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Friday, February 27, 2015

whether after the disposal of the appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether he continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed by the Court? -when a Receiver is appointed pending suit or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep an account of rent and profits that may be realized by the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the lis is finally decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers who are appointed comes to an end with the final decision of the case. However, even after the final decision, the Court has the discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as and when the need arises. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellants have already put the decree in execution for recovery of possession. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Executing Court while executing the decree may take assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in accordance with law and not more than that.=2015 SC msklawreports.


     

the suit property was  declared  as  evacuee  property
and the same was purchased by the appellant in an auction sale as  far  back
as on 15.6.1964.  In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit  being  Civil
Suit No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court seeking  specific
performance of the sale of the property and possession  and  interim  relief
of injunction restraining the defendants therein from  carrying  on  further
construction on the suit property. The appellant further made a  prayer  for
appointment of Receiver. Trial court rejected to appoint receiver. 
But High court appointed the receiver.
The High Court while making  appointment  of
the Receiver directed to take possession  of  the  suit  property. 
 All  the
persons who were in actual possession of any part of the suit property  were
continued to remain in possession.  The Receiver  was  directed  to  collect
rent and compensation as the case may be from  all  the  persons  in  actual
possession after verifying from  them  their  present  right  to  remain  in
possession. The High Court further directed that the  Receiver  should  take
suitable  direction  from  the  court  if  he  was  presented  with      any
particular difficulty.
 Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed  of  on  4.2.1998.   While
disposing the suit, the trial court gave liberty to the  plaintiff-appellant
to move the High Court for directions for  taking  possession  of  the  suit
property from the Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court.
The  High  Court  after  taking  into
consideration these Court Receiver's  reports,  passed  the  impugned  order
holding that the receiver shall be deemed to have been discharged after  the
dismissal of the first appeal by the High Court, followed  by  dismissal  of
the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court.
Apex court held that
In our view, when a Receiver is appointed pending suit or appeal,  the
prime objective  is  to  preserve  the  property  by  taking  possession  or
otherwise and to keep an account of rent and profits that  may  be  realized
by the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the  lis  is  finally
decided.  Ordinarily the function of receivers who are  appointed  comes  to
an end with the final decision of the case.  However, even after  the  final
decision, the Court has the discretion to take  further  assistance  of  the
Receiver as and when the need arises.  In the instant case, admittedly,  the
appellants have  already  put  the  decree  in  execution  for  recovery  of
possession.  We are, therefore, of the  opinion  that  the  Executing  Court
while executing the decree  may  take  assistance  of  the  Receiver  or  by
appointing  new  Receiver  or  Commissioner  for   effecting   delivery   of
possession in accordance with law and not more than that.

 In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find  any  error
in the impugned order passed by the High  Court.   The  Civil  Appeals  are,
therefore, of no merit and are dismissed. - 2015 SC msklawreports

Representation of the People Act, 1951 Section 86 (7) - Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial.=election disputes under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 should be resolved expeditiously. The purpose is obvious. The tenure of the members of the Parliament as well as the Legislature of the State is relatively short. It is five years in the case of Lok Sabha and Legislative Assembly, and six years in the case of Rajya Sabha and Legislative Council. Therefore, if there is a dispute regarding the election of any member of any one of the said bodies, it is desirable that the dispute is resolved as early as possible for various reasons.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2538-40 OF 2015
            (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.  2487-2489 of 2015)

Mohd. Akbar                                  ...Appellant

Versus

Ashok Sahu & Ors.                                  ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T


Chelameswar,  J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The General Election to Chhattisgarh Legislative Assembly  took  place
in 2013.   The appellant herein is one of the contesting candidates for  72-
Kawardha Legislative Assembly Constituency.

3.     Polling  took  place  on  19.11.2013.  The  result  was  declared  on
8.12.2013.   First respondent was declared elected.  The  appellant  secured
the second highest number of votes in the said election.  On 20.1.2014,  the
appellant filed Election Petition No. 4 of 2014 challenging the election  of
the first respondent on various grounds including the commission of  certain
corrupt practices.  On 29.1.2014, the  High  Court  issued  summons  to  the
respondents.

4.    It appears that matter was listed  on  25.3.2014.    It  is  not  very
clear from the records whether all  the  respondents  were  served  or  not.
But from copy of the order dated 25.3.2014, it appears that only  respondent
Nos. 1, 5, 9 and 10 were represented by counsel and other  respondents  were
not represented.   The High Court recorded an order as follows:-
"There is an oral prayer made for  extension  of  time  for  filing  written
statement but there is no application is writing in that regard.

In the interest of justice, three days time is granted  to  learned  counsel
for the respondent to file application if any."

5.    On 26.3.2014, the first respondent herein  filed  two  applications  -
one invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  (for
short "CPC") and another  raising  certain  preliminary  objections  to  the
maintainability of the election petition.

6.    On 2.4.2014, two more interlocutory applications  came  to  be  filed,
one each at the instance of respondent No. 1 and  10  seeking  extension  of
time for filing the written statement.  The said applications  were  allowed
and the High Court granted another 30 days'  time  for  filing  the  written
statement.

7.    Thereafter the matter underwent number of  adjournments,  the  details
of which may not be necessary for the purpose of this  order.    Eventually,
arguments on Order VII Rule 11 CPC were heard in part on 27.6.2014.    After
two more adjournments, on 1.7.2014 arguments on the said  applications  were
concluded and the matter was fixed for orders  on  21.7.2014.  However,  the
order was not pronounced and the matter was again  adjourned  for  30.7.2014
on which date the interlocutory applications filed by the  respondents  were
dismissed.

8.    On 14.8.2014, appearance was entered on behalf of respondent No. 8  by
one Shri Ashish Shrivastav, who is none other than the  brother  of  Justice
Manindra M. Srivastava who was the  Judge  hearing  the  Election  Petition.
Justice Manindra Srivastava promptly recused from the election petition  and
in our  opinion  rightly.   On  such  recusal,  the  election  petition  was
allotted to another learned Judge.

9.    In the meanwhile on 26.8.2014, a complaint  regarding  the  appearance
by the above-mentioned Ashish  Srivastav  was  made  to  the  Hon'ble  Chief
Justice.   The election petition was further adjourned.

10.   It appears that respondent  No.  8  filed  another  application  under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.  But, the  counsel  for  respondent  No.  8,  Shri
Ashish Srivastava filed an application seeking permission  to  withdraw  his
Vakalatnama.   The said application was allowed  by  the  High  Court.    On
28.11.2014, a Vakalatnama came to be filed by Shri B.P. Gupta on  behalf  of
the respondent No. 1 though there is another counsel on record already.   It
appears that at the instance of Shri B.P. Gupta, the matter was  once  again
adjourned ostensibly to enable Shri B.P. Gupta to get ready with  the  case.
On 4.12.2014, the application filed by the respondent No. 8 under Order  VII
Rule 11 came to be dismissed.

11.   Broadly, it is in the above-mentioned background the instant SLP  came
to be filed complaining that notwithstanding the mandate of Section 86, sub-
Section (7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,  the  High  Court
has not disposed of the election petition so far.   Section 86, sub-
Section (7) reads as follows:-
Section 86 (7) - Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously  as
possible and endeavour shall be  made  to  conclude  the  trial  within  six
months from the date on which the election  petition  is  presented  to  the
High Court for trial.


12.   It was the pious hope of the Parliament that election  disputes  under
the  Representation  of  the   People   Act,   1951   should   be   resolved
expeditiously.   The purpose is obvious.  The tenure of the members  of  the
Parliament as well as the Legislature of the State is relatively short.   It
is five years in the case of Lok Sabha and  Legislative  Assembly,  and  six
years in the case of Rajya Sabha  and  Legislative  Council.  Therefore,  if
there is a dispute regarding the election of any member of any  one  of  the
said bodies, it is desirable that  the  dispute  is  resolved  as  early  as
possible for various reasons.
(i)    Membership  of  the  Legislative  bodies  under  the  scheme  of  our
constitution is a sacred responsibility. The continuance of  any  member  in
such  bodies  who  secured  his  election  to  such  a   body   by   legally
impermissible means even for a day is  most  undesirable.  Such  continuance
affords an opportunity to such a member to  take  part  in  the  law  making
process affecting the destinies of the people.
(ii)  Even from the point of view of the contesting candidates,  unless  the
rights and the  obligations  are  decided  within  a  reasonable  time,  the
adjudication and the consequences of the adjudication may eventually  remain
on paper without any tangible effect insofar as the  participation  of  such
parties in the legislative process.

13.   However, we are  sad  to  state  that  invariably  the  resolution  of
election disputes in this country takes unacceptably long  periods  in  most
of the cases.  Very rarely an election  dispute  gets  resolved  during  the
tenure of the declared candidate reducing the adjudicatory  process  into  a
mockery of justice.  Such delay coupled with  a  right  of  appeal  to  this
Court makes the whole process of adjudication a task in  a  good  number  of
cases.   The reasons are many, we will only mention few;
The stakes are very high for the parties.  Nothing short of  the  membership
of a constitutional body for a limited period. The power and glory  that  go
with such membership is too high and valuable and  the  returned  candidates
naturally leave no stone unturned for protracting the litigation as long  as
possible.

The  law  of  elections  and  election   disputes   is   highly   technical.
Therefore, there is always scope for lot of objections and  cross-objections
regarding every step in the conduct of the election petition.

The absence of dedicated Benches in the High Court  for  resolution  of  the
election disputes is another factor  which  contributes  enormously  to  the
delay in the adjudicatory process.

14.   We therefore deem it desirable  that  in  each  High  Court  dedicated
Benches are  created  by  the  Chief  Justice  to  deal  with  the  election
petitions exclusively.   In other words,  those  judges  assigned  with  the
adjudication of election petitions preferably may not be burdened  with  any
other work until the adjudication of the election  petitions  is  completed.
An exercise which may not be difficult especially the  class  of  litigation
occurs only once in 5 or 6 years and the  number  of  cases  would  be  very
limited.  We are conscious of the fact that it is not  possible  for  laying
down any absolute rules in this regard.   Essentially  it  is  for  a  Chief
Justice of the High Court to run the  administration  and  devise  ways  and
means for expeditiously disposing of  the  cases  brought  before  the  High
Court.   We only gently remind that the kind of delay  in  the  adjudication
of election disputes exposes the High Court's unpleasant criticism  damaging
the  credibility  of  the  institution.   A  situation  which  is  certainly
required to be avoided at any cost.

15.   The facts of the present case are telling. Some 15  months  after  the
election, the trial of the election petition has not yet commenced.  In  the
circumstances, we deem it appropriate to request the Chief Justice  to  take
necessary steps for  disposal  of  the  Election  Petition  No.  4  of  2014
expeditiously, by devising such appropriate measures as  the  Hon'ble  Chief
Justice may deem fit and proper in the circumstances.

16.   We also place on record our disapproval of the tactics adopted by  the
respondents in engaging counsel whose appearance is bound to  embarrass  the
presiding Judge and we feel sad for the  noble  profession,  some  of  whose
members are willing to take part in such unwholesome practices.

17.   Appeals are accordingly disposed of.


                                       ...................................J.
                                                         (J. Chelameswar)


                                       ...................................J.
                                            (Rohinton Fali Nariman)
New Delhi;
February 27, 2015

-----------------------
8


inadequacy of the sentence in the present appeal filed by the State. Moreover, in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court does not re-appreciate the evidence, in absence of perversity or patent legal error, merely because a different view was also possible. We are thus, not inclined to reopen the correctness of conviction of the respondent and proceed to consider the question of adequacy of the sentence. In our view, the sentence of mere fine of Rs.40,000/- imposed by the High Court is not adequate and proportionate to the offence. We have been informed that a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- has been awarded as compensation by the insurance company to the heirs of the deceased. We are also of the view that where the accused is unable to pay adequate compensation to the victim or his heir, the Court ought to have awarded compensation under Section 357A against the State from the funds available under the Victim Compensation Scheme framed under the said section. This Court has dealt with the issue in Suresh vs. State of Haryana[1], Manohar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.99 of 2015 decided on 16.1.2015) and State of M.P. vs. Mehtaab (Criminal Appeal No.290 of 2015 decided on 13.2.2015). Having regard to totality of circumstances of the present case, we feel that ends of justice will be served if the accused is required to pay total compensation of Rs.1 lakh and the State to pay a sum of Rs.3 lakhs. 14. Accordingly, we modify the impugned order passed by the High Court and enhance the compensation to be paid by the respondent accused to Rs.1 lakh to be paid within four months failing which the sentence awarded by the Court of Session shall stand revived. In addition, we direct the State of Himachal Pradesh to pay interim compensation of Rs.3 lakhs. In case the respondent fails to pay any part of the compensation, that part of compensation will also be paid by the State so that the heirs of the victim get total sum of Rs. 4 lakhs towards compensation. The amount already paid may be adjusted.

REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 393 OF 2015
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.4213 OF 2013)



STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                              ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

RAM PAL                                                       ...RESPONDENT









                               J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    This appeal has been preferred against judgment and order  dated  27th
February, 2013 passed by the High Court of Himachal  Pradesh  at  Shimla  in
Criminal Appeal No.406 of 2011.

3.    Only  question  raised  for  consideration  is  whether  the  sentence
imposed in the facts and circumstances is fair and just.

4.    On 20th August, 2009 at 5.35 P.M. FIR was lodged by PW 3  Chhering  to
the effect that he was a mason in  the  work  of  construction  of  road  at
Gulaba near Manali.  At  2.30  P.M.,  a  tanker  driven  by  the  respondent
accused struck the deceased Sonam a 20 year old girl, which was  on  account
of rash and negligence driving by the respondent.  The injured was taken  to
Mission hospital, Manali where she was declared  dead  on  arrival.    After
completing the investigation, the accused was sent up for trial.

5.    The prosecution examined  six  witnesses,  namely,  PW  1  Dr.  Balbir
Rawat, PW 2 Budhi Singh, PW 3 Chhering, PW 4 Smt. Seema, PW 5  Sange  Sherpa
and PW 6 SI Om Chand.  The accused took up the plea that the  deceased  came
under the rear tyre after a part of the vehicle had  already  crossed.   The
girl had come running and struck against the vehicle and the  appellant  was
not rash or negligent in driving.

6.    The trial Court noted that the vehicle was coming uphill  as  admitted
by PW 4 Seema.  It was also admitted that the girl was struck  on  the  back
side of the vehicle.  The vehicle was going uphill on a road,  condition  of
which was bad.  Thus, the vehicle could not be at high speed.

7.    On appeal, the view taken by the trial Court  was  reversed.   It  was
held that even if the vehicle was  going  at  slow  speed  and  uphill,  the
vehicle could have been stopped and its striking  to  the  girl  could  have
been prevented.  Undoubtedly, the death was because of vehicle  hitting  the
girl which in the circumstances was clear result of rash and  negligent  act
of driving.  Accordingly,  the  appellate  Court  convicted  the  respondent
under Section 279 and 304 A IPC and awarded  sentence  of  imprisonment  for
six months and fine of Rs.1000,  in  default  further  imprisonment  of  one
month under Section 304 A IPC and concurrent imprisonment for  three  months
and fine of Rs.500, in default further imprisonment of  fifteen  days  under
Section 279 IPC.

8.    The respondent accused preferred appeal to the High  Court.  The  High
Court noticed the post mortem report to the effect that "the cause of  death
of the deceased was crush injury  of  lumbo-sacral  spine  and  pelvic  bone
leading to cardio respiratory arrest".  It was  inferred  that  such  injury
could be possible only with rash and negligent driving.   However,  sentence
of imprisonment was set aside and substituted by  fine  of  Rs.40,000/-,  in
default of which sentence awarded by the trial Court  was to revive.

9.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

10.   Learned counsel for the State   pointed out that it was  the  duty  of
the Court to award just and fair sentence.  If a liberal view was  taken  on
sentence of imprisonment, reasonable amount of compensation was required  to
be awarded.  On this  text,  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court  is  not
sustainable.  The amount of  Rs.40,000/-  cannot  be  held  to  be  adequate
compensation when life of a young girl aged 20 years was lost.

11.   Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the  accused  was  a
poor man and a driver and could not pay more  amount  as  compensation.   He
also submitted that even though it was a case  of  driving  in  a  difficult
terrain where different parameters  ought  to  be  applied  for  determining
negligence.

12.   We have given our anxious consideration to the rival  submissions  and
perused the record.

13.   It is evident from the facts and circumstances of the  case  that  the
respondent has not called in question his conviction.   We  have  before  us
only challenge to the inadequacy of  the  sentence  in  the  present  appeal
filed by the State.   Moreover, in  an  appeal  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution, this Court does not re-appreciate the evidence, in absence  of
perversity or patent legal error, merely because a different view  was  also
possible.   We  are  thus,  not  inclined  to  reopen  the  correctness   of
conviction of the  respondent  and  proceed  to  consider  the  question  of
adequacy of the sentence.  In  our  view,  the  sentence  of  mere  fine  of
Rs.40,000/- imposed by the High Court is not adequate and  proportionate  to
the offence.  We have been informed that a sum  of  Rs.3,60,000/-  has  been
awarded as compensation by  the  insurance  company  to  the  heirs  of  the
deceased.  We are also of the view that where the accused is unable  to  pay
adequate compensation to the victim or his heir, the  Court  ought  to  have
awarded compensation under Section 357A against the  State  from  the  funds
available under  the  Victim  Compensation  Scheme  framed  under  the  said
section.  This Court has dealt  with  the  issue  in  Suresh  vs.  State  of
Haryana[1], Manohar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan  &  Ors.  (Criminal  Appeal
No.99 of 2015 decided on 16.1.2015) and State of M.P. vs. Mehtaab  (Criminal
Appeal No.290 of 2015 decided on 13.2.2015).  Having regard to  totality  of
circumstances of the present case, we feel that  ends  of  justice  will  be
served if the accused is required to pay total  compensation  of  Rs.1  lakh
and the State to pay a sum of Rs.3 lakhs.

14.   Accordingly, we modify the impugned order passed  by  the  High  Court
and enhance the compensation to be paid by the respondent  accused  to  Rs.1
lakh to be paid within four months failing which  the  sentence  awarded  by
the Court of Session shall stand revived.  In addition, we direct the  State
of Himachal Pradesh to pay interim compensation of Rs.3 lakhs.  In case  the
respondent fails  to  pay  any  part  of  the  compensation,  that  part  of
compensation will also be paid by the State so that the heirs of the  victim
get total sum of Rs. 4 lakhs towards compensation.  The amount already  paid
may be adjusted.

15.   The appeal is disposed of accordingly.


                                    ......................................J.
                                                 [T.S. THAKUR]



                                  ........................................J.
                                             [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 27, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    2015 (2) SCC 227

whether any direct link has been shown between dowry demand and death, in the case of Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641, the accused has been convicted under Sections 113B and 304B of the IPC, on the basis of presumption, since certain foundational facts were established. In the present case, it has been established from the versions of PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 that there was a demand for dowry and the deceased was being mentally harassed. 17. In the case of Thanu Ram v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 353, this Court has observed certain criteria with regard to establishment of guilt in the cases of dowry death. The first criterion being that the suicide must have been committed within seven years of marriage. The second criterion is that the husband or some relative of the husband had subjected the victim to cruelty, which led to the commission of suicide by the victim. This is when Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act indicates that in such circumstances, the Court may presume, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. In the present case that we are dealing with, both the above mentioned criteria have been satisfied, since the deceased died within seven years of marriage and with the version of the witnesses, it has been further proved that there was cruelty meted out to the deceased immediately before her unfortunate death. 18. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the High Court or the Trial Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 186 OF 2010

Amrutlal Liladharbhai Kotak & Ors.                       .....Appellants

                                  :Versus:

State                               of                               Gujarat
.....Respondent





                                  JUDGMENT

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

   1. This criminal appeal,  by  special  leave,  is  directed  against  the
      impugned common judgment dated June 17, 2009  of  the  High  Court  of
      Gujarat whereby the High Court dismissed Criminal  Appeal  No.1327  of
      2004 filed by the appellants and confirmed the  order  passed  by  the
      Trial Court. The High Court in the present matter upheld the  sentence
      as awarded by the Trial Court by stating that the evidence led by  the
      complainant (PW-1), the elder sister of the deceased  (PW-8)  and  the
      grandfather of the deceased (PW-9) gets support from the evidence  led
      by PW-7, who are the friends and relatives of the deceased.

   2. The case of the Prosecution is that  the  marriage  between  Truptiben
      (the deceased) and the appellant No.3 herein took place on 01.05.1996.
      Truptiben was  the  daughter  of  one  Kantilal  Dhanjibhai  Karia  of
      District  Rajkot  in  Gujarat.  After  the  marriage,  Truptiben   was
      residing in a joint family with her in-laws appellant Nos.1 and 2  and
      her husband appellant No.3 at Morbi, Gujarat. Out of the said wedlock,
      a girl named Gopi was born.




   3. On 23.03.2000 at around 1130 Hrs, while Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia  was
      discharging his duties in the Bank of Baroda at Rajkot, he received  a
      telephonic message from Appellant No.1, that his daughter  is  hanging
      by the fan and  that  he  may  immediately  come  to  Morbi.  Kantilal
      Dhanjibhai Karia informed  about the said telephonic  message  to  his
      nearest relatives and thereafter, they all proceeded towards Morbi.




   4. In the meantime, Appellant No.1 had informed about the  said  incident
      to Morbi City Police Station. The  P.S.O,  who  was  on  duty  at  the
      relevant time, made the relevant entry in  the  Station  Register  and
      directed the ASI to investigate the matter. The ASI went to the  scene
      of the offence and carried out preliminary investigation. He  recorded
      the statement of Appellant No.1 and thereafter, sent a  yaadi  to  the
      P.S.O to register the incident as an accidental death, which  came  to
      be registered as A.D. No.16/2000. Thereafter, investigation  into  the
      said incident was  taken  over  by  Police  Inspector  Mr.  Jaynarayan
      Rameshwar Srivastav.   The  Investigating  Officer  informed  Kantilal
      Dhanjibhai Karia, the father of the deceased, of the said incident and
      in return he asked  the  Investigating  Officer  not  to  disturb  the
      position of the dead body of his daughter till he arrives at Morbi.




   5. The said Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia, the father of the deceased arrived
      at 1500 Hrs on the same day. He felt something fishy behind the  death
      of her daughter  Truptiben,  as  the  appellants  had  demanded  dowry
      several times in the past, which was further strengthened by the  fact
      that none of the appellants were present in the house at the  relevant
      point of time.




   6. On the same day, i.e on 23.03.2000, in the evening hours,  a  criminal
      complaint with regard to the said incident was filed by the father  of
      the deceased against the appellants,  which  ultimately,  came  to  be
      registered as I-C.R No. 92/2000 for offence punishable under  Sections
      498-A, 304-B & 306 read with Section 114 of the IPC. The body  of  the
      deceased was taken off the fan and sent for  post-mortem  examination.
      The investigation was  carried  out  and  the  statements  of  several
      witnesses were recorded.




   7. After the registration of the complaint  against  the  appellants,  an
      arrest warrant was issued by the concerned  Judicial  Magistrate,  1st
      Class, Morbi on  report  filed  by  the  Investigating  Officer  under
      Section 70 Cr.P.C, but the  appellants  were  untraceable.  They  were
      absconding  for  a  period  of  thirty  six  days  and  ultimately  on
      29.04.2000 at around 2130 Hrs., the appellants surrendered  themselves
      at the Morbi City Police Station.




   8. The appellants were produced in the court  of  the  District  &  Addl.
      Sessions  Judge,  Fast  Track  Court  No.7,  Morbi  in  Sessions  Case
      No.52/2000 and the trial was held. During  the  trial,  the  witnesses
      were examined at length. The witnesses PW-1 ,  PW-8  and  PW-9  stated
      that the deceased used  to  complain  about  the  mental  torture  and
      harassment frequently meted out to her  by  the  accused  due  to  the
      insufficient dowry provided during the  marriage.  This  evidence  was
      supported by PW-7, the friend of the  deceased  who  stated  that  the
      deceased had informed her that she  was  subject  to  frequent  mental
      torture and harassment by the accused for bringing  less  dowry.  This
      witness was also cross-examined at length by the other side alike  the
      other witnesses and based on the evidence provided by  the  witnesses,
      the accused were convicted for the offences punishable under  Sections
      498A, 304B & 306 IPC read with Section 114 IPC.




   9. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid  judgment  and  order
      passed by the Sessions  Court,  the  appellants  preferred  an  appeal
      before the High Court. The counsel for the appellants contended before
      the High Court that the  evidence  stated  by  the  relatives  of  the
      deceased are interested witnesses and their statements  could  not  be
      solely relied upon.




  10. The High Court opined out that the deceased died of a  suicidal  death
      is not a dispute though the evidence on record, more particularly, the
      photographs of the dead body at Exhibits 49/1 to 49/7 and the  inquest
      Panchnama, say an altogether different story. The High  Court  further
      observed that since it was an appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C, it  did
      not want to enter into the other aspect of the case and instead  focus
      on the present appeal. The evidence led by the complainant (PW-1), the
      elder sister (PW-8) and the grandfather of the  deceased  (PW-9)  gets
      support from the evidence  led  by  (PW-7)  who  are  the  friend  and
      relatives of the deceased. The High Court further opined out that  the
      evidence of PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9  clearly  establishes  that  the
      appellants were greedy people, who had started to demand  dowry  right
      from the date of marriage i.e on 01.05.1996.  It is the  case  of  the
      appellants  that  the  essential  ingredient  of  Section  304-B   IPC
      regarding the existence of cruelty soon before the death has not  been
      established by  the  prosecution.  The  High  Court  thus  upheld  the
      ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of conviction recorded  by
      the Trial Court.

  11. We have heard the learned counsels on both the sides.




  12. The counsel for the  appellant  contended  that  the  prosecution  has
      failed to substantiate the guilt of the appellants under Sections  306
      and 304B of IPC. The counsel further contended  that  to  satisfy  the
      conditions of Sections 304-B and 306 of the IPC, it must be shown that
      the deceased was incited, provided or virtually driven  to  committing
      suicide by the accused. The counsel for the appellant stated  that  in
      the case of Kishori Lal  v. State of M.P., (2007)  10  SCC  797,  this
      Court has held that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must
      be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of
      suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated wife with  cruelty  is
      not enough.




  13. The counsel for the appellants further stated  that  in  the  case  of
      Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India,  (2005) 6 SCC 281,  this  Court
      has held that the object of Section 498A of the IPC is to get  to  the
      root of  dowry  menace  and  its  unleashing  will  lead  to  a  legal
      terrorism. The provision is to be used as  a  shield  and  not  as  an
      assassin's weapon. The counsel further contended that in the  case  of
      Sakatar Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana,  (2004)  11  SCC  291,  this
      Court has held that such evidence which is not based on  the  personal
      knowledge of the witness  cannot  be  the  foundation  for  basing  of
      conviction. The learned counsel for the  appellant  further  contended
      that in the case of M. Srinivasulu v. State of  A.P.,  (2007)  12  SCC
      443, it was held by this Court that a presumption under  Section  113B
      of the Indian Evidence Act can be only raised in case of dowry  death,
      if there is concrete proof of cruelty and harassment meted out to  the
      deceased by the accused.   The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants
      further contended that merely because the accused was absconding,  the
      said fact cannot be made  the  basis  for  inferring  his  guilt.  The
      learned counsel cited the case of Matru v. State of U.P., reported  in
      (1971) 2 SCC 75 , where it has been held that the appellants'  conduct
      in absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion
      of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade
      arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime.

  14. We would like to conclude that going by the version provided by  PW-1,
      PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9, there is a reasonable apprehension of  the  crime
      committed by the accused. With regard to the position of law involving
      applicability of Sections 498A, 304B and 306 of the IPC, in  the  case
      of Balwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 15  SCC
      497, it has been held that Section 304B and Section 498A  of  the  IPC
      are not mutually inclusive. If  an  accused  is  acquitted  under  one
      section, it does not mean that the accused cannot be  convicted  under
      another section. According to Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,
      presumption arises when a woman has committed suicide within a  period
      of seven years from the date of the  marriage.  In  this  case,  after
      going  through  the  documentary  evidence  and  the  version  of  the
      witnesses, the accused were convicted under Sections 304B and 498A  of
      the IPC.  In the present case that we are dealing with,  a  reasonable
      apprehension can be raised, for that the  accused  committed  a  crime
      under Section 304B of the IPC and a presumption can  be  raised  under
      Section 113 B of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  since  seven  years  of
      marriage had not been completed.




  15. With regard to the applicability of Sections  113A  and  113B  of  the
      Indian evidence Act, in the case of State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh and
      Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 1, this Court observed that the legislative  intent
      is clear to curb the menace of dowry deaths, etc, with a firm hand. It
      must be remembered that since crimes are generally  committed  in  the
      privacy of residential homes, it is not easy to gather direct evidence
      in such cases. That is why the legislature has by introducing Sections
      113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence  Act,  tried  to  strengthen  the
      prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if  certain
      foundational facts are established and the unfortunate event has taken
      place within a period of seven years.




  16. With regard to whether any direct link has been  shown  between  dowry
      demand and death, in the case of Dinesh v. State of Haryana, 2014  (5)
      SCALE 641, the accused has been convicted under Sections 113B and 304B
      of the IPC, on the basis of presumption,  since  certain  foundational
      facts were established. In the present case, it has  been  established
      from the versions of PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 that there was a demand
      for dowry and the deceased was being mentally harassed.




  17. In the case of Thanu Ram v. State of M.P., (2010)  10  SCC  353,  this
      Court has observed certain criteria with regard  to  establishment  of
      guilt in the cases of dowry death. The first criterion being that  the
      suicide must have been committed within seven years of  marriage.  The
      second criterion is that the husband or some relative of  the  husband
      had subjected the victim to cruelty, which led to  the  commission  of
      suicide by the victim.  This  is  when  Section  113A  of  the  Indian
      Evidence Act indicates that  in  such  circumstances,  the  Court  may
      presume, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such
      suicide has been abetted by her husband or by  such  relative  of  her
      husband. In the present case that we are dealing with, both the  above
      mentioned criteria have been satisfied, since the deceased died within
      seven years of marriage and with the version of the witnesses, it  has
      been further proved that there was cruelty meted out to  the  deceased
      immediately before her unfortunate death.




  18. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the  impugned  judgment
      passed by the High Court or the Trial Court. The appeal is accordingly
      dismissed.









                                       .......................................
                                       ..J

                                                         (M.Y. EQBAL)




                                       .......................................
                                       ..J

                                                         (PINAKI CHANDRA
   GHOSE)

   New Delhi;


   February 26, 2015.

Section 376(2) of IPC, the legislature has empowered the Court to award lesser sentence where "adequate and special reasons" exist. The incident in the present case had taken place 20 years ago. The victim (prosecutrix) and the accused have entered into a compromise stating therein that the prosecutrix does not want to proceed with the case against the accused and wants to close the case. Both of them are married (not to each other) and have settled in life. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this is an "adequate and special reason" for awarding lesser sentence. 17. This Court has in the case of Baldev Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2011) 13 SCC 705, invoked the proviso to Section 376 (2) (g) of IPC on the consideration that the case was an old one. The facts of the above case also state that there was compromise entered into between the parties. 18. In light of the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of the opinion that the case of the appellant is a fit case for invoking the proviso to Section 376(2)(g) of IPC for awarding lesser sentence, as the incident is 20 years old and the fact that the parties are married and have entered into a compromise, are the adequate and special reasons. Therefore, although we uphold the conviction of the appellant but reduce the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1410  OF  2013

      Ravindra                                  ... Appellant

                                  :Versus:

      State of Madhya Pradesh                ... Respondent







                               J U D G M E N T

      Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

   1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order  dated
      12.3.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore,
      in Criminal Appeal No.1275 of 1997 whereby the High Court  has  upheld
      the sentence awarded to  the  appellant  by  the  Additional  Sessions
      Judge, Khargone, in S.T. No. 288/94. The  Trial  Court  convicted  the
      appellant under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal  Code  ("IPC",  for
      short) and sentenced him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine
      of Rs. 2000/-, and in default of payment  of  fine,  6  months  simple
      imprisonment.



   2. The factual matix of the case is  that  on  24.8.94,  the  complainant
      Narmadabai had gone to the field of the  accused  Ravindra  for  doing
      labour work. When she was plucking Moong Beans at about 12  O'  clock,
      accused Ravindra came near her, caught her hand, pushed her  down  and
      committed sexual intercourse without her  consent.  Complainant  cried
      but nobody was nearby. The Petticoat of the  complainant  was  stained
      with semen of the accused. After committing rape the accused fled away
      from the spot. The prosecutrix (PW1) came home and  she  narrated  the
      incident to her  parents.  Her  mother  called  her  maternal  uncles,
      Shankar  Singh  (PW4)  and  Pahadsingh  (PW5)  and   father   of   the
      prosecutrix. On the same day, an FIR was  lodged  by  the  prosecutrix
      (PW1) at Police Station Bhikagaon. The  complainant  and  the  accused
      were medically examined by Smt. Vandana Sarkanungo (PW3)  and  gave  a
      report.  On 1.09.1994 accused  was  arrested  vide  arrest  memo.  The
      clothes of the prosecutrix and the accused were sent to the FSL. After
      completion of the investigation, charge sheet  was  filed  before  the
      Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhikagaon, against the accused under
      Section 376 IPC which was registered as Criminal Case No.590/94.



   3. The findings of the lower Court, as stated in  the  impugned  judgment
      were that at the time of occurrence the prosecutrix (PW-1)  was  above
      16 years  of  age.  PW1  in  her  statement  very  categorically  made
      allegation against the present appellant that when she  was  alone  in
      the  agricultural  field  of  the  appellant/accused,  he   came   and
      forcefully caught hold of both her hands, and thereafter  removed  her
      clothes and committed rape. Dr. Smt. Vandana Sarkanungo (PW3) did  not
      find any injury on the internal and external part of  the  prosecutrix
      (PW1) and opined that prosecutrix was habitual to sexual  intercourse.
      In respect of the false implication on the appellant, it has  come  on
      record in the statement of Nand Kishore (PW2), who is  father  of  the
      prosecutrix, that a sum of Rs.500/- was taken on loan by him from  the
      appellant. But PW1 and PW2 have not deposed that due to the  aforesaid
      reason there was previous enmity between them.  The  finding  on  this
      aspect of the High Court in the impugned judgment was  that  if  there
      was any enmity, the appellant/accused could not have come to the house
      of the prosecutrix for inviting her to work in his agricultural field.
      The appellant/accused was examined by the doctor who found him capable
      of performing sexual intercourse. Semen was found in the undergarments
      of the prosecutrix, from the exhibit.




   4. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the High  Court
      was of the view that it is well settled that the woman who is a victim
      of sexual assault is not an accomplice  to  the  crime.  Her  evidence
      cannot be tested with suspicion as that of an accomplice. As a  matter
      of fact her  evidence  is  similar  to  the  evidence  of  an  injured
      complainant or witness. The testimony of  the  prosecutrix,  if  found
      reliable by itself may be sufficient to convict  the  culprit  and  no
      corroboration of her evidence is necessary. Secondly,  in  prosecution
      of rape, the law does not require corroboration. The evidence  of  the
      prosecutrix may sustain a conviction. It is only by  way  of  abundant
      caution that Court may look for some corroboration so  as  to  satisfy
      its conscience and rule out any  false  accusations.  Thus,  the  High
      Court was of the view that the Trial Court had not committed any error
      in convicting the appellant under Section 376 of IPC. The statement of
      the prosecutrix was reliable. Prompt FIR was  lodged  by  her  and  no
      further corroboration of her statement was required.




   5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial  Court  and
      the High Court ignored the contradictions in  the  statements  of  the
      prosecutrix Smt. Narmadabai  (PW1)  and  Nand  Kishore  (PW2)  on  the
      question, whether the prosecutrix was  called  in  the  field  in  the
      morning or in the afternoon or a day in advance.  The High Court  also
      committed an error in accepting the finding of the Trial Court without
      any evidence, that no injury  was  found  on  her  body  as  rape  was
      committed on the sand. Counsel submitted that except some sand on  her
      clothes, no statement was given by the prosecutrix that  the  incident
      took place on plain soil, ruling out any  possibility  of  injury.  In
      view of the medical examination of the prosecutrix, Dr.  Vandana,  who
      examined her, did not give  any  definite  opinion  about  rape  being
      committed on the prosecutrix and there were no injury on  her  private
      parts or other part of body though as per her statement the  rape  was
      committed in the field having standing crop, 5 feet  high  Jawar  crop
      and 4 feet high Moong crop.  The  prosecutrix  also  stated  that  she
      grappled in the field for 15-20 minutes, but no signs of  injury  were
      found either on the  prosecutrix  or  on  the  appellant.  Appellant's
      statement is also contradicted by the medical evidence.



   6. According to the learned counsel for the  appellant,  the  High  Court
      committed an error in placing reliance on Sheikh Zakir  vs.  State  of
      Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 911, and holding that no corroboration is  required
      for convicting the accused under Section 376, on  account  of  a  long
      line of judicial decisions which held that where a case is tried by  a
      judge alone, and is based on evidence of the prosecutrix  without  any
      corroboration, it will not be illegal on that sole ground. In case  of
      a  grown  up  and  married  woman  it  is  safe  to  insist  on   such
      corroboration. Further, it was argued by the counsel for the appellant
      that the High Court made an error by placing reliance in the  case  of
      State of U.P. v. Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697, as it was not applicable
      to the present matter.



   7. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that this was a case where
      there was a possibility of consent of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix
      tried to show that she was less than 16 years, which is  found  to  be
      false in the present case. The medical evidence shows that  her  hymen
      was old ruptured  and  it  was  in  the  healing  stage.  The  medical
      examination report had given no definite opinion regarding  rape.  The
      statement of Dr. Vandana (PW3) also supported that view as  no  injury
      either on the person of Narmadabai or on her private parts was  found.
      Her hymen being old ruptured was in healing condition.  There  was  no
      injury on any of them even though the incident took place  in  5  feet
      Jawar crop and 4 feet Moong crop  and  they  had  grappled  for  15-20
      minutes.



   8. In view of the admitted statements of PW1 and PW2 that before  lodging
      the report, they made offer for compromise to the  appellant's  father
      and when the appellant's father did not  agree  for  compromise,  they
      lodged the FIR. Nand  Kishore  (PW2)  has  himself  admitted  that  he
      received Rs.500/- from the appellant's father some 3-4 years  ago  but
      had not returned the same till that date. Thus, a false case has  been
      fastened since a demand had been made for the return  of  the  amount.
      PW4 and PW5, who are the two maternal uncles of the  prosecutrix,  did
      not support her and they were declared hostile.



   9. Further, the learned counsel, relying on  the  Trail  Court  judgment,
      contended that the Prosecutrix has failed to establish  that  her  age
      was below 16 years and in view of the fact that there was no  sign  of
      rape or any injury, the present case,  at  the  most,  is  a  case  of
      consent.



  10. Learned counsel appearing for the State, on the other hand, has relied
      on the fact of presence of semen on the Petticoat of the  prosecutrix.
      It is submitted that the  Chemical  Examiner  report  found  that  the
      sample of semen found on the garments was not sufficient to  link  the
      same with the accused.



  11. Now, we shall examine whether this case falls under proviso to Section
      376 IPC, to award a lesser sentence for "adequate and special reason".
      In the present case, the incident took place 20 years ago and now with
      passage of time both victim and  accused  are  married  (not  to  each
      other) and they have entered into a compromise. Thus, an adequate  and
      special reason for awarding a  lesser  sentence  exists  in  terms  of
      proviso to Section 376.



  12. Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken four  primary  grounds  of
      defence. First, that there is no sign of injury on  the  body  of  the
      victim and no definite opinion of rape is given by  the  PW-3,  though
      there had been grappling for 15-20 minutes between the victim and  the
      accused. However, the victim has stated that she did not  scratch  the
      accused and that the accused caught hold of her hand and put her  down
      and committed rape in the field. From this it  can  be  inferred  that
      rape was committed on the ground  in  the  field.  But  it  is  highly
      improbable that their clothes would not tear and there  would  not  be
      any injury on the body of the victim. In Dastagir Sab & Anr. v.  State
      of Karnataka, (2004) 3 SCC  106,  it  was  held  by  this  Court  that
      presence of injury on the body of the victim is not a sine qua non  to
      prove the charge of rape. In the said  case,  the  facts  showed  that
      medical examination  was  conducted  after  a  month  of  the  alleged
      offence. The medical opinion was that abrasion or  marks  of  violence
      would be visible for twenty four hours and  thereafter  the  same  may
      disappear. In the present case, the medical examination  was  done  on
      the same day on which the alleged offence was committed, and going  by
      the medical examination report and  the  statement  of  P.W.3,  it  is
      improbable that rape was committed.



  13. The second ground taken by the defence is that  there  is  absence  of
      spermatozoa in the  vaginal  swab  of  the  victim  and  the  Chemical
      Examination report found  that  the  sample  of  semen  found  on  the
      garments of the victim was insufficient to  link  the  same  with  the
      accused. On the aspect of benefit of doubt, this Court has observed in
      Hem Raj v. State of Haryana, (2014) 2 SCC 395,  that  prosecution  had
      brought on record  FSL  report  which  showed  that  human  semen  was
      detected on the salwar of the prosecutrix and on the underwear of  the
      accused. However  it  was  difficult  to  infer  from  this  that  the
      prosecutrix was raped by the accused. The appellant in that  case  was
      given benefit of doubt.



  14. In the present case, the  Chemical  Examiner  report  found  that  the
      sample of semen was not sufficient to link the same  to  the  accused,
      notwithstanding that absence of spermatozoa on the vaginal smear could
      not be allowed to tell against the version of the prosecutrix, as held
      in Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 728.



  15. The third ground of defence taken by the accused is that there  is  no
      corroboration and there is contradiction in the  prosecution  case  on
      important aspects, though on the aspect of appreciation  of  evidence,
      being the testimony of  the  prosecutrix,  this  Court   has  held  in
      Narendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171,  that  minor
      contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence  of  the
      witnesses are not of a substantial  character.  However,  in  Sadashiv
      Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2006) 10 SCC  92,  where
      the sole testimony is unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole
      surrounding circumstances are highly improbable to belie the case  set
      up by the prosecutrix, this Court held that Court shall not act on the
      solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. Thus, in light of the above  the
      Court should not rely solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix.  The
      statement in the present case requires corroboration as it  has  minor
      contradictions and is not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
      The two maternal uncles  (PW-4 and PW-5) of the  prosecutrix  did  not
      support her and were declared hostile.



  16. The fourth ground of defence taken by  the  appellant  is  that  under
      proviso to Section 376(2) of IPC, the legislature  has  empowered  the
      Court to award lesser sentence where "adequate  and  special  reasons"
      exist. The incident in the present case had taken place 20 years  ago.
      The  victim  (prosecutrix)  and  the  accused  have  entered  into   a
      compromise stating therein that  the  prosecutrix  does  not  want  to
      proceed with the case against the accused and wants to close the case.
      Both of them are married (not to each other) and have settled in life.
      Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this is  an  "adequate
      and special reason" for awarding lesser sentence.



  17. This Court has in the case of Baldev Singh & Ors. v. State of  Punjab,
      (2011) 13 SCC 705, invoked the proviso to Section 376 (2) (g)  of  IPC
      on the consideration that the case was an old one. The  facts  of  the
      above case also state that there was compromise entered  into  between
      the parties.



  18. In light of the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of  the
      opinion that the case of the appellant is a fit case for invoking  the
      proviso to Section 376(2)(g) of IPC for awarding lesser  sentence,  as
      the incident is 20 years old and the fact that the parties are married
      and have entered into a  compromise,  are  the  adequate  and  special
      reasons. Therefore, although we uphold the conviction of the appellant
      but reduce the  sentence  to  the  period  already  undergone  by  the
      appellant. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.






                                       .......................................
                                       ..J

                                                         (M.Y. EQBAL)




                                       .......................................
                                       ..J

                                                         (PINAKI CHANDRA
   GHOSE)

   New Delhi;


   February 26, 2015.