whether the appellants are entitled to claim the relief of payment of retrenchment compensation.

                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 1389 OF 2015
                    (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33509/2011)


Oshiar Prasad and Others                     Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      The Employers in relation to
Management of Sudamdih
Coal Washery of M/s BCCL,
Dhanbad, Jharkhand                      Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    This civil appeal  is  filed  by  the  unsuccessful  writ  petitioners
against the judgment and order dated 17.06.2011 passed by the High Court  of
Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A. No. 447 of 2009 which arises out of the  order
dated 03.09.2009 passed by the learned single Judge of  the  High  Court  in
C.W.J.C. No. 616 of 1999(R).
3.    By impugned judgment, the Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appellants'
intra court appeal and upheld  the  order  of  the  writ  court,  which  had
dismissed the appellants' writ petition and in consequence upheld the  award
dated 21.12.1998  passed by  the Labour Court in Reference Case  No.  75  of
1995.
4.    In order to appreciate the controversy involved in this appeal, it  is
necessary to set out the facts in detail.
5.    The respondent - M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd (hereinafter  referred  to
as "the BCCL") is a Government of India undertaking.  It is engaged  in  the
business of manufacture and sale  of  various  kinds  of  coal.   It  has  a
colliery at Dhanbad, Jharkhand known as "Sudamdih Coal Washery".
6.    On 24.07.1974, the BCCL invited tenders for  construction  of  Washery
on Turnkey basis for running the colliery.   The  contract  was  awarded  to
one Company - M/s MC Nelly, Bharat  Engineering  Company  Ltd.  (hereinafter
referred to as "the Contractor").  An  agreement  was  accordingly  executed
between the BCCL and the Contractor on 29.01.1976.  Since the  execution  of
the work was to be done on turnkey basis, the Contractor was required to  do
every thing  to  make  the  Washery  operational.   The  work  included  the
complete  design  of  the  Washery,  supply  of   materials   required   for
construction of plant, building, installation of  machinery,  all  kinds  of
construction of the structures of Washery etc.
7.    Pursuant to the contract, the Contractor started the work in  1977  by
employing several skilled and unskilled workers and completed  the  same  by
December 1979. After completion of the work, the Contractor  terminated  the
employment of all the workers and offered them retrenchment compensation  as
per the provisions of Section 25 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in  short
"the Act") except 39 skilled workers, who were retained to  look  after  the
maintenance work of Washery after it was  made  operationalized.   These  39
workers continued to work.  After retaining their  services  for  about  one
year, the Management terminated  the  services  of  these  39  employees  in
January,  1981.   These  39  employees  raised  a  dispute  demanding  their
absorption and continuation in service with the BCCL.  Since  their  demands
were not accepted, a reference was made under  Section  10  of  the  Act  to
Industrial Tribunal No. 3 Dhanbad vide Reference Case  No.  58  of  1981  to
answer the following question:
"Whether the management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat  Coking  Coal
Ltd., P.O. Sudamdih, Dist. Dhanbad are justified in not absorbing  Sarvashri
Gorakh Sharma and 38 others as their regular employees?   If  not,  to  what
relief are the said workmen entitled?"

8.    The Industrial Tribunal by its award  dated  03.03.1983  answered  the
reference in workers' favour and directed that 39  workers  be  absorbed  by
the BCCL in their employment as their regular employees and  they  be  given
all such consequential benefits to which they were entitled to claim due  to
their regularization in the services of BCCL.  The BCCL  did  not  challenge
the award and implemented  the  directions  by  absorbing  and  regularizing
these 39 workers in their employment.
9.    It may be  mentioned  that  five  workers  (including  the  appellants
herein), who claimed to be working in the same  project,  filed  Title  Suit
No. 51/1980 against the BCCL in the Court of Munsif 2nd Dhanbad under  Order
I Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  for  declaration  that  they
are entitled to continue in their services under the BCCL  and  prayed  that
their services be absorbed and regularized in the services of BCCL with  all
consequential benefits. They also prayed for an injunction  restraining  the
BCCL from terminating their services pending civil suit.
10.   The Trial Court, however, on contest declined to grant  the  temporary
injunction to the plaintiffs. It is not in dispute that during the  pendency
of the suit, the services of these workers  were  discontinued.  They  were,
therefore, no more in the employment.
11.    By judgment and decree dated 27.05.1983, the trial Court decreed  the
suit and held that the plaintiff's are entitled to continue in  services  of
BCCL.
12.   Felt aggrieved,  the BCCL filed Title Appeal No.  71  of  1983  before
the Appellate Court.  The  Appellate  Court  by  judgment  and  order  dated
16.12.1986 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the  judgment  and  decree  of
the Trial Court.
13.   The BCCL pursued the matter further and filed an appeal  being  Second
Appeal No.23 of 1987(R) before the High Court. The High Court,  by  judgment
and order dated 05.03.1993 allowed the  Second  Appeal  and  set  aside  the
judgment and decree of the two Courts  which  had  decreed  the  plaintiffs'
suit. It was held that the  suit  was  not  maintainable  in  the  light  of
provisions of Labour laws.
14.    Against  the  aforesaid  judgment,  the  plaintiffs  (workers)  filed
Special Leave Petition being Special Leave Petition (C)  No.  4495  of  1994
before this Court.  By order dated 14.11.1994, this  Court,  after  granting
leave, dismissed the appeal  (C.A.  No.8403/1994)  with  a  liberty  to  the
plaintiffs/appellants to approach the Industrial Tribunal for  claiming  any
appropriate relief, if so advised.
15.   It is with this background, the plaintiffs (five  workers)  approached
the Central Government under Section 10 of the Act and also on behalf of  as
many as 150 workers espousing their cause  in  representative  capacity  for
their absorption and regularization and  prayed  for  making  an  industrial
reference to the Industrial Tribunal for its  adjudication.  The  Government
acceded to their request and accordingly made  the  following  reference  to
the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate:
"Whether the management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat  Coking  Coal
Ltd., P.O. Sudamdih,  Dist. Dhanbad are justified in  not  absorbing  Ainuel
Haque and 150 others (as in the list annexed) as  their  regular  employees?
If not, to what reliefs are the said workmen entitled?"

16.   The  Industrial  Tribunal  by  award  dated  21.12.1998  answered  the
reference against the workers.  It was held that they were not  entitled  to
seek their absorption in the Services of BCCL as  their  regular  employees.
The workers, felt aggrieved, filed C.W.J.C.No. 616  of  1999(R)  before  the
High Court.  The learned single Judge by orders dated  03.09.2009  dismissed
the writ petition and upheld the award passed by the Tribunal.  The  workers
pursued the matter and filed intra Court appeal  being  L.P.A.  No.  447  of
2009.  The Division Bench by impugned judgment dismissed the appeal  finding
no fault in the award. Challenging the said order, the  workers  filed  this
appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
17.    While  assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the   impugned
judgment, Mr. R.P. Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel for the  appellants  mainly
urged two points. His first submission was that the Courts  below  erred  in
not answering the reference in favour of the appellants and  thereby  Courts
below erred in not granting them the relief  for  which  the  reference  was
made.   His  second  submission  was  that  since  the  identical  reference
(Reference Case No.58/1981) made at the instance of  39  workers  alike  the
appellants was answered in workers' favour vide award  dated  03.03.1983,  a
fortiori, the present reference being identical in nature should  also  have
been answered in favour of the appellants  to maintain the parity. In  other
words, the submission was that  if  one  set  of  workers  got  the  benefit
earlier in point of time from the Court, the other set of workers  similarly
placed too should have been granted the same benefits.  In the  alternative,
learned Senior Counsel urged that in any  event,  the  appellants  were  not
paid any retrenchment compensation, for which otherwise they  were  entitled
to get from the Contractor or/and BCCL as per the provisions of  Section  25
of the Act read with the  provisions  of  Contract  Labour  Prohibition  and
Regulation  Act, 1970 and hence to this extent, this Court can still  direct
either Contractor or the BCCL or both, as  the  case  may  be,  to  pay  the
retrenchment compensation to the appellants.
18.   In Contra, learned  Counsel  for  the  respondent-BCCL  supported  the
impugned order and contended that no case is made out by the  appellants  to
interfere in the impugned order and hence the appeal merits dismissal.
19.   Having heard the learned counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find no merit in  the  main  submissions  of  the
appellants but find substance in the alternative submission.
20.   Before we examine the factual matrix of the case in hand, we  consider
it apposite to take note of law  laid  down  by  this  Court  regarding  the
powers of the appropriate Government in making reference  under  Section  10
of the Act  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunal  while  answering  the
reference.  Indeed it is well settled and remains no more res integra.
21.   One of the questions which fell for consideration  by  this  Court  in
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Others (AIR  1967
SC 469) was that what are the powers of  the  appropriate  Government  while
making a reference and the scope and  jurisdiction  of  Industrial  Tribunal
under Section 10 of the Act.


22.   Justice Mitter, speaking for the  Bench, held as under:
"(8) ......Under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act,  it  is  open  to  the  appropriate
Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists to  make
an order in writing referring
"the dispute or any  matter appearing to be connected with, or  relevant  to
the dispute,.....to a Tribunal for adjudication" under s. 10(4)
"where in an order referring  an  industrial  dispute  to  a  Labour  Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a  subsequent  order,
the  appropriate  Government  has  specified  the  points  of  dispute   for
adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal,  as
the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and  matters
incidental thereto."

(9) From the above it therefore  appears  that  while  it  is  open  to  the
appropriate Government to refer the dispute or any matter  appearing  to  be
connected  therewith  for  adjudication,  the  Tribunal  must  confine   its
adjudication to the  points  of  dispute  referred  and  matters  incidental
thereto. In other words, the Tribunal is not free to enlarge  the  scope  of
the dispute referred to it but must confine  its  attention  to  the  points
specifically mentioned and anything which is incidental  thereto.  The  word
'incidental' means according to Webster's New World Dictionary :
"happening or likely to  happen  as  a  result  of  or  in  connection  with
something more important; being an incident;  casual;  hence,  secondary  or
minor, but usually associated :"

"Something incidental to a dispute" must therefore mean something  happening
as a result of or in connection with the  dispute  or  associated  with  the
dispute. The dispute is the fundamental  thing  while  something  incidental
thereto is an adjunct to it. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut  at
the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct to it....."

23.   The same issue came up for consideration before three Judge  Bench  in
a case reported in Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat vs. Perfect  Pottery  Co.  Ltd.
and Another, (1979) 3 SCC 762.   Justice  Y.V.  Chandrachud  -  the  learned
Chief Justice speaking for the Court laid down the following proposition  of
law:

"10. Two questions were argued before the High Court: Firstly,  whether  the
tribunals had jurisdiction to question the  propriety  or  justification  of
the closure and secondly, whether they  had  jurisdiction  to  go  into  the
question of retrenchment compensation. The High Court has held on the  first
question that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal  in  industrial  disputes  is
limited to the points specifically referred  for  its  adjudication  and  to
matters incidental thereto and that the Tribunal cannot go beyond the  terms
of the reference made to it. On the  second  question  the  High  Court  has
accepted the respondent's  contention  that  the  question  of  retrenchment
compensation has to be decided under Section 33-C(2) of the Central Act.
11. Having heard a closely thought out argument made by Mr. Gupta on  behalf
of the appellant, we are of the opinion that the High Court is right in  its
view on the first question. The very terms of the references show  that  the
point of dispute between the parties was not the fact of the closure of  its
business by the respondent  but  the  propriety  and  justification  of  the
respondent's  decision  to  close  down  the  business.  That  is  why   the
references were expressed  to  say  whether  the  proposed  closure  of  the
business was proper and justified. In other words, by  the  references,  the
Tribunals were not called upon by the  Government  to  adjudicate  upon  the
question as to whether there was in fact a closure of  business  or  whether
under the pretence of closing the business the workers were  locked  out  by
the management. The references [pic]being limited to the narrow question  as
to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunals by  the  very
terms of the references, had no  jurisdiction  to  go  behind  the  fact  of
closure and inquire into the question  whether  the  business  was  in  fact
closed down by the management."

24.   The abovesaid principle of law has  been  consistently  reiterated  in
M/s Firestone  Tyre  &  Rubber  Co.  of  India  (P)  Ltd.  vs.  The  Workmen
Empoloyed, represented by Firestone Tyre employees' Union AIR 1981 SC  1626,
National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan &  Ors.,  (2000)
1 SCC 371,  Mukand Ltd. vs. Mukand Staff & Officers' Association, (2004)  10
SCC 460 and  State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Om Prakash Sharma, (2006)  5
SCC 123.
25.   It is thus clear that the appropriate Government is empowered to  make
a reference under Section 10  of  the  Act  only  when  "Industrial  dispute
exists" or "is apprehended between  the  parties".  Similarly,  it  is  also
clear that the Tribunal while answering the reference  has  to  confine  its
inquiry to the question(s)  referred  and  has  no  jurisdiction  to  travel
beyond the question(s) or/and the terms of  the  reference  while  answering
the reference. A fortiori, no inquiry can be made on those questions,  which
are  not  specifically  referred  to  the  Tribunal  while   answering   the
reference.
26.   Coming now to the facts of this case, it is an admitted case that  the
services of the appellants and those at whose  instance  the  reference  was
made were terminated long back prior to  making  of  the  reference.   These
workers were, therefore, not in the services  of  either  Contractor  or/and
BCCL on the date of making the reference in question.  Therefore, there  was
no industrial  dispute  that  "existed"  or  "apprehended"  in  relation  to
appellants' absorption in the services of the BCCL on  the  date  of  making
the reference.
27.   Indeed a dispute regarding the appellants' absorption was  capable  of
being referred to in reference for adjudication, had the appellants been  in
the services of Contractor or/and  BCCL.   But  as  said  above,  since  the
appellants' services were discontinued or/and  retrenched  (whether  rightly
or wrongly) long back, the question of their  absorption  or  regularization
in the services of BCCL, as claimed by them, did  not  arise  and  nor  this
issue could have been gone into on its merits for the  reason  that  it  was
not  legally  possible  to  give  any  direction  to  absorb/regularize  the
appellants so long as they were not in the employment.
28.   It is a settled principle of law that  absorption  and  regularization
in the service can be claimed or/and  granted  only  when  the  contract  of
employment subsists and is in force inter se employee  and  employer.   Once
it comes to an end either by efflux of time or  as  per  the  terms  of  the
Contract of employment or by its termination by the employer, then  in  such
event, the relationship of employee and employer comes  to  an  end  and  no
longer subsists except for the limited purpose to examine the  legality  and
correctness of its termination.
29.   In  our  considered  opinion,   the  only  industrial  dispute,  which
existed for being referred to the Industrial Tribunal for  adjudication  was
in relation to termination of appellants' employment   and    -  whether  it
was legal or not? It is an admitted fact that it was  not  referred  to  the
Tribunal and, therefore, it attained finality against the appellants.
30.   In our considered opinion, therefore, the reference, even if  made  to
examine the issue of absorption of the appellants in the services  of  BCCL,
the same was misconceived.
31.   Apart from this infirmity noticed in this case, we have also not  been
able  to  find  any  parity  in  the  facts   of   the   earlier   reference
(R.C.No.58/81) and the case in hand. As noted above, the  earlier  reference
was made to decide the absorption of 39 workers in the BCCL. This  could  be
made because they were in the service.   So  far  as  the  present  case  is
concerned, the appellants  were  not in service.
32.   It can safely be noted that merely because the  workers  in  both  the
references were working in one project by itself  was  not  enough  to  give
them any right to claim parity with the claim of others.  So  long  as,  the
parity was not proved on all the relevant issues arising  in  the  case,  no
worker whether individual or collectively was entitled to claim  the  relief
only on the basis of similarity in the status qua employer.
33.   In the light  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  are  of  the  considered
opinion that  the  reference  made  to  examine  the  issue  of  appellants'
absorption qua the BCCL was incapable of  being  referred  to  on  the  said
question and in any event,  it was incapable of being answered in favour  of
the appellants.
34.   That apart, when three Courts, despite this infirmity, went  into  the
facts  and  held  that  the  appellants  were  not  entitled  to  claim  any
absorption in the services qua the BCCL, then  in  our  considered  opinion,
they were right in holding so and we do not find any good ground to go  into
the factual issues de  novo  in  our  appellate  jurisdiction.  The  factual
findings recorded by the three Courts are binding on this Court.
35.   We, therefore, find no ground to set  aside  the  impugned  order  and
accordingly uphold the same.
36.   This takes us to the next question as to whether  the  appellants  are
entitled to claim  the  relief  of  payment  of  retrenchment  compensation.
Having given our  anxious  consideration  to  this  issue,  we  are  of  the
considered view that having regard to the peculiar facts of  this  case  and
the reasons, which we have set out hereinbelow,  we  are  inclined  to  hold
that the appellants are entitled  to  claim  the  retrenchment  compensation
from the Contractor/BCCL.
37.   It is for the reason that firstly, the  respondent  in  their  written
statement filed before the Tribunal have offered  to  pay  the  retrenchment
compensation to all such  workers  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of
Section 25F of the Act. Secondly, no documents were filed by the  respondent
to show that any such compensation was paid to  the  appellants  or  to  any
worker till date by the respondent and lastly, more than three decades  have
passed and yet the issues of absorption, and/or payment of compensation  has
not attained finality.
38.   Indeed, in similar circumstances, this Court in the  case  of  Pottery
Mazdoor Panchayat's  case  (supra)  had  directed  payment  of  retrenchment
compensation to the workers and made the  following  pertinent  observations
in the concluding paras:
"17. It is unnecessary to  consider  the  second  question  as  regards  the
payment of retrenchment compensation and  we  will,  therefore,  express  no
opinion as to whether  the  Tribunals  had  jurisdiction  to  go  into  that
question. Happily,  the  parties  have  arrived  at  a  settlement  on  that
question under which, the respondent agrees to fix within a  period  of  six
months from today the retrenchment compensation payable  to  the  retrenched
workers in accordance with the provisions of Section 25FFF  of  the  Central
Act, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947,  without  the  aid  of  the
proviso to that section. After the retrenchment compensation is so fixed,  a
copy of the decision fixing the compensation payable to each of  the  worker
will be sent by the respondent to the appellant Union. The workers or  their
legal representatives, as the case may be, will then be entitled to  receive
the retrenchment compensation from the respondent, which agrees to  pay  the
same to them. The respondent will be entitled to set off of the  amounts  of
retrenchment compensation already paid to the workers  against  the  amounts
found due to them under  this  settlement.  On  receiving  the  retrenchment
compensation the workers concerned shall withdraw the applications, if  any,
filed by them for relief in that behalf.

18. We would only like to add that the compensation which will  be  paid  to
the workers will be without  prejudice  to  their  right,  if  any,  to  get
employment from the respondent in the new  business  as  and  when  occasion
arises."

39.   Following  the  course  adopted  by  this  Court  in  Pottery  Mazdoor
Panchayat (supra), we direct the Industrial Tribunal to verify the  case  of
the appellants (150 or so) for deciding each worker's claim for  payment  of
retrenchment compensation to him/her as per the provisions  of  Section  25F
of the Act and accordingly he/she be  paid  retrenchment  compensation.   In
case any worker has expired then his/her  compensation  amount  be  paid  to
his/her legal representative after making proper verification of the case.
40.   We, however, make it clear that the respondent  would  not  raise  any
objection about the maintainability of workers' claim nor  would  raise  any
objection on merits before the Tribunal and the inquiry would  only  confine
to determine the  quantum  of  retrenchment  compensation  payable  to  each
worker.
41.   The appellants and respondents would appear  before  the  Tribunal  on
16.02.2015 and file necessary documents to enable  the  Tribunal  to  verify
the claim of each worker for determining the quantum of  compensation.   The
Tribunal would issue notice to the Contractor to enable them to  participate
in  the  proceedings  in  the  light  of  provisions  of   Contract   Labour
Prohibition and Regulation Act, 1970. The appellants and  all  such  workers
can be represented through recognized Union before the Tribunal.
42.   The entire exercise should be completed and payment  be  made  to  the
workers within six months.
43.   With these directions, the appeal stands disposed of.

.............................................................J.
                 [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]



...............................................................J.
                       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


      New Delhi;
      February 02, 2015.
-----------------------
26

The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may."

                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 175 OF 2015
                   (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.) No.8715/2014)

      Balu S/o Onkar Pund & Others             Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


The State of Maharashtra                      Respondent(s)

                       WITH

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.166-167 OF 2015
               (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.) Nos.10109-10110/2014)
                                     AND
                     CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.164-165 OF 2015
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.) Nos.9524-9525/2014)

                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1.    These appeals are filed by the accused persons  against  the  judgment
and order dated 03.02.2014 passed   by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at
Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 215  and   225  of  2011
which arise out of judgment/order dated 11.04.2011 passed  by  the  Sessions
Judge, Parbhani in Sessions Trial No.80 of 2008.
2.    Accused Nos. 5, 8, 9 & 10 have filed appeal @ SLP(Crl.)  No.  8715  of
2014   whereas  appeals  @  SLP(Crl.)  Nos.10109-10110/2014  are  filed   by
accused Nos.1 and 4 and appeals @ SLP(Crl.) Nos.  9524-9525/2014  are  filed
by accused Nos. 2, 3 and 6.
3.    By impugned judgment, the High  Court  confirmed  the  conviction  and
sentences awarded to the appellants by the learned trial Judge.  Suffice  it
to state here that the appellants, apart from other offences were  convicted
under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced  to  suffer
life imprisonment and to  pay  fine  of  Rs.10,000/-  each,  in  default  of
payment of fine, to undergo further six months rigorous  imprisonment.   The
sentences imposed in respect of other offences are of below 7 years and  all
the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
4.    The question, regard being had to  the  submissions  advanced  by  the
learned counsel for the appellants, is whether the learned  trial  Judge  as
well as the High Court was justified  in  convicting  the  appellants  under
Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC considering the genesis of  occurrence
and the facts in entirety or they should have been convicted  under  Section
304 Part-I, IPC.
5.    In order to appreciate the issue involved  in  these  appeals,  it  is
necessary to state the relevant facts in brief.
6.    Apparao Rajaram Pund (A-1) and Madhavrao Rangnathrao  Range  (PW-  3),
both resident of village Itlapur in District Parbhani,  were  good  friends.
Both were agriculturists. Savitribai-the deceased was the wife of  Madhavrao
Range.  Around 25-30 years back, Madhavarao  had  purchased  two  kathas  of
land from Apparao for his cattle shed in the same village and  he  was  also
placed in its possession. However, no sale deed was  executed  between  them
yet Madhavrao continued to remain in possession of cattle shed all through.
7.    In  course  of  time,  both  entered  in  politics  and  formed  their
respective panels to contest the elections for the post of Sarpanch  of  the
village. In the election, panel led by Madhavrao  Range  won  whereas  panel
led by Apparao Pund lost. Due to this  event,  the  relations  between  them
were not as cordial as they used to be  in  the  past.   Thereafter  Apparao
started pressurizing Madhavrao Range to vacate the land and  hand  over  the
possession  of  cattle  shed  else  he  was  threatened  to  face  the  dire
consequences.
8.    On 15.01.2008, the appellants around 7.30  to  8.00  A.M.  armed  with
weapons barged in the cattle shed  and  started  removing  the  iron  sheets
fixed on the roof.  Madhavrao requested the appellants  not  to  remove  the
sheets. Since the appellants did not listen to Madhavrao  and  continued  in
their operation in removing the sheets, Madhavrao resisted and made  attempt
to stop them. At that time,  Savitribai and  Madhavrao's  son  -  Udhav  (PW
-5), who were  also  present  on  the  spot,  intervened  and  resisted  the
appellants from removing the sheets. This led to scuffle between  Apparao  (
A-1), Sachin-( A-4), Achyut (A-3) and Madhavrao (PW-3).  Accused Nos.  1,  3
and 4 beat Madhavrao with fist blows and leg kicks  and  threw  him  out  of
cattle shed.  Apparao(A-1),  who  was  having  bottle  containing  kerosene,
poured the entire kerosene on cattle shed and Sachin ( A-4) set  the  cattle
shed on fire.  Savitribai, who was  resisting  the  appellants,  caught   in
contact of fire  and  received  severe  burn  injuries.  On  noticing  this,
Madhavrao tried to enter in cattle shed to save his  wife-Savitribai.  Gopal
(A-2) then inflicted an axe  blow  on  Madhavrao's  head  due  to  which  he
sustained bleeding injury. When Madhavrao cried for help, Navnath and  other
persons reached there and tried to extinguish  the  fire.   Thereafter  they
wrapped Savitribai in a piece of cloth and took her to  the  civil  hospital
around 10 A.M.
9.    In the meantime, Mohammad Bashir  Sheikh  Umar  (PW-2)-  Inspector  on
duty to the Nanal Peth Police Station, got an information that a  lady  with
burn injuries was admitted to the Hospital.  Therefore,  he  rushed  to  the
hospital to record her statement.   After  getting  certification  from  the
doctors that Savitribai was in a fit condition to give her  statement,  PW-2
recorded her statement (Ex-45). In the  meantime,  Kishore  Achyut  Deshmukh
(PW-1), In-charge Tahsildar of the area also reached  to  the  hospital  and
recorded the statement of Savitribai (Ex-P-42).
10.   Annasahab Gholap - Assistant Police Inspector (PW-16) then  registered
the crime being Crime No. 6 of 2008 and started investigation.  On the  same
day, five accused were  arrested,   panchnama  (Ex-P-58)  was  prepared  and
several articles were recovered from the spot.  On 16.01.2008 at 6.15  a.m.,
Savitribai succumbed to her injuries while in  the  Hospital.  This  led  to
arrest of some other accused persons and also led to  registration  of  case
of offence punishable under Section 302 of  the   Indian  Penal  Code,  1860
(hereinafter referred to as "IPC")  along  with  other  offences  punishable
under Sections 147, 148, 323,  324,  436,  440,  448,  506  all   read  with
Section 149 IPC against the appellants and other accused persons.  The  case
was then committed to Sessions for trial. The accused  abjured  their  guilt
and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses. The statements  of
the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
11.   The  Sessions  judge  convicted  the  appellants-accused  and  imposed
punishment to each appellant  as  specified  above.   Challenging  the  said
order, the  appellants  filed  appeals  in  the  High  Court  against  their
conviction. The High Court, by impugned judgment,  dismissed  their  appeals
and confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded  by  the  trial  Court  to
each of the  appellants.   Against  the  said  order,  the  appellants  have
preferred these appeals by way of special leave before this Court.
12.   While assailing the legality and correctness of  the  impugned  order,
Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned Counsel for the  appellants  has  argued
only one point.  According to him, taking the prosecution case on  its  face
value, it was not a case of murder of Savitribai so as to enable the  Courts
to convict the appellants under Section 302 IPC but it was  a  case  falling
under Section 304 Part-I IPC. Learned counsel pointed  out  that  there  was
neither any intention on the part of any of the  appellants  to  commit  the
murder of Savitribai nor the appellants had visited the spot with  any  such
intention. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the  only  intention  of
the appellants was to take possession of the  cattle  shed  and  it  was  in
process of taking forcible possession, the sudden fight ensued  between  the
two groups as  also  cattle  shed  caught  fire  causing  burn  injuries  to
Savitribai, which unfortunately resulted in her death.  It was also  pointed
out that if the appellants had  come  to  the  spot  with  an  intention  to
eliminate Savitribai,  they or any member of their group would have  in  the
first instance targeted Savitribai, who was present on  the  spot  with  her
husband (PW-3) and inflicted injury.  It was not done. According to  learned
Counsel, her death was as a result of burn injuries because she  was  inside
the shed, which caught fire.  Therefore, learned  Counsel  urged  that  this
Court should alter the sentence to that of the one punishable under  Section
304 Part-I IPC instead of under Section 302 IPC because it was  not  a  case
of murder but it was a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
13.   Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the  impugned
order and urged that two courts have rightly held the appellants guilty  for
committing murder of  Savitribai  and  hence  the  appeals  merit  dismissal
calling no interference.
14.   Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find force  in  the  submission  of  the  learned
Counsel for the appellants.
15.   Before we examine the factual matrix  of  the  case  in  hand,  it  is
apposite to take note of the law laid down by this Court on the question  as
to when culpable homicide is a murder under Section 300 "thirdly"  and  what
are the elements which the  prosecution  should  establish.  This  Court  in
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab,  1958  SCR  1495,  examined  this  issue  in
detail.
16.   The learned Judge Vivian Bose in his distinctive style of writing  and
speaking for the Court succinctly stated as under:

"13. In considering whether the intention was to inflict  the  injury  found
to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines  as,
for example, whether there was an intention  to  strike  at  a  vital  or  a
dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient  force  to  cause  the  kind  of
injury found to have been inflicted. It is,  of  course,  not  necessary  to
enquire into every last  detail  as,  for  instance,  whether  the  prisoner
intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he  intended  to  penetrate
the liver or the  kidneys  or  the  heart.  Otherwise,  a  man  who  has  no
knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for,  if  he  does  not  know
that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels,  he  cannot  be  said  to  have
intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry.  It  is
broad-based and simple and based on commonsense: the kind  of  enquiry  that
"twelve good men and true" could readily appreciate and understand.
14. To put it shortly,  the  prosecution  must  prove  the  following  facts
before it can bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly";
15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that  a  bodily  injury  is
present;
16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must  be  proved;  These  are  purely
objective investigations.
17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to  inflict  that
particular bodily injury, that is to say, that  it  was  not  accidental  or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
18. Once these  three  elements  are  proved  to  be  present,  the  enquiry
proceeds further and,
19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type  just  described
made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death  in
the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely  objective
and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
20. Once these four elements are established by  the  prosecution  (and,  of
course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence  is  murder
under Section 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no  intention
to cause death. It does not matter that  there  was  no  intention  even  to
cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the  ordinary
course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between  the  two).
It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that  kind
will be likely to cause death.  Once  the  intention  to  cause  the  bodily
injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of  the  enquiry  is
purely objective and the only question is whether, as  a  matter  of  purely
objective inference, the injury is sufficient  in  the  ordinary  course  of
nature to cause death. No  one  has  a  licence  to  run  around  inflicting
injuries that are sufficient to  cause  death  in  the  ordinary  course  of
nature and claim that they  are  not  guilty  of  murder.  If  they  inflict
injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and  they  can  only
escape if it can be shown,  or  reasonably  deduced,  that  the  injury  was
accidental or otherwise unintentional."


17.   Relying on the aforesaid principle of  law,  recently  this  Court  in
Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy Vs. State of  Andhra  Pradesh  (2006)11
SCC 444, again examined the issue as to  what  relevant  factors  should  be
kept in consideration while deciding the question  as  to  whether  case  in
hand falls under Section 302 or 304 Part-I or  Part-II.  Justice  Raveendran
speaking for the Court held in para 29 as under:
"29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal  question  of
intention, with care and caution, as  that  will  decide  whether  the  case
falls under Section 302 or 304  Part  I  or  304  Part  II.  Many  petty  or
insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel  of
children, utterance of a rude word or  even  an  objectionable  glance,  may
lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual  motives
like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be  totally  absent  in  such
cases. There may be no intention. There may be no  premeditation.  In  fact,
there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the  spectrum,  there
may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the  penalty  for
murder by attempting to put forth a case that  there  was  no  intention  to
cause death. It is for the  courts  to  ensure  that  the  cases  of  murder
punishable  under  Section  302,  are  not  [pic]converted   into   offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of  culpable  homicide  not
amounting to murder, are treated as murder  punishable  under  Section  302.
The intention to cause death can be gathered generally  from  a  combination
of a few or several  of  the  following,  among  other,  circumstances:  (i)
nature of the weapon used; (ii)  whether  the  weapon  was  carried  by  the
accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is  aimed  at
a vital part of the body; (iv) the  amount  of  force  employed  in  causing
injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden  quarrel  or  sudden
fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by  chance  or
whether there was any premeditation;  (vii)  whether  there  was  any  prior
enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was  any
grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the  cause  for  such  provocation;
(ix) whether it  was  in  the  heat  of  passion;  (x)  whether  the  person
inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel  and
unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt  a  single  blow  or  several
blows. The above list of circumstances is, of  course,  not  exhaustive  and
there  may  be  several  other  special  circumstances  with  reference   to
individual cases which may throw light on  the  question  of  intention.  Be
that as it may."

18.   Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of  the  case  in
hand and keeping the same in consideration when we examine the  evidence  of
the prosecution, we find that this is a case  where  the  appellants  should
have been convicted for the offence  punishable  under  Section  304  Part-I
instead of Section 302 IPC.
19.   It is for the reason that firstly, neither there was  any  motive  and
nor any intention on  the  part  of  any  of  the  appellants  to  eliminate
Savitribai. Secondly, there was no enmity of any  kind  with  Savitribai  in
person with any of the appellants. Thirdly, the appellants  had  gone  there
to take possession of the cattle shed and not with an intention to kill  any
member of the family of Madhavrao Renge. Fourthly, if at all, if  there  was
some kind of animosity or jealousy then it was towards A-1 whose  panel  had
won the election.  Savitribai had nothing to do with  election  because  she
never contested the election.  Fifthly, despite the  appellants  armed  with
weapons, none of them inflicted any injury or gave blow  to  Savitribai  but
single blow was inflicted  only  on  Madhavrao,  who  fortunately  survived.
Sixthly, Savitribai died due to  sustaining  of  burn  injuries,  which  she
suffered because the appellants ablazed the cattle shed by pouring  kerosene
on it. In other words, if the appellants had not  ablazed  the  cattle  shed
then the incident of death of Savitribai would not have occurred.  Eighthly,
it was a fight on a spur of moment between the two male groups on the  issue
of taking possession of cattle shed with no intention to kill  any  one  and
lastly, in the absence of any overt act attributed to any of the  appellants
towards Savitribai for inflicting any injury to her,  the  appellants  could
not have been convicted for an offence of committing  murder  of  Savitribai
so as to attract the rigour of Section 302 IPC and instead they should  have
been convicted for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting  to  murder
under Section 304 Part I IPC.
20.   In the light of foregoing discussion, we allow the  appeals  in  part.
The appellants are accordingly convicted for  an  offence  punishable  under
Section 304  Part-I  IPC  instead  of  Section  302  IPC  and  each  of  the
appellants is hereby awarded 7 years RI.
21.   So far as the conviction and sentence  awarded  by  the  courts  below
under various other sections, as specified above, are  concerned,  they  are
upheld calling no interference.  All the sentences shall  run  concurrently.

                 .............................................J.
                                  [DIPAK MISRA]


               .................................................J.
                               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
      New Delhi;
      February 2, 2015.


-----------------------
18

threefold: Firstly, whether the Court was justified in granting solatium and interest without considering the fact that there is no provision for awarding these under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952; secondly, whether the Court was right in ignoring the fact that the Constitutional validity of non-inclusion of the provision for the payment of solatium and interest in the Act has been upheld by this Court in the case of Hari Krishna Khosla and finally, whether the Court was right in enhancing the compensation from Rs.6/- per sq. yard to Rs.12/- per sq. yard without fully appreciating the Cross Objections and evidence proffered by the Appellant?

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3137 OF 2010



DEFENCE ESTATE OFFICER                ..      APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

SYED ABDUL SALEEM AND OTHERS          .. RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1     The Appellant has by the pulpit of  this  Civil  Appeal  assailed  the
Judgment and final Order dated 13.3.2007 passed by the  Hon'ble  High  Court
of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) in CMA No. 1986 of 2003,  rendered
in the matter of  Syed Abdul Saleem v. The  Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh,
wherein the appeal preferred by the Respondents herein was  allowed  by  the
High Court, which enhanced the rate of  compensation  from  Rs.6/-  per  sq.
yard awarded by the Learned Arbitrator, to Rs.12/- per sq. yard  along  with
the award of 30% solatium and interest at 9% from the  date  of  possession,
i.e.,  28.07.1970.  The  subject  lands,  situated  at  Village  Ibrahimbagh
District, Hyderabad, were acquired for setting up of an Artillery Centre  at
Golconda. The  Ministry  of  Defence,  Government  of  India,  accorded  its
sanction dated 1.12.1969 for the acquisition  of  land  admeasuring  1181.70
acres, at an estimated total cost approximating  Rs.35,45,100/-.  The  lands
of the Respondents, admeasuring 2 acres 28 guntas in  Revenue  Sy.  No.  94,
and 1 acre 27 guntas in Revenue Sy.No. 95, totaling 4 acres and  15  guntas,
were acquired under the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition  of
Immovable Property Act,  1952  by  the  Central  Government.  The  Form  'J'
Notification was published on 22.07.1971.   The Competent  Authority,  viz.,
the Collector, Hyderabad, offered Rs.39,930/- as compensation in respect  of
4 acres 15 guntas, by fixing the rate at Rs.2/- per  sq.  yard.     Further,
the Collector also granted interest at 4% p.a. from the date of  publication
of 'J' Notice to  the  date  of  payment;  an  amount  of  Rs.45,295.90  was
deposited by SDC, LA (Defence) in the Court, vide letter dated 03.02.1975.
2     Dissatisfied with the said compensation,  the  Respondents  thereafter
requested for the appointment of  a  Statutory  Arbitrator.  The  Government
appointed the Arbitrator on 21.10.1980, with a direction to him  to  dispose
of the matter within four months.   As the sole  Arbitrator  was  unable  to
dispose of the matter within the  prescribed  period,  the  Government  once
again appointed an Arbitrator on 11.11.1999 to complete  the  exercise.  The
Arbitrator enhanced the compensation from Rs.2/- per sq. yard to Rs.6/-  per
sq. yard along with solatium of 30% and interest at 9% p.a.  from  the  date
of taking possession of the acquired land, i.e.,  28.07.1970,  up  till  the
date of payment. The  Arbitrator  recorded  in  his  Award  that  after  the
failure of the first Arbitrator to dispose of the matter within a period  of
four months, the Government took 19 years  to  appoint  another  Arbitrator.
The Arbitrator observed: "it is no doubt true that the matter was stayed  by
the Hon'ble High Court for some years on account  of  proceedings  initiated
by the claimants 1 and 2 herein. But, even after the above aspect  is  taken
into consideration, it is very clear that the Government is not diligent  in
prosecuting the matter". The fact of  undue  delay  in  the  institution  of
arbitral proceedings having been  determined,  the  Arbitrator  applied  the
principle enunciated in Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla  (1993)  Supp.
2 SCC 149, whereto we  shall  advert  shortly,  and  awarded  the  aforesaid
payment of solatium and interest.
3     Dissatisfied with the Award, the Respondents filed  an  appeal  before
the High Court; Cross Objections were preferred by the Appellant.  The  High
Court allowed the Respondents' Appeal while dismissing the Cross  Objections
of the Appellant and enhanced the compensation from Rs.6/- per sq.  yard  to
Rs.12/- per sq. yard and upheld the Arbitrator's Award granting solatium  of
30% and interest at 9%. The High Court also placed reliance on this  Court's
judgment in Hari Krishna Khosla.
4     The questions of law raised by the Appellant before us are  threefold:
Firstly, whether the Court was justified in granting solatium  and  interest
without considering the fact that there is no provision for  awarding  these
under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable  Property  Act,  1952;
secondly, whether the  Court  was  right  in  ignoring  the  fact  that  the
Constitutional validity of non-inclusion of the provision  for  the  payment
of solatium and interest in the Act has been upheld by  this  Court  in  the
case of Hari Krishna Khosla and finally, whether  the  Court  was  right  in
enhancing the compensation from Rs.6/- per sq. yard to Rs.12/- per sq.  yard
without fully appreciating the Cross Objections and  evidence  proffered  by
the Appellant?
5     Per contra, the Respondents submit that Hari Krishna Khosla,  and  its
succeeding judgments, all indicate that there is a settled alcove of  equity
in the  jurisprudence  pertaining  to  land  requisition.   This  Court  has
recognized  the  hardships  suffered  by  affected/dispossessed  parties  in
requisition proceedings, in cases of extensive delay  in  the  disbursal  of
compensation, or, as in this case, delay in the initiation  and  eventuation
of proceedings under the  statute,  and  has  equitably  extended  the  twin
ameliorators of solatium and interest  on  compensation,  albeit  their  not
being available under the requisition Statute.
6     The submissions of both parties  hereto  having  been  adumbrated,  we
find  that  the  Appeal  is  without  merit.  The  Appellant   presents   as
exceptionable the High Court's enhancement of compensation. But the  chiefly
objectionable  aspect  to  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  is,  in  the
submission of the Appellant, the High Court's extra-legal Award of  solatium
and interest on the principal statutory  compensation  awardable  under  the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952.  This  Court
has previously, in Hari Krishan Khosla, conducted  a  thorough  analysis  of
the features of the aforementioned Act apropos  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,
1894, and providing cogent  rationales  therefore,  in  our  humble  opinion
rightly labelled as "odious" any attempt to make a  black-letter  comparison
of the  two  enactments.  Whilst  upholding  the  Constitutionality  of  the
Requisitioning Act absent the provisions therein of the  award  of  solatium
and interest, the Court nevertheless, relying upon a previous  pronouncement
in Harbans Singh Shanni Devi v. Union of India [disposed of  by  this  Court
on 11.02.1985 in Civil Appeal Nos. 470 & 471 of 1985],  found  it  just  and
proper to uphold award of both solatium (at 30%)  and  9  %  interest  along
with  the  principal  statutory  compensation,  where  appointment  of   the
Statutory Arbitrator had been delayed by 16 years. "Equity is a mitigant  to
the harshness of common law" is  a  well-known  Common  Law  maxim.  Several
Benches of this Court, from Hari Krishan Khosla in  1993;  the  Constitution
Bench in Union of India v. Chajju Ram (2003) 5 SCC 568, in  the  context  of
the Defence of India Act, 1971; Union of  India v. Parmal   Singh  (2009)  1
SCC 618 and thereafter in Dilawar Singh v. Union  of  India  (2010)  14  SCC
357, have consistently applied mutatis mutandis the equity resting  in  this
maxim to  mitigate  the  harshness  of  this  requisition  statute,  thereby
providing for payment of interest and  solatium  to  affected/  dispossessed
parties in cases of  extensive  protraction,  where  the  statute  ex  facie
provides for neither of these ameliorators. The precedential position  being
unquestionably clear, we find that the facts before us, displaying  dilation
by the Appellant of 19 years in reappointment of the  statutory  Arbitrator,
command and not  merely  commend  the  application  of  the  precedent.  We,
therefore, sustain the Judgment of the High Court, and confirm the award  of
solatium  and  interest  therein,  along  with  the  principal  compensation
amount.
7     Appeal is dismissed.   Since this Appeal stood covered on  all  fours,
the Appellant shall pay costs to the Respondents.


............................................J.
                                                [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]







      .............................................J.
                                                [ SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
New Delhi,
February 02,  2015.

whether respondent no. 1 - Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti, Akola, an "aghadi" or "front" formed by some of the elected councillors of respondent no. 5 -Akola Municipal Corporation in March, 2013, without its registration under second proviso to Section 31A(2) of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (for short "1949 Act") stood registered and recognized as a party or group for the purposes of representation, and as such whether the petition filed by respondent no.1 before the High Court challenging the Standing Committee constituted under the 1949 Act was maintainable.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1388 OF 2015
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 28853 of 2013)

Ajay Ramdas Ramteke and Anr.            ... Appellants

                                   Versus

Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti, Akola & Ors.   ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.


             Leave granted.





2.    The question involved in this appeal is whether  respondent  no.  1  -
Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti, Akola, an "aghadi" or "front"  formed  by  some  of
the elected councillors of respondent no. 5 -Akola Municipal Corporation  in
March, 2013, without its  registration  under  second  proviso  to   Section
31A(2) of the  Maharashtra  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  1949  (for  short
"1949 Act") stood registered and recognized as a  party  or  group  for  the
purposes of representation, and  as  such  whether  the  petition  filed  by
respondent no.1 before the High Court challenging  the   Standing  Committee
constituted  under the 1949 Act  was maintainable.


3.       Brief facts of the case are that  elections  were  held  for  Akola
Municipal  Corporation  in  February,  2012,  wherein  73  councillors  were
elected to the House.  From amongst elected members, initially  23  members,
and thereafter in all 26 members claimed to  have formed an "aghadi"  (group
of persons) with the name "Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti".   On  5.3.2012,  within
one  month  of  the  election,  leader  of  the  said  group  submitted   an
application before the Divisional Commissioner for  its  registration  under
second proviso to Section 31A(2) of the 1949 Act.  It appears  that  in  the
meantime there was a controversy as to whether two of  the  elected  members
projected to be part of the  group  were  actually  members  of  the  aghadi
(respondent  no.1)  or  another  group  Akola  Vikas   Mahaaghadi   (present
respondent no.6).  The said issue  was  decided  by  the  High  court  by  a
detailed judgment dated 08.05.2012 passed in writ petition no. 1426 of  2012
holding that the aforesaid two members were not part  of  either  respondent
no. 1 or 6.  Thereafter,  the  Divisional  Commissioner  passed  a  detailed
order on 28.08.2012 whereby the application for registration  of  respondent
no.1 as aghadi filed in  March  2012  was  rejected.   Said  order  was  not
challenged by any party.  However,  meanwhile  Resolution  dated  29.04.2013
was  passed  by  the  Akola  Municipal  Corporation  whereby   the   present
appellants and six others (present respondent nos. 9 to 14)  were  nominated
in  the  Standing  Committee  as  members  thereof.   The   Resolution   was
challenged by respondent nos. 1 to 3 by filing a Writ Petition no.  2571  of
2013 before the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at  Bombay.   A
preliminary objection was raised on  behalf  of  Mayor  (respondent  no.  4)
before  the  High  Court  that  the  writ  petition  was  not  maintainable.
Defending the Resolution dated 29.04.2013, it was stated that there  was  no
illegality in nominating the members whose names  figured  in  the  Standing
Committee constituted vide Resolution dated 29.04.2013.

4.          After hearing the parties, the High Court  took  the  view  that
since the application for registration, in the register maintained  in  Form
IV as per Rule 5 of Maharashtra Local  Authority  Members'  Disqualification
Rules, 1987 (for short "1987 Rules"), was made within time,  the  respondent
no.1 should have been treated as separate aghadi, and as such  non-inclusion
of names of its members for  proportional  representation  in  the  Standing
Committee invalidates the Resolution dated  29.04.2013.    Accordingly,  the
High Court quashed the Resolution dated  29.04.2013  and  allowed  the  writ
petition.

5.        Aggrieved, by the above order  dated  14.08.2013,  passed  by  the
High Court, in Writ Petition No. 2571 of 2013, this appeal is filed  by  the
appellants who were respondent nos. 6 and 7 before the High  Court,  through
special leave.

6.             It is pleaded on behalf  of  the  appellants  that  the  High
Court has erred in law by accepting the writ petition  filed  by  respondent
nos. 1 to 3 which was not maintainable.  It is stated that  the  High  Court
ignored  the  fact  that  vide  order  dated  28.08.2012,   the   Divisional
Commissioner  had  rejected  the  application  for  registration  moved   by
respondent  No.  1  as  separate  aghadi.   It  is  further   pleaded   that
registration of post-poll group or alliance was mandatory under Section  31A
of  1949  Act  read  with  1987  Rules.    It  is  argued  before  us   that
unregistered aghadi is not an aghadi in  the  eyes  of  law,  and  as  such,
neither the same could have been recognized for its  representation  in  the
Standing Committee nor maintain the writ petition in the High Court.

7.           On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent  nos.  1  to  3,
who were the writ petitioners before the High Court,  contended  that  since
there was no rule or procedure prescribed for  registration  as  such  their
only duty was to   intimate the Divisional  Commissioner  under  Rule  3  of
1987 Rules about the formation of aghadi, and the rest was  the  ministerial
work to be completed. The contesting respondent nos. 1  to  3  placed  their
reliance   in  the  case  of  Jeevan  Chandrabhan  Idnani  and  Another  vs.
Divisional Commissioner, Konkar Bhawan and others (2012) 2 SCC 794.

8.    Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to  mention  as
to what is the meaning  of  word  'Aghadi',  and  for  what  purpose  it  is
constituted by the councillors of Corporation.  Word 'aghadi' is defined  in
Clause  (a)  of  Section  2  of   Maharashtra   Local   Authority   Members'
Disqualification Act, 1986 (for short "1986 Act") which reads as under:
"2.  In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,-

 "aghadi" or "front" means a group of persons  who  have  formed  themselves
into party for the purpose of setting up candidates for election to a  local
authority."

9.      Object of allowing elected members to form an  aghadi  as  post-poll
alliance is to give  proportional  representation  of  its  members  to  the
various   standing   committees   constituted   for   functioning   of   the
Corporations.

10.         Second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section  31A  of  1949  Act
allows the concillors to form an aghadi after the election  to  a  Municipal
Corporation.  Section 31A reads as under:
"31A.  Appointment  by  nomination  on  Committees  to  be  by  proportional
representation - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act  or  the
rules or bye-laws made thereunder, in the case of the following  committees,
except where it  is  provided  by  this  Act,  that  the  appointment  of  a
Councillor to any Committee shall be by virtue of his  holding  any  office,
appointment of Councillors  to  these  Committees,  whether  in  regular  or
casual  vacancies,  shall  be  made  by  the   Corporation   by   nominating
Councillors in accordance with the provisions of sub-section(2):-

      Standing Committee;

      Transport Committee;

      Any special Committee appointed under section 30;

     Any ad hoc Committee appointed under section 31"


(2)    In nominating the  Councillors  on  the  Committee,  the  Corporation
shall take into account the relative strength of the recognized  parties  or
registered parties or groups and nominate members, as nearly as may  be,  in
proportion to the strength of such parties or  groups  in  the  Corporation,
after consulting the Leader of the House, the Leader of Opposition  and  the
leader of each such party or group:



Provided  that,  the  relative  strength  of  the  recognized   parties   or
registered parties or groups or aghadi  or  front  shall  be  calculated  by
first dividing the total number of Councillors  by  the  total  strength  of
members of the Committee.  The  number  of  Councillors  of  the  recognized
parties or registered parties or groups or aghadi or front shall be  further
divided by the quotient of this division.  The figures so arrived  at  shall
be the relative strength of the respective recognized parties or  registered
parties  or groups or aghadi or front.  The seats shall be allotted  to  the
recognized parties or registered parties or groups or  aghadi  or  front  by
first considering the whole number of their respective relative strength  so
ascertained.   After allotting the seats in this  manner,  if  one  or  more
seats remain to be allotted, the same shall be  allotted  one  each  to  the
recognized parties or registered parties or groups or  aghadi  or  front  in
the descending order of the  fraction  number  in  the  respective  relative
strength  starting  from  the  highest  fraction  number  in  the   relative
strength, till all the seats are allotted:



Provided further that, for the purpose of deciding the relative strength  of
the recognized parties or registered parties or groups under this  Act,  the
recognized parties or registered parties or groups, or  elected  Councillors
not belonging to any such  party  or  group  may,  notwithstanding  anything
contained in the Maharashtra Local Authority Members' Disqualification  Act,
1986 (Mah. XX of 1987), within a period  of  one  month  from  the  date  of
notification of election results, from the  aghadi  or  front  and,  on  its
registration, the provisions of the said Act shall apply to the  members  of
such aghadi or front, as if it is a registered pre-poll aghadi or front.



(3)   If any question arises as regards the  number  of  Councillors  to  be
nominated on behalf of such party or group, the decision of the  Corporation
shall be final".



11.   In Jeevan Chandrabhan Idnani (supra), this Court  has  made  following
observations interpreting the second proviso of  sub-section  2  of  Section
31A:
"26. The second proviso to sub-section  (2)  of  Section  31-A  enables  the
formation of an aghadi or front within a period of one month from  the  date
of notification of the election results. Such an  aghadi  or  front  can  be
formed by various possible combinations of Councillors belonging  to  either
two  or  more  registered  parties  or  recognised  parties  or  independent
Councillors. The proviso categorically stipulates that such a  formation  of
an "aghadi" or "front" is possible  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in
the Disqualification Act. Because an "aghadi" or "front", as  defined  under
the Disqualification Act, clearly, can only be the combination  of  a  group
of persons forming themselves  into  a  party  prior  to  the  election  for
setting up candidates at  an  election  to  a  local  authority  but  not  a
combination of political parties or political parties and individuals.

27. Therefore, the second  proviso  to  Section  31-A(2)  of  the  Municipal
Corporations Act which is a later expression of the will of  the  sovereign,
in contrast to the stipulation as contained under Sections 2(a) and 3(2)  of
the Disqualification Act,  would  enable  the  formation  of  post-electoral
aghadis or fronts. However, such a formation is only  meant  for  a  limited
purpose of enabling such aghadis to  secure  better  representation  in  the
various categories of the  Committees  specified  under  Section  31-A.  The
component parties or individual independent Councillors,  as  the  case  may
be, in the case  of  a  given  front/aghadi  do  not  lose  their  political
identity and merge into the aghadi/front  or  bring  into  existence  a  new
political party. There is no merger  such  as  the  one  contemplated  under
Section 5 of the Disqualification Act.  It  is  further  apparent  from  the
language of the second proviso that on the formation of such  an  aghadi  or
front, the same is  required  to  be  registered.  The  procedure  for  such
registration is  contained  in  the  Maharashtra  Local  Authority  Members'
Disqualification Rules, 1987.

28. Once such an aghadi is registered by a legal fiction created  under  the
proviso, such an aghadi is treated as  if  it  were  a  pre-poll  aghadi  or
front. The proviso further declares that once such a registration  is  made,
the provisions of the Disqualification Act apply  to  the  members  of  such
post-poll aghadi. We do not propose to examine  the  legal  consequences  of
such a declaration as it appears  from  the  record  that  a  complaint  has
already been lodged against Respondents 6 to 13 herein under the  provisions
of the Disqualification Act. [pic]The limited question before us is  whether
the first respondent was legally right in registering  an  aghadi  or  front
formed after the lapse of one month from the date  of  the  notification  of
the election results.

                  XXX           XXX             XXX           XXX

30. In substance, the High Court held that the interpretation of Section 31-
A depends upon the tenor and scheme of the subordinate legislation.  Such  a
principle of statutory construction is not normally resorted to save in  the
case of interpretation of an old enactment where the language is  ambiguous.
We are conscious of the fact that there is some  difference  of  opinion  on
this principle but for the purpose of the present case we do  not  think  it
necessary to examine the  proposition  in  detail  as  in  our  opinion  the
language of Section 31-A is too explicit to require any other  external  aid
for the interpretation of the same.  Subordinate  legislation  made  by  the
executive in exercise of the powers delegated by the legislature,  at  best,
may reflect the understanding of the executive of the scope  of  the  powers
delegated. But there is no inherent guarantee that such an understanding  is
consistent with the true meaning and purport of the parent enactment.

31. Such variations of the relative strength of aghadis would  have  various
legal consequences provided under the Disqualification Act.  Depending  upon
the fact situation in a given  case,  the  variation  might  result  in  the
consequence  of  rendering  some  of  the   Councillors   disqualified   for
continuing as Councillors. Section 31-A of  the  Municipal  Corporation  Act
only enables the formation of an aghadi or front within  a  month  from  the
date of the notification of the results of the  election  to  the  Municipal
Corporation. To permit recognition of variations in  the  relative  strength
of the political parties [pic]beyond the abovementioned period of one  month
would be plainly in violation of the  language  of  the  second  proviso  to
Section 31-A."


12.     We have already discussed that an aghadi formed  after  election  is
required to be registered as provided in sub-section (2) of Section  31A  of
1940 Act. Rule 5 of 1987 Rules, which relates to maintaining a  register  of
information as to councilors and members, provides as under:



"Register of information as to councilors or members.- (1) The  Commissioner
in the case of a councilor of a Municipal Corporation and the Collector,  in
the case of any other councilor or member, shall  maintain  in  Form  IV,  a
register based on the information furnished under rules 4 and 5 in  relation
to the councilor of a municipal party, Zilla Parishad party or, as the  case
may be, member of a Panchayat Samiti Party."


13.          There is no detailed procedure prescribed for  registration  of
an aghadi.  It is evident from Rule 5 quoted above, that power  to  register
vests with the Commissioner.  The word "Commissioner" is defined  in  clause
(c) of Rule 2 of 1986 Act   and the same is reproduced below:

"(c) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of a revenue  division  appointed
under Section 6 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966".

14.         In earlier round, respondent no. 1 filed writ petition no.  1426
of 2012 challenging Resolution dated 20.03.2012 passed in the  General  Body
Meeting of Akola Municipal Corporation which was decided by the  High  Court
with the following two concluding paragraphs:
"30.   This discussion leads to conclusion that Respondent Nos. 5 & 6  could
not have been treated as members either of Respondent No. 4 or then  of  the
petitioner.    The  proportionate  representation  of   the   Petitioner   &
Respondent No. 4 on Standing Committee needed to be worked out  by  ignoring
them.  The Petitioner therefore, is  rightly  given  5  members.   But  then
there has to  be  proportionate  reduction  in  representation  allotted  to
Respondent 4.  Strength of Respondent No. 4 in general body  of  73  is  33.
It therefore gets 7.23 seats in Standing Committee i.e. 7 seats.   One  seat
remains vacant and decision about it cannot be taken  as  Respondent  No.  3
Divisional  Commissioner  has  still   not   completed   his   exercise   of
verification.   First  proviso  to  Section   31A(2)   does   not   prohibit
Corporation  from filling in such vacancy by  nominating  on  the  Committee
any member not belonging to any such party or group.  If no such  member  is
available, Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as also Petitioner have to  start  working
with Standing Committee of 15 members only & continue  till  the  Respondent
No. 3 decides on the validity of change or then status of Respondent Nos.  5
& 6.  It is settled position that law does not expect  compliance  with  the
impossibilities.  Holding  of  a  General  Body  Meeting  for  this  limited
purpose is essential.  If Respondent 3 finds  Respondent  Nos.  5  &  6  not
disqualified, Corporation can thereafter, proceed to fill in  the  sixteenth
vacancy.

31.   Accordingly, Respondent No. 4 Aghadi as also Respondent  Nos.  1  &  2
are directed to bring down representation of Respondent No.  4  on  Standing
Committee from 8 to 7.  Proceedings and meeting conducted on 20.03.2012  are
quashed & set-aside to that extent.  Respondent Nos.  1,2  &  4  to  hold  a
general body meeting to  bring  down  the  strength  of  representatives  of
Respondent No. 4 from 8 to 7.  Respondent 1 Corporation is free to  fill  in
resulting vacancy by nominating on the Standing Committee  a  Councillor  as
per first proviso to Section 31A(2) of the Corporation Act in this  meeting.
 Said general body meeting be  held  within   period  of  three  weeks  from
today.  If 16th seat in  Standing  Committee  can  not  be  filled  in,  the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 shall function with Standing Committee of 15  members
only.   Petition is thus partly allowed.  Rule is  made  absolute  in  above
terms.  However, there shall be no order as to costs."

But in that round of  litigation,  Divisional  Commissioner  was  neither  a
party, nor any direction was sought against him.

15.         Shri Nikhil Nayyar, learned counsel for  the  respondent  no.  1
referred  to a copy of letter  dated  06.05.2013   (Annexure  R1/5)  annexed
with  the reply on behalf of respondent no. 1 and contended that  respondent
1 was  registered.   Per  contra  on  behalf  of  appellants,  Shri  Shekhar
Naphade, learned senior counsel drew our attention to  the   copy  of  order
dated 28.8.2012 (Annexure  P-5)  whereby  application  for  registration  of
Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti - respondent no. 1 as an aghadi was rejected by  the
Divisional Commissioner, Amravati.

16.         Copy of  communication dated 06.05.2013 (Annexure R-1/5)  issued
by  Municipal Secretary,  Akola  earlier  informing  that  Mahanagar  Sudhar
Samiti as one of the registered aghadi is re-produced below:
                             "O.N.AMNC/NS/25/12
                        Office of Municipal Secretary
                         Akola Municipal Corporation
                             Akola Dated.6/5/13
To  Shri Sunil Meshram
Member, MNC
Ward no.8-A

Subject - Regarding the list of Gatneta and Aghadi  which  are  approved  by
Divisional Commissioner, Amravati.

|S. No |            Name of          |Gatneta                   |
|      |Party/Aghadi/Gat             |                          |
|1)    |Akola Vikas Mahaaghadi       |Shri Madan Babulal Bhargad|
|2)    |Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti      |Shri Harish Ratanlal      |
|      |                             |Alimchandani              |
|3)    |Shivsena                     |Smt. Manusha Sanjay Shelke|
|4)    |Akola Shahar Vikas Aghadi    |Shri Beni Sh. Ganga       |
|      |                             |Beniwale.                 |

The Divisional  Commissioner  Amravati  had  issued  a  letter  bearing  no.
MNC/Namuna 5/akola/MNC/12/2012 Dtd.7/6/2012 by which it is  communicated  to
Municipal Corporation that four Aghadi and Gatneta are registered under  the
provisions of Maharashtra Local  Authorities  Members  Disqualification  Act
and the list of the same is appended herewith

                                             Sd/-
                                     Municipal Secretary Akola"


17.   Before above communication  the  Divisional  Commissioner  had  passed
order dated 28.08.2012, relevant extracts of  the  same  are  reproduced  as
under:
"BEFORE SHRI GANESH  THAKUR,  DIVISIONAL  COMMISSIONER,  AMRAVATI  DIVISION,
AMRAVATI.

                 Case No. 3/Akola M.C/2011-12

   Shri Harish Ratanlalji Alimchandani, Party
   leader, Mahanagar Sudhar Committee,
   Akola, Municipal Corporation, Akola, R/o.
   Aalsi Plots, Tq & Distt. Akola       ....Applicant


  Shri Madan Bodulal Bhargad,
  Party Leader, Akola Vikas
  Mahaaghadi, Municipal Corporation,
  Akola, R/o. Geeta Nagar, Tq &
  Distt. Akola                          ...Applicant


Adv. Milind Vaishnav.... On behalf of Applicant No. 1

                             O R D E R

      As per Maharashtra Local Authority  Membership  Disqualification  Act,
1986 (hereinafter referred to as "Disqualification Act")  and Rule  3(a)  of
the Maharashtra Local  Authority  Membership  Disqualification  Rules,  1987
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  "Disqualification  Rules")  thereunder,   on
05/03/2012 Shri Harish  Ratanlalji  Alimchandani,  Party  Leader,  Mahanagar
Sudhar Samiti, Akola, Municipal Corporation,  Akola  submitted  proposal  in
prescribed form  for  registration  of  "Mahanagar  Sudhar  Samiti,  Akola",
sponsored  by  "  Bhartiya  Janata  Party"  in  the  registration  book   of
Divisional Commissioner  Office.   Alongwith  the  present  application  the
applicant no.1 has  filed  list  of  members  (List  of  Councillors).   The
applicant no.2, Shri  Madan  Bodulal  Bhargad,  Party  Leader,  Akola  Vikas
Aghadi, Municipal Corporation, Akola on  16/03/2012  submitted  proposal  in
prescribed form as per provisions of Disqualification Act  for  registration
of Akola Vikas  Mahaaghadi  sponsored  by  Bhartiya  Rashtriya  Congress  in
registration book of the office of Divisional Commissioner.   Alongwith  the
proposal in prescribed form the applicant has submitted  list  of  total  35
members (List of Councillors).

On scrutiny of both the proposals, it comes  to  the  notice  that,  in  the
proposal submitted by applicant no.1 the name of Shri Sanjay Babulal  Badone
is at Sr.no.20 and name of Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone  is  at  Sr.no.21.  So
also, in the proposal filed by applicant no.  2  the  name  of  Shri  Sanjay
Babulal Badone is at Sr.no.(Five)  (2)  and  name  of  Sau.  Madhuri  Sanjay
Badone is at Sr.no.(Five)(3).  As the names of Shri  Sanjay  Babulal  Badone
and Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone are mentioned in both  the  lists,  confusion
has been created as to which vanguard/front they  are  members.   Therefore,
by  notice  dt.  23/03/2012  both  the  applicants  and  City  Secretary  of
Municipal Corporation  were  informed  to  remain  present  for  hearing  on
27/03/2012 alongwith original documents and proof.

On 27/03/2012  both  the  applicants  alongwith  their  Advocates  and  City
Secretary of Municipal Corporation Shri Gajanan  Madhusudan  Pande  remained
present for hearing.  In the said case, Adv. G.B. Lohiya  advanced  argument
on behalf of  Municipal Corporation, Akola.  Adv.  Santosh  Rahate  advanced
his argument on behalf of  Shri  Sanjay  Babulal  Badone  and  Sau.  Madhuri
Sanjay Badone.

           _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

           _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


In the affidavit dt. 14/03/2012 sworn by  Shri  Sanjay  Babulal  Badone  and
Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone there is no name  and   signatures  of  witnesses
and on 14/03/2012 the said affidavit has been recorded  at  Sr.no.174/12  by
Notary Shri R.R. Deshpande, Adv.  As per provisions of Indian Evidence  Act,
the said affidavit cannot be held as complete unless  attested.   Therefore,
there is no sufficient scope to treat the  said  affidavit  of  Shri  Sanjay
Babulal Badone and Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone as valid.

After considering all the aspects above in totality and on  careful  perusal
of concerned documents filed in the case it comes to the notice  that,  from
the entry made by Stamp Vendor on the stamp papers, the stamp papers  appear
to have been purchased on  23/02/2012  for  the  affidavit  of  Shri  Sanjay
Babulal Badone and Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone attached to the  proposal  dt.
05/03/2012 submitted by applicant  no.1  Shri  Harish  Alimchandani  to  the
Divisional  Commissioner  for  registering  the  Mahanagar   Sudhar   Samiti
sponsored by Bhartiya Janta Party  as  per  provisions  of  rule  3  of  the
Disqualification  Rules.    Yet  the  date  of  attestation  being  not   as
'23/02/2012' it is "22/02/2012".   How  the  affidavit  has  been  sworn  on
22/02/2012 by purchasing stamp papers on 23/02/2012 is  an  incomprehensible
aspect.  He filed Xerox copies of said affidavit after receipt of notice  in
the case before the Divisional Commissioner.  It is a notable  aspect  that,
Shri Harish Alimchandani has not submitted  original  copies  of  affidavits
during hearing of present case.


Shri Sanjay Babulal Badone and Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone have been  elected
from Prabhag no.  34-A  and  no.34-B  in  the  Akola  Municipal  Corporation
elections as independent candidates.  As the applicant  no.1  and  applicant
no.2 have failed to file any kind of reliable documents in regard as  to  in
which front created in the Akola Municipal Corporation Shri  Sanjay  Babulal
Badone and Sau. Madhuri Sanjay Badone have participated, I have come to  the
conclusion  that  it  does  not  become  clear  that  definitely  to   which
vanguard/Committee/front out of  Mahanagar  Sudhar  Committee  sponsored  by
Bhartiya Janta  Party  or  Akola  Vikas  Mahaaghadi  sponsored  by  Bhartiya
Rashtriya Congress, Shri Sanjay  Babulal  Badone  and  Sau.  Madhuri  Sanjay
Badone are attached.

Therefore, the following order is being passed.

                       ORDER

   As   per   provisions   of   Maharashtra   Local   Authority   Membership
Disqualification Act 1986  and Rule 3(a) of the Maharashtra Local  Authority
Membership Disqualification Rules, 1987,  the  proposal  submitted  by  Shri
Harish Ratanlalji  Alimchandani,  Party  Leader,  Mahanagar  Sudhar  Samiti,
Akola, Municipal Corporation, Akola in prescribed form for  registration  of
"Mahanagar Sudhar Samiti, Akola", sponsored by   Bhartiya  Janata  Party  on
05/03/2012  for  registration  in  the  Register  Book  of  the  office   of
Divisional Commissioner, is hereby rejected.

   As   per   provisions   of   Maharashtra   Local   Authority   Membership
Disqualification Act 1986  and Rule 3(a) of the Maharashtra Local  Authority
Membership Disqualification Rules, 1987,  the  proposal  submitted  by  Shri
Madan  Bodulal  Bhargad,  Party  Leader,   Akola  Vikas  Mahaaghadi,  Akola,
Municipal Corporation, Akola in prescribed form for registration of "  Akola
Vikas Mahaaghadi Akola", sponsored by  Bhartiya Rashtriya Congress Party  on
16/03/2012  for  registration  in  the  Register  Book  of  the  office   of
Divisional Commissioner, is hereby rejected.

The said order passed today on 28th August,  2012  under  my  signature  and
seal.

                              Sd/- 28.08.2012
                              (Ganesh Thakur)
                 Divisional Commissioner, Amravati"

18.         We have gone through  the  above  two  documents.   Order  dated
28.08.2012  passed  by  Divisional  Commissioner,  Amravati,   whereby   the
application for registration was disposed of, shows that the application  of
the writ petitioners was rejected as affidavits  of  Sanjay  Babulal  Badone
(respondent no. 14) and Smt. Madhuri Sanjay Badone were not  complete.   The
two,  who  were  elected  from  Prabhag  no.31  and  Prabhag  no.  34-B   as
independent candidates, failed to file any document  to  show  as  to  which
group they belonged.  Their names figured in two groups.

19.         In the order dated 28.08.2012 the Divisional  Commissioner  also
referred to a serious infirmity in accepting the proposal, as he found  that
the affidavit was sworn to and attested on 22.02.2012,  whereas  the  stamps
were purchased on 23.02.2012 which the Divisional Commissioner  held  to  be
an incomprehensible act of the proposer.   Such  serious  infirmities  which
weighed with the Divisional Commissioner in passing the order  of  rejection
dated 28.08.2012 cannot be found fault with.  Considering the Scheme of  the
1987 Rules, we are convinced that  it  was  incumbent  upon  the  Divisional
Commissioner to hold a meaningful exercise of scrutinizing the proposal  for
registration and pass a positive order of registration and  then  alone  the
exception carved out under Section 31A(2) of the  1949  Act,  even  for  the
limited purpose to get rid of disqualification under the 1987 Rules  can  be
allowed to operate.  Viewed in that respect also the order dated  28.08.2012
assumes greater significance and,  therefore,  unless  and  until  the  said
order was set aside in the manner known to law, the formation of the  aghadi
as claimed by the first respondent could not have come into effect.

20.         It is not disputed  that  no  one  challenged  the  order  dated
28.08.2012 passed by the Divisional  Commissioner,  as  such  the  same  has
attained finality.  That  being  so,  the  Mahanagar  Sudhar  Samiti,  Akola
(respondent no.1) cannot be said to be a registered group as required  under
second proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 31A of the  Act  of  1949.   In
our opinion, the High Court has erred in law by ignoring the above order  of
the Divisional  Commissioner,  and  holding  that  respondent  no.  1  stood
registered.   If there was objection to registration of an  aghadi,  on  the
ground that names of certain members were falsely or wrongly  shown  in  the
list, the Commissioner had no option but to verify the same.  And,  in  such
cases, unless the verification is done, an aghadi can not be  said  to  have
got registered, by merely submitting an  application  within  one  month  of
election to Municipal Corporation.   Had  the  writ  petitioners  challenged
order dated 28.08.2012 passed  by  the  Divisional  Commissioner,  with  the
Resolution dated 29.04.2013, the situation would have been  different.   But
in the present case, order of Divisional Commissioner rejecting  application
for registration has attained finality, and  same  cannot  be  ignored.   As
such, writ petition filed by respondent nos. 1 to 3 questioning validity  of
resolution dated 29.04.2013 was liable to be dismissed.
21.         Therefore, this appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly,  the
appeal is allowed and impugned order dated  14.8.2013  passed  by  the  High
Court in Writ Petition no. 2571  of  2013  is  hereby  set  aside,  and  the
Resolution dated 29.04.2013 shall stand restored.  No orders as to costs.


           .....................................................J.
                     [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]

   ......................................................J.
                               [Prafulla C. Pant]

New Delhi;
February 02, 2015.