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Wednesday, May 13, 2015

writ to restrain the Union of India and all State Governments from using public funds on Government advertisements which are primarily intended to project individual functionaries of the Government or a political party. The writ petitioners have also prayed for laying down of appropriate guidelines by this Court to regulate Government action in the matter so as to prevent misuse/wastage of public funds in connection with such advertisements.We are, therefore, of the view that in departure to the views of the Committee which recommended permissibility of publication of the photographs of the President and Prime Minister of the country and Governor or Chief Minister of the State alongwith the advertisements, there should be an exception only in the case of the President, Prime Minister and Chief Justice of the country who may themselves decide the question. Advertisements issued to commemorate the anniversaries of acknowledged personalities like the father of the nation would of course carry the photograph of the departed leader. 24. Insofar as the recommendation with regard to the appointment of Ombudsman is concerned, we are of the view that for ironing out the creases that are bound to show from time to time in the implementation of the present directions and to oversee such implementation the government should constitute a three member body consisting of persons with unimpeachable neutrality and impartiality and who have excelled in their respective fields. We could have but we refrain from naming the specific persons and leave the said exercise to be performed by the Union Government. 25. Insofar as performance/special audit is concerned, we do not feel the necessity of any such special audit inasmuch as the machinery available is adequate to ensure due performance as well as accountability and proper utilization of public money. 26. If Government advertisements adhere to the objects and parameters mentioned above we do not feel the necessity of imposing a special curb on government advertisements on the eve of the elections, as suggested by the Committee. 27. In an earlier part of the present order we had indicated the power of the purse that Government advertisements invariably involve. Needless to say the concepts of fairness and even dispensation to all media/publishing houses will have to be maintained by the Government be it at the Centre or the States. 28. We close the matters on the aforesaid note by approving and adopting the recommendations of the Committee except what has been specifically indicated above with regard to (1) publication of photographs of the Government functionaries and political leaders alongwith the advertisement(s). (2) appointment of an Ombudsman (3) the recommendation with regard to performance audit by each Ministry. (4) embargo on advertisements on the eve of the elections. 29. We also make it clear that the present directions issued under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be comprehensive and there are several aspects of the matter which may have escaped our attention at this stage. In this regard, we would like to clarify that it is not the intention of the Court to attempt to lay down infallible and all comprehensive directions to cover the issue at hand. The gaps, if any, we are confident would be filled up by the executive arm of the government itself inasmuch as the attainment of constitutional goals and values enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution is the conjoint responsibility of the three organs of the State i.e. legislative, executive and the judiciary, as earlier discussed.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 13 OF 2003

COMMON CAUSE                            ...PETITIONER (S)
                                   VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA                          ...RESPONDENT (S)

                                    WITH
                          W.P. (C) No. 197 of 2004
                                      &
                           W.P. (C) No.302 of 2012


                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.     Common  Cause  and  Centre  for  Public  Interest   Litigation,   two
registered bodies, have approached  this  Court  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution seeking an appropriate writ to restrain the Union of India  and
all State Governments from using public funds on  Government  advertisements
which are primarily intended to  project  individual  functionaries  of  the
Government or a political party.  The writ petitioners have also prayed  for
laying down of appropriate guidelines by this Court to  regulate  Government
action in the matter so as to prevent  misuse/wastage  of  public  funds  in
connection with such advertisements.

2.    In  the  above  stated  writ  petitions  the  writ  petitioners  while
conceding the beneficial effect of government  advertisements  which  convey
necessary information to the citizens with regard  to  various  welfare  and
progressive measures as also their rights  and  entitlements,  however,  had
contended that in the  garb  of  communicating  with  the  people,  in  many
instances, undue political advantage and mileage is sought  to  be  achieved
by personifying individuals and  crediting  such  individuals  or  political
leaders (who are either from a political party or government  functionaries)
as  being responsible for various government  achievements  and  progressive
plans.  According to the petitioners such practice becomes  rampant  on  the
eve of the elections. Such advertisements not only result in  gross  wastage
of public  funds  but  constitute  misuse  of  governmental  powers  besides
derogating the fundamental rights of a large  section  of  the  citizens  as
guaranteed by Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

3.    The  writ  petitions,  filed  as  public  interest  litigations,  were
resisted by the Union of India primarily  on  the  ground  that  the  issues
sought  to  be  raised  pertain  to  governmental  policies  and   executive
decisions in respect of which it may not be appropriate for  this  Court  to
lay down binding guidelines under Article 142.  The decision of  this  Court
in Manzoor Ali Khan & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.[1] and a  pronouncement
of the Delhi High Court in Umesh Mohan Sethi Vs. Union of  India  &  Anr.[2]
have been relied upon by the Union in support of its above stated stand.

4.    The issues arising in the  writ  petitions  were  considered  by  this
Court  in  an  earlier  round  of  exhaustive  hearings.  By   order   dated
23.04.2014, this Court, on consideration of the  respective  stands  of  the
parties and by  relying  on  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  decisions
specifically referred to in the  aforesaid  order  dated  23.04.2014,  inter
alia, held that there is  no  dispute  that  “primary  cause  of  government
advertisement is to use public funds to inform the public of  their  rights,
obligations, and entitlements as well as  to  explain  Government  policies,
programmes, services and initiatives.”  It was further held that  only  such
government advertisements which do not  fulfil  the  above  requisites  will
fall  foul  of  the  area  of  permissible   advertisements.    This   Court
acknowledged  the  fact  that  the   dividing   line   between   permissible
advertisements that are a part of government  messaging  and  advertisements
that are  “politically  motivated”  may  at  times  gets  blurred.   As  the
materials laid before the Court by the parties were found to  be  inadequate
for the purpose of evolving what would be  the  best  practices  keeping  in
view the prevailing scenario in other jurisdictions across the  globe,  this
Court felt the necessity of  constituting  a  Committee  consisting  of  (1)
Prof. (Dr.) N.R. Madhava Menon, former Director, National Judicial  Academy,
Bhopal (2) Mr. T.K. Viswanathan, former Secretary  General,  Lok  Sabha  and
(3) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate to go into the  matter  and  submit  a
report to the Court.

5.    In  terms  of  the  order  of  this  Court,  the  Committee  was  duly
constituted and after full deliberations in the matter, a  report  had  been
submitted by the Committee suggesting a set of guidelines  for  approval  of
this Court.  It is the plea of  the  petitioner  that  the  said  guidelines
should be approved by this Court and directions be issued under Article  142
of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the  said  guidelines  until
an appropriate legislation in this regard is  brought  into  effect  by  the
Parliament.

6.    The contents of  the  guidelines  suggested  by  the  court  appointed
Committee may be usefully extracted hereinbelow:-
                    “GUIDELINES ON CONTENT REGULATION OF
                            GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING

These Guidelines shall  be  called  the  Government  Advertisement  (Content
Regulation) Guidelines 2014.

They shall come into force with effect from......


2.    APPLICATION:

(1)   These Guidelines shall apply to all  Government  advertisements  other
than Classified Advertisements.

(2)   These  Guidelines  shall  apply  to  the  content  of  all  Government
Advertising till a suitable legislation is  enacted  by  the  Government  to
prevent the misuse of public  funds  on  advertisements  to  gain  political
mileage as distinct from legitimate Government messaging.

(3)   These Guidelines shall apply to all –

      (a)   institutions of Government;

      (b)   public sector undertakings;

(c)   local bodies and  other  autonomous  bodies/organizations  established
under a Statute.



      3.    DEFINITIONS:

In these Guidelines unless the context otherwise requires:

 “Classified Advertisements” include public  notices,  tenders,  recruitment
notices, statutory notifications.


“DAVP Guidelines” means  the  existing  guidelines  of  the  Directorate  of
Advertising  and  Visual  Publicity  of  the  Ministry  of  Information  and
Broadcasting dealing with the eligibility  and  empanelment  procedures  and
rates of payment and such other matters;

“Government” means Central  Government,  State  Governments/Union  Territory
Administrations and also includes local bodies, public  sector  undertakings
and other autonomous bodies/organisations established under a Statute.

“Government advertising” means any message, conveyed and  paid  for  by  the
government for placement in media such  as  newspapers,  television,  radio,
internet, cinema and such other,  media  but  does  not  include  classified
advertisements; and includes both copy (written  text/audio)  and  creatives
(visuals/video/multi  media)  put  out  in  print,  electronic,  outdoor  or
digital media.

OBJECTS:

      The objects of these Guidelines are:-

to  prevent  arbitrary  use  of  public  funds  for  advertising  by  public
authorities to project  particular  personalities,  parties  or  governments
without any attendant public interest.


neither to belittle the need nor to deny the  authority  of  the  Union  and
State Governments and its agencies to disseminate information necessary  for
public to know on the policies and programmes  of  Government  but  only  to
exclude the possibility of any  misuse  of  public  funds  on  advertisement
campaigns  in  order  to   gain   political   mileage   by   the   political
establishment;

to address the gap in the existing DAVP Guidelines which only deal with  the
eligibility and empanelment of newspapers/journals  or  other  media,  their
rates of payment, and such like matters and  not  on  how  to  regulate  the
content of Government advertisements;

to  ensure  that  “all   government   activities   satisfy   the   test   of
reasonableness and public interest, particularly while dealing  with  public
funds and property”;

to  ensure  that  government  messaging  is  well  co-ordinate,  effectively
managed in the best democratic traditions and is responsive to  the  diverse
information needs of the public.



5.    GOVERNMENT ADVERTISEMENT TO INFORM CITIZENS

Subject to these Guidelines Government may place advertisements or  purchase
advertising space or time in any  medium  to  inform  citizens  about  their
rights  and  responsibilities,  about   government   policies,   programmes,
services or initiatives, or about dangers or risks to public health,  safety
or the environment.

6.    THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT REGULATION:

      While placing advertisements or purchasing advertising  space  in  any
media, the Government shall be guided by the following principles, namely:-

Advertising Campaigns to be related to Government responsibilities:



While it is the duty of the Government to provide the  public  with  timely,
accurate, clear, objective and  complete  information  about  its  policies,
programmes, services and initiatives since the public has a  right  to  such
information, the content of government advertisements should be relevant  to
the governments’  constitutional  and  legal  obligations  as  well  as  the
citizens’ rights and entitlements.


Advertisement materials should  be  presented  in  an  objective,  fair  and
accessible manner and be designed to meet the objectives of the campaign:

The material shall be presented in a fair and objective manner and shall  be
capable of fulfilling the intended objectives;

Government shall exercise due caution while deciding  the  content,  layout,
size and design of the message including the target area  and  the  creative
requirement of the intended  communication  in  order  to  ensure  that  the
maximum reach and impact are achieved in the most cost effective manner;

Content of advertisement must enable the recipients of  the  information  to
distinguish between facts and analysis and where  information  is  presented
as a fact, it should be accurate and verifiable;

Pre-existing policies, products, services  and  initiatives  should  not  be
presented as new unless there has been a substantial change or  modification
of such policies, products or services;

Content of  advertisement  should  provide  information  in  a  manner  that
accommodates  special  needs  of   disadvantaged   individuals   or   groups
identified as being within the target audience;

Multiple formats may be used to ensure equal access;

Every effort shall be made to pre-test the material in case of  large  scale
campaign with target audiences.



Advertisement materials should be objective and not  directed  at  promoting
political interests of ruling party:

Display material must be presented in objective  language  and  be  free  of
political argument or partisan standpoint:


Government  advertising  shall  maintain  political  neutrality  and   avoid
glorification  of  political  personalities  and   projecting   a   positive
impression of the party  in  power  or  a  negative  impression  of  parties
critical of the government.

Advertisement materials must not –

 Mention the party in government by name;

 directly attack the views or actions of others in opposition;


 include party political symbol or logo or flag;

 aim to influence public  support  for  a  political  party,  candidate  for
election; or

 refer to link to the websites of political parties or politicians.

Government advertisement materials should  avoid  photographs  of  political
leaders and if it is felt  essential  for  effective  Government  messaging,
only the  photographs  of  the  President/Prime  Minster  or  Governor/Chief
Minister should be used;


Government advertisements shall not be used at patronizing media  houses  or
aimed at receiving favourable reporting for the party or person in power


Advertisement Campaigns be justified and  undertaken  in  an  efficient  and
cost-effective manner:


Since it is the responsibility of government  to  safeguard  the  trust  and
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of public  services  and  hence
it should be the policy of governments to use public funds in such a  manner
as to obtain maximum value for taxpayers’ money;


Advertisement Campaigns must be justified and  undertaken  in  an  efficient
and cost-effective manner;


The Government shall –


decide and announce beforehand, a list of personalities on  whose  birth  or
death  anniversaries,  advertisements  could  be  released  every  year  and
specify which Ministry/Department could release the same;



avoid the issue of multiple  advertisements  by  different  departments  and
PSUs of the same Government in Commemorative Advertisements and shall  issue
a single advertisement only;

(d)   Though advertising by governments  should  remain  regulated  all  the
time, it is particularly important to scrupulously follow  these  principles
before and during the elections.  As far  as  possible,  during  the  period
prior to elections, only those  advertisements  required  by  law  (such  as
public health and safety advisories  or  job  and  contract  advertisements)
alone be released by governments;

(e)   Advertisement campaigns should only be need based; and

(f)   In case of large volume advertisement campaigns, post-campaign  impact
assessment is necessary to be included in the planning  process  itself  and
shall identify the indicators to  measure  success  when  the  campaign  has
ended.

(5)    Government  advertising  must  comply  with  legal  requirements  and
financial regulations and procedures:

Governments shall ensure that all Advertisements comply with:-

relevant laws regarding  privacy,  intellectual  property  rights,  election
laws  and  consumer  protection  laws  apart  from  laws   in   respect   of
broadcasting and media; and



copyright laws  and  ownership  rights  associated  with  works  subject  to
copyright are fully respected.

COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT:

The Government shall appoint an Ombudsman who shall  be  an  eminent  expert
independent of  the  Government  to  receive  complaints  of  violations  of
Guidelines and to recommend action in accordance with the Guidelines.


 Heads of government departments  and  agencies  shall  be  responsible  for
ensuring compliance with these Guidelines and shall follow  a  procedure  of
certification of  compliance  before  advertisements  are  released  to  the
media.

As part of the performance audit of the Ministry/Department/Agency –

  there  shall  be  separate  audit  of  the  compliance  of   Advertisement
Guidelines by the Ministry/Department/Agency concerned; and

The annual report  of  such  ministry/department/agency  shall  publish  the
findings of such audit and the money spent on advertising.

The regulatory bodies of print and electronic media  will  be  within  their
powers to impose sanctions against such media groups  acting  against  these
Guidelines in seeking or obtaining government advertisements.

8.    GENERAL:

(1)   These Guidelines shall be in addition to and not in derogation of  the
existing Guidelines which are in  place  under  the  existing  Advertisement
Policy of Government.

(2)   These Guidelines are equally applicable to State Governments  and  its
agencies.  The State Governments  shall  undertake  amendments  to  whatever
policies they have in this regard and observe  the  Guidelines  strictly  in
letter and spirit.

The Ombudsman may recommend suitable changes to the Guidelines to deal  with
new circumstances and situations.



The Government shall take necessary steps to initiate necessary  legislation
on the subject, given its importance for democracy, human  rights  and  good
governance.”


                                   *******



Whether the guidelines recommended  should  commend  acceptance  and  if  so
whether the same should be made operative and enforceable under Article  142
of the Constitution.


7.    In the earlier order  dated  23rd  April,  2014,  this  Court,   after
holding that reasonableness and fairness consistent with Article 14  of  the
Constitution would be the ultimate test of all  State  activities  proceeded
to hold that the deployment of  public  funds  in  any  Government  activity
which is  not  connected  with  a  public  purpose  would  justify  judicial
intervention.  We would like to say something more.

Part IV of the Constitution is as much a  guiding  light  for  the  Judicial
organ of the State as the Executive and  the  Legislative  arms,  all  three
being integral parts of the “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of  the
Constitution.[3]-[4] A policy certainly  cannot  be  axed  for  its  alleged
failure to comply with any of the provisions of Part IV.   Neither  can  the
Courts charter a course, merely on the strength of  the  provisions  of  the
said Part of the Constitution, if the effect thereof would be to lay down  a
policy.  However, in a situation where the field is open  and  uncovered  by
any government policy, to guide and control  everyday  governmental  action,
surely,  in  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Article  142   of   the
Constitution, parameters can be laid down by this Court consistent with  the
objects enumerated by any of the provisions of Part IV.   Such  an  exercise
would be naturally time bound i.e. till the Legislature  or  the  Executive,
as the case may  be,  steps  in  to  fulfill  its  constitutional  role  and
authority by framing an appropriate policy.
8.    Article 38 and 39 of the Constitution enjoin upon the State a duty  to
consistently endeavour  to  achieve  social  and  economic  justice  to  the
teeming millions of the country who even today live behind  an  artificially
drawn poverty line.  What can be the surer way in the march forward than  by
ensuring avoidance of unproductive expenditure of  public  funds.   This  is
how we view the present matter and feel the necessity  of  exercise  of  our
jurisdiction under Article 142  of the Constitution to proceed further.

9.    It is neither possible nor feasible  or  even  necessary  to  try  and
encompass the myriad situations where government advertisements are  issued.
 Indeed, the situations and circumstances; events  and  occasions  on  which
government  advertisements  are  issued  are  infinite.   Nevertheless,   an
attempt can be made to arrive at a broad categorization for the  purpose  of
an illustrative understanding.

Advertisements  highlighting  completion  of   a   fixed   period   of   the
Government’s Tenure



Governments at the  Centre  as  well  as  in  the  States  often  bring  out
advertisements on completion of a  number  of  days,  months  and  years  of
governance.   In  such  advertisements,  not  only  the  ‘achievements’  are
highlighted  even  the  different  tasks  which  are  in  contemplation  are
enumerated.  By way of example one of the points highlighted may  be  supply
of electricity to each and every village.   Though  the  achievements  of  a
Government should not be a matter of publicity and  really  ought  to  be  a
matter of perception to be felt by the citizens  on  the  results  achieved,
such advertisements do have the effect of keeping the citizens  informed  of
the government functioning and therefore would be permissible.

Advertisements announcing projects:

      On an everyday basis both the Government at the Centre as well  as  in
different States issue advertisements announcing events like laying  of  the
foundation  of  different  development  projects  or  the  inauguration   of
projects completed. In many of such advertisements the results  obtained  in
the particular field covered by the advertisement and the  plan/targets  for
the future are highlighted.  Though such  advertisements  may  look  like  a
report card of the Government there is an element of informative content  in
such advertisements inasmuch as information is conveyed to the  citizens  as
regards government programmes, policies and achievements.

 Advertisements issued on the  occasion  of  birth/death  anniversaries  and
such other events:



Government advertisements are issued in the memory  of  great  personalities
who occupy a significant place in our history, such as, the  father  of  the
Nation, Mahatma Gandhi. While such persons  must  certainly  be  remembered,
what, however, would not be justified is several similar, if not  identical,
advertisements issued by different Departments on the same  occasion  as  is
happening today.  One  single  advertisement  issued  by  a  Central  Agency
should be enough to commemorate the anniversaries of  the  few  acknowledged
and undisputed public figures  whose  contribution  to  the  National  Cause
cannot raise any dispute or debate.

Advertisement issued on certain other occasions, for instance, to  mark  the
centenary year of the Patna High Court does not serve any purpose  and  must
be avoided.  Institutions need not be glorified. They  must  earn  glory  by
contribution and work.

Advertisements announcing policies and benefits for public:



All advertisements that  fall  within  this  category  would  be  in  public
interest.  Such advertisements, as for example in respect  of  the  National
Savings Schemes informing the public about benefits under  the  Scheme,  are
purely  informational  and  make  people   aware   of   their   rights   and
entitlements.   Similarly,  advertisements   issued   to   generate   public
awareness would also be justified on the touchstone of public interest.   By
way of illustration, an advertisement issued by the Ministry of  Health  and
Family Welfare informing the public of preventable  disease,  safeguards  to
be taken, vaccination programmes for the  children,  etc.  would  be  highly
informative and, therefore, justified.

10.   A connected facet of the matter which cannot be ignored is  the  power
of the Government to give/award advertisements to selected media houses  and
the  concomitant  issue  of  freedom  of  press.  Award  of  advertisements,
naturally, brings financial benefit to the particular media  house/newspaper
group. Patronization of any particular media house(s) must  be  avoided  and
award of advertisements must be on an equal  basis  to  all  newspapers  who
may,  however,  be  categorized  depending  upon  their  circulation.    The
D.A.V.P. guidelines do not deal with the  said  aspect  of  the  matter  and
hence the necessity of incorporating the same in the present  directions  to
ensure the independence, impartiality  and  the  neutrality  of  the  fourth
estate which is vital to the growth and sustenance of  democracy  will  have
to be weighed and considered by us.


11.   An analysis of the Draft Guidelines as prepared by the  Committee  set
up by this Court in the case may now be made.  The  applicability  of  these
Guidelines is to all Government advertisements other  than  classifieds  and
in all mediums of communication,  thereby  including  internet  advertising.
The objective of these Guidelines emphasize the Government’s  responsibility
to disseminate information necessary  for  the  public  to  know  about  the
policies and programmes  of  Government.  It  principally  spells  out  five
principles to regulate the contents  of advertisements, namely,

i)      advertising   campaigns   are   to   be   related   to    government
responsibilities,

ii)   materials should be presented in an  objective,  fair  and  accessible
manner and designed to meet objectives of the campaign,

iii)  not directed at promoting political interests of a Party,

iv)   campaigns must be justified and undertaken in an efficient  and  cost-
effective manner and

v)    advertisements must  comply  with  legal  requirements  and  financial
regulations and procedures.

The five broad Content Regulations contained in the draft guidelines  framed
by the Committee are similar to the  provisions   found  in  the  Australian
guidelines.  However, under each broad head specific  regulatory  parameters
have been indicated which seem to embody what would  be  good  practices  in
the Indian context.

12.    While  under  the  first  head  the  requirement  of  conformity   of
Government advertisements with  dissemination  of  information  relating  to
Government’s constitutional and  legal  obligations  and  the  corresponding
rights and entitlements of  citizens  is  being  stressed  upon,  under  the
second  head  objective  presentation  of  the  materials  contained  in  an
advertisement bearing in mind  the  target  audience  has  been  emphasized.
Under the third head, the  Guidelines  state  that  advertisement  materials
must not: (a) mention the party in government by its name,  (b)  attack  the
views or actions of other parties  in  opposition,  (c)  include  any  party
symbol or logo, (d) aim to influence public support for  a  political  party
or a  candidate for election or  (e)  refer  or  link  to  the  websites  of
political parties or politicians. It is also stated in the  Guidelines  that
photographs of leaders should be avoided and only  the  photographs  of  the
President/ Prime Minister or Governor/ Chief  Minister  shall  be  used  for
effective  government  messaging.   The  fourth   head   deals   with   cost
effectiveness  of  an  advertisement  campaign  and  measures  to  cut  down
avoidable expenses.  A somewhat restricted range of advertising activity  on
the eve of the elections is also recommended.  Appointment of  an  Ombudsman
to hear complaints of violation of  the  norms  and  to  suggest  amendments
thereto from time to time beside special performance audit by the  concerned
Ministries is also recommended.

13.   The  Union  Government  and  the  State  of  Bihar  have  filed  their
responses to the guidelines suggested by the Committee.  The State of  Bihar
suggests that some of the  recommendations  of  the  Committee,  details  of
which need not be noticed, are somewhat vague and  require  a  more  precise
definition or meaning.  The only aspect of the suggestions where  the  State
has responded emphatically is with regard to the recommendation  to  confine
the  publication of photographs of the President and the Prime  Minister  of
the  country  and  the  Governor  and  the  Chief  Minister  of  the  State.
According to the State of Bihar such a restriction should not be imposed.

14.   The Union in its response to the guidelines of the Committee has  been
more categorical in suggesting certain changes as well as deletion  of  some
of the recommendations.  It will, therefore, be  necessary  to  specifically
notice the said objections raised by the Union.

|Content of the Recommendations    | |Response of the Union           |
|(1)  Object of Guidelines                                           |
|(a)   To prevent arbitrary use of | |The meaning of the word         |
|public funds for advertising by   | |“arbitrary” according to the    |
|public authorities.               | |Union needs to be more          |
|                                  | |specifically defined.           |
|(b) To exclude the possibility of | |According to the Union the      |
|any misuse of public funds on     | |expression “political mileage”  |
|advertisement campaign in order to| |is inappropriate and should be  |
|gain political mileage by the     | |deleted.                        |
|political establishments.         | |                                |
|(2)   5 Principles of Content Regulation                            |
|(a)  Clause (vii) under the 2nd   | |According to the Union this     |
|point of the 5 principles         | |should be done only when the    |
|recommended by the Committee –    | |same is feasible and whenever   |
|Every effort should be made to    | |public interest so demands.     |
|pre-test the material in case of  | |                                |
|large scale campaign  with target | |                                |
|audiences.                        | |                                |
|(b) Clause (c)(i) under the 4th   | |According to the Union the words|
|point of the 5 principles of      | |“decide and announce beforehand”|
|Content Regulation states that    | |may be deleted as the same is   |
|“The Government shall decide and  | |not feasible since issuance of  |
|announce beforehand, a list of    | |advertisement depends on a host |
|personalities on whose birth or   | |of factors like availability of |
|death anniversaries,              | |funds, last minute changes and  |
|advertisements could be released  | |the priorities of the           |
|every year and specify which      | |government.                     |
|Ministry/Department could release | |                                |
|the same.                         | |                                |
|(c) Clause (d) of the 4th point of| |According to the Union          |
|the 5 principles of Content       | |advertisement that serve public |
|Regulation states that “as far as | |interest may be issued at any   |
|possible, during the period prior | |point of time.                  |
|to elections, only those          | |                                |
|advertisements required by law    | |                                |
|(such as public health and safety | |                                |
|advisories or job and contract    | |                                |
|advertisements) alone be released | |                                |
|by the governments.               | |                                |
|                                                                    |
|(3) Ombudsman                                                       |
|The suggestion of the Committee   | |The Union objects to the same   |
|with regard to appointment of the | |and seeks deletion of the said  |
|Ombudsman is in the following     | |recommendation as also the      |
|terms: “The Government shall      | |recommendation with regard to   |
|appoint an Ombudsman who shall be | |separate performance audit of   |
|an eminent expert independent of  | |each Ministry and publication of|
|the Government to receive         | |the result of such audit.       |
|complaints of violations of       | |According to the Union the      |
|Guidelines and to recommend action| |Government has inbuilt machinery|
|in accordance with the            | |for redressal and for audit     |
|Guidelines.”                      | |purposes.                       |



15.   A consideration of the objections filed by the Union would go to  show
that  the  Union  seriously  disagrees  with  the  recommendations  of   the
Committee in respect of the following matters:
(1)   restricted publication of photographs of the Government  functionaries
and political leaders alongwith the advertisement etc.
(2)   appointment of an Ombudsman
(3)   the recommendation with regard to performance audit by each  Ministry.

(4)   embargo on advertisements on the eve of the elections.
16.   The rest of the objections are really in  the  nature  of  suggestions
which having been considered we are of the view that  incorporation  of  the
said suggestions  made  by  the  Union  or  otherwise  would  not  make  any
substantial  difference   to   the   impact   and   effect   of   the   said
recommendations.  It is the recommendations with regard to  the  publication
of photographs; appointment of Ombudsman;  carrying  out  independent  audit
and embargo on advertisements during election time  that  will  have  to  be
specifically dealt with in some details.
17.    The  remaining  recommendations  of  the  Committee  appear   to   be
comprehensive and based on an analytical  approach  of  the  best  practices
prevailing  in  other  jurisdictions.   The  said  recommendations,  in  our
considered view, would serve public interest by  enabling  dissemination  of
information and spreading awareness amongst the citizens  not  only  of  the
government policies; achievements made and targets to be  reached  but  also
the rights and entitlements of the citizens including the availability of  a
host of welfare measures.   The said recommendations, therefore, commend  to
the Court for acceptance and are accordingly accepted.
18.   At this juncture we  may  very  briefly  deal  with  the  with     the
situation prevailing  in  other  jurisdictions  across  the  globe.   While,
undoubtedly there  can be no blind adherence to the  practices  followed  in
other jurisdictions as what may be appropriate to another  country  may  not
be ideal in the Indian context,  the correct approach  will  be  to  discern
some of the best practices prevailing in such jurisdictions  and  thereafter
to test the relevance of the same to our own country.  Though  the  recitals
contained in the Report of the Committee do mention a consideration of  such
good practices  prevailing  in  other  jurisdictions  there  is  however  no
discussion or even an indication of the precise contents  of  the  practices
that were found by the Committee to be in existence in other countries.   It
has therefore become necessary for us to deal with the  matter  though  very
briefly.  In this regard we may  usefully,  though  illustratively,  make  a
reference to certain practices prevailing in  Canada,  United  Kingdom,  New
Zealand and Australia.

19.   Insofar as Canada(Ontario) is concerned, it appears  that  the  object
of issuing a government advertisement is :  (i)  to  inform  the  public  of
current or proposed government policies, programs or services  available  to
them; (ii) to inform the public of their rights and  responsibilities  under
the law and (iii) to encourage or discourage specific  social  behaviour  in
public interest.  Such advertisements are not to include the name, voice  or
image of any functionary of the  State  and  the  primary  objective  of  an
advertisement ought not to be to foster a positive impression of the  ruling
government or a negative impression of any person, group or  party  critical
of the government.

20.   In some of the foreign jurisdictions there is a mechanism  for  review
of advertisements on fixed parameters even before  they  are  published  and
publication/issuance thereof only upon passing of  the  required  test.   In
Australia and United Kingdom,  there  is  an  added  emphasis  on  the  cost
effectiveness  of  advertising   campaigns.    In   Australia,   advertising
campaigns  of  more  than  a  particular  pecuniary  value   i.e.   1million
Australian dollars require to undergo a cost benefit  analysis  wherein  the
best options to achieve the intended objective of the  campaign  has  to  be
determined before launching the same.

21.   The good practices adopted in other jurisdictions as noticed above  do
find adequate reflection in  the  recommendations  of  the  Committee  which
further fortify our conviction to adopt the same.

22.   This will require the Court to consider the  different  aspects  of  a
government advertisement campaign  highlighted  earlier  on  which  we  have
reserved  our  comments.   The  first  is  with  regard  to  publication  of
photographs of functionaries of the State  and  political  leaders  alonwith
the advertisement issued.   There  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  that  one
government  advertisement  or  the  other  coinciding  with  some  event  or
occasion is published practically every day.  Publication of the  photograph
of an individual be a State or party functionary not only has  the  tendency
of associating that particular individual  with  either  the  achievement(s)
sought to be highlighted or being the architect of the benefits  in  respect
of which information is sought to be percolated.
Alternatively, programmes/targets for the future  as  advertised  carry  the
impression  of  being  associated   with   the   particular   individual(s).
Photographs, therefore, have the potential  of  developing  the  personality
cult and the image of  a  one  or  a  few  individuals  which  is  a  direct
antithesis of democratic functioning.

23.   The legitimate and permissible object of an advertisement, as  earlier
discussed, can always be achieved without publication of the  photograph  of
any particular functionary either in the State of  a  political  party.   We
are, therefore, of the view that in departure to the views of the  Committee
which recommended permissibility of publication of the  photographs  of  the
President and Prime Minister of the country and Governor or  Chief  Minister
of the State alongwith the advertisements,  there  should  be  an  exception
only in the case of the President, Prime Minister and Chief Justice  of  the
country who may themselves decide the question.   Advertisements  issued  to
commemorate the anniversaries of acknowledged personalities like the  father
of the nation would of course carry the photograph of the departed leader.

24.   Insofar as the  recommendation  with  regard  to  the  appointment  of
Ombudsman is concerned, we are of the view that for ironing out the  creases
that are bound to show from time  to  time  in  the  implementation  of  the
present directions and to oversee such implementation the government  should
constitute a three member body  consisting  of  persons  with  unimpeachable
neutrality and impartiality  and  who  have  excelled  in  their  respective
fields.  We could have but we refrain from naming the specific  persons  and
leave the said exercise to be performed by the Union Government.

25.   Insofar as performance/special audit is concerned, we do not feel  the
necessity of any such special audit inasmuch as the machinery  available  is
adequate to ensure due performance as  well  as  accountability  and  proper
utilization of public money.

26.   If Government advertisements adhere  to  the  objects  and  parameters
mentioned above we do not feel the necessity of imposing a special  curb  on
government advertisements on the eve of the elections, as suggested  by  the
Committee.

27.   In an earlier part of the present order we had indicated the power  of
the purse that Government advertisements invariably  involve.   Needless  to
say the concepts of fairness and even dispensation to  all  media/publishing
houses will have to be maintained by the Government be it at the  Centre  or
the States.



28.   We close the matters on the aforesaid note by approving  and  adopting
the recommendations of the  Committee  except  what  has  been  specifically
indicated above with regard to

(1)    publication  of  photographs  of  the  Government  functionaries  and
political leaders alongwith the advertisement(s).
(2)   appointment of an Ombudsman
(3)   the recommendation with regard to performance audit by each  Ministry.

(4)   embargo on advertisements on the eve of the elections.




29.  We also make it clear that the present directions issued under  Article
142 of the Constitution  cannot  be  comprehensive  and  there  are  several
aspects of the matter which may have escaped our attention  at  this  stage.
In this regard, we would like to clarify that it is  not  the  intention  of
the  Court  to  attempt  to  lay  down  infallible  and  all   comprehensive
directions to cover the issue at hand.  The gaps, if any, we  are  confident
would be filled up by the executive arm of the  government  itself  inasmuch
as the attainment of constitutional goals and values enshrined  in  Part  IV
of the Constitution is the conjoint responsibility of the  three  organs  of
the  State  i.e.  legislative,  executive  and  the  judiciary,  as  earlier
discussed.



                                                    ………..........………………………J.
                                    [RANJAN GOGOI]




                                                    …………..........……………………J.
                                    [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE]
NEW DELHI,
MAY 13, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]    (2014) 7 SCC 321
[2]    WP (C) No.2926 of 2012 decided on 12.12.2012
[3]    Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. –AIR
1967 SC 1=(1966) 3 SCR 744

[4]    Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. –
(1973) 4 SCC 225 (Para 1703)

-----------------------
33


Without having any additional evidence - adverse orders should not be given - The contention urged on behalf of the respondent-firm that the Award of compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs in lieu of the reinstatement and 50% back wages by the High Court is on account of the alleged closure of the respondent establishment is neither supported by any pleading nor any evidence has been adduced before the Labour Court or this Court in that regard by the respondent-establishment. If any additional material is produced before the High Court, the same would be impermissible in law for the reason that the respondent-employer was required to plead with regard to the alleged closure and substantial evidence must be produced in support of the same before the Labour Court at the first instance, and no such plea has been taken before the Labour Court by them. In absence of such a plea, producing additional documents by the respondent-establishment before the High Court is totally impermissible in law for the reason that the High Court’s jurisdiction is to examine the correctness of the Award passed by the Labour Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is very limited. In the present case, even if we consider the facts, there is no additional material evidence produced on record before the High Court and it has no jurisdiction to receive the same and render its findings. Apart from the said reason no other reason has been assigned by the High Court in its judgment and order for modifying the Award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, the legal contention urged in this regard on behalf of the respondent-establishment is misconceived and the same is liable to be rejected.

 NON-REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4370 OF 2015
                 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 29960 of 2014)

RAJ KUMAR DIXIT                           …APPELLANT

                                       Vs.

M/S.VIJAY KUMAR GAURI SHANKER,
KANPUR NAGAR                             …RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T


V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

    Leave granted.

 This appeal is directed against  the  impugned  final  judgment  and  order
dated 02.07.2014 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at  Allahabad,  in
Writ Petition No.19573 of 2010, whereby the High Court quashed the  judgment
and order of the Labour Court, Kanpur, in Adjudication Case  No.66  of  2009
dated 03.07.2009, wherein the Labour Court  directed  the  reinstatement  of
the appellant-workman in his post along with 50% back wages. The High  Court
modified the Award by granting compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs  to  be  paid  to
the appellant-workman in place of the Award passed by the Labour Court.

  The factual matrix and the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of  the
parties are briefly stated hereunder with a view to  find  out  whether  the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court warrants interference by  this
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction  and  for  what  relief  the
appellant is entitled to?

  M/s.Vijay Kumar Gauri Shanker, the respondent-firm  herein,  was  carrying
on the business of transporting caustic  soda  from  M/s.Modi  Alkalies  and
Chemicals Ltd. in Alwar, Rajasthan. For the said  purpose,  the  respondent-
firm was in possession of seven tankers which  were  used  for  transporting
caustic soda from Alwar to the place of supply.

   It is the case of the appellant that he was working as an accounts  clerk
in the respondent-establishment from the year 1994  and  was  looking  after
all the factories of the respondent-establishment. Apart from  that  he  was
in charge of maintenance  of  all  the  seven  tankers  in  the  respondent-
establishment and was also looking after  the  transport  office  and  court
work of the respondent-employer and in return he was being  paid  Rs.1,800/-
per month along with bonus as  was  being  paid  to  other  workmen  of  the
respondent-establishment.

  On 11.6.2001, when the  appellant  who  had  fallen  sick  approached  the
respondent-firm for his outstanding salary, the  respondent-firm  terminated
him from his services.  However, the workmen who were  junior  to  him  were
still  working  in  the  respondent-establishment.   The   appellant-workman
requested for reinstatement of his services in his post but the  respondent-
establishment refused the same which action amounts to retrenchment as  they
have done so without following the mandatory conditions  as  provided  under
Section 6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (hereinafter,
“the Act”). Aggrieved by the order of termination, the appellant  raised  an
industrial dispute  before  the  Labour  Court,  Kanpur  narrating  all  the
relevant facts and grounds in support of his claim.

        The Labour Court on the basis of the pleadings of  the  parties  and
in accordance with the claim and written statements  of  the  appellant  and
the respondent and on re-appreciation of the evidence on record  adjudicated
the existing  industrial  dispute  between  the  parties  and  recorded  its
finding on the points of dispute referred to it in favour of  the  appellant
which are extracted in the narration of the facts and based on the  evidence
and circumstances of the case, it held that  the  appellant  was  under  the
employment of the respondent-firm and terminating him from his  services  by
the respondent-firm is in contravention to the provisions of Section 6N  and
other provisions of the Act which is improper and illegal. The Labour  Court
directed the respondent-firm to reinstate him in the said post and  pay  him
50% back wages from the date of termination till the date of passing of  the
Award.

   The correctness of the said  Award  was  challenged  by  the  respondent-
establishment before the High Court by filing writ petition  urging  various
legal grounds. The High Court, based on the findings  and  reasons  recorded
on the points of dispute, held that the  termination  order  passed  against
the appellant-workman is not legal.  The  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its
judicial review power  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India
modified the Award passed by the Labour Court, holding that the workman  has
neither stated anything with  regard  to  his  gainful  employment  nor  any
averments were made by him in  this  regard  during  the  aforesaid  period.
Therefore, awarding 50% back wages in favour of the workman  by  the  Labour
Court in its Award is held to be not justified and the High  Court  modified
the Award by awarding Rs.2 lakhs compensation in lieu of reinstatement  with
50% back wages as awarded by the Labour Court.

  The appellant-workman aggrieved by the judgment  and  order  of  the  High
Court has filed this appeal by special leave, urging various  legal  grounds
in support of his claim and prayed this Court  to  set  aside  the  impugned
judgment and order of the High Court  and  restore  the  Award  and  further
direct the respondent to reinstate him in his post and  pay  him  full  back
wages from the date of the Award passed by the Labour Court.

It has been contended by the learned counsel on  behalf  of  the  appellant-
workman that the services  of  the  workman  have  been  terminated  without
complying with the mandatory provisions  of  Section  6N  of  the  Act.  His
juniors  are  still  continuing  in  the  employment  of   the   respondent-
establishment while  his  services  were  arbitrarily  terminated  which  is
contrary to the law laid down by this  Court  in  a  catena  of  cases.  The
learned  counsel  has  further  contended  that  the   respondent-firm   has
erroneously claimed that the appellant-workman is not  an  employee  of  the
firm as he was carrying out the work  of  advocacy  in  the  courts  on  its
behalf whenever the tankers of the respondent-firm met with an accident.  It
has been further contended by him that the maintenance of  the  tankers  was
done by the appellant-workman  in  the  capacity  of  the  employee  of  the
respondent-firm as the said work could be carried out by an employee of  the
respondent-firm only. It has been further contended by the  learned  counsel
on behalf of the appellant-workman that the High  Court  has  erred  in  its
decision in holding that the  reinstatement  of  the  appellant-workman  was
unjustified since the respondent-firm has  closed  down  its  business.  The
High Court has further erred in its decision  in  holding  that  the  Labour
Court was not justified in passing an Award of reinstatement of the  workman
in his post with 50%  back  wages  as  the  Labour  Court  in  another  case
involving the driver working at the  establishment  of  the  respondent-firm
has not ordered his reinstatement which fact of  the  case  could  not  have
applied to the fact situation of the present  case  as  only  the  transport
business of the respondent-firm has closed down  and  its  other  businesses
are still continuing and the appellant-workman was working in  the  capacity
of an accounts clerk of the respondent-firm which does  not  disqualify  him
from reinstatement in his post.

On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned  counsel  on  behalf
of the  respondent-firm  that  the  appellant-workman  has  not  placed  any
evidence on record, either oral or documentary to the effect that he was  an
accounts clerk employed in the respondent-firm  and  as  such  there  is  no
master-servant relationship between him and the respondent-firm. Hence,  the
provisions of Section  6N  of  the  Act  are  not  applicable  to  the  fact
situation of the present case. It has been further  submitted  by  him  that
the management of the respondent-firm gave special power of Attorney to  the
appellant-workman for the purpose of getting the tankers released  from  the
custody of the police or the court and he has worked in that  capacity  only
and nothing more. For the said work the respondent-firm  used  to  give  him
fee for all the necessary expenses that he would incur with  regard  to  the
release of the tankers of  the  respondent-firm  from  the  custody  of  the
police or the court.

It has been further contended by the learned counsel that  since  M/s.  Modi
Alkalies and Chemicals Ltd. has been closed down in the year  2000  and  the
work of transporting caustic soda  from  the  said  factory  was  completely
stopped, therefore, the tankers of the respondent-firm  were  sold  off  and
all  the  licenses  of  the  tankers  were  surrendered  to  the  respective
authority. Hence, the Labour Court has erred in  directing  the  respondent-
firm to reinstate the workman with 50% back wages  and  the  same  has  been
rightly quashed by the High Court and modified the Award  by  awarding  Rs.2
lakhs towards compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back  wages  awarded
by the Labour Court.

We have heard both the learned counsel on behalf  of  the  parties.  On  the
basis of the aforesaid rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the
parties and on perusal of the findings recorded by the Labour Court  in  its
Award, we have to answer the points of dispute  on  the  basis  of  evidence
produced on record. We are of the view that the  conclusion  arrived  at  by
the High Court is erroneous in law in holding  that  the  appellant  workman
was not in employment under  the  respondent-firm  and  it  has  erroneously
quashed the Award of reinstatement of the appellant-workman  passed  by  the
Labour Court along with 50%  back  wages.  In  support  of  the  above  said
conclusion arrived at by us, we record our reasons hereunder:-

    It is an admitted fact that the respondent-firm used  to  authorise  the
appellant-workman on its behalf to do the work of releasing of  the  tankers
of the respondent-firm from the custody of police or the court whenever  the
tankers met with an accident and a special power of  Attorney  was  executed
by the respondent-firm in this regard  to  the  appellant-workman.  Further,
the respondent-firm also used to give him advance amount  for  the  expenses
that he would incur for carrying out the said  work.  The  appellant-workman
was also given bonus every year and the same has been recorded in the  cash-
book of the respondent-firm. The fact  that  the  respondent-firm  is  still
continuing with its business of trading betel nut and the new plea that  the
transport business of the respondent-firm has been shut down has  also  been
considered by us. The question that arises for  our  consideration  in  this
case, keeping in view the relevant facts, circumstances and the evidence  on
record is that whether the appellant-workman was gainfully employed  in  the
capacity of the clerk in the establishment of the respondent  firm  or  not.
The same is answered by the Labour Court in the positive, on  the  basis  of
the evidence on record in favour of the appellant for the  reason  that  one
would not simply authorize a person who is  not  even  an  employee  of  its
establishment for carrying on with the work of getting the tankers  released
from the custody of the police or the court. Further, the bonus received  by
the workman is only given in the case where he  would  be  employed  in  the
establishment of the respondent-firm. Thus, the contention  of  the  learned
counsel on behalf of the respondent-firm that the appellant-workman  is  not
the  employee  of  the  respondent-firm  and  there  is  no   master-servant
relationship between them, was rightly  rejected  by  the  Labour  Court  by
recording its reasons and holding that the concerned  workman  was  employed
in the establishment of the respondent-firm. Further, the payment of  labour
charges for the repair of the tankers was given to the workman through  bill
or voucher separately,  instead  of  it  being  mentioned  directly  in  the
invoices of the repair of the tankers, which evidence was  produced  by  him
before the Labour Court, the same  is  rightly  accepted  by  it  on  proper
appreciation in exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Further, various records such as court orders or the  report  given  at  the
police station were placed on record before the  Labour  Court  which  would
clearly  show  that  the  appellant-workman  worked  in  the   capacity   of
Munim/Clerk/Manager in the establishment of the  respondent-firm.  Even  the
power of Attorney executed by the respondent-firm clearly  states  that  the
appellant-workman was authorised to carry out whatever action  necessary  in
connection with the release of the tankers  of  the  respondent-firm  either
from the police custody or the court. Thus,  it  is  clear  from  the  above
evidence produced on record by the appellant before the  Labour  Court  that
he has worked in the capacity of not only a mechanic  in  the  establishment
of the respondent-firm but also as  an  accounts  clerk.  The  witnesses  on
behalf of the respondent-firm had further deposed before  the  Labour  Court
that the appellant-workman used to carry out the repair work of the  tankers
of the respondent-establishment on a regular basis and  the  said  work  was
done by the appellant-workman only.  Therefore, in the light  of  the  facts
and circumstances of the case and the evidence  admitted  on  record  before
the Labour Court and produced before this Court, it is amply clear that  the
appellant-workman was employed in the establishment of  the  respondent-firm
and he used to  carry  out  the  business  of  the  respondent-firm  in  the
capacity of an employee/clerk  and  not  just  a  third  party  agent  or  a
mechanic. Therefore, the High Court has gravely erred in quashing the  Award
of reinstatement of  the  appellant-workman  with  50%  back  wages  in  the
establishment of the respondent-firm by  awarding  a  compensation  of  Rs.2
Lakhs in lieu of the same which modification of  the  Award  of  the  Labour
Court is not  only  erroneous  but  also  suffers  from  error  in  law  and
therefore, the same is liable to be quashed by this Court.

Awarding compensation to an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs  to  the  workman  by  the
High Court in lieu of reinstatement of the appellant-workman along with  50%
back wages is once again contrary to the well settled principles of  law  as
has been laid down by this Court in a catena  of  cases,  particularly,  the
case of  Punjab  Land  Development  and  Reclamation  Corporation.  Ltd.  v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court,[1]  wherein  the  Constitution  Bench  held
that the order of termination simpliciter has to be held bad in law for non-
compliance of the mandatory requirements provided under the Act and  further
held that the order of termination will be rendered  void-ab-initio  in  law
and therefore, the workman is entitled for all  benefits  for  which  he  is
legally entitled to in law.

The High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in setting aside  the  Award
passed by the Labour Court  in  awarding  reinstatement  of  the  appellant-
workman in his post along with 50% back wages which is erroneous in  law  as
the High Court has not noticed the fact that the appropriate Government  has
referred the dispute to the Labour Court for its adjudication on the  points
of dispute referred to it. Since, there was non-compliance of the  mandatory
requirements as provided under the provisions of the Act by the  respondent-
firm at the time of passing an order of termination against  the  appellant-
workman, therefore, the same has been held to be bad in law and as  such  it
should have awarded full  back  wages  to  the  workman  from  the  date  of
termination till the date of passing the Award unless  the  employer  proves
that the workman was gainfully employed during the  aforesaid  period  which
fact is neither pleaded nor proved before the Labour Court.

Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court is  bad  in  law  as  the
normal rule to be  followed  by  the  respondent-firm  with  regard  to  the
termination of the services of the workman has not been done in the  present
case and further, the High Court has once again exceeded in its  supervisory
jurisdiction in exercise of its judicial review power under Article  227  of
the Constitution of India by setting aside the Award of  reinstatement  with
50% back wages passed by the Labour  Court  and  has  instead  awarded  Rs.2
lakhs as compensation to the appellant-workman which is contrary to the  law
laid down by this Court. The High  Court  cannot  exercise  its  supervisory
jurisdiction and act as either original court  or  appellate  court  to  set
aside the finding of fact recorded on the points of dispute referred to  the
Labour Court on proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence on  record  in
favour of the workman as has been done in the instant  case.  The  Award  of
compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs awarded in place of reinstatement with  50%  back
wages as awarded by the Labour Court has been modified  by  the  High  Court
without assigning any cogent and valid reason which is  not  only  erroneous
in law but suffers from error in law as well, as the  same  is  contrary  to
the catena of decisions of this Court. On this ground itself,  the  impugned
judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside and we  pass  an  order
to restore the Award passed by the Labour Court. Reliance  has  been  placed
in  the  case  of  Syed  Yakoob  v.  K.S.  Radhakrishan[2]  which  has  been
elaborately considered by this Court in  the  case  of  Harjinder  Singh  v.
Punjab State Warehousing Corporation[3], the relevant para  of  which  reads
thus:

“12. In Syed Yakoob case, this Court delineated the scope  of  the  writ  of
certiorari in the following words:

“7. The question about the limits of the  jurisdiction  of  High  Courts  in
issuing  a  writ  of  certiorari  under  Article  226  has  been  frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that  behalf  is  no
[pic]longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari  can  be  issued  for  correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these  are
cases where orders are  passed  by  inferior  courts  or  tribunals  without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure  to  exercise
jurisdiction.  A  writ  can  similarly  be  issued  where  in  exercise   of
jurisdiction conferred on it,  the  court  or  tribunal  acts  illegally  or
improperly, as for  instance,  it  decides  a  question  without  giving  an
opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the  order,  or  where  the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed  to  principles  of
natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to  issue
a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court  exercising
it  is  not  entitled  to  act  as  an  appellate  court.  This   limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by  the  inferior  court  or
tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence  cannot  be  reopened  or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which  is  apparent  on  the
face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not  an  error  of  fact,
however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of  fact  recorded
by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown  that  in
recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously  refused  to  admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously  admitted  inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a  finding
of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error  of  law
which can be corrected by  a  writ  of  certiorari.  In  dealing  with  this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that  a  finding  of
fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be  challenged  in  proceedings  for  a
writ of certiorari on the ground that the  relevant  and  material  evidence
adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate  to  sustain  the
impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence  led  on  a  point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are  within  the
exclusive jurisdiction of the  tribunal,  and  the  said  points  cannot  be
agitated  before  a  writ  court.  It  is  within  these  limits  that   the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a  writ
of certiorari can be legitimately exercised  (vide  Hari  Vishnu  Kamath  v.
Ahmad Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and  Kaushalya
Devi v. Bachittar Singh).

8. It is, of course, not easy to  define  or  adequately  describe  what  an
error of law apparent  on  the  face  of  the  record  means.  What  can  be
corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an  error
of law as can be regarded as one which  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the
record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion  of  law  recorded
by an inferior court or tribunal is based on  an  obvious  misinterpretation
of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in  ignorance  of  it,  or
may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded  on  reasons  which
[pic]are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected  by  a  writ  of
certiorari. In all  these  cases,  the  impugned  conclusion  should  be  so
plainly  inconsistent  with  the  relevant  statutory  provision   that   no
difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the  said  error
of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be  that  in  some
cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent  on  the  face
of the record as such and the court may need an  argument  to  discover  the
said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by  a  writ
of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the  whole,  be
of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is  an  error  of  law
apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision  is  reasonably
capable of two constructions and one construction has been  adopted  by  the
inferior court or tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always  be
open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion,  it  is  neither
possible  nor  desirable  to  attempt  either  to  define  or  to   describe
adequately all cases of errors  which  can  be  appropriately  described  as
errors of law apparent on  the  face  of  the  record.  Whether  or  not  an
impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is  apparent  on
the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and  circumstances
of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision  which  is
alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.””



The findings and reasons recorded by the High  Court  in  its  judgment  and
setting aside the award of the Labour Court is contrary to the  decision  of
this Court. Further, in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v.  Kranti  Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya[4], this Court, after adverting to  the  three  Judge
Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma v.  Central
Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court[5], has categorically  held  that
the termination order passed by  the  employer  is  the  subject  matter  of
dispute either before the Tribunal or before the Labour Court and it is  for
the employer to show that the workman was gainfully employed from  the  date
of the termination till the date of passing of the Award so as to  deny  him
back wages and this Court further held that if the termination order is  set
aside, the award of reinstatement is the normal rule  and  awarding  of  the
back wages must follow, the same need not  be  awarded  if  the  workman  is
either gainfully employed during  the  period  of  adjudication  or  if  the
employer is facing any financial crunch. The said decision of this Court  in
the Deepali Gundu Surwase’s case reads thus:

“24. Another three-Judge Bench considered the same issue in  Surendra  Kumar
Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and observed:

“6. … Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an  order  terminating
the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to  the  reinstatement  of  the
services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never  been,  and  so  it
must ordinarily lead to  back  wages  too.  But  there  may  be  exceptional
circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable  vis-à-vis  the
employer and workmen to direct  reinstatement  with  full  back  wages.  For
instance, the industry  might  have  closed  down  or  might  be  in  severe
financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might [pic]have secured better  or
other employment elsewhere and  so  on.  In  such  situations,  there  is  a
vestige of discretion left in the court to  make  appropriate  consequential
orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement  where  reinstatement
is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may  deny  the
relief of award of full back wages where  that  would  place  an  impossible
burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases  the  court  may
mould the  relief,  but,  ordinarily  the  relief  to  be  awarded  must  be
reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must  be  awarded  where  no
special impediment in the way of  awarding  the  relief  is  clearly  shown.
True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must  remember
that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain  to
be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than  to  the  employer  if
the relief is granted.”



The contention urged on behalf of the  respondent-firm  that  the  Award  of
compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs in lieu of the reinstatement and 50%  back  wages
by the High Court is on account of the alleged  closure  of  the  respondent
establishment is neither supported by any  pleading  nor  any  evidence  has
been adduced before the Labour Court or this Court in  that  regard  by  the
respondent-establishment. If any additional material is produced before  the
High Court, the same would be impermissible in law for the reason  that  the
respondent-employer was  required  to  plead  with  regard  to  the  alleged
closure and substantial evidence must be produced in  support  of  the  same
before the Labour Court at the first instance, and no  such  plea  has  been
taken before the Labour Court by them. In absence of such a plea,  producing
additional documents by the respondent-establishment before the  High  Court
is totally impermissible in  law  for  the  reason  that  the  High  Court’s
jurisdiction is to examine the  correctness  of  the  Award  passed  by  the
Labour Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article  227  of
the Constitution of India which is very limited. In the present  case,  even
if we consider the facts, there is no additional material evidence  produced
on record before the High Court and it has no jurisdiction  to  receive  the
same and render its findings. Apart from the said  reason  no  other  reason
has been assigned by the High Court in its judgment and order for  modifying
the Award passed by the Labour Court. Therefore, the legal contention  urged
in this regard on behalf of  the  respondent-establishment  is  misconceived
and the same is liable to be rejected.

The High Court has erred in its decision,  both  on  facts  and  in  law  in
setting aside the  order  of  reinstatement  with  50%  back  wages  to  the
workman. It is the workman  who  was  aggrieved  with  regard  to  the  non-
awarding of 50% back wages and this  aspect  of  the  matter  has  not  been
considered by the High Court while interfering with the Award of the  Labour
Court and awarding compensation  in  lieu  of  the  reinstatement  and  back
wages. Therefore, the appeal must succeed in this case. The  High  Court  in
awarding compensation to the workman has erroneously held that the order  of
reinstatement passed in favour of the appellant-workman is illegal and  void
ab initio in law without assigning valid and cogent reasons  and  therefore,
the same is liable to be set aside  as  there  has  been  a  miscarriage  of
justice. The grounds urged by the appellant in this case  are  well  founded
and we accordingly pass the following order:



The Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed  by  the  High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 19573  of  2010  dated
02.07.2014 is hereby set aside and the Award passed by the Labour  Court  in
awarding reinstatement with 50% back wages  from  the  date  of  termination
till the date of passing the Award by the Labour Court is restored.







We further direct the respondent-firm to pay full back wages to the  workman
from the date of passing of the Award by the Labour Court till the  date  of
his reinstatement in service. The  order  shall  be  complied  with  by  the
respondent-firm within six weeks from the date of receipt of  copy  of  this
order.




              ……………………………………………………………………………………J.
              [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]




                            ……………………………………………………………………………………J.

              [V. GOPALA GOWDA]


New Delhi,
  May 12, 2015
-----------------------
[1]


       (1990) 3 SCC  682
[2]    (1964)  AIR SC 477
[3]    (2010) 3  SCC 192
[4]    (2013) 10 SCC 324
[5]    (1980) 4 SCC 443

Thus, we find the accused respondents guilty under Section 20 of NDPS Act for possession of 11 Kgs. Ganja. The commercial quantity of Ganja is 20 Kgs. or more, and the accused are in possession of small quantity as per the Notification of the Central Government providing small and commercial quantities of various contrabands. In view of this, we convict the accused persons (Asha Devi and her husband Om Prakash) under Section 20 of the NDPS Act and sentence them to simple imprisonment for five years.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1953 OF  2009

STATE OF HARYANA                             … Appellant
                                  :Versus:
ASHA DEVI AND ANR.                     … Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1.    This appeal has been  filed  by  the  State  of  Haryana  against  the
judgment and order dated 10.12.2007 of the High Court of Punjab and  Haryana
at Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No.560-MA of 2007, whereby  the  High  Court
has declined to grant leave to the State to appeal against the acquittal  of
the respondents.

2.    The facts of this case, as per the  prosecution  story,  are  that  on
3.2.2006, when Sub Inspector Ram Phal, ASI  Rishi  Raj,  Constable  Surender
Singh, Lady Constables Babita Rani and Promila, were on  patrol  duty  in  a
police vehicle which was being  driven  by  Constable  Darshan  Singh,  near
Chimni Bai Dharamshala, NIT No.3, SI Ram Phal received a secret  information
that Om Prakash son of Moti Lal, and his wife Asha Devi, residents  of  Gali
No.1, Jhuggi Kalyanpuri, bring Ganja (intoxicated drug) from Madhya  Pradesh
and supply in Faridabad and if a raid is conducted at their house, Ganja  in
heavy quantity would  be  recovered.  On  receiving  this  information,  the
aforesaid police team raided the house of Om Prakash. On seeing  the  police
party, Om Prakash managed to escape by scaling over the wall of  the  house.
Asha Devi also tried to escape but she was  apprehended  with  the  help  of
Lady Constables. On query she disclosed her name as Asha wife of Om  Prakash
and also disclosed that the man who  had  escaped  from  the  house  was  Om
Prakash. A notice in writing under Section 50  of  the  Narcotic  Drugs  and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”, for short) was served on  her
informing her of the right to either allow the Sub Inspector to take  search
of her house or opt for the search in presence of some Gazetted  Officer  or
a Magistrate. Asha Devi consented for search of her house  in  the  presence
of some Gazetted Officer. Accordingly, Shri Maharaj Singh, the  then  Deputy
Superintendent of Police, NIT,  Faridabad,  reached  the  spot  and  in  his
presence the house of Asha Devi was searched.  Asha  Devi  unpacked  a  box,
took out a bag containing Ganja and produced it before  the  Sub  Inspector.
The bag was weighed and found to be contained 11 Kgs. of Ganja out of  which
two samples of 200 gms. each were taken and sealed  with  letters  “RP”  and
“MS” on the seal. Both the samples along with the residue and  the  specimen
seal impressions  were  taken  into  possession  by  the  police  under  the
recovery memo which was prepared by I.O. Ramphal and witnessed  by  ASI  Tej
Ram and ASI Rishiraj and attested by DSP Maharaj Singh  and  thumb  mark  of
Asha Devi. The case property along with the samples and the  witnesses  were
produced before the Station House Officer, who  after  verifying  the  facts
affixed  his  seal  thereon  and  were  deposited  in  the  Moharrer  Police
Malkhana. A case was registered against  accused  Asha  Devi  under  Section
20(61) of the NDPS Act and she was arrested. Thereafter, on 04.02.2006  case
property  and  both  samples  were  produced  before  the  learned  Judicial
Magistrate, 1st Class, Faridabad. The learned judicial Magistrate broke  the
seals on the case property as well one of the samples. The learned  Judicial
Magistrate verified the material, photographs were taken and contraband  was
weighed; thereafter the sample  was  resealed  with  the  seal  of  RP.  The
Judicial Magistrate  directed  the  Investigation  Officer  to  deposit  the
material to Judicial Malkhana. After investigation, accused  Asha  Devi  was
charged under Section 20 of the NDPS Act and accused Om Prakash was  charged
under Sections 28 & 29 of the NDPS Act. The accused pleaded not  guilty  and
hence the case was committed for trial.

3.    The Trial Court examined ten prosecution  witnesses  and  two  defence
witnesses. After going through the prosecution evidence  and  after  hearing
the learned counsel for the parties, the Trial Court  did  not  find  favour
with the prosecution version as according to it,  on  receiving  the  secret
information, Sub Inspector did not join any independent witness  during  the
investigation of the case despite the fact that they were available  at  the
spot. It further found that the seal “RP”  was  entrusted  to  ASI  Rishiraj
after sealing the case property and samples on 3.2.2006;  so,  I.O.  Ramphal
could not have possessed that seal the next day when the case  property  was
produced before  the  learned  judicial  magistrate.  However,  the  learned
judicial magistrate has testified to  the  fact  that  sample  was  resealed
after verification, photograph and weighment with  the  seal  of  “RP”.  The
learned Trial Court found it irreconcilable that seal “RP” could  have  been
available with the learned Judicial Magistrate  when  ASI  Rishiraj  is  not
there. Further, the Trial Court found non  production  of  ASI  Rishiraj  as
prosecution witness creates more suspicion. Also, ASI  Tej  Raj  (PW-2)  had
chased the accused Om Prakash when he was trying to  run  away  but  he  was
unable to apprehend him. This part of the story was  also  not  believed  by
the Trial Court for the reason that five constables  were  standing  outside
the house of Om Prakash and it was not  possible  for  Om  Prakash  to  have
scaled the wall of the house. The Trial Court  found  the  evidence  of  the
prosecution as completely inconsistent and untrustworthy and held  that  the
prosecution has failed to prove its charges against the accused  beyond  all
shadows of reasonable doubt and accordingly, acquitted the  accused  of  the
charges levelled against them.

4.    The State moved an application before the High  Court  of  Punjab  and
Haryana at  Chandigarh,  seeking  leave  to  appeal  against  the  order  of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The High Court vide  its  judgment  and
order dated 10.12.2007, declined to grant  leave  to  the  State  to  appeal
against the acquittal of  the  respondents  and  dismissed  the  application
filed by the State. The State of Haryana has, thus,  impugned  the  judgment
of the High Court before us.

5.    We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the State  of  Haryana
as  also  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  accused   respondents.


6.    The High Court was of the  view  that  the  Trial  Court  after  going
through the prosecution evidence and hearing the  learned  counsel  for  the
parties, rightly acquitted the accused as it did not find  favour  with  the
prosecution version and so far as the search conducted in  the  presence  of
the Gazetted Officer is  concerned,  the  same  was  nothing  but  a  casual
approach adopted by the Gazetted Officer while  effecting  the  recovery  of
the contraband (Ganja) and the  Investigation  Officer  did  not  offer  any
plausible explanation. ASI Rishi Raj was present with  the  seal  which  was
used at the time of effecting the recovery, no explanation  was  offered  by
the prosecution as to how the seal continued to remain in possession of  the
ASI Rishi Raj from the date of  seizure.  The  only  presumption  which  the
Trial Court drew is that the possibility of sample being  tampered  with  is
not ruled out. The High Court was of the view that it  is  not  a  fit  case
where leave to appeal is made out in favour of the  State  of  Haryana  and,
therefore, declined the same.

7.    We find that the High Court and Trial Court both relied on three  main
points to decide the matter against the State - (i) no independent  witness;
(ii) Om Prakash could not have fled in presence  of  five  police  officers;
and (iii) the link evidence of the  possession  of  seal  “RP”  transferring
from ASI Rishiraj to I.O. Ramphal is not proved. The assessment of  evidence
and consideration of the matter as regards these three points  by  both  the
Courts, in our view, is erroneous and cannot be termed as a possible view.

8.    We find that both the DSP Maharaj Singh as well as I.O.  Ramphal  have
deposed that public persons were available when the contraband  was  seized;
however, none of the public person acceded to their request of  joining  the
investigation as an independent witness. The  Courts  below  have  found  it
unbelievable but no reason  for  same  is  rendered.  In  our  opinion,  the
consistent statement of both the DSP as well as  I.O.  rather  enhances  the
veracity of the circumstances as put forth by  them.  With  respect  to  the
finding of the Courts below that Om Prakash could not have fled  away  after
scaling the wall and the police constables would have failed to  catch  hold
of  him;  we  find  the  Courts  below  have  proceeded  on  assumption  and
conjecture. There is nothing in  the  evidence  which  could  show  that  Om
Prakash could not have run away. There are positive  statements  by  several
prosecution witnesses that he ran away on seeing the police party and  these
statements have withstood the test of cross examination  as  well.  Further,
no other evidence was led to disprove the fact of running  away  of  accused
Om Prakash. So, we are of the view that the High Court and the  Trial  Court
were not correct in arriving at the said finding.

9.    There has been a controversy with respect to possession of  seal.  The
controversy is that I.O. Ramphal had given the seal “RP” to ASI Rishiraj  on
03.02.2006 after sealing the contraband and samples  thereof.  However,  the
next day when the case property was produced  before  the  learned  Judicial
Magistrate, after verification it was resealed again with “RP”.  The  Courts
below found the case of prosecution as doubtful inasmuch as  that  when  the
seal “RP” was in possession of ASI Rishiraj, how could  it  have  been  with
I.O. Ramphal the next day. We find, the more  important  evidence  was  with
respect to the sample which was sealed with “RP”. There  is  clear  evidence
that initially the samples were taken and  sealed  with  “RP”  and  “MS”  on
03.02.2006 at the place of seizure and thereafter, on same day,  SHO  Vikram
Singh also sealed the  said  samples  with  “SS”.  There  is  uncontroverted
evidence to the fact that the  samples  were  produced  before  the  learned
Judicial Magistrate, where seal of one sample was broken and  resealed  with
“RP”. Thereafter, the sample was deposited in Judicial Malkhana  from  where
it was sent to the FSL. The FSL report notes that the seal  was  intact  and
the sample was un-tampered.

10.   All the persons who possessed the contraband sample have been  brought
on record to support that no  tampering  was  done  with  the  samples.  The
Defence failed to  bring  out  anything  in  the  cross-examination  of  the
witnesses with respect to tampering of the samples. Thus, we find  that  the
samples were properly dealt with throughout and the same  was  found  to  be
Ganja. Going further, with respect to the seal that was handed over  to  ASI
Rishiraj, the Defence failed to cross-examine the I.O.  Ramphal  as  to  how
did  he  got  possession  of  seal  back  from  ASI  Rishiraj.  Under  these
circumstances, we do not believe that the  prosecution  was  duty  bound  to
explain the movement of the seal from one person to  another  in  the  given
circumstances. Since, the movement of sample has been proved  and  found  to
be regular, the prosecution has sufficiently proved its  case  to  establish
the guilt of the accused in the present case.

11.   We have noticed the decision of this Court in Allauddin  Mian  &  Ors.
Vs. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5.  In the said decision, this  Court  held
as under:-

“10. Even a casual glance at the provisions of  the  Penal  Code  will  show
that the punishments have  been  carefully  graded  corresponding  with  the
gravity of offences; in grave wrongs the punishments prescribed  are  strict
whereas  for  minor  offences  leniency  is  shown.  Here  again  there   is
considerable room for manoeuvre because the  choice  of  the  punishment  is
left to the discretion of the judge  with  only  the  outer  limits  stated.
There are only a few cases where a minimum  punishment  is  prescribed.  The
question then is what procedure does the judge follow  for  determining  the
punishment to be imposed in each case to fit the crime? The  choice  has  to
be made after following the procedure set out in sub-section (2) of  Section
235 of the Code. That sub-section reads as under:

If the accused  is  convicted,  the  judge  shall,  unless  he  proceeds  in
accordance with the provisions of Section  360,  hear  the  accused  on  the
question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.

The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy  the  rule  of
natural justice. It is a fundamental  requirement  of  fair  play  that  the
accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution  evidence  on  the
question of guilt should,  on  being  found  guilty,  be  asked  if  he  has
anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence.  This
is all the more necessary since the courts are generally  required  to  make
the choice from a wide range of discretion in the matter of  sentencing.  To
assist the court in determining the  correct  sentence  to  be  imposed  the
legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235.  The  said  provision
therefore satisfies a  dual  purpose;  it  satisfies  the  rule  of  natural
justice by according to the accused an opportunity of  being  heard  on  the
question of sentence and at the same time helps  the  court  to  choose  the
sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the  accused
an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having  a
bearing on the  question  of  sentence  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the
provision  is  salutary  and  must  be  strictly  followed.  It  is  clearly
mandatory and should not be treated  as  a  mere  formality.  Mr  Garg  was,
therefore, justified in making a grievance that  the  trial  court  actually
treated it as a mere formality as is evident from the fact that it  recorded
the finding of guilt [pic]on 31-3-1987, on the same day before  the  accused
could absorb and overcome the shock of conviction they were  asked  if  they
had anything to say on the question of sentence and  immediately  thereafter
the decision imposing the death penalty on the two accused  was  pronounced.
In a case of life or death as stated earlier,  the  presiding  officer  must
show a high decree of concern for the statutory right  of  the  accused  and
should not treat it as a mere formality to  be  crossed  before  making  the
choice of sentence. If the choice is made, as in this case,  without  giving
the accused an effective and real  opportunity  to  place  his  antecedents,
social and economic background, mitigating  and  extenuating  circumstances,
etc., before the court, the  court’s  decision  on  the  sentence  would  be
vulnerable. We need hardly mention that in many cases a sentencing  decision
has far more serious consequences on the offender  and  his  family  members
than  in  the  case  of  a  purely  administrative  decision;  a   fortiori,
therefore, the principle of fair play must apply with greater vigour in  the
case of the former than the latter. An administrative decision having  civil
consequences, if taken without giving a hearing is generally struck down  as
violative of the rule of natural justice.  Likewise  a  sentencing  decision
taken without following the requirements of sub-section (2) of  Section  235
of the Code in letter and spirit would also meet  a  similar  fate  and  may
have to be replaced by an  appropriate  order.  The  sentencing  court  must
approach the question seriously and must  endeavour  to  see  that  all  the
relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the  question  of  sentence  are
brought on record. Only after giving due weight to the  mitigating  as  well
as the aggravating circumstances placed before it,  it  must  pronounce  the
sentence. We  think  as  a  general  rule  the  trial  courts  should  after
recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date and  call  upon
both the prosecution as well as the defence to place the  relevant  material
bearing on the question of sentence before it and thereafter  pronounce  the
sentence to be imposed on the offender. In the present case, as pointed  out
earlier, we  are  afraid  that  the  learned  trial  Judge  did  not  attach
sufficient importance to the mandatory requirement  of  sub-section  (2)  of
Section 235 of the Code. The High Court also had before it only  the  scanty
material placed before the learned Sessions  Judge  when  it  confirmed  the
death penalty.”


12.   Thus, we find the accused respondents guilty under Section 20 of  NDPS
Act for possession of 11 Kgs. Ganja. The commercial quantity of Ganja is  20
Kgs. or more, and the accused are in possession of  small  quantity  as  per
the Notification of the Central Government providing  small  and  commercial
quantities of various contrabands. In view of this, we convict  the  accused
persons (Asha Devi and her husband Om Prakash) under Section 20 of the  NDPS
Act and sentence them to simple imprisonment for five years.

13.   Before sentencing, following the  principle  laid  down  in  Allauddin
Mian  (supra),  this  matter  was  adjourned,  giving  a   chance   to   the
respondents/accused to place  facts  before  us  and  further  directed  the
appellant to find out about  the  conduct  of  the  respondents  after  this
incident and to inform this Court.   On  the  adjourned  date,  the  learned
counsel for the appellant and learned counsel  for  the  respondents/accused
expressed that the respondents thereafter were not found  to  be  implicated
in any other matter. After hearing the learned counsel for the  parties  and
after giving due weight  to  the  mitigating  as  well  as  the  aggravating
circumstances placed before us, we think that it would be proper for  us  to
convict the accused persons with the sentence  passed  by  us,  which  would
serve the purpose.

14.   Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and order passed  by  the  High
Court as also by the Trial Court and  direct  that  the  accused/respondents
shall be taken into custody forthwith to undergo the  sentence.  The  appeal
is accordingly allowed.



….....….……………………J
(Pinaki Chandra  Ghose)




….....…..…………………..J
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
May 12, 2015.
ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.11               SECTION IIB
(For judgment)
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

                     Criminal Appeal  No(s).  1953/2009

STATE OF HARYANA                                   Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

ASHA DEVI & ANR.                                   Respondent(s)



Date : 12/05/2015      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. Rakesh K. Mudgal, AAG
                       Mr. Dinesh Mudgal, Adv.
                       For Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen, AOR

For Respondent(s)      Mr. Ravi Kumar Tomar, AOR


      Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra  Ghose  pronounced  the  reportable
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.  Justice  Uday
Umesh Lalit.
      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  reportable  judgment  as
follows:
      “Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and order passed by  the  High
Court as also by the Trial Court and direct that the     accused/respondents
shall be    taken into custody    forthwith to    undergo the sentence.  The
appeal is accordingly allowed.”

      (R.NATARAJAN)                                 (SNEH LATA SHARMA)
       Court Master                                    Court Master
            (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)