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Friday, February 27, 2015

"Provided that pension shall also be granted to an employee who opts to retire before attaining the age of superannuation, but after having served for a minimum period of 15 years in terms of any scheme that may be framed for the purpose by the Bank's Board with the concurrence of the Government."= by insertion of the proviso in Regulation 28 (in the year 2002 with effect from 1-9-2000), all classes of employees under VRS, 2002 were intended to be covered, such amendment in Regulation 28, needs to be harmonized with Regulation 29......" 29. While answering Point no, 2 in favour of the respondents, I held that the State Bank of India should implement the amendment made to Rule 28 of the Employees Pension Regulation in granting pension to the employees seeking voluntary retirement under SBI-VRS. I therefore, answer point no 3 in favour of the respondents and direct the appellant Bank to grant pension to the employees seeking voluntary retirement under the SBI-VRS after completing 15 years of pensionable service. Therefore, the respondent Radhey Shyam Pandey, having completed 19 years 8 months and 18 days of service, respondent M.P. Hallan, having completed 19 years and 4 months of service and the respondent R.P. Nigam, having completed 16 years and 6 months of service, become eligible for pension as per the amended Regulation 28 of Employees Pension Rules, 1995. By virtue of power vested in this Court under Article 142 Constitution of India, I hold that the pension relief is also extended to all the other employees who have availed SBI-VRS 2000 after having completed 15 years of pensionable service. Thus, C.A. No.@ SLP (C) No.3686 of 2007, C.A. Nos.2287- 2288 of 2010 and C.A. No. 10813 of 2013 are dismissed. 30. The C.A. Nos.5035-5037 of 2012 of the appellant Bank succeed in that respondent Mihir Kumar Nandi, having completed 12 years 3 months and 4 days of service, becomes ineligible for pension benefits.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2463 OF 2015
              [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 3686 OF 2007]


Assistant General Manager, State Bank of
India & Others                                     ... Appellants

                                   Versus

Radhey Shyam Pandey                           ... Respondent

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2287-2288 OF 2010
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5035-5037 OF 2012
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10813 OF 2013


                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.

            Leave granted in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 3686 of 2007.
Having regard to the commonality of controversy in this batch of appeals  it
was heard together and is disposed of by a singular judgment.  For the  sake
of clarity and convenience, I shall adumbrate the facts  from  Civil  Appeal
Nos. 2287-2288 of 2010 and at the  appropriate  stage  refer  to  the  views
expressed in other  appeals.   The  1st  respondent,  M.P.  Hallan,  an  ex-
serviceman joined as a clerk on 18.5.1981 in the  appellant-Bank  which  has
been constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955 (for  brevity  'the
Act').  The Indian Banks  Association  (I.B.A.),  after  obtaining  approval
from the Government of India evolved a Voluntary Retirement Scheme  (V.R.S.)
and the  appellant-Bank  adopted  the  Scheme  with  certain  modifications,
despite it having its  own  Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme  in  the  existing
service   conditions   meant   for   its   employees   to   seek   voluntary
retirement/premature retirement/resignation.   The  Scheme,  namely,  S.B.I.
Voluntary Retirement Scheme (for short 'the Scheme')   was  adopted  by  the
State Bank of India on 29.12.2000.  The Scheme was  to  remain  open  during
the period 15.1.2001 to 31.1.2001 with the option either to close  it  early
or extend the period, without assigning any reason.
After adoption of the Scheme, the Deputy Managing  Director,  the  competent
authority, issued a Circular No. HRD/CDO/  VRS/1  on  29.12.2000  clarifying
certain aspects of the Scheme.  Another  Circular  being  No.  HRD/CDO/VRS/5
was issued on 10.1.2001.  On 11.01.2001, the said Circular  was  brought  to
the notice of  all  the  Branches/offices  of  all  the  Circles,  including
Chandigarh Circle.
As per the Scheme, the  applications  for  voluntary  retirement  under  the
Scheme were to be submitted during the period i.e. 15.1.2001  to  31.1.2001.
The 1st respondent submitted his application  seeking  voluntary  retirement
and it was accepted on 17.3.2001 with effect from 31.3.2001.  On  27.3.2001,
the respondent No. 1 submitted an application to withdraw  his  request  for
voluntary retirement.  The said application was  declined  by  the  Bank  on
18.4.2001 stating that the date for withdrawal of  application  had  already
expired on 15.2.2001.  It is apt to note that here the  respondent  wrote  a
letter on 12.4.2001 claiming pension under the Pension Fund Rules,  1995  in
terms of State Bank  of  India  Employees  Pension  Rules  (for  short  'the
Rules').  The claim of the 1st respondent for withdrawal of his  application
for voluntary retirement and grant  of  pension  and  leave  encashment  was
refused by the Bank on 4.7.2001.  Being grieved  by  the  aforesaid  refusal
and declination of the prayer, the 1st respondent  preferred  writ  petition
being CWP No. 14325 of 2001.
The Writ Court took note of the fact there was acceptance of  the  voluntary
retirement on 17.3.2001 with  a  stipulation  that  the  employee  would  be
relieved from his duties at the close of business hours on  31.3.2001.   The
Division Bench referred to the decision in Mohinder Pal Singh v. Punjab  and
Sind Bank and others[1] and the decision of this Court in Bank of India  and
others v. O.P. Swarankar etc.[2] and after  reproducing  the  directions  of
from Swarankar's case came to hold as follows:-
"In view of the aforesaid finding, the moment a decision  is  taken  by  the
Bank, the jural relationship of  employer  and  employee  stood  terminated.
The  petitioner  has  admittedly  sought  to  withdraw  his  offer  to  seek
voluntary retirement after the acceptance was conveyed  to  the  petitioner.
Mere fact that the date of voluntary retirement was fixed as 31.03.2001,  is
wholly inconsequential as employer and  employee  relationship  has  already
come to an end with the  communication  of  acceptance.   It  was  only  the
procedural  part  under  which  the  petitioner  continued  to   work   till
31.03.2001."

In the ultimate analysis, the High Court did not find any merit with  regard
to refusal by the Bank in  not  accepting  the  application  for  withdrawal
submitted by the employee.   Determination on the said score  is  not  under
assail in any of the appeals before this court.
 The next question that emerged for consideration before the High Court  was
whether the employee  was  entitled  to  pension  in  terms  of  the  rules,
including  computed  value  of  pension.   It  was  contended  by  the   1st
respondent in the  writ  court  that  the  pension  rules  were  amended  on
9.3.2001 and the said rules were in vogue when the petitioner had  submitted
his application for voluntary retirement, and hence, he was entitled to  get
the pensionary benefits.  It was also urged that in  terms  of  the  amended
Rule 22 of the  pension  rules,  he  was  entitled  to  pension.   The  said
submission was resisted by the Bank that Rule 22 did  not  cover  the  cases
like that of the petitioner.   In  justification  of  the  said  submission,
reliance was placed on the Division Bench judgment  of  the  High  Court  of
Delhi in Vipin Kalia and Ors. v. State Bank of India  and  Ors.  decided  on
28.2.2007 in L.P.A. No. 410 of 2002 and also on a decision rendered  by  the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in C.W.P. No. 2098 of 2006.
The Division Bench referred to the anatomy of Rule 22  and  after  analyzing
the scope of the rule distinguished the decision of the High Court of  Delhi
as well as that of Andhra Pradesh and came to  hold  that  it  was  apparent
from the record that the writ petitioner was  in  service  of  the  Bank  on
01.11.1993 and had completed 10 years of  pensionable  service  and  further
had attained the age of 58 years.  Therefore, in terms of  Rule  22  of  the
Pension Rules, he was entitled to  pension.   Dealing  with  the  claim  for
leave encashment which  is  based  upon  the  circular  of  the  Bank  dated
23.09.1986, it opined that the leave encashment was payable to  an  employee
of the Bank, who had been discharged if he was eligible for pension  and  as
it had been found that the petitioner was entitled to pension  in  terms  of
the Pension Rules he would be entitled to leave encashment as well.
In this batch of appeals,  the  question  that  emanates  for  consideration
whether the respondent-employees are entitled to get pension.  There can  be
no cavil over the fact that their right to seek withdrawal from  the  scheme
of voluntary retirement has been negatived by the impugned judgments  passed
by various High Courts and, therefore, I am not  required   to  address  the
said issue.   It is essential to advert to the issue  whether  the  employee
would be entitled to pension under the four corners of the  Rules.  Rule  22
which squarely falls for consideration is as follows:-

"22. (i)  A member shall be entitled to  a  pension  under  these  rules  on
retiring from the Bank's service -

After having completed twenty years' pensionable service  provided  that  he
has attained the age of fifty years or if he is in the service of  the  Bank
on or after 1.11.93, after having completed ten  years  pensionable  service
provided that he has attained the age of fifty eight years or if  he  is  in
the service of the Bank on or after 22.5.1998, after  having  completed  ten
years pensionable service provided that he has attained  the  age  of  sixty
years;

After having completed twenty years' pensionable  service,  irrespective  of
the age he shall have attained, if he shall satisfy the authority  competent
to sanction his retirement by  approved  medical  certificate  or  otherwise
that he is incapacitated for further active service;

After having completed twenty years  pensionable  service,  irrespective  of
the age he shall have attained at his request in writing.

After twenty five years' pensionable service.
A member who has attained the age  of  fifty-five  years  or  who  shall  be
proved to the satisfaction  of  the  authority  empowered  to  sanction  his
retirement to be permanently incapacitated by  bodily  or  mental  infirmity
from further  active  service  (such  infirmity  not  being  the  result  of
irregular or intemperate habits) may, at the discretion of the trustees,  be
granted a proportionate pension.

A member who has been permitted to retire under Clause 1(c) above  shall  be
entitled to proportionate pension."

Keeping the aforesaid Rule in view,  it  is  obligatory  to  scrutinize  the
analysis made by the High Court in the backdrop  of  the  facts.   The  High
Court has taken note of the fact that the 1st respondent had completed  more
than 19 years and 10 months of service as on 31.3.2001 and,  therefore,  the
first part of Clause (a) is not applicable to him.  The High Court has  also
opined that the third part of Clause (a) is not applicable to him as he  had
completed more than 19 years of service but  not  attained  the  age  of  60
years.  The case of the 1st respondent was that his case was  covered  under
second part of Clause (a) which enables an employee to  get  pension  if  he
was in service of the Bank as on 1.11.1993 and had completed ten  years'  of
service and attained the age of 58 years.  The High Court took note  of  the
fact that the counter-affidavit was silent regarding the claim  of  the  1st
respondent under second part of  Clause  (a).   Analysing  further  in  this
regard, the High Court opined as follows:-
"The petitioner has submitted his offer for voluntary  retirement  in  terms
of the Pension Rules existing in the month of January, 2001.   On  the  said
date a member of the Pension Funds was entitled to pension on completion  of
20 years of pensionable service provided he  has  attained  the  age  of  50
years.  Alternatively, if a member is in service of the  Bank  on  or  after
01.11.1993 and has  completed  10  years  of  pensionable  service  and  has
attained the age of 58 years, he shall be  entitled  to  the  pension.   The
petitioner fulfils the second part of Clause (a) of Rule  22  which  was  in
existence  on  the  day  when  the  petitioner  submitted  his  request  for
voluntary retirement.  Even  after  the  amendment  on  09.03.2001,  another
clause has been added i.e. 3rd part of Clause (a) as mentioned above,  which
does not affect the claim of the petitioner for pension as  he  is  entitled
to pension in the second part of Rule 22(1)(a)."


The High Court referred  to  the  voluntary  Retirement  Scheme  floated  on
29.12.2000, and reproduced the relevant part of the said Scheme which is  as
follows:-
"5.  Amount of Ex-Gratia:

The staff  member  whose  request  for  retirement  under  SBIVRS  has  been
accepted by Competent Authority will be paid an amount of  ex-gratia  of  60
days' salary (pay plus stagnation increments plus special pay plus  dearness
allowance) for each completed year of service (for this purpose fraction  of
service of six months and above will be taken as one  year  and  accordingly
service of less than six months will be counted) or salary  for  the  number
of months service is left, whichever is less, fraction of a month,  if  any,
will be ignored.  'Relevant Date' means  the  date  on  which  the  employee
ceases to be in service of the Bank as a consequence of  the  acceptance  of
the request for voluntary retirement under the scheme.

For the purpose of calculation of ex-gratia, 60  days  salary  mentioned  in
the Scheme is to be taken as equivalent to 2 months salary  (with  reference
to salary for the month in  which  employee  is  relieved  from  service  on
(Voluntary Retirement).

Income Tax shall be deducted at source in  respect  of  ex-gratia  exceeding
Rs.5.00 lakhs or such other ceiling as may be prescribed  under  the  Income
Tax Act as on the relevant date.

Other benefits:

Gratuity as payable under the extent instructions on the relevant date.

Provident Fund Contribution as per State Bank of India  Employees  Provident
Fund Rules as on relevant date.

Pension in terms of State Bank of India Employees'  Pension  Fund  Rules  on
the relevant date (including commuted value of pension).

Encashment of balance of privilege Leave,  as  applicable  on  the  relevant
date.

Respective facilities extended  to  officers/others  such  as  retention  of
accommodation, telephone, car, continuation of housing loan  etc.,  will  be
extended  to  officers/others  retiring  under   SBIVRS   as   per   present
dispensations, at the discretion of Competent Authority.  However,  in  such
cases of retention of physical facilities, 50% of the  amount  of  ex-gratia
payable will be released only after the employee surrenders the  facilities.
 No interest, however, will be paid for the amount so withheld.   All  other
outstanding loans/advances will have to be repaid before date of  retirement
under SBIVRS, failing which the  amount  of  ex-gratia  and  other  terminal
benefits  payable  to  the  employee  will  be   appropriate   towards   the
outstanding loans/advances and the balance amount only will  be  payable  to
the employee."


The High Court opined that the said paragraphs, when  properly  appreciated,
convey that the amount of ex-gratia is to be paid and  what  are  the  other
benefits to be paid have also been enumerated.  Referring  to  Clause  6  it
ruled that it deals with  gratuity, provident fund contribution, pension  in
terms of the Rules  on  the  relevant  date  (including  commuted  value  of
pension), encashment  of  balance  of  privilege  leave  and  certain  other
benefits.  The Court also took note of the clarificatory circular issued  by
the Bank on 10.1.2001.  While answering the question, whether  or  not,  the
employee completing 15 years of pensionable service as on relevant date  the
Court held he would be entitled for pension benefit.
Presently I shall refer to the relevant part of  Clarificatory circular:-
"In this connection, we invite a  reference  to  para  6(c)  of  the  Scheme
forwarded under  the  cover  of  Circular  No.  CIR.DO/PER  &  HRD/99  dated
29.12.2000.  The payment of pension to the employee  retiring  under  SBIVRS
would be governed by State Bank of India Employees  Pension  Fund  Rules  on
the relevant date (including commuted value of pension).   However,  as  per
existing rules, employees who have not completed  20  years  of  Pensionable
Service are not eligible for pension."

Having noted the rule relating to pension on which the case is  founded  and
the scheme on which reliance has been  placed  by  the  High  Court,  it  is
necessary to notice how various High Courts have  approached  this  problem.
I have already stated that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  has  opined
that the employee who had opted for  voluntary  retirement  is  entitled  to
pension in the second part of Rule 22 (1) (a).   Now, I shall advert to  the
analysis made by the High Court of Calcutta which is the subject  matter  of
C.A. No. 5035-37 of 2002.  The learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court  of
Calcutta took note of the contention that when an offer  of  acceptance  had
become a concluded contract any subsequent change of the pension fund  rules
could  not  have  adversely  affected  his  rights,  for   the   explanatory
memorandum issued by the bank on 9th March 2001  stipulated  to  the  effect
that no employee/pensioner of the State  Bank  of  India  is  likely  to  be
effected adversely by the notification  being  given  retrospective  effect.
He repelled the contention of the bank that the voluntary retirement  scheme
itself provided that  payment  of  pension  was  dependent  upon  the  rules
prevalent on the date on which the employee would cease to be in service  of
the bank and admittedly the writ petitioner therein  had  ceased  to  be  an
employee on 31st March 2001 and, thereafter, the amendment  of  the  pension
rules effecting from that day was binding upon him and as such  he  was  not
liable to get any pension.  The learned Single Judge formulated  two  issues
namely, (i) whether the right of the petitioner to receive  pension  as  per
the existing rules could have been taken away by  the  amended  rules  which
became effective on 31st March, 2001?  and  (ii)  was  the  writ  petitioner
estopped  from espousing his cause  of  action  due  to  delay,  laches  and
acquiescence and answered both the issues in the negative against  the  bank
and in favour of the writ petitioner.
On an appeal being preferred the division bench referred to Section  17  and
19 of the Contract Act and came to hold as follows:-
"In the case before us, on the date of acceptance of the  contract,  it  was
known to the bank that it had already decided to amend its pension rules  by
which the appellant would be deprived of his right to get  pension  although
on the date of acceptance  if  he  retired  he  would  be  entitled  to  get
pension.  The employee ad no means of knowledge of such  change  of  pension
rules at the time of agreement.  In such a situation, the  relation  between
the parties being that of employer and employee, it  was  the  duty  of  the
employer to inform the employee about the future amendment  of  the  pension
rules which would deprive the employee  of  his  right  to  get  pension  by
entering into the voluntary retirement scheme.  If he had known  this  fact,
he would not definitely enter into the scheme because if he had  retired  in
due course without opting for voluntary retirement, he would be entitled  to
get  pension  even  under  the  amended  rules.   Therefore,   the   silence
maintained by the employer in such a situation  amounted  to  fraud  on  its
part.  As pointed out in illustration (b) to S. 17 of the Contract  Act,  if
it becomes a duty of a father to disclose the defect of the  horse  proposed
to be sold to his just grown up daughter, in the same  manner,  it  is  also
the duty of the employer to inform his employee about the  future  amendment
of the pension rules causing prejudice to his employee at the last stage  of
his service life before accepting the  terms  of  the  voluntary  retirement
scheme declared by it when such source of prejudice is know to the  employer
and the employee had no manner of knowledge of such perilous condition."

            Thereafter, the Bench referred to Food Corporation of  India  v.
Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries[3] and opined thus:-
"Therefore, on that ground also the writ petitioner is entitled to  get  the
pensionary benefit which was available to him on the date of declaration  of
the scheme and also on the date of acceptance of the offer of  the  employee
under voluntary retirement scheme.  If the proposed amendment was  disclosed
to the  writ  petitioner  in  advance,  he  would  not  have  accepted  such
prejudicial terms  of  voluntary  retirement  scheme  and  offered  for  the
scheme.  We do no for a moment dispute the submission of Mr. Gupta, the  Ld.
Sr. Advocated appearing on behalf of the appellant  that  the  contract  was
competed by acceptance of the offer of the  employee  under  the  scheme  as
laid down in the  case  of  Bank  of  India  v.  O.P.  Swarnanakar  but  the
appellant having committed  fraud  upon  the  writ  petitioner  by  adopting
silence in the matter of proposed amendment of  the  pension  rules  on  the
last date of the service of the employee, the writ  petitioner  is  entitled
to the relief claimed by taking aid of Article 14  of  the  Constitution  of
India."

Be it stated, as the Single Judge had not  granted  interest,  the  division
bench thought it appropriate to grant interest at the rate 12% per annum  on
arrears amount of pension.
As far as the High Court of  Allahabad  is  concerned,  the  learned  Single
Judge had remitted the matter to the bank to consider the case of  the  writ
petitioner for his entitlement for grant of  pension.   In  the  intra-court
appeal, the Division Bench addressed to  the  lis  on  merits,  referred  to
clause 6 (c) of the scheme which provides that pension shall be  granted  in
terms of State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules on  the  relevant
date (including  commuted value pension)  and opined that  the  said  clause
was a binding contract between the writ  petitioner  and  on  18.3.2001  the
bank accepted the offer of retirement made by the writ  petitioner,   though
the employee did in fact retire on 31.3.2001.   The High Court took note  of
the  fact  although  the  amendments  were  sufficiently  formulated  before
31.03.2001 yet the trustees of the pension fund accepted the  amended  rules
only on the 30.10.2001.  The High Court referred to the existing  rules  and
the amended rules which  I  shall  refer  to  at  a  later  stage.   It  was
contended by the writ petitioner before  the  Division  Bench  that  he  was
covered under second part of the Rule 22 (i) (a)  inasmuch as he was in  the
service of the Bank on and after 1.11.1993 and he had completed 10 years  of
pensionable service, and attained the age of 58 years  before  the  date  he
retired.   The  bank  resisting  the   said   stand   contended   that   the
clarificatory circular issued by the bank and contended  that  the  employee
was not entitled to get pensionary benefits.   The High Court observed  that
the clarification had  no  greater  status  in  law  than  the  reading  and
understanding the terms of the contract according to one party.   It  opined
that the pension rules should apply to the writ petitioner not by any  force
of special statutory law but only by force  of  agreement.   Eventually  the
Court ruled thus:-
"The second important point raised by the Bank was that  under  22(1)(c)  of
the Pension Fund Rules, when an employee retires upon a request  in  writing
being made by him, he has  to  complete  20  years  of  service.   Thus  the
voluntary retirement being a retirement pursuant to the employees'  request,
it is this clause which will be applicable to him and it will not be  proper
to give him pension because he comes under another clause i.e.  Clause  (a),
which was merely introduced to accommodate late entrants into  service  when
the retirement age  was  raise  to  58  on  1.11.1993  and  then  to  60  on
22.5.1998.  Clause (a) was inserted so  as  to  give  employees  benefit  of
pension after 10 years of pensionable service even if they had joined  late.
 According to the Bank the writ petitioner is seeking to take  advantage  of
this clause although this clause was never intended to cover it.

         It is also said that if  in  cases  of  retirement  on  request  in
writing clause (a) is made applicable then clause (c) will have no field  of
operation at all.  Everybody will be entitled  to  pension  after  10  years
and, therefore, the 20 years'  requirement  of  Clause  (c)  will  lose  all
meaning."

Thereafter the division bench referred to Clause 15 of the Bank  Fund  Rules
which permits  retirement  on  request  by  the  bank  employee  provided  a
sanction is made by the competent authority.  After referring  to  the  said
clause the court held thus:-
"In our opinion, the voluntary retirement under the  scheme  should  not  be
equated to a retirement to clause 15 of the Pension Fund  Rules.   It  might
be  that  Clause  22(c)  made  to  cover  pension  aspects  for  Clause   15
retirements and Clause 22(i)(a) was  made  to  cover  normal  superannuation
retirements, but voluntary retirement was a special contract made  available
for special purpose, and that too for a very small period of time which  was
practically  one  moment  or  just  one  short  fleeting  period  during  an
employee's service career.  For this scheme  and this contract  the  pension
rules did not apply as  rules.   The  rules  apply  only  as  words  in  the
contract. Therefore, if a contracting party is entitled to take  benefit  of
a permissive clause, then that cannot be denied  to  him  on  the  basis  of
purpose if construction  of  a  statutory  rule.   This  type  of  purposive
construction is far less, if at all,  applied to contracts.   Contacts  are,
generally speaking, strictly  interpreted  on  the  basis  of  the  language
agreed upon by the parties.  The  Court  does  not  make  out  the  parties'
contract, they make their own contact.

        On this basis of strict interpretation, the writ petitioner  clearly
comes within Rule 22(i)(a) although this is better put  as  Clause  22(i)(a)
of the Pension Fund Rules in reference to the contract.

Regarding the other aspect of Clause 22(i)(c) having no field  of  operation
at all, one bare look will show that the said clause  will  operate  in  all
cases where the retiring employee has  not  even  attained  the  age  of  58
years.  If the pensionable period of 20  years  has  been  completed  before
that, and the competent authority grants sanction to retire under  Rule  15,
then and in that event one would get pension although one  would  not  under
the second or third parts  of  Clause  22(i)(a).   Thus  each  part  of  the
contractual document is left with a meaning even if  the  interpretation  in
favour of the writ petitioner is wholly accepted."

At this juncture, it is apt to appreciate the decision rendered in  case  of
Vipin Kalia (supra) by the division  bench of  Delhi  High  Court.   In  the
said case the division bench dealing with the State Bank of India  Voluntary
Retirement Scheme whereunder the  option  exercised  by  the  employees  was
accepted by the respondent bank on 31.3.2001.  All  the  appellants  therein
had either completed 15 years of service or were of 40 years of  age  as  on
31.12.2000 and accordingly, as per the provision of the State Bank of  India
Employees Pension and Provident Fund Rules they had claimed pension  as  per
the rules. The court referred to  Indian  Bank's  Association  letter  dated
11.12.2000 which was the fulcrum of the scheme  to  get  the  pension.   The
division bench reproduced the said letter which I think  it  appropriate  to
reproduce.
"Indian Bank's Association Stadium House 6th Floor,  Block  2  Veer  Nariman
Road Mumbai-400020

PD/CIR/76/G2/G4/
December 11,2000

Designated officers of all Public Sector Banks.

Dear Sirs,

Voluntary Retirement Scheme  in  Public  Sector  Banks-Amendments  To  Bank,
(Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995.


Please refer to our circular letter No. PD/CIR/76/G4/933 dated  31st  August
2000 convening the 'No Objection' of the Government in  banks  adopting  and
implementing a voluntary retirement scheme for employees  on  the  lines  of
what was contained in the Annexure to the circular.


As per the scheme, an employee who is eligible  and  applies  for  voluntary
retirement is entitled  for  the  benefit  of  CPF,  Pension,  Gratuity  and
encashment of accumulated privilege leave, as per rules.


Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1955 do not have provisions  enabling
payment of pension to an employee who retires before attaining  the  age  of
super annuation except under circumstances as in Regulations 29, 30, 32  and
33. We had, therefore, taken up with the Government the need to  incorporate
necessary provisions in the Pension Regulations  by  way  of  amendments  to
Regulation 28 so that employees who retire as  above  under  special/ad  hoc
schemes formulated by the banks, after  serving  for  a  prescribed  minimum
period would be eligible for pro rata pension.


Government of India has after examining the proposal conveyed  its  approval
and desired that IBA advise banks to  make  necessary  amendments  to  their
Pension Regulations as in the  Annexure.  We  request  banks  to  take  note
accordingly.


Please note  that  with  the  above  amendments,  employees  who  apply  for
voluntary retirement after having rendered a minimum of 15 years of  service
under a special/ad hoc scheme formulated with the specific approval  of  the
Government and the Board of Directors will be eligible for pro rata  pension
for the period of service rendered as they are to retire  on  attaining  the
age of superannuation on that date.

                                                           Yours faithfully,
                                                                        sd/-
                                                         (Allen C A Pereira)
                                                          PERSONNEL ADVISER"

It was contended before the High Court that under  the  said  recommendation
the bank was obliged to pay pension to them but the said contention was  not
accepted by the Single Judge on the ground the said letter is not a  binding
circular under Section 18 of  the  State  Bank  of  India  Act,  1955.   The
learned Single Judge had also opined that voluntary retirement scheme was  a
package by itself  and  it  was  not  open  to  the  employees  to  ask  for
modification of the scheme and if the  employees  wanted  to  avail  of  the
benefit of pension, they should not have opted under the  scheme  and  after
completing requisite years of service, would have been entitled to  pension.
  The Court examined the SBIVRS dated 30.12.2000 and opined that it  was  an
invitation to  the  employees  to  make  an  offer  and  opt  for  voluntary
retirement.  The scheme, as analysed by  the  Division  Bench,  specifically
stipulated that the employees who were eligible and the period during  which
an offer for voluntary retirement could be  made.   Reference  was  made  to
Clause 5 and 6 of the scheme that provides  for  ex-gratia  payment  to  the
officers who had opted for voluntary retirement.   The  court  referring  to
the letter dated  11.1.2001  opined  that  the  payment  of  pension  to  an
employee retiring under the voluntary retirement scheme are to  be  governed
by the relevant pension rules, and as per the existing  rules,  an  employee
who had not completed 20 years of pensionable service would not be  eligible
for pension.  Thereafter the Division Bench observed that the  employee  who
has opted under voluntary retirement scheme was fully  conscious  and  aware
of the fact that he would not be entitled to pension under the scheme as  he
had not completed 20 years of pensionable service and  pension  was  payable
only to those employees who were eligible for pension  under  the  rules  as
applicable o the relevant date.   Reference was made to Bank of  India  O.P.
Swarankar (supra) and accordingly it was held as follows:-
"The appellants, therefore, cannot be allowed to wriggle out  of  the  terms
and conditions accepted  and  agreed  upon  by  the  two  parties  viz.  the
appellants and the respondent-bank. The  appellants  had  entered  into  the
said contract with open eyes and fully conscious and aware of what  benefits
they would be entitled to by opting under the Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme.
They were conscious and aware and in fact specifically informed  by  way  of
clarification by the respondent that the employees who had not completed  20
years of service, would not be  eligible  for  pension  under  the  relevant
rules. The appellants by way of  appeal  are  seeking  modification  of  the
terms of the concluded contract which in equity is not just and fair."

      Eventually concurring with the Single Judge the Division Bench ruled:-

"13. The State Bank of  India,  as  already  stated,  has  its  own  pension
regulations. The employees of the State Bank  of  India  are  bound  by  the
same. Letter/circular dated 11th December, 2000 refers to amendment to  Bank
(Employees')  Pension  Regulations,  1995.  The  said  regulations  are  not
applicable to the employees of State Bank of India. The Pension  regulations
applicable to the State Bank of India employees are  different.  As  far  as
employees of State Bank of India are concerned, the Bank Employees'  Pension
Regulations,  1995  are  not  applicable.   The   amendment   suggested   by
letter/circular dated 11th December, 2000 by Indian Bank's  Association  was
not applicable to the appellants and the employees  of  the  State  Bank  of
India. We may also point out here that State Bank of India  in  the  counter
affidavit has explained that its Voluntary Retirement Scheme was  a  special
and a distinct scheme offering a handsome  package  for  the  employees  who
were ready and willing to opt for retirement. It is also  pointed  out  that
the State Bank of India's employees  unlike  employees  belonging  to  other
public sector banks were entitled to both contributory  provident  fund  and
membership of a pension fund. It is stated that employees  of  other  public
sector  bank  are  eligible  either  for  contributory  provident  fund   or
membership of pension fund.

14. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellants,  however,  also  relied  on  the
judgment of a single Judge of this Court in  the  case  of Punjab  and  Sind
Bank Officers Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. on  11th  May,
2006. In the said case, learned single Judge was  examining  regulations  28
and 29 of the Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations,  1995.  The  issue  was
which of the two regulations would apply. It was  held  that  Regulation  29
would apply to employees who had taken voluntary  retirement  whether  under
normal circumstances or under a special scheme. It  was  further  held  that
the scheme or package cannot be  altered  unilaterally.  The  said  decision
does not support the contention of the appellants. The terms and  conditions
of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme were clear and specific. The  terms  were
not ambiguous. The employees including the appellants were  fully  conscious
of the decision taken by them and the benefits they would  be  entitled  to.
The appellants voluntarily, with open eyes entered  into  an  agreement  and
after having retired and enjoyed the benefits, they  cannot  go  behind  the
concluded contract and claim further benefits. It must be remembered that  a
Voluntary Retirement Scheme is formulated and conceived in public  interest.
Interest of the respondent bank is also to be taken into consideration."


Having stated the various views taken by the High Courts I may now refer  to
certain authorities dealing with these kind of schemes.
In Arikaravula  Sanyasi  Raju  v.  Branch  Manager,  State  Bank  of  India,
Visakhapatnam (A.P.) and others[4]  the question arose  whether  an  officer
who is removed from service on finding of misconduct would  be  entitled  to
get the relief of pension under Rule 22 of the State Bank of  India  Service
Rules.  In the said  case  the  High  Court  had  directed  the  payment  of
provident fund in terms of rules but denied  the  relief  of  pension.   The
Court referred to Rule 22 of the rules and opined  had  the  officer  sought
retirement on that basis and allowed the retirement from  service  he  would
have been entitled to pension on  completion  of  20  years  of  pensionable
service but removal would not entitle  him  to  get  pension.   Interpreting
Clause 22(i)(c) the two-Judge observed thus:-
"Clause  22(i)(c)  envisage  only  that  after  completing   20   years   of
pensionable service, if an incumbent retired at his request in  writing  and
was permitted to retire, he would be entitled to pension.  In  other  words,
for voluntary retirement, on completion of 20 years of pensionable  service,
clause (c) of Rule 22(1) gets attracted"

In V. Kasturi  v.  Managing  Director,  State  Bank  of  India,  Bombay  and
another[5] though the Court was dealing with eligibility to be entitled  for
pension under Rule 22(i)(c) yet it reproduced  the  rule,  referred  to  the
contentions and came to hold as follows:-
"12. On a close look at the relevant provisions of  the  Rules,  it  is  not
possible to agree with this contention. The  appellant,  in  order  to  earn
pension under Rule 22(1) clause (c) as amended in 1986 has  to  satisfy  the
following twin conditions:

(i) at the time when the amended clause (c) applied, i.e.,  from  22-9-1986,
he should be a member of the pension fund;

(ii) he should have by then completed 20 years of pensionable  service,  and
should have put forward his requisition in writing for availing the  benefit
of the said provision.

Unless both these conditions are satisfied the amended clause  (c)  of  Rule
22(1) cannot apply in his case."

The afore-referred two decisions show how the Court had perceived  the  rule
position.
In Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, A.P. SIDC  Ltd.  and  another  v  R.
Varaprasad and  others[6]  while  dealing  with  the  concept  of  voluntary
retirement schemes the Court has ruled that:-
"All employees who accepted VRS could be relieved at  a  time  or  batch  by
batch depending  on  availability  of  funds.  Further  funds  may  be  made
available early or late. If the argument of the respondents  that  relieving
date should be taken as effective date  for  calculating  terminal  benefits
and financial package under VRS, the dates may be fluctuating  depending  on
availability of funds. Hence it is not possible  to  accept  this  argument.
When the employees have opted for VRS on their own  without  any  compulsion
knowing fully well about the Scheme, guidelines and circulars governing  the
same, it is not open to them  to  make  any  claim  contrary  to  the  terms
accepted. It is a  matter  of  contract  between  the  Corporation  and  the
employees. It is not for the courts to rewrite the terms  of  the  contract,
which were clear to the contracting parties, as indicated in the  guidelines
and circulars  governing  them  under  which  Voluntary  Retirement  Schemes
floated."

In O.P. Swarnakar (supra)  the question arose whether an employee  who  opts
for voluntary retirement pursuant or in furtherance  of  scheme  floated  by
the Nationalised Banks and the State Bank of India would be  precluded  from
withdrawing the  said  offer.    The  court  dealing  with  the  concept  of
voluntary retirement held as follows:-
"59. The request of employees seeking voluntary retirement was not  to  take
effect until and  unless  it  was  accepted  in  writing  by  the  competent
authority. The competent authority had the absolute  discretion  whether  to
accept or reject the request of the employee  seeking  voluntary  retirement
under the Scheme. A  procedure  has  been  laid  down  for  considering  the
provisions of the said Scheme to the effect that an employee who intends  to
seek  voluntary  retirement  would  submit  duly  completed  application  in
duplicate  in  the  prescribed  form  marked  "offer   to   seek   voluntary
retirement" and the application so  received  would  be  considered  by  the
competent authority on  first-come-first-serve  basis.  The  procedure  laid
down therefor suggests that the applications of the  employee  would  be  an
offer which could be considered by the bank in terms of the  procedure  laid
down therefor. There is no assurance  that  such  an  application  would  be
accepted without any consideration.

60. Acceptance or otherwise of the request of an employee seeking  voluntary
retirement is required to be communicated to him in writing. This clause  is
crucial in view of the fact that therein  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of
such request has been provided. The decision of the authority rejecting  the
request is appealable to the Appellate Authority. The  application  made  by
an employee as an offer as well as the decision of the bank thereupon  would
be communicated to the  respective  General  Managers.  The  decision-making
process shall take place at various levels of the banks."

      Eventually analyzing the stand of various banks  the  court  expressed
thus:-

"90. The basic concept of the Scheme, therefore, underwent  a  change  which
also goes to show that the  banks  had  sought  to  invoke  their  power  of
amending the Scheme. Once the Scheme is amended and/or  an  apprehension  is
created in the mind of the employees that they would not  even  receive  the
entire benefits as envisaged under the Scheme, they were entitled to  revoke
their offers. Their action in our considered opinion is reasonable.  It  may
be that some of the employees only opted  for  the  provident  fund  benefit
which did not undergo any amendment  but  the  same  would  not  change  the
attitude on the part of the banks."

In HEC Voluntary Retd.  Employees  Welfare  Society  and  Another  v.  Heavy
Engineering Corpn. Ltd. and others[7] the  Court  referring  to  concept  of
voluntary retirement opined that an offer for voluntary retirement in  terms
of a scheme, when accepted,  leads  to  a  concluded  contract  between  the
employer and the employee. In terms of such a scheme,  an  employee  has  an
option either to accept or  not  to  opt  therefor.  The  scheme  is  purely
voluntary, in terms whereof the tenure of service  is  curtailed,  which  is
permissible in law. Such a scheme is ordinarily floated with  a  purpose  of
downsizing the employees. It is beneficial both to the employees as well  as
to the employer. Such a scheme is issued for effective  functioning  of  the
industrial undertakings.  The  court  further  observed  that  although  the
Company is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of  the  Constitution,
the terms and conditions of service would be governed  by  the  contract  of
employment. Thus, unless the terms and conditions of  such  a  contract  are
governed by a statute or statutory rules, the  provisions  of  the  Contract
Act would be applicable both at the formulation of the contract as also  the
determination thereof. By reason of such a scheme, it only is an  invitation
of offer floated. When pursuant to or in furtherance  of  such  a  Voluntary
Retirement Scheme an employee opts therefor, he makes an  offer  which  upon
acceptance by the employer gives rise to a contract.  Thus,  as  the  matter
relating to voluntary  retirement  is  not  governed  by  any  statute,  the
provisions of the Contract Act, 1872, therefore, would  be  applicable  too.
In this context reliance  was  placed  on  O.P.  Swarankar's  case  (supra).
After so stating, the Court ruled:
"We have noticed that  admittedly  thousands  of  employees  had  opted  for
voluntary retirement during the period in question. They  indisputably  form
a distinct and different  class.  Having  given  our  anxious  consideration
thereto, we are of the opinion that neither are  they  discharged  employees
nor  are  they  superannuated  employees.  The  expression  "superannuation"
connotes a distinct meaning. It ordinarily means, unless otherwise  provided
for in the statute, that not only  he  reaches  the  age  of  superannuation
prescribed therefor, but also  becomes  entitled  to  the  retiral  benefits
thereof including pension. "Voluntary retirement" could have  fallen  within
the aforementioned expression, provided it was so stated  expressly  in  the
Scheme.

Financial considerations are, thus, a relevant factor both  for  floating  a
scheme of voluntary retirement  as  well  as  for  revision  of  pay.  Those
employees who opted for  voluntary  retirement,  make  a  planning  for  the
future. At the time of giving option, they know where they  stand.  At  that
point of time they did not anticipate that they would  get  the  benefit  of
revision in the scales of pay. They prepared themselves to contract  out  of
the jural relationship by resorting to "golden handshake".  They  are  bound
by their own act. The  parties  are  bound  by  the  terms  of  contract  of
voluntary retirement. We have noticed hereinbefore that unless a statute  or
statutory provision interdicts, the relationship between the parties to  act
pursuant to  or  in  furtherance  of  the  Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme  is
governed by contract. By such contract, they  can  opt  out  of  such  other
terms and conditions as may be agreed upon.  In  this  case  the  terms  and
conditions of the contract are  not  governed  by  a  statute  or  statutory
rules."

      In the said case the court referred to V.  Kasturi  Case  (supra)  and
understood it in the following manner:-
"It has not been suggested that voluntary retirement, in the absence of  any
express statutory rule governing the field, would  bring  about  a  case  of
superannuation. In V. Kasturi, a  new  rule  was  introduced  providing  for
pension of an employee  after  retirement  on  completion  of  20  years  of
service, provided he requested in  writing  therefor.  The  questions  which
fell for consideration therein were  that  if  a  person  was  eligible  for
pension at the time of his retirement and if he survives till  the  time  of
subsequent amendment of  the  relevant  Pension  Scheme,  whether  he  would
become entitled to enhanced pension or would become  eligible  to  get  more
pension as per the new formula  of  computation  of  pension.  In  the  fact
situation obtaining therein, it was held that employees could be divided  in
two [pic]categories i.e. those who were eligible for pension at the time  of
their retirement and those who were  not.  Whereas  in  the  case  of  first
category the benefit of the amended provisions would be applicable,  but  in
the second it would not. V. Kasturi also,  thus,  in  our  opinion,  is  not
applicable to the fact of the present case."

In this backdrop, I am required to scan the  anatomy  of  Rule  22  and  the
appropriate interpretation is required to  be  placed  on  the  same.   Rule
22(i) (a) postulates that members shall be entitled  to  pension  under  the
said rule on retiring from the  bank's  service.   Thus,  the  key  word  is
retiring from bank's service.  The  said  rule  when  understood  in  proper
perspective, covers cases of normal  retirement/superannuation.   There  are
various compartments and  each  compartment  has  different  criterion.   An
employee, who  has  completed  20  years  of  pensionable  service  and  has
attained the age of 50 years, would be entitled to  get  the  pension  under
the rules.  This is one compartment.  Second one, as  is  envisaged,  carves
out an exception to the first part, which stipulates that when  an  employee
who is working in the bank on or  after  01.11.1993  and  has  completed  10
years of pensionable service, shall be entitled for pension provided he  has
attained the age of 58 years.  The third part of the  rule  stipulates  that
all employees who are in service of the bank or after  22.05.1998  and  have
put in 10 years of pensionable service, to be eligible for pension  provided
they have attained the age of 60 years i.e. age of superannuation.   As  the
facts would demonstrate, in the  instant  case,  the  employees/respondents,
before attaining the age  of  superannuation,  sought  voluntary  retirement
under the Scheme.
At this juncture, it is relevant to state Rule 22(i)(b) which provides  that
an employee who has completed 20 years of pensionable service,  irrespective
of age, if he satisfies the authority competent to  sanction  retirement  by
appropriate medical certificate or otherwise that he  is  incapacitated  for
further active service, he would be entitled to pension.  This  clause  does
not cover the present respondents.   Clause 22(i)(c) deals with  entitlement
of pension by an employee if  he  has  completed  20  years  of  pensionable
service irrespective of age, if he seeks retirement at his  own  request  in
writing.  It is the stand of the  Bank  that  Rule  22(i)(c)  was  added  on
20.09.1986 for the specific purpose of granting pension to  those  who  have
voluntary retired.  As is evident from the factual score under the SBI  VRS,
the  employees  were  required  to  submit  written   applications   seeking
voluntary retirement under the Scheme.  When the scheme  was  in  operation,
the competent authority i.e. Deputy Managing Director had issued a  circular
dated  10/15.1.2001  clarifying  the  position  that  the  employees   could
withdraw their applications made  under  SBI  VRS  by  15.2.2001  and  those
employees who have not completed 20 years of pensionable  service,  are  not
eligible for pension.  There can be no doubt, by abundant caution, the  bank
issued a clarificatory circular.  The said  circular  cannot  be  given  any
type of nomenclature other than a clarificatory  circular,  despite  treated
as such.  It is graphically clear from the same that  an  employee  who  has
completed 20 years of pensionable service  would  be  entitled  to  pension,
even if they seek voluntary retirement under SBI VRS.  It was  open  to  the
employees to withdraw their applications under SBI VRS  by  15.2.2001.   The
respondent-employees, as is manifest,  chose  not  to  withdraw.   In  these
circumstances, the question arises whether any part of Rule 22  would  apply
to the respondent  for  extension  of  benefit  of  pension.   As  has  been
elaborated earlier, Clause 22(i)(a)  and  22(i)(b)  are  not  applicable  to
them.
Mr. Rohtagi, learned Attorney General, has submitted that on 30.1.2001,  the
SBI Employees Pension Fund Rules was amended by the Central  Board  of  SBI.
The SBI VRS was in operation from 15.1.2001  to  31.1.2001.   The  employees
were at liberty, as has been  stated  earlier,  to  withdraw  by  15.2.2001.
Admittedly, the Rule was in force on 30.1.2001.   The  employees  were  very
well aware about the amended Rule.   There can  be  no  scintilla  of  doubt
that the Rule existed as on 31.1.2001.  If an employee wanted  to  withdraw,
he could have withdrawn prior to 15.2.2001 but as is the admitted  position,
none of the employees withdrew.  There is no cavil over the  fact  that  the
employees had accepted all the benefits of the VRS.  The crux of the  matter
is whether the respondents  can  get  the  benefit,  despite  the  amendment
brought to the Rules.
In Arikaavula Sanyasi Raju (supra), it has been clearly held, for  voluntary
retirement on completion of 20 years of pensionable service, clause  (c)  of
Rule 22(i) gets attracted.  Another aspect  needs  to  be  noted.   The  SBI
Pension Rules have been framed under Section 50 of the SBI Act,  1955.   The
Rules  have  statutory  force.   The  concept  of  any  kind  of  promissory
estoppel, if any, could not be applicable to promote or condone  the  breach
of law.
In Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. Vs. R. Hanumaiah & Ors.[8] it  has
been held that rule of promissory estoppel cannot be availed  to  permit  or
condone a breach of law.  It cannot be invoked to compel the  Government  to
do an act prohibited by law, for such  a  direction  would  be  against  the
statute.  To arrive at the  said  conclusion,  the  two-Judge  Bench  placed
reliance on TISCO Ltd. V.  State  of  Jharkhand[9],  Hira  Tikkoo  V.  Union
Territory,  Chandigarh[10]  and  Savitaben  Somabai  Bhatiya  V.  State   of
Gujarat[11].
The High Court, to sustain its conclusion, has referred to  Clause  6(c)  of
the Scheme which postulates that  the  benefits  shall  be  granted  to  the
employee which include the pension and the said pension shall be granted  in
terms of the State Bank  of  India  Employees  Pension  Fund  Rules  on  the
relevant date.   The  High  Court  referred  to  Rule  22(i)  prior  to  the
amendment i.e. 09.03.2001.  The unamended  portion  of  the  Rule  reads  as
follows:
"After having completed 20 years' pensionable service provided that  he  has
attained the age of 50 years or if he is in service of the Bank on or  after
01.11.1993, after having completed 10  years  pensionable  service  provided
that he has attained the age of 58 years."

After the amendment that was incorporated on 9.3.2001,  the  Rule  reads  as
under:
"After having completed 20 years' pensionable service provided that  he  has
attained the age of 50 years or if he is in service of the Bank on or  after
01.11.1993, after having completed 10  years  pensionable  service  provided
that he has attained the age of 58 years or if he is in the service  of  the
Bank on or after 22.05.1998, after having  completed  10  years  pensionable
service provided that he has attained the age of 60 years".


Analysing the said Rule, the High Court opined that the employees  would  be
covered under second  part  of  clause  (a)  of  Rule  22(i)  which  was  in
existence on  the  date  when  the  petitioner  submitted  his  request  for
voluntary retirement.  That apart, the High Court has also held  even  after
amendment on 09.03.2001, by which another clause has been  added,  that  is,
third part of clause (a), would not affect the claim of  the  employees  for
pension as he is entitled to pension in the second part of Rule  22(i)  (a).
Here, as I find, the High Court has opined as the respondent was in  service
of Bank on 1.11.1993 and had completed 10 years of pensionable  service  and
attained the age of 58 years, he would be entitled to pension.  There is  no
doubt that the Government of India, on 22.5.98, advised all the  banks  that
the age of retirement would be 60 years.  Accordingly, the Board of SBI,  on
22.5.1998  itself,  passed  a  resolution  whereby  it  fixed  the  age   of
retirement 60 years w.e.f. that date.  As a consequence  of  re-fixation  of
age of retirement, the rules were amended and third part  of  Rule  22(i)(a)
was added for all employees who were in service of the  bank  on  or  before
22.5.98 and had put in 10 years of pensionable service to  be  eligible  for
pension benefit provided that they have attained the age of  60  years.   As
has been stated earlier, the respondents had not retired  on  attaining  the
age of superannuation but sought voluntary retirement  under  the  SBI  VRS.
The Bank has placed reliance on the clarificatory  circular  issued  by  the
Deputy Managing Director  on  10/15.1.2001,  which  lays  a  postulate  that
employees who have not completed 20 years of  pensionable  service  are  not
eligible for pension.
In this context, reference may be made to a decision in  Bank  of  Baroda  &
Others V. Ganpat Singh Deora[12], wherein the Court  was  interpreting  Bank
of Baroda (Employees) Pension Regulations 1995.  In the said case, the  Bank
of Baroda had introduced "Bank  of  Baroda  Employees  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme 2001" and under the Scheme along with terminal  benefits  pension  in
terms of 1995 Regulations was to be provided to the employees who opted  for
the VRS Scheme.  The respondent-employee therein, after accepting  voluntary
retirement, filed an application for claiming pension which was  opposed  by
the Bank in terms of Regulations 14, 28 and 29 of  the  Pension  Regulations
1995.  Eventually, the matter  travelled   to  the  Tribunal,  who,  by  its
award, allowed the respondent's claim and directed the Bank to  pay  to  the
respondent pension according  to  the  Pension  Regulations.    Against  the
award passed by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, the Bank preferred a  writ
petition before the High Court but the said challenge did not meet with  any
success.  This Court referred to the language of the Scheme  and  opined  as
follows:
"27. The conditions relating to completing 15 years  of  service  for  being
eligible to apply for BOBEVRS, 2001 are special to the  Scheme  as  also  to
the case of those employees who wished to  apply  for  voluntary  retirement
under the aforesaid Scheme, if they had completed or would be completing  40
years of age. The latter condition appears  to  have  been  incorporated  in
view of the provisions of Regulations 14 and 32 of the Pension  Regulations,
1995, [pic]to enable employees who had completed  10  years  of  service  to
also become eligible to apply for premature  retirement  under  the  Pension
Regulations, 1995.

28. However, we are inclined to agree with Ms Bhati that Regulation 29  does
not contemplate voluntary retirement under the Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme
and applies only to such employees who themselves wish to retire dehors  any
scheme  of  voluntary  retirement,  after  having  completed  15  years   of
qualifying service for the said purpose.  There  is  a  distinct  difference
between the two situations and Regulation 29 would not cover the case of  an
employee opting to retire on the basis of a voluntary retirement scheme.

29. Furthermore, Regulation 2 of the Voluntary Retirement  Scheme,  2001  of
the appellant Bank merely prescribes a period of qualifying service  for  an
employee to be eligible to apply for voluntary retirement.

30. On the other hand, Regulations 14 and 29  of  the  Pension  Regulations,
1995, relate to the period of qualifying service for pension under the  said
Regulations, in two different situations. While Regulation 14 provides  that
in order to be eligible for pension an  employee  would  have  to  render  a
minimum of 10 years' service, Regulation 29 is applicable to  the  employees
choosing to retire from service prematurely, and in their  case  the  period
of qualifying service would be 15 years".

After so stating, the Court further opined thus:
"31. The facts of the present case, however, do not attract  the  provisions
of Regulation 29 since  the  respondent  accepted  the  offer  of  voluntary
retirement under the Scheme framed by the Bank and not on his  own  volition
dehors any scheme of voluntary retirement. In such  a  case,  Regulation  14
read with Regulation 32 providing for premature retirement  would  not  also
apply to the case of the respondent. While  Regulation  2  of  the  BOBEVRS,
2001 speaks of eligibility for applying under the Scheme, Regulation  14  of
the Pension  Regulations,  1995,  contemplates  a  situation  whereunder  an
employee would be eligible for premature pension.  The  two  provisions  are
for two different  purposes  and  for  two  different  situations.  However,
Regulation 28  of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995,  after  amendment  made
provision for situations similar to the one in the instant case.

32. In the absence of any particular provision for  payment  of  pension  to
those who opted for BOBEVRS,  2001  other  than  Regulation  11(ii)  of  the
Scheme, we are once again left to fall  back  on  the  Pension  Regulations,
1995, and the amended provisions of Regulation 28  which  bring  within  the
scope of superannuation  pension  employees  who  opted  for  the  Voluntary
Retirement Scheme, which will be  clear  from  the  explanatory  memorandum.
However, the period of qualifying service has been retained as 15 years  for
those opting for BOBEVRS, 2001 and is  treated  differently  from  premature
retirement where the minimum period of qualifying service has been fixed  at
10 years in keeping with Regulation 14 of the Pension Regulations, 1995.

33. We are, therefore, of the view that not having  completed  the  required
length of qualifying service as provided under Regulation  28  of  the  1995
Regulations, the respondent was not eligible for pension under  the  Pension
Regulations, 1995 of the appellant Bank."

      Being of this view, the Court allowed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the
Bank.
In Bank of India and Another  V.  K.  Mohandas  and  Others[13],  the  Court
referred to Regulation 28 of the Employees' Pension Regulations 1995,  which
had provided superannuation pension and Regulation 29  provided  pension  on
voluntary retirement.  After referring to series  of  decisions,  the  Court
held thus:
"31. It is also a well-recognised principle of construction  of  a  contract
that it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the  true  meaning  of
its several clauses and the words of each clause should  be  interpreted  so
as  to  bring  them  into  harmony  with  the  other  provisions   if   that
interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they  are  naturally
susceptible. (North Eastern Railway Co. v. Lord Hastings[14])

32. The fundamental position is that it is the banks  who  were  responsible
for formulation of the terms in the contractual Scheme that  the  optees  of
voluntary retirement under that Scheme will be  eligible  to  pension  under
the Pension Regulations, 1995, and, therefore, they bear the  risk  of  lack
of clarity, if any. It is  a  well-known  principle  of  construction  of  a
contract that if [pic]the  terms  applied  by  one  party  are  unclear,  an
interpretation against that party  is  preferred  (verba  chartarum  fortius
accipiuntur contra proferentem)".

Thereafter, the Court adverted to intention of the  Banks  at  the  time  of
bringing out VRS 2000.  The Court observed that if the intention was not  to
give  pension  as  provided   under  Regulation  29  and  particularly  sub-
Regulation (5) thereof, they could have said so in the Scheme  itself.   The
Court  also  reproduced  the  communication  dated  5.9.2000  sent  by   the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department  of  Economic  Affairs,
Banking Division to the Personnel  Advisor,  Indian  Banks  Association  and
came to hold as follows:
"39. Two things immediately become noticeable from the  said  communication.
One is that as per Regulation  29  of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995,  an
employee can take voluntary retirement after 20 years of qualifying  service
and become eligible  for  pension.  The  other  thing  is  that  the  Scheme
provides that the employees with 15 years of service  or  40  years  of  age
shall be eligible to take voluntary retirement under the  Scheme  and  under
Regulation 29,  the  employees  having  rendered  15  years  of  service  or
completed 40 years of age but not completed 20 years of  service  shall  not
be [pic]eligible for pensionary  benefits  on  taking  voluntary  retirement
under the Scheme.

40. The use of the words "such employees" in the communication is  referable
to employees having rendered 15 years of service but not completed 20  years
of service and, therefore, it was decided  to  bring  an  amendment  in  the
Regulations so that the employees having not completed 20 years' service  do
not lose the benefit of pension. The  amendment  in  Regulation  28,  as  is
reflected from the afore referred communication, was intended to  cover  the
employees who had rendered 15 years' service but  not  completed  20  years'
service. It was not intended to cover the optees who had  already  completed
20 years' service as the provisions contained  in  Regulation  29  met  that
contingency.

                         xxx         xxx        xxx

43. It was submitted that by such construction  a  class  within  the  class
would be created which is impermissible. We  do  not  agree.  If  a  special
benefit under Regulation  29(5)  is  available  to  the  employees  who  had
completed 20 years of service or more, by no stretch of imagination, can  it
be said that it is discriminatory to those employees who  had  completed  15
years of service but not completed  20  years.  In  view  of  the  provision
contained in Regulation 29(5), if the  optees  who  have  not  completed  20
years get excluded from the weightage of five years which has been given  to
the optees who have completed  20  years  of  service  or  more,  it  is  no
discrimination. Such provision can neither be said to be arbitrary  nor  can
be held to be violative of any constitutional or statutory  provisions.  The
weightage of five years under Regulation 29(5) is applicable to  the  optees
having service of 20 years or more. There is,  thus,  basis  for  additional
benefit. Merely because the [pic]employees who have completed  15  years  of
service but not completed 20 years of service are not entitled to  weightage
of five years for qualifying service under Regulation 29(5),  the  employees
who have completed 20 years  of  service  or  more  cannot  be  denied  such
benefit.

                         xxx         xxx        xxx

46. The precise effect of the  Pension  Regulations,  for  the  purposes  of
pension,  having  been  made  part  of  the  Scheme,  is  that  the  Pension
Regulations, to the extent, these are applicable,  must  be  read  into  the
Scheme. It is pertinent to bear in mind that interpretation  clause  of  VRS
2000 states that the words and  expressions  used  in  the  Scheme  but  not
defined and defined in the rules/regulations shall  have  the  same  meaning
respectively assigned to them under the rules/regulations. The  Scheme  does
not define the expression "retirement" or "voluntary retirement".  We  have,
therefore,  to  fall  back  on  the  definition  of  "retirement"  given  in
Regulation 2(y) whereunder  voluntary  retirement  under  Regulation  29  is
considered to be retirement. Regulation 29 uses  the  expression  "voluntary
retirement under these Regulations". Obviously,  for  the  purposes  of  the
Scheme, it has to be understood to mean with necessary changes in points  of
details. Section 23 of the Contract Act has no application  to  the  present
fact situation.
                         xxx         xxx        xxx

50. It  is  true  that  VRS  2000  is  a  complete  package  in  itself  and
contractual in nature. However, in that package, it has been  provided  that
the optees, in addition to ex gratia  payment,  will  also  be  eligible  to
other benefits inter alia pension under the Pension  Regulations.  The  only
provision in the  Pension  Regulations  at  the  relevant  time  during  the
operation of VRS 2000 concerning voluntary retirement was Regulation 29  and
sub-regulation (5) thereof provides for weightage of addition of five  years
to qualifying service for pension to  those  optees  who  had  completed  20
years' service. It, therefore, cannot be accepted  that  VRS  2000  did  not
envisage grant of pension benefits under Regulation  29(5)  of  the  Pension
Regulations, 1995, to the optees of 20 years' service along with payment  of
ex gratia.

51. The whole idea in bringing out VRS 2000  was  to  right  size  workforce
which the banks had not been able to  achieve  despite  the  fact  that  the
statutory Regulations provided for voluntary  retirement  to  the  employees
having completed 20 years' service. It was for this  reason  that  VRS  2000
was made more attractive. VRS 2000, accordingly, was an  attractive  package
for the employees to go in for as they were getting special benefits in  the
form of ex gratia and in addition thereto, inter  alia,  pension  under  the
Pension Regulations which also provided  for  weightage  of  five  years  of
qualifying service for the purposes of pension  to  the  employees  who  had
completed 20 years' service".

In the said case, the decision  rendered  in  Bank  of  Baroda  (supra)  was
distinguished by stating thus:
"63. The decision of  this  Court  in  Bank  of  Baroda  is,  thus,  clearly
distinguishable  as  the  employee  therein  had  not  completed  qualifying
service much less 20 years of service for being eligible  to  the  weightage
under Regulation 29(5) and cannot be applied to the present controversy  nor
does that matter decide the question here  to  be  decided  in  the  present
group of matters".

            Eventually, the Court concluded thus:

"66. We hold, as it must be, that the employees who had completed  20  years
of service and were pension optees and offered  voluntary  retirement  under
VRS 2000 and whose offers  were  accepted  by  the  banks  are  entitled  to
addition of five years of notional service  in  calculating  the  length  of
service for the purposes of that Scheme  as  per  Regulation  29(5)  of  the
Pension Regulations, 1995. The contrary views expressed by some of the  High
Courts do not lay down the correct legal position."

Recently, in State Bank of Patiala V. Pritam Singh Bedi  &  Others[15],  the
Court was dealing with the State of Bank  of  Patiala  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme, 2000, introduced by a circular dated 20.1.2001.   The  Court  quoted
in extenso  from  K.  Mohandas  &  Others  (supra).   Thereafter  the  Court
referred to Clause 3 and 7.  Clause 7  thereof  dealt  with  other  benefits
including pension or Bank's contribution  to  provident  fund  as  the  case
maybe as per rules applicable on the relevant date on the  basis  of  actual
years of service rendered.  The Court also took note of Regulation 2(w)  and
2(y) of  State  Bank  of  Patiala  (Employees)  Pension  Regulations,  1995.
Regulation 2(w) defined "qualifying service" and 2(y) defined  "retirement".
 Regulation 2(y)(b) referred to  voluntary  retirement  in  accordance  with
provisions contained in Regulation 29 of  the  Regulations.   Reference  was
also  made  to  Regulation  14  that  defined  "qualifying  service"   which
stipulates that employee who has rendered a minimum  of  ten  years  in  the
bank from the date of his retirement or on the date on which  he  is  deemed
to have retired shall qualify for  pension.   Reference  was  also  made  to
Regulation 18 which prescribes how the broken  period  of  service  of  less
than one year has to  be  computed.    Regulation  28  thereof   dealt  with
superannuation pension and Regulation 29 related  to  pension  on  voluntary
retirement.  Scanning the various provisions of the Regulations,  the  Court
held thus:
"22. The Respondents completed more than 10 years of service in the Bank  on
the  date  of  retirement;  therefore,  they  fulfill  the  requirement   of
qualifying service as per Regulation 14.

23. It has not been disputed by Appellant-Bank that the Respondents  in  all
the appeals have completed much more than 19 years 6 months  of  service  in
the Bank. For example, Respondent No. 1-Prakash Chand in  C.A.  No.  173  of
2010 had joined the Bank on 4th May, 1981 and relieved on 31st March,  2001.
Thus, he had completed 19  years,  10  months  and  28  days  of  qualifying
service on the date of relieving from service.

24. Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 provides that  if  broken
period is more than six months, it shall be treated as one year.  Therefore,
all the Respondents-writ Petitioners having completed  more  than  19  years
and 6 months of service in  the  Bank,  they  are  to  be  treated  to  have
completed 20 years of service. The aforesaid  question  was  neither  raised
nor decided in the case of 'Bank of Baroda' or 'Bank of India'.

25. In view of the aforesaid fact,  the  Appellant-Bank  cannot  derive  the
benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank  of  Baroda as  the  employees
who were parties before the Court in the said  case  had  not  completed  20
years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank  of  India,  the
Respondents-writ Petitioners  having  completed  20  years  of  service  are
entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29."

Keeping in  view  the  aforesaid  pronouncements,  I  shall  advert  to  the
Regulations and the Scheme in question.  From the aforesaid  two  decisions,
it  is  graphically  clear  that  the  Court  has  read  into  the   scheme,
Regulations governing the pension.  In the case at  hand,  as  I  find,  the
Regulation 22(i)(a) refers to three categories; twenty years of  pensionable
service and attaining age of fifty years, or as on 1.11.1993 an employee  in
service has completed ten years  of  pensionable  service  provided  he  has
attained the age of fifty-eight years, or an employee to be  in  service  of
the Bank on or after 22.05.1998  and has completed ten years of  pensionable
service provided that he has attained the age  of  sixty  years.   The  High
Court has held that the employees would be  covered  under  second  part  of
Clause (a).  I have already dealt with clause (b).  Mr. Rohtagi has  heavily
relied  on  Clause  22(i)(c).   It  really  requires  close  scrutiny.    It
stipulates that a member shall be entitled to pension on  completion  of  20
years of pensionable service irrespective of the age he has attained if  the
retirement is at his own request in writing.  Thus, there is  a  distinction
between a  normal  retirement  and  a  voluntary  retirement.   A  voluntary
retirement stands in a distinction to retirement and also  retirement  which
comes under Clause 22(i)(b) which dwells on sanction of competent  authority
and member being incapacitated.  A scheme has come  into  existence  because
of certain objectives.   The  objectives  of  the  scheme  were  to  have  a
balanced  age-profile  providing  for  mobility,  training,  development  of
skills and succession plans for higher-level positions, to  provide  for  an
exit for employees who have an honest feeling that they  should  now  retire
and take rest or that there are  better  opportunities  elsewhere,  to  have
overall reduction in the existing strength of the employees and to  increase
productivity  and  profitability.    Clause  3  of   the   Scheme   provides
eligibility criterion.  It reads as follows:
"The Scheme will be open to all  permanent  employees  of  the  Bank  except
those specifically mentioned as 'ineligible', who have put in  15  years  of
service or have completed 40 years of age as on  31st  December  2000.   Age
will be reckoned on the basis of  the  date  of  birth  as  entered  in  the
service record."

            Clause 4 deals with ineligibility which  need  not  be  referred
to.  Clause 5 deals with amount of ex-gratia.  Clause  6  deals  with  other
benefits which I have already referred to.   Clause 6(c) clearly  stipulates
that an employee seeking voluntary retirement  would  have  the  benefit  of
pension in terms of State Bank of India Employees'  Pension  Fund  Rules  on
the relevant date.
40.   In this context, what I have  noticed  in  the  case  of  K.  Mohandas
(supra) that the Court has referred to the Scheme  to  understand  the  true
meaning of several clauses; formulation  of  the  contractual  scheme  where
reference has been made to Pension Regulations 1995 of the Banks which  were
in appeal before this Court and the special salient features of  the  scheme
which  stipulated  that  an  employee  whose   application   for   voluntary
retirement is accepted and relieved from the  Bank  shall  be  eligible  for
contributory provident fund  or  own  contribution  of  provident  fund  and
pension in terms of the employees  Pension  Regulations  1995,  in  case  of
those who have opted for pension and have  put  in  20  completed  years  of
service in the Bank.  The Court also referred  to  Regulations  28  and  29,
which deals  with  superannuation  pension  and  the  pension  on  voluntary
retirement respectively.  The Court also took note  of  the  fact  that  all
employees who have completed 20  years  of  service  and  the  amendment  in
Regulation 28, which was carried out in 2002 with retrospective effect  from
1.9.2000 and the amendment inserted a proviso which  provided  that  pension
shall also be granted to an employee who opts  to  retire  before  attaining
the age of superannuation but after having served for a  minimum  period  of
13 years in terms of any scheme that may be framed for the  purpose  by  the
Bank's Board with the concurrence of the Government.   The Court  took  note
of the fact that the benefits provided under Regulation 29  were  not  found
to be attractive by the employees and, therefore, the  necessity  arose  for
floating a special scheme i.e. VRS-2000.  The grievance  of  the  optees  in
the case was that they were given the retiral benefits  by  the  respondent-
Bank under VRS-2000 save and except the benefit of pension under  Regulation
29(5).  Regulation 29(5) in the case of those banks is as follows:

"The qualifying service of  an  employee  retiring  voluntarily  under  this
Regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years,  subject
to the  condition  that  the  total  qualifying  service  rendered  by  such
employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years  and  it  does  not
take him beyond the date of superannuation".

One of the contentions canvassed by the Bank  was  that  the  Regulation  29
does not cover the persons  retired  under  VRS-2000  which  is  dehors  the
statutory scheme  for  voluntary  retirement.   The  counter  submission  on
behalf of the employees was that by making provisions  in  the  scheme  that
the optees would be eligible for the benefits in addition to  the  ex-gratia
amount, inter alia, pension  as  per  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995,  the
employees  understood  that  what  was  contemplated   was   pension   under
Regulation 29 and, therefore, any ambiguity in VRS 2000 ought to  have  been
construed and harmonized with the intention of the  parties;  Regulation  29
was the only regulation under the Pension Regulations, 1995,  applicable  to
the voluntary retirement and, therefore, Regulation 29, ipso  facto,  became
the terms of the contract; and that each and every paragraph  of  Regulation
29 can be made applicable to an optee of  more  than  20  years  of  service
without coming into conflict with any provision of the  scheme;  the  notice
period of three months in Regulation 29(3) can be waived at  the  discretion
of the banks.   The Court posed the questions as follows:
"The principal question that falls for our  determination  is:  whether  the
employees (having completed 20 years of service) of  these  banks  (Bank  of
India, Punjab National Bank, Punjab and Sind Bank, Union Bank of  India  and
United Bank of India) who had opted for voluntary retirement under VRS  2000
are entitled to addition of five years of notional  service  in  calculating
the length of service for the purpose of the said Scheme as  per  Regulation
29(5) of the Pension Regulations, 1995?"


To examine the question posed, the Court thought it appropriate  to  examine
the contract and the circumstances in which it was  made  in  order  to  see
whether or not from the nature of it,  the  parties  must  have  made  their
bargain on the footing that a particular thing  or  state  of  things  would
continue to exist.
I have already referred to Clause 6 of the Scheme, which deals  with  'other
benefits'.  Sub-clause (3) of Clause 6 stipulates that an employee would  be
entitled to get pension in terms  of  the  State  Bank  of  India  Employees
Pension Fund Rules on the relevant  date.    The  High  Courts  have  placed
reliance on the second part of Rule 22(i)(a).  Similar contention  has  been
advanced before us.  Per contra, Mr. Rohtagi would submit that  it  is  Rule
22(i)(c) which would be applicable.  I find force in  the  said  submission,
for Rule 22(i)(a) deals with the concept of retirement  and  22(i)(c)  deals
with the concept of retirement on request.   In  K.  Mohandas  (supra),  the
Rule was read into the Scheme in the absence of any other  postulate.   Same
is  the  case  here  and,  therefore,  I  read  the  Rule  to  the   Scheme.
Interpreting the 1995 Regulations, this Court had said that  it  will  apply
in entirety and, therefore, benefit was  extended  in  Rule  29(5).   Be  it
noted,  in  the  said  Regulation,  it  was  categorically   provided   that
pensionary benefits should  be  available  to  a  person  seeking  voluntary
retirement if he has put in 20 years of service.    Same  is  the  provision
here, that is, 20 years of  service  irrespective  of  the  age.    As  some
doubts  had  arose,  a  clarificatory  circular  was  issued  on  10.1.2001.
Relevant part has already been reproduced  earlier.   It  has  been  clearly
clarified that as per existing Rules, employees who have  not  completed  20
years  of  Pensionable  Service  are  not  eligible   for   pension.    This
clarification is in consonance with the Rules.  The  amendment  facet  which
has come into existence  afterwards  is  absolutely  inconsequential  as  it
deals with different facets of Rule 22(i)(a).  In  this  context,  reference
to circular dated 11.1.2001 is absolutely necessitous.   The  relevant  part
reads as follows:
"In this connection, queries  have  been  raised  whether  an  employee  who
submits his application for retirement under SBIVRS  can  withdraw  such  an
application subsequently.  Corporate Centre  have  examined  the  issue  and
have advised that the scheme is purely voluntary.  The role of the  employee
is active.  It is his conscious decision and there will  be  no  reason  for
his withdrawal of application at a later  date.   However,  there  could  be
few, yet genuine cases where  the  employees  would  like  to  withdraw  the
application submitted  under  the  scheme  for  various  reasons.   It  has,
therefore, been decided that the employee who has submitted  an  application
for retirement under SBIVRS may be permitted to withdraw the application  on
or before 15th February, 2001.  For this purpose, the employee will have  to
make a written request which must  reach  the  Branch  Manager/head  of  the
Department/ Head of the Unit i.e. authority  to  whom  the  application  for
retirement under SBIVRS has been submitted, on or  before  15.02.2001.   The
authority receiving the applications for withdrawal must forward it  to  the
competent authority immediately but not later than  the  following  day  and
obtain a confirmation to that effect from the competent authority."


Both the circulars  were  almost  simultaneous  and  both  were  within  the
knowledge of the employees and if an employee desired to withdraw, he  could
have done so as time was there till  15.2.2001.   None  of  the  respondents
chose to withdraw.  In the absence of withdrawal, there cannot be any  trace
of doubt that the employees would be governed by the rules existing  at  the
time of floating of the Scheme which has to be read  into  the  Scheme,  for
the Scheme clearly stipulates that the employees  availing  the  benefit  of
the Scheme would be entitled to pension as per the Pension  Rules.   I  have
already scanned the anatomy of the Rules  and  I  notice  that  there  is  a
categorical distinction between  'retirement'  and  'voluntary  retirement'.
In all the  impugned  judgments,  as  I  find,  the  High  Courts  have  not
appreciated the said distinction and applied the Rule pertaining  to  normal
retirement.  If the decisions in K. Mohandas (supra) and Ganpat Singh  Deora
(supra) are read carefully, it will go a long way to show that  a  voluntary
retirement    and     retirement     are     distinguishable,     if     the
Rule/Regulations/Scheme distinguishes. In the case at hand, it is  clear  as
day that the Rule carves out  two  categories  of  retirement,  one,  normal
retirement  on  superannuation  and  second,  retirement  on  request   i.e.
voluntary  retirement,  ordinarily  called   the   golden   handshake   and,
therefore, the scheme was floated.  In the instant case, as I perceive,  the
Scheme which is more beneficial was provided.  It had the  pension  and  the
ex-gratia.  However, it had a condition as enumerated in the  Rule  that  if
an employee had not completed 20 years of service, as per Rule 22(i)(c),  he
would not  get  pension.   In  K.  Mohandas  (supra),  if  an  employee  has
completed 20 years of service, apart  from  pensionary  benefits,  he  would
also get the benefit under  Regulation  29(5)  as  stipulated  therein.   To
elaborate, unless one is not  entitled  to  pension,  the  other  additional
benefits pertaining to pension do not arise.  I may hasten to add that I  am
only concerned with the concept of voluntary retirement under the Rules  and
the Scheme and as I find, the Rule cannot be interpreted as employees  would
be entitled to pension.  That is neither the intention  nor  the  spirit  of
the Rule, which has to be read into the Scheme as a part of it.
I have been apprised with regard to the relevant details of the  respondents
herein.  It is as follows:

|NAME OF THE   |LENGTH OF       |AGE AS OF   |EX-GRATIA AMOUNT PAID |
|RESPONDENT    |SERVICE         |31.03.2001  |(Apart from other     |
|              |                |            |benefits like PF &    |
|              |                |            |Gratuity)             |
|Radhey Shyam  |19 yrs. 8 months|59 yrs. 3   |Ex-Gratia-Rs.6,20,014/|
|Pandey        |18 days         |months      |-                     |
|SLP No.       |                |            |                      |
|3686/07       |                |            |                      |
|Mihir Kumar   |12 yrs. 3 months|58 yrs.     |Ex-Gratia-Rs.2,46,576/|
|Nandi C.A.No. |24 days         |1 month     |-                     |
|5035-5037/12  |                |            |                      |
|M.P. Hallan   |19 yrs. 4 months|58 yrs. 11  |Ex-Gratia-Rs.5,55,108/|
|C.A. Nos.     |                |months 25   |-                     |
|2287-88/10    |                |days        |                      |
|R.P. Nigam    |16 yrs 6 months |56 yrs. 11  |Ex-Gratia-Rs.4,40,037/|
|C.A. No.      |                |months 29   |-                     |
|10813/13      |                |days        |                      |


In the case at hand, unlike the decision  of  Ganpat  Singh  Deora  (supra),
there is no provision for  computation  of  broken  period  and,  therefore,
unless an employee has completed 20  years  of  service,  he  would  not  be
entitled to pension.  Therefore, I have no hesitation in  holding  that  the
impugned judgments and orders passed by various High  Courts,  namely,  High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana High Court at  Chandigarh
and High Court of Calcutta are unsustainable in law and  accordingly  I  set
aside the same.
Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgments and  orders
are set aside.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, there  shall  be
no order as to costs.

                                             .............................J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
February 26, 2015
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2463 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 3686 of 2007)

ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER,
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS.            .........APPELLANTS
                             VERSUS
RADHEY SHYAM PANDEY                        ....RESPONDENT
                                    WITH

                         C.A. NOS.2287-2288 of 2010

State Bank of India & Ors .          ....... APPELLANTS

                     VERSUS
M.P. HALLAN & ANR.                         ......... RESPONDENTS

                         C.A. NOS.5035-5037 of 2012

CHAIRMAN, State Bank of India & Ors.  ....... APPELLANTS

                     VERSUS

MIHIR KUMAR NANDI & ANR.            ......... RESPONDENTS

                                     AND

                           C.A. NO. 10813 of 2013

STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS.              ......APPELLANTS
                           VERSUS
RAMESH PRASAD NIGAM                     .......RESPONDENT




                               J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

     I had the opportunity to read the opinion of my brother Judge,  Justice
Dipak Misra and I am in respectful disagreement with  the  opinion  rendered
by him in the present appeals.

2.  Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 3686 of 2007. The appellant Bank-the  State
Bank of India, on the recommendation of the  Indian  Banks  Association  (in
short "IBA"), introduced a scheme titled 'SBI Voluntary  Retirement  Scheme,
2000 (in short 'SBI-VRS'). This scheme was introduced by SBI  despite  there
being provisions in the State Bank of India       Employees' Provident  Fund
Rules,     for     its     employees            to      avail      premature
retirement/resignation/voluntary retirement. SBI-VRS was in operation for  a
limited period and was introduced by the appellant  Bank  with  package  for
the purpose specified in the scheme.

3. It is the claim of the appellant Bank that clause  6(c)  of  the  SBI-VRS
provided for "other benefits"  which  is,  "Pension  in  terms  of  the  SBI
Employees' Pension Fund Rules on the relevant date (including  the  commuted
value of pension).

4. It is the further claim of the appellant  Bank  that  the  employees  who
applied for retirement under SBI-VRS will be bound  by  the  circular  dated
11.01.01, issued by the competent authority viz., Dy. Managing  Director  of
the Bank clarifying that:-
".... However, as per existing rules employees who  have  not  completed  20
years of pensionable service are not eligible for pension."

The respondents, who were employees of the State Bank of India, applied  for
voluntary retirement under SBI-VRS on different dates between 15.1.2001  and
31.1.2001. Their applications got accepted and they stood retired  from  the
bank service with effect from 31.3.2001.

5. In  the  meanwhile,  a  parallel  development  had  taken  place  in  the
appellant Bank with  respect  to  its  employees'  Pension  Fund  Rules.  On
31.1.2001, the age of normal retirement of  the  employees  working  in  the
appellant Bank was extended from 58 years  to  60  years.  Accordingly,  the
Service Rule as well as Rule 22(i)(a) of the  SBI  Pension  Fund  Rules  was
amended wherein it was added that a member would be entitled to pension :
"..... if he is in the service of the bank  on  or  after  22.5.1998,  after
having completed 10 years pensionable service provided that he has  attained
the age of 60 years."

6. The respondents made representations  where  they  sought  pension  under
Rule 22(i)(a) and were advised by the bank that  they were not eligible  for
pension under Rule 22(i)(a). The respondents  filed  Writ  Petitions  before
respective High Courts of their jurisdictions  namely,  the  High  Court  of
Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Kolkata  and  the  High
Court of Punjab and Haryana, which were allowed by  both  the  Single  Bench
and the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the appeals  are  filed  by
the appellant Bank before this Court.

7. I am in respectful disagreement with the opinion rendered by  my  brother
Judge in the present appeals. However, I intend to  assign  my  reasons  for
the same, based on certain relevant considerations. The issues  arising  for
deliberation in this case are as under:
Whether the respondents in the present appeals  are  to  be  considered  for
pension benefits under the provisions of Rule 22(i)(c) of the State Bank  of
India Employee's Pension Fund Rules  alone,  as  claimed  by  the  appellant
Bank?

Whether the State Bank of India is entitled to  retain  its  own  employment
Rules which is not in consonance with the subsequent amendments made in  the
Employee's Pension Regulations, 1995 in all the  public  sector  undertaking
Banks in the light of the correspondence between the  Finance  Ministry  and
Indian Banks Association?

Under what legal provisions will the respondent  employees  be  entitled  to
make their claims for pension?

Answer to Point no. 1

8.  Pension  benefits  accrue  upon  an  employee  on  retirement  from  his
employment.  Therefore,  we  first  need  to  assess   the   definition   of
'retirement' before answering the  question  on  pension  benefits  for  the
respondents herein. Neither the State Bank of India Act, 1955 nor the  State
Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules defines  retirement.  Therefore,
I am inclined to read the definition of retirement as has been mentioned  in
the State Bank of Patiala Employee's Pension Regulation 1995 which  provides
for the definition of retirement from employment  since  the  same  is  pari
materia to the Employees' Pension  Regulation  1995.  Section  2(y)  of  the
Regulation reads thus:
"2(y) "retirement" means cessation from the Bank's service-

On attaining the age of superannuation specified in Service  Regulations  or
Settlements;

On  voluntary  retirement  in  accordance  with  provisions   contained   in
regulation 29 of these regulations;

On  premature  retirement  by  the  Bank  before  attaining   the   age   of
superannuation specified in Service Regulations or Settlements."

In the present case, however, clause (b) of  the  definition  will  also  be
read in the light of  the  amended  Regulation  28  which  was  intended  to
provide relief to the employees seeking voluntary retirement under  the  VRS
2000, after providing 15 years of pensionable service. Thus, from the  above
definition, one is left with no doubt that the  employees  who  availed  VRS
2000 have 'retired' from the Bank as per the definitions.

It is pertinent now to highlight the object and purpose of the  SBI-VRS.  At
a meeting conducted on 13.6.2000 between the Finance Minister and the  Chief
Executives of the Public Sector  Banks,  the  human  resource  and  manpower
planning in Public Sector Banks was reviewed. A  committee  was  constituted
to examine the issues confronting the Public Sector  Banks  in  this  regard
and to suggest suitable remedial measures. The committee had  observed  that
high establishment costs and low productivity in Public Sector Banks  affect
their  profitability.  It  was  hence,  necessary  to  convert  their  human
resources into assets compatible with business strategies through a  variety
of measures including constant upgradation of skills, achieving  proper  age
and skill profile, creating opportunities for lateral as  well  as  vertical
career progression and including fresh skilled personnel with technical  and
professional skills for new business opportunities.

9. The data available with IBA indicated that 43%    of employees in  Public
Sector Banks are in the 46+ age group and only 12% are in  the  25-35  years
age group. This pattern of jobs in the public  sector  Banks,  according  to
the committee, had serious implications for  the  Banks  with  reference  to
mobility, training, development of skills  and  succession  plans  for  high
level positions. This, coupled with  excess  manpower  wherever  it  exists,
would come in  the  way  of  induction  of  new  skills  and  proper  career
progression.

The  Committee  had  therefore  recommended  introduction  of  a   Voluntary
Retirement Scheme that would assist the Bank in  their  effort  to  optimize
their human resources and achieve a balanced age skills profile  in  keeping
in mind with the business strategies. The Banks were further advised by  the
IBA to implement the scheme in right earnest.

10. From the memorandum of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme presented by  the
appellant Bank itself, it is clear that the SBI-VRS  scheme  was  introduced
for the purpose of  business  enhancement  and  profitability  of  the  Bank
itself and not for the benefits of the employees per se.  The  intention  of
the Public Sector Banks including the appellant  Bank,  in  introducing  the
VRS 2000, is rightfully highlighted in the decision of this  Court  in  Bank
of India v. K. Mohandas & Ors.[16] which read as under:
"36. ...........The banks decided to shed surplus manpower.  By  formulation
of the special scheme (VRS  2000),  the  banks  intended  to  achieve  their
objective of  rationalizing  their  force  as  they  were  overstaffed.  The
special Scheme was, thus, oriented to  lure  the  employees  to  go  in  for
voluntary retirement. In this background,  the  consideration  that  was  to
pass between the parties assumes significance and a harmonious  construction
to the Scheme and the Pension Regulations, therefore, has to be given".
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

In ordinary situation, an employee who retires either on  reaching  the  age
of superannuation, or by request in writing after completing the  prescribed
number of years, become eligible to pension under the State  Bank  of  India
Employee's Pension Rules. The pertinent provisions under the  SBI  Employees
Pension Rules relating to pension of employees, read as under:

"22. (i). A member shall be entitled to  a  pension  under  these  rules  on
retiring from the Banks service-

a). After having completed twenty years' pensionable service  provided  that
he has attained the age of fifty years or if he is in  the  service  of  the
Bank on or after 1.11.93,  after  having  completed  ten  years  pensionable
service provided that he has attained fifty eight years or if he is  in  the
service of the Bank on or  after  22.05.1998,  after  having  completed  ten
years pensionable service provided that he has attained  the  age  of  sixty
years.

      XXX       XXX      XXX

c). After having completed twenty years  pensionable  service,  irrespective
of the age he shall have attained at his request in writing. "

11. This situation is altered temporarily by the introduction  of  the  SBI-
VRS. Therefore, it is also important to understand  the  framework  of  SBI-
VRS. In the absence of the  SBI-VRS,  the  respondents  had  the  option  of
seeking  voluntary  retirement  under  Rule  22(i)(c)  which  in  fact,  the
respondents  did  not  avail.  Instead  they  availed  the  SBI-VRS.  It  is
therefore pertinent to see how the SBI-VRS  was  functioning  and  what  the
respondents  seeking      SBI-VRS  might  have  reasonably  foreseen   while
availing the  scheme.  When  the  application  of  voluntary  retirement  of
respondent Radhey Shyam  Pandey  was  accepted  by  the  appellant  Bank  on
18.3.2001, he still had about 9 months services left and  he  was  59  years
and 3 months old.

As on 31st March, 2001, when his voluntary retirement  from  service  became
effective, he had been on pensionable service for 19 years, 9 months and  18
days.

12.  If  the  respondent  had  chosen  to  retire  by  superannuation  after
attaining 60 years of age which was the normal age of retirement,  he  would
have put in  a  little  more  than  20  years  of  pensionable  service.  He
consequently, would have  become  eligible  to  pension.  However,  when  he
retired on 31.3.2001, he still had 2 and    months  short  to  complete  20
years of service. It is pertinent to understand what  prompted  him  to  opt
for the SBI-VRS at this stage.

13. In clause 5 of the scheme, the incentive  of  the  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme is mentioned. It is an ex-gratia payment of 60 days salary for  every
year of completed service. Since, the respondent had finished  20  years  of
service approximately, he would have been entitled to 40  months  of  salary
as ex-gratia.

Pension on the other hand, is calculated as half month's salary  per  month.
Therefore, by utilizing the SBI-VRS, although the respondent had given up  9
months service still left, he would have gained 40 months incentive. To  add
to this, he becomes eligible for pension, then he in addition to  ex-gratia,
will get half month's salary as his pension from the time he  retires.  This
can be considered  as  a  good  bargain  from  availing  the  SBI-  VRS.  On
reasonable presumption, it can  be  ascertained  that  it  is  this  benefit
provided by the SBI-VRS through ex-gratia payment along with  pension  which
prompted the employees in availing the benefits of the  scheme  rather  than
retiring on superannuation under the Rules.

14. On the other hand, if he is not entitled to pension, then availing  SBI-
VRS is unwise since the respondent has given  up  his  half  month's  salary
worth pension for his working period in return of 40 months' salary.

SBI-VRS is admittedly a contract between the Bank and its employees  as  has
been recognized in the case of Bank of India v. K. Mohandas  case  mentioned
supra. The application of the Voluntary Retirement  Scheme  meant  that  the
Bank employees agreed with the Bank that it would be  bound  by  the  scheme
thereby entering into a contract. However, clause 6(c) of SBI-VRS states:

"6. Other Benefits :

    XXX          XXX      XXX

    XXX          XXX      XXX


(c) Pension in terms of State Bank of India Employees'  Pension  Fund  Rules
on the relevant date (including commuted value pension)."

15. Considering that  the  incentives  of  SBI-VRS  are  distinct  from  the
benefits provided under Rule 22(i)(c) of the State  Bank  Employees  Pension
Fund Rules and also, that Clause  6(c)  of  SBI-VRS  does  not  specifically
state that the pension benefits are to be provided under  rule  22(i)(c)  of
SBI Employees Pension Fund Rules, the claim for pension by  the  respondents
cannot be decided solely on the basis of the provision of Rule  22(1)(c)  of
the State Bank of India Employees' Pension Rules.

Answer to Point no. 2

16. It has been claimed by the appellant Bank that State Bank of  India  has
its own Pension  Rules  that  are  different  from  the  Employees'  Pension
Regulations 1995 which operate in the other Public Sector Banks.  The  claim
made by the appellant Bank that it is not bound by the  Pension  Regulations
1995, is premised on the assumption that the employees of the State Bank  of
India form a distinct class of employment from the employees  of  the  other
Public  Sector  Banks  on  the  ground  of   reasonable   and   intelligible
differentia.

This conclusion by the  appellant  Bank  is  not  warranted  since  all  the
employees of Public Sector Bank forms one homogenous  class  since  all  the
fourteen Public Sector Banks which were formed under the  Banking  Companies
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)  Act,  1970  and  the  six  banks
under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)  Act,
1980, are subject to the control of the Central Government. It is  pertinent
to note that Section 19 of both-  The  Banking  Companies  (Acquisition  and
Transfer of Undertakings) Acts of 1970 and 1980 and Section 50 of the  State
Bank of India Act, 1955, vest the power on the Central  Government  to  make
consistent rules for all the Public Sector Banks.

Section 50(2)(o) of State Bank of India Act, 1955 reads thus:

"50. Power of Central Government to make regulations: (1) The Central  Board
may, after  consultation  with  the  Reserve  Bank  and  with  the  previous
sanction  of  the  Central  Government  [by  notification  in  the  Official
Gazette] make regulations, not inconsistent with  this  Act  and  the  rules
made  thereunder,  to  provide  for  all  matters  for  which  provision  is
expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of  the  foregoing
power, such regulation may provide for-

  XXX                  XXX              XXX

(o) The establishment and maintenance of superannuation, pension,  provident
or other funds for the benefit of the employees of the State Bank or of  the
dependent of such employees or for the purposes of the State Bank,  and  the
granting of superannuation allowances, annuities and  pensions  payable  out
of any such fund;]"

17. The Central Government through a  letter  dated  5.9.2000  directed  the
Indian Banks Association to  formulate  a  uniform  norm  for  pensions  for
employees  voluntarily  retiring  under  SBI-VRS  2000  and  the  same   was
formulated by the Indian Banks Association  on  11.12.2000.  Therefore,  the
State Bank of India is bound by the directions issued in this regard by  the
Indian Banks Association under Section 50(2)(o) of the State Bank  of  India
Act, 1955.

18. The appellant Bank, State Bank of India is  an  instrumentality  of  the
State as has been held by this Court in the case of Bank of India & Ors.  v.
O.P. Swarnakar & Ors.[17]  which reads as under:

"48...But the State Bank  of  India  as  also  the  nationalized  banks  are
"States" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.  The
services of the workman are also governed by  several  standing  orders  and
bipartite settlements which have the force of  law.  The  banks,  therefore,
cannot take recourse to "hire and fire" for the purpose of  terminating  the
services of the  employees.  The  banks  are  required  to  act  fairly  and
strictly in terms of the norms laid down therefor.  Their  actions  in  this
behalf must satisfy the test of Articles 14 and 21 of  the  Constitution  of
India.


Therefore, the appellant Bank cannot engage in acts which  are  antithetical
to equality. In the case of E.P. Royappa v. State  of  Tamil  Nadu[18],  the
constitution Bench of this Court held as under:
"Equality is a dynamic concept with  many  aspects  and  dimensions  and  it
cannot be "cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and  doctrinaire
limits. From a  positivistic  point  of  view,  equality  is  antithetic  to
arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness  are  sworn  enemies;  one
belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to  the  whim  and
caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit  in
it that it is unequal both according to political logic  and  constitutional
law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and  if  it  affects  any  matter
relating to public employment, it is also violative of  Art.  16.  Arts.  14
and 16 strike at arbitrariness in  State  action  an(  ensure  fairness  and
equality of treatment. They require that  State  action  must  be  based  on
valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and  it
must not be guided by any extraneous or  irrelevant  considerations  because
that would be denial of equality.  Where  the  operative  reason  for  State
action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the  antechamber  of  the
mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the  area
of permissible considerations, it would :amount to  mala  fide  exercise  of
power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16."

19.   Even though the SBI-VRS is in the nature of contract,  it  has  to  be
interpreted under the scanner of Article 14 of the  Constitution  of  India.
In the process of implementation of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme  on  its
own terms, the appellant Bank being an associate Bank of  the  Indian  Banks
Organization, it cannot set rules and procedures  which  deviates  from  the
standard and safeguards set by the Central Government in consensus with  the
Indian Banks Association.

20. It is the claim of the appellant Bank  that  the  SBI-VRS  provides  the
optees with handsome ex-gratia amount on retirement.  It  does  not  however
mean that the appellant  is  entitled  to  deprive  the  respondent  of  his
pension on the ground that he  has  been  given  handsome  ex-gratia  amount
under the scheme. Pension received by an employee  upon  his  retirement  is
not a bounty as has been held in the case of Deokinandan Prasad v. State  of
Bihar[19] as under:
"Pension is not a bounty payable on the  sweet  will  and  pleasure  of  the
Government and that, on the other hand, the right to pension is  a  valuable
right..."

21. The same proposition of law was reiterated by the Constitution Bench  of
this Court in the case of D.S. Nakara v. Union  of  India[20]  wherein  this
Court held as under:
"20. The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty, a  gratuitous  payment
depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not  claimable  as  a
right and, therefore, no right to pension can be enforced through court  has
been swept  under the carpet by the decision of the Constitutional Bench  in
Deokinandan Prasad v. State of  Bihar  wherein  this  court  authoritatively
ruled that pension is a right and the payment of it  does  not  depend  upon
the discretion of the  Government  but  is  governed  by  the  rules  and  a
government servant coming within rules is entitled to claim pension. It  was
 further held that the grant  of  pension  does  not  depend  upon  anyone's
discretion.  It is only for the purpose of  quantifying  the  amount  having
regard to service and other allied matters that it may be necessary for  the
authority to pass an order to that effect but the right to  receive  pension
flows to the officer not because of the order but by the  virtue  of  rules.
This view was reaffirmed in State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh."
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, depriving the respondents seeking      SBI-VRS of their right  to
pension solely on the ground that they  have  availed  voluntary  retirement
under a scheme while providing less than 20 years of  service  and  also  on
the ground that they have been provided with handsome  ex-gratia  amount  on
their retirement, is arbitrary and attracts the wrath of Article 14  of  the
Constitution  of  India.  This  is  particularly  so,  because  SBI-VRS  was
introduced for the benefit of the Public Sector  Banks  which  included  the
appellant Bank. It was not a welfare scheme which provided  the  respondents
with multiple offers to choose from. Therefore, the appellant Bank  at  this
stage, cannot  absolve  itself  from  the  responsibility  of  granting  the
respondents  what  is  due  to  them  by  virtue  of  providing  pensionable
services, on the pretext of having provided ex-gratia amount.

22.  In  another  case  of  Roop  Chand   Adlakha   v.   Delhi   Development
Authority[21], this Court held as under:
"To overdo classifications is to undo equality. The idea  of  similarity  or
dissimilarity of situations of persons, to justify  classifications,  cannot
rest on merely differentia which may, by themselves be rational or  logical,
but depends on whether the differences are relevant to the goals  sought  to
be reached by the law which seeks to  classify.  The  justification  of  the
classification  must   needs,   therefore,   to   be   sought   beyond   the
classification.  All  marks  of  distinction  do  not  necessarily   justify
classification irrespective of the relevance or nexus of objects  sought  to
be achieved by the law imposing the classification."
                                      (emphasis supplied)

23. In the case on hand,  the  classification  between  employees  who  have
voluntarily retired under the SBI-VRS and those who have retired  under  the
same scheme introduced by the other Public Sector  Banks,  is  not  rational
since they constitute the employees of the appellant Bank  into  a  distinct
class on the basis of the VRS 2000 scheme introduced by the  appellant  Bank
and the same scheme  introduced  by  other  Public  Sector  Banks,  with  no
intelligible differentia. The payment of ex-gratia cannot  be  held  against
the employees since it cannot be  expected  of  a  person  to  give  up  his
service  before  superannuation  without  reasonable  incentives.  What  the
appellant Bank intends to show as the benefit of the employees  seeking  VRS
under the scheme, is actually meant for the benefit of  the  appellant  Bank
itself.

24. In setting up schemes such as the SBI-VRS, the appellant Bank, which  is
the instrumentality of the  State  under  Article  12  of  the  Constituion,
cannot deviate from its constitutional duties as has been held in  the  case
of D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (supra) :
"36. Having set out clearly the society which we  propose  to  set  up,  the
direction in which the State action must move, the welfare  State  which  we
propose to build up, the constitutional  goal  of  setting  up  a  socialist
State and  the  assurance  in  the  Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy
especially of security in old age  at  least  to  those  who  have  rendered
useful service during their active years, it is  indisputable,  nor  was  it
questioned, that pension as a retirement benefit is in consonance  with  and
in furtherance of the  goals  of  the  Constitution.  The  goals  for  which
pension is paid themselves give a fillip and  push  [pic]to  the  policy  of
setting up a  welfare  State  because  by  pension  the  socialist  goal  of
security of cradle to grave is assured at least when  it  is  mostly  needed
and least available, namely, in the fall of life.


25. Moreover, this decision of the appellant  Bank  to  distinguish  between
two sets of employees, goes against Article 39 of the Constitution of  India
which directs the State to make policies  to  ensure  equal  pay  for  equal
work. The appellant Bank being an  instrumentality  of  the  State,  is  not
permitted to make such discriminations. Hence, the appellant Bank is  liable
to implement  the  amendments  made  by  the  Indian  Banks  Association  to
accommodate the grant of pension to those  employees  who  sought  voluntary
retirement through SBI-VRS.


Answer to point no. 3

26. Under Rule 22 of the State Bank of India Employees'  Pension  Rules,  an
employee's entitlement to pension accrues on retiring from the Bank  service
on one of the following conditions:
Under Rule 22(1)(a):
After having completed 20 years pensionable services provided  that  he  has
attained the age of 50 years OR
If he was in the service on or after 1.11.93, then  after  having  completed
10 years of service provided that he has attained the age of 58 years, OR
If he was in the service on or after 22.5.98, then  after  having  completed
10 years pensionable service provided, that he has attained the  age  of  60
years.

Under Rule 22(1)(c):
After 20 years of pensionable service, at his request in writing (where  the
entitlement is to proportionate pension).

On the other hand,  the  un-amended  Employee's  Pension  Regulations,  1995
provide for pension under the following condition:
Regulation 28 reads as under:
"28. Superannuation Pensions:-
Superannuation pension shall be granted to an employee who  has  retired  on
his  attaining  the  age  of  superannuation  specified   in   the   Service
Regulations and Settlements."

      Regulation 29 reads as under:

"29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement:
On or after the 1st day of November, 1993 at any  time,  after  an  employee
has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may,  by  giving  notice
of not less than three  months  in  writing   to  the  appointing  authority
retire from service; ......"

27. It can be observed that the  State  Bank  of  India  Employees'  Pension
Rules and the un-amended Employee's Pension Regulation, 1995 are  consistent
in so far as  both  Rules  set  the  eligibility  of  pension  on  voluntary
retirement service only after 20 years of pensionable service.  However,  it
is imperative to understand the amendment which the  correspondence  between
the  Finance  Ministry  and  Indian   Banks   Association,   following   the
introduction of the SBI-VRS, brought about.

28. By  a  letter  (F.no.4/8/4/2000-IR),  dated  5.9.2000,  written  by  the
Finance Ministry to the Indian Banks Association, the  Ministry  recommended
to  the  IBA  to  suggest  amendments  to  Regulation  29  of  the   Pension
Regulations in the following terms:
"I am directed to refer to this Division's Letter no. 11/1/99 IR dated 29-8-
2000 conveying the Government's no objection for  circulation  of  Voluntary
Retirement Scheme in public sector banks. The Scheme, inter  alia,  provides
that employees with 15 year of service or 40 years of age shall be  eligible
to take voluntary  retirement  under  the  Scheme.  As  per  the  provisions
contained in Regulation 29 of the Pension Regulations, an employee can  take
voluntary retirement after 20 years of  qualifying  service  and  thereafter
becomes eligible for pension. Thus employees having  rendered  15  years  of
service or completing 40 years of age, but not having completed 20 years  of
service shall not be eligible for pensionary benefits  on  taking  voluntary
retirement under the Scheme.

In order to ensure that such employees do not lose the benefits of  pension,
IBA may work out modalities and suggest amendments, if any, required  to  be
made in the Pension Regulations to ensure that these employees also get  the
benefits of pension".

Pursuant to this correspondence, the Indian Banks Association  suggested  an
amendment to the Regulations in the following terms:
"INDIAN BANKS ASSOCIATION
STADIUM HOUSE, 6th FLOOR
BLOCK 2 VEER NARIMAN ROAD
MUMBAI- 400020

PD/CIR/76/G2/G4/
December 11, 2000

VOLUNTARY RETIRMENT  SCHEME  IN  PUBLIC  SECTOR  BANKS  AMENDMENTS  TO  BANK
(EMPLOYEES') PENSION REGULATIONS, 1995
Designated officers of all Public Sector Banks.

Dear Sirs,
Please refer to our circular letter no. PD/CIR/76/G4/993 dated  31st  August
2000 convening the 'No Objection' of the Government in  banks  adopting  and
implementing a voluntary retirement scheme for employees  on  the  lines  of
what was contained in the Annexure to the circular.
As per the scheme, an employee who is eligible  and  applies  for  voluntary
retirement is entitled for  the  benefits  of  CPF,  Pension,  Gratuity  and
encashment of accumulates privilege leaves, as per rules.
Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1955 do not have provisions  enabling
payment of pension to an employee who retires before attaining  the  age  of
superannuation except under circumstances as in Regulations 29, 30,  32  and
33.   We  had,  therefore,  taken  up  with  the  Government   the  need  to
incorporate necessary provisions  in  the  Pension  Regulations  by  way  of
amendments to Regulation 28 so that employees  who  retire  as  above  under
special/ ad hoc schemes  formulated  by  the  banks,  after  serving  for  a
prescribed minimum period would be eligible for pro rata pension.
Government of India has after examining the proposal conveyed  its  approval
and desired that IBA advise banks to  make  necessary  amendments  to  their
Pension Regulations as in the  Annexure.  We  request  banks  to  take  note
accordingly.
Please note  that  with  the  above  amendments,  employees  who  apply  for
voluntary retirement after having  rendered  minimum  15  years  of  service
under a special/ ad hoc scheme formulated with the specific approval of  the
Government and the Board of Directors will be eligible for pro rata  pension
for the period of service rendered as they are to retire  on  attaining  the
age of superannuation on that date.

Yours Faithfully,
Sd/-
(Allen C A Pareira)
PERSONNEL ADVISER"

Pursuant  to  this  suggestion,   Regulation   28   of   Employees   Pension
Regulations, 1995 was amended to  include  the  proviso  with  retrospective
effect from 1.9.2000 as under:
"Provided that pension shall also be granted to  an  employee  who  opts  to
retire before attaining the age of superannuation, but after  having  served
for a minimum period of 15 years in terms of any scheme that may  be  framed
for  the  purpose  by  the  Bank's  Board  with  the  concurrence   of   the
Government."

This Court, in the case of Bank of India  v.  K.  Mohandas  (supra)  further
clarified  the  intention  behind  amendment  of  Regulation  28   and   its
retrospective application. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
"40.........The amendment in Regulation 28, as is reflected from  the  afore
referred  communication,  was  intended  to  cover  the  employees  who  had
rendered 15 years' service but not completed 20 years' service. ....

41. Even if it be assumed that by insertion of the proviso in Regulation  28
(in the year 2002 with effect  from  1-9-2000),  all  classes  of  employees
under VRS, 2002 were intended to be covered, such  amendment  in  Regulation
28, needs to be harmonized with Regulation 29......"

29. While answering Point no, 2 in favour of the respondents,  I  held  that
the State Bank of India should implement the amendment made to  Rule  28  of
the Employees Pension  Regulation  in  granting  pension  to  the  employees
seeking voluntary retirement under SBI-VRS.

I therefore, answer point no 3 in favour of the respondents and  direct  the
appellant  Bank  to  grant  pension  to  the  employees  seeking   voluntary
retirement under the  SBI-VRS  after  completing  15  years  of  pensionable
service. Therefore, the respondent Radhey Shyam Pandey, having completed  19
years 8 months and 18 days  of  service,  respondent   M.P.  Hallan,  having
completed 19 years and 4 months of service and the  respondent  R.P.  Nigam,
having completed 16 years and 6  months  of  service,  become  eligible  for
pension as per the amended Regulation 28 of Employees Pension  Rules,  1995.
By virtue of power vested in this Court under Article  142  Constitution  of
India, I hold that the pension relief is also  extended  to  all  the  other
employees who have availed SBI-VRS 2000 after having completed 15  years  of
pensionable service. Thus, C.A. No.@ SLP (C) No.3686 of 2007, C.A. Nos.2287-
2288 of 2010 and C.A. No. 10813 of 2013 are dismissed.

30. The C.A. Nos.5035-5037 of 2012 of the appellant  Bank  succeed  in  that
respondent Mihir Kumar Nandi, having completed 12 years 3 months and 4  days
of service, becomes ineligible for pension benefits.

31.   All the appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.



                ......................................................... J.
                                           [V. GOPALA GOWDA]



New Delhi,
February 26, 2015


-----------------------
[1]    2002 (2) SLR 716
[2]    (2003) 2 SCC 721
[3]    AIR 1993 SC 1601
[4]    (1997) 1 SCC 256
[5]    (1998) 8 SCC 30
[6]    (2003) 11 SCC 572
[7]    (2006) 3 SCC 708
[8]    (2005) 12 SCC 508
[9]    (2005) 4 SCC 272
[10]   (2004) 6 SCC 765
[11]   (2005) 3 SCC 636
[12]    (2009) 3 SCC 217
[13]    (2009) 5 SCC 313
[14]    (1900) AC 260
[15]    2014 (8) SCALE 397
[16]   (2009) 5 SCC 313
[17]   (2003) 2 SCC 721
[18]   AIR 1974 SC 555
[19]   1971 SCR 634
[20]   (1983) 1 SCC 305
[21]   1988 (Supp 3) SCR 253

-----------------------
89


pouring of kerosene on Savita, intervention of Prabhabai in the process and her receiving burn injuries resulting in her death are integral part of the same transaction. Thus, the statement which relates to circumstances of the transaction resulting in her death being admissible, it can be relied upon to show as to how death of Savita took place. The said statement is also corroborated by the admission of the accused himself to the extent that the death of Savita was by burning and the deceased Prabhabai received the burn injuries in the same incident. Though, the version of the accused that it was suicide, the same has been rightly found to be false.

REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1330 OF 2009

TEJRAM PATIL                                           ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                                 ...RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1.    This appeal has been preferred against the judgment  and  order  dated
17th November, 2008 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay,
Nagpur Bench, in Criminal Appeal No.455 of 2003,  upholding  the  conviction
of  the  appellant  under  Section  302  IPC  and   sentence   of   rigorous
imprisonment for life.  The appellant has also been directed to pay fine  of
Rs.10,000/-, in default, to suffer RI for six months.

2.     Deceased Savita was married to the appellant about three years  prior
to the date of the incident in question, i.e., on  28th  March,  1999.   One
son and one daughter were born out of the wedlock.  They were  living  in  a
rented house owned by PW1 Vimalbai.
3.    According to the prosecution, the deceased was  subjected  to  cruelty
and on the fateful day, the appellant returned  home  in  drunken  condition
and started abusing the deceased and her mother Prabha Bai who had  come  on
a visit to her daughter's house.  Thereafter, the appellant poured  kerosene
on the deceased and set her on fire.  Prabhabai and Vimalbai, PW1, tried  to
extinguish the fire and received burn injuries in the  process.   They  were
taken to Medical College and Hospital, Nagpur.  The deceased  made  a  dying
declaration ('DD') (Exhibit  45)  before  PSI  Sunil  Eknadi  Wanjari.   She
succumbed to her injuries at 6.25 A.M. on 29th March, 1999.  Prabhabai  also
made a DD (Exhibit 43) before the PSI Bhila Narayan  Bachao  (PW5),  on  the
basis of which FIR was lodged at Police  Station  Imambada.   Rajiv  Babarao
Raut (PW3), Special Judicial Magistrate (SJM) also recorded DD of  Prabhabai
(Exhibit 41) at 9.30 A.M. on 29th March, 1999.   The  said  Magistrate  also
recorded the statement of PW1 Vimalbai (Exhibit 29).  Prabhabai died on  1st
April, 1999 at 2.2.0 A.M. with 77% burn  injuries.   The  dead  bodies  were
subjected to post mortem.

4.    After completion of investigation, the accused was sent up for  trial.
 The prosecution examined PW1, Vimalbai,  the  land  lady,  PW2  Purshottam,
father of the deceased, PW3 Rajiv Babarao Raut,  SJM, PW 4 PSI Sunil  Eknadi
Wanjari and PW5 PSI Bhila Narayan Bachao, apart from producing the  DDs  and
other documents.  The prosecution mainly relied upon DD  made  by  Prabhabai
duly recorded by the SJM, Rajiv Babarao Raut, Exhibit 41.  As  regards,  the
DD of deceased Savita Exhibit 45, the trial Court did not place reliance  on
the same pointing out  the  infirmities  that  the  said  DD  did  not  bear
signature or thumb mark of the deceased.  There was no evidence  of  fitness
of the deceased to make a statement.

5.     As  regards,  the  DD  of  Prabhabai,  the  objection   as   to   its
admissibility, in so far as  it  related  to  the  cause  of  death  of  the
deceased Savita, was overruled.  This  question  will  be  considered  in  a
later part of this order.  To complete narration of facts,  the  content  of
the said declaration may be noted, which is as follows :

"I had gone to the house of my daughter Savita casually.  The  incident  had
taken place at 8.30 p.m.  The husband of Savita  (Tejram)  accused  returned
to the house drunk.  Tejram picked up  quarrel  with  Savita.   Then  Tejram
poured kerosene on the person of Savita and ignited match stick and set  her
ablaze.  I and landlady Vimalbai (P.W.1) rushed to  save  Savita.   However,
fire flared up.  I tried to catch Savita but got burnt.  The neighbour  took
us to the hospital."

The above statement is identical to the statement (Exhibit 43)  recorded  by
PW5 PSI Bhila Narayan Bachao.  It may be noted here that the DD  Exhibit  41
recorded by the Magistrate carried certification of  the  Doctor  about  the
fitness of the declarant to make the statement.

6.    The stand of the accused in his statement under Section 313  was  that
the deceased Savita committed suicide by pouring kerosene  on  herself  when
the accused failed to meet her demand  to  pay  her  Rs.200/-  for  domestic
expenses.

7.    The trial Court held the case of  the  prosecution  proved  mainly  by
relying on DDs Exhibits 41 and 43 made by deceased Prabhabai.  The said  DDs
were held to be admissible and genuine.

8.    On appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of  the
appellant but on a different basis.  The High Court held  the  DDs  Exhibits
41 and 43 to be inadmissible for cause  of  death  of  Savita  as  the  said
statements were made by deceased Prabhabai and could be  relevant  only  for
the cause of death of Prabhabai.  However, the DD Exhibit 45 made by  Savita
which was not accepted by the trial Court, was accepted by the  High  Court.
It was held that since Savita had 100 per  cent  burn  injuries,  there  was
urgency for PSI Sunil Eknadi Wanjari PW4 to  record  her  statement  and  in
such circumstances failure to obtain medical evidence or  to  wait  for  the
Magistrate was not a fetter to the reliability of the said DD.

9.    The High Court held that there are following important aspects of  the
case:

"(a)  presence of appellant, Prabhabai  (mother  of  deceased)  as  well  as
Vimal (land lady of deceased) on the spot at the time of incident.

Similarly,  Savita,  Prabhabai,  Vimal  sustained  burn  injuries  and  were
admitted in the hospital is also not disputed.

There is absolutely no evidence on record to show  that  Savita  was  either
fed up with her life or was frustrated and  therefore,  wanted  to  end  her
life.

Similarly, there is nothing on record to show that Savita had any reason  to
end her life."

10.   We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
11.   Learned counsel for the appellant mainly submitted that DD Exhibit  45
was rightly discarded by the trial Court and has been  wrongly  relied  upon
by the High court as the sole basis for conviction of  the  appellant.    He
further submitted that DDs Exhibits 41 and 43  made  by  Prabhabai  are  not
admissible in evidence  as  rightly  held  by  the  High  Court.   He  thus,
concluded that there was no legal evidence in support of conviction  of  the
appellant.
12.   On the other  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  supported  the
judgment of the courts below.  According to him, DD made by deceased  Savita
as well as DDs made by  Prabhabai  were  admissible  in  evidence  and  were
reliable.  He further submitted that the incident has been admitted  by  the
appellant and his only  defence  was  that  the  deceased  Savita  committed
suicide by pouring kerosene on herself which has been found to be  false  by
both the courts below. Thus, the circumstantial  evidence  of  the  deceased
being present at the place of occurrence and the death  being  not  suicidal
rule out the chance of the appellant  being  innocent.   The  circumstantial
evidence itself proves the guilt of the appellant.
13.   We have given our anxious consideration to the rival  submissions  and
perused the evidence on record.
14.   The decision of this appeal will rest on the answers to the  following
two questions :
(i)   Reliability of DD Exhibit 45 recorded by PSI Sunil Eknadi  Wanjari  PW
4 made by deceased Savita;

(ii)  Admissibility and reliability of DDs made  by  Prabhabai  recorded  by
SJM, Rajiv Babarao Raut Exhibit 41) and PSI Bhila Narayan Bachao
(Exhibit 43).

15.   As regards the reliability of DD Exhibit 45,  we  find  merit  in  the
contention of learned counsel for the appellant.  We are of  the  view  that
the trial Court was justified in discarding  the  said  piece  of  evidence.
Undoubtedly, as held by the High Court relying on judgment of this Court  in
Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra[1] that even in absence of certification  by
the Doctor as to fitness of mind of the declarant and  even  if  the  DD  is
recorded by the Police Officer, the same can be relied upon.   However,  the
Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit mental  condition  to
make the  DD  and  that  the  statement  was  faithfully  recorded  and  was
otherwise reliable.  In the present case, it is  difficult  to  record  such
satisfaction.  There is no material for the Court being satisfied  that  the
deceased was in fit condition to make the declaration.  The deceased was  in
the hospital at the time of her alleged statement but no effort was made  by
the PSI to ascertain her  medical  condition  or  to  certify  that  he  had
satisfied himself about the fitness of the declarant.  The DD does not  bear
the signature or thumb mark of the deceased.   The  deceased  had  sustained
100 per cent burns and succumbed to her injuries on 29 March, 1999  at  6.25
a.m. as already noted.  The view  taken  by  the  High  Court  that  in  the
peculiarity of facts, authenticity of DD could be accepted, in our  opinion,
is not sound.
16.   Coming now to the second question of admissibility and reliability  of
DDs Exhibits 41 and 43 it will be necessary to refer to the text of  Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act, which is as follows :
"32 Cases in which statement of relevant fact  by  person  who  is  dead  or
cannot be found, etc ., is relevant.  -Statements,  written  or  verbal,  of
relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or  who
has become incapable of giving  evidence,  or  whose  attendance  cannot  be
procured  without  an  amount  of  delay  or  expense   which,   under   the
circumstances  of  the  case,  appears  to  the  Court   unreasonable,   are
themselves relevant facts in the following cases:-

(1)    when it relates to cause of death. -When the statement is made  by  a
person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of  the  circumstances  of
the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause  of
that person's death comes into question.

Such statements are relevant whether the person who made  them  was  or  was
not, at the time when they  were  made,  under  expectation  of  death,  and
whatever may be the nature of the proceeding  in  which  the  cause  of  his
death comes into question."
(emphasis added)

17.   A bare perusal of the section shows :

Statement should be of a person  who  is  dead/cannot  be  found/has  become
incapable of giving evidence etc;

It should relate to the relevant facts; and

It  should  relate  to  cause  of  'his  death'  or  circumstances  of   the
transaction which resulted in 'his death', in cases in which  the  cause  of
that person's death comes into question.

18.   In the present case, we are concerned  with  Point  (iii)  as  we  are
concerned with the question whether statement of Prabhabai is  relevant  for
determining cause of death of Savita.  In other words,  when  charge  is  of
murder of Savita, whether cause of death  of  Prabhabai  which  is  integral
part of the incident can also be held to be
in question.
19.   On a plain reading, the statement is admissible  about  the  cause  of
death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted  in  the  death
of the person making the statement.   Question  is  what  happens  when  two
deaths have taken place in the same transaction  and  circumstances  of  the
transaction resulting in one death is closely interconnected with the  other
death.   Admittedly, the DD of Prabhabai is admissible as to  cause  of  her
death as well as the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in  her
death.  Such statement may not by itself  be  admissible  to  determine  the
cause of death of  anyone  other  than  the  person  making  the  statement.
However, when the circumstances of the transaction which resulted  in  death
of the person making the statement as well as death of any other person  are
part of the same transaction, the same  will  be  relevant  also  about  the
cause of death of such other person.
20.   Expressions "Relevant"  and  "facts  in  issue"  are  defined  in  the
Evidence Act as follows:
"Relevant" - One fact is said to be relevant to  another  when  the  one  is
connected with the other in any of the ways referred to  in  the  provisions
of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts.

"Facts in issue" -The expression "facts in issue"  means  and  includes--any
fact from which, either by itself or in connection  with  other  facts,  the
existence, nonexistence, nature  or  extent  of  any  right,  liability,  or
disability asserted  or  denied  in  any  suit  or  proceeding,  necessarily
follows.

Section 6 is as follows :
"6. Relevancy of facts forming part  of  same  transaction  -  Facts  which,
though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to  form  part
of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they  occurred  at  the  same
time and place or at different times and places.

                                Illustrations
                                  xxxxxxx"

21.   Thus, when a  dying  declaration  relating  to  circumstances  of  the
transaction which resulted in death of a person making the  declaration  are
integral part of circumstances resulting in death of any other person,  such
dying declaration has relevance for death of such other person also.
22.   We may now refer to the decisions dealing with the said  legal  issue.
In Kashinath Tukaram Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtrath, a Division Bench  of
the Bombay High Court held the  same  view  relying  upon  the  judgment  of
Travancore-Cochin High  Court,  in  Lukka  Ulahannen  vs.  Travancore-Cochin
State (AIR 1955 Trav-Co 104)
as follows :
"The view that the statement of one dead person is not a relevant fact  with
respect to the question about the death of another person  or  with  respect
to the causing of hurt to a third is too narrow to be accepted.  To  exclude
from the evidence statements made by  a  deceased  person  as  to  incidents
which occurred during the course of the transaction which  resulted  in  his
death statements other than those relating to the cause of his death,  would
be to import a limitation to the words  used  in  the  section  which  their
natural meaning does not warrant.  When a limitation like that is  intended,
the Legislature specially provides for it."

In doing so, the High Court also relied upon an early Madras Judgment in  Re
P. Subbu Thevan [2 Weir 750 (B)] and Judgment of Rangoon High Court  in  Nga
His Din vs. Emperor (AIR 1936 Rang 187)  but dissented from the  view  taken
by the Allahabad High Court in Kunwarpal Singh vs.  Emperor  (AIR  1948  All
170) .  The Bombay High Court in that case dealt with death of  two  persons
in the same transaction.  The person making the DD was stabbed while  saving
the other person who was stabbed.  Such DD was held  to  be  admissible  for
both the deaths.  The DD and discussion of the Court in  the  said  judgment
are as follows :
"27.  The relevant part of the dying declaration of Tatya read:

      "On Sunday, the 30 July, 1978, at about  1.00  p.m.  myself  and  Shri
Khanna were standing near the flour mill, in Tagore Nagar, Group No.7.   One
Kashya Jadhav came there and called us.  He asked whether we were  searching
him for assaulting.  Immediately thereafter, he took out one open knife  and
stabbed Khanna on his chest twice.  When I  tried  to  save  Khanna,  Kashya
stabbed me on
my chest.

28.      A  reading  of  the  declaration  shows  that   it   would   become
unintelligible and present a distorted picture if  the  narration  regarding
stabbing of Khanna is excluded therefrom.  Why did Kashya  stab  Tatya?   It
is because Tatya ran to the rescue of Khanna who was being  stabbed  Kashya.
Be excluding the narration regarding Khanna, the  declaration  may  give  an
impression that Kashya came to  the  spot  and  straightway  lunged  towards
Tatya and stabbed him - which is not  what  the  declarants  states.   Right
from the moment Kashya arrived at the crossing of the roads where  Nana  and
Khanna were standing till the stabbing of Nana formed an unbroken  chain  of
events  constituting  one  transaction.   Hence,  the  narration   of   Nana
regarding the manner in which Kashya stabbed Khanna would also  fall  within
the meaning of the phrase "any of  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction"
contained in sub-section (1) of S.32 of the Evidence Act.   An  errant  bus-
drived ploughing his  bus  into  a  crowd  of  waiting  commuters;  a  rogue
pachyaderm running amock from captivity trampling the  onlookers;  a  racist
spraying bullets on the foci of his hatred  -  will  not  the  last  of  the
survivors of the rampage be able to describe how  others  met  their  deaths
before the avalanche hit him?

23.   In Ratan Gond vs. State of  Biharth   two  young  girls  Baisakhi  and
Aghani, aged 9 years and 5 years respectively were killed. They had gone  to
the jungle at a short distance from their village.  Their mother  Jatri  had
also gone to the jungle.  When Jatri came back she  found  Aghani  alone  in
the house.  Aghani gave a statement to her mother about Baisakhi  and  since
she died, the question was whether her statement was  admissible  about  the
cause of death of Baisakhi.  It may  be  mentioned  that  Baisakhi  had  not
returned to her house and her dead body was found  on  the  next  day.   The
question  before  the  Court  was  whether  the  statement  of  Aghani   was
admissible about the cause of death of Baisakhi, the Court held :
"In the case before us, the statements made by Aghani do not relate  to  the
cause of her death or to any of the circumstances relating to her death;  on
the contrary, the statements relate to the death  of  her  sister.  We  are,
therefore, of the opinion that the statements do  not  come  within  Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act and, indeed, Mr. Dhebar  appearing  on  behalf  of
the State, has conceded that Section 32(1) does not apply to the  statements

of Aghani."

It is clear from the above judgment  that  it  was  not  a  case  where  the
transaction in which the person making the statement and the other  deceased
died was the same as in the present case.
24.   The matter was again considered in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.  State
of Maharashtra[2].   It was observed :
"10. ...........Coming now to the  question  of  interpretation  of  Section
32(1) of The Evidence Act, this Court in the case of Ratan Gond v. State  of
Bihar (1959 SCR 1336 : AIR 1959 SC 18 : 1959 Cri LJ 108), S.K. Das, J.  made
the following observations:

The only relevant clause of Section  32  which  may  be  said  to  have  any
bearing is clause (1) which relates to statements made by  a  person  as  to
the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the  transaction
which resulted in his death. In the case before us, the statements  made  by
Aghani do  not  relate  to  the  cause  of  her  death  or  to  any  of  the
circumstances relating to her death; on the contrary, the statements  relate
to the death of her sister.

In the Law of Evidence by Woodroffe & Ameer Ali, (Vol. II) the authors  have
collected all the cases at one place and indicated their conclusions thus:

To sum up, the test of the relevancy of a statement under Section 32(1),  is
not what the final finding in the case is  but  whether  the  cause  of  the
death of the person making the statement comes into question  in  the  case.
The expression "any of the circumstances of the transaction  which  resulted
in his death" is wider in scope  than  the  expression  "the  cause  of  his
death"; in other words, clause (1) of Section 32  refers  to  two  kinds  of
statements: (1) statement made by a person as to the  cause  of  his  death,
and (2) the statement made by a person as to any  of  the  circumstances  of
the transaction which resulted in his death.

The words 'resulted in his death' do not mean 'caused his  death'.  Thus  it
is well settled that declarations are admissible only insofar as they  point
directly to the fact constituting the res gestae of the  homicide;  that  is
to say,  to  the  act  of  killing  and  to  the  circumstances  immediately
attendant thereon, like threats and  difficulties,  acts,  declarations  and
incidents,  which  constitute  or  accompany  and  explain   the   fact   or
transaction in issue. They are admissible for or against  either  party,  as
forming parts of the res gestae......."

11.   The leading decision on this question,  which  has  been  endorsed  by
this Court, is the case of Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (AIR 1939 PC  47
: 66 IA 66 : 180 IC 1) where Lord Atkin has laid down the following tests:

It has been suggested that the statement must be made after the  transaction
has taken place, that the person making it must be at any rate  near  death,
that the 'circumstances' can only include the acts done when and  where  the
death was caused. Their Lordships are of opinion that  the  natural  meaning
of the words used does not convey any of these  limitations.  The  statement
may be made before the cause of death has arisen,  or  before  the  deceased
has any reason  to  anticipate  being  killed.  The  circumstances  must  be
circumstances of the transaction: general  expressions  indicating  fear  or
suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise and  not  directly
related to the  occasion  of  the  death  will  not  be  admissible.........
"Circumstances of the transaction" is a phrase no doubt  that  conveys  some
limitations. It is not as broad as  the  analogous  use  in  "circumstantial
evidence" which includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the  other
hand narrower than "res gestae".  Circumstances  must  have  some  proximate
relation to the actual occurrence:............

It will be observed that "the circumstances" are of  the  transaction  which
resulted in the death of the declarant.

These principles were followed and fully endorsed  by  a  decision  of  this
Court in Shiv Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Cri. Appeal  No.55  of  1966,
decided on July 29, 1966) where the following observations were made:

It is clear that if the statement of the deceased is to be admissible  under
this section it must be a statement relating to  the  circumstances  of  the
transaction resulting in his death. The statement may  be  made  before  the
cause of death has  arisen,  or  before  the  deceased  has  any  reason  to
anticipate being killed,........  A  necessary  condition  of  admissibility
under the  section  is  that  the  circumstance  must  have  some  proximate
relation to the actual occurrence........... The  phrase  "circumstances  of
the transaction" is a phrase that no doubt conveys some limitations.  It  is
not as broad  as  the  analogous  use  in  "circumstantial  evidence"  which
includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the  other  hand  narrower
than "res gestae" (See Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor)."

25.   It is thus clear that the DD is admissible not  only  in  relation  to
the  cause  of  death  of  the  person  making  the  statement  and  as   to
circumstances of the  transaction  which  resulted  in  his  death,  if  the
circumstances of the said transaction relate to  death  of  another  person,
the statement cannot be held to be inadmissible when circumstances of  "his"
death are integrally connected to the circumstances of death of  such  other
person.
26.   In the present case, the statement of pouring of kerosene  on  Savita,
intervention of Prabhabai in the process and  her  receiving  burn  injuries
resulting in her death are integral part of  the  same  transaction.   Thus,
the statement which relates to circumstances of  the  transaction  resulting
in her death being admissible, it can be relied  upon  to  show  as  to  how
death of Savita took place.  The said statement is also corroborated by  the
admission of the accused himself to the extent that the death of Savita  was
by burning and the deceased Prabhabai received  the  burn  injuries  in  the
same incident.  Though, the version
of the accused that it was suicide, the same has been rightly found
to be false.
27.    In  these  circumstances,  the  death  of  Savita  is  proved  beyond
reasonable doubt to  be  homicidal  death  by  burning  and  by  pouring  of
kerosene and setting her on fire by the accused.   This  stands  established
by the statement of Prabhabai and the  attendant  circumstances.   The  said
statement was duly recorded by the Magistrate and carries an endorsement  by
the doctor about her consciousness and fitness to make a  statement.   There
is no reason for not accepting the authenticity of the version given in  the
said DD.
28.   Accordingly, we hold that the DD made by Prabhabai was  admissible  as
to the circumstances of the transaction which included the  circumstance  of
pouring of kerosene and lighting of fire by the accused resulting  in  death
of the deceased.
29.   As a result of the above discussion, we hold  that  the  case  of  the
prosecution against the appellant is proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt.   No
interference is called for with his conviction and sentence.
      The appeal is accordingly dismissed.


                                ..........................................J.
                                   [DIPAK MISRA]


                               ...........................................J.
                                                       [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 26, 2015

-----------------------
[1]    (2002) 6 SCC 710
th     1984 Crl. L.J. 1447
th     AIR 1959 SC 18 = 1959 SCR 1336
[2]    (1984) 4 SCC 116

-----------------------
18

Page 17 of 18


whether a case falls under Section 302 or 304 has to be decided from case to case depending on factors like the circumstances in which the incident takes place, the nature of weapon used and whether weapon was carried or was taken from the spot and whether the assault was aimed on vital part of the body; the amount of force used; whether the deceased participated in the sudden fight; whether there was any previous enmity; whether there was any sudden provocation; whether the attack was in the heat of passion; whether the person inflicting the injury took any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The list of circumstances is not exhaustive and there may be several other circumstances with reference to individual cases. Applying these tests to the present case, we are unable to accept the defence on behalf of the appellant. It was a case of previous enmity and the nature of injury suggests intention to cause death or a fatal injury on a vital part of the body with full force sufficient to cause death. In these circumstances, we do not find any ground to interfere.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1848 OF 2008


DHIRENDRA KUMAR @ DHIROO                ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND                         ...RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1.    This appeal has been preferred against the judgment  and  order  dated
17th November, 2007 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at  Nainital  in
Criminal Appeal No.158 of 2007 upholding the  conviction  of  the  appellant
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code  and  sentence  to  undergo  life
imprisonment.

2.    Case of the prosecution is that the  appellant  caused  the  death  of
Surat Singh deceased with a stone  at  8.30  P.M.  on  1st  April,  1983  at
Village Jantanwala.  On 2nd April, 1983 at 9.05 A.M.,  Mani  Ram  father  of
the deceased (who died during  pendency  of  proceedings  before  the  trial
Court) lodged FIR to the effect that on 28th March, 1983, the  deceased  had
gone to the house of the accused to  celebrate  holi.   In  the  night,  the
accused came to the  house  of  the  complainant  to  assault  the  deceased
alleging that he had knocked the door of  his  aunt  Kumari  Sunita  in  the
night with evil intention when  she  was  alone  in  her  house.   With  the
intervention of Mani Ram and PW 7 Raj Kumari,  wife  of  the  deceased,  the
accused was prevented from dragging the deceased out of the  house  but  the
accused left the house with a threat.  On 1st April, 1983 when the  deceased
went to the nearby Dehradun city, he did not return home at the  night.   In
the morning PW2 Lal Singh told him that  the  deceased  was  seen  with  the
accused at 7.30 P.M. in the night.  Further, Lakhi  Ram  PW  4  and  Bahadur
Singh PW 3 told him that the accused was seen beating the  deceased  with  a
stone at 8.30 P.M.  One Jagdish Singh told him that he  had  seen  the  dead
body near the bank of the river near the field of Ratan Singh.
3.    After registering the FIR,  the  investigation  was  conducted  by  SO
Rajpal Singh PW 11.  Post mortem was conducted by Dr. I.F. Nath PW6.   After
completing the investigation, the accused was sent up for trial.

4.    The prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses.  The accused in  his
statement under 313 Cr.P.C. took the plea that he was falsely implicated  as
he was member of Yuvak Gram Kalyan Samiti and he had made complaint  to  the
District Magistrate against illegal distillation of liquor  which  made  the
police inimical to him.  He  had  also  made  a  complaint  against  illegal
dealings of the contractors in selling  Government  cement  which  had  made
contractors inimical to him.  He examined his brother, DW 1  Vijendra  Kumar
Sharma in support of
his version.

5.    After considering the evidence on record, the  trial  Court  convicted
and sentenced the appellant which has been affirmed by the High Court.
6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

7.    Main contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the  evidence
of Bahadur Singh PW 3 and Lakhi Ram PW 4 as eye witnesses  is  not  reliable
as if they had seen the occurrence as claimed,  they  could  not  have  kept
quiet in the night.  It was further submitted that the  alleged  motive  was
far fetched and could not be believed.  It was finally  submitted  that  the
case was covered by Exception 4 to Section 300 as it was a  case  of  sudden
fight in which both the parties threw stone at each other and thus the  case
falls under Section 304 Part II.  Reliance has been placed  on  judgment  of
this Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra[1].

8.    We have given due consideration to the rival submissions  and  perused
the record.

9.    As far as reliability of evidence on record is concerned,  we  are  of
the view that re-appreciation of evidence is not called  for  in  an  appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution in absence  of  patent  illegality  or
perversity merely because a different view could  also  be  taken.   In  the
present case, both the courts below have found the evidence of PW 3  Bahadur
Singh and PW 4 Lakhi Ram to be reliable.  Evidence of PW 7 Raj Kumari  widow
of the deceased has also been believed with regard to the  earlier  incident
furnishing motive to the accused.  PW 2 Lal Singh has also corroborated  the
version given by the eye witnesses by stating that he had seen  the  accused
and deceased together just before the occurrence.  The  defence  version  of
the accused has not been found to  be  reliable.   The  view  taken  by  the
courts below is certainly a possible view for accepting the evidence led  by
the prosecution in support of its version.  We thus do not find  any  reason
to reject the prosecution version.  There is enough evidence to  prove  that
the  accused  appellant  was  responsible  for  causing  the  death  of  the
deceased.

10.   Only other question which remains to be considered is  the  nature  of
offence.  Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the accused  also
received injuries which showed the case to be of free fight.   The  injuries
found on the person of the accused by PW 1 Dr. D.M. Kala are as follows :

 "1.   Abraded contusion 3 x 2.5 cm. just above right  eyebrow.

2.    Abraded contusion 8 cm. x 2.5 cm. on right side of face  inusilry  the
area just below and lateral to right eye.

3.    Abrasion 4 cm. x 1 cm., on right side of face 2 cms. From right  angle
of mouth.

In the opinion of Medical Officer, the injuries were caused  by  hard  blunt
object or friction about one day before Injury No.1 and  2  was  kept  under
observation while Injury No.3 was simple."



11.   On the other hand, the injury noticed on the body of the  deceased  is
as follows :

"1.   The face and head is flattened from side to side. There  are  multiple
irregular lacerated wounds all over. The face is disfigured  and  right  eye
could not be made out.  All the bones of skull, base of skull  and  mandible
are pulverized and the brain  matter  is  seen  flowing  out  from  all  the
wounds.

In the opinion of Medical Officer, the death of the deceased was caused  due
to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante mortem injury.  The  doctor  has
also opined that the injury may be caused by stone in between 8:00  to  9:00
p.m. on 01.04.1983."

12.   The nature of injuries suffered by the deceased  does  not  show  that
the injury was suffered accidentally.  There are  multiple  wounds  and  the
face is disfigured.   The  bones  are  pulverized.   The  brain  matter  was
flowing out from all wounds.   Seen in the light  of  previous  motive,  the
accused can be said to have caused the death by acting in  a  cruel  manner.
In a plea of sudden fight, the burden to show  that  the  case  falls  under
Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. is on the accused.  No doubt even  without
leading positive, the  plea  can  be  substantiated  from  the  material  on
record.

13.   In the present case, there is nothing  on  record  to  establish  free
fight.   Plea  of  the  accused  is  of   false   implication.    From   the
circumstances taken as a whole, only possible inference is that the  accused
has inflicted the fatal injury with a view to cause death.  The injuries  on
the head have been caused with full force.  There is prior enmity.   It  was
not a case of any sudden quarrel or sudden provocation or  in  the  heat  of
passion.

14.   Judgment in Ankush does not advance the case  of  the  appellant.   In
the said case, the accused were walking near the field of the deceased  when
a dog barked at them.  The accused hit the dog with  an  iron  pipe  and  on
objection being raised by the deceased  there  was  exchange  of  hot  words
which led to a scuffle in the course of which one of  the  accused  hit  the
deceased with iron pipe which he was already carrying.  Thus, it was a  case
of a sudden fight on  account  of  barking  of  the  dog  belonging  to  the
deceased.  There was no previous enmity.  Barking of the dog  triggered  the
incident and intervention of the deceased led to a quarrel culminating  into
the fatal injury on a
vital part.

15.   Question whether a case falls under Section  302  or  304  has  to  be
decided from case to case depending on factors  like  the  circumstances  in
which the incident takes place,  the  nature  of  weapon  used  and  whether
weapon was carried or was taken from the spot and whether  the  assault  was
aimed on vital part of the body; the  amount  of  force  used;  whether  the
deceased participated in the sudden fight; whether there  was  any  previous
enmity; whether there was any sudden provocation; whether the attack was  in
the heat of passion; whether the  person  inflicting  the  injury  took  any
undue advantage or acted  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  manner.   The  list  of
circumstances  is  not  exhaustive  and   there   may   be   several   other
circumstances with reference to individual cases.  Applying these  tests  to
the present case, we are unable to accept  the  defence  on  behalf  of  the
appellant.  It was a case of  previous  enmity  and  the  nature  of  injury
suggests intention to cause death or a fatal injury on a vital part  of  the
body with full force sufficient to cause death.  In these circumstances,  we
do not find any ground to interfere.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

                              ............................................J.
                                  [DIPAK MISRA]


                             .............................................J.
                                              [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 26, 2015

-----------------------
[1]    2013 (6) SCC 770

-----------------------
8


NOT FIT FOR NORMAL ACTIVE DUTY AND 100% PERMANENT INCAPACITATION FOR FURTHER SERVICE. Since the Respondent comes under second category, he was dealt with as per procedure laid down in section VIII of CRPF Medical Manual. However, it is respectfully submitted that full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohd. Yasin Ansari [(2006) 3 UPBEBC 2508] has held that a person in the armed forces even with lower degree of disability cannot be retained in services." 28. Apart from the plea of the disabled officers mentioned being vague, for no particulars are given as to the extent of their disability, the Union has made it clear that Standing Order No.7/99 will not apply and that since the job requirements demand a high level of fitness and ability CRPF is exempted from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act. Not only has this plea not been raised before the High Court, but the plea raised before us is lacking in particulars and has to be dismissed for this reason also. 29. We make it clear that the respondent, who has been occupying official accommodation, will vacate such accommodation by 30th June, 2015. Mr. Patwalia has assured us that, given the facts of this case, no penal charges will be collected from him till the date on which he vacates the said accommodation. 30. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the Allahabad High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2466-2467 OF 2015
            (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.25568-25569 OF 2014)


UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                   ...APPELLANTS



                                   VERSUS



DILEEP KUMAR SINGH                      ...RESPONDENT



                        J U D G M E N T

R.F.Nariman, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    These appeals raise an interesting question as to  the  interpretation
of a proviso contained in  Section  47  of  the  Persons  with  Disabilities
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of  Rights  and  Full  Participation)  Act,
1995 (in short the "1995 Act").

3.    The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:-

On 1st January, 1998, the respondent was enlisted in the CRPF  as  Assistant
Commandant. While on duty, on 19th  October,  2001,  he  sustained  grievous
injuries in his spinal cord and legs while he was out on  a  visit  checking
night guards.  Thereafter, he was provided  with  specialized  treatment  in
various hospitals, but nothing worked and, ultimately, a  medical  board  in
its report dated 22nd July, 2004 categorized the respondent as PEE-5,  i.e.,
a person who is permanently  incapacitated  and  stated  that  he  has  100%
disability and recommended that he  be  relieved  from  service  on  medical
grounds.  On 27th October, 2004, a show  cause  notice  was  served  on  the
respondent along with a copy of the report  of  the  medical  board  with  a
direction to  submit  his  representation,  if  any,  against  the  proposed
invalidation from  service  on  medical  grounds.  Instead  of  representing
against  the  show  cause  notice,  the  respondent  filed   writ   petition
No.30278/2004 challenging the said show cause notice. By  an  interim  order
passed on 19th January, 2005, the appellants were directed not to  pass  any
order pursuant to  the  report  given  by  the  medical  board  against  the
respondent.

4.    Pursuant to an order modifying  the  stay  application,  by  an  order
dated 1st July, 2011, the respondent was relieved  from  service  and  given
invalidation pension as admissible under Rule 38 of the CCS (Pension)  Rules
of 1972.  The respondent filed a  second  writ  petition  No.42101  of  2011
challenging the aforesaid order.

5.    By the impugned judgment dated 8th January, 2014, the  Allahabad  High
Court held on  a  construction  of  Section  47  of  the  said  Act  that  a
Notification dated 10th September, 2002 issued under Section 47  insofar  as
the CRPF is concerned, (exempting the CRPF from the rigours of  Section  47)
would have to be read with reference to the field occupied by Section  47(2)
only.  Thus, the High Court made  it  clear  that  the  exemption  provision
would apply only to promotion  and  not  to  continuing  the  respondent  in
service.  As a consequence, the order dated 1st July, 2011,  was  set  aside
and the Union was directed to treat the petitioner in service and to  adjust
him against any suitable post  or  against  a  supernumerary  post  until  a
suitable post is available or until he attains the  age  of  superannuation,
whichever is earlier.

6.    Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing  on
behalf of the Union of  India  has  placed  the  1995  Act  before  us.   He
referred to Section 33, Section 47 and Section 73  and  submitted  that  the
penultimate proviso to Section 47 would apply to the entire Section and  not
merely to sub-section (2) thereof as is  clear  from  the  language  of  the
proviso which uses the words "this Section" and not "this sub-section".   He
further submitted that since there is no  ambiguity  in  the  provision,  no
resort can be taken to Section 73(3) and 73(4) which refers to  the  proviso
in Section 47 as "the  proviso  to  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  47".   He
further submitted that the scheme of the  Act  would  be  disturbed  by  the
impugned judgment inasmuch as Section 33  and  Section  47  cover  the  same
ground - Section 33 being applicable pre-appointment and  Section  47  being
applicable after appointment. He cited Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State  of  Bihar
& Ors.,  (2010) 4 SCC 653 at paragraph 179, which  judgment  refers  to  the
literal rule of construction and S.R. Bommai v. Union  of  India,  (1994)  3
SCC 1 at paragraphs 238 and 239, for  the  proposition  that  courts  cannot
supply a cassus omissus.

7.    Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned senior  counsel  for  the  respondent,  has
argued before us that the impugned judgment is correct inasmuch as the  1995
Act is a beneficial legislation  meant  to  help  disabled  persons  and  an
expansive construction is, therefore, in order.

8.    He argued that Sections 47 and 73 have to  be  harmoniously  construed
and so construed, Section 73 throws  light  on  Section  47  and  makes  the
proviso apply only  to  sub-section  (2)  thereof.  He  argued  that  in  no
circumstance can a disabled person, once he  acquires  a  disability  during
his service, be terminated as it would go against the purpose  of  the  Act.
Further, he argued that the exemption  notification  dated  10th  September,
2002 would not apply on facts as the disability was incurred  prior  to  the
notification. He also argued  that  there  was  discrimination  against  the
respondent in that others  with  disabilities  did  not  get  their  service
terminated.

9.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.  The  Preamble  of  the
1995 Act states as follows:-

"An Act to give effect to the Proclamation on  the  Full  Participation  and
Equality of the People with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region

Whereas the Meeting to Launch the  Asian  and  Pacific  Decade  of  Disabled
Persons 1993-2002 convened by the Economic and Social  Commission  for  Asia
and Pacific held at Beijing on  1st  to  5th  December,  1992,  adopted  the
Proclamation  on  the  Full  Participation  and  Equality  of  People   with
Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region;

And Whereas India is a signatory to the said Proclamation;

And Whereas  it  is  considered  necessary  to  implement  the  Proclamation
aforesaid."



10.   Sections 33, 47 and 73(3) & (4) are set out hereinbelow:

"33. Reservation of posts.-Every appropriate  Government  shall  appoint  in
every establishment such percentage of vacancies not  less  than  three  per
cent for persons or class of persons with disability of which one  per  cent
each shall be reserved for persons suffering from-

(i) blindness or low vision;

(ii) hearing impairment;

(iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy,

in the posts identified for each disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the  type  of
work carried on in any department or establishment, by notification  subject
to such conditions, if any,  as  may  be  specified  in  such  notification,
exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.


47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.-(1) No establishment  shall
dispense with, or reduce in rank, an  employee  who  acquires  a  disability
during his service:

Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability  is  not  suitable
for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other  post  with  the
same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the  employee  against
any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a  suitable  post  is
available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.

(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on  the  ground  of  his
disability:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the  type  of
work carried on in any establishment, by notification and  subject  to  such
conditions, if any, as may be specified in  such  notification,  exempt  any
establishment from the provisions of this section.


73. Power of appropriate Government to make rules.-
(3) Every notification made by the Central Government under the  proviso  to
Section 33, proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47,  every  scheme  framed
by it under Section 27, Section 30, sub-section (1) of Section  38,  Section
42, Section 43, Section 67, Section 68 and every rule made by it under  sub-
section (1), shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before  each
House of Parliament, while it is in session for a  total  period  of  thirty
days which may be comprised in one session or  in  two  or  more  successive
sessions, and if, before the expiry of  the  session  immediately  following
the session or the successive  sessions  aforesaid,  both  Houses  agree  in
making any modification in the rule, notification  or  scheme,  both  Houses
agree that the rule, notification or scheme should not be  made,  the  rule,
notification or scheme shall thereafter have effect only  in  such  modified
form or be of no effect, as the case may be;  so,  however,  that  any  such
modification or annulment shall be without  prejudice  to  the  validity  of
anything previously done under that rule, notification  or  scheme,  as  the
case may be.

(4) Every notification made by the State Government  under  the  proviso  to
Section 33, proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47, every scheme  made  by
it under Section 27, Section 30, sub-section (1) of Section 38, Section  42,
Section 43, Section 67, Section 68, and every rule made  by  it  under  sub-
section (1), shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before  each
House of State Legislature, where it consists of two Houses  or  where  such
legislature consists of one House before that House."



11.   There is no doubt whatsoever  that  Mr.  Mahabir  Singh  is  right  in
saying  that  this  is  a  beneficial  legislation  passed  pursuant  to   a
proclamation  on  the  full  participation  and  equality  of  people   with
disabilities in the Asian and Pacific region to which India is a  signatory.
However, we find  that  for  the  reasons  given  hereinafter  the  impugned
judgment cannot be sustained.

12.   It will be noticed that Section 47 proviso speaks of  "this  Section".
The literal rule applied to this proviso would make it clear that  it  would
apply to the entire Section, for otherwise the words used  would  have  been
"this sub-section". Quite apart from this, the language of this  proviso  is
similar to the language  of  the  proviso  contained  in  Section  33.  Both
provisions speak of an exemption being granted having regard  to  the  "type
of work" carried on in any establishment.  It is clear that given the  "type
of work" carried on by the armed forces or the CRPF before us,  persons  who
have disabilities may  not  have  any  reservation  for  them  at  all  pre-
appointment, if exempted, for the simple reason that persons suffering  with
disabilities (which as defined under Section 2(t) means a  person  suffering
from not less  than  40%  of  any  disability  as  certified  by  a  medical
authority) may be persons wholly unfit for service required in  the  defence
of the country.  It is obvious that, if at the  appointment  stage,  persons
with disabilities need not  have  vacancies  in  posts  reserved  for  them,
equally after suffering a disability during service, a person  may  for  the
self-same reason not be able to perform what  is  required  of  him  in  the
defence of the nation, thereby justifying his discharge from service.

13.   The context of the provision is "type of  work".   It  is  clear  that
given  this  context,  there  is  no  rationale  for  exemption  so  far  as
"promotion" is concerned but  no  exemption  so  far  as  "dispensation"  is
concerned.

14.   One argument that weighed with the  High  Court  was  that  under  the
second proviso to sub-section (1), if it  is  not  possible  to  adjust  the
employee against any post, he may be kept on  a  supernumerary  post.   From
this it was sought  to  be  inferred  that  under  no  circumstance  can  an
employee who  acquires  disability  during  his  service  have  his  service
dispensed with.  This reasoning is  fallacious  for  the  reason  that  sub-
section (1) deals with dispensing with  service  as  well  as  reduction  in
rank.  The argument that an employee's services can never be dispensed  with
under Section 47(1) having due regard to the second  proviso  thereof  fails
to take into account that there is no such requirement as far  as  reduction
in rank is concerned. If an exemption can be given so far  as  reduction  in
rank is concerned, then there is no reason  why  such  exemption  cannot  be
given so far as dispensing with service is concerned, as both are  contained
in Section 47(1) of the Act.

15.   We now come to what appealed to the High Court  and  was  argued  most
vehemently before us.  It was stated that Section 73(3) & (4) made it  clear
that the proviso is only a proviso to sub-section  (2)  of  Section  47  and
that therefore it must be read only as such.  To this again  there  are  two
answers.

16.   It is well settled that the provisions  of  a  statute  must  be  read
harmoniously together.  However, if this is not possible then it is  settled
law that where there is a conflict between  two  Sections,  and  you  cannot
reconcile the two, you have to determine which is the leading provision  and
which the subordinate provision, and which  must  give  way  to  the  other.
This statement of the law is to be found in Institute  of  Patent  Agents  &
Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood, 1894  A.C.  347  at  360.   Lord  Herschell,  L.C.,
stated this, as follows:-

"Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections  to  be  found  in
the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best  you  may.  If  you
cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and  which  the
subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other."



17.   This Judgment has been subsequently followed  by  the  High  Court  of
Australia in Project Blue Sky Inc.  v.  Australian  Broadcasting  Authority,
153 ALR 490, in the following terms:

      "A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima  facie  basis
that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals.   Where
conflict appears to arise from the language of  particular  provisions,  the
conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by  adjusting  the  meaning
of the competing provisions to achieve that  result  which  will  best  give
effect to the purpose and language of  those  provisions  while  maintaining
the unity of all the statutory provisions.  Reconciling conflict  provisions
will often require the court "to determine which is  the  leading  provision
and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the  other".
 Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible  in
many cases to give each provision the meaning which  best  gives  effect  to
its purpose and language  while  maintaining  the  unity  of  the  statutory
scheme." (at pages 509-510)



18.   Under similar circumstances, in Smt.  Laxmi  Devi  v.  Sethani  Mukand
Kanwar and Two Others, 1965 (1) SCR 726, a question  arose  as  to  how  one
would harmonise Section 2(d) with Section 5  of  the  Transfer  of  Property
Act.  The effect of Section 2(d), which is a  saving  clause,  is  that  the
provisions of the Transfer of  Property  Act  will  apply  to  transfers  by
operation of law.  Whereas  Section  5  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act
defines transfer of property as intended to take in  transfers  effected  by
acts of parties.  Auction sales, being transfers effected  by  operation  of
law would, therefore, be within the purview of  Section  100  (latter  part)
read with Section 2(d).  (Section 100  provides  that  no  charge  shall  be
enforced against any property  in  the  hands  of  a  person  to  whom  such
property has been transferred for consideration and without  notice  of  the
charge.)  Section 2(d) was held to prevail over Section 5 because  it  is  a
"positive provision" which is "clear". This Court held:

"This position, however, has become somewhat complicated by  reason  of  the
provisions contained  in  s.5 of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act.  Section
5 provides,  inter  alia,  that  in  the  following  sections  "transfer  of
property" means an act  by  which  a  living  person  conveys  property,  in
present or in future, to one or more other living persons. In  other  words,
in terms, the definition of the expression "transfer of  property"  as  used
in all the sections of the Transfer of Property Act is intended to  take  in
transfers effected by acts of  parties  inter  vivos,  and  an  auction-sale
clearly is not such an act. Section 5 would, therefore,  appear  to  exclude
auction sales from  the  purview  of  s.100 altogether.  This  result  would
appear to be consistent with the provision in the preamble of the Act  which
says that the Transfer of Property Act was enacted because  it  was  thought
expedient to define and amend certain parts  of  the  law  relating  to  the
transfer of property by act of parties. That is the position  which  emerges
from the reading of  s.5 coupled  with  the  preamble;  and  that  naturally
raises  the  question  as  to  how  to  reconcile  these  two   inconsistent
positions.

In our opinion, the positive provision contained  in  s.  2(d) must  prevail
over the definition of "transfer of property" prescribed by  s.5. No  doubt,
the purpose of the definition is to  indicate  the  class  of  transfers  to
which the provisions of the Transfer of Property  Act  are  intended  to  be
applied; but a definition of  this  kind  cannot  over-ride  the  clear  and
positive direction contained in the specific words used by s.  2(d).  As  we
have already seen, the result of the saving clause enacted by s. 2(d) is  to
emphasise the fact that  the  provisions  of  s.57 and  those  contained  in
Chapter IV must apply to transfer by  operation  of  law.  Such  a  positive
provision cannot be made to yield to what may appear to  be  the  effect  of
the definition prescribed by s.5, and so,  we  are  inclined  to  hold  that
notwithstanding the  definition  prescribed  by  s.5,  the  latter  part  of
s.100 must be deemed to include auction sales." (at page 733)



19.   A reference to these two judgments makes it clear that Section  47  is
the "leading provision" and  Section  73  is  the  "subordinate  provision".
Further, Section 47 is a positive and  clear  provision.  This  is  because,
Section 47 is the substantive provision  exempting  the  subject  matter  of
Section 47 as a whole as opposed to Section 73 which  is  only  a  machinery
provision by which notifications made  under  Section  47  are  to  be  laid
before each House of Parliament.

20.   Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel  beyond  the
provision to which it is a proviso.  Therefore, the golden rule is  to  read
the whole Section, inclusive of  the  proviso,  in  such  manner  that  they
mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious  construction.
 This is laid down in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, (1976) 1  SCC  128,
as follows:-

"18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the following,  among  other
decisions, were cited at  the  Bar  bearing  on  the  uses  of  provisos  in
statutes: CIT v.Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd, [AIR 1959 SC 713 : 1959  Supp  (2)
SCR 256, 266 : (1959) 36 ITR 1] ; Ram Narain  Sons  Ltd. v. Asstt.  CST [AIR
1955  SC  765  :  (1955)  2   SCR   483,   493   :   (1955)   6   STC   627]
; Thompson v. Dibdin [(1912) AC 533, 541  :  81  LJKB  918  :  28  TLR  490]
; Rex v. Dibdin [1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125] and Tahsildar  Singh v.State  of
U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri  LJ  1231]  .
The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to  the  subject-matter  of  the
enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that  a  proviso  must
prima facie be read and considered in relation to the  principal  matter  to
which it is a proviso. It  is  not  a  separate  or  independent  enactment.
"Words are dependent on the principal  enacting  words  to  which  they  are
tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as  divorced  from  their  context"
(Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If  the  rule  of  construction  is  that
prima facie a proviso should be limited in its  operation  to  the  subject-
matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound.  To  expand
the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against  the  fundamental
rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in  relation  to  the
principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A  proviso  ordinarily  is
but a proviso, although the golden  rule  is  to  read  the  whole  section,
inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw  light  on
each other and result in a harmonious construction."


21.   Viewed at in this light also, one is to read Section  47  as  a  whole
and being read as a whole it is clear from the proviso that it  would  apply
to "type of work" carried on in  any  establishment  and  would,  therefore,
apply to both dispensing with service including reduction in  rank  as  well
as promotion.

22.   Another interesting facet is brought  out  by  the  marginal  note  of
Section 47 and Chapter VIII in which Section 47 falls.  Chapter VIII has  as
its heading "non-discrimination". Equally, the marginal note of  Section  47
is "non-discrimination in government employments".  It  is  clear  that  the
idea of Section 47 is not to  discriminate  against  employees  who  acquire
disability during service.  It is settled law that discrimination cannot  be
viewed in the abstract - the doctrine  of  classification  is  an  important
adjunct to the doctrine of discrimination.  It is clear, therefore, that  if
there is an intelligible differentia  having  a  rational  relation  to  the
object  sought  to  be  achieved,  a  provision  will  not  be  held  to  be
discriminatory.  It is clear that an exemption provision is based on such  a
classification and exempting any  establishment  from  not  dispensing  with
service or reduction in rank or  not  granting  promotions  has  a  rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved,  namely,  that  the  "type  of
work" carried on in an establishment may be such that a disabled  employee's
services may have to be dispensed with and/or promotion denied.

23.   Shri Mahabir Singh cited United India Insurance Co. Ltd.  v.  Lehru  &
Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 at page 345 for the proposition that in a  beneficial
legislation what the legislature gives for the benefit of those  covered  by
it, the court cannot take away. We are of the view that this authority  will
not apply  for  the  basic  reason  that  we  are  construing  an  exemption
provision in a  beneficial  legislation.  We  have  already  held  that  the
exemption provision will cover the entirety of the field of Section 47.   In
what facts and circumstances the Government exercises its discretion  taking
into account the type of work in an establishment is obviously to be  guided
by the object for which the beneficial legislation is enacted together  with
balancing the need for exempting some establishments  from  a  part  or  the
whole of the provisions of the Act.  On a true  construction,  it  is  clear
that the legislation has "given" the Government  the  power  to  exempt  any
establishment from the rigours of the Act not only qua  promotion  but  also
qua termination from service and reduction of rank as has been held above.

24.   Learned counsel also cited before us Kunal Singh v. Union of  India  &
Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 524.  This judgment decided that the benefit  of  Section
47 would be available to a person as an additional benefit  even  though  he
may get certain other benefits under the service Rules  applicable  to  him.
No question as to the proviso to Section 47 arose before the court  in  that
case and for the purposes of the present  controversy,  the  ratio  of  that
decision will have little or no bearing.

25.   We now come to two other contentions  raised  by  Mr.  Mahabir  Singh.
According to him, the exemption  notification  dated  10th  September,  2002
will not apply for the reason that the accident took place  prior  to  2002.
It is clear that the exemption notification  will  apply  to  all  cases  in
which an  employee's  services  are  dispensed  with.   The  relevant  date,
therefore, is the date of dispensing with service and not the date on  which
the disability is incurred, for Section 47 prohibits an  establishment  from
dispensing with the service of an employee who  acquires  disability  during
his service.  Since service was dispensed with on 1st July,  2011  (that  is
long after the date of the exemption notification), the  notification  will,
obviously, apply.

26.   The plea of discrimination sought to be made by Mr. Mahabir  Singh  is
based on  an  averment  made  in  the  reply  affidavit  on  behalf  of  the
petitioner (respondent herein) in the Supreme Court.   The  averment  is  as
follows:

   "Further the contention of the petitioners that the disabled persons  are
not being retained in  service  is  absolutely  wrong  because  the  persons
disabled due to militant action etc. are retained and not being  invalidated
from service in accordance to Para 9(a)(i)  of  Standing  Order  No.7/99  of
CRPF. Many disabled persons has been retained or  re-instated  in  CRPF  and
other armed forces after enactment of the Act of 1995 and amendment of  rule
20(2) of the C.C.S. (Leave) Rules 1972 as well as  the  judgment  passed  by
this Honorable Court reported in 2003(2) ESC (SC) Kunal  Singh  Vs.  U.O.I..
Even the CRPF itself has retained such disabled officer Shri  Pratap  Singh,
Deputy Commandant till superannuation and retained Shri Y.N. Ray and  Sameer
Shrivastava who became disabled in the  rank  of  Assistant  Commandant  and
granted regular promotion and at present they  are  Commandant.   Two  other
officers Sh. R.K. Singh and Sh. P.R.  Mishra  have  also  been  retained  in
service despite their disability.  Similarly the B.S.F. also  has  not  only
retained Shri Surinder Singh but had promoted him up to his present rank  of
Second in Command.  The Indian  Army  has  retained  similarly  wheel  chair
bound physically disabled (paraplegic) Officer S.K. Rajdan and promoted  him
to the rank of Major General and Indian Air Force also  retained  its  wheel
chair bound disabled (paraplegic) trainee cadet Harjot Singh."



27.   In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants  this  averment  is
denied in the following terms:-

  "The contents of para 5 (G-H) of reply are wrong, misconceived  and  hence
denied.  It is  submitted  that  Central  Para  Military  forces  perform  a
critical role in maintaining internal  security  and  guarding  of  national
borders.  By very nature, the job requirements  are  "technical'  in  nature
requiring a high level of physical fitness and abilities.  CRPF is  exempted
from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act.  The Respondent does not  come
within the purview of  Standing  Order  7/99  and  has  been  declared  100%
permanently  incapacitated  for  further  service,  he  was  dealt  as   per
procedure laid down in Section  VIII  of  CRPF  medical  manual.   There  is
difference between NOT  FIT  FOR  NORMAL  ACTIVE  DUTY  AND  100%  PERMANENT
INCAPACITATION FOR  FURTHER  SERVICE.   Since  the  Respondent  comes  under
second category, he was dealt with as per procedure  laid  down  in  section
VIII of CRPF Medical Manual.  However, it  is  respectfully  submitted  that
full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of  Union  of  India
Vs. Mohd. Yasin Ansari [(2006) 3 UPBEBC 2508] has held that a person in  the
armed forces even with lower degree of  disability  cannot  be  retained  in
services."



28.   Apart from the plea of the disabled officers  mentioned  being  vague,
for no particulars are given as to  the  extent  of  their  disability,  the
Union has made it clear that Standing Order No.7/99 will not apply and  that
since the job requirements demand a high level of fitness and  ability  CRPF
is exempted from the provisions of Section 47 of  the  Act.   Not  only  has
this plea not been raised before the High Court, but the plea raised  before
us is lacking in particulars and has to be dismissed for this reason also.

29.   We make it clear that the respondent, who has been occupying  official
accommodation, will vacate  such  accommodation  by  30th  June,  2015.  Mr.
Patwalia has assured us that,  given  the  facts  of  this  case,  no  penal
charges will be collected from him till the date on  which  he  vacates  the
said accommodation.

30.   The appeals are, therefore, allowed.  The judgment  of  the  Allahabad
High Court is set aside.  There will be no order as to costs.


............................................J.
                                  (T.S. Thakur)



............................................J.
                                  (R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi,
February 26, 2015.








Caste Certificate - Ancestors are Hindu Pulaya Community - Grand father embraced Christianity - Appellant re embraced Hindu Pulaya Community -Akhila Bharata Ayyappa Seva Sangham granted certificate as Hindu Pulaya Community - applied to the Tahasildar - Tahasildar issued certificate - Basing on the certificate he obtained job - on enquiry order for removal from service - and order for recovery of 15 lakhs - enquiry committee held that though converted to Hinduism - but married to Christian - not professing Hinduism - Challenged - the High Court has accepted the report of the Scrutiny Committee constituted under the Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") wherein the caste certificate granted in favour of K.P. Manu, the appellant herein, had been cancelled. - Apex court held that the judgment in S. Swvigaradoss (supra), as far as the second principle is concerned, is per incuriam.- As far as the marriage and leading of Hindu life are concerned, we are of the convinced opinion that, in the instant case, it really cannot be allowed to make any difference. The community which is a recognised organisation by the State Government, has granted the certificate in categorical terms in favour of the appellant.It is the community which has the final say as far as acceptance is concerned, for it accepts the person, on reconversion, and takes him within its fold. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that the appellant after reconversion had come within the fold of the community and thereby became a member of the scheduled caste. Had the community expelled him the matter would have been different. The acceptance is in continuum. Ergo, the reasonings ascribed by the Scrutiny Committee which have been concurred with by the High Court are wholly unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court, findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the orders passed by the State Government and the second respondent are set aside. The appellant shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all the benefits relating to seniority and his caste, and shall also be paid backwages upto 75% within eight weeks from today. - 2015 S.C.msklawreports

Caste Certificate - Ancestors are Hindu Pulaya Community - Grand father embraced Christianity - Appellant re embraced Hindu Pulaya Community -Akhila Bharata Ayyappa Seva  Sangham granted certificate as Hindu Pulaya Community - applied to the Tahasildar - Tahasildar issued certificate - Basing on the certificate he obtained job - on enquiry order for removal from service - and order for recovery of 15 lakhs - enquiry committee held that though converted to Hinduism - but married to Christian - not professing Hinduism - Challenged -  the High Court has  accepted  the report of the Scrutiny Committee constituted  under  the  Kerala  (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of  Community  Certificates Act, 1996 (for short "the Act") wherein the  caste  certificate  granted  in favour of K.P. Manu, the appellant herein, had been cancelled. - Apex court held that the judgment in S. Swvigaradoss (supra), as  far  as  the  second  principle  is concerned, is per incuriam.- As far as  the  marriage  and  leading  of Hindu life are concerned, we are of  the  convinced  opinion  that,  in  the
instant case, it really cannot be  allowed  to  make  any  difference.  
 The community which is a recognised organisation by the  State  Government,  has granted the certificate in categorical terms in  favour  of  the  appellant.It is the community which  has  the  final  say  as  far  as  acceptance  is concerned, for it accepts the person, on reconversion, and takes him  within its fold.   Therefore, we are inclined  to  hold  that  the  appellant  after
reconversion had come within the fold of the community and thereby became  a
member of the scheduled caste.  Had the community expelled  him  the  matter
would have been different.  The  acceptance  is  in  continuum.   Ergo,  the reasonings ascribed by the Scrutiny  Committee  which  have  been  concurred
with by the High Court are wholly unsustainable.  Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of  the High Court, findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the orders passed by  the State Government and the second respondent are  set  aside.   The  appellant
shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all the benefits  relating  to seniority and his caste, and shall also be paid backwages  upto  75%  within eight weeks from today. - 2015 S.C.msklawreports