Court.
4.          Ms. Pinki Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General  contended
that Nikhi Marchant case is not an authority on the  question  involved  and
in Rumi Dhar (Smt.) vs. State of West Bengal & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 364,  this
Court raised doubts as to the correctness of the judgment passed  in  Nikhil
Merchant’s case. It was submitted that the facts of  the  present  case  are
totally different and in this case thirty nine  prosecution  witnesses  were
already examined and substantial progress has  been  made  in  the  criminal
case and while so, High  Court  was  not  right  in  quashing  the  criminal
proceedings qua the respondent.  Learned Additional  Solicitor  General  has
drawn our attention to State of Maharashtra through CBI vs. Vikram  Anantrai
Doshi and Ors., 2014 (10) SCALE  690  and  submitted  that  this  Court  has
distinguished Nikhil Merchant’s case and held that availing  loan  from  the
bank by producing forged documents has immense societal impact and the  High
Court ignoring the facts and circumstances  of  the  present  case  was  not
justified in quashing the criminal proceedings qua the respondent.
5.          Learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  respondent  Mr.  K.K.  Menon
submitted that availing facilities from the bank is purely of civil  dispute
which are personal in nature and therefore High Court was totally  justified
in quashing the proceedings in view  of  the  judgment  rendered  in  Nikhil
Merchant’s case.  It was further submitted that  the  judgment  rendered  in
Nikhil Merchant’s case was upheld in Gian Singh  vs.  State  of  Punjab  And
Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303; Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. vs. Radhika & Anr., (2011)  10
SCC 705 and other judgments.
6.          We have carefully considered the rival contentions  advanced  by
the parties and perused the material on record.
7.          In the case at  hand,  respondent  and  one  Suresh  Kumar  Puri
introducing themselves as proprietors of M/s Ronney Exports and M/s  Fashion
India opened current accounts Nos.4443 & 4441 on 08.11.1986  with  New  Bank
of India (PNB) and by forged documents they had  availed various  facilities
viz.:- (i) Anticipated case incentive advance Rs.50,000/-  to  each  of  the
firms; (ii) F.B.P. against order documents (the bills of ladings now  turned
out to be forged) Rs.3,05,000/- each; (iii) F.B.P. against  order  documents
(the bills of  ladings  now  turned  out  to  be  forged)  additional  funds
released Rs.22,000/-  each;  (iv)  P.C.L.  against  orders  (Packing  Credit
Loans) Rs.1,50,000/- each and interest Rs.4,000/- to each of the firms.   In
the charges, it is further alleged that A.K. Satija, the then  Manager,  IBD
Cell, New Bank of India, Ludhiana has sanctioned various  credit  facilities
to respondent and  Suresh  Kumar  Puri  viz.:  (i)  Packing  Credit  against
confirmed orders; (ii) Advance against anticipated cash incentive/duty  draw
back; (iii) Advance against cash incentive  and  duty  draw  back  and  (iv)
Advance  against  foreign  bill  purchase.  Chargesheet  refers  to  various
transactions by which bank amounts were credited  to  the  accounts  of  the
said firms based on forged documents.
8.          Accused-respondent  Maninder  Singh  and  his  brother  Arvinder
Singh did not cooperate with the investigating agency  and  were  absconding
and declared proclaimed offenders by  CMM,  Tis  Hazari,  Delhi  vide  order
dated 03.10.1989.  In the trial, thirty nine  witnesses  were  examined  and
thus substantial progress was made.  In  fact,  on  29.11.2005,  respondent-
accused filed an application before the trial  court  for  pleading  guilty;
but the accused did not appear in the court and his  advocate  withdrew  the
aforesaid application.
9.          Placing reliance upon Nikhil Merchant’s  case,  the  High  Court
quashed the criminal proceedings qua the respondent on the ground  that  the
respondent has settled the matter with the bank.  In Nikhil Merchant’s  case
the dispute between the company and the bank which was set at  rest  on  the
basis of compromise arrived at by them  and  dues  of  the  bank  have  been
cleared.  In Nikhil Merchant’s case certain documents were alleged  to  have
been forged by the respondent thereon in order to  avail  credit  facilities
beyond the limit to which the company was entitled.  The  case  at  hand  is
clearly distinguishable on facts. The  chargesheet  referred  to  number  of
transactions based on such forged documents bank money was credited  to  the
accounts of firms of  the  respondent.  For  instance,  respondent  Maninder
Singh and Suresh Kumar Puri are said to have submitted the forged  documents
of shipment for bill purchased on 27.11.1986. These documents included  Bill
of Lading and  invoices  which  were  found  forged  and  according  to  the
prosecution no consignment was sent by the respondent to foreign  companies.
It is further alleged that the Bill of Lading and  G.R.  Form  and  Shipping
Bill also contained forged signatures of customs officers.
10.         The allegation against  the  respondent  is  ‘forgery’  for  the
purpose of cheating and use of forged  documents  as  genuine  in  order  to
embezzle the public money.  After facing such serious  charges  of  forgery,
the respondent wants the proceedings to be quashed on account of  settlement
with the  bank.  The  development  in  means  of  communication,  science  &
technology etc. have led to an enormous increase  in  economic  crimes  viz.
phishing, ATM frauds etc. which  are  being  committed  by  intelligent  but
devious individuals involving huge  sums  of  public  or  government  money.
These are actually public wrongs or crimes  committed  against  society  and
the gravity and magnitude attached to  these  offences  is  concentrated  at
public at large.
11.         The inherent power of the High Court under Section  482  Cr.P.C.
should be sparingly used. Only when the Court comes to the  conclusion  that
there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process  of
the  Court  if  such  power  is  not  exercised,  Court  would   quash   the
proceedings.  In economic offences Court must not only  keep  in  view  that
money has been paid to the bank  which  has  been  defrauded  but  also  the
society at large.  It is not a case of  simple  assault  or  a  theft  of  a
trivial amount; but the offence with  which  we  are  concerned  is  a  well
planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye  of  personal
profit regardless of consequence to the society  at  large.   To  quash  the
proceeding merely on the ground that the  accused  has  settled  the  amount
with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy.   If  the  prosecution  against
the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community  is
aggrieved.
12.         In recent decision in Vikram Anantrai Doshi (supra), this  Court
distinguished Nikhil Merchant’s case and Narendra Lal Jain’s case where  the
compromise was a part of the decree of the court and by  which  the  parties
withdrew all allegations against each other.   After  referring  to  various
case laws  under  subject  in  Vikram  Anantrai  Doshi’s  case,  this  Court
observed that cheating by bank exposits fiscal impurity and  such  financial
fraud is an offence against society at large in para (23), this  Court  held
as under:-
“23. …Be it stated, that availing of money from a nationalized bank  in  the
manner, as alleged by the  investigating  agency,  vividly  exposits  fiscal
impurity and, in a way, financial fraud.  The modus operandi as narrated  in
the chargesheet cannot be  put  in  the  compartment  of  an  individual  or
personal wrong.  It is a social wrong and it has  immense  societal  impact.
It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that  whenever  there  is
manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of  these  kind  of
benefits  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  case  having  overwhelmingly  and
predominantingly  of  civil  character.   The   ultimate   victim   is   the
collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest  of  the  society.
The gravity of the offence creates a dent  in  the  economic  spine  of  the
nation.  The  cleverness  which  has  been   skillfully  contrived,  if  the
allegations are true, has a serious consequence.  A crime  of  this  nature,
in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which  travel
far ahead of personal or private wrong.  It has the  potentiality  to  usher
in economic crisis.  Its implications  have  its  own  seriousness,  for  it
creates  a  concavity  in  the  solemnity  that  is  expected  in  financial
transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and  obtain
a “no due certificate” and enjoy the benefit of  quashing  of  the  criminal
proceedings on the hypostasis that nothing more  remains  to  be  done.  The
collective interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot  be  a  silent
or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn,  or  for  that
matter yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the  accused  persons  to  invoke
the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section  482
of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not  legally  permissible.   The
Court is expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves.   The  High
Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping  in  mind
that in these kind of litigations the accused when perceives  a  tiny  gleam
of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for  quashing  of  the
criminal proceeding.  The court’s principal duty, at that  juncture,  should
be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of  allegations  and  the
crux of the settlement.  It is the experience of the Judge comes to his  aid
and the said experience should be used with  care,  caution,  circumspection
and courageous prudence.  As we find in the case at hand the learned  Single
Judge has not taken pains to scrutinize the entire conspectus  of  facts  in
proper perspective and quashed the criminal proceeding.  The said  quashment
neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it  prevent  the  abuse
of the process of the Court nor can it be also  said  that  as  there  is  a
settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be  remote  chance
of conviction.  Such a finding in our view would  be  difficult  to  record.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social  interest  would  be  on
peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be  treated
as an alien to the whole case.  Ergo, we have no other option  but  to  hold
that the order of the High Court is wholly indefensible”.


13.         In this case, the  High  Court  while  exercising  its  inherent
power ignored all the facts viz. the impact of the offence, the use  of  the
State machinery to keep the matter pending for so many  years  coupled  with
the  fraudulent  conduct  of  the  respondent.  Considering  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case at hand in the light of  the  decision  in  Vikram
Anantrai Doshi’s case, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained.
14.         The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court  is
set aside and the trial  court  is  directed  to  proceed  with  the  matter
expeditiously in accordance with law.  We make it clear  that  we  have  not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.

                                                                …………………………J.
                                                   (DIPAK MISRA)


                                                                …………………………J.
                                                   (R. BANUMATHI)
New Delhi;
August 28, 2015
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