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Friday, January 30, 2015

Whether by the alleged action the respondents-Companies directly or indirectly had transferred or parted with their interest/benefit under their respective agreements for licence. Whether the respondents-Companies violated the terms as contained in Clause 4(h) of agreement and Clause 3(p)of their lease deed and Whether the respondents-Companies are liable to pay transfer fee for alleged transfer of its own interest.

     Whether  by  the  alleged  action  the  respondents-Companies  directly   or
indirectly had transferred  or  parted  with  their  interest/benefit  under
their respective agreements for licence.
Whether the respondents-Companies violated the terms as contained in  Clause
4(h) of agreement and  Clause 3(p)of their lease deed and
Whether the  respondents-Companies  are  liable  to  pay  transfer  fee  for
alleged transfer of its own interest.=


 In the present case it has not been denied that respondent  company
M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd. and the other company Super Agro  Tech.  Ltd.
are   family   held   companies   of   the   same   family   having   common
Directors/Promoters. Pursuant to the  order  of  amalgamation  by  the  High
Court the plot of land in question namely A-9, A-10, Industrial  Area  Unnao
Site-II which was allotted to Super Agro Tech. Ltd. became the asset of  the
respondent company M/s Super  Tannery  (India)  Ltd.   As  per  Amalgamation
Scheme, all the property, rights and power of Super Agro Tech. Ltd.,  having
its office at 184/170, Jajmau Kanpur was transferred without further act  or
deed to M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd. Thus it is clear that  by  the  order
of the Court the premises in question  was  transferred  in  favour  of  the
other Company.
  In view of the aforesaid facts as noticed in  each  case,  we  hold
that the appellant rightly issued notice demanding transfer  fee  from  each
of the respondents and there was no reason for the High Court  to  interfere
with the same.

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO.2731 OF 2005


U.P. STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV.CORPN. LTD.                         APPELLANT

                          VS.

MONSANTO MANUFACTURES (P) LTD. & ANR.               RESPONDENTS

WITH

C.A.NO.1310 OF 2006

C.A.NO.1318 OF 2015 (@SLP(C) NO.16404 of 2006)

C.A.NO. 1319 OF 2015 (@SLP(C) NO.5838 of 2008)


                               J U D G M E N T


         Leave granted in SLP (C) No.16404 of 2006  and  SLP(C)  No.5838  of
2008.
2.       The Government of Uttar Pradesh acquired land in various  districts
and conveyed the same to the  appellant-U.P.  State  Industrial  Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Corporation'  for  short)  for
the purpose of  setting  up  industrial  area.  The  Corporation  thereafter
divided the said land
into plots for leasing  the  same  to  industrial  units.  The  respondents-
Companies, applied to the  appellant-Corporation  for  grant  of  lease.  On
receiving part premium of the plot, the appellant executed an agreement  for
licence and  later  executed  lease  deed  in  favour  of  the  respondents-
Companies. Later the  appellant-Corporation  made  an  allegation  that  the
respondents-companies' share holders transferred their company/their  shares
to new shareholders without  the  consent  of  appellant-Corporation,  which
amounted to transfer of interest, for which transfer levy is required to  be
deposited. Demand notices were issued by the  appellant-Corporation  to  the
respondents-Companies.  Those  demand  notices  were   challenged   by   the
respondents-Companies in  different  writ  petitions  or  suits  which  were
allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature  at  Allahabad
by impugned judgments.

3.       In the  aforesaid  cases  the  High  Court  held  that  unless  the
respondents-Companies transfer its right in the plot in question  in  favour
of another legal entity, there is no question to apply clause  4(h)  of  the
Agreement for licence. The High Court  further  held  that  mere  change  in
shareholders or Directors, does not change legal entity of the  Company  and
as such it continues unchanged.

4.       The questions that arise for our  consideration  in  these  appeals
are:
Whether  by  the  alleged  action  the  respondents-Companies  directly   or
indirectly had transferred  or  parted  with  their  interest/benefit  under
their respective agreements for licence.
Whether the respondents-Companies violated the terms as contained in  Clause
4(h) of agreement and  Clause 3(p)of their lease deed and
Whether the  respondents-Companies  are  liable  to  pay  transfer  fee  for
alleged transfer of its own interest.

5.  The facts leading to the cases are as follows:-
Monsanto Manufactures Private Ltd.(A Company registered under the Companies
Act, 1956)
         The respondent-Company applied  to  the  appellant-Corporation  for
grant of lease of plot of  land  bearing  no.38/1-A  situated  in  Sahibabad
Industrial Area, Site No.4 of Tehsil   and  District  Ghaziabad  admeasuring
14,533 square yards for the purpose  of  constructing  an  industrial  unit.
The appellant-Corporation after receiving part  premium  of  the  plot  land
executed an agreement for licence on  12th  June,  1978  in  favour  of  the
respondent-Company. The possession of the  land  was  given  on  12th  June,
1978. After construction of the building of  the  factory,  the  respondent-
Company and the appellant-Corporation  executed  a  deed  of  lease  on  5th
September, 1979 for a period of 90 years. Later,  the  appellant-Corporation
vide letter dated 12th April, 1994 asked the respondent-Company  to  provide
the list of its Directors and shareholders duly certified by  the  Chartered
Accountant.  The  same  was  furnished  by  the  respondent-Company  to  the
appellant-Corporation  on  7th  May,  1994.  According  to  the   appellant-
Corporation the respondent-Company changed the  Directors  and  shareholders
without prior permission and consent of the appellant-Corporation and  since
the respondent-Company was purchased  by  the  present  Directors  from  the
previous Directors. The appellant-Corporation  by  letter  dated  27th  May,
1994 asked for details in order to take necessary action in accordance  with
the terms of the lease deed.  The  respondent-Company  categorically  denied
the allegations levelled by the appellant-Corporation by their letter  dated
27th September, 1994.
6.        By  letter  dated  1st  October,  1999  the  appellant-Corporation
demanded  Rs.25,51,781/-  from  respondent-Company  towards  transfer   levy
charges as the original shareholders of the  respondent-Company  transferred
their entire shareholding and interest to the  new  shareholders  and  there
was change in the Directors of  the  respondent-Company.  According  to  the
appellant such change makes the shifting of the controlling interest of  the
respondent-Company and transfer levy for the  same  was  demanded  from  the
respondent-Company  as  per  the  rules  of  the  Corporation.  The  Company
submitted its reply vide letter dated 8th December, 1999 and reiterated  its
earlier stand to the effect that there is no breach  of  any  terms  of  the
lease deed as no transfer or assignment or sale of premises in question  has
been made.  However, it was  not  accepted  by  the  Corporation,  who  sent
another reminder dated 13th January, 2000 asking the Company to  pay  a  sum
of Rs.25,51,781/- towards transfer levy charges.
         The aforesaid demand  notice  was  challenged  by  the  respondent-
Company before the High Court of Allahabad which by impugned judgment  dated
11th May, 2004 allowed the writ petition.
U.P. Twiga Fiberglass Limited (A  Company  registered  under  the  Companies
Act, 1956)
7.       The appellant-Corporation executed an  agreement  with  respondent-
Company  followed  by  lease  deed  dated  27th  May,  1977  by  which   the
Corporation leased plot nos.9 and 23-A  admeasuring  approximately  1,10,926
square meters of land situated  at  Sikandrabad  Industrial  Area,  District
Bulandshahr,  Uttar  Pradesh  to  the  respondent-Company.   The  lease  was
executed for 90 years.  In the year 1994,  the  respondent-Company  suffered
heavy losses to the  tune  of  Rs.42  crores.   Therefore,  the  respondent-
Company sold almost its entire shares including shares of its promoters  and
shares lying with financial institutions  to  a  foreign  company  known  as
"Rotar India Ltd.". As entire shares of the  respondent-Company  transferred
to Rotar India Ltd., the promoters of the said Company were replaced by  new
promoters/Directors.
8.       According to  the  appellant-Corporation,  in  view  of  the  above
disposal of controlling interest in the venture of  the  existing  allottee,
they were liable to pay transfer levy as per Clause 6(f) of  the  guidelines
of the Corporation pertaining to reconstitution and transfer.
9.       The Corporation vide its letter dated 26th  April,  1995  requested
the respondent-Company to supply list  of  new  shareholders,  list  of  new
Directors  and  copies  of  Memorandum  of  Association  and   Articles   of
Association.  However, it is alleged that respondent-Company  neglected  the
same  and  refused  to  supply  the  documents.  The   appellant-Corporation
thereafter vide letter dated 15th May, 1995 asked the respondent-Company  to
pay a sum of Rs.24,95,835/- towards transfer levy as there was  disposal  of
controlling interest in the venture by  the  existing  allottee.   The  said
demand of transfer levy, according to appellant, was as per lease  deed  and
guidelines of the Corporation pertaining to re-constitution and transfer.
10.      Being aggrieved the respondent-Company filed  suit  bearing  No.876
of 1996 before Civil Judge, Bulandshahr  seeking  permanent  injunction  and
praying for restraining the appellant-Company from claiming  any  amount  as
transfer levy. The appellant  filed  written  statement  and  contested  the
suit.
11.      The Civil Judge, Bulandshahr vide judgment and  decree  dated  23rd
January, 1999 allowed the suit and directed  the  appellant-Corporation  not
to charge transfer levy from the respondent-Company. The Civil  Judge,  held
that the respondent-Company is a legal person and disposal of  its  majority
shares in the name of a foreign Company namely Rotar  India  Ltd.  does  not
change the legal status of the Company and therefore, there is no  transfer.

12.      The appellant-Corporation being  dissatisfied  with  the  aforesaid
order filed Civil Appeal No.45 of 1999  in  the  Court  of  District  Judge,
Bulandshahr  which  was  dismissed  vide  order  dated  15th   July,   2000.
Thereafter, the appellant-Corporation filed Second Appeal  No.1425  of  2000
before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and the same  dismissed  by
impugned judgment dated 24th October, 2005.

M/s Enrich Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd.(A Company registered under the
Companies Act, 1956)
13.      One M/s Tyres & Tubes Co. Pvt. Ltd. having its  registered   office
at Scooters India Ltd. Premises, Sarojini  Nagar,  PO  Lucknow  through  its
Directors Shri S.Sounderarajan s/o of late Shri  S.  Srinivasan  applied  to
appellant-Corporation for allotment  of  plots  of  land.   After  agreement
which was followed by lease deed dated 21st December,  1976  the  appellant-
Corporation  allotted   industrial   plot   no.A-4   and   A-5   admeasuring
approximately  40,489  square  yards  and  8.36  square  yards  respectively
situated at site no.2, Rai Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh  to  M/s  Tyres  &  Tubes
Company Pvt. Ltd. The lease was for 90 years.  M/s Tyres &  Tubes  Co.  Pvt.
Ltd. suffered heavy losses and pursuant to its winding  up,  Allahabad  High
Court vide judgment and order dated 9th  January,  1996  appointed  Official
Liquidator. The Official Liquidator sold the properties of M/s Tyres &  Tube
Co. Pvt. Ltd. including right and  interest  on  the  land  in  question  to
respondent M/s Enrich Engineering Pvt. Ltd.  The said sale was  affirmed  by
the Allahabad High Court vide order dated 9th February,  2000.  Pursuant  to
the order of the  Allahabad  High  Court  dated  10th  September,  2003  the
Official Liquidator issued  sale  certificate  dated  12th  March,  2004  in
favour of respondent-Company.
14.      The appellant-Corporation  was  not  a  party  in  the  winding  up
proceedings nor was any notice issued to the  appellant-Corporation  by  the
Official Liquidator.  On  knowing  about  transfer  of  the  rights  of  the
original  allottee-  M/s  Tyres  &  Tubes  Co.  Pvt.  Ltd.,  the  appellant-
Corporation  demanded  transfer  levy  amounting  to  Rs.3,80,621.25/-  from
respondent-Company.  According to the appellant, such demand was  made  from
the respondent-Company, as the said company had purchased M/s Tyres &  Tubes
Co. Pvt. Ltd., with all its assets and liabilities.

15.      Against the demand, respondent-Company preferred  a  writ  petition
being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.56982 of 2005 before the  Allahabad  High
Court which was allowed by the impugned judgment  dated  27th  April,  2006.
The demand notice was set aside by  the  High  Court  in  view  of  judgment
rendered in another similar case.
M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd.(A  Company  registered  under  the  Companies
Act, 1956)
16.               The appellant-Corporation entered into an agreement  dated
10th October, 1990 with one M/s Super Agro  Tech  Ltd.  for  setting  up  of
specialty paper  unit  in  industrial  plot  nos.A-9  and  A-10  admeasuring
approximately 45,080/- square meters in Industrial  Area  Unnao  Site-2.  No
right whatsoever in regard to transfer of  said  plots  were  given  to  the
licensee M/s Super Agro Tech Ltd. The  possession  of  the  said  plots  was
handed over on 25th January, 1991 and subsequently lease was also  executed.
 M/s Super Agro Tech Ltd. thereafter did not  set  up  any  specialty  paper
unit and no investment was made.   According  to  the  appellant-Corporation
said licensee M/s Super Agro Tech Ltd. with a view to enrich itself  started
amalgamation proceeding with  the  new  company  namely  M/s  Super  Tannery
(India)  Ltd.-respondent  herein.  The  said  amalgamation  was   a   mutual
understanding between M/s  Super  Agro  Tech  Ltd.  and  M/s  Super  Tannery
(India) Ltd. The Allahabad  High  Court  vide  order  dated  9th  May,  1997
sanctioned the amalgamation in Company Petition No.32 of  1997.  Though  the
land belongs to the appellant-Corporation, it was not made a  party  to  the
said petition. According  to  the  appellant-Corporation,  the  amalgamation
does not  create  any  right  whatsoever  on  respondent-M/s  Super  Tannery
(India) Ltd. over industrial plots  in  question  and  the  said  two  plots
cannot be legally transferred to the new  Company  i.e.  M/s  Super  Tannery
(India) Ltd.
17.                The  respondent-Super  Tannery  (India)  Ltd.   made   an
application for the transfer of the said industrial plot. On  such  request,
the appellant-Corporation demanded transfer  levy  from  M/s  Super  Tannery
(India) Ltd. for transfer of the said industrial plot.  However,  no  amount
was deposited.  The Corporation by notice dated 3rd November, 2001  demanded
a sum of Rs.34,23,954.51/- as on that date from M/s  Super  Tannery  (India)
Ltd. towards transfer levy.  The aforesaid  notice  was  challenged  by  the
respondent-M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd. by filing a  writ  petition  being
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.18535 of 2002 before Allahabad High  Court  and
the same was allowed, by the  impugned  judgment  dated  22nd  August,  2007
following the decision rendered in another case.


Case wise stand of the parties and finding of this Court.
Monsanto Manufactures Private Ltd.
18.      Learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation  submitted  that  the
respondent-Company  has  violated  Clause  3(p)  of  lease  deed  dated  5th
September, 1979 entered  into  between  the   said  Company  and  appellant-
Corporation inasmuch as its "Memorandum  of  Association"  and  "Article  of
Association" were  altered  without  the  written  consent  of  Lessor  i.e.
appellant-Corporation. In view of   the same the  appellant-Corporation  has
the right to determine the said lease deed dated 5th September, 1979.
19.      On the other hand, according to counsel for the respondent  as  the
Company has got separate legal status and the Corporation has  allotted  the
industrial plot to it by name and not in the  name  of  its  Directors,  the
Directors being only officials  working  on  behalf  of  the  Company,  mere
change of names of Directors or shareholders does not in any way  or  manner
affect the legality or status of the  respondent-Company.   It  was  further
contended that change of names of Directors, shareholders duly  done  within
the purview of the Companies Act, 1956, does not affect the legal status  of
the respondent-Company and much less there has  been  any  transfer  of  the
site by the Company to any other individual person.
20.      For  deciding  the  issue  involved  in  the  present  case  it  is
necessary to refer certain clauses of  licence  agreement,  lease  deed  and
guidelines issued by the appellant-Corporation which are common in  all  the
cases.
21.      Clause 4(h) of the licence agreement prohibits licensee's  acts  to
directly  or indirectly  transfer, assignment, sale, encumber or  part  with
its interest under the  benefit  of  the  said  Agreement  without  previous
consent in writing of the  Grantor,  relevant  portion  of  which  reads  as
follows:
"4(h). That the Licence will not directly or  indirectly  transfer,  assign,
sell, encumber or part with its  interest  under  or  the  benefit  of  this
Agreement or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever without the  previous
consent in writing of the Grantor and it shall be open  to  the  Grantor  to
refuse such consent or grant the same subject to such conditions as  may  be
laid down by the Grantor in the behalf."

22.      Sub-Clause (p) of Clause 3  of  lease  deed  also  prohibits    any
alteration in the Memorandum and Articles of Association or in  its  capital
structure without the written consent of the  Lessor,  relevant  portion  of
which reads as follows:
"3(p)    That the Lessee  being  a  registered  partnership  firm  declares,
affirms and undertakes that during the subsistence  of  the  terms  of  this
agreement, the said partnership shall not  be  dissolved,  reconstituted  or
wound up, and/or dealt with in any way which may jeopardize the  rights  and
interests of the  Lessor  in  the  matter  of  this  lease,  nor  shall  its
constitution be altered in any  manner  otherwise  written  consent  of  the
Lessor, first and obtained, and it shall not stand dissolved  on  the  death
or insolvency of any of its partners;
                                     OR
         The Lessee being an individual or sole proprietor of a firm,  shall
not allow any person(s) as partner(s) with him  without  the  prior  written
consent of the Lessor;
                                     OR
         The Lessee  being a Company shall not make or attempt to  make  any
alterations, whatsoever in the provisions of its Memorandum and Articles  of
Association or in its capital structure without the written consent  of  the
Lessor, first had and obtained, and the  Lessee  hereby  undertakes  to  get
registered the prescribed particulars of the charge hereunder  created  with
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies  under  Section  126  of  Companies  Act,
1956, within stipulated period.

         While granting its consent as aforesaid the Lessor may require  the
successor in interest of the Lessee to enter into a  binding  contract  with
the Lessor to abide by and  faithfully  carry  out  the  terms,  conditions,
stipulations, provisos and agreements herein contained or such  other  terms
and conditions as the Lessor may, in its discretion,  impose  including  the
payment  by  the  successor-in-interest  such  additional   premium   and/or
enhanced rent as the Lessor may in its discretion think proper. In the  even
of breach of this  condition  the  agreement  shall  be  determined  at  the
discretion of the Lessor.

         Provided that the right to  determine  this  agreement  under  this
clause will not be exercised if the  industry  at  the  premises  has   been
financed by the State Government or the Industrial  Finance  Corporation  of
India or the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India,  or  the
U.P.  Financial  Corporation  or  Pradeshiya   Industrial   and   Investment
Corporation of Uttar Pradesh or any scheduled bank(including the State  Bank
of India) and the said financing body or bodies mentioned  above  decide  to
take over possession or sell, or lease or assign  the  mortgaged  assets  in
exercise vesting in it or them by virtue of the deeds or  deed  executed  in
its or their favour by the Lessee as provided herein  above,  or  under  any
law for the time being in force."

23.      The Corporation has issued guidelines for  transfer/re-construction
in respect of the plots in the industrial area of  the  Corporation.  Clause
6.01(E) of the said guidelines prescribes Transfer Levy and  Clause  6.01(F)
defines transfer. The aforesaid provisions reads as follows:
"6.01(E) Transfer Levy - per sq.m. @ 5% to 15% of the  rate  of  premium  in
fast moving areas and 2.5% to 7.5% of the current  premium  in  slow  moving
areas prevailing on the date of issuance of transfer  approval  letter  will
be  changed  as  applicable.  While  calculating  the  transfer   levy   the
locational charges of a particular plot will  not  be  considered  and  only
basic premium will be taken into account.

 6.01(F) Transfer - Means disposal of controlling interest  in  the  venture
by the existing allottee.  In  the  case  of  reconstitution,  the  existing
allottee retains controlling interest except  in  case,  where  interest  is
transferred to family members as defined in 6.3(iv)(a) below or where  there
is  change  in  the  constitution  of  the  allottee  due  to   inheritance,
succession or operation of law."

24.      In the present case the entire shareholding of Goyal family  headed
by Mr. Amar Nath Goyal in the said company was  transferred  to  the  Mehta-
Lamba Family. The entire list of shareholders, Managing Director  and  Board
of Directors was provided by  Monsanto  to  the  appellant-Corporation  vide
letter dated 7.5.1994.  The record shows that the  original  subscribers  of
shares were  members  of  Goyal  family  and  the  entire  shareholding  was
transferred to Mehta-Lamba family. Therefore, the  original  subscribers  of
shares of respondent No. 1 Company were totally changed.
25.      The "Memorandum of Association" of  a  company  limited  by  shares
mandatorily prescribes in "Table-B" (Table-B of  1956  Act  and  Table-A  of
2013 Act deals  with  Company  Limited  by  shares)  of  the  Companies  Act
mandatorily prescribed that the names,  addresses,  description,  occupation
of subscribers shall be given in Memorandum of Association. In this case  as
the original subscribers of shares were changed in 1994, there was  material
alteration in the "Memorandum of Association" of respondent no. 1 Company.
26.      It was also contended that there was an alteration in "Articles  of
Association" of respondent no. 1  Company  as  well.   The  last  column  of
"Articles of  Association"  also  mandatorily  provides  for  giving  names,
addresses and description of subscribers. In this case, the  subscribers  of
shares has been completely changed from  the  Goyal  Family  to  Mehta-Lamba
Family and hence there was material alteration of "Articles of  Association"
of the respondent no. 1 Company.
27.      In this case, the ownership of a  huge  Industrial  plot  measuring
14,533 sq.  ft.  in  the  prestigious  and  economically  affluent  area  of
Sahibabad (Ghaziabad) has been transferred from Goyal family to  the  Mehta-
Lamba family for  material financial gains, by adopting  clever  means  that
too  without  taking  written  consent  of  the   Lessor   i.e.   appellant-
Corporation.  There are many instances/examples in  which  the  lessee  gets
allotment of huge industrial plots and thereafter sells the  same  for  huge
monetary gains. This adversely affects the aims and objectives of appellant-
Corporation i.e. the planned development of industrial areas  in  the  State
of Uttar Pradesh. The Hon'ble High Court ought not  to  have  interfered  in
the matter looking into the public interest involved and Clause 3(p) of  the
lease deed.
U.P. Twiga Fiberglass Limited
28.      Similar submissions as made in the above  case  were  made  by  the
learned counsel for  the  appellant  in  the  present  case  also.   It  was
contended that  the  respondent-U.P.  Twiga  Fiberglass  Ltd.  has  violated
Clause 3(p) of lease deed dated  27th  May,1977  entered  between  the  said
company  and  appellant-Corporation   inasmuch   as   its   "Memorandum   of
Association", "Articles of Association" and capital structure  were  altered
without the written consent of Lessor appellant-Corporation and in  view  of
the same, the appellant-Corporation has the  right  to  determine  the  said
lease deed dated 27th May,1977.
29.       Per  contra,  according   to   the   respondent,   the   aforesaid
contention(s) are fallacious, misconceived and untenable.   Learned  counsel
for the respondent made the following submissions:
i)       The Lease-Deed dated 27th  May,  1977  has  been  executed  by  the
respondent-company, in  the  capacity  of  a  "lessee".   Consequently,  the
provisions of the Lease-Deed obligate the Lessee/the  Company  and  not  its
shareholder(s);
ii)      The Lease-Deed contains no clause whatsoever, that authorises  such
levy of transfer-fee, nor does it prohibit any change in  the  share-holding
of the respondent-company. Even otherwise, such change in share-holding  was
committed with the express consent and approval of the petitioner;
iii)     Law recognises a categorical distinction between a Company and  its
share-holders, who have otherwise no right whatsoever on  the  assets  of  a
company. Reliance was placed on Constitution  Bench  decision  in  Bacha  F.
Guzdar, Bombay vs.Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74,  which
observed as follows:
         "A share-holder has got no interest in the property of the  company
though he has undoubtedly a right to participate in the profits if and  when
the company decides to divide them".
And
         "the Company is a juristic person and is distinct from  the  share-
holders. It is the Company which  owns  the  property  and  not  the  share-
holders".

iv)      In a relationship between the Lessor and a Lessee, it is the Lease-
Deed which is paramount and whose contents are binding on the parties.
v)       A  unilateral  guideline  issued  by  the  Lessor  cannot  be  held
applicable or binding to a lessee. On the  face  of  the  lease  deed,  such
guideline has  no  binding  force.  Further,  change  in  share-holding  was
admittedly done with the express consent/approval of the appellant; and
vi)      Any fee, penalty, compensation, damages or transfer charges  to  be
claimed by the lessor from the lessee must necessarily be  provided  in  the
lease-deed. Otherwise, such fee, penalty, compensation, damages or  transfer
charges being beyond the  terms  of  the  Lease-Deed  cannot  be  sought  or
claimed by the Lessor; Thus the levy of transfer-fee as sought  and  claimed
by the appellant is illegal, misconceived and untenable,  being  beyond  the
terms of the lease deed. It is not a transfer  in  law,  since  transfer  in
share-holding does not amount to  any  transfer  in  the  Company's  assets,
immovable or otherwise. It is equally not a  transfer  in  fact,  since  the
provisions  of  the  Lease-Deed  do  not  recognise/nor  prohibit  any  such
transfer.
vii)      The Guidelines and in particular Clause 6.01(F) is not  applicable
in the present case as there has been no "disposal of  controlling  interest
in the venture  by  an  existing  allottee".  Undoubtedly,  the  respondent-
company is the  "existing  allottee"  and  the  respondent-company  has  not
disposed its "controlling interest in the venture". In  other  words,  there
is no transfer even upon a literal construction of the Guidelines.
30.      It is not in dispute that the appellant-Corporation  on  27th  May,
1977 allotted huge plot measuring 1,10,926 sq. mtrs.  to  respondent  no.  1
Company in  the  industrial  area,  Sikandarabad,  Bulandshehar  on  nominal
amount. The respondent no. 1 clearly admitted that it had  a  huge  debt  of
Rs.13,14,00,000/- the different financial institutions  and,  therefore,  it
sold shares of company, its own shares, shares of promoters  and  shares  of
financial institutions to the foreign company, namely, "M/s Rotar Ltd."
31.      The appellant-Corporation in written statement filed  in  Suit  No.
876/1996 clearly and categorically mentioned that  the  shares  of  original
promoters were transferred in the name of new promoters of  foreign  company
and therefore, the  appellant-Corporation demanded list of new  shareholders
and Memorandum and "Articles of Association" of the Company. The  change  of
original promoters shares to the new  promoters  means  the  subscribers  of
shares were  changed  and,  therefore,  there  is  material  change  in  the
"Memorandum of Association" and "Articles of Association" of the Company.
32.      The appellant-Corporation clearly brought on record that  there  is
change in "Capital Structure" of the company and the "Capital structure"  in
common parlance means "debt-equity ratio".  In this case admittedly there  a
huge amount of Rs. 13,14,00,000/- was funded by the  foreign  company,  i.e.
"M/s Rotar  Ltd."  towards  settling  the  debt.   In  this  background  the
appellant alleged that   there is change in  "debt-equity  ratio"  resulting
alteration in the "capital structure" of the company.
33.       There  is  larger  public  interest  involved   in   incorporating
alteration in "Capital Structure" in Clause 3(p) of the  lease  deed.  There
are many instances where the company takes loan from third  parties  on  the
security and land and structure allotted to them in lease, keeping  in  dark
the lessor which amounts to incurring liabilities on  the  property  without
the knowledge of the lessor.  In this case also there  was  huge  amount  of
debt on the company as it  took  loan  on  land  and  building/factory  from
different  financial  institutions.  Therefore,  there  is  public  interest
involved for which consent of lessor was necessary.

M/s Enrich Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd
34.      In this case also similar submission has been made by the  parties.

35.      It is not in dispute that the huge plot of about  40,  489  &  8.35
sq. yards in the industrial area of Rai  Bareilly  (U.P.)  was  allotted  by
appellant-Corporation to M/s Tyres and Tubes Company Pvt. Ltd. As  the  said
company suffered heavy losses, on 9.1.1996 the company  Judge  of  Allahabad
High Court appointed Official Liquidator and perused High Court's  Order  on
12.3.2004 the said company was sold to M/s  Enrich  Engineering  Works  Pvt.
Ltd., by the Official Liquidator.
36.      Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was a case  of
reconstitution and  therefore  payment  of  transfer  fee  does  not  arise.
However, such submission can not be accepted in view  of  Clause  6.01(E)  &
(F) of the guidelines.  The fact that there is  a  change  of  hand  of  the
asset  including  the  land  in  question  by  transfer.    Therefore,   the
respondent is liable to pay transfer fee.

M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd.
37.      Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the huge  plot  of
45080 sq. mtrs. in Kanpur was allotted  to  M/s  Supre  Ago  Tech  Ltd.  for
establishing and running a "Specialty Paper Industry". In this case, only  a
"License  Agreement"  dated  10.10.1990  was  executed  by  UPSIDC  and  the
admitted fact on record is that no lease deed was executed  by  UPSIDC  with
M/s Super Agro Tech. Ltd.
38.      In view of the above,  M/s  Super  Agro  Tech  Ltd.  was  merely  a
licensee and as per  the  license  agreement  dated  10.10.1990  it  had  no
authority whatsoever to transfer the  said  industrial  land  to  M/s  Super
Tannery (I) Ltd.
39.      On the other  hand,  according  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the
respondents, due to  various  constraints  over  head  costs  and  financial
hardship company became non viable and the major production  activities  was
not feasible to run the company. In order to  avoid  the  future  problem  a
scheme of amalgamation was prepared as per the provisions of  the  Companies
Act, seeking amalgamation under Chapter V of the  Companies  Act.   A  joint
application was filed before the Allahabad High Court.  The High Court  vide
order dated 9.5.1997 allowed the petition for  amalgamation  and  sanctioned
the scheme of amalgamation and ordered that M/s Super Agro  will  be  merged
into M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd.
40.      In the present case it has not been denied that respondent  company
M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd. and the other company Super Agro  Tech.  Ltd.
are   family   held   companies   of   the   same   family   having   common
Directors/Promoters. Pursuant to the  order  of  amalgamation  by  the  High
Court the plot of land in question namely A-9, A-10, Industrial  Area  Unnao
Site-II which was allotted to Super Agro Tech. Ltd. became the asset of  the
respondent company M/s Super  Tannery  (India)  Ltd.   As  per  Amalgamation
Scheme, all the property, rights and power of Super Agro Tech. Ltd.,  having
its office at 184/170, Jajmau Kanpur was transferred without further act  or
deed to M/s Super Tannery (India) Ltd. Thus it is clear that  by  the  order
of the Court the premises in question  was  transferred  in  favour  of  the
other Company.
41.      In view of the aforesaid facts as noticed in  each  case,  we  hold
that the appellant rightly issued notice demanding transfer  fee  from  each
of the respondents and there was no reason for the High Court  to  interfere
with the same.
42.      For the reason aforesaid,  we  set  aside  the  impugned  judgments
dated 11th May, 2004 in C.W.P.No.5094 of 2000, 24th October, 2005 in  Second
Appeal No.1425 of 2000, 27th April, 2006 in Civil Misc.W.P.No.56982 of  2005
and 22nd August, 2007 in C.M. Writ Petition No.18535 of 2002 passed  by  the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and allow the appeals.

                                               ...........................J.
                                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                               ...........................J.
                              (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 29, 2015
-----------------------
21


as the prosecution has failed to prove the demand of illegal gratification made by the appellant from the complainant and acceptance of the bribe money by the appellant. Further, the phenolphthalein test cannot be said to be a conclusive proof against the appellant, as the colour of the solution with regard to the other samples were pink and had remained so throughout. However, the lime solution in which the appellant's hands were dipped in, did not show the same pink colour. The reason assigned by the Trial Court is that the colour could have faded by the lapse of time. The said explanation of the Trial Court cannot be accepted by us in view of the fact that the colour of the other samples taken by the Investigation Officer after the completion of the trap laid against the appellant had continued to retain the pink colour. Moreover, the sample of the shirt worn by the appellant which was produced before the Trial Court did not show any colour change on the shirt's pocket section, where the bribe money was allegedly kept by him after the complainant had allegedly given him the bribe money. Thus, on a careful perusal of the entire evidence on record along with the statement of the prosecution witnesses, we have to hold that the prosecution has failed to satisfy us beyond all reasonable doubt that the charge levelled against the appellant is proved.


 NON REPORTABLE





                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 192 of 2015
                       (S.L.P (Crl.) No.9835 of 2014)


C. SUKUMARAN                         ....APPELLANT

                                     VS.

STATE OF KERALA                     .....RESPONDENT




                               J U D G M E N T




V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.


    Leave granted.

This appeal is filed by the appellant  against  the  impugned  judgment  and
order dated 22.05.2014 passed by the High Court of Kerala, at  Ernakulam  in
Criminal Appeal No.108 of 2001, whereby the High Court  has  partly  allowed
the appeal of the appellant and upheld the order of conviction  recorded  by
the   Court   of   Ld.   Enquiry    Commissioner    and    Special    Judge,
Thiruvananthapuram, vide its judgment and order dated 30.01.2001 in C.C  No.
63 of 1999 and convicted the appellant  for  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') with rigorous  imprisonment
for a period of one year and  a  fine  of  Rs.10,000/-  and  in  default  of
payment of fine, to further undergo six months simple imprisonment.

For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged  on  behalf
of the parties in this appeal and with a  view  to  find  out  whether  this
Court is required to interfere  with  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High
Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:
    It is the case of the  prosecution  that  the  appellant,  who  was  the
"station writer" at the Fort Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, demanded  a
sum of Rs.1500/- from the complainant PW2, for  releasing  certain  articles
belonging to him, which were taken into custody by the police. PW2  was  the
surety to an accused in a criminal case pending before  the  Judicial  First
Class  Magistrate-II,  Thiruvanathapuram  and  since  the  accused  in  that
particular case had absconded, PW2 was ordered to pay Rs.3000/-  as  penalty
and a warrant was issued against him  in  this  regard.  Therefore,  he  was
apprehended by  the  police  and  his  personal  belongings,  including  the
bicycle, wallet, fountain pen, etc. were retained by  the  police.  PW2  was
subsequently released by the Magistrate, wherein he was given  further  time
to remit the money. It  is  the  case  of  the  prosecution  that  when  PW2
approached the police station on 09.12.1998, to  get  back  his  belongings,
the station writer demanded an amount of Rs.1500/- as  bribe  for  returning
the articles which were seized by the police.

PW2 approached PW6, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Special Investigation Unit, Thiruvanathapuram and gave  a
First Information Statement, upon which an  F.I.R.  was  registered  against
the appellant. Thereafter, a trap was arranged by PW6 and the appellant  was
arrested for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d)  of  the
Act. The Investigation Officer after completing all  the  formalities  filed
the final report before the Special Judge after framing the charges  against
the appellant. Several witnesses were examined and  various  documents  were
produced as evidence by the prosecution in support of  the  charges  against
the appellant.


 The learned Special Judge on appreciation of the evidence on  record  found
that the appellant was guilty of the offences punishable  under  Sections  7
and 13(1)(d) read with   Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  and  thereby  he  had
convicted and sentenced  him  with  3  years  of  imprisonment  each  under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act and further  ordered  that  the  sentence
must run concurrently. Aggrieved by the judgment  and  order  of  the  Trial
Court, the  appellant  had  preferred  an  appeal  before  the  High  Court,
questioning the correctness of the same and urging  various  legal  grounds.
The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence  has  partly  allowed  the
appeal of the appellant. The High Court held  that  the  conviction  of  the
appellant under Section 7 of the Act  is  not  warranted  as  the  essential
element of demand of  illegal  gratification  by  the  appellant,  from  the
complainant, is not proved. However, the High Court has held that  there  is
a strong evidence against the appellant under Section 13(1)(d)  of  the  Act
to show  his  culpability.  The  High  Court  further  held  that  there  is
sufficient evidence to prove that PW2 had paid two decoy notes  of  Rs.100/-
denomination to the appellant and he had voluntarily accepted the  money  as
bribe from PW2. Hence, the appeal of the appellant was  partly  allowed  and
the conviction of the appellant under Section 7 of the Act  was  set  aside.
However, his conviction under Section 13(1)(d)read with Section 13(2)of  the
Act was confirmed and the order of sentence was modified. Aggrieved  by  the
judgment of conviction and sentence, this  appeal  has  been  filed  by  the
appellant, urging certain legal grounds for setting aside the  judgment  and
order of conviction and sentence imposed upon him.

 It is the contention of the learned counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellant
that both in the First Information Statement and in the F.I.R, the  name  of
the appellant is not mentioned, specifically, in regard  to  the  demand  of
the bribe made by him from the complainant PW2. However, it is  specifically
mentioned in the complaint that the person who had demanded  the  bribe  was
the "station writer" of  the  Fort  Police  Station.  It  has  been  further
contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that  the  appellant  has
never been assigned the work of the "station writer" at the  police  station
and  further  urged  that  the  prosecution  has  failed  to   produce   any
documentary  evidence  to  prove  the  same   against   the   appellant   to
substantiate the charge against him.


  It  is  further  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  that  the  de-facto
complainant had deposed before the Special  Judge  in  this  case  that  one
Ajith, was the  "station  writer"  of  the  Fort  Police  Station,  who  had
demanded the bribe from him for the return of the seized  articles  to  him.
It is further stated that PW4, who is the Sub-Inspector of the  Fort  Police
Station had deposed that there was  an  "additional  station  writer"  named
Ajith in the police station, which was not considered by  the  courts  below
while recording the findings of the guilt of the appellant  on  the  charges
framed against him.

 It has been further contended by the  learned  counsel  on  behalf  of  the
appellant that as per the complaint, Rs.1500/-  was  allegedly  demanded  by
the appellant as bribe  money  from  the  complainant.  However,  the  money
allegedly paid and recovered from the appellant was  only  Rs.200/-.  Hence,
there is a huge disparity between the money allegedly demanded and  paid  to
the appellant by the complainant.

 Further, it is contended that there existed several contradictions  in  the
deposition of the other prosecution witnesses, particularly,  PW1  and  PW2,
who are the star  witnesses  of  the  prosecution  case,  as  they  did  not
subscribe to the prosecution version of  the  story  at  all.  It  has  been
further contended that the prosecution had only examined nine out of the  16
witnesses mentioned  in  the  charge  sheet.  Further,  the  conviction  and
sentence was imposed for the alleged offence  under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with Section 13 (2) of the Act by the High  Court  without  considering  the
relevant aspect of the case that in the absence of demand of  gratification,
the charge under Section 13(1)(d) of the  Act  is  wholly  unsustainable  in
law.

  On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned counsel on  behalf
of the respondent that the appellant is  the  station  writer  of  the  Fort
Police Station, a fact which has been stated by  the  prosecution  witnesses
in the case, which has been upheld by both the Trial Court  as  well  as  by
the High Court on proper appreciation of the evidence on record.


  It has been further contended by the learned counsel that  the  trap  laid
down by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance  and  Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Special Investigation Unit, Thiruvanathapuram, had resulted  in  the
capturing of the appellant and the phenolphthalein test was  conducted  then
and there itself. The result of the test was positive for each  one  of  the
Rs.100/- notes. It has been further contended by him that a  sample  of  the
appellant's shirt was also taken as evidence as he had  kept  the  notes  in
his pocket. The test result for the same was  also  found  to  be  positive.
Further, when the trap was being  laid  to  catch  the  appellant,  PW2  was
specifically told by  the  officer  of  the  Vigilance  and  Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Special Investigation  Unit  to  handover  the  bribe-money  to  the
appellant only when he would ask for the same. Hence,  the  appellant  would
have received the money only when he would  have  asked  for  the  same  and
therefore, there was demand and acceptance on the part of the appellant.

  On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on  behalf  of
the parties, we have to find out whether  the  concurrent  findings  on  the
charge under Section 13(1)(d)  of  the  Act,  recorded  by  the  High  Court
against the appellant is legal and valid and whether the judgment and  order
of conviction and sentence under Section 13(2) of the Act, imposed upon  the
appellant by the High Court, warrants interference by this Court.

  With reference to the abovementioned  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on
behalf of the parties and the evidence  on  record,  we  have  examined  the
concurrent finding of fact on the charge made against the appellant. It  has
been  continuously  held  by  this  Court  in  a  catena  of   cases   after
interpretation of the provisions of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act  that
the demand of illegal gratification by the accused is the sine qua  non  for
constituting an offence under the provisions of the Act.  Thus,  the  burden
to prove the accusation against the appellant  for  the  offence  punishable
under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act with regard to the acceptance  of  illegal
gratification from the complainant PW2, lies on the prosecution.

  In the present case, as has been rightly held by the High Court, there  is
no demand for the illegal gratification on the part of the  appellant  under
Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, in our view, the question of acceptance  of
illegal gratification from the complainant under the  provision  of  Section
13(1)(d) of the Act also does not arise. The learned Special Judge has  come
to the erroneous conclusion that the appellant had received  the  money  and
therefore he had recorded the finding that there was demand  and  acceptance
of the bribe money on the part of the appellant and convicted and  sentenced
the appellant. However, the High Court on  re-appreciation  of  evidence  on
record has held that the demand alleged to have been made by  the  appellant
from the complainant PW2, was not proved and that  part  of  the  conviction
and sentence was rightly set aside in the impugned  judgment.  However,  the
High Court has erroneously affirmed the conviction for the  alleged  offence
under Section 13(1)(d) read with  Section 13(2) of the Act, although as  per
law, demand by the appellant under Section 7 of the Act,  should  have  been
proved to sustain the charge under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act.

  Further, the fact that out of Rs.1500/- that  was  allegedly  demanded  as
bribe money from the complainant, an amount of only  Rs.250/-  was  paid  by
him, out of which the appellant allegedly managed to return Rs.50/-  to  the
complainant, since he had no money left, makes us pause and ponder over  the
facts and circumstances of the case and casts a serious shadow of  doubt  on
the sequence of events as narrated by the prosecution.

  Further, none of the prosecution witnesses have actually  deposed  in  the
case that the appellant was the person who had  demanded  and  accepted  the
bribe from the complainant and since  PW2  has  materially  turned  hostile,
therefore, neither the demand aspect nor the acceptance of the  bribe  money
can be verified from any other witnesses of the  prosecution.  Further,  PW1
in his deposition before the Special Judge has also not supported  the  case
of the prosecution, as he had refused to acknowledge the  ownership  of  the
tea shop, on the premises of which the bribe money  was  allegedly  accepted
by the appellant from the complainant. Hence, it is safe  to  say  that  the
prosecution has failed  to  prove  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt  that  the
appellant had accepted the illegal gratification from the complainant  under
Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. In support of the same, the learned counsel  on
behalf of the appellant has rightly placed reliance  upon  the  decision  of
this Court in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.[1], which reads thus:-
"8. ......there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made  any
demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be  relied
upon to come to the conclusion that the above material  furnishes  proof  of
the demand allegedly made by the accused. We  are,  therefore,  inclined  to
hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not  correct
in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The  only
other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes  from
the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is  admitted  by  the
accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of  the  currency  notes  from
the accused without proof of demand will not bring home  the  offence  under
Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as  the  offence  under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence  of  any  proof
of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means  or
abuse of position as a public  servant  to  obtain  any  valuable  thing  or
pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established"
                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)

 Now, coming to the legality  of  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  under
Section 13(2) of the Act by the High Court in its judgment, the same  cannot
be allowed to sustain in law, as the prosecution has  failed  to  prove  the
demand of illegal gratification made by the appellant from  the  complainant
and  acceptance  of  the  bribe  money  by  the  appellant.   Further,   the
phenolphthalein test cannot be said to be a  conclusive  proof  against  the
appellant, as the colour of the solution with regard to  the  other  samples
were pink and had remained so throughout.  However,  the  lime  solution  in
which the appellant's hands were dipped in,  did  not  show  the  same  pink
colour. The reason assigned by the Trial Court  is  that  the  colour  could
have faded by the lapse of time. The said explanation  of  the  Trial  Court
cannot be accepted by us in view of the fact that the colour  of  the  other
samples taken by the Investigation Officer after the completion of the  trap
laid against  the  appellant  had  continued  to  retain  the  pink  colour.
Moreover, the sample of the shirt worn by the appellant which  was  produced
before the Trial Court did not show any colour change on the shirt's  pocket
section, where  the  bribe  money  was  allegedly  kept  by  him  after  the
complainant had allegedly given him the bribe money.


 Thus, on a careful perusal of the entire evidence on record along with  the
statement  of  the  prosecution  witnesses,  we  have  to  hold   that   the
prosecution has failed to satisfy us beyond all reasonable  doubt  that  the
charge levelled against the appellant is proved.




 The decision of this  Court  referred  to  supra  upon  which  the  learned
counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance  upon  and  the  ratio
laid down in the above case, aptly applies to the  fact  situation  on  hand
and therefore, we have to grant the relief  to  the  appellant  by  allowing
this appeal.


 For the aforesaid  reasons,  the  appeal  is  allowed.  Since,  the  charge
against the appellant is not proved, the  conviction  and  sentence  imposed
upon the accused-appellant by the High Court  under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with Section 13(2) of the  Act  is  set  aside.  The  jail  authorities  are
directed to release the appellant forthwith, if he is  not  required  to  be
detained in any other case.


.....................................................................J.

                           [V. GOPALA GOWDA]



..................................................................J.
  [R. BANUMATHI]
 New Delhi,
 January 29, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    (2014) 13 SCC 55

Thursday, January 29, 2015

General Power of Attorney given by the complainant Company. The complaint was not signed either by Managing Director or Director of the Company. It is also not in dispute that PW-1 is only the employee of the Company. As per Resolution of the Company i.e. Ex.P3 under first part Managing Director and Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution. Under third part of the said Resolution they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc. But nothing on the record suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company. This apart, Managing Director and Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and by giving evidence. At best the said persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the Company before the Court. In the present case one Shri Shankar Prasad employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy General Manager of the Company i.e. PW-1 gave evidence as if he knows everything though he does not know anything. There is nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any Director. Therefore, Magistrate by judgment dated 30th October, 2001 rightly acquitted the appellant. In such a situation, the case of the appellant is fully covered by decision by the larger bench of this Court passed in the present appeal. We have no other option but to set aside the impugned judgment dated 19th September, 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.578 of 2002. The judgment and order dated 30th October, 2001 passed by the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C.No.18 of 2000 is upheld. 21. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.73 OF 2007
A.C. NARAYANAN                                     ... APPELLANT
                                     V/s
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.                        ... RESPONDENTS
                                    With
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1437  OF 2013

SHRI G. KAMALAKAR                                         ... APPELLANT
                                     V/s
M/S SURANA SECURITIES LTD. & ANR.                   ... RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

      As the question of law involved is common in both  the  appeals,  they
are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.
Criminal Appeal No.73 of 2007
2.    Brief facts of the case are as follows:
The accused-appellant,A.C. Narayanan challenged the common order dated  29th
November, 2000 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  9th
Court, Bandra, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as  the,  'Trial  Court')  by
filing applications u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973  before
the High Court.  By the said common order the applications preferred by  the
appellant-A.C.Narayanan for  discharge/recalling  process  against  him  was
rejected by the Trial Court. The High Court by impugned judgment dated  12th
August, 2005, dismissed the applications  preferred  by  the  appellant  and
upheld the order passed by the Trial Court.
3.    The appellant is  the  Vice-Chairman  and  Managing  Director  of  the
Company  M/s  Harvest  Financials  Ltd.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
"Company") having its  registered  office  at  Bombay.  Under  a  scheme  of
investment, the appellant collected various amounts from various persons  in
the form of loans and in consideration  thereof  issued  post-dated  cheques
either in his personal capacity or as the signatory  of  the  Company  which
got dishonoured.
4.    Respondent No. 2-Mrs. Doreen Shaikh is the power  of  attorney  holder
of six complainants, namely Mr.Yunus A. Cementwalla,  Smt.  Fay  Pinto,  Mr.
Mary Knoll Drego, Smt. Evelyn Drego, Mr. Shaikh Anwar  Karim  Bux  and  Smt.
Gwen Piedade.  On 16th December, 1997, Respondent No.2 on behalf of the  six
complainants filed Complaint Case  Nos.292/S/1998,  293/S/1998,  297/S/1998,
298/S/1998, 299/S/1998 and 300/S/1998  respectively  against  the  appellant
herein under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881
(hereinafter referred to as the, 'N.I. Act') before the  Trial  Court.   The
said Respondent No. 2 verified the complaint  in  each  of  those  cases  as
Power  of  Attorney  Holder  of  the  complainants.  The  Additional   Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 04th  April,  1998  issued  process
against the appellant u/s 204 of the  Cr.P.C  for  the  offences  punishable
under Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act.
5.     The   appellant,   being   aggrieved   moved   an   application   for
discharge/recall of process in each of the complaints. The Trial Court  vide
common order dated 29th November, 2000 dismissed the applications  filed  by
the appellant.
 6.   The appellant being aggrieved preferred  applications  being  Criminal
Application Nos.797, 798, 799, 801, 802 and 803  of  2002  before  the  High
Court for calling for the records of the case pending in  the  Trial  Court.
By impugned order  dated  12th  August,  2005  the  said  applications  were
dismissed by the High Court.

Criminal Appeal No.1437 of 2013
7.    The brief facts of the case is as follows:
This appeal has been preferred  by  the  accused-G.  Kamalakar  against  the
judgment and order dated 19th September, 2007  passed by the High  Court  of
Judicature,  Andhra Pradesh of Hyderabad  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  578  of
2002.   By the  impugned  judgment,   the  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal
preferred by the 1st respondent- M/s  Surana  Securities  Ltd.  (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Company') set aside  the  judgment  of  acquittal  dated
30th October, 2001 passed by the XVIII  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Hyderabad
in CC No.18 of 2000 convicted the appellant under Section 138  of  the  N.I.
Act and  sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of Rs.  6,10,000/-,   out  of
which an amount of  Rs.  6,00,000/-  was  to  be  paid  to  the  complainant
towards compensation and in default to  suffer  simple  imprisonment  for  a
period of one month.
8.    The 1st respondent -  M/s Surana Securities Ltd.  is  the  complainant
and is a limited Company  carrying on business of trading in  shares.    The
appellant-G. Kamalakar is the client  of  the  1st  respondent-Company   and
used to trade in shares.  During the course of  business,  the  appellant-G.
Kamalakar became liable to pay  an amount of  Rs.  7,21,174/-  towards   the
respondent-Company.   In  order  to  discharge  the  said  liability,    the
appellant issued six cheques amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/-  each  and  another
cheque for Rs. 1,21,174/- of  different dates.     When  first  six  cheques
were presented  for  encashment  on  18th  September,  1997,  the  same  got
dishonoured with an endorsement "funds insufficient".  Upon  receiving  such
information, the Company issued a legal notice to the appellant to  pay  the
amount but the same was not paid by the appellant.
9.    The Board of Directors of the 1st respondent-Company, by a  resolution
authorized its Managing Director  to  appoint  an  agent  to  represent  the
Company.  Pursuant thereto, one Shri V. Shankar Prasad was appointed  as  an
agent by executing a General Power of Attorney.   Later, he was  substituted
by one Shri Ravinder Singh under another  General  Power  of  Attorney.  The
respondent-Company filed a complaint under  Section  138  of  the  N.I.  Act
being CC No. 1098 of 1997 in the  Court  of  XIth  Metropolitan  Magistrate,
Secunderabad.  The  complaint  was  transferred  to  the  Court  of  XVIIIth
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by order dated  3rd  May,  2000  and  was
registered as CC No. 18 of 2000.  By judgment dated 30th October, 2001,  the
Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the complaint  filed  by  the  respondent-
Company u/s 138 of the N.I. Act.
10.   Aggrieved by the said order, respondent-Company filed an appeal  being
Criminal No. 578 of  2002  before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature,  Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad. By the impugned judgment dated 19th  September,  2007,
the High Court allowed  the  appeal,  set  aside  the  judgment  dated  30th
October, 2001 passed by the XVIIIth Metropolitan Magistrate,  Hyderabad  and
convicted the appellant u/s 138 of  the  N.I.  Act.  Against  the  aforesaid
order of conviction, the present appeal has been preferred.
11.   On 4th January, 2007, in view  of  the  difference  of  opinion  among
various High courts as also decisions of this Court  in  M.M.T.C.  Ltd.  and
Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma(P) Ltd. and Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 234  and
Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and  Anr. vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. and Ors.,  (2005)  2
SCC 217 referred the matter to larger bench. The entire order  of  reference
reads as under:
      "Delay in filing counter affidavit is condoned.
      Leave granted.
      Interpretation and/or application of Section 142(a) of the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, ("NI Act")  is  in  question  in  this  appeal  which
arises out of a judgment and order  dated  12.8.2005  passed  by  a  learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

      The basis fact of the matter is not in dispute.
      Several cheques on  different  dates  were  issued  by  the  applicant
herein  which were dishonoured.  The complaint petitions  in  the  Court  of
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra,  Mumbai.    The  complaint
petitions were filed in the name of the respective payees of   the  cheques.
She also filed affidavits in support of the  averments  made  in  the   said
complaint petitions.   Cognizance of offence under Section 138 of  the  N.I.
Act was taken against the appellant.  Summons  were  issued.     Questioning
the order issuing summons by the  learned  Magistrate  in  exercise  of  his
power under Section 204 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,    appellant
herein filed criminal application before  the High Court  of  Judicature  at
Bombay,  inter alia,   contending that the complaint petitions filed by  the
Power of Attorney Holder was not maintainable and relying  thereupon  or  on
the basis  thereof the learned Magistrate could  not  have  issued  summons.
The said contention has been negative by the  High  Court  in  its  impugned
judgment.
In the aforementioned premises interpretation of  Section  142  (a)  of  the
N.I. Act comes up for consideration  before  us.   We  may  notice  that  in
M.M.T.C. and Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd.  and  Anr.  (2002)1
SCC 234,  a Division Bench of  this Court has opined.:
      "This Court has,  as far  back as,  in the case of  Vishwa  Mitter  v.
O.P. Poddar,  (1983) 4 SCC 701 held that it is clear  that  anyone  can  set
the Criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of  facts  constituting  an
offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance on the  sole  ground
that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.   It has  been
held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes  any  special
provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the  statute,    then
the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of  the  office
must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute.    In  the
present case,  the  only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section  142  is
that the  complaint must be  by the payee  or  the  holder  in  due  course.
This criteria is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf  of
the appellant Company"
However,  in a later  judgment  in  Janki  Vashdeo  Bhojwani  and  Anr.  vs.
Indusind Bank Ltd. and  Ors.  ,  2005(2)SCC  217,   albeit  in  a  different
context,  another Division Bench of this Court  overruled  the  judgment  of
the  Bombay  High  Court  in  Pradeep  Mohanbay  vs.  Minguel  Carlos  Dias,
[2000(1)Bom.L.R.908), inter alia opining as follows:

      "Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empowers the holder of  power  of  attorney
to 'act' on behalf of the  principal.  In our view the word 'acts'  employed
in Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC confines only to in respect of 'acts'  done  by
the  power-of-attorney  holder  in   exercise  of  power  granted   by   the
instrument.   The term 'acts'  would  not  include  deposing  in  place  and
instead of the principal.  In other words,  if the power of attorney  holder
has rendered some 'acts' in pursuance of power of attorney,  he  may  depose
for the principal in respect of such acts, but  he  cannot  depose  for  the
principal  for  the  acts   done  by  the  principal   and   not   by   him.
Similarly,  he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the  matter  of
which only the principal is entitled to be cross-examined."

      "on  the  question  of  power  of  attorney,   the  High  Courts  have
divergent views.     In the case  of  Shambhu  Dutt  Shastri  vs.  State  of
Rajasthan [1986 2 WLN 713 (Raj.)]  it was  held  that  a  general  power-of-
attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf  of  the  party  but  he
cannot become a witness on behalf of the  party.   He  can  only  appear  in
his own witness box on behalf of himself.   To appear in a  witness  box  is
altogether a different act. A general  power-of-attorney  holder  cannot  be
allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff  in  the  capacity
of the plaintiff."
      "However, in the  case  of  Humberto  Luis  v.  Gloriano  Armado  Luis
[(2002) 2 Bom. CR 754)  on which reliance has been placed  by  the  Tribunal
in the present case,  the High Court took a dissenting view  and  held  that
the provisions contained in Order 3  Rule  2  CPC  cannot  be  construed  to
disentitle  the  power-of-attorney  holder  to  depose  on  behalf  of   his
principal. The High Court further held that  the  word  'act'  appearing  in
Order 3 Rule 2 CPC takes within its sweep 'depose'. We are unable  to  agree
with this view taken by the Bombay High
Court in Floriano Armando."

      It is not in dispute that there is  a  conflict  of  opinion  on  this
issue amongst various High Courts, including the  decision  of  Bombay  High
Court  in  Mamtadevi  Prafullakumar  Bhansali  vs.  Pushpadevi  Kailashkumar
Agrawal & Anr.   [2005 (2) Mah. L.J. 1003)  on the one hand and  a  decision
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S.P. Sampathy vs. Manju Gupta  and  Anr.
(2002) Crl.L.J. 2621),  on the other.  One  of  the  questions  which  would
arise  for  consideration  is  as  to  whether  the   eligibility   criteria
prescribed by Section 142(a)  of the NI Act would  stand  satisfied  if  the
complaint petition itself is filed in the name of the payee or   the  holder
in due course of the cheque and/or whether a complaint  petition has  to  be
presented before the Court  by  the  payee  or  the  holder  of  the  cheque
himself.
Another issue which would arise for consideration  is  as  to   whether  the
payee must examine himself in support of the  complaint petition keeping  in
view the insertion of Section 145 of the Said Act (Act No. 55 of 2002).
      In our opinion, in view of difference of opinion amongst various  High
Courts as also the decisions of this Court in  M.M.T.C.  Ltd.  (Supra)   and
Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra),  particularly in view of the  fact  that  in
the  later  case  the  earlier  one  was  not  noticed,   an   authoritative
pronouncement is necessary to be given in this regard.   We, therefore,  are
of the opinion that the matter should be considered by a larger Bench."

12.   The matter was considered by a  larger  Bench  of  three  Judges.   By
judgment dated 13th September, 2013 reported in 2013 (11) SCALE 360  -  A.C.
Narayanan vs.  State  of  Maharashtra  the  said  larger  Bench  framed  the
following questions:
      (i)   Whether  a  Power  of  Attorney  holder  can  sign  and  file  a
complaint petition  behalf  of  the  complainant?  Whether  the  eligibility
criteria prescribed by Section 142(a) of NI Act  would  stand  satisfied  if
the complaint petition itself is filed in the  name  of  the  payee  or  the
holder in due course of the cheque?
      (ii)   Whether a Power of Attorney holder can be varied on oath  under
Section 200 of the Code?
      (iii) Whether specific averments as to the knowledge of the  Power  of
Attorney holder in the impugned transaction must be explicitly  asserted  in
the complaint?
      (iv)  If the Power of Attorney holder fails to assert  explicitly  his
knowledge in the complaint then can the Power of Attorney holder verify  the
complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge?
      (v)   Whether the proceedings contemplated under Section  200  of  the
Code can be dispensed with in the light of  Section  145  of  the  N.I.  Act
which was introduced by an amendment in the year 2002?

13.   The first question relating to the eligibility of  Power  of  Attorney
holder to sign and file a complaint petition on behalf of  the  complainants
and whether eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142(a) of   N.I.  Act
is satisfied, if the  complaint petition itself is  filed  in  the  name  of
the payee or the holder in due  course  of  the  cheque,   was  answered  by
larger Bench in affirmative by its judgment in A.C. Narayanan vs.  State  of
Maharashtra, 2013(11) Scale 360 with observation, which reads as follows:
"19) As noticed hereinabove, though Janki Vashdeo  Bhojwani(supra),  relates
to powers of Power of  Attorney  holder  under  CPC  but  it  was  concluded
therein that a plaint by a  Power  of  Attorney  holder  on  behalf  of  the
original plaintiff is maintainable provided he  has  personal  knowledge  of
the transaction in question. In a way, it is an exception to a well  settled
position that criminal law can be put  in  motion  by  anyone  [vide  Vishwa
Mitter (supra)] and under  the  Statute,  one  stranger  to  transaction  in
question, namely, legal heir  etc.,  can  also  carry  forward  the  pending
criminal  complaint  or  initiate  the  criminal  action  if  the   original
complainant dies [Vide Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas vs. State of Maharashtra  (1967)
1 SCR 807]. Keeping in mind various situations like inability  as  a  result
of sickness, old age or death or staying abroad of the payee  or  holder  in
due course to appear and depose before the  Court  in  order  to  prove  the
complaint, it is permissible for the Power of Attorney  holder  or  for  the
legal representative(s) to file a complaint  and/or  continue  with  the  21
Page 22 pending criminal complaint for and on behalf of payee or  holder  in
due course. However, it is expected that such power of  attorney  holder  or
legal representative(s) should have knowledge about the  transaction
in  question  so  as  to  able  to  bring  on  record  the  truth   of   the
grievance/offence, otherwise, no criminal justice could be achieved in  case
payee or holder in due course, is  unable  to  sign,  appear  or  depose  as
complainant due to above quoted reasons. Keeping these aspects in  mind,  in
MMTC (supra), this Court had taken the view that if complaint is  filed  for
and on behalf of payee  or  holder  in  due  course,  that  is  good  enough
compliance with Section 142 of N.I. Act. "

14.   The second question relating to  verification  of  Power  of  Attorney
holder on oath as prescribed under Section 200 of the Code was  answered  as
follows:-
"20) The stand of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 73 of  2007  is  that
no complaint can be filed and no cognizance of the complaint  can  be  taken
if the complaint is by the power of attorney holder,  since  it  is  against
Section 200 of the Code and deserves to be rejected.  There  is  no  dispute
that complaint has to  be  filed  by  the  complainant  as  contemplated  by
Section 200 of the Code, but the said Section does not  create  any  embargo
that  the  attorney  holder  or  legal   representative(s)   cannot   be   a
complainant.

22) From a conjoint reading of Sections 138, 142 and 145 of the N.I. Act  as
well as Section 200 of the Code,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  open  to  the
Magistrate to issue process on the basis of the contents of  the  complaint,
documents in support thereof and the affidavit submitted by the  complainant
in support of the complaint. Once the complainant  files  an   affidavit  in
support of the complaint before issuance of the process  under  Section  200
of the Code, it is  thereafter open to the Magistrate, if he thinks fit,  to
call upon the complainant to remain present and to examine  him  as  to  the
facts contained in the affidavit submitted by  the  complainant  in  support
of his complaint. However, it is a matter of discretion and  the  Magistrate
is not bound to call upon the  complainant  to  remain  present  before  the
Court and to examine him upon oath for taking decision  whether  or  not  to
issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I.  Act.  For  the
purpose of issuing process under Section 200 of the Code, it is open to  the
Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit  filed  by
the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138  of  the  N.I.
Act. It  is  only  if  and  where  the  Magistrate,  after  considering  the
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, documents  produced in  support
thereof and the verification in the form of affidavit  of  the  complainant,
is of the view that examination of the  complainant  or  his  witness(s)  is
required, the Magistrate may call upon the  complainant  to  remain  present
before the Court and examine the complainant and/or his  witness  upon  oath
for taking a decision whether or not  to  issue  process  on  the  complaint
under  Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

23) In the light of the discussion, we are of the view  that  the  power  of
attorney holder may be allowed to file, appear and  depose for  the  purpose
of issue of process for the offence punishable  under  Section  138  of  the
N.I. Act. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder  of
the complainant does not have a personal knowledge  about  the  transactions
then he cannot be examined.  However,  where  the  attorney  holder  of  the
complainant is in charge of the business of the complainant  payee  and  the
attorney holder alone is personally aware of the transactions, there  is  no
reason why the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness. Nevertheless,  an
explicit assertion as to the knowledge  of  the  Power  of  Attorney  holder
about the transaction in question must be specified  in  the  complaint.  On
this count, the fourth question becomes infructuous.

24) In view of the discussion, we are  of  the  opinion  that  the  attorney
holder  cannot  file  a  complaint  in  his  own  name  as  if  he  was  the
complainant, but he can initiate  criminal  proceedings  on  behalf  of  his
principal. We also reiterate that where the payee is a proprietary  concern,
the complaint can  be  filed  (i)  by  the  proprietor  of  the  proprietary
concern, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the "payee"; (ii)  the
proprietary concern,  describing  itself  as  a  sole  proprietary  concern,
represented by  its  sole  proprietor;  and  (iii)  the  proprietor  or  the
proprietary concern represented by the attorney  holder  under  a  power  of
attorney executed by the sole proprietor.

25) Similar substantial questions were raised in the appeal arising  out  of
S.L.P (Crl.) No. 2724 of 2008, which stand answered  as  above.  Apart  from
the above questions, one distinct query was raised as to  whether  a  person
authorized by a Company or Statute or Institution  can  delegate  powers  to
their subordinate/others for filing a criminal complaint? The  issue  raised
is in reference to validity of sub-delegation of functions of the  power  of
attorney. We have already clarified to the extent that the  attorney  holder
can sign and file a complaint on behalf of the  complainant-payee.  However,
whether the power of attorney  holder  will  have   the   power  to  further
delegate the functions to another person  will   completely  depend  on  the
terms of the general power of attorney.  As a result, the authority to  sub-
delegate the functions must be explicitly mentioned in the general power  of
attorney. Otherwise,   the sub-delegation  will  be  inconsistent  with  the
general power of attorney and thereby will be invalid in law.  Nevertheless,
the general power of attorney itself  can  be  cancelled  and  be  given  to
another person."

15.   While holding that there is no serious conflict between the  decisions
in "MMTC (supra) and Janki  Vashdeo  Bhojwani  (supra)",  the  larger  Bench
clarified the position and answered the questions framed  in  the  following
manner:
"(i) Filing of complaint petition under  Section  138  of  N.I  Act  through
power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent.

(ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath  before  the
Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint.  However,  the  power
of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an  agent  of  the
payee/holder in due course or  possess  due  knowledge  regarding  the  said
transactions.

(iii) It is required by the complainant to make  specific  assertion  as  to
the knowledge of the power  of  attorney  holder  in  the  said  transaction
explicitly in the  complaint and the power of attorney  holder  who  has  no
knowledge regarding the transactions cannot  be examined  as  a  witness  in
the case.

(iv) In the light of section 145 of N.I Act, it is open  to  the  Magistrate
to rely upon the  verification  in  the  form  of  affidavit  filed  by  the
complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138  of  the  N.I  Act
and  the  Magistrate  is  neither  mandatorily  obliged  to  call  upon  the
complainant  to  remain  present  before  the  Court,  nor  to  examine  the
complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or  not
to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

(v) The functions under the general power of attorney  cannot  be  delegated
to another person without specific clause permitting the same in  the  power
of attorney. Nevertheless, the general  power  of  attorney  itself  can  be
cancelled and be given to another person."


Case of A.C. Narayanan

16.   In this case Magistrate had taken cognizance of the complaint  without
prima facie establishing the fact  as  to  whether  the  Power  of  Attorney
existed in first place and whether it was in order. It  is  not  in  dispute
that the complaint against the appellant was not preferred by the  payee  or
the holder in due course and the statement on oath of the person  who  filed
the complaint has also not stated that he filed the  complaint  having  been
instructed by the payee or holder in due course of  the  cheque.  Since  the
complaint was not filed abiding with the provisions of the Act, it  was  not
open to the Magistrate to take cognizance.
17.   From the bare perusal of the said  complaint,  it  can  be  seen  that
except mentioning in the cause title there is no mention of, or a  reference
to the Power of Attorney in the body  of  the  said  complaint  nor  was  it
exhibited as part of the said complaint. Further, in the  list  of  evidence
there is just a mere mention of the words at serial  no.6   viz.  "Power  of
Attorney", however there is no date or any other particulars  of  the  Power
of Attorney mentioned in the complaint. Even in the  verification  statement
made by the respondent no.2, there is not even a whisper that she is  filing
the complaint as the Power of Attorney holder of the complainant.  Even  the
order of issue of process dated 20th February, 1998 does  not  mention  that
the Magistrate had perused any Power of Attorney for issuing process.
18.   The appellant has  stated  that  his  Advocate  conducted  search  and
inspection of the papers and  proceedings  of  the  criminal  complaint  and
found that no Power of Attorney was found to be a part of that record.  This
has not been disputed by the respondents. In that view of the matter and  in
light of decision of the larger Bench, as referred above, we hold  that  the
Magistrate wrongly took cognizance in the matter and the Court  below  erred
in putting the onus on  the  appellant  rather  than  the  complainant.  The
aforesaid fact has also been overlooked by the High Court while passing  the
impugned judgment dated 12th August, 2005.
19.   In the result, the impugned judgment dated 12th  August,  2005  passed
by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  and  the  order  dated  29th
November, 2000 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  9th
Court, Bandra, Mumbai are set aside and the proceedings in question  against
the appellant are quashed.

Case of G. Kamalakar

20.   In this case it is not in dispute that the complaint was filed by  one
Shri V. Shankar Prasad claiming to be  General  Power  of  Attorney  of  the
complainant  company.  Subsequently  PW-1  Shri  Ravinder  Singh  gave   the
evidence on behalf of the Company under the General Power of Attorney  given
by the complainant Company. The complaint was not signed either by  Managing
Director or Director of the Company.  It is also not in  dispute  that  PW-1
is only the employee of the Company.  As per Resolution of the Company  i.e.
Ex.P3 under first part Managing Director  and  Director  are  authorized  to
file suits and criminal complaints  against  the  debtors  for  recovery  of
money and for prosecution. Under third part  of  the  said  Resolution  they
were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear  on  their
behalf in the Court and engage  lawyer  etc.   But  nothing  on  the  record
suggest that an employee is empowered to file the  complaint  on  behalf  of
the Company.  This apart, Managing  Director  and  Director  are  authorized
persons of the Company to file  the  complaint  by  signing  and  by  giving
evidence. At best the said persons can  nominate  any  person  to  represent
themselves or the Company before the Court.  In the present  case  one  Shri
Shankar Prasad employee of the Company signed the complaint and  the  Deputy
General Manager of the Company i.e.  PW-1  gave  evidence  as  if  he  knows
everything though he does not  know  anything.   There  is  nothing  on  the
record to suggest that he was authorized by the  Managing  Director  or  any
Director.  Therefore,  Magistrate  by  judgment  dated  30th  October,  2001
rightly acquitted the appellant.  In such  a  situation,  the  case  of  the
appellant is fully covered by decision by the larger  bench  of  this  Court
passed in the present appeal.  We have no other option but to set aside  the
impugned judgment dated 19th September, 2007 passed by  the  High  Court  of
Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.578  of  2002.
The judgment and order dated 30th October,  2001  passed  by  the  Court  of
XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C.No.18 of 2000 is upheld.
21.   The appeals are allowed accordingly.

..............................................................................
                                                                    ......J.
                                 (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


..............................................................................
                                                                    ......J.
NEW DELHI,                                 (S.A. BOBDE)
JANUARY 28, 2015.

Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 92/2015


JAGE RAM & ORS.                                       ..Appellants

                                   Versus

STATE OF HARYANA                                ..Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.

            This appeal is preferred against the judgment  dated   19.8.2011
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No.181  SB
of 2000,  whereby the High Court partly allowed  the  appeal  filed  by  the
appellants thereby confirming the conviction of the appellants with  certain
modifications.
2.          Briefly stated, case of the prosecution is that on  the  fateful
day i.e. 18.11.1994, at about 8.00  A.M.  in  the  morning  the  complainant
Jagdish (PW-5) along with his two sons namely Sukhbir and Mange  Ram  (PW-6)
were busy in cutting pullas (reeds) from the dola of their field.   At  that
time, Jage Ram (A-1) and his sons Rajbir Singh @ Raju  (A-2),  Rakesh  (A-3)
and Madan (A-4) armed with jaily,  pharsi and lathis  respectively,  entered
the land where  the complainant  was working with his sons  and  asked  them
not to cut the pullas  as it was jointly held by both  the  parties.   Wordy
altercations ensued between the parties and Jage Ram insisted that he  would
take away the entire pullas.   In the fight,  the  accused  persons  started
inflicting injuries to the complainant, and his sons  Rajbir  @  Raju  (A-2)
gave a pharsi blow on the head of Sukhbir, Jage Ram (A-1) caused  injury  to
Jagdish  (PW-5)  with  two  jaily  blows.  Additionally,  Madan  and  Rakesh
attacked the complainant  with  lathi  blows  on  shoulder  and  left  elbow
respectively and caused several other injuries  to  the  complainant  party.
Jagdish and his injured sons raised alarm, hearing  which  Rajesh  and  Usha
came to rescue them and on seeing them, the accused persons fled away.
3.          The injured witnesses were taken to the Primary  Health  Centre,
Taoru where Dr. Pardeep  Kumar,  Medical  Officer,  medically  examined  the
injured persons.  Injured Sukhbir was vomiting in the hospital and later  on
he was referred to General Hospital, Gurgaon as his condition  deteriorated.
 A CT scan disclosed that large  extra-dural  haematoma  was  found  in  the
frontal region with mass effect and Sukhbir needed  urgent  surgery  and  he
was operated upon and the large extra-dural  haematoma  was  removed.    Dr.
Pardeep Kumar (PW-2) also examined the other injured persons,  PW  5-Jagdish
and PW 6- Mange Ram.
4.          Statement of Jagdish was recorded, based  on  which  F.I.R.  was
registered at Police Station Taoru, Gurgaon under  Sections  323,  324,  325
and 307 read with Section 34 IPC.            PW  8-Ramesh  Kumar  (ASI)  had
taken up the investigation.  He examined the witnesses and after  completion
of investigation, challan was filed under Sections 307, 325, 324  read  with
Section 34 IPC.  In the trial court,  prosecution  examined  nine  witnesses
including Jagdish-PW5, Mange Ram-PW6 and Dr. Prem        Kumar-PW2  and  Dr.
HiIol Kanti Pal-PW9, Neuro Surgeon,          PW8-investigating  officer  and
other witnesses.  The accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  about
the incriminating  evidence  and  circumstances.   First  accused  Jage  Ram
pleaded that on the date of occurrence-complainant  party  Jagdish  and  his
sons Mange Ram and Sukhbir forcibly trespassed into the  land  belonging  to
the accused and attempted to  forcibly  cut  the  pullas.   Jagdish  further
claims that he along with Rakesh caused injuries to  the  complainant  party
in exercise of right of private defence of property.   He  has  denied  that
Rajesh and Usha had seen the incident.   Raju (A-2) and Madan  (A-3)  stated
that they  were  not  present  on  the  spot  and  they  have  been  falsely
implicated.  Rakesh (A-4) adopted the stand of his father Jage Ram.
5.           Upon  consideration  of  oral  and  documentary  evidence,  the
learned Additional Sessions Judge vide judgment  dated  17.2.2000  convicted
all the accused persons under Sections 307 and 325 IPC  and  sentenced  them
to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for five years and one  year  respectively
and a fine of Rs. 500/- each with default clause.   Aggrieved  by  the  said
judgment, the accused-appellants  filed  criminal  appeal  before  the  High
Court of Punjab and Haryana.  The High Court vide  impugned  judgment  dated
19.8.2011 modified the judgment of the trial court  thereby  convicted  Jage
Ram (A-1) under Section 325  IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for one year, convicted second  accused  Rajbir  @  Raju  under
Section 307 IPC and imposed sentence of imprisonment for five years as  well
the fine of Rs.500/- was confirmed  by  the  High  Court.    Sentence  under
Section 325 IPC (two counts) was modified as the sentence under Section  323
IPC and he was sentenced to undergo six months rigorous  imprisonment.  Both
the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.   High  Court  modified  the
sentence of Madan (A-3) Rakesh (A-4) under Section  323  IPC  and  sentenced
them  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  six  months   (two   counts)
respectively.   In this appeal, the appellants  assail  the  correctness  of
the impugned judgment.
6.          Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for
the appellants contended that the evidence of  the  witnesses  suffers  from
material discrepancy and is  self-contradictory.    It  was  submitted  that
injured witness Sukhbir was not examined in the court and  neither  CT  Scan
nor x-ray nor operational notes of Sukhbir were produced  before  the  court
and in the  absence  of  such  material  evidence,  courts  below  erred  in
convicting the second accused under Section  307  IPC.    Additionally,  the
learned counsel contended that the defence plea of private defence  was  not
considered by the courts below in proper perspective.
7.          Per contra, learned counsel appearing for  the  respondent-State
contended that the evidence of all the witnesses satisfactorily  establishes
the overt act of the accused persons and  Jagdish (PW-5) and Mange Ram  (PW-
6) being the injured witnesses, the veracity of these  witnesses  cannot  be
doubted.   It  was  submitted  that  the   medical   evidence   sufficiently
corroborated the oral evidence  and  the  prosecution  has  established  the
intention of the 2nd accused in causing attempt to commit murder of  Sukhbir
and in appreciation  of  the  evidence,  courts  below  recorded  concurrent
findings convicting the second accused under Section 307 IPC  and  the  same
warrants no interference.
8.          We have carefully considered  the  rival  contentions  and  gone
through the impugned judgment and perused the materials on record.
9.          As it emerges from the evidence, complainant Jagdish (PW-5)  and
his two sons Sukhbir and Mange  Ram  were  cutting    pullas.   The  accused
party went there and asked them not  to  cut  the  pullas.    In  the  wordy
altercation, second accused Rajbir @ Raju gave pharsi blows on the  head  of
Sukhbir.   PWs 5 & 6 have clearly spoken about the overt act of the  accused
that A-1 Jage Ram attacked and caused injury  to  PW-5  Jagdish  with  jaily
blows and that second accused Rajbir @ Raju attacked on the head of  Sukhbir
with pharsi.  They have also stated that Madan and  Rakesh  caused  injuries
to PW5-Jagdish with lathi on shoulder and left elbow respectively.    PW  2-
Dr. Pardeep Kumar in his evidence stated that he has examined PWs  5  and  6
and  noted the injuries on the  body  of  PWs  5  and  6  and  issued  wound
certificates.  Evidence of PWs 5 and 6  is  amply  corroborated  by  medical
evidence.  PWs 5 and 6 being injured witnesses, their evidence  is  entitled
to great weight.   Cogent and convincing grounds  are  required  to  discard
the evidence of injured witnesses.  In the light of the fact that PWs 5  and
6 were injured  witnesses,  courts  below  tested  their  evidence  for  its
credibility  and  recorded  concurrent  findings  that  PWs  5  and  6   are
trustworthy witnesses.  We find no reason to take a different view.
10.         Appellants have  raised  the  contention  that  the  prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that A-2 Rajbir  attempted  to  commit  murder  of
Sukhbir.    It  was  submitted  that  injured  person  Sukhbir  was  neither
examined nor medical evidence like CT Scan, x-ray and operational notes  and
Sukhbir were produced to corroborate the oral evidence and while  so  courts
below erred in convicting second accused Rajbir @  Raju  under  Section  307
IPC.
11.         Dr. Pardeep Kumar-PW-2, who examined Sukhbir  found  during  his
medico-legal examination a lacerated wound in the middle of the top  of  the
skull.  Injured-Sukhkbir was found vomiting  in  the  hospital  and  he  was
examined by a Neuro  Surgeon  Dr.  Hilol  Kanti  Pal  (PW-9)  of  Safdarjung
Hospital, Delhi on 19.11.1994, i.e. the day after the  incident.   PW-9  has
stated that Sukhbir was unconscious since 2.00 P.M. on  18.11.1994  and  was
deeply comatose with irregularity of pupils and a laceration  was  diagnosed
on the right front parietal region.  Further, PW-9 has  stated  that  during
the CT scan,  it  was  revealed  that  a  large  extra-dural  haemotoma  was
present in the frontal  region  with  mass  effect   and  to  avoid  further
deterioration of his condition, he was operated  upon  by  frontal  trephine
craniopmy an haemotoma measuring  about 125 ml was evacuated.   PW-9  stated
that had not the operation been conducted on Sukhbir and had not the  extra-
dural   haemotoma removed by operation urgently, the head injury  caused  to
Sukhbir would have caused his death.  As noted by  the  High  Court,  it  is
thus brought on evidence that had not  surgical  assistance  been  given  to
Sukhbir, he would have   definitely died.
12.          For  the  purpose  of  conviction  under   Section   307   IPC,
prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to  commit  murder  and  (ii)
the act done by the  accused.    The  burden  is  on  the  prosecution  that
accused had attempted to commit  the  murder  of  the  prosecution  witness.
Whether the accused person intended  to  commit  murder  of  another  person
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.   To  justify  a
conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is  not  essential  that  fatal  injury
capable of causing death should have been caused.  Although  the  nature  of
injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to  a  finding  as  to
the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from  other
circumstances.  The intention of the accused is  to  be  gathered  from  the
circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the  accused
at the time of the incident, motive of  the  accused,   parts  of  the  body
where the injury was caused and the nature of injury  and  severity  of  the
blows given etc.
13.         In the case of State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors.[1],  the  scope
of intention for attracting conviction under Section 307 IPC was  elaborated
and it was held as under:-

"13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there  is
present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution  thereof.  It  is
not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should  have  been
inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act  of  the  accused
and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the  act,  irrespective
of  its  result,  was  done  with  the  intention  or  knowledge  and  under
circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged  under
Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because  the  injuries  inflicted
on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.
[pic]
14. This position was highlighted in State of  Maharashtra  v.  Balram  Bama
Patil, (1983) 2 SCC 28, Girija Shanker v. State of U.P.(2004) 3 SCC 793  and
R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9 SCC 27.
                                *     *     *
16. Whether there was intention to kill or  knowledge  that  death  will  be
caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given  case.
The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the  accused  was  simple  or
minor will not by itself rule  out  application  of  Section  307  IPC.  The
determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the  case  may  be,
and not the nature of the injury."
See State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC  554 pp. 559-60, paras 11-14 and
16.
13. "6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more  harm  to
the justice system to undermine the public confidence  in  the  efficacy  of
law and society could not long endure under such  serious  threats.  It  is,
therefore, the duty of every court to award proper  sentence  having  regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner in  which  it  was  executed  or
committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated  by  this  Court  in
Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N.(1991) 3 SCC 471."

14.         Having regard to the weapon used for causing the  head  injuries
to Sukhbir,  nature of injures, situs of the injury and the severity of  the
blows,  courts  below  recorded  concurrent  findings  convicting  the   2nd
appellant under Section 307 IPC. In our considered view, the  conviction  of
the second appellant Rajbir @ Raju under Section 307  IPC  is  unassailable.

15.         Learned counsel for the appellants  contended  that  the  second
appellant is in custody for more than three years and since  the  occurrence
was in the year 1994, prayed for reduction of the sentence  imposed  on  the
second appellant to the period already  undergone.   Placing  reliance  upon
the judgment of this Court in  Hari  Singh  vs.  Sukhbir  Singh  &  Ors[2].,
learned counsel for the appellants additionally  submitted that in terms  of
 Section 357 (3)  Cr.P.C. that the  compensation   may  be  awarded  to  the
victim and the sentence be modified to the period already undergone.
16.         For the conviction under Section 307 IPC,  courts below  imposed
upon the 2nd appellant rigorous imprisonment of five years,  while  imposing
punishment, courts have  an  obligation  to  award  appropriate  punishment.
Question of awarding sentence is a matter of discretion and  the   same  has
to be exercised by the courts taking into  consideration  all  the  relevant
circumstances.  What sentence would meet the ends of  justice  would  depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the courts  must  keep  in
mind the gravity of the  offence,  motive  for  the  crime,  nature  of  the
offence and all other attendant  circumstances.   Vide  State  of  M.P.  vs.
Bablu Natt[3]; Alister Anthony  Pareira  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra[4]  and
Soman  vs. State of Kerala[5].
17.         In the light of the above, considering the  case  in  hand,  the
occurrence was of the year 1994  when  the  complainant  party  was  cutting
pullas, the accused asked them not to cut the  pullas    which  resulted  in
the wordy altercation.  In the heat of  passion,  the  accused  have  caused
injuries to the complainant party.  The second accused Rajbir @ Raju  is  in
custody.  He surrendered on 5.1.2012 and is stated to be  in  custody  since
then,  for  more  than  three  years.   Having  regard  to  the  facts   and
circumstances of the case, in our considered view, the  period  of  sentence
of five years may be reduced to three years apart from directing the  second
appellant Rajbir  @  Raju   to  pay  substantial  compensation  to  injured-
Sukhbir.
18.          As  noticed  above,  injured-Sukhbir  sustained  grievous  head
injuries and was deeply comatose and was in a state  of  shock  and  trauma.
Learned counsel for the injured-witness submitted that for quite  some  time
injured-Sukhbir  was  unconscious  and  thereafter  suffering  from   mental
trauma.  Having regard to the nature of injuries sustained  by  Sukhbir  and
the period of treatment  and other circumstances, we are of the  view  that,
it would be appropriate to direct second appellant-accused Rajbir @ Raju  to
pay Rs.7,50,000/- as compensation to the injured-Sukhbir.   When the  matter
came up for hearing  on  14.10.2014,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants
informed the Court that he had offered Rs.5,00,000/- by way of demand  draft
towards compensation to the injured-Sukhbir in the presence of the  Sarpanch
 of the village which he has refused to receive the same.  The  said  amount
of Rs.5,00,000/- is now kept in fixed deposit in the Registry of        this
Court.
19.         For inflicting blows on PW-5 Jagidsh with  jaily  A-1  Jage  Ram
was convicted under Section  325  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for one year.  A-3 and A-4 have also given lathis blows to  PW-
5 and were  convicted  under  Section  323  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three months by the High Court.  Having regard  to
the fact that the occurrence was of the year  1994,  considering  the  other
facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence  of  imprisonment  imposed
on  Jage Ram (A-1),  Madan (A-3) and  Rakesh (A-4) is reduced to the  period
already undergone by them.
20.         The conviction of A-1 under Section 325 IPC, A-3 and  A-4  under
Section 323 IPC is confirmed and the  sentence  is  reduced  to  the  period
already undergone by each of them. The conviction of second  accused  Rajbir
@ Raju under Section 307 IPC is confirmed and the sentence  of  imprisonment
of five years is reduced to the period already  undergone  and  additionally
the second accused shall pay a compensation of Rs.7,50,000/- to the  injured
witness-Sukhbir. Compensation amount  of  Rs.5,00,000/-  deposited  in  this
Court by the 2nd appellant shall be paid  to  the  injured  witness-Sukhbir.
The second accused Rajbir @ Raju  shall  deposit  the  balance  compensation
amount of Rs.2,50,000/- before the trial court  within  three  months   from
the date of this judgment and on such deposit, the same shall also  be  paid
to  the  injured  witness-Sukhbir.   On  failure  to  deposit  the   balance
compensation, the second appellant  Rajbir  @  Raju  shall  undergo  default
sentence of one year.
21.         The  appeal  is  allowed  to  the  above  said  extent.   Second
appellant Rajbir @ Raju is ordered to be released forthwith if not  required
in any other case.  Bail  bonds  of  accused  A1,  A3  and  A4  shall  stand
discharged.

                                               ...........................J.
                                                           (V. Gopala Gowda)


                                               ...........................J.
                                                                         (R.
                                                                  Banumathi)

New Delhi;
January 28, 2015

ITEM NO.1A-For JUDGMENT     COURT NO.12            SECTION IIB

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal  No(s).  92/2015 arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 488/2012

JAGE RAM & ORS.                                    Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.                            Respondent(s)

Date : 28/01/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT
today.

For Appellant(s)     Mr. Gagan Gupta,Adv.

For Respondent(s)       Mr. Ajay Bansal, AAG
                     Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta,Adv.
                        Mr. Gaurav Yadav, Adv.

                     Mr. Akshat Goel,Adv.

            Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi  pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice  V.  Gopala  Gowda  and  Hon'ble
Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.
            The appeal is allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed     reportable
judgment.  Second  appellant  Rajbir  @  Raju  is  ordered  to  be  released
forthwith if not required in any other case.  Bail bonds of accused  A1,  A3
and A4 shall stand discharged.

    (VINOD KR. JHA)                             (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

-----------------------
[1]   [2] AIR 2009 SC 1642 = (2009) 4 SCC 26

[3]   [4] (1988) 4 SCC 551

[5]   [6] (2009)  2 SCC 272
[7]   [8] (2012) 2 SCC 648
[9]   [10] (2013) 11 SCC 382