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Monday, July 28, 2014

Service matter - VRS scheme 2000 - Pension Who completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS - Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 - High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition as the employees who took voluntary service not completed the requisite period for granting pension -basing on that judgment Bank filed this appeal - Apex court held that Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 provides that if broken period is more than six months, it shall be treated as one year. Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed more than 19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they are to be treated to have completed 20 years of service. The aforesaid question was neither raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’. In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank cannot derive the benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda as the employees who were parties before the Court in the said case had not completed 20 years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank of India, the respondents-writ petitioners having completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not have merit in reference with the impugned judgment,they are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. = STATE OF BANK OF PATIALA … APPELLANT VERSUS PRITAM SINGH BEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41751

   Service matter - VRS scheme 2000 - Pension  Who completed  20  years  of  service  are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS - Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995 -  High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition  as the employees who took voluntary service not completed the requisite period for granting pension -basing on that judgment Bank filed this appeal - Apex court held  that  Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995  provides  that  if broken period is more than six months, it shall  be  treated  as  one  year. Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed  more  than 19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they  are  to  be  treated  to have completed 20 years of  service.  The  aforesaid  question  was  neither raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’. In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank  cannot  derive  the benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of  Baroda  as  the  employees who were parties before the Court in the said  case  had  not  completed  20 years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank  of  India,  the respondents-writ petitioners  having  completed  20  years  of  service  are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not  have  merit in reference with the impugned judgment,they  are,  accordingly,  dismissed. No costs. =


 A number of employees  who  were  allowed  to  retire  from  the  Bank
pursuant to  scheme  called  State  Bank  of  Patiala  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme, 2000(herein  after  referred  to  as  the  “Scheme”)  introduced  by
Circular dated 20th January, 2001, and had completed  more  than  19  and  ½
years of service, in whose favour pension was not released by  the  Bank  in
accordance with the State Bank of Patiala (Employees)  Pension  Regulations,
1995 (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  “Regulations,  1995”).  They  moved
before the High Court for direction to  the  Bank  and  its  authorities  to
release pension in their favour in accordance with the  Scheme. = 

The High Court by the impugned judgment referring to earlier  Division
Bench decision of the High Court in Dharam  Pal  Singh  v.  Punjab  National
Bank, 2008 (1) PLR 745 held that the pension was  payable  under  Regulation
28 and that Regulation 29 will not apply. 
The Division  Bench  of  the  High Court further held as follows:
           “12.  A perusal of the Regulation 28 shows that on attaining the
           age of superannuation specified in  Regulations  or  settlements
           pension is payable. The age of superannuation has been laid down
           in Service Regulations which is said to  be  60  years  now  and
           earlier it was 58 years.  But  under  the  Voluntary  Retirement
           Scheme, which according to the writ petitioners will be  at  par
           with Settlement, the requirement is 15 years of  service  or  40
           years of age, which admittedly the writ petitioners  had.  Under
           Regulation 32 of the pension is payable on premature  retirement
           on account of orders of the Bank if the employee  was  otherwise
           entitled  to  pension/superannuation  on  that  day.  Read  with
           Regulations 14 and 28, the said age is 10 years and if read with
           the Scheme, it is 15 years of age or 40 years of service and  in
           either case the employees were covered by  the  pension  scheme.
           The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Regulation  29  relating  to
           voluntary retirement was not  applicable.  Thus,  contention  on
           behalf of the Bank that Regulation  29  applied  and  therefore,
           pension payable only after 20 years service cannot be accepted.”=

Apex court held that

The respondents completed more than 10 years of service  in  the  Bank
on the date of  retirement;  therefore,  they  fulfill  the  requirement  of
qualifying service as per Regulation 14.
23.   It has not been disputed by appellant-Bank  that  the  respondents  in
all the appeals have completed much more than 19 years 6 months  of  service
in the Bank. For example, respondent No.1-Prakash Chand in  C.A.  No.173  of
2010 had joined the Bank on 4th May, 1981 and relieved on 31st March,  2001.
Thus, he had completed 19  years,  10  months  and  28  days  of  qualifying
service on the date of relieving from service.
24.   Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995  provides  that  if
broken period is more than six months, it shall  be  treated  as  one  year.
Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed  more  than
19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they  are  to  be  treated  to
have completed 20 years of  service.  The  aforesaid  question  was  neither
raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’.
25.   In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank  cannot  derive  the
benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of  Baroda  as  the  employees
who were parties before the Court in the said  case  had  not  completed  20
years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank  of  India,  the
respondents-writ petitioners  having  completed  20  years  of  service  are
entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.
26.   In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not  have  merit
in reference with the impugned judgment,they  are,  accordingly,  dismissed.
No costs.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41751


                                                             REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  172  OF 2010

STATE OF BANK OF PATIALA                      … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

PRITAM SINGH BEDI & ORS.                      … RESPONDENTS

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.173 OF 2010,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.177 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.178 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.179 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.180 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.186 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.187 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1916 OF 2011



                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      All these appeals have been preferred by the  State  Bank  of  Patiala
(hereinafter referred to as “Bank”)against different  judgments  and  orders
passed by Punjab and Haryana High  Court  at  Chandigarh  but  since  common
issues were involved they  were  heard  together  and  disposed  of  by  the
impugned common judgment.
2.    A number of employees  who  were  allowed  to  retire  from  the  Bank
pursuant to  scheme  called  State  Bank  of  Patiala  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme, 2000(herein  after  referred  to  as  the  “Scheme”)  introduced  by
Circular dated 20th January, 2001, and had completed  more  than  19  and  ½
years of service, in whose favour pension was not released by  the  Bank  in
accordance with the State Bank of Patiala (Employees)  Pension  Regulations,
1995 (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  “Regulations,  1995”).  They  moved
before the High Court for direction to  the  Bank  and  its  authorities  to
release pension in their favour in accordance with the  Scheme.  By  one  of
the judgments dated 22nd October, 2008, learned Single  Judge  of  the  High
Court allowed  the  writ  petitions  preferred  by  some  of  the  aggrieved
employees (respondents) in C.A. No.172 of 2010 and directed to  pay  pension
in their favour. Against the said order the Bank  preferred  LPA  No.312  of
2008 before the Division Bench, which by the  impugned  judgment  dated  9th
January, 2009 dismissed the  LPA  and  affirmed  the  order  passed  by  the
learned Single Judge. The said impugned judgment  dated  9th  January,  2009
passed in LPA No.312 of 2008 is under challenge in C.A.No.172 of 2010.
      Some other similarly situated employees who had  completed  more  than
19 and ½ years of  service  and  retired  persons  to  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme also preferred similar writ petitions  which  were  allowed.  Against
the  respective  judgments  Bank  filed  different  LPAs  which  were   also
dismissed by different orders in view of the  judgment  dated  9th  January,
2009. Against the judgments which have followed the  earlier  decision,  the
rest of the civil appeals have been preferred by the Bank.
3.    The High Court by the impugned judgment referring to earlier  Division
Bench decision of the High Court in Dharam  Pal  Singh  v.  Punjab  National
Bank, 2008 (1) PLR 745 held that the pension was  payable  under  Regulation
28 and that Regulation 29 will not apply. The Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court further held as follows:
           “12.  A perusal of the Regulation 28 shows that on attaining the
           age of superannuation specified in  Regulations  or  settlements
           pension is payable. The age of superannuation has been laid down
           in Service Regulations which is said to  be  60  years  now  and
           earlier it was 58 years.  But  under  the  Voluntary  Retirement
           Scheme, which according to the writ petitioners will be  at  par
           with Settlement, the requirement is 15 years of  service  or  40
           years of age, which admittedly the writ petitioners  had.  Under
           Regulation 32 of the pension is payable on premature  retirement
           on account of orders of the Bank if the employee  was  otherwise
           entitled  to  pension/superannuation  on  that  day.  Read  with
           Regulations 14 and 28, the said age is 10 years and if read with
           the Scheme, it is 15 years of age or 40 years of service and  in
           either case the employees were covered by  the  pension  scheme.
           The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Regulation  29  relating  to
           voluntary retirement was not  applicable.  Thus,  contention  on
           behalf of the Bank that Regulation  29  applied  and  therefore,
           pension payable only after 20 years service cannot be accepted.”




      The view taken by  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  affirmed  by  the
Division Bench and the LPA was dismissed.
4.    Learned counsel for the appellant-Bank  referred  to  Regulations  13,
28,29, 32 and Clause 3 of State Bank of Patiala Voluntary Retirement  Scheme
and submitted as follows:
           “(a)  Regulation 14 which refers to qualifying  service  is  not
           applicable in view of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in  the
           case of PNB vs. Dharam Pal;


           (b)   Clause 3 of the SBP VRS would not apply for pension, as it
           speaks  of  eligibility   for   applying   under   the   Scheme,
           particularly, in view of the judgment of this Hon’ble  Court  in
           the case of Bank of India (supra);


           (c)   Regulation 32 which relates to premature retirement  would
           also not apply as the retirement of  employee  was  not  on  the
           orders of the Bank in public interest,  by  way  of  punishment,
           further SBP VRS was not by way of a settlement.


           (d)   Thus it  is  only  Regulation  29  “pension  on  voluntary
           retirement” which would be applicable for granting  pension,  in
           case of those applying under SBP VRS.


           (e)   In case it is  held  that  SBP  VRS  is  not  a  voluntary
           retirement in accordance with Regulation 29, then it would  mean
           that  the  respondent  employees  have  not  retired,   as   per
           Regulation 2(y), not covered under Pension Regulations and hence
           not entitled for pension.”



5.    On the other hand, following submissions  were  made  by  the  learned
counsel for the respondents:
           i)    All the respondents have completed  more  than  19  and  ½
           years of service but less than 20 years in the Bank,  therefore,
           they are entitled to treat the broken year  as  one  year  under
           Regulation  18.  Therefore,  in  view  of  Regulation  18,   the
           respondents should be treated to  have  completed  20  years  of
           service.
           ii)   The respondents are entitled for pension under  Regulation
           32 otherwise also the respondents are entitled to  pension  even
           under Regulation 29.”


6.    Learned counsel for the appellant-Bank  relied  on  the  decisions  of
this Court in Bank of Baroda vs. Ganpat Singh Deora, 2009 (3)  SCC  217  and
Bank of India vs. K. Mohandas and others, 2009(5)  SCC  313.  On  the  other
hand, according to the counsel for the  respondents,  the  present  case  is
different than the decisions in Bank of Baroda (supra)  and  Bank  of  India
(supra) as the respondents are guided by Regulations 18, 28, 29  and  32  of
the State Bank  of  Patiala  (Employees)  Pension  Regulations,  1995  which
varies from the provisions of the other Banks.
7.    In the present case the question arises for consideration  is  whether
under the State Bank of Patiala (Employees) Pension  Regulations,  1995  the
respondents are entitled for pension.
8.    Similar question was considered  by  this  Court  in  Bank  of  Baroda
(supra). In the said case Bank of Baroda employees were retired pursuant  to
Bank of Baroda Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme,  2001.  However,  they
had not completed 20 years of  service;  therefore,  they  were  denied  the
benefit of pension under their Pension Regulations, 1995. In the  said  case
this Court noticed Regulation 28 of Bank of Baroda  Pension  Regulations  as
it stood prior to the amendment made on  2nd  January,  2004  which  was  as
follows:
               “28.Superannuation pension.—Superannuation pension shall  be
           granted to an employee who has retired on his attaining the  age
           of  superannuation  specified  in  the  Service  Regulations  or
           settlements.”

9.    This  Court  also  noticed  the  amended  Regulation  28  in  Bank  of
Baroda(supra) which was published in the Gazette of India  on  2nd  January,
2004 and provides as follows:
               “28.Superannuation pension.—Superannuation pension shall  be
           granted to an employee who has retired on his attaining the  age
           of  superannuation  specified  in  the  Service  Regulations  or
           settlements:


              Provided that, with effect from 1-9-2000 pension  shall  also
           be granted to an employee who opts to  retire  before  attaining
           the age of superannuation, but after  rendering  service  for  a
           minimum period of 15 years in terms of any scheme  that  may  be
           framed for such purpose by the Board with the  approval  of  the
           Government.”

10.   Having noticed the aforesaid provisions and Regulation 29 of the  Bank
of Baroda Pension Regulation which is peri materia, similar one, this  Court
in view of the fact that the respondents of said Bank had not completed  the
required length of qualifying service as provided  under  Regulation  28  of
Regulations, 1995, held that the respondents were not eligible  for  pension
under the Pension Regulation, 1995 of the Bank of Baroda.

11.    Subsequently,  similar  provisions  of  different   Bank   fell   for
consideration before a Bench  of  this  Court  in  Bank  of  India  (supra),
referring to the scheme and different provisions which  are  almost  similar
to the present one held as under:

              “33. What was, in respect of pension, the  intention  of  the
           banks at the time of bringing out VRS  2000?  Was  it  not  made
           expressly clear therein that  the  employees  seeking  voluntary
           retirement will be eligible  for  pension  as  per  the  Pension
           Regulations? If  the  intention  was  not  to  give  pension  as
           provided in Regulation 29 and  particularly  sub-regulation  (5)
           thereof, they could have said so in the Scheme itself. After all
           much thought had gone into the formulation of VRS  2000  and  it
           came to be framed after great deliberations. The only  provision
           that could have been in mind while providing for pension as  per
           the  Pension  Regulations  was  Regulation  29.  Obviously,  the
           employees, too, had the benefit of Regulation 29(5) in mind when
           they offered for voluntary retirement as  admittedly  Regulation
           28, as was existing at that time, was  not  applicable  at  all.
           None of Regulations 30 to 34 was attracted.


              37. The amendment to Regulation 28 can, at best, be  said  to
           have been intended to cover  the  employees  with  15  years  of
           service or  more  but  less  than  20  years  of  service.  This
           intention is reflected from  the  communication  dated  5-9-2000
           sent  by  the  Government  of  India,   Ministry   of   Finance,
           [pic]Department of Economic Affairs (Banking  Division)  to  the
           Personnel Advisor, Indian Banks’ Association.


              39. Two things immediately become noticeable  from  the  said
           communication. One is that as per Regulation 29 of  the  Pension
           Regulations, 1995, an employee  can  take  voluntary  retirement
           after 20 years of qualifying service  and  become  eligible  for
           pension. The other thing is that the Scheme  provides  that  the
           employees with 15 years of service or 40 years of age  shall  be
           eligible to take voluntary retirement under the Scheme and under
           Regulation 29, the employees having rendered 15 years of service
           or completed 40 years of age  but  not  completed  20  years  of
           service shall not be [pic]eligible for  pensionary  benefits  on
           taking voluntary retirement under the Scheme.


              40.  The  use  of  the  words   “such   employees”   in   the
           communication is referable to employees having rendered 15 years
           of service but not completed 20 years of service and, therefore,
           it was decided to bring an amendment in the Regulations so  that
           the employees having not completed 20 years’ service do not lose
           the benefit of pension. The amendment in Regulation  28,  as  is
           reflected from the afore referred communication, was intended to
           cover the employees who had rendered 15 years’ service  but  not
           completed 20 years’ service. It was not intended  to  cover  the
           optees who had  already  completed  20  years’  service  as  the
           provisions contained in Regulation 29 met that contingency.


              46. The precise effect of the Pension  Regulations,  for  the
           purposes of pension, having been made part  of  the  Scheme,  is
           that  the  Pension  Regulations,  to  the  extent,   these   are
           applicable, must be read into the Scheme.  It  is  pertinent  to
           bear in mind that interpretation clause of VRS 2000 states  that
           the words and expressions used in the Scheme but not defined and
           defined in the rules/regulations shall  have  the  same  meaning
           respectively assigned to them under the  rules/regulations.  The
           Scheme does not define the expression “retirement” or “voluntary
           retirement”. We have, therefore, to fall back on the  definition
           of “retirement” given in Regulation  2(y)  whereunder  voluntary
           retirement under Regulation 29 is considered to  be  retirement.
           Regulation 29 uses the expression  “voluntary  retirement  under
           these Regulations”. Obviously, for the purposes of  the  Scheme,
           it has to be understood to mean with necessary changes in points
           of details. Section 23 of the Contract Act has no application to
           the present fact situation.


              48. It is true that validity and legality  of  Regulation  28
           has not been put in issue. It was apparently not  done  because,
           according to the employees, amended Regulation 28 although  made
           retrospective could not have affected the concluded contract. We
           have  already  indicated  above  as  to  how  the  amendment  in
           Regulation 28 in the year 2002 with effect from  1-9-2000  could
           not have  applied  to  the  optees  under  the  Scheme  who  had
           completed service of 20 years. Lack of challenge  to  Regulation
           28 by the employees is, therefore, not very material. It is  not
           correct to say that by taking recourse  to  Regulation  29,  the
           amendment to Regulation 28 is rendered otiose.


              50. It is true that VRS 2000 is a complete package in  itself
           and contractual in nature. However, in that package, it has been
           provided that the optees, in addition to ex gratia payment, will
           also be eligible to other benefits inter alia pension under  the
           Pension  Regulations.  The  only  provision   in   the   Pension
           Regulations at the relevant time during  the  operation  of  VRS
           2000 concerning voluntary retirement was Regulation 29 and  sub-
           regulation (5) thereof provides for  weightage  of  addition  of
           five years to qualifying service for pension to those optees who
           had completed  20  years’  service.  It,  therefore,  cannot  be
           accepted that  VRS  2000  did  not  envisage  grant  of  pension
           benefits under Regulation  29(5)  of  the  Pension  Regulations,
           1995, to the optees of 20 years’ service along with  payment  of
           ex gratia.


              51. The whole idea in bringing out VRS 2000 was to right size
           workforce which the banks had not been able to  achieve  despite
           the fact that the statutory Regulations provided  for  voluntary
           retirement to the employees having completed 20 years’  service.
           It was for this reason that VRS 2000 was made  more  attractive.
           VRS  2000,  accordingly,  was  an  attractive  package  for  the
           employees to go in for as they were getting special benefits  in
           the form of ex gratia  and  in  addition  thereto,  inter  alia,
           pension under the Pension Regulations which  also  provided  for
           weightage of five years of qualifying service for  the  purposes
           of  pension  to  the  employees  who  had  completed  20  years’
           service.”

12.   In the said case of Bank of India  (supra),  this  Court  noticed  the
observation made by this Court in the case of Bank  of  Baroda  (supra)  but
distinguished the same with the following observation:
              “61. The observations made by this Court in Bank  of  Baroda,
           (2009) 3 SCC 217, which have been quoted above and  relied  upon
           by  the  banks  in  support  of  their  contention  have  to  be
           understood in the factual backdrop, namely,  that  the  employee
           had completed only 13 years of service and, was not eligible for
           the pension under the Pension  Regulations,  1995  and  for  the
           benefit of addition of five years to  qualifying  service  under
           Regulation 29(5), an employee must have completed  20  years  of
           service. The question therein was not identical in form with the
           question here to be decided.


              62. The following observations in Bank of  Baroda(supra)  are
           significant: (SCC p. 221, para 21)
              “21. … since both the Tribunal as  well  as  the  High  Court
           appear not to have considered or taken note of the fact that the
           respondent was not eligible for pension as he had not  completed
           15 years of qualifying service….”


           63. The decision of this Court in Bank of Barod(supra)is,  thus,
           clearly  distinguishable  as  the  employee  therein   had   not
           completed qualifying service much less 20 years of  service  for
           being eligible to  the  weightage  under  Regulation  29(5)  and
           cannot be applied to  the  present  controversy  nor  does  that
           matter decide the question here to be  decided  in  the  present
           group of matters.”

13.   For determination of the issue,  it  is  desirable  to  refer  to  the
relevant provisions of  the  State  Bank  of  Patiala  Voluntary  Retirement
Scheme, 2001, the background of  such  Scheme  and  relevant  provisions  of
State Bank of Patiala (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995.
14.   Pursuant to Government  of  India,  Indian  Banks  Association  advice
different Banks introduced Voluntary Retirement Scheme including  the  State
Bank of Patiala Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 introduced  by  the  Bank,
by its Circular No. Per/VRS/48 dated 20th January, 2001.
      Clause 3 of the Scheme prescribed eligibility of voluntary  retirement
as follows:
           “Clause 3:
           Eligibility
           The scheme will be open to all permanent employees of the  Bank,
           except those specifically mentioned as ‘ineligible who have  put
           in 15 years of service or have completed 40 years of age  as  on
           31st December, 2000. Age will be reckoned on the  basis  of  the
           date of birth as entered in service record.


                 While calculating the period of service, absence, which is
           reckoned as service, will be excluded.


                 If an officer, who has not completed  mandatory  rural  or
           semi-urban assignment  (either  wholly  or  partly)  submits  an
           application for retirement under SBP VRS  before  approving  his
           case, his  promotions  would  stand  withdrawn  if  confirmation
           subsequent to promotion is subject to completing such  mandatory
           service.”


15.   Apart from  ex  gratia  which  were  offered  under  the  Scheme,  the
following other benefits were prescribed therein:
           “Clause 7:
           Other benefits
                 i) Gratuity as payable under the extant instructions on the
                    relevant date.


                ii)  Provident  Fund  contribution  as  per  SBP  Employees’
                    Provident Rules as on relevant date.


               iii) Pension or Bank’s contribution to Provident Fund as  the
                    case may be as per rules applicable on the relevant date
                    on the basis of actual years of service rendered.
                                  xxx   xxx  xxx   xxx”


16.   The respondents who had completed more than 19 and ½ years of  service
applied for and were allowed to Voluntary Retirement Scheme aforesaid.  They
have been paid most of the benefits but pensionary benefits  were  not  paid
to them. Therefore, they had to move before the High Court.
17.    State Bank of  Patiala  (Employees)  Pension  Regulations,  1995  are
applicable to full time employees  of  the  Bank.  Regulation  2(w)  defines
qualifying service and 2(y) defines retirement, they are as follows:
           “2(w) “qualifying service” means the service rendered  while  on
           duty or otherwise which shall be  taken  into  account  for  the
           purpose of pension under these regulations;


           2(y)  “retirement” means cessation from Bank’s service:-


                    a) on attaining the age of superannuation  specified  in
                       –Service Regulations of Settlements;


                    b) on voluntary retirement in accordance with provisions
                       contained in regulation 29 of these regulations;


                    c) on premature retirement by the Bank before  attaining
                       the  age  of  superannuation  specified  in   Service
                       Regulations or Settlement;”




18.   Chapter IV  relates  to  qualifying  service.  Regulation  14  defines
qualifying service as under:
           “14.Qualifying Service-
                  Subject  to  the  other  conditions  contained  in  these
           regulations, an employee who has rendered a minimum of ten years
           of service in the Bank, on the date of his retirement or on  the
           date on which he is deemed to have  retired  shall  qualify  for
           pension.”

      For the purpose of qualifying  service,  under  the  said  Chapter  IV
Regulation 18 prescribes broken period of service of less than one  year  as
under:
           “18.Broken period of service of less than one year-
                 If the period of service of an  employee  includes  broken
           period of service is less than one year,  then  if  such  broken
           period is more than six months, it shall be treated as one  year
           and if such broken period is six months  or  less  it  shall  be
           ignored.”




19.   Chapter  V  relates  to  Classes  of  Pension  (Classes  of  Pension).
Regulation 28 deals with superannuation pension as under:

           “28.Superannuation Pension-

                 Superannuation pension shall be granted to an employee who
           has retired on his attaining the age of superannuation specified
           in the Service Regulations or settlements.”




20.   Regulation 29 relates to Pension  on  Voluntary  Retirement,  relevant
portion of which reads as under:

           “29.Pension on Voluntary Retirement-

                  1) On or after the Ist day of November, 1993, at any time
                     after  an  employee  has  completed  twenty  years  of
                     qualifying service he may, by writing to the competent
                     authority retire from service;

                     Provided that this sub-regulation shall not  apply  to
                     an employee who is on deputation  or  on  study  leave
                     abroad unless after having been transferred or  having
                     returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in
                     India and has served for a period of not less than one
                     year:

                     Provided further that this  sub-regulation  shall  not
                     apply to an employee who seeks retirement from service
                     for being absorbed permanently in an  autonomous  body
                     or  a  public  sector  undertaking   or   company   or
                     institution body, whether incorporated or not to which
                     he is on deputation at the time of  seeking  voluntary
                     retirement.

                     Provided that this sub-regulation shall not  apply  to
                     an  employee  who  is  deemed  to  have   retired   in
                     accordance with clause (1) of Regulation 2.”

                             xxx  xxx   xxx  xxx
                 (5)    The  qualifying  service  of  an  employee  retiring
                       voluntarily under this regulation shall be  increased
                       by a period not exceeding five years, subject to  the
                       condition that the total qualifying service  rendered
                       by such employee shall not in any case exceed  thirty
                       years and it does not take him  beyond  the  date  of
                       superannuation.”


21.   For premature retirement pension  one  may  refer  to  Regulation  32,
which reads as under:
           “32. Premature Retirement Pension
                 Premature retirement Pension may be granted to an employee
           who, -


              a) has rendered minimum ten years of service;


              b) retires from service on account of orders of  the  Bank  to
                 retire prematurely in the public  interest  for  any  other
                 reason specified in service regulations or  settlement,  if
                 otherwise he was entitled to such pension on superannuation
                 on that date.”

      Regulation  33  deals  with  an  employee  compulsorily  retired  from
service as a penalty and which is not applicable in the present case.
22.   The respondents completed more than 10 years of service  in  the  Bank
on the date of  retirement;  therefore,  they  fulfill  the  requirement  of
qualifying service as per Regulation 14.
23.   It has not been disputed by appellant-Bank  that  the  respondents  in
all the appeals have completed much more than 19 years 6 months  of  service
in the Bank. For example, respondent No.1-Prakash Chand in  C.A.  No.173  of
2010 had joined the Bank on 4th May, 1981 and relieved on 31st March,  2001.
Thus, he had completed 19  years,  10  months  and  28  days  of  qualifying
service on the date of relieving from service.
24.   Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995  provides  that  if
broken period is more than six months, it shall  be  treated  as  one  year.
Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed  more  than
19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they  are  to  be  treated  to
have completed 20 years of  service.  The  aforesaid  question  was  neither
raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’.
25.   In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank  cannot  derive  the
benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of  Baroda  as  the  employees
who were parties before the Court in the said  case  had  not  completed  20
years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank  of  India,  the
respondents-writ petitioners  having  completed  20  years  of  service  are
entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.
26.   In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not  have  merit
in reference with the impugned judgment,they  are,  accordingly,  dismissed.
No costs.


                                                       …………………………………………………J.
                                    (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                                       …………………………………………………J.
                                           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07,2014.

Sec.226,227 and 228 of Cr.P.C.- one out of 3 no charge sheet was filed under sec.302 I.P.C. - but committal court famed charge under sec.302 of I.P.C against this accused too - challanged - high court dismissed the writ for quashing - Apex court held that In this case, it is not alleged that the Sessions Judge has not followed Sections 226 and 227 Cr.P.C before framing the charge. Further, it is not the case of the appellant that the court has not given him hearing at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. For framing of charge u/s 228, the judge is not required to record detail reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing the parties at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. if the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is competent to frame charge for such offence even if not mentioned in the charge sheet. We find no merit in this appeal.= DINESH TIWARI … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41750

 Sec.226,227 and 228 of Cr.P.C.- one out of 3 no charge sheet was filed under sec.302 I.P.C. - but committal court  famed charge under sec.302 of I.P.C against this accused too - challanged - high court dismissed the writ for quashing - Apex court held that In this case, it is not  alleged  that  the  Sessions  Judge  has  not followed Sections 226 and 227 Cr.P.C before framing the charge. Further,  it is not the case of the appellant that the court has not  given  him  hearing at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. For framing  of  charge  u/s  228, the judge is not required to record detail reasons as to why such charge  is framed. On perusal of record  and  hearing  the  parties  at  the  stage  of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. if the Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is competent  to frame charge for such offence even if not mentioned in the charge sheet.  We find no merit in this appeal.=


  CBCID  submitted
charge sheet against Sadhu Saran Yadav co-accused for the offence  u/s  302,
323,  504  and  506  IPC. 
 It  was  mentioned  in  the  charge  sheet   that
investigation shall continue against rest of the accused  persons.  The  CJM
took cognizance of the offence vide order dated 8th  May,  2006.  
The  case
was committed to the Court of  Sessions  and  was  registered  as  S.T.  No.
149/2006 titled State v. Sadhu Saran Yadav.
Thereafter, CBCID submitted  the
charge sheet against Ram Vijay Yadav for the offence u/s 302, 323,  504  and
506 IPC and as against the appellant for the offence u/s 323,  504  and  506
IPC.  No charge sheet was submitted against the appellant  for  the  offence
u/s 302 IPC. 
The cognizance was taken by CJM on charge sheet no.5A  of  2006
on 23rd January, 2007.  Bail was granted to the appellant  for  the  offence
u/s 323, 504 and 506 IPC.
The case was committed to the Court  of  Sessions
by the CJM after taking cognizance and  the  Sessions  Court  framed  charge
against the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC, apart from  Section  323,
504 and 506 IPC.=

High court order 
The  aforesaid  order  was  challenged  by  the  appellant  by  filing
criminal miscellaneous application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for  quashing  the  order
framing the charge u/s 302 IPC. The High  Court  by  impugned  judgment  and
order dated 11th December, 2007 dismissed the same.=
Apex court held that
We may refer to  the  well-settled
law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh: (SCC pp.  41-
42, para 4)
“4.  Under  Section  226  of  the  Code  while  opening  the  case  for  the
prosecution the Prosecutor has  got  to  describe  the  charge  against  the
accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove  the  guilt  of  the
accused.
Thereafter comes at the initial stage the  duty  of  the  court  to
[pic]consider the record of the case and the documents  submitted  therewith
and to hear the submissions of the  accused  and  the  prosecution  in  that
behalf.
The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under  Section  227
or Section 228 of the Code.
If  ‘the  Judge  considers  that  there  is  no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the  accused,  he  shall  discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing’,  as  enjoined  by  Section
227.
If, on the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an  offence  which—  …  
(b)  is
exclusively triable by the  court,  he  shall  frame  in  writing  a  charge
against  the  accused’,  as  provided  in  Section  228.  
Reading  the   two
provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be,  it  would  be
clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the  trial  the  truth,
veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to  adduce
are not to be meticulously judged.
Nor is any weight to be attached  to  the
probable defence of the accused.
It is not obligatory for the Judge at  that
stage of the trial to consider in  any  detail  and  weigh  in  a  sensitive
balance whether the  facts,  if  proved,  would  be  incompatible  with  the
innocence of the accused or not. 
The standard of test and judgment which  is
to be finally applied before recording a  finding  regarding  the  guilt  or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly  to  be  applied  at  the  stage  of
deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the  Code.
At  that
stage the court is not  to  see  whether  there  is  sufficient  ground  for
conviction of the accused or whether  the  trial  is  sure  to  end  in  his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter  remains  in
the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at  the
conclusion of the trial. But at the initial  stage  if  there  is  a  strong
suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for  presuming
that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to  the  court
to say that there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the
accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is  to  be  drawn
at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the  trial  of
criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be  guilty  unless
the contrary is proved. But it is only for the  purpose  of  deciding  prima
facie whether the court should  proceed  with  the  trial  or  not.  If  the
evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt  of  the
accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in  cross-examination
or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show  that  the  accused
committed  the  offence,  then  there  will  be  no  sufficient  ground  for
proceeding with the trial.  An  exhaustive  list  of  the  circumstances  to
indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion  or  the  other  is  neither
possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law  by
one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence  of  the
accused are something like even at the conclusion of  the  trial,  then,  on
the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But  if,
on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making  an  order  under
Section 227 or Section 228, then in such  a  [pic]situation  ordinarily  and
generally the order which will have to be made will  be  one  under  Section
228 and not under Section 227.”


11.   In this case, it is not  alleged  that  the  Sessions  Judge  has  not
followed Sections 226 and 227 Cr.P.C before framing the charge. Further,  it
is not the case of the appellant that the court has not  given  him  hearing
at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. For framing  of  charge  u/s  228,
the judge is not required to record detail reasons as to why such charge  is
framed. On perusal of record  and  hearing  the  parties  at  the  stage  of
discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. if the Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is competent  to
frame charge for such offence even if not mentioned in the charge sheet.  We
find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41750


                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1365 OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No.3051/2008)


DINESH TIWARI                                       … APPELLANT

                                   Versus


STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                  … RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated  11th
December, 2007 passed by the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in
Criminal Miscellaneous  Application  No.26878  of  2007.   By  the  impugned
judgment, the High Court dismissed the application filed by  the  appellant-
accused u/s 482 Cr.P.C for quashing the  order  dated  1st  September,  2007
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C No.3, Basti in Sessions  Trial
No.207/07 in State  v.  Ram  Vijay  Yadav  etc.   By  the  said  order,  the
Additional Sessions Judge framed the charge  against  the  appellant-accused
for the offence u/s 302, 323, 504 and 506 IPC.

3.    The factual matrix of the case is as under:

      One Mahender Prasad Tiwari  complainant  lodged  an  FIR  against  the
present appellant-Dinesh Tiwari, Sadhu Saran and Ram  Vijay  Yadav  for  the
offence u/s 302, 323, 504 and 506 IPC in  Police  Station  Mahuli,  District
Sant Kabir Nagar. It was registered as  Crime  No.84/2006.  It  was  alleged
that the appellant along with Sadhu Saran committed murder of  Arvind  Kumar
Tiwari son of the complainant.  Reasons  for  enmity  and  detail  event  of
murder were mentioned in the FIR.

      Police started the investigation but subsequently,  on  the  order  of
the Government the investigation was transferred to CBCID.  CBCID  submitted
charge sheet against Sadhu Saran Yadav co-accused for the offence  u/s  302,
323,  504  and  506  IPC.  It  was  mentioned  in  the  charge  sheet   that
investigation shall continue against rest of the accused  persons.  The  CJM
took cognizance of the offence vide order dated 8th  May,  2006.   The  case
was committed to the Court of  Sessions  and  was  registered  as  S.T.  No.
149/2006 titled State v. Sadhu Saran Yadav. Thereafter, CBCID submitted  the
charge sheet against Ram Vijay Yadav for the offence u/s 302, 323,  504  and
506 IPC and as against the appellant for the offence u/s 323,  504  and  506
IPC.  No charge sheet was submitted against the appellant  for  the  offence
u/s 302 IPC. The cognizance was taken by CJM on charge sheet no.5A  of  2006
on 23rd January, 2007.  Bail was granted to the appellant  for  the  offence
u/s 323, 504 and 506 IPC.  The case was committed to the Court  of  Sessions
by the CJM after taking cognizance and  the  Sessions  Court  framed  charge
against the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC, apart from  Section  323,
504 and 506 IPC.

4.    The  aforesaid  order  was  challenged  by  the  appellant  by  filing
criminal miscellaneous application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for  quashing  the  order
framing the charge u/s 302 IPC. The High  Court  by  impugned  judgment  and
order dated 11th December, 2007 dismissed the same.

5.    Counsel for the appellant has made the following submissions:

(a) Appellant-accused was not given an opportunity  of  being  heard  before
framing of the charge u/s 302 IPC.

(b) Neither any charge sheet  was  submitted  by  the  investigating  agency
against the appellant for the offence u/s 302 IPC  nor  any  cognizance  was
taken by the CJM against him for the said offence. But Sessions Judge  after
committal framed the charge u/s 302 IPC which was not permissible.

6.    Per contra, according to learned counsel for  the  respondents,  there
is ample material on record to show that  the  appellant  along  with  Sadhu
Saran committed murder of Arvind Kumar Tiwari son  of  the  complainant  and
hence the Trial Court rightly framed the charge u/s 302 IPC.

7.    Chapter  XVIII  of  Cr.P.C.  deals  with  “Trial  before  a  Court  of
Session”.  As per Section 226, when the accused  person  is  brought  before
the Court in pursuance of a commitment of the case u/s 209,  the  prosecutor
is required to open his case by describing the charge  brought  against  the
accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove his guilt  of  the
accused.

8.    Section 227 deals with Discharge and it reads as follows:

“227. Discharge.-If, upon consideration of the record of the  case  and  the
documents submitted therewith, and after  hearing  the  submissions  of  the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers  that  there
is not sufficient ground  for  proceeding  against  the  accused,  he  shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.”



As per the aforesaid provision, upon consideration of  the  records  of  the
case  and  the  documents  submitted  before  him  and  after  hearing   the
submissions of the party accused and the prosecution if the Judge is of  the
opinion that no sufficient  ground  is  made  out  to  proceed  against  the
accused, he is required to discharge the accused and record his reasons  for
doing so.

9.    Section 228 relates to framing of charge as follows:

“228.Framing of charge.-(1), If, after such  consideration  and  hearing  as
aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for  presuming  that
the accused has committed an offence which-

is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame  a  charge
against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the  Chief
Judicial Magistrate (or any other Judicial Magistrate  of  the  first  class
and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate,  or,
as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of  the  first  class,  on  such
date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try  the  offence
in accordance with the procedure for the trial of  warrant-cases  instituted
on a police report;

is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall  frame  in  writing  a  charge
against the accused.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of  sub-section  (1),
the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused  shall
be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged  or  claims  to  be
tried.”



From  sub  Section  (1)  of  Section  228,  it  is  clear  that  after  such
consideration and hearing, as given under Section 227,  if  Judge  forms  an
opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has  committed
an offence, Judge may frame the charge(s).

From Section 228 it is clear that no separate  hearing  is  required  to  be
given for  framing  the  charge  if  the  accused  is  not  discharged  upon
consideration of the record of the case and documents and after hearing  the
submissions under Section 227.

10.   Relative scope of  Sections  227  and  228  Cr.P.C.  was  noticed  and
considered by this Court in Amit  Kapoor  v.  Ramesh  Chander  and  another,
(2012) 9 SCC 460.  This Court held as follows:

“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the  trial  court
in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged  under
Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is  required
to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith  and,
after hearing the parties, may either discharge  the  accused  or  where  it
appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for  presuming  that
the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the  charge.  Once  the
facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would  be  right
in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused  and  frame
the charge accordingly. This presumption is not  a  presumption  of  law  as
such. The satisfaction  of  the  court  in  relation  to  the  existence  of
constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is  a  sine
qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may  even  be  weaker  than  a
prima facie case. There is  a  fine  distinction  between  the  language  of
Sections 227 and 228 of the  Code.  Section  227  is  the  expression  of  a
definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228  is  tentative.
Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court  should  form
an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of  committing  an  offence,
is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.”

“19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge,  the  court  is  concerned
not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the  accused  has  committed
an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him  guilty.  All  that  the
court has to see is that the material on  record  and  the  facts  would  be
compatible with the innocence of the accused  or  not.  The  final  test  of
guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to  the  well-settled
law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh: (SCC pp.  41-
42, para 4)
“4.  Under  Section  226  of  the  Code  while  opening  the  case  for  the
prosecution the Prosecutor has  got  to  describe  the  charge  against  the
accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove  the  guilt  of  the
accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the  duty  of  the  court  to
[pic]consider the record of the case and the documents  submitted  therewith
and to hear the submissions of the  accused  and  the  prosecution  in  that
behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under  Section  227
or Section 228 of the Code.  If  ‘the  Judge  considers  that  there  is  no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the  accused,  he  shall  discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing’,  as  enjoined  by  Section
227. If, on the other hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an  offence  which—  …  (b)  is
exclusively triable by the  court,  he  shall  frame  in  writing  a  charge
against  the  accused’,  as  provided  in  Section  228.  Reading  the   two
provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be,  it  would  be
clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the  trial  the  truth,
veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to  adduce
are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached  to  the
probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at  that
stage of the trial to consider in  any  detail  and  weigh  in  a  sensitive
balance whether the  facts,  if  proved,  would  be  incompatible  with  the
innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which  is
to be finally applied before recording a  finding  regarding  the  guilt  or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly  to  be  applied  at  the  stage  of
deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the  Code.  At  that
stage the court is not  to  see  whether  there  is  sufficient  ground  for
conviction of the accused or whether  the  trial  is  sure  to  end  in  his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter  remains  in
the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at  the
conclusion of the trial. But at the initial  stage  if  there  is  a  strong
suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for  presuming
that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to  the  court
to say that there  is  no  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the
accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is  to  be  drawn
at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the  trial  of
criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be  guilty  unless
the contrary is proved. But it is only for the  purpose  of  deciding  prima
facie whether the court should  proceed  with  the  trial  or  not.  If  the
evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt  of  the
accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in  cross-examination
or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show  that  the  accused
committed  the  offence,  then  there  will  be  no  sufficient  ground  for
proceeding with the trial.  An  exhaustive  list  of  the  circumstances  to
indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion  or  the  other  is  neither
possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law  by
one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence  of  the
accused are something like even at the conclusion of  the  trial,  then,  on
the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But  if,
on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making  an  order  under
Section 227 or Section 228, then in such  a  [pic]situation  ordinarily  and
generally the order which will have to be made will  be  one  under  Section
228 and not under Section 227.”


11.   In this case, it is not  alleged  that  the  Sessions  Judge  has  not
followed Sections 226 and 227 Cr.P.C before framing the charge. Further,  it
is not the case of the appellant that the court has not  given  him  hearing
at the stage of discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. For framing  of  charge  u/s  228,
the judge is not required to record detail reasons as to why such charge  is
framed. On perusal of record  and  hearing  the  parties  at  the  stage  of
discharge u/s 227 Cr.P.C. if the Judge is of opinion that  there  is  ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is competent  to
frame charge for such offence even if not mentioned in the charge sheet.  We
find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.


                                                        ………………………………………………J.
  (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                                        ………………………………………………J.
                                  (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07, 2014.

Service matter - Dismissed from service for unauthorized absent - refused to receive the witnesses and refused to receive Medical certificates - Single judge High court allowed the writ and set aside the dismissal order - DB bench reversed the single Judge - Apex court set aside the order of DB and held that In his reply, the appellant has taken the plea that he was seriously ill between 11.12.89 and 24.10.90, which was beyond his control; he never intended to contravene any of the provisions of the service regulations. He submitted the copies of medical certificates issued by Doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the post. The medical reports were submitted after about 24 days. There was no allegation that the appellant’s unauthorized absence from duty was willful and deliberate.The Inquiry Officer has also not held that appellant’s absence from duty was willful and deliberate. It is neither case of the Disciplinary Authority nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by the appellant were forged or fabricated or obtained for any consideration though he was not ill during the said period. In absence of such evidence and finding, it was not open to the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the Doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay.=CHHEL SINGH … APPELLANT VERSUS M.G.B. GRAMIN BANK PALI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41749

 Service matter - Dismissed from service for unauthorized absent - refused to receive the witnesses and refused to receive Medical certificates - Single judge High court allowed the writ and set aside the dismissal order - DB bench reversed the single Judge - Apex court  set aside the order of DB and held that  In his reply, the appellant has taken  the  plea  that he was seriously ill between 11.12.89 and 24.10.90,  which  was  beyond  his control;  he never intended to  contravene  any  of  the  provisions  of  the service regulations.  He submitted the copies of medical certificates  issued by Doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the  post.   The  medical reports were submitted after about 24 days.  There was  no  allegation  that the appellant’s unauthorized absence from duty was willful  and  deliberate.The Inquiry Officer has also not held that  appellant’s  absence  from  duty was  willful  and  deliberate.  It  is  neither  case  of  the  Disciplinary Authority nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by  the appellant were forged  or  fabricated  or  obtained  for  any  consideration though he was not ill during the said period.  In absence of  such  evidence and finding, it was not open to the  Inquiry  Officer  or  the  Disciplinary Authority to disbelieve the  medical  certificates  issued  by  the  Doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay.=

The  appellant  was  working  with  the  respondent-Bank  since  17th
February, 1984 as Clerk-cum-Cashier.
While in  service  he  remained  absent
from duty from 11th December, 1989 to 24th October, 1990  (approximately  10
and  1/2  months)  without  obtaining  prior  permission  of  the  competent
authority.
For the said reason he was  served  with  a  memorandum  on  5th
October, 1991 alleging contravention of the provisions of the Marwar  Gramin
Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980, for the following charges:
He remained absent from duty from 11th December, 1989 to 24th October,  1990
without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority;
He failed to comply with the orders and directions given to him  which  were
the letters issued asking him to join duty;
He remained absent from duty without any reason.
On the day of joining he failed to submit medical certificate and  submitted
the same after much delay.=
During the inquiry 
the  appellant  submitted  list  of  seven  defence
witnesses.  However, Inquiry Officer called only two witnesses  and  refused
to call rest of the  five  witnesses  on  the  ground  that  the  presenting
officer of the Bank was ready to answer the questions on behalf of  them  as
may be raised by the appellant. After inquiry the Inquiry Officer  submitted
report dated 3rd January, 1994, rejecting the testimony of two witnesses  as
“untrustworthy” and held the appellant guilty for the charges.=
Finally, after hearing the appellant, the Disciplinary  Authority  held  the
charges to be proved and removed the appellant from service by  order  dated
17th October, 1994.=

The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 31st  March,  2009  allowed
the writ petition, quashed the order of removal and directed the  respondent
to reinstate the appellant in service with all consequential  benefits  with
following observation:
 “In the instant case the reason given for not calling the  witnesses  named
by the delinquent employee is absolutely vague and irrelevant. It  does  not
and cannot appeal to the measures and standards of a quasi judicial  inquiry
that ultimately resulted  into  removal  of  the  delinquent  employee  from
service. The refusal to call defence witnesses in  the  manner  existing  in
present case is apparent denial of reasonable  opportunity  to  the  charged
employee for defending himself. A definite prejudice, therefore,  is  caused
by not calling the witnesses  named  by  the  petitioner  without  examining
their relevance and  ultimately  holding  him  guilty  for  the  charges  in
defence of which he indicated his desire to examine those witnesses.”=

But D.B. Bench Reversed the single judge =
Apex court held that
From  the  plain  reading  of  the  charges  we  find  that  the  main
allegation is absence from duty from 11.12.89 to 24.10.90 (approximately  10
and ½  months),  for  which  no  prior  permission  was  obtained  from  the
competent authority.  
In his reply, the appellant has taken  the  plea  that
he was seriously ill between 11.12.89 and 24.10.90,  which  was  beyond  his
control; 
he never intended to  contravene  any  of  the  provisions  of  the
service regulations. 
He submitted the copies of medical certificates  issued
by Doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the  post.   
The  medical
reports were submitted after about 24 days.  
There was  no  allegation  that
the appellant’s unauthorized absence from duty was willful  and  deliberate.

The Inquiry Officer has also not held that  appellant’s  absence  from  duty
was  willful  and  deliberate.  
It  is  neither  case  of  the  Disciplinary
Authority nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by  the
appellant were forged  or  fabricated  or  obtained  for  any  consideration
though he was not ill during the said period.  
In absence of  such  evidence
and finding, it was not open to the  Inquiry  Officer  or  the  Disciplinary
Authority to disbelieve the  medical  certificates  issued  by  the  Doctors
without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay.
16.   In view of the  observation  made  above,  the  order  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court cannot be  upheld.   
We,  accordingly,  set
aside the impugned judgment and order dated 10th May,  2012  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court in D.B. Civil  Special  Appeal  (Writ)  No.
850 of 2009 and upheld the order passed by the learned  Single  Judge  dated
31st March, 2009 in S.B. Civil Appeal Writ Petition No. 1702 of  1995.   
The
respondents are directed to implement the direction  and  order  dated  31st
March, 2009 issued by the learned Single Judge within four  weeks  from  the
date of receipt of copy of this judgment.
17.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and directions.   No
costs.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41749

                                                             REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6018 OF 2014
                  (arising out of SLP (C) No.29807 of 2012)

CHHEL SINGH                                    … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

M.G.B. GRAMIN BANK PALI & ORS.                … RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated  10th
May, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of  Judicature  for
Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur  whereby  the  Division  Bench  allowed  the   appeal
preferred by the respondent-M.G.B. Gramin Bank,  Pali (hereinafter  referred
to as the “Bank”) and set aside the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single
Judge.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
       The  appellant  was  working  with  the  respondent-Bank  since  17th
February, 1984 as Clerk-cum-Cashier. While in  service  he  remained  absent
from duty from 11th December, 1989 to 24th October, 1990  (approximately  10
and  1/2  months)  without  obtaining  prior  permission  of  the  competent
authority.  For the said reason he was  served  with  a  memorandum  on  5th
October, 1991 alleging contravention of the provisions of the Marwar  Gramin
Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1980, for the following charges:
He remained absent from duty from 11th December, 1989 to 24th October,  1990
without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority;
He failed to comply with the orders and directions given to him  which  were
the letters issued asking him to join duty;
He remained absent from duty without any reason.
On the day of joining he failed to submit medical certificate and  submitted
the same after much delay.

4.    The appellant by his reply dated  23rd  November,  1991  disputed  the
allegations and informed that he was seriously ill  between  11th  December,
1989 and 24th October, 1990, therefore, the absence was beyond his  control;
he never intended to  contravene  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  service
regulations. The explanation submitted by the appellant was not accepted  by
the Disciplinary Authority, who decided to  inquire  into  the  charges  and
appointed one Shri P.R. Agarwal as the Inquiry Officer.
5.    During the inquiry the  appellant  submitted  list  of  seven  defence
witnesses.  However, Inquiry Officer called only two witnesses  and  refused
to call rest of the  five  witnesses  on  the  ground  that  the  presenting
officer of the Bank was ready to answer the questions on behalf of  them  as
may be raised by the appellant. After inquiry the Inquiry Officer  submitted
report dated 3rd January, 1994, rejecting the testimony of two witnesses  as
“untrustworthy” and held the appellant guilty for the charges.
6.    The Disciplinary Authority, having gone through the report,  issued  a
show cause notice enclosing the copy of the inquiry report  as  to  why  the
appellant  should  not  be  punished  for  the  charges  mentioned  therein.
Finally, after hearing the appellant, the Disciplinary  Authority  held  the
charges to be proved and removed the appellant from service by  order  dated
17th October, 1994. The appeal preferred against the order  of  the  removal
was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide  order  dated  26th  December,
1994.
7.    The said orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate  Authority
were challenged by the appellant before the  High  Court  in  Writ  Petition
No.1702/1995. One of the grounds taken was that  the  entire  inquiry  stood
vitiated having conducted in violation of  principles  of  natural  justice.
The Inquiry Officer without having any  justifiable  reason  disallowed  the
prayer of the appellant to  summon  five  important  witnesses.   The  other
ground was that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the  gravity  of
charges.
8.    The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 31st  March,  2009  allowed
the writ petition, quashed the order of removal and directed the  respondent
to reinstate the appellant in service with all consequential  benefits  with
following observation:
 “In the instant case the reason given for not calling the  witnesses  named
by the delinquent employee is absolutely vague and irrelevant. It  does  not
and cannot appeal to the measures and standards of a quasi judicial  inquiry
that ultimately resulted  into  removal  of  the  delinquent  employee  from
service. The refusal to call defence witnesses in  the  manner  existing  in
present case is apparent denial of reasonable  opportunity  to  the  charged
employee for defending himself. A definite prejudice, therefore,  is  caused
by not calling the witnesses  named  by  the  petitioner  without  examining
their relevance and  ultimately  holding  him  guilty  for  the  charges  in
defence of which he indicated his desire to examine those witnesses.”

      The Court also observed:
“In the instant  matter  the  inquiry  officer  simply  mentioned  that  the
defence witnesses Kalyan Singh and Ganpat  Singh  are  not  trustworthy.  No
reason is  given  by  the  Inquiry  Officer  to  disbelieve  those  persons.
Pertinent  to  note  here  that  Ganpat  Singh  as  well  as  Kalyan   Singh
extensively narrated facts about serious  ailment  of  the  petitioner.  The
Inquiry Officer while disbelieving those persons should have given  definite
reasons to justify his conclusion. Merely saying that the  persons  are  not
found trustworthy, is not at all sufficient. The  basic  principle  is  that
every person coming forward as a witness in  evidence  states  trust  except
proved otherwise, therefore, onus was upon the Inquiry Officer to  establish
by adequate discussion relating to conduct and  character  of  Kalyan  Singh
and  Ganpat  Singh  to  disbelieve  them  or  to  say  that  they  were  not
trustworthy.”

9.    The  aforesaid  judgment  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  was
challenged by the Bank in a writ appeal. The Division Bench though  accepted
that the Inquiry stood vitiated but set aside  the  order  of  reinstatement
with following observation:
      “Therefore, we are of the consigned opinion that even while the  order
as  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  quashing  the  orders  of   the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority need  not  be  interfered
with, the other part of the order calls for interference and it  appears  in
the interest of justice that the matter be restored for reconsideration  of,
and re-reporting by,  the  Inquiry  Officer  after  concluding  the  inquiry
proceedings in conformity with the requirements  of  principles  of  natural
justice.
      In view of the above, this appeal  succeeds  and  is  allowed  in  the
manner that the order passed by the learned Single  Judge  insofar  quashing
of the impugned orders dated 17.08.94 and 26.12.1994 is concerned, the  same
is affirmed, but the other part of the order of the  learned  Single  Judge,
declaring the petitioner entitled to  be  reinstated  in  service  with  all
consequential benefits, is set aside. Instead, we  consider  it  proper  and
hence order that the report as made by the Inquiry Officer dated  03.01.1994
shall  stand  annulled   and   the   matter   shall   stand   restored   for
reconsideration of, and re-reporting by, the Inquiry Officer.

      It goes without saying that if the Inquiry  Officer  who  had  earlier
conducted the inquiry is not available, or for any other sufficient  reason,
it shall always be permissible for the  Disciplinary  Authority  to  appoint
any  other  officer  to  inquire  into  the  matter.  For  looking   further
instructions in the matter, the parties  shall  stand  at  noted  to  appear
before the Disciplinary Authority on 18.06.2012.”

10.   The learned counsel for the appellant while placing  reliance  on  the
Inquiry Report and finding of the learned Single Judge  submitted  that  the
inquiry was conducted in violation  of  principle  of  natural  justice  and
hence the learned Single Judge rightly directed  the  reinstatement  of  the
appellant. Whereas according to learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-Bank,
the Division  Bench  rightly  set  aside  the  order  of  reinstatement  and
remitted the matter for fresh enquiry.
11. After giving our careful consideration to the  facts  and  circumstances
of the case and the submission made by the learned counsel for the  parties,
we are of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in  setting  aside  the
order of reinstatement.
12.   The Division Bench has accepted that the  inquiry  stood  vitiated  by
disallowing the request of the appellant to summon  the  rest  of  the  five
witnesses.  For the said reason, the Division Bench has not interfered  with
such part of the finding and  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge
whereby the impugned order of termination dated 17th October, 1994  and  the
Appellate Authority order dated 26th December, 1994 were quashed.
13.   The order of termination being quashed by the High Court,  in  absence
of any observation and grounds to refuse the  reinstatement,  the  appellant
automatically stood  reinstated.   Without  reinstatement  in  service,  the
question of further inquiry does not arise.  There was no occasion  for  the
Division Bench  of  the  High  Court  to  direct  further  inquiry,  without
reinstatement of appellant.
14.    The  following  charges  were  leveled  against  the  appellant,   as
mentioned in the inquiry report:
      “Charge No.1:
      According to Rule 22(1) of Marwar  Gramin  Bank  Employee  Association
Rules, 1980 no officer or employee would absent himself  without  the  prior
permission from competent authority and in case of disease and  accident  no
one would absent himself without  providing  medical  certificate,  but  you
flouted the instructions of competent authority and without  permission  you
remained  absent  from  11.12.89  to  24.10.90  and  you  got  the   medical
certificate issued  in  connection  with  your  illness  you  submitted  the
medical certificate on 20.10.90 with so much of delay.


Charge No.2:

According to Rule 22(2) of Marwar Gramin Bank  Employee  Association  Rules,
1980 if any officer or employee remains  absent  without  leave  or  remains
absent after the expiry  of  leave,  (leaving  the  circumstances  which  is
beyond  their  control  and  for  that   he   has   to   give   satisfactory
clarification), then he would not be entitled for payment  of  such  absence
or the period after the absence and would be liable for  such  action  which
would  be  charged  by  competent  authority.   But   you   violated   these
instructions:

(D) You remained on medical leave from 11.12.89 to 24.10.90 and you did  not
submit leave application as per rule.

(E) You had been instructed by the  head  office  by  its  letter  no.K/7901
dated 23.08.90 to present yourself on duty within 7 days and  also  to  give
clarification for being absent without leave but  you  did  not  submit  any
reply.  Thereafter also, you were again given instruction  by  head  quarter
letter no.K/10076 dated 22.9.90 you were instructed to present  on  duty  by
05.10.90 and  also  to  submit  the  clarification.   The  said  letter  was
received by you on 4.10.90.  Then also you did not send any  information  to
bank about your absence.

(F)  In  your  clarification  you  have  stated  that  you  could  not  give
information since you were suffering from incurable disease but  in  medical
certificate submitted by you there is no mention of any  incurable  disease,
where it was not possible for you to send the leave information.  Thus,  you
gave wrong information to bank.

      Charge No.3:
      You not being seriously ill, produced the  evidence  of  illness  from
various doctors whereas:
(A) You  travelled  during  your  alleged  serious  illness.   According  to
medical certificate issued by Dr. S.S. Purohit,  Navdeep  Hospital  Palanpur
issued on 25.10.90, you got treatment from him from 13.8.90 to 24.10.90  and
rest has been prescribed  whereas  during  that  period  you  were  on  your
permanent residence at Chitalwana.  You  yourself  received  the  registered
letter no.K/1-0078 dated 22.9.90 and K/11211 dated 11.10.90 at Chitalwana.

(B) In the letter K/11211 dated 11.10.90  the  instruction  given  was  very
clear that join the duty by 27.10.90 and it was stated in that  letter  that
if you do not join the duty then it would  be  presumed  that  you  are  not
interested to work in the bank.  Then you had shown yourself to  be  healthy
and you joined duty on 25.10.90

Charge No.4:

      In Circular no.21/78 dated 22.6.78 it has  been  instructed  that  the
employees on leave on health reason would submit medical  certificate  while
joining on duty.  You violated these instructions and did  not  present  the
medical certificate while joining duty.  You submitted the said  certificate
on 20.10.90 with delay.”


15.   From  the  plain  reading  of  the  charges  we  find  that  the  main
allegation is absence from duty from 11.12.89 to 24.10.90 (approximately  10
and ½  months),  for  which  no  prior  permission  was  obtained  from  the
competent authority.  In his reply, the appellant has taken  the  plea  that
he was seriously ill between 11.12.89 and 24.10.90,  which  was  beyond  his
control; he never intended to  contravene  any  of  the  provisions  of  the
service regulations. He submitted the copies of medical certificates  issued
by Doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the  post.   The  medical
reports were submitted after about 24 days.  There was  no  allegation  that
the appellant’s unauthorized absence from duty was willful  and  deliberate.
The Inquiry Officer has also not held that  appellant’s  absence  from  duty
was  willful  and  deliberate.  It  is  neither  case  of  the  Disciplinary
Authority nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by  the
appellant were forged  or  fabricated  or  obtained  for  any  consideration
though he was not ill during the said period.  In absence of  such  evidence
and finding, it was not open to the  Inquiry  Officer  or  the  Disciplinary
Authority to disbelieve the  medical  certificates  issued  by  the  Doctors
without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay.
16.   In view of the  observation  made  above,  the  order  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court cannot be  upheld.   We,  accordingly,  set
aside the impugned judgment and order dated 10th May,  2012  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court in D.B. Civil  Special  Appeal  (Writ)  No.
850 of 2009 and upheld the order passed by the learned  Single  Judge  dated
31st March, 2009 in S.B. Civil Appeal Writ Petition No. 1702 of  1995.   The
respondents are directed to implement the direction  and  order  dated  31st
March, 2009 issued by the learned Single Judge within four  weeks  from  the
date of receipt of copy of this judgment.
17.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and directions.   No
costs.



                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                       (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                                ………………………………………………………………….J.
                                           (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07, 2014.

Sec.19 of Consumer Act - Whether the National Consumer Forum can grant stay orders at appeal stage - much more conditional Stay orders - Apex court held that It is not the case of any of the appellants that the Consumer Forum including State and National Commissions has no power to pass interim order of stay. If the National Commission after hearing the appeal of the parties in its discretion wants to stay the amount awarded, it is open to the National Commission to pass an appropriate interim order including conditional order of stay. Entertainment of an appeal and stay of proceeding pursuant to order impugned in the appeal stands at different footings, at two different stages. One (pre-deposit) has no nexus with merit of the appeal and the other (grant of stay) depends on prima facie case; balance of convenience and irreparable loss of party seeking such stay. In view of the finding recorded above, the interference with the impugned order dated 15th May, 2012 passed by the National Commission is not called for.=M/s Shreenath Corp. & Ors. … APPELLANT VERSUS Consumer Education & Research Society & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41748

    Sec.19 of Consumer Act - Whether the National Consumer Forum can grant stay orders at appeal stage - much more conditional Stay orders - Apex court held that It is not the case of any of the appellants that  the Consumer  Forum including State and National Commissions has no power to pass interim  order of stay. If the National Commission after hearing the appeal of the  parties in its discretion wants to stay the  amount  awarded,  it  is  open  to  the National  Commission  to  pass  an  appropriate  interim   order   including conditional  order  of  stay.   Entertainment  of  an  appeal  and  stay  of proceeding pursuant to order impugned in  the  appeal  stands  at  different footings, at two different stages.  One  (pre-deposit)  has  no  nexus  with merit of the appeal and the other (grant of stay)  depends  on  prima  facie case; balance of convenience and irreparable  loss  of  party  seeking  such stay. In view of the finding  recorded  above,  the  interference  with  the impugned order dated 15th May, 2012 passed by  the  National  Commission  is not called for.=

A number of complaints u/s 17(1) of the Consumer Protection Act,  1986
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’)  were  filed  by  different  persons
before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Gujarat State,  Ahmedabad
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘State Commission’) against the  appellants
- opposite parties.
4.    The State Commission by order dated 30th  January,  2012  allowed  the
applications in part and directed the  appellants-opposite  parties  to  pay
certain amount with interest in favour of the complainants.
5.    Against  the  aforesaid  orders,  the  appellants  preferred  separate
appeals u/s 19 of the Act before the National Commission being First  Appeal
Nos.91-104  of  2012.   In  all   these   appeals   separate   interlocutory
applications for stay were filed by the appellants. The National  Commission
by impugned common order dated 15th May,  2012  passed  conditional  interim
order which reads as under:
            “Heard.
            Issue notice on main appeal as well as on stay  applications  to
the respondents, returnable on 22.11.2012.
            In the meanwhile, operation of the impugned order  shall  remain
stayed, till next date, subject to appellants depositing 50% of the  awarded
amount (principal amount), within three months from today,  with  the  State
Commission.
            On deposit of the amount, State Commission shall  put  the  same
in fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank, initially for one year.
            Dasti.” =

This Court in State of  Haryana  v.  Maruti  Udyog  Ltd.  and  others,
(2000) 7 SCC 348, while dealing with case of waiver of “pre-deposit”  in  an
appeal under first proviso to Section 39(5) of  the  Haryana  General  Sales
Tax Act held:

“7…………….There cannot be any dispute that right of appeal is the creature  of
the statute and has to be exercised within the limits and according  to  the
procedure provided by law.  It  is  filed  for  invoking  the  powers  of  a
superior court to redress the error of the court below, if any. No right  of
appeal can be  conferred  except  by  express  words.  An  appeal,  for  its
maintainability, must have a clear authority  of  law.  Sub-section  (5)  of
Section 39 of the Act vests a  discretion  in  the  appellate  authority  to
entertain the appeal if it is filed within sixty days and the amount of  tax
assessed along with penalty and  interest,  if  any,  recoverable  from  the
persons has been paid. The aforesaid restriction is subject to  the  proviso
conferring discretion upon the appellate  authority  to  dispense  with  the
deposit of the amount only on proof of  the  fact  that  the  appellant  was
unable to  pay  the  amount.  Before  deciding  the  appeal,  the  appellate
authority affords an opportunity to the party concerned to  either  pay  the
amount or make out a case for the stay in terms of  proviso  to  sub-section
(5) of Section 39 of the Act.  Once  the  conditions  specified  under  sub-
section (5) of Section 39 are complied with, the appeal is  born  for  being
disposed of on merits after hearing both the sides.”

11.   The second proviso to Section 19 of the Act mandates  pre-deposit  for
consideration of an appeal before the National Commission. It  requires  50%
of the amount in terms of an order  of  the  State  Commission  or  35,000/-
whichever  is  less  for  entertainment  of  an  appeal  by   the   National
Commission. Unless the appellant has deposited the pre-deposit  amount,  the
appeal cannot be entertained by  the  National  Commission.   A  pre-deposit
condition to deposit 50% of the amount in terms of the order  of  the  State
Commission  or  Rs.35,000/-  being  condition  precedent  for   entertaining
appeal, it has no nexus with the order of stay, as such an order may or  may
not be passed by the  National  Commission.   Condition  of  pre-deposit  is
there to avoid frivolous appeals.
12.   It is not the case of any of the appellants that  the  Consumer  Forum
including State and National Commissions has no power to pass interim  order
of stay. If the National Commission after hearing the appeal of the  parties
in its discretion wants to stay the  amount  awarded,  it  is  open  to  the
National  Commission  to  pass  an  appropriate  interim   order   including
conditional  order  of  stay.   Entertainment  of  an  appeal  and  stay  of
proceeding pursuant to order impugned in  the  appeal  stands  at  different
footings, at two different stages.  One  (pre-deposit)  has  no  nexus  with
merit of the appeal and the other (grant of stay)  depends  on  prima  facie
case; balance of convenience and irreparable  loss  of  party  seeking  such
stay.
13.   In view of the finding  recorded  above,  the  interference  with  the
impugned order dated 15th May, 2012 passed by  the  National  Commission  is
not called for. In  absence  of  any  merit,  the  appeals  are  accordingly
dismissed. No costs.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41748



                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9052 OF 2014
                  (arising out of SLP (C) No.21668 of 2012)

M/s Shreenath Corp. & Ors.                     … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

Consumer Education & Research
Society & ORS.                                … RESPONDENTS


WITH
Civil Appeal No. 9053 /2014 (@ SLP(C) NO.22442 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9054/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 22452 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9055/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 22511 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9056/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 23047 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9057/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 25741 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9058/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 26119 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9059/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 26683 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9060/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 26687 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9061/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 26699 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9062/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 27433 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9064/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 27434 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9065/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 27435 of 2012)
Civil Appeal No. 9066/2014 (@ SLP(C) NO. 27436 of 2012)




                               J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    These appeals are directed against common  interim  order  dated  15th
May, 2012 passed by the National  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal  Commission,
New Delhi  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the,  ‘National  Commission’)  in
interlocutory applications for  stay  in  First  Appeals  preferred  by  the
appellants.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-
      A number of complaints u/s 17(1) of the Consumer Protection Act,  1986
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’)  were  filed  by  different  persons
before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Gujarat State,  Ahmedabad
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘State Commission’) against the  appellants
- opposite parties.
4.    The State Commission by order dated 30th  January,  2012  allowed  the
applications in part and directed the  appellants-opposite  parties  to  pay
certain amount with interest in favour of the complainants.
5.    Against  the  aforesaid  orders,  the  appellants  preferred  separate
appeals u/s 19 of the Act before the National Commission being First  Appeal
Nos.91-104  of  2012.   In  all   these   appeals   separate   interlocutory
applications for stay were filed by the appellants. The National  Commission
by impugned common order dated 15th May,  2012  passed  conditional  interim
order which reads as under:
            “Heard.
            Issue notice on main appeal as well as on stay  applications  to
the respondents, returnable on 22.11.2012.
            In the meanwhile, operation of the impugned order  shall  remain
stayed, till next date, subject to appellants depositing 50% of the  awarded
amount (principal amount), within three months from today,  with  the  State
Commission.
            On deposit of the amount, State Commission shall  put  the  same
in fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank, initially for one year.
            Dasti.”

6.    Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned  interim
order dated 15th May, 2012 passed by the National Commission is contrary  to
the provisions of Section 19 of the  Act.  It  was  further  contended  that
deposit of specific amount has been prescribed under the second  proviso  to
Section 19 of the Act, and, therefore, the National Commission  cannot  pass
an order asking the appellant before it to deposit an amount more  than  50%
of the amount awarded by the State Commission or  Rs.35,000/-  whichever  is
less. In support of  such  contention  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant
relied upon judgment of  Delhi  High  Court  in  Dr.(Mrs.)  K.  Kathuria  v.
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, AIR 2007 Delhi 135.

7.    On the other hand, according  to  counsel  for  the  respondents,  the
impugned order is a conditional order  of  stay  and  is  not  passed  under
second proviso to Section 19 of the Act.

8.    After giving our careful consideration to the facts and  circumstances
of the case and submissions made by learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  we
find ourselves entirely in agreement with the submission made on  behalf  of
the respondents.

9.    Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act,  1986  deals  with  appeals
against the order made by the State Commission  in  exercise  of  its  power
conferred by sub-clause (i) of  clause  (a)  of  Section  17  and  the  said
section reads as follows:-

      “19.Appeals.-Any person aggrieved  by  an  order  made  by  the  State
Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i)  of  clause
(a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order  to  the  National
Commission within a period of thirty days from the  date  of  the  order  in
such form and manner as may be prescribed:

      Provided that the National Commission may entertain  an  appeal  after
the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied  that  there
was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

      Provided further that no appeal by

a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms  of  an  order  of  the
State Commission, shall be entertained by  the  National  Commission  unless
the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent  of  the
amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less.”

On plain reading of aforesaid Section 19, we find that  the  second  proviso
to Section 19 of the Act relates to “pre- deposit” required  for  an  appeal
to be entertained by the National Commission.

10.   This Court in State of  Haryana  v.  Maruti  Udyog  Ltd.  and  others,
(2000) 7 SCC 348, while dealing with case of waiver of “pre-deposit”  in  an
appeal under first proviso to Section 39(5) of  the  Haryana  General  Sales
Tax Act held:

“7…………….There cannot be any dispute that right of appeal is the creature  of
the statute and has to be exercised within the limits and according  to  the
procedure provided by law.  It  is  filed  for  invoking  the  powers  of  a
superior court to redress the error of the court below, if any. No right  of
appeal can be  conferred  except  by  express  words.  An  appeal,  for  its
maintainability, must have a clear authority  of  law.  Sub-section  (5)  of
Section 39 of the Act vests a  discretion  in  the  appellate  authority  to
entertain the appeal if it is filed within sixty days and the amount of  tax
assessed along with penalty and  interest,  if  any,  recoverable  from  the
persons has been paid. The aforesaid restriction is subject to  the  proviso
conferring discretion upon the appellate  authority  to  dispense  with  the
deposit of the amount only on proof of  the  fact  that  the  appellant  was
unable to  pay  the  amount.  Before  deciding  the  appeal,  the  appellate
authority affords an opportunity to the party concerned to  either  pay  the
amount or make out a case for the stay in terms of  proviso  to  sub-section
(5) of Section 39 of the Act.  Once  the  conditions  specified  under  sub-
section (5) of Section 39 are complied with, the appeal is  born  for  being
disposed of on merits after hearing both the sides.”

11.   The second proviso to Section 19 of the Act mandates  pre-deposit  for
consideration of an appeal before the National Commission. It  requires  50%
of the amount in terms of an order  of  the  State  Commission  or  35,000/-
whichever  is  less  for  entertainment  of  an  appeal  by   the   National
Commission. Unless the appellant has deposited the pre-deposit  amount,  the
appeal cannot be entertained by  the  National  Commission.   A  pre-deposit
condition to deposit 50% of the amount in terms of the order  of  the  State
Commission  or  Rs.35,000/-  being  condition  precedent  for   entertaining
appeal, it has no nexus with the order of stay, as such an order may or  may
not be passed by the  National  Commission.   Condition  of  pre-deposit  is
there to avoid frivolous appeals.
12.   It is not the case of any of the appellants that  the  Consumer  Forum
including State and National Commissions has no power to pass interim  order
of stay. If the National Commission after hearing the appeal of the  parties
in its discretion wants to stay the  amount  awarded,  it  is  open  to  the
National  Commission  to  pass  an  appropriate  interim   order   including
conditional  order  of  stay.   Entertainment  of  an  appeal  and  stay  of
proceeding pursuant to order impugned in  the  appeal  stands  at  different
footings, at two different stages.  One  (pre-deposit)  has  no  nexus  with
merit of the appeal and the other (grant of stay)  depends  on  prima  facie
case; balance of convenience and irreparable  loss  of  party  seeking  such
stay.
13.   In view of the finding  recorded  above,  the  interference  with  the
impugned order dated 15th May, 2012 passed by  the  National  Commission  is
not called for. In  absence  of  any  merit,  the  appeals  are  accordingly
dismissed. No costs.



                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                       (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                                ………………………………………………………………….J.
                                            (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07, 2014.