The onus of proof is not on the claimant (employee), the corollary is that onus of proof that the condition for non-entitlement is with the employer. A claimant has a right to derive benefit of any reasonable doubt and is entitled for pensionary benefit more liberally (Rule 9).=There is admittedly neither any note in the service records of the respondents at the time of their entry into service nor have any reasons been recorded by the Medical Board to suggest that the disease which the member concerned was found to be suffering from could not have been detected at the time of his entry into service. The initial presumption that the respondents were all physically fit and free from any disease and in sound physical and mental condition at the time of their entry into service thus remains unrebutted. Since the disability has in each case been assessed at more than 20%, their claim to disability pension could not have been repudiated by the appellants.

                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2904 OF 2011

Union of India & Anr.                        ...Appellants

Versus

Rajbir Singh                                       ...Respondent

                                    With

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2905 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3409 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5144 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.2279 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1498 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5090 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5414 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5163 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5840 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7368 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7479 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7629 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5469 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10747 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.11398 OF 2011
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.183 OF 2012
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.167 OF 2012
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10105 OF 2011
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5819 OF 2012
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5260 OF 2012
                        CIVILL APPEAL D.16394 OF 2013


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1856 OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.15768 of 2011)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1854 OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.14478 of 2011)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1855 OF 2015
                   Arising out of SLP (C) No.26401 of 2010

                        CIVILL APPEAL NO.1858 OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 32190 of 2010)

                        CIVILL APPEAL NO.1859 OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.27220 of 2012)



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals arise out of separate but similar orders passed  by  the
Armed Forces Tribunal holding the respondents entitled to  claim  disability
pension under the relevant Pension Regulations of the  Army.   The  Tribunal
has taken the view that the disability of each one of  the  respondents  was
attributable to or aggravated by military service and the same  having  been
assessed  at  more  than  20%  entitled  them  to  disability  pension.  The
appellant-Union of  India  has  assailed  that  finding  and  direction  for
payment  of  pension  primarily  on  the  ground  that  the  Medical  Boards
concerned having clearly opined that the disability had not  arisen  out  of
or aggravated by military service, the Tribunal was not justified in  taking
a contrary view.

3.    Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Union of  India  and  Ors.
v.  Keshar Singh (2007) 12 SCC 675; Om Prakash Singh   v.   Union  of  India
and Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 667;  Secretary, Ministry  of  Defence  and  Ors.  v.
A.V. Damodaran (Dead) through LRs. and Ors.  (2009) 9 SCC 140; and Union  of
India and Ors. v. Ram Prakash  (2010) 11 SCC 220, it was  contended  by  Mr.
Balasubramanian, learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  in  these
appeals, that the opinion of the Release Medical Board and in some cases Re-
survey Medical Board and Appellate  Medical  Authority  must  be  respected,
especially  when  the  question  whether  the  disability  suffered  by  the
respondents was attributable to or aggravated  by  military  service  was  a
technical question falling entirely in  the  realm  of  medical  science  in
which the opinion expressed by medical experts could not be lightly  brushed
aside.  Inasmuch as the Tribunal had failed to show  any  deference  to  the
opinion of the experts who were better qualified to determine  the  question
of attributability of  a  disease/disability  to  a  military  service,  the
Tribunal had fallen in error argued the learned counsel.

4.    On behalf of the respondents it was,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted
that the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant were  of
no assistance in view of the later pronouncement of this Court in  Dharamvir
Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (2013) 7 SCC 316 where  a  two-Judge  Bench
of this Court had, after a comprehensive review of  the  case  law  and  the
relevant rules and regulations, distinguished the said decisions and  stated
the true legal position.     It was contended that the earlier decisions  in
the cases relied upon by the appellants were decided in the  peculiar  facts
of those cases and did not constitute a binding  precedent  especially  when
the said decisions had not dealt with several aspects to which the  decision
of this Court in Dharamvir Singh's case (supra) had adverted.  Applying  the
principles enunciated in  Dharamvir  Singh's  case  (supra)  these  appeals,
according to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,  deserve  to  be
dismissed and indeed ought to meet that fate.
5.    The material facts giving rise to the  controversy  in  these  appeals
are not in dispute.  It is not in dispute that the respondents in all  these
appeals were invalided out of  service  on  account  of  medical  disability
shown against each in the following chart:

|Case No.          |Name of the         |Nature of            |Percentage of|
|                  |Respondent          |Disease/Disability   |Disability   |
|                  |                    |                     |determined   |
|C.A. No. 2904/2011|Ex. Hav. Rajbir     |Generalized Seizors  |20% for 2    |
|                  |Singh               |                     |years.       |
|C.A. No. 5163/2011|Ex. Recruit Amit    |Manic Episode (F-30).|40%          |
|                  |Kumar               |                     |(Permanent)  |
|C.A. No. 5840/2011|Hony. Flt. Lt. P.S. |Primary Hypertension.|30%          |
|                  |Rohilla             |                     |             |
|C.A. No. 7368/2011|Ex. Power Satyaveer |Diabetes Mellitus    |40%          |
|                  |Singh               |(IDDM) ICD E 10.9.   |(Permanent). |
|C.A. No. 7479/2011|Ex. Gnr. Jagjeet    |1. Non-Insulin       |20% each and |
|                  |Singh               |Dependent Diabetes   |composite    |
|                  |                    |Melllitus (NIDDM).   |disability   |
|                  |                    |2. Fracture Lateral  |40%          |
|                  |                    |Condyl of Tibia with |(Permanent). |
|                  |                    |fracture neck of     |             |
|                  |                    |Fibula left.         |             |
|C.A. No. 7629/2011|Ex. Rect. Charanjit |Mal-descended Testis |60%          |
|                  |Ram                 |(R) with Inguinal    |(Permanent). |
|                  |                    |hernia.              |             |
|C.A. No. 5469/2011|Jugti Ram (through  |Schizophrenic        |80%          |
|                  |LR)                 |Reaction (300)       |             |
|C.A. D. No.       |HavaldarSurjit Singh|Neurotic Depression  |40% for 2    |
|16394/2013        |                    |V-67.                |years.       |
|C.A. No. 2905/2011|Ex. Naik Ram Phai   |Otosolerosis (Rt.)   |20%          |
|                  |                    |Ear OPTD             |             |
|C.A. No.          |Sadhu Singh         |Schizophrenia        |20% for 2    |
|10747/2011        |                    |                     |years.       |
|C.A. No.          |Rampal Singh        |Neurosis (300.       |20% for 2    |
|11398/2011        |                    |                     |years.       |
|C.A. No. 183/2012 |Raj Singh           |Neurosis             |30%.         |
|C.A. No. 167/2012 |Ranjit Singh        |Other Non-Organic    |20% for 2    |
|                  |                    |Psychosis (298, V-67)|years.       |
|C.A. No. 5819/2012|Ex. Sub. Ratan Singh|Primary Hypertension |30%          |
|                  |                    |                     |(Permanent)  |
|C.A. No. 5260/2012|Ex. Sep. Tarlochan  |Epilepsy (345)       |Less than 20%|
|                  |Singh               |                     |             |
|C.A. No.          |Harbans Singh       |1.Epilepsy (345)     |20% each and |
|10105/2011        |                    |2. High              |composite    |
|                  |                    |Hyper-metropia Rt.   |disability   |
|                  |                    |Eye with partial     |40% for 2    |
|                  |                    |Amblyopia.           |years.       |
|C.A.NO.....OF 2015|Balwan Singh        |Personality Disorder |60%          |
|(@ SLP(C)No.      |                    |                     |             |
|27220/2012)       |                    |                     |             |
|C.A.NO.....OF 2015|Sharanjit Singh     |Generalized Tonic    |Less than 20%|
|(@ SLP (C) No.    |                    |Clonic Seizure, 345  |             |
|32190/2010)       |                    |V-64.                |             |
|C.A. No. 5090/2011|Abdulla Othyanagath |Schizophrenia        |30%          |
|C.A.NO........OF  |Sqn. Ldr. Manoj Rana|1. Non-Organic       |40%          |
|2015 (@ SLP (C)   |                    |Psychosis            |             |
|No. 26401/2010)   |                    |2. Stato-Hypatitis   |             |
|C.A. No. 2279/2011|Labh Singh          |Schizophrenia        |30% for 2    |
|                  |                    |                     |years.       |
|C.A. No. 5144/2011|Makhan Singh        |Neurosis (300-Deep)  |20%          |
|C.A. No.          |Ajit Singh          |Idiopathic Epilepsy  |20%          |
|14478/2011        |                    |(Grandmal)           |             |
|C.A.NO.......OF   |ManoharLal          |Renal Calculus       |20%          |
|2015 (@ SLP (C)   |                    |(Right)              |             |
|No. 15768/2011)   |                    |                     |             |
|C.A. No. 3409/2011|Major Man Mohan     |IHD (Angina Pectoris)|Less than 20%|
|                  |Krishan             |                     |             |
|C.A. No.          |Ex. Sgt. Suresh     |1.Generalized Seizors|70%          |
|1498/2011*        |Kumar Sharma        |                     |(permanent)  |
|                  |                    |2. Inter-vertebral   |             |
|                  |                    |Disc Prolapse        |             |
|                  |                    |3.PIVD C-7-D,        |             |
|                  |                    |(Multi-Disc Prolapse)|             |
|C.A. No. 5414/2011|Rakesh Kumar Singla |Bipolar Mood Disorder|20% for 5    |
|                  |                    |                     |years.       |


6.    It is also not in dispute that the extent of disability  in  each  one
of the cases was assessed to be above 20%  which  is  the  bare  minimum  in
terms of Regulation 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961.   The
only question that arises in the above backdrop is  whether  the  disability
which  each  one  of  the  respondents  suffered  was  attributable  to   or
aggravated by military service. The Medical Board  has  rejected  the  claim
for disability pension only on  the  ground  that  the  disability  was  not
attributable to or aggravated by  military  service.  Whether  or  not  that
opinion is in itself sufficient to deny to the  respondents  the  disability
pension claimed by them is the only question falling for our  determination.
Several decisions of this Court have in the past examined similar  questions
in  almost  similar  fact  situations.   But  before  we  refer   to   those
pronouncements we may briefly refer to the Pension Regulations  that  govern
the field.

7.    The claims of the respondents for payment of pension, it is  a  common
ground,  are  regulated  by  Pension  Regulations  for   the   Army,   1961.
Regulation 173 of the said Regulations  provides  for  grant  of  disability
pension to persons who  are  invalided  out  of  service  on  account  of  a
disability which is attributable to or aggravated  by  military  service  in
non-battle casualty and is assessed at 20% or above.  The regulation reads:

"173. Primary conditions for the  grant  of  disability  pension:     Unless
otherwise specifically provided a disability pension may be  granted  to  an
individual who is invalided from service on account of  a  disability  which
is attributable to or aggravated by military service and is assessed  at  20
percent or over. The question whether a disability  is  attributable  to  or
aggravated by military  service  shall  be  determined  under  the  rule  in
Appendix II."


8.    The above makes  it  manifest  that  only  two  conditions  have  been
specified for the grant of disability pension viz.  (i)  the  disability  is
above 20%; and (ii) the disability  is  attributable  to  or  aggravated  by
military service. Whether or  not  the  disability  is  attributable  to  or
aggravated  by  military  service,  is  in  turn,  to  be  determined  under
Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982  forming  Appendix-II
to the Pension Regulations. Significantly, Rule 5 of the  Entitlement  Rules
for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 also  lays  down  the  approach  to  be
adopted while determining the entitlement to disability  pension  under  the
said Rules.  Rule 5 reads as under:
"5. The approach to the  question  of  entitlement  to  casualty  pensionary
awards and evaluation of  disabilities  shall  be  based  on  the  following
presumptions:

Prior to and during service
A member is presumed to have been in sound  physical  and  mental  condition
upon entering service except as to physical disabilities noted  or  recorded
at the time of entrance.
In the event of his subsequently being discharged from  service  on  medical
grounds any deterioration in his health, which has taken place,  is  due  to
service."

9.    Equally important is Rule 9 of the  Entitlement  Rules  (supra)  which
places the onus of proof upon the establishment.  Rule 9 reads:
      "9. Onus of proof. - The claimant shall not be called  upon  to  prove
the conditions of entitlements.  He/She will  receive  the  benefit  of  any
reasonable  doubt.  This  benefit  will  be  given  more  liberally  to  the
claimants in field/afloat service cases."

10.   As regards diseases Rule 14 of the Entitlement Rules  stipulates  that
in the case of a disease which has  led  to  an  individual's  discharge  or
death, the disease shall be deemed to have arisen in service, if no note  of
it was made at the time of individual's  acceptance  for  military  service,
subject to the condition that if medical opinion holds  for  reasons  to  be
stated  that  the  "disease  could  not  have  been  detected   on   medical
examination prior to acceptance for service, the same will not be deemed  to
have so arisen". Rule 14 may also be extracted for facility of reference.
"14. Diseases.- In respect of diseases, the following rule will be  observed
-
Cases in which it is established that conditions  of  military  service  did
not determine or contribute to the onset of the disease but  influenced  the
subsequent courses of the disease will fall for acceptance on the  basis  of
aggravation.

A disease  which  has  led  to  an  individual's  discharge  or  death  will
ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service, if no note of  it  was  made
at the time of the individual's acceptance for military  service.   However,
if medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated, that the  disease  could
not have been detected  on  medical  examination  prior  to  acceptance  for
service, the disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service.

If a disease is accepted as having  arisen  in  service,  it  must  also  be
established  that  the  conditions  of  military   service   determined   or
contributed to the onset of the disease and that the conditions were due  to
the circumstances of duty in military service."
   (emphasis supplied)


11.   From a conjoint and harmonious  reading  of  Rules  5,  9  and  14  of
Entitlement Rules (supra) the following guiding principles emerge:
a member is presumed to have been in sound  physical  and  mental  condition
upon entering service except as to physical disabilities noted  or  recorded
at the time of entrance;
in the event of his being discharged from service on medical grounds at  any
subsequent stage  it must be presumed that any  such  deterioration  in  his
health which has taken place is due to such military service;
the disease which has  led  to  an  individual's  discharge  or  death  will
ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service, if no note of  it  was  made
at the time of the individual's acceptance for military service; and
if medical opinion holds that the disease, because of which  the  individual
was discharged, could not have been detected on  medical  examination  prior
to acceptance of service, reasons for the same shall be stated.

12.   Reference may also be made at this stage to the guidelines set out  in
Chapter-II of the Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pensions), 2002  which
set out the "Entitlement:  General  Principles",  and  the  approach  to  be
adopted in such cases. Paras 7, 8 and 9 of  the  said  guidelines  reads  as
under:

"7. Evidentiary value is attached to the record of a member's  condition  at
the commencement of service, and such record has, therefore, to be  accepted
unless any different conclusion has been reached due to  the  inaccuracy  of
the record in a particular case or otherwise. Accordingly,  if  the  disease
leading to member's invalidation out of service or death while  in  service,
was not noted in a medical  report  at  the  commencement  of  service,  the
inference would be that the disease arose  during  the  period  of  member's
military service. It  may  be  that  the  inaccuracy  or  incompleteness  of
service record on entry in service  was  due  to  a  non-disclosure  of  the
essential facts by the member e.g. pre-enrolment history  of  an  injury  or
disease like epilepsy, mental disorder, etc. It may also be  that  owing  to
latency or obscurity of the symptoms,  a  disability  escaped  detection  on
enrolment. Such lack of recognition may affect  the  medical  categorisation
of the member on enrolment and/or cause him to  perform  duties  harmful  to
his condition. Again, there may  occasionally  be  direct  evidence  of  the
contraction of a disability, otherwise than by service. In all  such  cases,
though the disease cannot be considered to have been caused by service,  the
question  of  aggravation  by  subsequent  service  conditions   will   need
examination.
[pic]
The following are some of the diseases which ordinarily escape detection  on
enrolment:
(a) Certain congenital abnormalities which are latent and only  discoverable
on full investigations  e.g.  Congenital  Defect  of  Spine,  Spina  bifida,
Sacralisation,

(b) Certain familial and hereditary diseases  e.g.  Haemophilia,  Congential
Syphilis, Haemoglobinopathy.

(c)  Certain  diseases  of  the  heart  and  blood  vessels  e.g.   Coronary
Atherosclerosis, Rheumatic Fever.

(d)  Diseases  which  may  be  undetectable  by  physical   examination   on
enrolment, unless adequate history is given at the time by the  member  e.g.
Gastric and Duodenal Ulcers, Epilepsy, Mental Disorders, HIV Infections.

(e) Relapsing forms of mental disorders which have intervals of normality.

(f) Diseases which have periodic attacks e.g.  Bronchial  Asthma,  Epilepsy,
Csom, etc.

8. The question whether the invalidation or death of a member  has  resulted
from service conditions, has to be judged in the light of the record of  the
member's condition on enrolment as noted in service  documents  and  of  all
other available evidence both direct and indirect.

In addition to any documentary evidence relative to the  member's  condition
to entering the service and during service, the  member  must  be  carefully
and closely questioned on the circumstances which led to the advent  of  his
disease, the duration, the family history, his pre-service history, etc.  so
that all evidence in support or against the claim is elucidated.  Presidents
of Medical Boards should make this their personal responsibility and  ensure
that opinions on attributability, aggravation or otherwise are supported  by
cogent reasons; the approving authority should also be satisfied  that  this
question has been dealt with in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt.

9. On the question whether any persisting deterioration has occurred, it  is
to be remembered that invalidation from service does not  necessarily  imply
that the member's health has deteriorated  during  service.  The  disability
may have been discovered soon after joining and  the  member  discharged  in
his own interest in order to prevent deterioration.  In  such  cases,  there
may even have  been  a  temporary  worsening  during  service,  but  if  the
treatment given before discharge was on grounds of expediency to  prevent  a
recurrence, no lasting damage was inflicted by service and  there  would  be
no ground for admitting entitlement. Again a member may have been  invalided
from service because he is found so weak mentally that it is  impossible  to
make him an efficient soldier. This would not mean that  his  condition  has
worsened during service, but only that it is  worse  than  was  realised  on
enrolment in the army. To sum up, in each  case  the  question  whether  any
persisting deterioration on the  available  [pic]evidence  which  will  vary
according to the type of the disability, the consensus  of  medical  opinion
relating to the particular condition and the clinical history."


13.   In Dharamvir  Singh's  case  (supra)  this  Court  took  note  of  the
provisions of the Pensions Regulations, Entitlement Rules  and  the  General
Rules of Guidance to Medical Officers to sum up the legal position  emerging
from the same in the following words:
"29.1. Disability pension to be granted to an individual  who  is  invalided
from service on  account  of  a  disability  which  is  attributable  to  or
aggravated by military service in non-battle casualty  and  is  assessed  at
20% or over. The  question  whether  a  disability  is  attributable  to  or
aggravated by military service to be determined under the Entitlement  Rules
for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 of Appendix II (Regulation 173).

29.2. A member is to be presumed in  sound  physical  and  mental  condition
upon entering service if  there  is  no  note  or  record  at  the  time  of
entrance. In the event of his subsequently being discharged from service  on
medical grounds any deterioration in his health is to  be  presumed  due  to
service [Rule 5 read with Rule 14(b)].

29.3. The onus of proof is not on the claimant (employee), the corollary  is
that onus of proof that  the  condition  for  non-entitlement  is  with  the
employer. A claimant has a right to derive benefit of any  reasonable  doubt
and is entitled for pensionary benefit more liberally (Rule 9).

29.4. If a disease is accepted to have been as having arisen in service,  it
must also be established that the conditions of military service  determined
or contributed to the onset of the disease and that the conditions were  due
to the circumstances of duty in military service [Rule 14(c)].
[pic]
29.5. If no note of any disability or  disease  was  made  at  the  time  of
individual's acceptance for military service, a disease which has led to  an
individual's discharge or death will be deemed to  have  arisen  in  service
[Rule 14(b)].

29.6. If medical  opinion  holds  that  the  disease  could  not  have  been
detected on medical examination prior to  the  acceptance  for  service  and
that disease will not be deemed to have arisen during service,  the  Medical
Board is required to state the reasons [Rule 14(b)]; and

29.7. It is mandatory for the Medical Board to follow  the  guidelines  laid
down in Chapter II of the Guide to  Medical  Officers  (Military  Pensions),
2002 - "Entitlement: General Principles", including Paras  7,  8  and  9  as
referred to above (para 27)."


14.   Applying the above principles this Court  in  Dharamvir  Singh's  case
(supra) found that no note of any disease had been recorded at the  time  of
his acceptance into military service. This Court also  held  that  Union  of
India had failed to bring on record any document to suggest  that  Dharamvir
was under treatment for the disease at the time of his recruitment  or  that
the disease was hereditary in nature. This Court, on  that  basis,  declared
Dharamvir to be entitled to claim disability pension in the absence  of  any
note in his service record at the  time  of  his  acceptance  into  military
service. This Court observed:
"33.  In  spite  of  the  aforesaid  provisions,  the  Pension   Sanctioning
Authority failed to notice that the Medical Board had not given  any  reason
in support of its opinion, particularly  when  there  is  no  note  of  such
disease or disability available in the service record of  the  appellant  at
the time of acceptance for  military  service.  Without  going  through  the
aforesaid facts the Pension Sanctioning Authority  mechanically  passed  the
impugned order of rejection based on the report of  the  Medical  Board.  As
per Rules 5 and 9 of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty  Pensionary  Awards,
1982, the appellant is entitled for presumption and benefit  of  presumption
in his favour. In the absence of any evidence on record  to  show  that  the
appellant was suffering from "generalised seizure (epilepsy)"  at  the  time
of acceptance of his service, it will be presumed that the appellant was  in
sound physical and mental condition at the time of entering the service  and
deterioration in his health has taken place due to service."


15.   The legal position as stated in Dharamvir Singh's case (supra) is,  in
our opinion, in tune with the Pension  Regulations,  the  Entitlement  Rules
and the Guidelines issued to  the  Medical  Officers.  The  essence  of  the
rules, as seen earlier, is that a member of the armed forces is presumed  to
be in sound physical and mental condition at the  time  of  his  entry  into
service if there is no note or record to the contrary made at  the  time  of
such entry. More importantly, in the event of his subsequent discharge  from
service on medical ground, any deterioration in his health  is  presumed  to
be due to military service.  This  necessarily  implies  that  no  sooner  a
member of the force is discharged  on  medical  ground  his  entitlement  to
claim disability pension will arise unless of course the employer  is  in  a
position to rebut the presumption that the disability which he suffered  was
neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. From Rule  14(b)
of the Entitlement Rules it is further clear that  if  the  medical  opinion
were to hold that the disease suffered by the member  of  the  armed  forces
could not have been detected prior to acceptance for  service,  the  Medical
Board must state the reasons for saying so.  Last but not the least  is  the
fact that the provision for payment of disability pension  is  a  beneficial
provision which ought to be interpreted liberally so  as  to  benefit  those
who have been sent  home  with  a  disability  at  times  even  before  they
completed their tenure in the armed forces.   There  may  indeed  be  cases,
where the disease was wholly unrelated to military service,  but,  in  order
that denial of disability pension can be justified on that ground,  it  must
be affirmatively proved that  the  disease  had  nothing  to  do  with  such
service.  The burden to establish such a disconnect would lie  heavily  upon
the  employer  for  otherwise  the  rules  raise  a  presumption  that   the
deterioration in the health of the member of the service is  on  account  of
military service or aggravated by it.  A soldier cannot be  asked  to  prove
that the disease was contracted by him on account  of  military  service  or
was aggravated by the same. The very fact that he was upon  proper  physical
and other tests found fit to serve in the army should  rise  as  indeed  the
rules do provide for a presumption that he was disease-free at the  time  of
his entry into service. That presumption continues till it is proved by  the
employer that the disease was neither  attributable  to  nor  aggravated  by
military service. For the employer to say so, the least that is required  is
a statement of reasons supporting that  view.  That  we  feel  is  the  true
essence of the rules which ought to be kept  in  view  all  the  time  while
dealing with cases of disability pension.

16.   Applying the above parameters to the cases at  hand,  we  are  of  the
view that each one of the respondents having been  discharged  from  service
on account of medical disease/disability, the disability  must  be  presumed
to have been arisen in the course of service which must, in the  absence  of
any reason  recorded  by  the  Medical  Board,  be  presumed  to  have  been
attributable to or aggravated  by  military  service.  There  is  admittedly
neither any note in the service records of the respondents at  the  time  of
their entry into service nor have any reasons been recorded by  the  Medical
Board to suggest that the disease which the member concerned  was  found  to
be suffering from could not have been detected at  the  time  of  his  entry
into  service.  The  initial  presumption  that  the  respondents  were  all
physically fit and free from any disease and in sound  physical  and  mental
condition at the time of their entry into service thus  remains  unrebutted.
Since the disability has in each case been assessed at more than 20%,  their
claim  to  disability  pension  could  not  have  been  repudiated  by   the
appellants.

17.   In the result these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed without  any
order as to costs.


                          ................................................J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)






                          ................................................J.
New Delhi                                             (R. BANUMATHI)
February 13, 2015

In appeal, the High Court has also noticed the serious allegation of use of sharp weapon such as sword by the accused persons who chased the injured and then caused incised injuries on their persons. Even then the High Court showed leniency by altering conviction under Section 308 IPC to one under Section 324 IPC. It also reduced sentence of three years to six months for Section 324 IPC and further reduced sentence of six months each under Section 323 IPC and three years each under Section 452 IPC to R.I. for a period of three months each under Sections 452 and 323 IPC. From the order of the trial court on the question of sentence it transpires that the only plea for showing leniency was a claim that the appellants have got aged mother. In the facts and circumstances, the view taken by the trial court for not extending the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be faulted and hence we find no good reason to interfere in the matter.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.288-289 OF 2015
             [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)Nos.6240-6241 of 2014]

Binoy & Anr.                                            .....Appellants

      Versus

State of Kerala                                   .....Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.


Leave granted.
On behalf of both the appellants, the initial submission is  to  the  effect
that their conviction for offences under Sections 324, 452 and 323,  IPC  is
not justified by the prosecution evidence available on  record.   But  on  a
perusal of the judgment of the trial court which  convicted  the  appellants
for offences under Sections 308, 452 and 323 read with  Section  34  of  the
IPC as well as the appellate judgment by the High Court  which  altered  the
conviction under Section 308 IPC to one  under  Section  324  IPC  and  also
reduced the sentences awarded by the trial court  to  rigorous  imprisonment
for six months under Section 324 IPC and R.I. for three  months  each  under
Sections 452 and 323 IPC, we find no  merit  in  the  aforesaid  contention.
Both the injured witnesses P.W.1 and 2 as well as P.W.8 have  supported  the
prosecution case which also gets support from the  injury  reports  of  both
the injured witnesses.  Hence, we find no good reason to interfere with  the
conviction of the appellants.

3.    The other issue raised on behalf of the appellants is  that  the  High
Court while allowing the appeal in part failed to give any reasons  for  not
extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the appellants.   The
trial court, while considering the question of sentence,  specifically  held
that considering the  nature  of  the  offences  committed  by  the  accused
persons the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be  invoked  in  their  favour
and there were  no  extenuating  circumstances  in  favour  of  the  accused
persons.  In appeal, the High Court has also noticed the serious  allegation
of use of sharp weapon such as sword by the accused persons who  chased  the
injured and then caused incised injuries on their persons.   Even  then  the
High Court showed leniency by altering conviction under Section 308  IPC  to
one under Section 324 IPC.  It also reduced sentence of three years  to  six
months for Section 324 IPC and further reduced sentence of six  months  each
under Section 323 IPC and three years each under Section  452  IPC  to  R.I.
for a period of three months each under Sections 452 and 323 IPC.  From  the
order of the trial court on the question of sentence it transpires that  the
only plea for showing leniency was a claim  that  the  appellants  have  got
aged mother.
In the facts and circumstances, the view taken by the trial  court  for  not
extending the Probation of Offenders Act cannot  be  faulted  and  hence  we
find no good reason to interfere in the matter.
Both the  appeals  which  arise  out  of  common  judgment  are,  therefore,
dismissed.



......................................J.
                            [M.Y. EQBAL ]



......................................J.
                                  [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi.
February 13, 2015.

the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 =True copies of notification dated 3rd June, 1976 and Part Development Plan of Nagpur City have been produced wherein respondent no.4-Gorakshan Sabha has been shown within the area of public institutions and offices. In absence of original coloured plan the true copy of the plan cannot be relied upon to hold any construction illegal in view of the fact that the N.M.C which sanctioned building plan supposed to have gone through the original plan. 15. In absence of the sanctioned plan, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in deciding the disputed question of fact as to whether the building was constructed in accordance with Town Planning Scheme. The High Court ought to have looked into the sanctioned plan to find out whether it was for office (Karyalaya) or for residential or for commercial purpose for coming to a definite conclusion. Further, there being a long delay of eight years in filing the writ petition and in absence of challenge to the plan sanctioned by N.M.C, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the so called Public Interest Litigation filed by persons who had personal dispute with respondent no.4.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5577 OF 2004


SAI KRIPA MANGAL KARYALAYA & ORS.            ... APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

NAGPUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.          ... RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.


      This appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the  judgment
and order dated 30th April, 2002 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in  Writ  Petition  No.1485  of  1984.  By  the
impugned judgment, the  High  Court  allowed  the  writ  petition  filed  by
respondent nos.5 and 6 and held as follows:
      (i) The building permits granted by Nagpur  Municipal  Corporation  to
      the land belonging to respondent No.4-Gorakshan Sabha, a Public  Trust
      are unauthorized and illegal and hence buildings put  up  pursuant  to
      such building permits are liable to be demolished
      (ii) The parties may make fresh applications seeking building  permits
      within one month from the date of judgment in accordance with  revised
      sanctioned development plan of 2000-2001 and  the  Planning  Authority
      shall dispose of such applications within four months.
      (iii) The Planning Authority shall demolish  the  said  structures  if
      they were found not in conformity with the revised sanctioned plan  of
      2000-2001.
2.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

2.1   One Shri  Dhondiba  Diwadkar  gifted  land  bearing  Survey  No.  471,
admeasuring 18.25 acres situated at Mouza Lendhra, Tahsil,  District  Nagpur
to respondent No. 4 - Gorakshan Sabha, a Public Trust. The said land was  on
the outskirts of Town of Nagpur and with the passage of time is  now  within
the Municipal limits of City of Nagpur.

2.2   In the year 1936, the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act (For short,  '1936'
Act) was enacted with a view to make  provisions  for  the  improvement  and
expansion of the then town of Nagpur. Under the  1936  Act  a  Trust  namely
Nagpur Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as 'N.I.T' for short)  was
constituted and N.I.T was empowered to  frame  various  improvement  schemes
specified u/s 27 of the 1936 Act for any  area  and  on  such  scheme  being
sanctioned by the State Government, the N.I.T. was to implement the  scheme,
if necessary by acquiring the land as contemplated under the 1936 Act.

2.3   With the gradual development of "Town of Nagpur"  into  the  "City  of
Nagpur",  the  city  of  Nagpur  Corporation  Act,  1948  (for  short,  'the
Corporation Act') was enacted  with  a  view  to  make  special  legislative
provisions to consolidate and  amend  the  law  relating  to  the  Municipal
affairs  of  the  City  of  Nagpur.  Section  2  of  the   Corporation   Act
specifically provides that the N.I.T constituted under the  1936  Act  shall
in the city of Nagpur continue to exercise the  powers  and  perform  duties
conferred and imposed under the 1936 Act. Section 3(5)  of  the  Corporation
Act provides that all the provisions of 1936 Act shall apply to the city  of
Nagpur. Section 5(10) of the Corporation Act defines "City of Nagpur"  means
the larger urban area specified in the notification issued under Clause  (2)
of Article 243(Q) of the Constitution of India. With the  enactment  of  the
Corporation Act, certain amendments to the 1936 Act were carried out.  As  a
result of amendment to section 1(2) of the Trust Act,  the  jurisdiction  of
N.I.T. was extended to the area comprised within the limits of the city  and
to such other area outside these limits as the State Government may  declare
from time to time by notification.  Section  2(m)  of  1936  Act  which  was
amended in 1952 provides that all references  to  anything  required  to  be
done under the 1936 Act shall include anything required  to  be  done  under
the Corporation Act which the N.I.T by virtue  of  1936  Act  has  power  to
enforce. Thus, both the Nagpur Municipal  Corporation  ('N.M.C'  for  short)
constituted under the Corporation Act and the N.I.T  constituted  under  the
1936 Act were entrusted with the responsibility of the  orderly  development
of the city of Nagpur.

2.4   In the  year  1966,  the  State  Government  enacted  the  Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 ('T.P.  Act'  for  short)  inter  alia,
with a view to make provisions for  planning  the  development  and  use  of
lands in the regions established for that purpose and for  the  constitution
of Regional Planning Boards thereof for the creation of  new  towns  by  the
Development Authorities. Section 2(15) of the T.P.  Act  defines  the  local
authority, to include inter alia, the  N.M.C.  under  the  Corporation  Act,
1948 and the  N.I.T.  constituted  under  the  1936  Act,  which,  on  being
permitted by the State were entitled to exercise the powers  of  a  Planning
Authority under the T.P. Act for any area under  its  jurisdiction.  Section
2(19) of the T.P. Act  defines  'Planning  Authority',  as  local  authority
which includes such other authorities as prescribed  under  the  Act.  Under
the T.P. Act, it is obligatory on the part  of  the  Planning  Authority  to
survey a region and prepare an existing land-use map  and  prepare  a  draft
development plan for the area within its jurisdiction in accordance  with  a
regional plan or in such other manner as may be prescribed.  Section  22  of
the T.P. Act provides that a development plan shall generally  indicate  the
manner in which the use of the land in the  area  of  a  Planning  Authority
shall be regulated, and also indicate the manner in  which  the  development
of a plan shall be carried out. It is further provided in Section 22 of  the
T.P.  Act  that  the  development  plan  in  particular  shall  provide  for
proposals for  allocating  the  use  of  land  for  the  purposes,  such  as
residential,  industrial,   commercial,   agricultural,   recreational   and
proposals for designation of land  for  public  purpose,  such  as  schools,
colleges and other  educational  institutions,  medical  and  public  health
institutions, markets, social welfare and  cultural  institutions,  theatres
and places  for  public  entertainment  or  public  assembly,  museums,  art
galleries, religious building and Government and other public  buildings  as
may from time to time be approved by the  State  Government.  The  T.P.  Act
provides for modification of the draft  plan  on  receiving  objections  and
suggestions from the general public. Section 31 of  the  T.P.  Act  provides
for sanction to the draft development plan by the State  Government  and  on
the final development plan coming into force it is binding on  the  Planning
Authority. Section 42 of the T.P. Act  provides  that  on  the  coming  into
operation of any plan or plans referred to  Chapter  III  of  T.P.  Act,  it
shall be the duty of every Planning Authority to take such steps as  may  be
necessary to carry out the provisions of such plan or plans. Section  43  of
the T.P. Act provides restriction on the development of  a  land  after  the
date on which the declaration of intention to  prepare  a  development  plan
for area is published in the Official Gazette.  Thus,  once  declaration  of
intention to prepare draft  development  for  any  area  or  a  notification
specifying any undeveloped area as a notified area, or any  area  designated
as a site for a new town is published in the  Official  Gazette,  no  person
shall change the use of the land or carry out any development  of  the  land
without the permission in  writing  of  the  Planning  Authority  except  as
permitted under proviso appended thereto.

2.5   By a  notification  dated  6th  October,  1967  the  State  Government
permitted N.I.T. to exercise  the  powers  of  a  Planning  Authority  under
section 2(15) of the T.P. Act for the entire area under its jurisdiction.

2.6   In accordance with  the  aforesaid  provisions,  the  N.I.T.  on  12th
December, 1972 published draft development plan of the city  of  Nagpur  and
the same was published in the Government Gazette  on  28th  December,  1972.
After considering the  objections  and  suggestions,  modifications  to  the
draft development plan were made on 20th October, 1973  and  the  same  were
published on 17th January, 1974. Subsequently the  draft  development  plans
as further modified by the N.I.T. were forwarded  to  the  State  Government
for sanction under section 30(1) of the T.P. Act on 23rd October, 1974.  The
State  Government  extended  the  period  for  sanctioning  such  plan   and
ultimately with minor modification the draft development plan  was  approved
by the State Government. Thus, the final development plan for  the  city  of
Nagpur, as sanctioned by the State Government, came into force on 3rd  June,
1976.

3.    It appears that final development  plan  came  into  effect  from  3rd
June, 1976. Both N.M.C and N.I.T were granting

development permission in  their  respective  areas  and  later,  Government
noticed  the  problems  created  due  to  the  existence  of  two  sets   of
regulations in the Municipal Corporation Area. For the said  reason,  Deputy
Secretary  to  the  Government,  Urban  Development  Department  Mantralaya,
Bombay,  vide  letter  dated  1st  January,  1993  intimated  the  Municipal
Commissioner, N.M.C, Nagpur about Government  decision  that  draft  byelaws
published by the N.M.C u/s 169 of the T.P. Act read  with  Section  115  and
other sections of the Corporation Act, 1948 will not  be  operated  and  the
N.M.C like N.I.T  will  follow  the  draft  Development  Control  Rules  and
Building Byelaws prepared by the N.I.T as submitted to  Government  on  12th
October, 1990 which are under scrutiny of Government until  further  orders.
The aforesaid letter being relevant reads as follows:-

      "Confidential          No.TPS 2490/1504/CR-101/UD-9

                             Urban Development Department

                             Mantralaya, Bombay-400 032.

                             Dated: 1st January, 1993.

      To,

            The Municipal Commissioner,
            Nagpur Municipal Corporation,
            Nagpur.

      Sub: Regulation of Building  Control  Activity                     and
           implementation of Development Control         Rules and Building
           Bye-Laws in Nagpur City.

      Sir,

            The Nagpur Improvement Trust (N.I.T)  is  a  planning  Authority
      for the city of Nagpur in terms of the  Maharashtra  Regional  &  Town
      Planning Act, 1956.  Accordingly  if  prepared  the  development  plan
      alongwith building regulations  and  Development  Control  Rules  were
      approved by Government vide Notification No.:TPS 2476/478/UD-5,  dated
      the 3rd July, 1976.

            With a view to standing the I.C. rules  and  building  Bye-laws,
      Government had  directed  all  the  Municipal  Corporations  i.e.  the
      Planning Authorities  (Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  in  this  case)  to
      undertake  modification  under  Section  37  of  the  Act  and  follow
      standardized Development Control Rules and Building  byelaws  and  has
      forwarded the proposal for government approval on 12th October, 1990.

       2.     The  Nagpur  Municipal  Corporation  (N.M.C)  has  framed  the
      building Byelaws under City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 which were
      approved by the  Government  vide  notification  No.N.M.C  5365/33770,
      dated  the  24th  June,  1965.  Subsequently,  the  Nagpur   Municipal
      Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred under section  159  of
      the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 read with Section 415
      and other relevant sections of the City  of  Nagpur  Corporation  Act,
      1948 published draft revised byelaws. Those byelaws have been sent  to
      Government for approval vide letter No.GAD/18/G, dated 24th  February,
      1987 and they are yet  to  be  approved.  Both  the  Nagpur  Municipal
      Corporation and Nagpur  Improvement  Trust  are  granting  Development
      permission in their respective areas.

            Thus there has been no uniformity in  the  matter  of  the  (not
      eligible) There have been two sets  of  regulations  operated  in  the
      Municipal Corporation area and has been  admittedly  creating  certain
      serious problems.

       3.     Government  has  examined  the  matter   and   after   careful
      examination is pleased to issue directions under section  154  of  the
      Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1956 as follows:

             "Pending  the  approval  of  Government  for  the  proposal  of
      Development Control Rules and Building Byelaws submitted by the Nagpur
      Improvement Trust vide its letter No.D/630, dated 12th October, 1990.

        i) The draft Byelaws published by the Nagpur Municipal  Corporation
           under section 169 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act,
           1956 read with Section 115 and other sections  of  the  City  of
           Nagpur Corporation Act 1948 will not be operated.

       ii) The Nagpur Municipal Corporation like Nagpur  Improvement  Trust
           should follow the provisions in the  draft  Development  Control
           Rules and Building Byelaws prepared by  the  Nagpur  Improvement
           Trust as submitted to Government on 12th October, 1990 which are
           under scrutiny of Government until further orders.

      4.    The action taken may please be intimated to government.

                                                           Yours faithfully,




                                                       (C.S.Pentabalekungri)

                                             Deputy Secretary to Government"




4.    Between  1973  and  1983  lands  were  leased  to  the  appellants  by
respondent no.4 and building plans were sanctioned by the N.M.C.  The  N.M.C
was empowered to issue NOC during the said period  as  evident  from  letter
dated 15th September, 1981 written by Circle Engineer (P1),  N.I.T  to  Shri
Padmakar Joshi and brothers, Sitabuldi, Nagpur as quoted below:

      "OFFICE OF THE NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST

      No.Sch/NOC/2017  Nagpur, dated the 15.9.1981.

      To

      Shri Padmakar Joshi & Bros.

      Sitabuldi, Nagpur.




      Subject:-No Objection Certificate for Petrol Pump.

      Reference:-Your application dated 29.6.1981.

            With reference to above,  I  have  to  inform  that  the  Nagpur
      Municipal Corporation is empowered to issue no  objection  certificate
      in conformity with proposals of Development Plan of Nagpur.  You  may,
      therefore, approach  Nagpur  Municipal  Corporation,  Nagpur  in  this
      matter.

                                                                        Sd/-

                                                        Circle Engineer (P1)

                                                  Nagpur Improvement Trust."




      From  the  aforesaid  letter,  it  is  clear  that  inspite  of  draft
Development Plan which was published on  25th  December,  1972  followed  by
final Draft Plan on 3rd June, 1976, the N.I.T abdicated  its  authority  and
delegated it in favour of N.M.C by stating that N.M.C is empowered to  issue
NOC in conformity with proposals of Development Plan of Nagpur.

5.    Respondent nos.5 and 6 preferred a Public  Interest  Litigation  under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court  Bench
at Nagpur inter alia, seeking a direction to N.M.C and N.I.T to  remove  the
structures standing on the lands  owned  by  respondent  no.4-Trust  on  the
ground that the same are  contrary  to  the  building  regulations  and  the
development plan sanctioned by the State Government under the T.P.  Act.  In
the said writ petition, the impugned judgment  was  passed  on  30th  April,
2002 as noticed in the opening paragraph.

6.    Learned counsel for the appellants while referring to  the  facts,  as
narrated above, submitted that the writ petition  was  filed  by  respondent
no.5 after inordinate delay to vent out their personal  vendetta.  The  said
writ  petition  cannot  be  termed  to  be  Public  Interest  Litigation  as
respondent nos.5 and 6 vented out their private dispute.

7.    Learned counsel for the appellants further  submitted  that  the  said
writ petition was primarily filed  by  respondent  no.5  claiming  to  be  a
member of respondent no.4-  Trust  and  respondent  no.6  a  member  of  the
locality alleging mismanagement by the said Trust in leasing  lands  to  the
appellants.  Apart from the aforesaid fact the respondent nos.5  and  6  did
not disclose the nature of public interest involved. A  personal  grudge  of
respondent no.5 is clear as he was claiming to be  a  member  of  the  Trust
which was not accepted by the Trust. It was further submitted that the  writ
petitioners having not approached the Court with clean hands and it being  a
private dispute between respondent no.5 and Trust  the  said  writ  petition
was not maintainable. It is further contended that in absence  of  challenge
to the sanctioned layout the High Court ought  not  to  have  declared  them
unauthorized and illegal.

8.    Learned counsel for the parties relied upon Section 2  (15)  (c)  (ii)
(iii), Section 2(19), 20 and 154 of the T.P. Act.  Reliance was also  placed
on final Development Plan dated 3rd  June,  1976  sanctioned  by  the  State
Government.  A photocopy of True copy of Resolution  dated  3rd  June,  1976
enclosing copy of the notification issued under the  letter  head  of  N.I.T
alongwith part Development Plan of Nagpur City was also produced  separately
for perusal.

9.    Respondent nos.5 and 6 have taken similar pleas as were  taken  before
the High Court. Counsel for respondent  no.4  also  supported  the  case  of
respondent nos.5 and 6.

10.   We have heard the rival contentions raised by the parties and  perused
the record.

11.   It is not in dispute that the respondent  no.4-Trust  has  leased  the
property in favour of the appellants. Respondent no.5 was claiming to  be  a
member of the Trust and Respondent  no.6  claims  to  be  a  member  of  the
locality and as noticed above they filed the writ petition before  the  High
Court   alleging  mismanagement  by  the  Trust  in  leasing  lands  to  the
appellants. But what we find  is  that  the  respondent  no.4-Trust  is  now
supporting respondent nos.5 and 6.

12.    The  aforesaid  fact  clearly  shows  that  writ  petition  filed  by
respondent nos.5 and 6 was not bona fide but it was filed  only  on  account
of personal disputes between the parties i.e. inter se between  the  members
of the respondent no.4-Trust indirectly  affecting  the  appellants-tenants.
Respondent no.4-Trust in its reply  before  the  High  Court  supported  the
appellants but before this Court their learned counsel  supported  the  case
of respondent nos.5 and 6.

13.   There is no dispute that no such notification was issued by the  State
Government  empowering  the  N.M.C  to  exercise  the  power   of   Planning
Authority. By letter dated 1st January, 1993,  the  State  Government  asked
the N.M.C to follow the draft development Rules framed by  the  N.I.T  there
being conflict between two draft Rules one drafted by the N.M.C and  another
by   N.I.T.   The   State   Government   on   27th   February,   2002    has
rescinded/withdrawn the notification dated 6th October, 1967  and  permitted
N.M.C to exercise the powers of a Planning Authority in the area  under  its
jurisdiction except the areas in which the N.I.T has improvement schemes  as
more particularly set out in the said  notification.  Thus,  prior  to  1967
N.M.C was the authority to exercise the same power sanctioning the plan  and
since 27th February, 2002 the N.M.C was  again  empowered  to  sanction  the
plan. During the period from 1967 till 2002, though N.I.T was  the  Planning
Authority for the city of Nagpur, it abdicated its power,  delegated  it  in
favour of N.M.C and did not sanction any building plan which is  also  clear
from letter dated 15th September, 1981 issued by N.I.T to one Shri  Padmakar
Joshi & Bros., Sitabuldi, Nagpur as quoted above.

14.   True copies of notification dated 3rd June, 1976 and Part  Development
Plan of Nagpur City have been  produced  wherein  respondent  no.4-Gorakshan
Sabha has been shown within the area of public institutions and offices.  In
absence of original coloured plan the  true  copy  of  the  plan  cannot  be
relied upon to hold any construction illegal in view of the  fact  that  the
N.M.C which sanctioned building plan  supposed  to  have  gone  through  the
original plan.

15.   In absence of the sanctioned plan, we are of the view  that  the  High
Court was not justified in deciding the disputed  question  of  fact  as  to
whether the building  was  constructed  in  accordance  with  Town  Planning
Scheme.  The High Court ought to have looked into  the  sanctioned  plan  to
find out whether it was for office (Karyalaya) or  for  residential  or  for
commercial purpose for coming  to  a  definite  conclusion.  Further,  there
being a long delay of eight  years  in  filing  the  writ  petition  and  in
absence of challenge to the plan sanctioned by N.M.C,  the  High  Court  was
not justified in entertaining  the  so  called  Public  Interest  Litigation
filed by persons who had personal dispute with respondent no.4.

16.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  and
order dated 30th April, 2002 passed by  the  High  Court  of  judicature  at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench in Writ Petition No.1485 of 1984 and dismiss  the  Writ
Petition preferred by respondent nos.5 and 6.  The  appeal  is  allowed  but
there shall be no orders as to cost.



                      ....................................................J.
                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)




                      ....................................................J.
                                      (PRAFULLA C. PANT)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 12, 2015.

There can be no manner of doubt that before exercising the power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act to make appointment of an arbitrator the Court will have to decide on the existence of an arbitrable dispute/enforceable claim by and between the parties to the contract. The existence of a claim and denial thereof giving rise to a dispute is required to be determined on the basis of what the parties had agreed upon as embodied in the terms of the contract and only for the purpose of a decision on the question of arbitrability and nothing beyond. It is from the aforesaid standpoint that the issues raised in the present proceedings will have to be considered.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                   ARBITRATION CASE (CIVIL) NO.36 OF 2014

M/S KSS KSSIIPL CONSORTIUM
THRO. ITS CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY
MR. DEVENDRA KUMAR                             ...PETITIONER
                            VERSUS

M/S GAIL (INDIA) LTD.                          ...RESPONDENT

                                    WITH

                   ARBITRATION CASE (CIVIL) NO.38 OF 2014

M/S KSS KSSIIPL CONSORTIUM
THRO. ITS CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY
MR. DEVENDRA KUMAR                             ...PETITIONER
                            VERSUS

M/S GAIL (INDIA) LTD.                          ...RESPONDENT


                                  JUDGMENT

1.          Both these applications under Section 11(6) of  the  Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the  Arbitration
Act") have been filed seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator  to  go  into
the disputes and differences that the petitioner claims to have  arisen  out
of two  separate  contract  agreements  entered  into  by  and  between  the
parties.

2.          The facts in brief may be noted at the outset.

3.          The petitioner is a consortium of two  companies  i.e.  M/s  JSC
OGCC KazStoryService, a company incorporated under the laws of the  Republic
of Kazakhstan  and  KazStoryService  Infrastructure  India  Private  Limited
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.  The said  consortium  has  been
formed by an agreement dated 1st July, 2010 for the purposes of executing  a
contract that was to be awarded by the respondent for  Pipeline  Laying  and
Terminal Works for Dabhol - Bangalore Pipeline Project.

4.          According to  the  petitioner,  the  respondent  had  floated  a
Tender for the said project in  the  year  2010  and  the  entire  work  was
divided in 10 Spreads  (A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J).   While  Arbitration  Petition
(Civil) No.36 of  2014  pertain  to  the  award  of  work  for  Spread  'J',
Arbitration Petition (Civil) No.38 of 2014 relates to the work  awarded  for
Spread 'D'.

5.           Pursuant  to  the  bid(s)  made  by  the  petitioner,  detailed
letter(s) of acceptance was issued  by  the  respondent  on  13th  December,
2010.  According to the petitioner though in terms of the contracts  it  had
mobilized its men and machinery, the work got jeopardized/frustrated as  the
respondent did not make available to the petitioner the  Construction  Right
of use and permits in terms of  Clause  28  of  the  Special  Conditions  of
Contract  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "the  SCC").  According   to   the
petitioner, the respondent did not  have  the  necessary  work  fronts  with
respect to SV station work.  Furthermore, the petitioner  has  alleged  that
the respondent failed to provide  necessary  engineering  inputs.   Besides,
there were frequent modifications with respect to drawings, extra  work  and
delays in providing free issue  materials.  All  these  led  to  substantial
delays in the execution of the works, such delay being attributable   solely
to the respondent.

6.          According to the petitioner, on account of  the  delays  due  to
the aforesaid reasons, the petitioner  became  entitled  for  extended  stay
compensation in terms of clause 42 of the SCC read with  clause  12  of  the
detailed letter of acceptance.  Apart from extended stay  compensation,  the
petitioner  claims  to  be  entitled  for  payment  for   additional   works
undertaken during  the  course  of  execution  of  the  contracts.   On  4th
January, 2013 and 5th July, 2013, the petitioner submitted its claim to  the
respondent for Rs.34,70,11,907/- (Rupees  Thirty  Four  Crore  Seventy  Lacs
Eleven thousand  Nine  hundered  and  seven  only)[In  Arbitration  Petition
(Civil) No.36 of 2014] and for Rs.1,79,23,83,208/- (Rupees One Arab  Seventy
Nine Crore Twenty Three Lacs Eighty Three thousand  Two  hundred  and  Eight
only) [In Arbitration Petition (Civil) No.38  of  2014)  respectively.   The
petitioner alleges that the respondent rejected the said  claims  which  was
not acceptable to  the  petitioner.   The  petitioner,  thereafter,  invoked
clause 40.2 of the  General  Conditions  of  Contract   which  provides  for
conciliation.  As the petitioner's proposal for  conciliation  was  rejected
by  the  respondent,  the  petitioner  had  no  option  but  to  invoke  the
Arbitration Clause (Clause 59) and seek appointment of a sole arbitrator  in
respect of the disputes arising from each of the two agreements.   The  said
demand was repeated in several communications which were not  responded  to.
The  petitioner,  therefore,  has  lodged  the  present  applications  under
Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for the reliefs earlier noticed.

7.          The claims made by the petitioner  have  been  resisted  by  the
respondent by filing separate counter  affidavits  in  both  the  cases.   A
reading of the affidavits filed by the respondent indicate that  insofar  as
the claim for  extended  stay  compensation  is  concerned,  the  respondent
contend that the said claim does not  give  rise  to  any  arbitrable  issue
inasmuch as under clause 42.1.1 the bidder is  required to mention the  rate
for extended stay compensation  per  month  in  the  "Priced  Part".   Under
Clause 42.1.2 in case the bidder did not indicate such  rate  it  is  to  be
presumed that no extended stay compensation is required to  be  paid.  Under
clause 42.1.4 it was expressly mentioned that "Bidder to note that  in  case
they  don't  indicate  the  rate  for  extended  stay  compensation  as  per
proforma, provisions of clause No.42.0 will  not  be  applicable  to  them".
According  to  the  respondent  in  the  relevant   proforma   relating   to
"Compensation  for  Extended  Stay",  the  petitioner  had  mentioned/quoted
"NIL".  Thus, according to the clauses 42.1.2 and 42.1.4, no  extended  stay
compensation is required to be paid to the petitioner.  The  above  position
was also expressly stated in clause 12 of the detailed letter of  acceptance
dated 13th December, 2010, which is in the following terms:
|"12.0 |COMPENSATION FOR EXTENDED STAY      |
|      |Extended stay compensation is not   |
|      |applicable and shall not be payable |
|      |to the Contractor as per clause no. |
|      |42.0 of Special Conditions of       |
|      |Contract."                          |


8.          According to the respondent, the aforesaid  clause  was  further
amplified in Annexure  -1 to the said detailed letter  of  acceptance  which
was not placed before the Court though the  detailed  letter  of  acceptance
dated 13th December, 2010 formed a  part  of  the  petitions  filed  by  the
petitioner.

9.          Insofar as  the  claim  of  payments  for  additional  works  is
concerned, according to the respondent, clause 91.0 of the  GCC  deals  with
such claims. Clauses 91.1 and 91.2 contemplate  that  such  claims  will  be
verified by  the  Engineer-in-charge  whose  decision  will  be  final.  The
respondent further states  that  the  claims  made  by  the  petitioner  for
additional costs had been rejected by the Engineer-in-charge  and  in  terms
of clause 91.2 of the GCC such a decision(s) must be construed to  be  final
and binding between the parties and  therefore  would  stand  excluded  from
arbitration.

10.         There can be no manner  of  doubt  that  before  exercising  the
power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act to make appointment  of  an
arbitrator the Court will have to decide on the existence of  an  arbitrable
dispute/enforceable claim by and between the parties to the  contract.   The
existence of a claim  and  denial  thereof  giving  rise  to  a  dispute  is
required to be determined on the basis of what the parties had  agreed  upon
as embodied in the terms of the contract and  only  for  the  purpose  of  a
decision on the question of arbitrability and nothing beyond.   It  is  from
the aforesaid standpoint that the issues raised in the  present  proceedings
will have to be considered.

11.         Clause 42.0 deals with "Compensation for extended stay".   Under
clause 42.1.1 the contractor is required to mention the  rate  for  extended
stay of compensation in the event the contract is to  be  prolonged/extended
beyond the contemplated date of completion.  Clauses 42.1.2  and  42.1.4  of
the SCC contemplate  that  in  the  event  the  contractor/bidder  does  not
indicate the rate of extended stay, it will be  presumed  that  no  extended
stay compensation is required to be paid.  In the present case,  admittedly,
the petitioner had quoted "NIL" against compensation for  extended  stay  in
its bid.  If that is so, it must  be  understood  that  the  petitioner  had
agreed to forego its claim to extended stay compensation in  the  event  the
period of performance of the contract is to be extended as had  happened  in
the present case. This position  was  conveyed  to  the  petitioner  by  the
letter of acceptance dated 13th December,  2010.   The  petitioner  did  not
raise  any  objection  on  the  aforesaid  score.   If  the  petitioner  had
voluntarily and consciously agreed  to  the  above  situation,  it  will  be
difficult to accept the contrary position that has sought to be now  adopted
by seeking to claim extended stay compensation which was earlier  agreed  to
be foregone.   It  must  therefore  be  held  that  the  claim  against  the
aforesaid 'Head' i.e. 'extended stay compensation' does not give rise to  an
arbitrable dispute so as to permit/require reference  to  arbitration  under
clause 59.

12.         The second issue i.e. claim  for  payment  of  additional  works
however  would  stand  on  a  different  footing.   Clause  91.1  and   91.2
contemplate the making/raising of claims by the  contractor  for  additional
works and consideration thereof by the Engineer-in-chief.  The  decision  of
the Engineer-in-chief is final and binding. The finality attached to such  a
decision cannot be an unilateral act beyond the pale  of  further  scrutiny.
Such  a  view  would  negate  the  arbitration  clause  in  the   agreement.
Justifiability of such a decision  though  stated  to  be  final,  must,  be
subject to a process  of  enquiry/adjudication  which  the  parties  in  the
present case have agreed would be by way  of  arbitration.   The  objections
raised by the  respondent  on  the  aforesaid  score,  therefore,  does  not
commend to the Court for acceptance and is hereby rejected.

13.         Accordingly, the claims made by the petitioner  for  payment  of
additional works under both the contracts are  referred  to  arbitration  by
Shri Justice M.M. Kumar, Chief Justice (Retd.), Jammu & Kashmir High  Court,
who  is  hereby  appointed  as  the  sole  arbitrator.   The  learned   sole
arbitrator is requested to enter upon the reference and  conclude  the  same
at an early date.  The terms of appointment of the sole arbitrator  as  well
as the venue of arbitration will be decided by the parties  in  consultation
with the learned Arbitrator.

14.         Consequently and in the light  of  the  above,  the  Arbitration
Petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above.


                                        ..................................J.
                                          (RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 12, 2015