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Thursday, October 16, 2014

Hindu Marriage Act - Mental curelty - Apex court held that Undoubtedly, not allowing a spouse for a long time, to have sexual intercourse by his or her partner, without sufficient reason, itself amounts mental cruelty to such spouse. = CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9036 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No.25056 of 2012) VIDHYA VISWANATHAN ... APPELLANT VERSUS KARTIK BALAKRISHNAN … RESPONDENT = 2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41950

     Hindu Marriage Act - Mental curelty - Apex court held that  Undoubtedly, not allowing a spouse for a long  time,  to  have  sexual intercourse by  his  or  her  partner,  without  sufficient  reason,  itself amounts mental cruelty to such spouse. =

 “ 44.  It has to be further pointed out that  while  P.W.1  was  cross
examined by the respondent, it has not  been  suggested  to  P.W.1  that  he
suggested to the respondent that they should have a  child  only  after  two
years. Thus it appears that this  explanation  of  the  respondent  for  non
consummation of the marriage is only an afterthought. Even  assuming  for  a
moment that the appellant wanted to have a child only after two  years  that
does not mean that the appellant and the respondent cannot  and  should  not
have sexual intercourse. Admittedly, both of  them  are  well  educated  and
there are so many contraceptives available and they  could  have  used  such
contraceptives and avoided pregnancy if they had wanted.   Xx  xx.”


12.   Undoubtedly, not allowing a spouse for a long  time,  to  have  sexual
intercourse by  his  or  her  partner,  without  sufficient  reason,  itself
amounts mental cruelty to such spouse. A  Bench  of  Three  Judges  of  this
Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 has enumerated some  of
the illustrations of mental cruelty. Paragraph  101  of  the  said  case  is
being reproduced below:
A  Bench  of  Three  Judges  of  this
Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 has enumerated some  of
the illustrations of mental cruelty. Paragraph  101  of  the  said  case  is
being reproduced below:

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance,  yet  we  deem
it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which  may  be
relevant in dealing with  the  cases  of  “mental  cruelty”.  
The  instances
indicated in  the  succeeding  paragraphs  are  only  illustrative  and  not
exhaustive:

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial  life  of  the  parties,  acute
mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the  parties
to live with each other could come within the  broad  parameters  of  mental
cruelty.

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal  of  the  entire  matrimonial  life  of  the
parties, it becomes  abundantly  clear  that  situation  is  such  that  the
wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up  with  such  conduct  and
continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty,  frequent
rudeness of language, petulance of  manner,  indifference  and  neglect  may
reach such a degree that it makes the married  life  for  the  other  spouse
absolutely intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a  state  of  mind.  The  feeling  of  deep  anguish,
disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by  the  conduct  of  other
for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating  treatment  calculated  to
torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of  one  spouse  actually
affecting physical and mental health of  the  other  spouse.  The  treatment
complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be  very  grave,
substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible  conduct,  studied  neglect,  indifference  or
total departure from  the  normal  standard  of  conjugal  kindness  causing
injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure  can  also  amount  to
mental cruelty.

(viii)  The  conduct  must  be  much  more   than   jealousy,   selfishness,
possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction  and  emotional
upset may not be a ground for grant of  divorce  on  the  ground  of  mental
cruelty.

(ix) Mere trivial  irritations,  quarrels,  normal  wear  and  tear  of  the
married life which happens in day-to-day life  would  not  be  adequate  for
grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed  as  a  whole  and  a  few  isolated
instances over a period of  years  will  not  amount  to  cruelty.  The  ill
[pic]conduct must be persistent for  a  fairly  lengthy  period,  where  the
relationship has deteriorated to an extent that  because  of  the  acts  and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds  it  extremely  difficult  to
live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation  without
medical reasons and without  the  consent  or  knowledge  of  his  wife  and
similarly, if the wife  undergoes  vasectomy  or  abortion  without  medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such  an  act  of
the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have  intercourse  for  considerable
period without there being any  physical  incapacity  or  valid  reason  may
amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage  not  to
have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.


xx          xx         xx         xx



The above mentioned illustrations, No.  (viii)  and  (xii)  given  in  Samar
Ghosh case (supra), support the view taken by  the  High  Court  in  holding
that in the present case the  wife  has  treated  her  husband  with  mental
cruelty.

   2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41950
                                   REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9036 OF 2014
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No.25056 of 2012)



VIDHYA VISWANATHAN                ...   APPELLANT


                 VERSUS

KARTIK BALAKRISHNAN                             …   RESPONDENT





                       J U D G M E N T



PRAFULLA C.PANT,J.


Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  13.2.2012
passed in CMA No.2862 of 2011 by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras
whereby the said Court has allowed the appeal filed  by  the  husband  under
Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1986, and dissolved  the  marriage  between
the parties.
   Brief facts of the case are that the appellant,  Vidhya  Viswanathan  got
married to the respondent,  Karthik  Balakrishnan  on  6.4.2005  in  Chennai
following the Hindu rites. After the marriage, the  couple  went  to  London
where the respondent (husband) was working, and they lived  there  for  some
eight months. In December, 2005, the appellant and the respondent came  back
to India. However, the appellant went back to England  all  alone,  and  his
wife did not go there though her husband had purchased a return  ticket  for
her. On 13.9.2008, the husband filed a petition under Section  13  (1)  (ia)
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage. It  is  pleaded
by the respondent (husband)  that  while  the  appellant  was  with  him  in
London, she used to insult him. It is alleged by him that at times she  used
to get violent and hysterical. The husband further pleaded that  even  after
his best efforts,  the  appellant  did  not  allow  him  to  consummate  the
marriage.  It is further stated that in  November,  2005  i.e.  about  seven
months after the marriage  the wife ( the present appellant) fell sick,  and
she was taken to a Medical Specialist who diagnosed that she  was  suffering
from tuberculosis. According to the husband, he provided the  best  possible
treatment to his wife. After the couple came  back  to  India  in  December,
2005, the wife stayed back in Chennai and continued  her  treatment.  It  is
alleged by the present respondent (husband) that his wife used to  send  him
e-mails which were derogatory and in bad taste. It is also  alleged  by  the
respondent that his wife refused to join his company  even  after  his  best
efforts.  With the above pleadings, the present respondent filed a  petition
for divorce before the Family Court, Chennai on the ground of cruelty.
The  appellant  contested  the  divorce  petition,  and  filed  her  written
statement. She denied the allegations made against her. She stated that  she
went with her husband to London with great expectations.  She  alleged  that
her husband and his mother did not treat her well.  She  admitted  that  she
came back with her husband to India in December, 2005. She  further  pleaded
that though the respondent purchased  the  return  ticket  for  her  but  he
himself instructed not to return to England without his  permission.  It  is
also stated by her that marriage could not be  consummated  for  the  reason
that her husband  wanted  to  have  children  after  one  or  two  years  of
marriage. She did not deny having sent e-mails  but  stated  that  she  only
responded to the respondent  as  he  wanted  divorce  decree  based  on  her
consent. She admitted that she received legal notice from  her  husband  but
stated that the allegations therein are  false.   She  prayed  for  counter-
claim directing the respondent to restore the conjugal  rights  between  the
parties.
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the  trial  court  framed  the
following issues:

“ (1) Whether the petitioner/husband is entitled for divorce on  the  ground
of cruelty ?

  (2) Whether the respondent/  wife  is  entitled  for  conjugal  rights  as
prayed for in the counter claim? ”



The parties led their oral and documentary evidence before the trial  court.
The First Additional Family Court at  Chennai,  after  hearing  the  parties
vide its judgment and order dated  11.8.2011,  dismissed  the  petition  for
divorce, and allowed the  counter-claim  of  the  wife.  Aggrieved  by  said
judgment and order the husband (Karthik Balakrishnan) filed an  appeal  (CMA
No.2862 of 2011 with M.P.No.1 of 2011)  before  the  High  Court.  The  High
Court after hearing the parties  allowed  the  appeal,  and  set  aside  the
judgment and order dated 11.8.2011 passed by  the  trial  court.   The  High
Court allowed the divorce petition, and dissolved the marriage  between  the
parties. Hence, this appeal with special leave petition before this Court.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, and  perused  the  papers  on
record.
8.    Admittedly, the appellant got married to respondent  on  6.4.2005.  It
is also admitted that there is no issue born out of the wedlock. This  Court
has now  to  examine  whether  the  High  Court  has  rightly  come  to  the
conclusion or not that the husband was treated with cruelty by the wife,  if
so, is he entitled to decree of divorce.
9.    On going through the evidence on record,  we  find  that  the  husband
(petitioner before the  trial  court),  in  his  evidence  has  narrated  in
detail, the incidents of alleged  cruelty  suffered  by  him.  The  relevant
paragraphs from the statement of the husband are being reproduced below:

“ 7)  ……  the marriage was solemnized on April 6th 2005,  as  stated  above.
But quite surprisingly, the respondent was very moody did not speak  at  all
throughout the wedding day.  The respondent was not even interested to  pose
for photographs, along with me.  What more worried  me  was  that  even  for
wedding lunch, the respondent had to be convinced to sit next to me to  have
lunch.  Initially thought that this  was  because  she  was  put  in  a  new
atmosphere.  However, I could  not  realize  that  the  respondent  was  not
interested either in my self or the marriage itself.

xx          xx         xx         xx

8)      …... inspite of the above odd things, I was able to get  a  visa  to
UK for  the  respondent.   I  further  submit  that  I  had  made  extensive
arrangements for the Honey moon to Scotland.   Even  during  the  Honeymoon,
the respondent was very moody, emotionless and abnormally quiet.  I  was  at
loss to understand as to what was hovering around in her mind.   However,  I
was very patiently waiting on the fond hope that things would become  normal
in due course.  However, all my dreams to lead a  very  happy  married  life
with the respondent were shattered  by  the  intolerable  behaviour  of  the
respondent.  I further submit that after returning from Scotland to  London,
I took the respondent to various places so  as  to  make  her  to  become  a
normal woman, but was taken aback by her sarcastic remarks about the  London
city  itself.   The  respondent  was  very  lethargic,   disinterested   and
showering lack of interest in any of the events.  Only thereafter, I  stared
thinking that the respondent was not interested in solemnizing the  marriage
itself.

xx          xx         xx         xx


9)    ……..between April, 2005 to December  2005,  I  could  infer  that  the
respondent was  always  moody,  throwing  tantrums,  showing  faces  openly,
showing anger and hatred insulting me when my self and the  respondent  were
alone and in front others.  The  respondent  reacted  violently  by  getting
aggressive and making sarcast remarks or locking herself  in  the  room  and
stopped talking for days together without any  reason.   When  I  questioned
about the same, the respondent used to get even more  aggressive  and  shout
hysterically and thereafter would  start  crying.    This  behaviour  became
more and more frequent over the time and made it impossible  to  handle  the
respondent  during  such  violent  outbursts  of  anger  and  hatred.    The
respondent was totally unapproachable and this left me with a deep sense  of
anguish and material agony.  The attitude of  the  respondent  was  becoming
worse day by day, resulted in  pulling  of  the  days  with  the  respondent
became a nightmare.


xx          xx         xx         xx


10)…………..the respondent did not show any intention at  all  in  consummating
the marriage.   The  respondent  evinced  no  interest  in  having  physical
contact with me.  A times, I myself had tried to  have  sexual  relationship
with the respondent as a  normal  husband  would  do.   However,  since  the
respondent showed no intention, I convinced myself that she would  mend  her
ways.  However, there was no attitudinal changes in her life.


xx          xx         xx         xx


13)………… the respondent deliberately used to wake me up rudely  sometimes  by
even kicking me when I was asleep and used to ask me to talk to  her  saying
that she was getting bored.  Without  minding  the  respondent’s  abominable
attitude, I would try to encourage the respondent as possible  as  I  could.
Further, the respondent used to bang her  head  against  the  walls  of  the
bedroom for no reason and when I  asked  the  reason  the  respondent  would
deliberately remain silent, having me spending sleepless nights.   This  has
caused great mental agony and torture to me when there was no fault on me.

xx          xx         xx         xx


17)………..during November 2005, the respondent  fell  sick  with  high  fever.
Despite the adamancy, not to take treatment, I  took  the  respondent  to  a
leading  specialist  who  diagnosed  that  the  respondent   suffered   from
Tuberculosis and got-months antibiotic course started in London……..


xx          xx         xx         xx


18)……….. In December 2005, I came down to Chennai with the respondent,  took
her  to  my  family  doctor,  who  referred  the  respondent  to  a  top  TB
specialist.  The doctor at Chennai also opined  the  same  as  that  of  the
doctor in London and advised the respondent to continue with the  antibiotic
prescribed by the doctor in London.


xx          xx         xx         xx


19)……………..I came back to London, after buying a return flight ticket to  the
respondent from Chennai to London for  July  2006,  presuming  that  the  TB
treatment at Chennai for the respondent would be completed by this time.


xx          xx         xx         xx



20)…………even though, I was in London,  I  used  to  get  in  touch  with  the
respondent and used to send emails on the fond hope  that  my  unconditional
love would make the respondent change her mind and behaviour  and  make  her
correct herself.  However, the respondent continued  to  act  irritationally
and showed anger in all the telephone calls by slamming down the receiver”.

P.W.1  Karthik  Balakrishnan  (husband)  who  made  above   statement,   was
subjected to lengthy  cross-examination  but  nothing  has  come  out  which
creates doubt in his testimony.
10.   The appellant Vidhya Viswanathan had also filed  her  evidence  before
the trial court, in the form of affidavit, and she also got  herself  cross-
examined as D.W.1. She denied the allegations made by  her  husband  but  in
cross-examination she admits that the marriage  was  not  consummated.   The
relevant portion from her cross-examination is being reproduced below:

      “   ….   ..   It is wrong to state that normally I  used  to  hit  the
petitioner  by my legs and wake him up and that I used to throw the  objects
on the petitioner and that  through  this  I  had  harassed  the  petitioner
physically and mentally. If it  is  asked  that  whether  the  marriage  was
consummated, no it is not. The petitioner said that we can beget  the  child
after one or two years. I and the petitioner were close. As  the  petitioner
joined  the new job he was under stress  and  tension.  The  petitioner  had
thyroid  infection frequently. The petitioner said that the starting of  the
matrimonial life shall be post-poned. It was not taken as an issue. After  8
months of the marriage, I became ill. Hence, I came to Chennai. It is  wrong
to state that  there is no connection between  thyroid  infection,  and  the
physical relationship and that I am adducing falsely.

xx          xx         xx         xx


My passport is lying with me. It is correct to state that in  the  passport,
a seal is made for visa. If it is asked when my U.K. visa would  expire,  it
is for 5 years.


xx          xx         xx         xx



Before my husband could file this case, I did not  file  any  case  for  the
restitution of conjugal rights. It is wrong  to  state  that  as  I  had  no
intention to live together, I did not file such a case. ”


11.    The High Court while rejecting the explanation given by the  wife  as
to why the marriage was not consummated observed as under:

      “ 44.  It has to be further pointed out that  while  P.W.1  was  cross
examined by the respondent, it has not  been  suggested  to  P.W.1  that  he
suggested to the respondent that they should have a  child  only  after  two
years. Thus it appears that this  explanation  of  the  respondent  for  non
consummation of the marriage is only an afterthought. Even  assuming  for  a
moment that the appellant wanted to have a child only after two  years  that
does not mean that the appellant and the respondent cannot  and  should  not
have sexual intercourse. Admittedly, both of  them  are  well  educated  and
there are so many contraceptives available and they  could  have  used  such
contraceptives and avoided pregnancy if they had wanted.   Xx  xx.”


12.   Undoubtedly, not allowing a spouse for a long  time,  to  have  sexual
intercourse by  his  or  her  partner,  without  sufficient  reason,  itself
amounts mental cruelty to such spouse. A  Bench  of  Three  Judges  of  this
Court in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 has enumerated some  of
the illustrations of mental cruelty. Paragraph  101  of  the  said  case  is
being reproduced below:

“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance,  yet  we  deem
it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which  may  be
relevant in dealing with  the  cases  of  “mental  cruelty”.  The  instances
indicated in  the  succeeding  paragraphs  are  only  illustrative  and  not
exhaustive:

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial  life  of  the  parties,  acute
mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the  parties
to live with each other could come within the  broad  parameters  of  mental
cruelty.

(ii) On comprehensive appraisal  of  the  entire  matrimonial  life  of  the
parties, it becomes  abundantly  clear  that  situation  is  such  that  the
wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up  with  such  conduct  and
continue to live with other party.

(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty,  frequent
rudeness of language, petulance of  manner,  indifference  and  neglect  may
reach such a degree that it makes the married  life  for  the  other  spouse
absolutely intolerable.

(iv) Mental cruelty is a  state  of  mind.  The  feeling  of  deep  anguish,
disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by  the  conduct  of  other
for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating  treatment  calculated  to
torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of  one  spouse  actually
affecting physical and mental health of  the  other  spouse.  The  treatment
complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be  very  grave,
substantial and weighty.

(vii) Sustained reprehensible  conduct,  studied  neglect,  indifference  or
total departure from  the  normal  standard  of  conjugal  kindness  causing
injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure  can  also  amount  to
mental cruelty.

(viii)  The  conduct  must  be  much  more   than   jealousy,   selfishness,
possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction  and  emotional
upset may not be a ground for grant of  divorce  on  the  ground  of  mental
cruelty.

(ix) Mere trivial  irritations,  quarrels,  normal  wear  and  tear  of  the
married life which happens in day-to-day life  would  not  be  adequate  for
grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

(x) The married life should be reviewed  as  a  whole  and  a  few  isolated
instances over a period of  years  will  not  amount  to  cruelty.  The  ill
[pic]conduct must be persistent for  a  fairly  lengthy  period,  where  the
relationship has deteriorated to an extent that  because  of  the  acts  and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds  it  extremely  difficult  to
live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilisation  without
medical reasons and without  the  consent  or  knowledge  of  his  wife  and
similarly, if the wife  undergoes  vasectomy  or  abortion  without  medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such  an  act  of
the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have  intercourse  for  considerable
period without there being any  physical  incapacity  or  valid  reason  may
amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage  not  to
have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.


xx          xx         xx         xx



The above mentioned illustrations, No.  (viii)  and  (xii)  given  in  Samar
Ghosh case (supra), support the view taken by  the  High  Court  in  holding
that in the present case the  wife  has  treated  her  husband  with  mental
cruelty.
13.   In Vinita Saxena vs. Pankaj Pandit (2006) 3 SCC  778  regarding  legal
proposition on aspect of cruelty has made the following observations:

“31. It is settled by a catena of decisions that mental  cruelty  can  cause
even more serious injury than the physical harm and create in  the  mind  of
the injured appellant such apprehension as is contemplated in  the  section.
It is to be determined on whole  facts  of  the  case  and  the  matrimonial
relations between the spouses. To amount to  cruelty,  there  must  be  such
wilful treatment of the party which caused suffering in body or mind  either
as an actual fact or by way of apprehension in such a manner  as  to  render
the continued living together of spouses harmful or injurious having  regard
to the circumstances of the case.

32. The word “cruelty” has  not  been  defined  and  it  has  been  used  in
relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in  relation
to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is  a  course  of
conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty  may  be
mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. There may be  cases  where
the conduct complained of itself is  bad  enough  and  per  se  unlawful  or
illegal. Then the [pic]impact or the injurious effect on  the  other  spouse
need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will  be
established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.”

In view of the above principle of law laid down by this  Court,  and  having
considered the submissions of parties, and the evidence  on  record,  we  do
not find any ground to interfere with the decree of divorce  passed  by  the
High Court on the ground of cruelty. However, we are conscious of  the  fact
that  the appellant, as stated by her, was doing a job before her  marriage,
and she (Vidhya Vishwanathan)  has stated as D.W.1 that at present   she  is
not doing any work. As such we think  it  just  and  proper  to  direct  the
respondent to pay to the appellant  (wife)  one  time  lump  sum  amount  of
alimony. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the  case
keeping in mind the economic status of  the  parties,  a  direction  to  the
respondent to pay Rs.40 lakhs (Rupees forty lakhs only) as one time  alimony
to the appellant, would meet the ends of justice, to which  learned  counsel
for the respondent during the arguments stated that the respondent is  ready
to pay the same.
15.   Accordingly, we  dispose  of  this  appeal  affirming  the  decree  of
divorce granted by the  High  Court  dissolving  the  marriage  between  the
parties namely Karthik Balakrishnan and  Vidhya Vishwanathan,  with  further
direction under Section  25  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  that  the
respondent shall pay to the appellant Rs.40 lakhs (Rupees forty lakhs  only)
as a lump sum amount of permanent alimony, within a period of  three  months
from the date of this judgment. No order as to costs.


                               ………..……………………………….……J.
                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                       …………………………………………..J
                       (PRAFULLA C. PANT)



NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 22, 2014
-----------------------
-17-


Tuesday, October 7, 2014

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, - Disputes arose - Arbitrator passed award - filed petition to cancellation - High court declined - DB also rejected - Apex court held that As noticed above, the parties have entered into concluded contract, agreeing terms and conditions of the said contract, which was finally acted upon. In such a case, the parties to the said contract cannot back out and challenge the award on the ground that the same is against the public policy. Even assuming the ground available to the appellant, the award cannot be set aside as because it is not contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law or against the interest of India or on the ground of patent illegality.= CIVIL APPEAL NO.9048 OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10849 of 2013) Swan Gold Mining Ltd. …Appellant (s) Versus Hindustan Copper Ltd. …Respondent(s) = 2014- Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41946

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, - Disputes arose - Arbitrator passed award - filed petition to cancellation - High court declined - DB also rejected - Apex court held that As noticed above, the  parties  have  entered into  concluded  contract,  agreeing  terms  and  conditions  of  the   said contract, which was finally acted upon.  In such a case, the parties to  the said contract cannot back out and challenge the award  on  the  ground  that the same is against the public policy.  Even assuming the  ground  available to the appellant, the award cannot  be  set  aside  as  because  it  is  not contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law  or  against  the  interest  of India or on the ground of patent illegality.=


Learned Single  Judge
had dismissed the appellant’s petition under Section 34 of  the  Arbitration
and Conciliation Act (in short, ‘the Act’)  challenging  the  award  of  the
Arbitrator.=
On refusal  by  the  respondent  to
make payment in  respect  of  excise  duty  and  other  taxes  paid  by  the
appellant relating to the work executed, the arbitration clause was  invoked
and the dispute was referred to a sole  Arbitrator,  who  after  considering
the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, held that the  price  bid  of
the appellant was not exclusive of  applicable  taxes.

Learned  Arbitrator
held that the clause relating  to  payment  of  taxes  was  deleted  by  the
appellant’s representative Mr. Ahlawat on 19.1.2007  and  since  work  order
was acknowledged, it is binding on the appellant. =

Aggrieved  by  the
decision of the learned Single Judge, appellant preferred appeal before  the
Division Bench of the High Court, which although upheld  the  contention  of
the appellant relating to the evidence on the issue of  deviation  in  price
bid on 19.1.2007, dismissed the Appeal on the ground of terms  contained  in
NIT and Work Order being in consonance with each other.  Hence, this  appeal
by special leave by the Australian company. =

 Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996  corresponds
to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 making a  provision  for  setting
aside the arbitral award.  In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of  the
Act, an arbitral award may be set  aside  only  if  one  of  the  conditions
specified therein is satisfied.
The  Arbitrator’s  decision   is  generally
considered binding between the parties  and  therefore,  the  power  of  the
Court to set aside the award would be exercised  only  in  cases  where  the
Court finds that the arbitral award is on  the  fact  of  it   erroneous  or
patently illegal or in contravention  of the provisions of the Act.
 It  is
a well settled proposition that the Court shall  not  ordinarily  substitute
its interpretation for that of the Arbitrator. Similarly, when  the  parties
have arrived at a concluded contract and acted on the basis of  those  terms
and conditions of the contract then substituting new terms in  the  contract
by the Arbitrator or by the Court would be erroneous or illegal.

13.   It is equally well  settled  that  the  Arbitrator  appointed  by  the
parties is the final judge of the facts. The finding of  facts  recorded  by
him cannot be interfered with on the ground that the terms of  the  contract
were not correctly interpreted by him. =
As noticed above, the  parties  have  entered
into  concluded  contract,  agreeing  terms  and  conditions  of  the   said
contract, which was finally acted upon.  In such a case, the parties to  the
said contract cannot back out and challenge the award  on  the  ground  that
the same is against the public policy.  Even assuming the  ground  available
to the appellant, the award cannot  be  set  aside  as  because  it  is  not
contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law  or  against  the  interest  of
India or on the ground of patent illegality.

 22.  The  words  “public  policy”  or  “opposed  to  public  policy”,  find
reference in Section 23 of the Contract Act and also Section  34  (2)(b)(ii)
of the Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996.   As  stated  above,  the
interpretation of the contract is   matter  of  the  Arbitrator,  who  is  a
Judge, chosen by the parties to  determine  and  decide  the  dispute.   The
Court is precluded from  re-appreciating  the  evidence  and  to  arrive  at
different conclusion by holding that  the  arbitral  award  is  against  the
public policy.

23.   We have given our anxious consideration in the matter.   In  our  view
the High Court has rightly came to the conclusion that no ground exists  for
setting aside the award as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act.

24.   For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit  in  this  appeal,
which accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

2014- Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41946

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.9048 OF 2014
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10849 of 2013)


Swan Gold Mining Ltd.                   …Appellant (s)

                                  Versus

Hindustan Copper Ltd.                   …Respondent(s)



                                  JUDGMENT

M.Y. Eqbal, J.:

      Leave granted.

2.    This appeal by special leave is  directed  against  the  judgment  and
order dated 19.9.2012 passed by the Division  Bench  of  the  Calcutta  High
Court whereby appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant  against  the  order  of
learned Single Judge of the High Court was dismissed.  Learned Single  Judge
had dismissed the appellant’s petition under Section 34 of  the  Arbitration
and Conciliation Act (in short, ‘the Act’)  challenging  the  award  of  the
Arbitrator.

3.  The case of the appellant is that a notice  inviting  tender  (NIT)  was
issued  by  the  respondent-Hindustan  Copper  Ltd.  inviting   offers   for
operation of its Surda Mine and Mosabani  Concentrator  Plant.   Respondent-
company was having several mines rich with natural resources being  metallic
ores.  The global tender floated by the respondent provided  that  it  shall
be the responsibility of successful bidder  for  payment  of  all  statutory
duties.  The appellant-company submitted its technical and  financial  bids.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the NIT contained  a  techno
commercial bid and a  separate  price  bid.   Price  bid  of  the  appellant
provided  that  any  Excise  Duty/Service  taxes  or  any   levy   presently
applicable or any variation or new  levy  in  future  to  be  reimbursed  on
actual basis.

4.  After negotiation and acceptance of the final price offer,  on  3.3.2007
respondent issued a Letter of Intent to  the  appellant  on  the  terms  and
conditions  of  the  NIT  and   other   terms   agreed   during   subsequent
discussions/negotiations.  Finally, on 26.3.2007  a  contract  was  executed
between the parties for re-commissioning and operation  of  the  Surda  Mine
and Mosabani Concentrator Plant.  Thereafter, a work  order  was  issued  on
14.4.2007 and the appellant raised its  Invoices  on  31.12.2007,  by  which
reimbursement  of  basic  excise  duty  and  other  duties  payable  by  the
appellant to the Government was sought.  On refusal  by  the  respondent  to
make payment in  respect  of  excise  duty  and  other  taxes  paid  by  the
appellant relating to the work executed, the arbitration clause was  invoked
and the dispute was referred to a sole  Arbitrator,  who  after  considering
the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, held that the  price  bid  of
the appellant was not exclusive of  applicable  taxes.   Learned  Arbitrator
held that the clause relating  to  payment  of  taxes  was  deleted  by  the
appellant’s representative Mr. Ahlawat on 19.1.2007  and  since  work  order
was acknowledged, it is binding on the appellant.

5.  The appellant challenged the award  by  way  of  filing  petition  under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Calcutta  High
Court on the grounds inter alia of perversity and contrary to law.   Learned
Single Judge of the High Court upholding the award and reasons  assigned  by
the learned Arbitrator, dismissed appellant’s petition.   Aggrieved  by  the
decision of the learned Single Judge, appellant preferred appeal before  the
Division Bench of the High Court, which although upheld  the  contention  of
the appellant relating to the evidence on the issue of  deviation  in  price
bid on 19.1.2007, dismissed the Appeal on the ground of terms  contained  in
NIT and Work Order being in consonance with each other.  Hence, this  appeal
by special leave by the Australian company.

6.    Mr.  Amarendra  Sharan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant assailed the award and the  impugned  order  passed  by  the  High
Court on various grounds. Learned counsel contended that the appellant is  a
reputed Australian Mining Company and it submitted bid in response  to  NIT.
The price bid submitted by the appellant provided for “base price plus  55%”
and that any excise duty/service tax or any levy to be reimbursed on  actual
basis.  A meeting of the Tender  Evaluation  Committee  of  the  respondent-
company with the bidders  was  held  on  18.1.2007  and  19.1.2007  and  the
respondent did not object to the price bid submitted by the appellant  which
was exclusive of taxes.  It is further contended by the senior counsel  that
after opening of price bid, although the respondent made a request to  lower
the bid price, there was no request to change provision  relating  to  taxes
mentioned in the price bid by  which  respondent  was  liable  to  reimburse
taxes.  The appellant-company submitted the revised  bid  on  27.1.2007  and
reduced the percentage from 55% to 50% (over the base price) and  reiterated
its earlier offer of payment of taxes  by  the  respondent.   After  further
negotiation and reduction of price bid to “base price plus 49%”,  respondent
issued Letter of Intent on 3.3.2007 and the contract was signed between  the
parties on 26.3.2007.

7.   Learned senior counsel contended  that  on  14.4.2007  Work  Order  was
issued with its Clause 4.9, which provided  for  payment  of  taxes  by  the
appellant.  For the settlement of disputes pertaining to taxes  and  duties,
appellant invoked clause 4.14 of NIT and sought  appointment  of  Arbitrator
where it was claimed by the  appellant  that  price  bid  submitted  by  the
appellant  is  exclusive  of  taxes  and  clause  4.9.1  of  Work  Order  is
inoperative and void. This claim was dismissed by the Learned Arbitrator  on
the ground that the clause relating to payment of taxes was  denied  by  the
appellant’s representative Mr. Ahlawat  on  19.1.2007  and  since  the  work
order was acknowledged, it is binding on the appellant.

8.  Mr. Sharan has submitted that there had never been any negotiation  with
regard to the liability of payment of excise duties and taxes  as  the  same
was finally concluded to the effect that the taxes shall  be  liable  to  be
reimbursed by the respondent. The negotiation was only with respect  to  the
percentage which was finally reduced to  49%.   It  is  submitted  that  the
respondent gave a calculation  which  does  not  include  taxes.  All  these
backgrounds have neither been considered by the Arbitrator nor by  the  High
Court.  It was submitted that non consideration of the offer, counter  offer
and letter of acceptance by the Arbitrator  amounts  to  serious  error  and
patent illegality in the Award.  NIT is only invitation to offer, which  has
been superseded by subsequent offers  and  counter  offers  and  hence,  NIT
cannot become the contract. Lastly, Mr. Sharan contended that work order  is
a unilateral document and there was  no  consensus   ad  idem  on  the  Work
Order.

9.    Mr. Sharan, learned counsel put heavy  reliance  on  the  decision  of
this Court in the case of Oil and  Natural  Gas  Corporation  Ltd.  vs.  Saw
Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, and submitted that if the  Award  is  contrary
to the substantive provision of law, or the provisions of  fact  or  against
the terms of contract, it would be patently illegal and could be  interfered
under Section 34 of the Act.  Mr. Sharan finally contended that the  parties
have expressly agreed that the bid price shall be exclusive of the  duty  of
taxes, deviation from such contract will go to the root of  the  matter  and
on  that  ground  Award  could  be  set  aside  if  it  is  so  unfair   and
unreasonable.  This will also be opposed to the public policy  and  required
to be adjudged void.

10.   Per contra, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for  the  respondent,
firstly submitted that the Award cannot be set aside except where the  Award
on the face of it suffers from patent illegality  and  perversity.   As  the
learned single Judge and the Division Bench  after  re-appreciation  of  the
entire facts and documents came to the conclusion that no ground  exists  to
set aside the Award, this Court should not interfere with the order  of  the
High Court.

11.   Learned senior  counsel  drawn  our  attention  to  various  documents
including NIT, initial bid proceedings of the meeting,  revised  bid,  offer
and counter offers, on the basis of which the letter of intent  was  issued.
Finally, the Work Order was issued and a contract was  signed  by  both  the
parties.  These documents would show that the appellant was made liable  for
payment of duty and taxes, which were inclusive of the bid price arrived  at
between the parties.

12.   Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996  corresponds
to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 making a  provision  for  setting
aside the arbitral award.  In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of  the
Act, an arbitral award may be set  aside  only  if  one  of  the  conditions
specified therein is satisfied.  The  Arbitrator’s  decision   is  generally
considered binding between the parties  and  therefore,  the  power  of  the
Court to set aside the award would be exercised  only  in  cases  where  the
Court finds that the arbitral award is on  the  fact  of  it   erroneous  or
patently illegal or in contravention  of the provisions of the Act.   It  is
a well settled proposition that the Court shall  not  ordinarily  substitute
its interpretation for that of the Arbitrator. Similarly, when  the  parties
have arrived at a concluded contract and acted on the basis of  those  terms
and conditions of the contract then substituting new terms in  the  contract
by the Arbitrator or by the Court would be erroneous or illegal.

13.   It is equally well  settled  that  the  Arbitrator  appointed  by  the
parties is the final judge of the facts. The finding of  facts  recorded  by
him cannot be interfered with on the ground that the terms of  the  contract
were not correctly interpreted by him.

14.  We have gone through the facts of the case and  perused  the  documents
on the basis of which the Arbitrator gave the Award on 24.7.2009.

15.   The respondent issued notice inviting tender (NIT) for  the  operation
of its mine.  Clauses 4.9.1 to 4.9.5 of the NIT are extracted hereinbelow:-
“4.9.1.      The rates quoted by the successful bidder shall  be  deemed  to
be (inclusive) of the sales taxes, other taxes  and  service  tax  that  the
successful bidder will have to pay in India & Abroad for the performance  of
this contract.  HCL will perform such duty regarding the deduction  of  such
taxes at source as per applicable laws.

4.9.2. The successful bidder shall also be responsible to bear and  pay  any
taxes, cess,  fees  and/or  duties  levied  including  but  not  limited  to
interest, penalty and/or fine imposed by any authorities  including  revenue
authorities in India and/or abroad at any time even  beyond  the  expiry  of
the Contract period with respect  of  the  work  to  be  performed   by  the
successful bidder in accordance with the Contract.

4.9.3.      The successful bidder  shall  also  be  responsible  for  filing
income  tax  return  and/or  complying  with  necessary   procedure   and/or
formalities as required or may be required under the fiscal  laws  of  India
and/or abroad in respect of the work  to  be  performed  by  the  successful
bidder in accordance with the Contract.

4.9.4.      Corporate Tax and/or Income Tax,  if  any  applicable/levied  in
India and/or abroad on the successful bidder and/or its personnel and/or  on
the sub-contractors engaged by the successful bidder and /or  the  personnel
of  such  sub-contractors  in  respect  of  this  contract   will   be   the
responsibility of the successful  bidder.   All  the  necessary  return  and
other formalities will be the responsibility of successful bidder.

4.9.5.      All other statutory levies including but not limited  to  Custom
Duties/Excise Duties, Sales Taxes,  Works  Contract  and  other  levies   of
whatsoever  nature  payable  in  accordance   with   the   law   of   India,
levied/leviable on the  successful  bidder  and/or  its  sub-contractors  in
respect of performance of this contract shall be the responsibility  of  the
successful bidder or any of its sub-contractors.”

16.    The  appellant  in  response  to  NIT  submitted  its  technical  and
financial bids.  Subsequent to submission  of  the  technical  bid  and  the
price bid, the parties entered into negotiation and thereafter a  letter  of
intent on the terms and conditions of NIT and the other terms agreed  during
subsequent negotiations was issued. In  the  said  letter  of  intent  dated
3.3.2007, it was specifically mentioned that the execution of work shall  be
on  the  terms  of  notice  inviting   tender   (NIT)   and   other   agreed
discussions/negotiations subsequently held  between  the  parties.   Finally
the Work Order was issued on 14.4.2007 in continuation with  the  letter  of
intent dated 3.3.2007.  The relevant portion of the work order is  extracted
herein-below:-
                                 “WORK ORDER
 SUB:- Re-opening and operating of Sudra Mine & Mosaboni concentrator plant
                     at Indian Copper Complex, Ghatsila
Dear Sir,
With reference to the above subject, Hindustan Copper Limited is  please  to
issue  work  order  to  continuation  with  LOI  dated  03-03-2007  to   re-
commission, operate and maintain Surda Mine and Mosaboni concentrator  plant
to supply and deliver copper concentrate at rates Rs 1,53,470.00 per ton  of
mental in concentrate (Excluding Royality)  to  Maubhandar  work  of  Indian
Copper Complex, produced from the operations of these units.

This Work shall be governed by the terms and conditions of  the  Expressions
of Interest  of  dated  21-09-2006,  Notice  Inviting  Tender  No.  HC/HO/GM
(M&S)/SUDRA  dated  11-12-2006  and  the  other  agreed  during   subsequent
discussions/negotiations, and the final offer.”
                                                            (Emphasis given)

17.   In the course  of  hearing,  Mr.  P.P.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel
appearing for the respondent produced before us a xerox  copy  of  the  Work
Order  dated  14.4.2007.  Clause  4.9.1  quoted   hereinabove   specifically
mentions therein that the rate quoted by  the  appellant  was  inclusive  of
sales tax, service tax and the  other  taxes.   The  representative  of  the
appellant signed the Work Order on each pages (20  pages)  and  acknowledged
and admitted the terms and conditions for the said work.

18.    From  the  facts  mentioned  hereinabove,  it  is  evident  that  the
appellant has accepted the liability of payment of excise duty,  sales  tax,
service tax and other taxes and hence it cannot  be  held  that  the  clause
4.9.1 of the Work Order is inconsistent with the  terms  and  conditions  of
contract documents.

19.   The learned Arbitrator has gone in detail of  the  dispute  raised  by
the appellant and rightly came to the conclusion that the responsibility  on
the appellant is to abide by the terms and conditions of the Work Order.

20.   We have also gone through the order passed by the  High  Court.    The
Court rightly came to the conclusion that there is no patent  illegality  in
the Award passed by the Arbitrator which needs  interference  under  Section
34 of the Act.

21.   Mr. Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the  appellant,  also
challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the  same  is  in  conflict
with the public policy of India.  We do not find any substance in  the  said
submission.  This Court, in the case of  Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Corporation
Ltd. (supra), observed that the term ‘public policy of  India’  is  required
to be interpreted in the context of jurisdiction  of  the  Court  where  the
validity of award is challenged before  it  becomes  final  and  executable.
The Court held that an  award  can  be  set  aside  if  it  is  contrary  to
fundamental policy of Indian law or the interest of India, or  if  there  is
patent illegality.  In our view, the said decision will not in any way  come
into rescue of the appellant.  As noticed above, the  parties  have  entered
into  concluded  contract,  agreeing  terms  and  conditions  of  the   said
contract, which was finally acted upon.  In such a case, the parties to  the
said contract cannot back out and challenge the award  on  the  ground  that
the same is against the public policy.  Even assuming the  ground  available
to the appellant, the award cannot  be  set  aside  as  because  it  is  not
contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law  or  against  the  interest  of
India or on the ground of patent illegality.

 22.  The  words  “public  policy”  or  “opposed  to  public  policy”,  find
reference in Section 23 of the Contract Act and also Section  34  (2)(b)(ii)
of the Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996.   As  stated  above,  the
interpretation of the contract is   matter  of  the  Arbitrator,  who  is  a
Judge, chosen by the parties to  determine  and  decide  the  dispute.   The
Court is precluded from  re-appreciating  the  evidence  and  to  arrive  at
different conclusion by holding that  the  arbitral  award  is  against  the
public policy.

23.   We have given our anxious consideration in the matter.   In  our  view
the High Court has rightly came to the conclusion that no ground exists  for
setting aside the award as contemplated under Section 34 of the Act.

24.   For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit  in  this  appeal,
which accordingly stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                              [ M.Y. Eqbal ]


                                                               …………………………….J
                                                      [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]
New Delhi
September 22, 2014










Environment Protection Act, 1986. - Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted (w.e.f.19th February, 1991) - The guidelines,-Hotels, Beach Resorts and Beach Bungalows in Goa - orders to demolish as the buildings were situated with in 500 meters from HTL permitted - High court allowed the Writ Pil - Apex court held that admittedly the all the buildings constructed before the commencement of the Act and guidelines which are not gazetted no force of law - all are prospective - and as such the apex court held that Violation of Article 21 on account of alleged environmental violation cannot be subjectively and individually determined when parameters of permissible/impermissible conduct are required to be legislatively or statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 which has been so done by bringing into force the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.In view of the foregoing discussion, the orders impugned in the writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot be sustained. Consequently, the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July, 2000 passed by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside which we hereby do while allowing the appeals.=CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3434-3435 OF 2001 GULF GOANS HOTELS CO. LTD. & ANR. . ..APPELLANTS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41945

 Environment  Protection Act, 1986. - Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) - The   guidelines,-Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach Bungalows in Goa - orders to demolish as the buildings were situated with in 500 meters from HTL permitted - High court allowed the Writ Pil - Apex court held that admittedly the all the buildings constructed before the commencement of the Act and guidelines which are not gazetted no force of law - all are prospective - and as such the apex court held that Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently, the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do while allowing the appeals.=

 The appellants are the owners  of  Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach
Bungalows in Goa who have been facing the prospect of  demolition  of  their
properties for the last several decades.      =

 The respondent-
Goa Foundation had filed parallel writ petitions before the High  Court  for
demolition of the allegedly illegal constructions raised by the  appellants.
Both sets of writ petitions i.e. those filed by the appellants  against  the
orders of demolition by the State Authorities and the writ  petitions  filed
by the Goa Foundation seeking demolition of constructions raised by each  of
the appellants were heard together  by  the  Bombay  High  Court.
The  High
Court, by separate impugned orders dated 13th July,  2000,  had  upheld  the
orders passed by the authorities requiring the appellants  to  demolish  the
existing structures.
It is against the aforesaid orders passed by  the  High
Court that the present group of appeals have been filed upon grant of  leave
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.=

The constructions raised by the appellants are not per se  illegal  in
the conventional sense. They are not without permission and sanction of  the
competent authority.
What has  been  alleged  by  the  State  and  has  been
approved by the High Court is that such constructions are in  derogation  of
the environmental guidelines in force warranting demolition of the  same  as
a step to safeguard the environment of the beaches in Goa.
Specifically,  it
is the case of the State that the constructions in question are  between  90
to 200 meters from the High Tide Line (HTL) despite the fact that under  the
guidelines in force, which  partake  the  character  of  law,  constructions
within 500 meters of the HTL are prohibited except in rare situations  where
construction activity between 200 to 500 meters from the HTL  are  permitted
subject to observance of strict conditions. 
Admittedly,  all  constructions,
though completed on  different  dates  and  in  different  phases,  were  so
completed before the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) in exercise of the powers under the  Environment  Protection
Act, 1986.=
Though  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone  (CRZ)  Notification  under  the  Act  was  issued  on  19th
February, 1991 and admittedly is prospective in nature, till such time  that
the said notification came into force it is the guidelines  which  held  the
field being administrative instructions  having  the  effect  of  law  under
Article 73 of the Constitution.=
The   guidelines,   detailed
reference to which are made in the  succeeding  paragraphs  of  the  present
order, are not ‘law’ so as to  constitute  activities  contrary  thereto  as
acts of infringement of the law and hence illegal. Such  guidelines  do  not
confer the power of enforcement and lack the authority to  bring  about  any
penal consequences.
It may, therefore, be understood that a Govt. policy may acquire  the
“force of ‘law’” if it conforms to a certain form possessed  by  other  laws
in force and encapsulates a mandate and discloses a specific purpose. 
In the event the statute does  not  contain
any prescription  and  even  under  the  subordinate  legislation  there  is
silence in the matter, the legislation will take  effect  only  when  it  is
published through the customarily recognized official channel,  namely,  the
official gazette (B.K. Srivastava vs. State of  Karnataka)[14].  Admittedly,
the ‘guidelines’ were not gazetted. =
   We  cannot  appreciate  the  above  view.
Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation
cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of
permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or
statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection
Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.

23.     In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the
writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently,
the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed
by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do
while allowing the appeals.
2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41945
                      REPORTABLE

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CIVIL APPEAL  NOS.3434-3435 OF 2001

GULF GOANS HOTELS CO. LTD. & ANR.  .     ..APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                           ...RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3438 OF 2001
                                    WITH
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3436-3437 OF 2001
                                    WITH
                         CIVIL APEAL NO.3439 OF 2001

                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    The appellants are the owners  of  Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach
Bungalows in Goa who have been facing the prospect of  demolition  of  their
properties for the last several decades. The respondent-Goa Foundation is  a
non-  Governmental  body  who  claims  to  be  dedicated  to  the  cause  of
environmental and ecological well being of the State of Goa. The respondent-
Goa Foundation had filed parallel writ petitions before the High  Court  for
demolition of the allegedly illegal constructions raised by the  appellants.
Both sets of writ petitions i.e. those filed by the appellants  against  the
orders of demolition by the State Authorities and the writ  petitions  filed
by the Goa Foundation seeking demolition of constructions raised by each  of
the appellants were heard together  by  the  Bombay  High  Court.  The  High
Court, by separate impugned orders dated 13th July,  2000,  had  upheld  the
orders passed by the authorities requiring the appellants  to  demolish  the
existing structures. It is against the aforesaid orders passed by  the  High
Court that the present group of appeals have been filed upon grant of  leave
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

2.    The constructions raised by the appellants are not per se  illegal  in
the conventional sense. They are not without permission and sanction of  the
competent authority. What has  been  alleged  by  the  State  and  has  been
approved by the High Court is that such constructions are in  derogation  of
the environmental guidelines in force warranting demolition of the  same  as
a step to safeguard the environment of the beaches in Goa. Specifically,  it
is the case of the State that the constructions in question are  between  90
to 200 meters from the High Tide Line (HTL) despite the fact that under  the
guidelines in force, which  partake  the  character  of  law,  constructions
within 500 meters of the HTL are prohibited except in rare situations  where
construction activity between 200 to 500 meters from the HTL  are  permitted
subject to observance of strict conditions. Admittedly,  all  constructions,
though completed on  different  dates  and  in  different  phases,  were  so
completed before the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) in exercise of the powers under the  Environment  Protection
Act, 1986.

3.    The above basis on which the impugned action of the State  is  founded
has been sought to be answered by the appellants by contending that  at  the
relevant point of time when building permissions and sanctions were  granted
in respect of the constructions undertaken, the prohibition was with  regard
to construction within 90 meters from  the  HTL.  Admittedly,  none  of  the
constructions  are  within  the  said  divide.  The   guidelines,   detailed
reference to which are made in the  succeeding  paragraphs  of  the  present
order, are not ‘law’ so as to  constitute  activities  contrary  thereto  as
acts of infringement of the law and hence illegal. Such  guidelines  do  not
confer the power of enforcement and lack the authority to  bring  about  any
penal consequences.

4.    Having very broadly noticed the contours of the adjudication that  the
present case would require, we may now proceed to consider the stand of  the
rival parties with some elaboration. The Stockholm declaration  of  1972  to
which India was the party is the foundation of the State’s  claim  that  the
guidelines in question, being in  implementation  of  India’s  international
commitments, engraft a legal framework by executive action under Article  73
of the Constitution.   The  said  guidelines  are  in  conformity  with  the
Nation’s commitment to international values in the  matter  of  preservation
of the pristine  purity  of  sea  beaches  and  to  prevent  its  ecological
degradation. Such commitment to an established feature of International  Law
stands engrafted in the Municipal Laws of the country by incorporation.  The
guidelines commencing with the instructions conveyed by the  Prime  Minister
of India in a letter dated  27th  November,  1981  addressed  to  the  Chief
Minister of Goa; the environmental guidelines  for  development  of  beaches
published in July, 1983 by the Government of  India and the 1986  guidelines
issued  by  Inter  Ministerial  Committee  by  the  Ministry   of   Tourism,
Government of India by order dated 11th June, 1986 have been  stressed  upon
as containing  the  responses  of  the  Union  of  India  to  the  Stockholm
Declaration. It is contended that enactment of laws by  the  legislature  is
not exhaustive of the manner in which India’s International commitments  can
be furthered.  Executive action, in the absence of statutory enactments,  is
an alternative mode authorised under Article 73 of the Constitution. In  the
present case, the exercise of executive power is traceable to Entry  13  and
14 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The power to  give
effect to the guidelines and to penalize  violators  thereof  may  not  have
been available at the time when the guidelines  became  effective.  However,
with the enactment of the  Environment  Protection  Act,  1986  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’) with effect from 19th November, 1986,  sections  3
and 5 empowered the Central Government to pass necessary  orders  and  issue
directions which are penal in nature. It is in  the  exercise  of  the  said
power under the Act read with the guidelines  referred  to  above  that  the
orders impugned by the appellants  have  been  passed.  Though  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone  (CRZ)  Notification  under  the  Act  was  issued  on  19th
February, 1991 and admittedly is prospective in nature, till such time  that
the said notification came into force it is the guidelines  which  held  the
field being administrative instructions  having  the  effect  of  law  under
Article 73 of the Constitution.

5.    The stand of the State in support of  the  impugned  action  has  been
noticed at the outset for a better appreciation of  the  arguments  advanced
by  the  appellants.  Shri  K.  Parasaran,  Shri  C.U.Singh  and  Shri  Raju
Ramachandran, learned senior counsels who had  appeared  on  behalf  of  the
appellants in the different appeals under consideration have submitted  that
the purport and effect of the CRZ  Notification  published  on          19th
February, 1991 in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act and the  Rules
read together has been considered by this Court  in  Goan  Real  Estate  and
Construction Limited & Anr. vs. Union of India through  Secretary,  Ministry
of Environment & Ors.[1] to hold that: “Thus, the intention  of  legislature
while  issuing  the  Notification  of  1991  was   to   protect   the   past
actions/transactions which came into existence before the  approval  of  the
1991 Notification.” It is further submitted  that  in  Goan  Real  Estate  &
Construction  Ltd.  (supra)  construction  which  had  commenced  after  the
amendments made in the year 1994 to the notification  dated  19th  February,
1991 till the same were declared illegal on         18th April,  1996,  were
protected by this Court by holding that  though  the  amending  notification
was declared illegal by this Court –  “all  orders  passed  under  the  said
notification and actions taken pursuant to the said notification  would  not
be affected in any manner whatsoever.” (Para 38). According to  the  learned
counsels, the above is the approach that this  Court  had  indicated  to  be
appropriate for adoption while considering the Regulations  and  its  impact
on environmental issues in so far as  coastal  areas  and  sea  beaches  are
concerned.

6.  In so far as the guidelines of  1983  and  1986  are  concerned,  it  is
contended that the Stockholm Declaration saw the emergence  of  the  concept
of sustainable development in  full  bloom.  In  Vellore  Citizens’  Welfare
Forum vs. Union of  India  &  Ors.[2],  this  court  understood  Sustainable
Development to mean  “development  that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present
without compromising the ability of the future  generations  to  meet  their
own needs”. In Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum (supra), it is  further  held
that “Sustainable Development” as a balancing concept  between  ecology  and
development has been accepted as  a  part  of  customary  international  law
though its salient features are yet to be  finalised  by  the  international
law jurists. The Stockholm Declaration, naturally,  does  not  and  in  fact
could not have visualized specific and  precise  parameters  of  sustainable
development including prohibitory and permissible parameters  of  industrial
and business activities  on  the  sea  beaches  that  could  be  universally
applied across the board. The very text and the language of the  guidelines,
according to learned counsels, make it clear that there  is  no  mandate  of
law in any of the  said  guidelines  which  are  really  in  the  nature  of
evolving parameters embodying suggestions for identification of the  correct
parameters for enactment of laws in the future.  It  is  accordingly  argued
that the guidelines do not amount to  an  exercise  of  law  making  by  the
executive under Article 73 of the Constitution. In any case, the  guidelines
were never published or authenticated as required under Article  77  of  the
Constitution. Pointing  out  the  provisions  of  the  Air  (Prevention  and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, it is argued that  the  aforesaid  Act  was
enacted to implement the decisions taken  in  the  Stockholm  Conference  of
1972. Parliament though fully aware of the  resolutions and decisions  taken
in the Stockholm Conference as well as the commitments made by the India  as
a signatory thereto did not consider it necessary to enact  a  comprehensive
law to protect and safeguard ecology and environment until enactment of  the
Environment Protection Act  with  effect  from  18th  November,  1986.  Even
thereafter, the parameters for enforcement of  the  provisions  of  the  Act
insofar as the sea  coast  and  beaches  are  concerned  had  to  await  the
enactment of the CRZ Notification of 19th  February,  1991.  Shri  Parasaran
has particularly relied on  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  State  of
Karnataka & Anr. vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr.[3] to  contend  that  even
if the court is to hold otherwise what would be called for is  a  “balancing
act” which would lean in favour of the protection  of  the  property  having
regard to the long period of  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  impugned
action was initiated against the appellants.

7.     In reply, Shri Chitale, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
Union of India has placed before the Court the several documents  which  the
Union would like the Court to construe as the ‘law  in  force’  to  regulate
commercial/business activities on the  sea  beaches  in  order  to  maintain
environmental health and  ecological  balance.  It  is  contended  that  the
aforesaid  guidelines,  though  had  existed  all  along,   could   not   be
specifically enforced in the absence of statutory  powers  to  penalize  the
violations thereof.  Such  power,  learned  counsel  contends,  came  to  be
conferred with the enactment of the Environment Protection Act  with  effect
from 19th November, 1986. The guidelines which all along had laid  down  the
parameters for application of the provisions of the  Act  were  replaced  by
the CRZ Regulations  with  effect  from                      19th  February,
1991.  Learned  counsel  has  contended  that  the  guidelines  issued   are
traceable to the power of the Union executive under Entry 13 and 14 of  List
I of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 73 of the Constitution.  Learned
counsel has also drawn the attention of the Court to  its  earlier  decision
in the case of Gramophone Company of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur  Pandey
& Ors.[4] to contend that it was not necessary to enact a  specific  law  to
give effect to Stockholm  Declaration  inasmuch  as  the  understanding  and
agreement reached in the International  Convention  to  which  India  was  a
party stood embodied in the Municipal Laws of the country by application  of
the doctrine of incorporation.

Particular emphasis was laid on the views expressed by this Court in Para  5
of the decision  in  Gramophone  Company  of  India  (supra)  which  may  be
extracted below:-

“5. There can be no question that nations must march with the  international
community and the municipal law must  respect  rules  of  international  law
even as  nations  respect  international  opinion.  The  comity  of  nations
requires that  rules  of  international  law  may  be  accommodated  in  the
municipal law even without express legislative  sanction  provided  they  do
not run into conflict with Acts of Parliament. But when  they  do  run  into
such conflict, the sovereignty and the integrity of  the  Republic  and  the
supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making  the  laws  may  not  be
subjected to external rules except to the extent  legitimately  accepted  by
the constituted legislatures themselves. The doctrine of incorporation  also
recognises  the  position  that  the  rules   of   international   law   are
incorporated into national law and considered to be  part  of  the  national
law, unless they are in conflict  with  an  Act  of  Parliament.  Comity  of
nations or no, municipal law must prevail  in  case  of  conflict.  National
courts cannot  say  yes  if  Parliament  has  said  no  to  a  principle  of
international law. National courts will endorse international  law  but  not
if it conflicts with national law.  National  courts  being  organs  of  the
national State and not organs  of  international  law  must  perforce  apply
national law if international law conflicts with  it.  But  the  courts  are
under an obligation within legitimate limits, to so interpret the  municipal
statute as to avoid confrontation with the comity of  nations  or  the  well
established principles of international law. But if conflict is  inevitable,
the latter must yield.”


8.    Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent  NGO,
Goa Foundation, has submitted that the Prime Minister’s  letter  dated  27th
November, 1981; the 1983 guidelines as well as guidelines of  1986  have  to
be  construed  to  be  law  within  the  meaning  of  Article  73   of   the
Constitution. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court  in  Vishaka  &
Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,[5], Shri Parikh has  submitted  that  in
framing the guidelines to ensure prevention of  sexual  harassment  at  work
place this Court has placed reliance on the  fact  that  the  Government  of
India has ratified some of the resolutions adopted in the convention on  the
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and had made  known
its commitments to the cause of women’s human rights  in  the  Fourth  World
Conference of Women held in Beijing. Similarly, relying on the  observations
of this Court in Para 52 in Vineet Narain  &  Ors.  vs.  Union  of  India  &
Anr.[6], it is contended that “it is the duty of the executive to  fill  the
vacuum by executive orders because its field is  coterminous  with  that  of
the legislature.” Shri Parikh has also relied on a judgment of  old  vintage
in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. vs. The State of Punjab[7]  to  contend
that the  executive  power  of  the  union  is  wide  and  expansive  and  –
“comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it  into
execution. This  evidently  includes  the  initiation  of  legislation,  the
maintenance of order, the promotion of  social  and  economic  welfare,  the
direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision  of  the
general administration of the State.” (sub-para of Para 13).

9.     Shri Parikh has further contended that  commitments  of  the  country
made at an international forum which are in  tune  with  the  constitutional
philosophy i.e. to preserve and maintain ecology and  environment,  must  be
understood to have been incorporated in the Municipal Laws  of  the  country
and executive decisions to the above effect  will  fill  in  the  void  till
effective statutory exercise is made which in the instant case came  in  the
form of CRZ Notification dated 19th February, 1991.

10.     Shri Parikh has also submitted that passage  of  time  resulting  in
astronomical  rise  of  property  value;  use  of  the  otherwise  illegally
constructed property during the pendency of the present proceeding and  such
other events cannot be the basis of any claim in equity  for  protection  of
the product of an apparently illegal act. Reliance in  this  case  has  been
placed on a decision of this Court in Fomento Resorts  &  Hotels  Limited  &
Anr. vs. Minguel Martins & Ors.[8] .

11.     The  cases  of  the  respective  parties  having  been  noticed  the
necessary discourse may now commence. In Bennett Coleman & Co. vs. Union  of
India[9], a ‘Newsprint Policy’, notified by the Central Govt.  for  imposing
conditions on import of newsprint came to be challenged  on  the  ground  of
violation  of  fundamental  rights.  Beg,  J.,  in  a  concurring  judgment,
observed:
“What is termed “policy” can become justiciable when it exhibits  itself  in
the shape of even purported “law”. According  to  Article  13(3)(a)  of  the
Constitution,  “law”  includes  “any  Ordinance,   order,   bye-law,   rule,
[pic]regulation, notification, custom or usage having in  the  territory  of
India the force of law”. So long as policy remains  in  the  realm  of  even
rules framed for the guidance of executive  and  administrative  authorities
it may bind those authorities as declarations of what they are  expected  to
do under it. But, it cannot bind citizens  unless  the  impugned  policy  is
shown     to      have      acquired      the      force      of      “law”.
                         (para 93 – emphasis added)

12.   The question ‘what is “law”? has perplexed  many  a  jurisprude;  yet,
the search for the elusive definition continues. It may be unwise  to  posit
an answer to the question; rather, one may proceed by examining  the  points
of consensus in jurisprudential theories. What appears to be common  to  all
these theories is the notion that law must possess a certain  form;  contain
a clear mandate/explicit command which may be  prescriptive,  permissive  or
penal and the law must also seek to achieve a clearly identifiable  purpose.
While the form itself or absence thereof will not be determinative  and  its
impact  has  to  be  considered  as  a  lending  or  supporting  force,  the
disclosure of a clear mandate and purpose is indispensable.

13.    It may, therefore, be understood that a Govt. policy may acquire  the
“force of ‘law’” if it conforms to a certain form possessed  by  other  laws
in force and encapsulates a mandate and discloses a specific purpose. It  is
from the aforesaid prescription that  the  guidelines  relied  upon  by  the
Union of India in this case, will have to be examined to  determine  whether
the same satisfies the minimum elements of law. The said guidelines are -
1.   Directives to the State Governments  in  letter  dated  27th  November,
1981 of the then Prime Minister;
2.    Notification dated 22nd July, 1982 of  the  Governor  setting  up  the
Ecological Development Council for Goa, inter alia, for  scrutiny  of  beach
construction within 500 meters of HTL;

3.    Environmental Guidelines for Development of Beaches of July 1983;

4.  Order dated 11th June, 1986 of Under  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Tourism,
also addressed to Chief Secretary, Govt.  of  Goa,  constituting  an  inter-
Ministerial Committee for considering tourist projects within 500 meters.


14.  The genesis  of  the  Executive’s  decision  to  restrict  construction
activity within 500 meters of  the  HTL  can  be  traced  to  the  Stockholm
Conference. It is India’s participation in the conference that  led  to  the
introduction of  Articles  48A  and  51A(g)  in  the  Constitution  and  the
enactment of several legislations like the Air Act 1981,Forest  Conservation
Act, 1980, Environment Protection Act,  1986  etc.  all  of  which  seek  to
protect, preserve and safeguard the environment. It may be possible to  view
the aforesaid guidelines as “affirmative action”,  aimed  at  implementation
of Articles 21 and 48A of  the  Constitution  and,  therefore,  outlining  a
visible purpose.  The  search  for  a  clear,  unambiguous  and  unequivocal
command to regulate the conduct of the citizens in the said guidelines  must
also be equally fruitful. However,  we  are  unable  to  find  in  the  said
guidelines any expressed or clearly defined dicta. In fact, having read  and
considered the guidelines, we  are  left  with  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to
whether what has  been  spelt  out  therein  are  not  mere  suggestions  or
opinions expressed in the process of a continuing  exploration  to  identify
the correct parameters that would effectuate the purpose  i.e.  safeguarding
and protecting the environment (sea beaches)  from  human  exploitation  and
degradation. The above is particularly significant in view of the fact  that
the Stockholm Declaration in its core  resolutions,  merely  enunciate  very
broad propositions  and  commitments  including  those  concerning  the  sea
beaches  as  distinguished  from  specific  parameters   that   could   have
application, without variation or exception, to all the signatories  to  the
declaration.  The  Stockholm  Conference  having   nowhere   expressed   any
internationally approved parameters of acceptable  distance  from  the  HTL,
incorporation of any such feature of international values in  the  Municipal
Laws of the country  cannot  arise  even  on  the  principle  enunciated  in
Gramophone Company of India (supra). The position  is  best  highlighted  by
noticing in a little detail the objectives sought  to  be  achieved  in  the
Stockholm Conference and the core principles adopted therein so far as  they
are relevant to the issues in hand.
“The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,  met  at  Stockholm
from 5 to 16 June, 1972, to consider the  need  for  a  common  outlook  and
common principles to inspire and guide the  peoples  of  the  world  in  the
preservation and enhancement of the human environment -
The Conference called upon Governments and peoples to exert  common  efforts
for the preservation and improvement  of  the  human  environment,  for  the
benefit of all the people and for their posterity.”

Extract of the relevant Principles –
“Principle 7- States shall take all possible steps to prevent  pollution  of
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards  to  human  health,
to harm living  resources  and  marine  life,  to  damage  amenities  or  to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

Principle 11 - The environmental policies of all States should  enhance  and
not  adversely  affect  the  present  or  future  development  potential  of
developing countries, nor  should  they  hamper  the  attainment  of  better
living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken  by  States
and international  organizations  with  a  view  to  reaching  agreement  on
meeting  the  possible  national  and  international  economic  consequences
resulting from the application of environmental measures.


Principle  14-  Rational  planning  constitutes  an   essential   tool   for
reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and  the  need  to
protect and improve the environment.


Principle 23- Without prejudice to such criteria as may be  agreed  upon  by
the  international  community,  or  to  standards  which  will  have  to  be
determined nationally, it will be essential in all  cases  to  consider  the
systems of values  prevailing  in  each  country,  and  the  extent  of  the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most  advanced  countries
but which may be inappropriate  and  of  unwarranted  social  cost  for  the
developing countries.


Principle  24-  International  matters   concerning   the   protection   and
improvement of the environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit  by
all countries, big and small, on an equal footing.


Cooperation  through  multilateral  or  bilateral  arrangements   or   other
appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent,  reduce  and
eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities  conducted
in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of  the  sovereignty
and interests of all States.”

15.     Article 77 of the  Constitution  provides  the  form  in  which  the
Executive must make and authenticate its orders and  decisions.  Clause  (1)
of Article 77 provides that all executive action of the Government  must  be
expressed to be taken in the name of the President.  The  celebrated  author
H.M.Seervai in Constitutional Law of India,  4th  Edition,  Volume  2,  1999
describes the consequences of Government orders or  instructions  not  being
in accordance with Clauses (1) or (2) of Article  77  by  opining  that  the
same would deprive of the orders of the immunity conferred by the  aforesaid
clauses and they may be open to challenge on the ground that they  have  not
been made by or under the authority of  the  President  in  which  case  the
burden would be on the Government to show that they were, in fact, so  made.
In the present case, the said burden has not been discharged in  any  manner
whatsoever.  The  decision  in  Air  India  Cabin   Crew   Association   vs.
Yeshaswinee Merchant[10], taking a somewhat different view can, perhaps,  be
explained by the  fact  that  in  the  said  case  the  impugned  directions
contained in the Government  letter  (not  expressed  in  the  name  of  the
President) was in exercise of the statutory power under Section  34  of  the
Air Corporations Act, 1953. In the present  case,  the  impugned  guidelines
have not been issued under any existing statute.

16.  Clause (2) of Article  77  also  provides  for  the  authentication  of
orders and instruments in a manner as may be prescribed  by  the  Rules.  In
this regard, vide S.O. 2297 dated  3rd  November,  1958   published  in  the
Gazette of India, the President has issued the  Authentication  (Orders  and
Other  Instruments)  Rules,  1958.  The  said  Rules  have  been  superseded
subsequently in 2002. Admittedly, the provisions of the said Rules  of  1958
had not been followed in the present case insofar  as  the  promulgation  of
the guidelines is concerned.

17.    In  the  absence  of  due  authentication  and  promulgation  of  the
guidelines, the contents thereof cannot  be  treated  as  an  order  of  the
Government and would really represent an expression of opinion. In law,  the
said guidelines and its binding effect  would  be  no  more  than  what  was
expressed by this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. S.K.  Vaish[11]  in  the
following paragraph of the report :

“It is settled law that all executive actions of  the  Government  of  India
and the Government of a State are required to be taken in the  name  of  the
President or the Governor of  the  State  concerned,  as  the  case  may  be
[Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other instruments made and  executed
in the name of the President or the Governor of a State,  as  the  case  may
be, are required to be authenticated in the manner specified  in  the  rules
made by the President or the Governor, as the case may  be  [Articles  77(2)
and 166(2)]. In other words, unless an order is expressed  in  the  name  of
the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner  prescribed
by the rules, the same cannot be treated  as  an  order  on  behalf  of  the
Government.”  [Para 23]

“A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting  simpliciter  and  nothing
more.  It  merely  represents  expression  of  opinion  by  the   particular
individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be  treated  as  a
decision of the Government. Even if  the  competent  authority  records  its
opinion in the file on the merits of the  matter  under  consideration,  the
same cannot be  termed  as  a  decision  of  the  Government  unless  it  is
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in  accordance  with  Articles
77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or  even  a
decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the  parties  only
when it is expressed in the name of the President or the  Governor,  as  the
case may be, [pic]and authenticated in the manner provided in Article  77(2)
or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision  recorded  in  the  file  can
always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned  and  the  court  cannot
take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the  power
of judicial review.”      [Para 24]


18.     It is also essential that what is  claimed  to  be  a  law  must  be
notified or made public in order to bind the citizen. In Harla vs. State  of
Rajasthan[12] while dealing with the vires of the Jaipur  Opium  Act,  which
was enacted by a resolution passed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers,  though
never published in the Gazette, this Court had observed :-
“Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must  be
promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable  way  so
that all men may know what it is, or, at the very least, there must be  some
special role or regulation or customary channel by  or  through  which  such
knowledge  can  be  acquired  with  the  exercise  of  due  and   reasonable
diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses  of  a
chamber to which  the  public  have  no  access  and  to  which  even  their
accredited representatives have no access and of  which  they  can  normally
know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and  property  by
the mere passing of a Resolution  without  anything  more  is  abhorrent  to
civilised man.”        [Para 10]


19.   The Court  in  Harla  vs.  State  of  Rajasthan  (supra)  noticed  the
decision in Johnson vs. Sargant & Sons[13] and particularly the following:-
 “The principle underlying this question has been judicially  considered  in
England. For example, on a somewhat lower plane, it was held in  Johnson  v.
Sargant, (1918) 1 K.B. 101: 87 L.J. K.B. 122  that  an  order  of  the  Food
Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition)  Order  1917,  does
not become operative  until  it  is  made  known  to  the  public,  and  the
differences between an Order  of  that  kind  and  an  Act  of  the  British
Parliament is stressed. The difference  is  obvious.  Acts  of  the  British
Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and  the
acts are passed by the accredited  representatives  of  the  people  who  in
theory can be trusted to see that their  constituents  know  what  has  been
done. They also  receive  wide  publicity  in  papers  and,  now,  over  the
wireless. Not so Royal Proclamations and Orders of a Food Controller and  so
forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their  cases.
The mode of publication can vary; what is a good method in one  country  may
not necessarily be the best in another. But reasonable publication  of  some
sort there must be.”   (Para 11)

20.    It will not be  necessary  to  notice  the  long  line  of  decisions
reiterating the aforesaid view.  So  far  as  the  mode  of  publication  is
concerned, it has been consistently held by this Court that such  mode  must
be as prescribed by the statute. In the event the statute does  not  contain
any prescription  and  even  under  the  subordinate  legislation  there  is
silence in the matter, the legislation will take  effect  only  when  it  is
published through the customarily recognized official channel,  namely,  the
official gazette (B.K. Srivastava vs. State of  Karnataka)[14].  Admittedly,
the ‘guidelines’ were not gazetted.

21.   If the guidelines relied upon by Union of India in  the  present  case
fail to satisfy the essential and vital parameters/requirements  of  law  as
the trend of the above discussion would go  to  show,  the  same  cannot  be
enforced to the prejudice of the appellants as has been done in the  present
case. For the same reason, the issue raised with regard to the authority  of
the Union to enforce  the  guidelines  on  the  coming  into  force  of  the
provisions of the Environment Protection Act so as to bring into effect  the
impugned consequences, adverse to  the  appellants,  will  not  require  any
consideration.

22.      An argument had  been  offered  by  Shri  Parikh,  learned  counsel
appearing for the  respondent,  Goa  Foundation,  that  while  dealing  with
issues concerning ecology and environment, a strict  view  of  environmental
degradation, which Shri Parikh would contend has  occurred  in  the  present
case, should be adopted having regard to the rights of  a  large  number  of
citizens to enjoy a pristine and pollution free  environment  by  virtue  of
Article 21 of  the  Constitution.  We  cannot  appreciate  the  above  view.
Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation
cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of
permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or
statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection
Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.

23.     In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the
writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently,
the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed
by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do
while allowing the appeals.

                                          ……………………………J.
                                           [RANJAN GOGOI]


                                         …………………..………..J.
                                          [M.Y.EQBAL]
New Delhi;
September 22, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    2010 (5) SCC 388; in para 31
[2]     (1996) 5 SCC 647 Para 10
[3]    (1977 (4) SCC 471)
[4]    1984 (2) SCC 534
[5]    1997 (6) SCC 241 para 13
[6]    1998 (1) SCC 226
[7]    AIR 1955 SC 549
[8]    2009 (3) SCC 571
[9]    [(1972) 2 SCC 788 – 5J]
[10]   (2003) 6 SCC 277 – para 72
[11]   (2011) 8 SCC 670
[12]   [AIR 1951 SC 467]
[13]   [(1918) 1 KB 101]
[14]   (1987) 1 SCC 658

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29