Once an application is duly filed in terms of Section 8 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Arbitration Act') before the civil court, what should be the approach of the court? -2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

In a suit for injunction filed by the respondent, the  prayer  made  was  to
restrain the first and second defendant  institutions  and  their  men  from
illegally taking away from the possession of plaintiff or her  employee,  or
interfering with the use and enjoyment of  ambassador or causing  damage  to
the car bearing registration  number  KL-11-AA-1473  in  the  ownership  and
possession of the plaintiff by way of a decree of injunction.  The  car  was
purchased on loan granted by the appellant.

Duly complying with the procedure under Section 8 of  the  Arbitration  Act,
the appellant filed an application bringing  to  the  notice  of  the  trial
court that in view of the agreement  for  arbitration  between  the  parties
regarding resolution of the disputes, the court did  not  have  jurisdiction
to try the case and the parties were  to  be  directed  to  the  process  of
arbitration in terms of the agreement. =
 Once an application is duly filed in terms of Section 8 of  The  Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to  as  'Arbitration  Act')
before the civil court, what should be the approach of  the  court?

Once an application in due compliance of Section 8 of  the  Arbitration  Act
is filed, the approach of the civil court should be not to see  whether  the
court has jurisdiction. It should be to see  whether  its  jurisdiction  has
been ousted. There is a lot of difference between the two  approaches.  Once
it is brought to the notice of the court  that  its  jurisdiction  has  been
taken away in terms of the procedure prescribed under a special statue,  the
civil court should first see whether there  is  ouster  of  jurisdiction  in
terms or compliance of the procedure under the special statute. The  general
law should yield to the special law - generalia  specialibus  non  derogant.
In such a situation, the approach shall not  be  to  see  whether  there  is
still  jurisdiction  in  the  civil  court  under  the  general  law.   Such
approaches would only delay the resolution of disputes  and  complicate  the
redressal of grievance and of course unnecessarily increase the pendency  in
the court.

The order dated 21.06.2010  passed  by  the  trial  court  and  order  dated
17.03.2014 passed by the High Court, are  set  aside.  The  trial  court  is
directed to pass fresh orders on the application  filed  by  the  appellant-
defendant under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. The needful shall be  done
within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

We, after giving our anxious consideration to the matter, are of the view that the District Court at Latur and High Court of Bombay have committed error of law in entertaining the application under Section 34 of the Act and dismissing the revision petition.= Indisputably, the Arbitration proceeding has been conducted within the jurisdiction of Raichur court, which has jurisdiction as per Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is subordinate to the High Court of Karnataka which entertained Section 11 Application. Hence, the Award cannot be challenged before a Court subordinate to the High Court of Bombay. Exercise of jurisdiction by such court shall be against the provision of Section 42 of the Act.

                                                                'REPORTABLE'

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.    2077       OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 8675 OF 2014)

M/S. BHANDARI UDYOG LIMITED  .....Appellant(s)
                                   versus
INDUSTRIAL FACILITATION COUNCIL
AND ANOTHER                             .....Respondent(s)




                                  JUDGMENT



M. Y. EQBAL, J.



Leave granted.





2.    The short question that falls for consideration in this appeal  is  as
to whether the Bombay High Court has correctly decided the  jurisdiction  of
a Court to entertain application under Section 34  of  the  Arbitration  and
Conciliation Act, 1996?





3.    The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.



4.    The Appellant Company is running a small scale   industry  at  Raichur
in the State of Karnataka and is engaged in the business of cotton  ginning,
pressing while extraction and in marketing the finished   products.  Whereas
Respondent No.2 is running a cotton spinning mill at Latur in the  State  of
Maharashtra.  Respondent  no.2  purchased  750  bales  of  cotton  from  the
appellant-company and made part  payment  to  the  appellant.   The  balance
amount was not paid which led to a dispute between the parties.



5.    It further appears that  the  appellant  filed  an  application  under
Sections 3 and 4 of the  Interest on Delayed Payments  to  Small  Scale  and
Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act,1993  (for  short  'IDP  Act')  before
respondent no.1, the Industrial Facilitation Council (for  short  'IFC')  to
arbitrate the dispute  between  the  appellant  and  respondent  no.2.   The
appellant thereafter filed a petition before the Karnataka High Court  under
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'Act  of
1996') for appointment of Arbitrator.  The said petition was allowed by  the
Chief Justice Designate and directed respondent No.1  (IFC)  to  decide  the
dispute between the  parties.   The  respondent  no.1  passed  an  Award  on
16.8.2010 directing respondent no.2 to pay a  sum  of  Rs.20,25,213.54  with
interest.





6.    The respondent no.2 challenged the  Award  by  filing  an  application
under  Section  34  of  1996  Act  before  the  District  Court  at   Latur,
Maharashtra for setting aside the Award.  The  appellant  opposed  the  said
application by challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court in  Latur.
  The  appellant  contended  that  the  District  Court   at   Raichur   has
jurisdiction to hear the application under  Section  34  of  the  Act.   The
District Judge proceeded to decide the  jurisdiction  by  referring  various
provisions including Sections 15 to 20 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  and
held that since respondent no.2 resides at Latur, delivery of  cotton  bales
was taken at Latur and the place of  business  of  respondent  no.2  was  at
Latur, it is the District Judge, Latur, who has  jurisdiction  to  entertain
the application under Section 34 of the Act.





7.    As against the aforesaid order passed by the  District  Judge,  Latur,
appellant preferred a revision before the Bombay  High  Court.   The  Bombay
High Court dismissed the revision holding that since the  Chief  Justice  of
the High Court dealing with an application under Section 11 of  the  Act  is
not a court, and that no application was filed in any  court  prior  to  the
filing of application under Section 34 of the  Act  and  further  the  bales
were supplied at Latur, it is the Latur  Court  which  has  jurisdiction  to
entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act.





8.    We have heard Mr. Jayant Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing
for the appellant and Mr. Shrish K.  Deshpande,  learned  counsel  appearing
for respondent no.2.  It is not  in  dispute  that  pursuant  to  the  order
passed  by  respondent  no.2,  the  cotton  bales  were  dispatched  by  the
appellant  from  Raichur  supported  by  all   bills/invoices   specifically
mentioning that "subject to Raichur jurisdiction".  The  dispute  arose  and
the matter was referred to respondent no.1, IFC Bangalore.  Respondent  No.2
participated in the arbitration proceedings  in  Bangalore  without  raising
objection with regard to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court
referring the matter to arbitration or the jurisdiction  of  IFC  to  decide
the dispute.  Admittedly, the arbitration proceeding  was  concluded  within
the jurisdiction of Raichur Court. The only forum  available  to  respondent
no.2 was to make an application under Section  34  of  the  Act  before  the
Civil Court of original jurisdiction at Raichur, since  the  Karnataka  High
Court has no original jurisdiction.





9.    Recently, when a  similar  question  for  consideration  arose  before
three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of State of West Bengal &  Ors.
vs. Associated contractors, (2015) 1 SCC 32, this Court held:-

"22. One more question that may arise under Section 42  is  whether  Section
42 would apply in cases where an application made in a court  is  [pic]found
to be without jurisdiction. Under Section 31(4) of the old Act, it has  been
held in F.C.I. v. A.M. Ahmed & Co.,(2001) 10 SCC 532 at p. 532, para  6  and
Neycer India Ltd. v. GMB Ceramics Ltd.(2002) 9 SCC 489 at pp.  490-91,  para
3 that Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act would not  be  applicable  if  it  were
found that an application was to  be  made  before  a  court  which  had  no
jurisdiction. In Jatinder Nath v. Chopra Land Developers (P) Ltd.,(2007)  11
SCC 453 at p. 460, para 9 and Rajasthan SEB  v.  Universal  Petro  Chemicals
Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 107 at p. 116, paras 33 to 36 and Swastik Gases  (P)  Ltd.
v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32 at pp.  47-48,  para  32,  it  was
held that where the agreement between the  parties  restricted  jurisdiction
to only one particular court, that court alone would  have  jurisdiction  as
neither Section 31(4) nor Section 42 contains a non obstante  clause  wiping
out a contrary agreement between the parties. It has  thus  been  held  that
applications preferred to courts outside the exclusive court  agreed  to  by
parties would also be without jurisdiction."


10.   Indisputably, the Arbitration proceeding has  been  conducted   within
the jurisdiction of  Raichur court, which has jurisdiction  as  per  Section
20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is subordinate to the  High  Court  of
Karnataka which  entertained  Section  11  Application.   Hence,  the  Award
cannot be challenged before  a  Court  subordinate  to  the  High  Court  of
Bombay.  Exercise of  jurisdiction  by  such  court  shall  be  against  the
provision of Section 42 of the Act.





11.   We, after giving our anxious consideration to the matter, are  of  the
view that the District  Court  at  Latur  and  High  Court  of  Bombay  have
committed error of law in entertaining the application under Section  34  of
the Act and dismissing the revision petition.





12.   We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside  the  order  passed  by
the High Court. There shall be no order as to costs.



                                        ..................................J.
                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)



                                        ..................................J.
                                                             (Kurian Joseph)
New Delhi,
February 20, 2015.







ITEM NO.1A           COURT NO.11               SECTION IX
[FOR JUDGMENT]

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No. 2077 of 2015 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).
 8675/2014

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 21/11/2013 in CRA
No. 179/2013 passed by the High Court Of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad)

M/S BHANDARI UDYOG LTD                             Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

INDUSTRIAL FACILITATION COUNCIL & ANR              Respondent(s)


Date : 20/02/2015 This appeal was called on for judgment today.


For Petitioner(s)      Mr. Anand Shrivastava, Adv. for
                    M/s. Lex Regis Law Offices


For Respondent(s)      Mr. Shirish K. Deshpande,Adv.

            Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.Y. Eqbal pronounced  the judgment  of  the
Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph.
            Leave granted.
            Appeal is allowed in terms of  signed  reportable  judgment.  No
costs.

(INDU POKHRIYAL)                           (PARDEEP KUMAR)
  COURT MASTER                                    AR-cum-PS
      [SIGNED REPORTABLE JUDGMENT IS PLACED ON THE FILE]

Fixing eligibility for a particular post or even for admission to a course falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature/executive and cannot be the subject-matter of judicial review, unless found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or has been fixed without keeping in mind the nature of service, for which appointments are to be made, or has no rational nexus with the object(s) sought to be achieved by the statute. Such eligibility can be changed even for the purpose of promotion, unilaterally and the person seeking such promotion cannot raise the grievance that he should be governed only by the rules existing, when he joined service. In the matter of appointments, the authority concerned has unfettered powers so far as the procedural aspects are concerned, but it must meet the requirement of eligibility, etc. The court should therefore, refrain from interfering, unless the appointments so made, or the rejection of a candidature is found to have been done at the cost of "fair play", "good conscience" and "equity". (Vide State of J&K v. Shiv Ram Sharma (1999)3 SCC 653 and Praveen Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 8 SCC 633.)" 11. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by this Court as above, we are of the opinion that since the respondent was not qualified for the post of driver, as such the High Court erred in law in directing the appellant to consider his case against the post of driver of heavy vehicle. 12. Therefore in the above circumstances, this appeal deserves to be allowed as the respondent is not qualified for the post of driver. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2061 OF 2015
              (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 21297 of 2014)


      The Rajasthan State Road
      Transport Corporation and others             ... Appellants


                                   Versus


      Revat Singh                                  ...Respondent






                               J U D G M E N T


      Prafulla C. Pant, J.




            This  appeal  is  directed  against  judgment  and  order  dated
      1.5.2014, passed by the High Court of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan,  in
      D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 428 of  2014  whereby  the  Division
      Bench declined to interfere with the order passed  by  learned  Single
      Judge.


   2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record.


   3. Brief facts of the case are  that  one  Kalyan  Singh  father  of  the
      respondent Revat Singh was a driver  with  appellant  Rajasthan  State
      Road  Transport  Corporation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
      "Corporation").  He died  in  harness  on  26.6.2006.  The  respondent
      sought  compassionate  appointment  on  the  post   of   driver.   His
      educational qualification  was  8th  standard  pass.   The  appellants
      considered the application for appointment  on  compassionate  ground,
      and rejected the same on  the  ground  that  the  respondent  was  not
      qualified either for the post of driver  or  that  of  conductor.  The
      respondent was accordingly communicated by the appellants vide  letter
      dated 18.1.2008.  The respondent made further  correspondence  in  the
      matter after obtaining driving licence  on  23.1.2007.  However,  said
      licence was not for heavy  vehicles.   When  the  appellants  did  not
      accept request for   appointment  against  the  post  of  driver,  the
      respondent filed writ petition no. 1892 of 2011 which was  allowed  by
      the learned Single Judge vide order  dated  29.1.2014,  directing  the
      appellant to consider case of the respondent for the post of driver.


   4. Aggrieved by the order of the  learned  Single  Judge,  the  appellant
      filed intra court appeal, but the same was disposed of by the Division
      Bench of the High Court vide impugned order dated  1.5.2014  declining
      to interfere with the order of learned Single Judge, and observed that
      the said order advances the cause of justice considering the  hardship
      faced by the family of deceased employee.   However,  it  was  further
      observed by the Division Bench that the order would be treated to have
      been passed in the special facts and circumstances of the case.



   5. Learned counsel for the appellant - Rajasthan State Road Corporation -
      submitted before this Court that the High Court has erred  in  law  in
      directing the  appellant  to  consider  the  case  of  respondent  for
      appointment against the post of driver on  the  compassionate  ground.
      It is specifically pointed out that the respondent  is  not  qualified
      for the post of driver as he  is  neither  matriculate  nor  possessed
      driving licence for heavy vehicles.



   6. Shri Virender Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for  the  respondent,  did
      not deny that the respondent was only          8th standard pass,  and
      the driving licence obtained in the year 2007, was in respect of light
      vehicles.



   7. During arguments, we are informed by learned counsel for the appellant-
      Corporation that respondent  has  now  been  offered  and  engaged  as
      Artisan Grade III.  On behalf of the respondent, it  is  pleaded  that
      the respondent be engaged at least against post of Artisan  Grade  II.
      However, there is nothing on the record to  show  that  such  post  is
      lying vacant nor is it clear that a person can be  directly  appointed
      to the post of Artisan Grade II.


   8. In I.G.(Karmik) and others  vs. Prahalad Mani Tripathi  (2007)  6  SCC
      162,  this Court has held that compassionate appointment  can  not  be
      granted to a post for  which  the  candidate  is  ineligible.   It  is
      further held in said case that even though higher post was applied for
      on  compassionate  ground,  when  a  lower  post  offered  considering
      qualification and  eligibility  as  per  rules  was  accepted  by  the
      candidate, he cannot claim higher post.


   9. In Steel Authority of India Limited v. Madhusudan Das, (2008)  15  SCC
      560,  this Court has  clarified  the  law  relating  to  compassionate
      appointments in following words:
           "15. This Court in a large number of decisions has held that the
           appointment on compassionate  ground  cannot  be  claimed  as  a
           matter of right. It must be  provided  for  in  the  rules.  The
           criteria laid down therefor viz. that  the  death  of  the  sole
           bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant  to
           provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are  raised,
           the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making  such  a
           scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and  16  of  the
           Constitution of  India  mandate  that  all  eligible  candidates
           should be considered for appointment in  the  posts  which  have
           fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to  a
           dependant of a deceased employee is an  exception  to  the  said
           rule. It is a concession, not a right. (See SBI  v.  Anju  Jain,
           (2008) 8 SCC 475 para 33.)"


  10. In State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari, (2012) 9 SCC  545,  this
      Court  while  examining  the  law  in  the  matters  of  compassionate
      appointment, has made following observations:
           "11. The courts and tribunals do not have  the  power  to  issue
           direction to make appointment by way of granting  relaxation  of
           eligibility or in contravention thereof. In  State  of  M.P.  v.
           Dharam Bir (1998) 6 SCC 165, this Court  while  dealing  with  a
           similar issue rejected the plea of humanitarian grounds and held
           as under: (SCC p. 175, para 31)


                 "31. ... The courts as also the tribunals have no power  to
                 override  the  mandatory  provisions  of   the   Rules   on
                 sympathetic  consideration  that  a  person,   though   not
                 possessing the essential educational qualifications, should
                 be allowed to continue on the post merely on the  basis  of
                 his experience. Such an order would amount to  altering  or
                 amending the statutory provisions made  by  the  Government
                 under Article 309 of the Constitution."


           12. Fixing  eligibility  for  a  particular  post  or  even  for
           admission to a course falls within the exclusive domain  of  the
           legislature/executive  and  cannot  be  the  subject-matter   of
           judicial review, unless found to be arbitrary,  unreasonable  or
           has been fixed without keeping in mind the  nature  of  service,
           for which appointments are to be made, or has no rational  nexus
           with the object(s) sought to be achieved by  the  statute.  Such
           eligibility can be changed even for the  purpose  of  promotion,
           unilaterally and the person seeking such promotion cannot  raise
           the grievance that he should  be  governed  only  by  the  rules
           existing, when he joined service. In the matter of appointments,
           the authority concerned has unfettered  powers  so  far  as  the
           procedural  aspects  are  concerned,  but  it  must   meet   the
           requirement of eligibility, etc.  The  court  should  therefore,
           refrain from interfering, unless the appointments  so  made,  or
           the rejection of a candidature is found to have been done at the
           cost of "fair play", "good conscience" and "equity". (Vide State
           of J&K v. Shiv Ram Sharma (1999)3 SCC 653 and Praveen  Singh  v.
           State of Punjab (2000) 8 SCC 633.)"


  11. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by this Court as above, we are
      of the opinion that since the respondent was  not  qualified  for  the
      post of driver, as such the High Court erred in law in  directing  the
      appellant to consider his case against the post  of  driver  of  heavy
      vehicle.


  12. Therefore in the above  circumstances,  this  appeal  deserves  to  be
      allowed as the respondent is not qualified for  the  post  of  driver.
      Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.  However, the respondent shall  be
      allowed to work on the post of Artisan Grade III as  offered  to  him.
      No order as to cost.


                                          ...................................
                                          ...J.
                                                   [Dipak Misra]







                                       ....................................J
                                       .
                                                 [Prafulla C. Pant]
      New Delhi;
      February 20, 2015.

The charge sheet against the appellant, in the original record, shows that the Investigating Officer signed it and submitted the same on 30.9.2013. Though the clerk concerned has not made any endorsement as to when actually the charge sheet was received, but there is endorsement of the Chief Judicial Magistrate which shows that he has mentioned "seen" on 3.10.2013 and signed at the top of the first page of the charge sheet. Order sheet of the court of the Magistrate also corroborates that on 3.10.2013 the clerk concerned reported to Chief Judicial Magistrate that the charge sheet had already been received.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMILAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.325 OF 2015


      Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind Singh            ... Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of Bihar                                     ...Respondent








                               J U D G M E N T




      Prafulla C. Pant, J.




            This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated
      24.12.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal
      Miscellaneous No. 48019 of 2013 whereby said Court has  dismissed  the
      petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,  1973  (for
      short "the Code") and declined  to  interfere  with  the  order  dated
      22.10.2013, passed by Sessions Judge, In-charge, Kaimur at  Bhabua  in
      Bail Petition No. 542 of 2013, and upheld the refusal to  release  the
      appellant on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code.


   2. Brief facts of the case are that appellant Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind
      Singh surrendered before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kaimur on 5.7.2013
      in connection with Crime No. 89 of 2013, registered at Police Station,
      Chainpur, relating to offences punishable under Section 302 read  with
      Section 34 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and under Section
      27 of Arms Act.  He was remanded to judicial custody  till  19.7.2013.
      His remand was extended under Section 167 of the  Code  from  time  to
      time, and the last  remand  under  said  provision  was  granted  till
      3.10.2013. On 3.10.2013, the  appellant  moved  an  application  under
      Section 167(2) of the Code for his release  on  the  ground  that  the
      charge sheet has not been filed.  On the same day, i.e., 3.10.2013, it
      was endorsed in the order sheet by the Chief Judicial Magistrate  that
      as per report of the clerk of the Court, charge sheet has already been
      received, as such, the bail application moved under Section 167(2)  of
      the Code was rejected by the Magistrate on the very  day  and  further
      remand order was passed under Section 209 of  the  Code.   Endorsement
      "seen" was also made by the Magistrate on  3.10.2013  on  the  charge-
      sheet.


   3. On 22.10.2013, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions  Judge.
      The applicant moved bail  application  No.  542  of  2013  before  the
      Sessions Judge, Kaimur at Bhabua seeking bail on the  ground  that  he
      was entitled to be released on bail under Section 167(2) of the  Code.
      He further pleaded that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has erred in law
      in rejecting his bail application on said ground.   However,  the  In-
      charge Sessions Judge, who disposed of  the  above  bail  application,
      also opined that since the charge sheet had already been submitted, as
      such, the appellant was not entitled to bail on the ground that charge-
      sheet was not received within time.



   4. On this, appellant Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind Singh appears  to  have
      moved a petition under Section 482 of the Code before the  High  Court
      of Judicature at Patna, praying that  order  passed  by  the  Sessions
      Judge, as above, and the one passed by the Magistrate be quashed.  But
      the High Court also took the view that  since  the  charge  sheet  had
      already been filed within the period of ninety days, as such,  it  did
      not find any error in the orders passed by the courts below.



   5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the original
      record of the case.



   6. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code reads as under: -
           "167(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused  person  is  forwarded
           under this section may, whether he has or  not  jurisdiction  to
           try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of  the
           accused in such custody as such Magistrate  thinks  fit,  for  a
           term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he  has  no
           jurisdiction to try  the  case  or  commit  it  for  trial,  and
           considers  further  detention  unnecessary,  he  may  order  the
           accused  to  be  forwarded   to   a   Magistrate   having   such
           jurisdiction:

                 Provided that-

           (a)   The Magistrate may authorize the detention of the  accused
                 person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond
                 the period  of  fifteen  days,  if  he  is  satisfied  that
                 adequate grounds exist for  doing  so,  but  no  Magistrate
                 shall authorise the detention  of  the  accused  person  in
                 custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding-


                 (i)   Ninety days, where the investigation  relates  to  an
                       offence punishable with death, imprisonment for  life
                       or imprisonment for a  term  of  not  less  than  ten
                       years;

                 (ii)  Sixty days, where the investigation  relates  to  any
                       other offence, and, on the expiry of the said  period
                       of ninety days, or sixty days, as the  case  may  be,
                       the accused person shall be released on bail if he is
                       prepared to and does furnish bail, and  every  person
                       released on bail  under  this  sub-section  shall  be
                       deemed to be so  released  under  the  provisions  of
                       Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;

           (b)   No Magistrate shall authorize detention of the accused  in
                 custody by the police under this section unless the accused
                 is produced before him in person for  the  first  time  and
                 subsequently every time till the  accused  remains  in  the
                 custody of  the  police,  but  the  Magistrate  may  extend
                 further detention in judicial custody on production of  the
                 accused  either  in  person  or  through  the   medium   of
                 electronic video linkage;

           (c)   No Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered
                 in this behalf by the high Court, shall authorize detention
                 in the custody of the police.

                 Explanation I. - For the avoidance of doubts, it is  hereby
           declared  that,  notwithstanding  the  expiry  of   the   period
           specified in paragraph (a), the accused  shall  be  detained  in
           Custody so long as he does not furnish bail.


                 Explanation II. - If any question arises whether an accused
           person was produced before  the  Magistrate  as  required  under
           clause (b), the production of the accused person may  be  proved
           by his signature on the order authorizing detention  or  by  the
           order certified by  the  Magistrate  as  to  production  of  the
           accused person through the medium of electronic  video  linkage,
           as the case may be.


                 Provided further that in case of  a  woman  under  eighteen
           years of age, the detention shall be authorized to be in custody
           of a remand home or recognized social institution."


      Above Proviso (a) to sub-section  (2)  of  Section  167  of  the  Code
      provides that the Magistrate  shall  not  authorize  detention  of  an
      accused in custody in which  the  investigation  relating  to  offence
      punishable with death, imprisonment for life  or  imprisonment  for  a
      term not less than ten years and if the  investigation  not  completed
      within ninety days, the accused shall be entitled to  be  released  on
      bail.


   7.  Admittedly,  the  appellant  surrendered  before  the  Magistrate  on
      5.7.2013.  It is also not disputed that  on  3.10.2013  the  appellant
      moved an application for his release on bail under proviso (a) to sub-
      section (2) of Section 167 of the Code.  However, the order  sheet  of
      the case  shows  that  there  is  endorsement  of  the  Magistrate  on
      3.10.2013 that the charge sheet has already been received.


   8. The charge sheet against the appellant, in the original record,  shows
      that the Investigating Officer signed it and  submitted  the  same  on
      30.9.2013.  Though the clerk concerned has not made any endorsement as
      to  when  actually  the  charge  sheet  was  received,  but  there  is
      endorsement of the Chief Judicial Magistrate which shows that  he  has
      mentioned "seen" on 3.10.2013 and signed at the top of the first  page
      of the charge sheet.  Order sheet of the court of the Magistrate  also
      corroborates that on 3.10.2013 the clerk concerned reported  to  Chief
      Judicial Magistrate that the charge sheet had already been received.



   9. It is argued on behalf of the learned senior counsel for the appellant
      that the appellant should have been given benefit of Section 167(2) of
      the Code. According to him, it was 91st day of detention on 3.10.2013.
       It is further contended by Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior  counsel,
      that even Sunday or  holiday  on  ninetieth  day  cannot  deprive  the
      benefit of proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the  Code.
      In support of his arguments he  relied  upon  cases  of  Powell  Nwawa
      Ogechi v. The State (Delhi Administration)[1] and State of Maharashtra
      v. Sharan B. Sarda[2].  In Sharan B. Sarda  (supra)  single  Judge  of
      Bombay High Court, and in Powel  Nwawa  Ogechi  (supra)  the  Division
      Bench of Delhi High Court took the view that  even  if  last  day  for
      filing charge sheet is holiday, the  accused  cannot  be  deprived  of
      benefit of Section 167(2) of the Code.


  10. Contrary to  this,  in  N.  Nureya  Reddy  and  another  v.  State  of
      Orissa[3], the Division Bench of Orissa High Court,  interpreting  the
      provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 10  of  the
      General Clauses Act, held that if ninetieth day is a  holiday,  filing
      of  charge  sheet  on  the  next  day  should  be  treated  sufficient
      compliance of filing of charge sheet within a period  of  ninety  days
      and it cannot be said that provision contained in  Section  167(2)  of
      the Code is infringed.



  11. In Chaganti Satyanarayana and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh[4], it
      has been held by this Court that period of ninety days  under  Section
      167(2) of the Code shall be computed from the date of  remand  of  the
      accused and not from the date of his arrest under Section  57  of  the
      Code.  However, in the present case, we have to see the relevant  date
      as the date when the accused surrendered and remanded by the court.


  12. In State of M.P. v. Rustam and others[5], this Court has laid down the
      law that while computing period of ninety days, the day on  which  the
      accused was remanded to the judicial custody should be  excluded,  and
      the day on which challan is filed in the court,  should  be  included.
      That being so, in our opinion, in the present case, date  5.7.2013  is
      to be excluded and, as such, the charge sheet was filed  on  ninetieth
      day, i.e., 3.10.2013.  Therefore, there is no infringement of  Section
      167(2) of the Code.


  13. For the reasons, as discussed above, in our opinion,  the  High  Court
      has not erred in law in dismissing the petition under Section  482  of
      the Code, and upholding the refusal of bail to appellant prayed by him
      under Section 167(2) of the Code.



  14. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.  Lower court record be sent back
      forthwith.


                                      ....................................J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]






                                     .....................................J.
                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]


      New Delhi;
      February 20, 2015.



                                                     -----------------------
[1] 1986 (3) Crimes 577
[2] 1983 (2) Crimes 254 (Short Note)
[3] 1985 CRLJ 939 (Orissa)
[4] (1986) 3 SCC 141

[5] 1995 Supp (3) SCC 221

The insurer company has contended that claimant was getting Rs.23,000/- per month at the time of accident. It appears that he was getting non-practitioner allowance also in addition to the salary. It would be appropriate to take his salary at Rs.25,000/- per month. Considering the fact that 60% permanent disability has been incurred and considering over all injuries caused, there is a loss of working capacity to the said extent. Monthly loss of earning capacity comes to Rs.15,000/-. Multiplier of 16 is applicable at the age of 36 years. Expenditure must have been incurred in 8 days when claimant was treated in Shanti Hospital when surgery of right leg was performed and two plates were inserted which we quantify at Rs.20,000/-. There was loss of earning during course of treatment which has been determined by the Claims Tribunal and medical expenditure in SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack comes to Rs.66,566/-. Compensation for pain and suffering, expenditure on attendant and on special diet has also to be awarded. The compensation after deducting medical reimbursement already received, is awarded in the following manner : Description Amount (Rs.) For loss of earning capacity due to permanent disability (Rs.15,000 x 12 x 16) 28,80,000/- Loss of salary during treatment in the year 2001-2002 2,14,848/- Expenditure incurred in SCB Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack 66,566/- Expenditure incurred in Shanti Hospital 20,000/- Physical pain and sufferings 2,00,000/- Expenditure incurred on attendant for 9 months during treatment 90,000/- Special diet 28,500/- .................... Grand Total: 34,99,914/- rounded off 35,00,000/- ......................

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2078 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.20977 OF 2014)

New India Assurance Co. Ltd.            ... APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

Dr. Sukanta Kumar Behera & Ors.         ...RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T

Arun Mishra, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appeal has been preferred by the insurer against the  order  dated
9.5.2014, passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in  M.A.C.A.  No.576
of 2008 awarding compensation  of  Rs.55,00,000/-  to  the  respondent,  Dr.
Sukanta Kumar Behera for the injuries sustained  and   permanent  disability
incurred by him in the accident dated  9.9.2001.  The  Claims  Tribunal  had
awarded compensation of Rs.4,01,414/-.

3.    The appellant was working as Senior Medical Officer  in  Bhilai  Steel
Plant.  He met with an accident and ultimately due to  permanent  disability
incurred by him, his services were terminated on 29.8.2007. He incurred  60%
permanent disability owing to various injuries sustained  in  the  accident.
The question to be considered is whether the  High  Court  is  justified  in
awarding  compensation  of  Rs.55,00,000/-  without   any   discussion   and
computation. The approach of the High Court cannot be said to  be  justified
in  such  cases  of  injury.  It  is  necessary  to  make   computation   of
compensation to be awarded on account of pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads.

4.    The claimant suffered fracture  in  the  right  forearm,  right  femur
neck, fracture  of  right  radius  midshaft  and  fracture  of  right  ulnar
midshaft in the right hand and grievous fracture of tebia in the  left  leg.
His cervical spinal cord  was  also  injured.   He  also  suffered  grievous
abdomen injury for which he had to be operated.  Besides, he  also  suffered
injury in the chest.

5.    He was admitted in various hospitals as indoor patient.  Firstly  from
9.9.2001 to 24.9.2001, he was treated  in SCB Medical College and  Hospital,
Cuttack where his left leg was operated, operation of abdomen,  traction  of
right leg was done and a slab was put  in  right  hand.   Secondly,  he  was
treated in Shanti Hospital, Cuttack, from 24.9.2001 to  30.9.2001  where  he
was operated upon for implanting two steel plates in  right  leg.   Thirdly,
he was  admitted  in  Kalinga  Hospital,  Bhubaneswar,  for  treatment  from
1.10.2001 to 15.10.2001 for abdominal surgery in which considerable part  of
his stomach and large intestine was removed to save his  life.   Thereafter,
he  was  admitted  in  C.M.C.  Hospital,  Vellore  as  indoor  patient  from
16.10.2001 to 25.5.2002 for 7-1/2 months and again in the month of  February
2004 he was admitted there for a period  of  8  days.   At  Vellore  in  CMC
Hospital, several surgeries were performed, besides bone  grafting  in  left
leg and removal of implanted right femur due to  infection  and  discharging
sinus.  The amount spent by him at Vellore CMC  Hospital  towards  treatment
and medical expenditure was reimbursed to the extent of Rs.10,72,013/-.

6.    As per  Dr.  R.K.  Pandey,  the  claimant  Dr.  Sukanta  Kumar  Behera
sustained injuries resulting into  60%  permanent  disability.   In  future,
treatment of left ankle, foot drop and right  hip  replacement  surgery  may
also be required.  It is also apparent that due to removal of large part  of
intestine the  claimant  will  have  to  remain  on  special  diet  and  his
digestion capacity has been declined to a  great  extent  due  to  abdominal
surgery for rest of his  life.   It  is  also  apparent  that  he  had  also
suffered grievous injuries resulting into 60% permanent  disability  besides
one inch shortening of right limb.

7.     The  insurer  company  has  contended  that  claimant   was   getting
Rs.23,000/- per month at the time  of  accident.  It  appears  that  he  was
getting non-practitioner allowance also  in  addition  to  the  salary.   It
would  be  appropriate  to  take  his  salary  at  Rs.25,000/-  per   month.
Considering the fact that 60% permanent disability  has  been  incurred  and
considering over all injuries caused, there is a loss of  working   capacity
to the said extent. Monthly loss of earning capacity comes  to  Rs.15,000/-.
Multiplier of 16 is applicable at the age of  36  years.   Expenditure  must
have been incurred in 8 days when claimant was treated  in  Shanti  Hospital
when surgery of right leg was performed and two plates were  inserted  which
we quantify at Rs.20,000/-.  There was loss  of  earning  during  course  of
treatment which has been determined  by  the  Claims  Tribunal  and  medical
expenditure  in  SCB  Medical  College  and  Hospital,  Cuttack   comes   to
Rs.66,566/-.  Compensation for pain and suffering, expenditure on  attendant
and on special  diet  has  also  to  be  awarded.   The  compensation  after
deducting  medical  reimbursement  already  received,  is  awarded  in   the
following manner :

Description                             Amount (Rs.)

For loss of earning capacity due
to permanent disability
(Rs.15,000 x 12 x 16)                        28,80,000/-

Loss of salary during treatment
in the year 2001-2002                    2,14,848/-

Expenditure incurred in SCB
Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack              66,566/-

Expenditure incurred in Shanti
Hospital                                         20,000/-

Physical pain and sufferings             2,00,000/-

Expenditure incurred on attendant
for 9 months during treatment                    90,000/-

Special diet                                           28,500/-
                                                   ....................
Grand Total:                                 34,99,914/-
rounded off
  35,00,000/-
                                                   ......................

            Accordingly,  the  appeal  is  allowed  in  part.   Compensation
amount of Rs.35,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Five lacs only) is  awarded  to  the
claimant along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum  with  effect  from
the date of filing of claim petition.  The said  amount  be  paid  within  a
period of two months from today.  No costs.



                                 .........................................J.
                                                        (RANJAN GOGOI)


                                  ........................................J.
                                                       (ARUN MISHRA)
New Delhi,
February 20, 2015.