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Sunday, July 27, 2014

whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and ‘Fatwa’ has any legal status. - Apex court held that Dar-ul-Qaza is neither created nor sanctioned by any law made by the competent legislature. Therefore, the opinion or the Fatwa issued by Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody is not adjudication of dispute by an authority under a judicial system sanctioned by law. A Qazi or Mufti has no authority or powers to impose his opinion and enforce his Fatwa on any one by any coercive method. In fact, whatever may be the status of Fatwa during Mogul or British Rule, it has no place in independent India under our Constitutional scheme. It has no legal sanction and can not be enforced by any legal process either by the Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person concerned or for that matter anybody. The person or the body concerned may ignore it and it will not be necessary for anybody to challenge it before any court of law. It can simply be ignored. In case any person or body tries to impose it, their act would be illegal. and further held that We would like to advise the Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter anybody not to give any response or issue Fatwa concerning an individual, unless asked for by the person involved or the person having direct interest in the matter. However, in a case the person involved or the person directly interested or likely to be affected being incapacitated, by any person having some interest in the matter. Issuance of Fatwa on rights, status and obligation of individual Muslim, in our opinion, would not be permissible, unless asked for by the person concerned or in case of incapacity, by the person interested. (imrana case) Fatwas touching upon the rights of an individual at the instance of rank strangers may cause irreparable damage and therefore, would be absolutely uncalled for. It shall be in violation of basic human rights. It cannot be used to punish innocent. No religion including Islam punishes the innocent. Religion cannot be allowed to be merciless to the victim. Faith cannot be used as dehumanising force. Apex court dismissed the writ as it was filed with misconception . = VISHWA LOCHAN MADAN ..... PETITIONER VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .... RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41747

  whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and  ‘Fatwa’  has  any legal status. - Apex court held that  Dar-ul-Qaza  is  neither  created nor sanctioned by any law made by  the  competent  legislature.   Therefore, the opinion or the Fatwa issued by Dar-ul-Qaza or for  that  matter  anybody is not adjudication of dispute by  an  authority  under  a  judicial  system sanctioned by law.  A Qazi or Mufti has no authority  or  powers  to  impose his opinion and enforce his Fatwa on any one by  any  coercive  method.   In fact, whatever may be the status of Fatwa during Mogul or British  Rule,  it has no place in independent India under our Constitutional  scheme.  It  has no legal sanction and can not be enforced by any  legal  process  either  by the Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person  concerned  or  for  that  matter anybody.  The person or the body concerned may ignore it and it will not  be necessary for anybody to challenge it before  any  court  of  law.   It  can simply be ignored.  In case any person or body tries  to  impose  it,  their act would be illegal.  and further held that We would like to advise the Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter  anybody  not  to give any response or issue Fatwa concerning an individual, unless asked  for by the person involved or the person having direct interest in  the  matter. However, in a case the person involved or the person directly interested  or likely to be  affected  being  incapacitated,  by  any  person  having  some interest in the matter. Issuance of Fatwa on rights, status  and  obligation of individual Muslim, in our  opinion,  would  not  be  permissible,  unless
asked for by the person concerned or in case of incapacity,  by  the  person interested. (imrana case) Fatwas touching  upon  the  rights  of  an  individual  at  the instance of rank strangers  may  cause  irreparable  damage  and  therefore, would be absolutely uncalled for.  It shall be in violation of  basic  human rights.  It cannot be used to punish innocent.  No religion including  Islam punishes the innocent.  Religion cannot be allowed to be  merciless  to  the victim. Faith cannot be used as dehumanising force.  Apex court dismissed the writ as it was filed with misconception . =


a  declaration  that
the movement/ activities being pursued by All  India  Muslim   Personal  Law
Board and other similar organizations for establishment of  Muslim  Judicial
System and setting up of Dar-ul-Qazas (Muslim Courts) and Shariat  Court  in
India are absolutely illegal, illegitimate  and  unconstitutional. 
Further
declaration sought for is  that  the  judgments  and  fatwas  pronounced  by
authorities have no place in the Indian Constitutional system, and the  same
are unenforceable being  wholly  non-est  and  void  ab-initio.   
Petitioner
further seeks direction to the Union of India and the  States  concerned  to
forthwith take effective steps to disband and diffuse all  Dar-ul-Qazas  and
the Shariat  Courts  and  to  ensure  that  the  same  do  not  function  to
adjudicate  any  matrimonial-disputes  under  the   Muslim   Personal   Law.

Petitioner’s  prayer  further  is   to   restrain   the   respondents   from
establishing a parallel Muslim  Judicial  System,  inter-meddling  with  the
marital status of Indian Muslims and  to  pass  any  judgments,  remarks  or
fatwas and from deciding the matrimonial dispute  amongst  Muslims.   
Lastly
the prayer of the petitioner is to direct the All India Muslim Personal  Law
Board (Respondent No.9), Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, and  other  Dar-ul-Ulooms  in
the country, not  to  train  or  appoint  Qazis,  Naib-Qazis  or  Mufti  for
rendering any judicial services of any kind. =

Back Ground for this petition
What perhaps prompted the petitioner to file  this  writ  petition  is  the
galore of obnoxious Fatwas  including  a  Fatwa  given  by  Dar-ul-Uloom  of
Deoband in relation to Imrana’s incident.  Imrana, a  28  years  old  Muslim
woman, mother of five children was allegedly  raped  by  her  father-in-law.
The question arose about her marital status and those of her  children  born
in the wedlock with  rapist’s  son.   The  Fatwa  of  Dar-ul-Uloom  in  this
connection reads as follows:

      “If one raped his son’s wife and it is proved  through  witnesses,  or
the rapist himself confesses it, Haram Musaharat will be proved.   It  means
that the wife of the son will become unlawful forever to him i.e.  the  son.
The woman with whom father has copulated legally or had  sexual  intercourse
illegally in both ways, the son can’t keep physical relationship  with  her.
The Holy Quran says:

“Marry not the woman whom your father copulated”

     The  Fatwa  has  dissolved  the  marriage  and  passed  a  decree  for
perpetual injunction restraining  the  husband  and  wife  living  together,
though none of them ever approached the Dar-ul-Uloom.
Another Fatwa of which our attention is drawn  rules  that  no  police
report can be filed against the father-in-law of Asoobi, who  had  allegedly
raped her.  According to the Fatwa, father-in-law  could  have  been  blamed
only if there had either been a witness to the case or the victim’s  husband
had endorsed  Asoobi’s  allegation.   Yet  another  Fatwa,  which  has  been
brought to our notice is in connection with Jatsonara, a 19 year old  Muslim
woman, who was asked to accept the rapist father-in-law as her real  husband
and divorce her husband.

     Petitioner alleges that all these  Fatwas  have  the  support  of  All
India Muslim Personal Law Board and it is striving for the establishment  of
parallel Muslim judicial system in  India.   According  to  the  petitioner,
adjudication of disputes is essentially the  function  of  sovereign  State,
which can never be abdicated or       parted with. =
   The stand of the Union of India 
is that Fatwas are advisory in  nature
and no Muslim is bound to  follow  those.
Further,  Dar-ul-Qaza  does  not
administer criminal justice  and  it  really  functions  as  an  arbitrator,
mediator, negotiator or conciliator in matters pertaining to family  dispute
or any other dispute of civil nature between the Muslims.
According to  the
Union of India, Dar-ul-Qaza can  be  perceived  as  an  alternative  dispute
resolution mechanism, which strives to settle disputes  outside  the  courts
expeditiously in an amicable and inexpensive manner and, in  fact,  have  no
power or authority to enforce its orders and, hence, it cannot be termed  as
either in conflict with or parallel to  the  Indian  Judicial  System.
The
Union of India has not denied that Fatwas as alleged by the petitioner  were
not issued but its plea is that they were not issued by any of  the  Dar-ul-
Qaza.
In any event, according to the Union of India, few bad  examples  may
not justify abolition  of  system,  which  otherwise  is  found  useful  and
effective.

  Respondent No.9, All India Muslim Personal law  Board  
does  not  deny
the allegations that it had established Dar-ul-Qazas and training Qazis  and
Naib Qazis and the practice of  issuing  Fatwas  
but  asserts  that  Dar-ul-
Qaza/Nizam-e-Qazas  are  not  parallel  judicial  systems   established   in
derogation of or in conflict with the recognised  judicial  system.  
 It  is
informal justice delivery system aimed to bring  about  amicable  settlement
of matrimonial disputes between the parties.  
According to this  respondent,
Dar-ul-Qazas  have  no  authority,  means  or  force  to  get  their  Fatwas
implemented  and  the  writ  petition   is   based   on   ignorance   and/or
misconception that they are parallel courts or judicial system.

     Respondent  No.10,  Dar-ul-Uloom,  Deoband  
admits  issuing  Fatwa  in
Imrana’s case as per Fiqah-e-Hanafi, which is based  on  Quaran  and  Hadith
but asserts that it has no agency or powers to enforce its  Fatwas.   
It  is
within the discretion of the persons or the parties  who  obtain  Fatwas  to
abide by it or not.  
However, according to  Respondent  No.10,  God  fearing
Muslims being answerable to the Almighty, obey the Fatwas, others  may  defy
them.  
In the aforesaid background, the plea of Respondent No.  10  is  that
it is not running parallel judiciary.
The stand of the State of U.P.
 is that Fatwas are advisory in  nature.
 They are not mandatory and do not prohibit any Muslim  to  approach  Courts
established by law for adjudication of their disputes.
Hence,  Dar-ul-Qaza
does not act as a parallel Court for adjudication of disputes.
 whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and  ‘Fatwa’  has  any
legal status.

 Dar-ul-Qaza  is  neither  created
nor sanctioned by any law made by  the  competent  legislature.
Therefore,
the opinion or the Fatwa issued by Dar-ul-Qaza or for  that  matter  anybody
is not adjudication of dispute by  an  authority  under  a  judicial  system
sanctioned by law.
A Qazi or Mufti has no authority  or  powers  to  impose
his opinion and enforce his Fatwa on any one by  any  coercive  method.
In
fact, whatever may be the status of Fatwa during Mogul or British  Rule,  it
has no place in independent India under our Constitutional  scheme.
It  has
no legal sanction and can not be enforced by any  legal  process  either  by
the Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person  concerned  or  for  that  matter
anybody.
The person or the body concerned may ignore it and it will not  be
necessary for anybody to challenge it before  any  court  of  law.
It  can simply be ignored.
In case any person or body tries  to  impose  it,  their
act would be illegal.
Therefore, the grievance of the petitioner that  Dar-
ul-Qazas  and  Nizam-e-Qaza  are  running  a  parallel  judicial  system  is
misconceived.

In the words  of  respondent  No.
10 “it is for the persons/parties who obtain Fatwa to abide by  it  or  not.
It, however, emphasises that “the persons who are God  fearing  and  believe
that they are answerable to the Almighty and have to face  the  consequences
of their doings/deeds, such are the  persons,  who  submit  to  the  Fatwa”.
Imrana’s case is an eye-opener in  this  context.   
Though  she  became  the
victim of lust of her father in law, her marriage was declared unlawful  and
the innocent husband was restrained from keeping physical relationship  with
her.  
In this way a declaratory  decree  for  dissolution  of  marriage  and
decree for perpetual injunction were passed.  
Though neither  the  wife  nor
the husband had approached for any opinion, an opinion was  sought  for  and
given at the instance of a journalist,  a  total  stranger.   In  this  way,
victim has been punished.  
A country governed by rule of law  cannot  fathom it.

We would like to advise 
the Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter  anybody  not  to
give any response or issue Fatwa concerning an individual, unless asked  for
by the person involved or the person having direct interest in  the  matter.
However, in a case the person involved or the person directly interested  or
likely to be  affected  being  incapacitated,  by  any  person  having  some
interest in the matter. Issuance of Fatwa on rights, status  and  obligation
of individual Muslim, in our  opinion,  would  not  be  permissible,  unless
asked for by the person concerned or in case of incapacity,  by  the  person
interested.  Fatwas touching  upon  the  rights  of  an  individual  at  the
instance of rank strangers  may  cause  irreparable  damage  and  therefore,
would be absolutely uncalled for.  It shall be in violation of  basic  human
rights.  It cannot be used to punish innocent.  No religion including  Islam
punishes the innocent.  Religion cannot be allowed to be  merciless  to  the
victim. Faith cannot be used as dehumanising force.
Dismissed the writ as it is filed under misconception

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41747


                                                                 REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 386 OF 2005



VISHWA LOCHAN MADAN               ..... PETITIONER

                                   VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.            .... RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


Chandramauli Kr. Prasad

      All India Muslim Personal Law Board comprises of Ulemas.  Ulema  is  a
body of Muslim scholars recognised as  expert  in  Islamic  sacred  law  and
theology.  It is the assertion of  the  petitioner  that  All  India  Muslim
Personal Law Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’) strives for  the
establishment of parallel judicial system in India as in its opinion  it  is
extremely difficult for  Muslim  women  to  get  justice  in  the  prevalent
judicial system.  Further, under the pressure of  expensive  and  protracted
litigation it has become very  difficult  for  the  downtrodden  and  weaker
section of the society to get justice.  Therefore,  to  avail  the  laws  of
Shariat, according to the Board, establishment of  Islamic  judicial  system
has become necessary. According to  the  petitioner,  the  Board,  Imarra-e-
Sharia of  different  States  and  Imarra-e-Sharia,  Phulwari  Shariff  have
established Dar-ul-Qazas, spread all over  the  country.   Camps  are  being
organised to train Qazis and Naib Qazis to administer justice  according  to
Shariat. Dar-ul-Qaza and Nizam-e-Qaza are interchangeable terms.  It is  the
allegation of the petitioner that Dar-ul-Qazas, spread all over the  country
are functioning as parallel judicial system aimed to administer  justice  to
Muslims living in this country according to Shariat i.e.  Islamic  Canonical
Law based on the teachings of the Quoran and the traditions of the  Prophet.
 What perhaps prompted the petitioner to file  this  writ  petition  is  the
galore of obnoxious Fatwas  including  a  Fatwa  given  by  Dar-ul-Uloom  of
Deoband in relation to Imrana’s incident.  Imrana, a  28  years  old  Muslim
woman, mother of five children was allegedly  raped  by  her  father-in-law.
The question arose about her marital status and those of her  children  born
in the wedlock with  rapist’s  son.   The  Fatwa  of  Dar-ul-Uloom  in  this
connection reads as follows:

      “If one raped his son’s wife and it is proved  through  witnesses,  or
the rapist himself confesses it, Haram Musaharat will be proved.   It  means
that the wife of the son will become unlawful forever to him i.e.  the  son.
The woman with whom father has copulated legally or had  sexual  intercourse
illegally in both ways, the son can’t keep physical relationship  with  her.
The Holy Quran says:

“Marry not the woman whom your father copulated”



      The  Fatwa  has  dissolved  the  marriage  and  passed  a  decree  for
perpetual injunction restraining  the  husband  and  wife  living  together,
though none of them ever approached the Dar-ul-Uloom.



      Another Fatwa of which our attention is drawn  rules  that  no  police
report can be filed against the father-in-law of Asoobi, who  had  allegedly
raped her.  According to the Fatwa, father-in-law  could  have  been  blamed
only if there had either been a witness to the case or the victim’s  husband
had endorsed  Asoobi’s  allegation.   Yet  another  Fatwa,  which  has  been
brought to our notice is in connection with Jatsonara, a 19 year old  Muslim
woman, who was asked to accept the rapist father-in-law as her real  husband
and divorce her husband.



      Petitioner alleges that all these  Fatwas  have  the  support  of  All
India Muslim Personal Law Board and it is striving for the establishment  of
parallel Muslim judicial system in  India.   According  to  the  petitioner,
adjudication of disputes is essentially the  function  of  sovereign  State,
which can never be abdicated or       parted with.



In the aforesaid background, the petitioner has sought  a  declaration  that
the movement/ activities being pursued by All  India  Muslim   Personal  Law
Board and other similar organizations for establishment of  Muslim  Judicial
System and setting up of Dar-ul-Qazas (Muslim Courts) and Shariat  Court  in
India are absolutely illegal, illegitimate  and  unconstitutional.   Further
declaration sought for is  that  the  judgments  and  fatwas  pronounced  by
authorities have no place in the Indian Constitutional system, and the  same
are unenforceable being  wholly  non-est  and  void  ab-initio.   Petitioner
further seeks direction to the Union of India and the  States  concerned  to
forthwith take effective steps to disband and diffuse all  Dar-ul-Qazas  and
the Shariat  Courts  and  to  ensure  that  the  same  do  not  function  to
adjudicate  any  matrimonial-disputes  under  the   Muslim   Personal   Law.
Petitioner’s  prayer  further  is   to   restrain   the   respondents   from
establishing a parallel Muslim  Judicial  System,  inter-meddling  with  the
marital status of Indian Muslims and  to  pass  any  judgments,  remarks  or
fatwas and from deciding the matrimonial dispute  amongst  Muslims.   Lastly
the prayer of the petitioner is to direct the All India Muslim Personal  Law
Board (Respondent No.9), Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, and  other  Dar-ul-Ulooms  in
the country, not  to  train  or  appoint  Qazis,  Naib-Qazis  or  Mufti  for
rendering any judicial services of any kind.



      The stand of the Union of India is that Fatwas are advisory in  nature
and no Muslim is bound to  follow  those.   Further,  Dar-ul-Qaza  does  not
administer criminal justice  and  it  really  functions  as  an  arbitrator,
mediator, negotiator or conciliator in matters pertaining to family  dispute
or any other dispute of civil nature between the Muslims.  According to  the
Union of India, Dar-ul-Qaza can  be  perceived  as  an  alternative  dispute
resolution mechanism, which strives to settle disputes  outside  the  courts
expeditiously in an amicable and inexpensive manner and, in  fact,  have  no
power or authority to enforce its orders and, hence, it cannot be termed  as
either in conflict with or parallel to  the  Indian  Judicial  System.   The
Union of India has not denied that Fatwas as alleged by the petitioner  were
not issued but its plea is that they were not issued by any of  the  Dar-ul-
Qaza.  In any event, according to the Union of India, few bad  examples  may
not justify abolition  of  system,  which  otherwise  is  found  useful  and
effective.



      Respondent No.9, All India Muslim Personal law  Board  does  not  deny
the allegations that it had established Dar-ul-Qazas and training Qazis  and
Naib Qazis and the practice of  issuing  Fatwas  but  asserts  that  Dar-ul-
Qaza/Nizam-e-Qazas  are  not  parallel  judicial  systems   established   in
derogation of or in conflict with the recognised  judicial  system.   It  is
informal justice delivery system aimed to bring  about  amicable  settlement
of matrimonial disputes between the parties.  According to this  respondent,
Dar-ul-Qazas  have  no  authority,  means  or  force  to  get  their  Fatwas
implemented  and  the  writ  petition   is   based   on   ignorance   and/or
misconception that they are parallel courts or judicial system.



      Respondent  No.10,  Dar-ul-Uloom,  Deoband  admits  issuing  Fatwa  in
Imrana’s case as per Fiqah-e-Hanafi, which is based  on  Quaran  and  Hadith
but asserts that it has no agency or powers to enforce its  Fatwas.   It  is
within the discretion of the persons or the parties  who  obtain  Fatwas  to
abide by it or not.  However, according to  Respondent  No.10,  God  fearing
Muslims being answerable to the Almighty, obey the Fatwas, others  may  defy
them.  In the aforesaid background, the plea of Respondent No.  10  is  that
it is not running parallel judiciary.



      The plea of the State of Madhya Pradesh is that Fatwa issued  by  Dar-
ul-Qaza has no legal value.



      The stand of the State of U.P. is that Fatwas are advisory in  nature.
 They are not mandatory and do not prohibit any Muslim  to  approach  Courts
established by law for adjudication of their disputes.   Hence,  Dar-ul-Qaza
does not act as a parallel Court for adjudication of disputes.



      From the pleadings of the parties  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any
dispute that several Dar-ul-Qazas presided over by the Qazis exist and  they
do issue Fatwas. In the present case, what  we  have  been  called  upon  to
examine as to whether Dar-ul-Qaza is a parallel court and  ‘Fatwa’  has  any
legal status.



      As  it  is  well  settled,  the  adjudication  by  a  legal  authority
sanctioned by law is enforceable and binding and meant to be  obeyed  unless
upset by an authority provided by law itself.  The power to adjudicate  must
flow from a validly made law. Person deriving benefit from the  adjudication
must have the right to enforce it and the person required to make  provision
in terms of adjudication has to comply that and on its failure  consequences
as provided in law is to ensue.  These are the  fundamentals  of  any  legal
judicial system.  In our opinion, the decisions of Dar-ul-Qaza or the  Fatwa
do not satisfy any of these requirements.  Dar-ul-Qaza  is  neither  created
nor sanctioned by any law made by  the  competent  legislature.   Therefore,
the opinion or the Fatwa issued by Dar-ul-Qaza or for  that  matter  anybody
is not adjudication of dispute by  an  authority  under  a  judicial  system
sanctioned by law.  A Qazi or Mufti has no authority  or  powers  to  impose
his opinion and enforce his Fatwa on any one by  any  coercive  method.   In
fact, whatever may be the status of Fatwa during Mogul or British  Rule,  it
has no place in independent India under our Constitutional  scheme.  It  has
no legal sanction and can not be enforced by any  legal  process  either  by
the Dar-ul-Qaza issuing that or the person  concerned  or  for  that  matter
anybody.  The person or the body concerned may ignore it and it will not  be
necessary for anybody to challenge it before  any  court  of  law.   It  can
simply be ignored.  In case any person or body tries  to  impose  it,  their
act would be illegal.  Therefore, the grievance of the petitioner that  Dar-
ul-Qazas  and  Nizam-e-Qaza  are  running  a  parallel  judicial  system  is
misconceived.



       As  observed  earlier,  the  Fatwa  has  no  legal  status   in   our
Constitutional scheme.  Notwithstanding that  it  is  an  admitted  position
that Fatwas have been  issued  and  are  being  issued.   All  India  Muslim
Personal Law Board feels the “necessity of establishment  of  a  network  of
judicial system throughout the country and  Muslims  should  be  made  aware
that they should get their disputes decided by the  Quazis”.   According  to
the All India Muslim Personal Law Board “this  establishment  may  not  have
the police powers but shall have the book of Allah in  hand  and  sunnat  of
the Rasool and all decisions  should  be  according  to  the  Book  and  the
Sunnat.  This will bring the  Muslims  to  the  Muslim  Courts.   They  will
 get justice”.

      The object of establishment of such a court may  be  laudable  but  we
have no doubt in our mind that it has no legal status.  It is bereft of  any
legal pedigree and has no sanction in laws of the land.  They are  not  part
of the corpus juris of the State.  A Fatwa is an opinion, only an expert  is
expected to give.  It is not a decree, not  binding  on  the  court  or  the
State or the individual.  It is  not  sanctioned  under  our  constitutional
scheme. But this does not mean that existence of  Dar-ul-Qaza  or  for  that
matter practice of issuing Fatwas are themselves illegal.   It  is  informal
justice delivery  system  with  an  objective  of  bringing  about  amicable
settlement between the parties.  It is within the discretion of the  persons
concerned either to accept, ignore or reject  it.   However,  as  the  Fatwa
gets strength from the religion; it causes serious psychological  impact  on
the person intending not to abide by that.  As projected by  respondent  No.
10 “God fearing Muslims obey the Fatwas”.  In the words  of  respondent  No.
10 “it is for the persons/parties who obtain Fatwa to abide by  it  or  not.
It, however, emphasises that “the persons who are God  fearing  and  believe
that they are answerable to the Almighty and have to face  the  consequences
of their doings/deeds, such are the  persons,  who  submit  to  the  Fatwa”.
Imrana’s case is an eye-opener in  this  context.   Though  she  became  the
victim of lust of her father in law, her marriage was declared unlawful  and
the innocent husband was restrained from keeping physical relationship  with
her.  In this way a declaratory  decree  for  dissolution  of  marriage  and
decree for perpetual injunction were passed.  Though neither  the  wife  nor
the husband had approached for any opinion, an opinion was  sought  for  and
given at the instance of a journalist,  a  total  stranger.   In  this  way,
victim has been punished.  A country governed by rule of law  cannot  fathom
it.

In our opinion, one may not object to  issuance  of  Fatwa  on  a  religious
issue or any other issue so long it does not infringe  upon  the  rights  of
individuals guaranteed under law.  Fatwa may be issued in respect of  issues
concerning the community at large at the instance of a  stranger  but  if  a
Fatwa is sought by a complete  stranger  on  an  issue  not  concerning  the
community at large but individual, than the Darul-Qaza or  for  that  matter
anybody may consider the desirability  of  giving  any  response  and  while
considering it should not be completely unmindful of the  motivation  behind
the Fatwa.  Having regard to the fact that a  Fatwa  has  the  potential  of
causing immense devastation, we feel impelled to  add  a  word  of  caution.
We would like to advise the Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter  anybody  not  to
give any response or issue Fatwa concerning an individual, unless asked  for
by the person involved or the person having direct interest in  the  matter.
However, in a case the person involved or the person directly interested  or
likely to be  affected  being  incapacitated,  by  any  person  having  some
interest in the matter. Issuance of Fatwa on rights, status  and  obligation
of individual Muslim, in our  opinion,  would  not  be  permissible,  unless
asked for by the person concerned or in case of incapacity,  by  the  person
interested.  Fatwas touching  upon  the  rights  of  an  individual  at  the
instance of rank strangers  may  cause  irreparable  damage  and  therefore,
would be absolutely uncalled for.  It shall be in violation of  basic  human
rights.  It cannot be used to punish innocent.  No religion including  Islam
punishes the innocent.  Religion cannot be allowed to be  merciless  to  the
victim. Faith cannot be used as dehumanising force.



      In the light of what we have observed above, the prayer  made  by  the
petitioner in the terms sought for cannot be granted.  However,  we  observe
that no Dar-ul-Qazas or for that matter, any  body  or  institution  by  any
name, shall give verdict or issue Fatwa touching  upon  the  rights,  status
and obligation, of an individual unless such an  individual  has  asked  for
it. In the case of incapacity of such an individual, any  person  interested
in the welfare of such person may be permitted to  represent  the  cause  of
concerned individual.  In any event, the decision or  the  Fatwa  issued  by
whatever body being not emanating from any  judicial  system  recognised  by
law, it is not binding on anyone including the person,  who  had  asked  for
it.  Further, such an adjudication or Fatwa does not have  a  force  of  law
and, therefore, cannot be enforced by any  process  using  coercive  method.
Any person trying to enforce that by any method shall be illegal and has  to
be dealt with in accordance with law.



      From the conspectus of what we have observed  above,  we  dispose  off
the writ petition with the observation aforesaid, but without any  order  as
to the costs.



   ………………………………………………………………J

   (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)



                           ………………………………………………………………J

                                   (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)

NEW DELHI,
July 7, 2014.

-----------------------
18





Sec.197 Cr. P.C. - want of sanction - Whether it can be raised at stage of trial by Accused - Trial court dismissed the objections raised by Accused on the ground the in some cases Sanction not obtained as he is an IAS officer and in some cases sanction obtained much prior to framing of charges - High court also dismissed the revision giving liberty to raise this issue at any time during trial - Apex court held that it has been consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant or acting in the discharge of his official duties to commit any of the offences covered by Section 406, 409, 420 etc. and the official status of the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for commission of the offences. Therefore, no sanction for prosecution of the public servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of the Code. Notwithstanding the above, the High Court had granted liberty to the appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending on the evidence that may come on record in the course of the trial. = CHANDAN KUMAR BASU ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR ... RESPONDENT (S) = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41746

 Sec.197 Cr. P.C. - want of sanction - Whether it can be raised at stage of trial by Accused - Trial court dismissed the objections raised by Accused on the ground the in some cases Sanction not obtained as he is an IAS officer and in some cases sanction obtained much prior to framing of charges - High court also dismissed the revision giving liberty to raise this issue at any time during trial - Apex court held that  it  has  been consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant  or acting in the discharge  of  his  official  duties  to  commit  any  of  the offences covered by Section 406, 409, 420 etc. and the  official  status  of the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for  commission of the offences.  Therefore,  no sanction  for  prosecution  of  the  public servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of  the  Code. Notwithstanding the above,  the  High  Court  had  granted  liberty  to  the appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending  on  the evidence that may come on record in the course of the  trial. =


the appellant filed revision applications before  the
learned Sessions Judge, Patna challenging the orders passed by  the  learned
Trial Court, primarily, on the ground that  the  said  orders  were  without
jurisdiction and incompetent in law inasmuch as sanction for prosecution  of
the  appellant  under  Section  197  of  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure
(hereinafter for short ‘the Code’) was not obtained or granted prior to  the
date of taking  of  cognizance.  The  revision  applications  filed  by  the
appellant were dismissed by the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Fast
Track Court No.2, Patna by orders of different dates.  The  said  orders  of
the learned Additional Sessions Judge were challenged before the High  Court
of Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 3187/2011, 3190/2011,  3191/2011  and  3192/2011.
The High Court by the common impugned order dated 27.11.2012  negatived  the
challenge made by the appellant leading to the present appeals. =

whether the acts giving rise  to  the  alleged  offences  had
been committed by the accused in the actual or purported  discharge  of  his
official duties.  
In a series of  pronouncements  commencing  with  Satwant
Singh vs. State of Punjab[2]; Harihar  Prasad  vs.  State  of  Bihar[3]  and
Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State  of  Punjab  &  Ors.[4]   
it  has  been
consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant  or
acting in the discharge  of  his  official  duties  to  commit  any  of  the
offences covered by Section 406, 409, 420 etc. and the  official  status  of
the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for  commission
of the offences.  
Therefore,  no sanction  for  prosecution  of  the  public
servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of  the  Code.
Notwithstanding the above,  the  High  Court  had  granted  liberty  to  the
appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending  on  the
evidence that may come on record in the course of the  trial.  
Despite  the
view taken by this Court in the series of pronouncements referred to  above,
the opportunity that has been provided by the High Court to the  benefit  of
the appellant need not be foreclosed by us inasmuch as
in Matajog Dobey  vs.
H.C. Bhari[5], P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim[6] and Prakash  Singh  Badal
(supra)
 this Court had consistently  held  that  the  question  of  sanction
under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at  any  time  after  cognizance
had been taken and may have to be determined  at  different  stages  of  the
proceeding/trial.
The observations of this Court  in  this  regard  may  be usefully extracted below.
Matajog Dobey  vs.  H.C. Bhari (para 21)
“The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. 
The  complaint  may
not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported  to
be done in the discharge of official duty; 
but facts subsequently coming  to
light on a police  or  judicial  inquiry  or  even  in  the  course  of  the
prosecution  evidence  at  the  trial,  may  establish  the  necessity   for
sanction. 
Whether sanction is necessary or not may  have  to  be  determined
from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the  course  of  the
progress of the case.”

P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim (para 15)
“It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the  Code
can be raised any time  after  the  cognizance;  may  be  immediately  after
cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion  of  trial
and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases  where  it  may
not  be  possible  to  decide  the  question  effectively   without   giving
opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did  was  in  discharge
of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether  claim  of  the
accused, that the act that he did was in course of the  performance  of  his
duty was reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be  examined
during the  course  of  trial  by  giving  opportunity  to  the  defence  to
establish it. In such an eventuality, the question  of  sanction  should  be
left open to be decided in the main judgment which  may  be  delivered  upon
conclusion of the trial.”

Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [Para 27]

“The question relating to the need of sanction  under  Section  197  of  the
Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is  lodged
and on the allegations contained therein. This question  may  arise  at  any
stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary  or  not
may have to be determined from stage to stage. ...”

10.   In view of the discussions we will  have  no  occasion  to  cause  any
interference with the orders passed by the High  Court  in  the  proceedings
instituted before it by the  appellant  which  have  been  impugned  in  the
appeals under consideration.  Consequently, we dismiss all the  appeals  and
maintain the orders passed by the High Court in all the cases before it.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41746


                            NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL  No.1359 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 3020 OF 2013)


CHANDAN KUMAR BASU                       ...    APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR                           ...  RESPONDENT (S)

                                    WITH
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL  No.1362 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 3022 OF 2013)
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL  No.1361 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 3016 OF 2013)
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL  No.1360 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 3014 OF 2013)
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL  No.1363 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 3074 OF 2013)


                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant, at the relevant point of time,  was  a  member  of  the
Indian  Administrative  Service   and   serving   on   deputation   as   the
Administrator-cum-Managing Director of the Bihar State  Housing  Cooperative
Federation Ltd.  The aforesaid Federation is a society registered under  the
Bihar Cooperative  Societies  Act,  1935.   On  the  basis  of  the  various
complaints made against the appellant, FIR Nos. 837/2002  dated  16.12.2002,
859/2002 and 860/2002 both dated 24.12.2002, 19/2003  dated  07.01.2003  and
41/2003 dated 18.01.2003 under  Sections  409/420/467/468/  471/34/120-B  of
the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter  for  short  ‘IPC’)  were  registered  at
Police Station Gardani  Bagh  (Shastri  Nagar),  Patna.   On  completion  of
investigation in all the  cases,  chargesheets  were  submitted  before  the
competent  court  on  the  basis  of  which  the  learned   Chief   Judicial
Magistrate, Patna took  cognizance  of  the  offences  alleged  against  the
appellant.  Aggrieved, the appellant filed revision applications before  the
learned Sessions Judge, Patna challenging the orders passed by  the  learned
Trial Court, primarily, on the ground that  the  said  orders  were  without
jurisdiction and incompetent in law inasmuch as sanction for prosecution  of
the  appellant  under  Section  197  of  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure
(hereinafter for short ‘the Code’) was not obtained or granted prior to  the
date of taking  of  cognizance.  The  revision  applications  filed  by  the
appellant were dismissed by the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Fast
Track Court No.2, Patna by orders of different dates.  The  said  orders  of
the learned Additional Sessions Judge were challenged before the High  Court
of Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 3187/2011, 3190/2011,  3191/2011  and  3192/2011.
The High Court by the common impugned order dated 27.11.2012  negatived  the
challenge made by the appellant leading to the present appeals.    There  is
yet another proceeding instituted by the appellant  before  the  High  Court
i.e. Crl. Misc. No. 41263/2010 in respect of P.S. Case  No.  859/2002  which
has been dismissed by the High Court by its order dated  18.07.2012  on  the
ground that the order taking cognizance by the learned Trial Court  had  not
been specifically challenged before it and it  is  only  the  order  of  the
learned Sessions Judge  that  has  been  assailed  by  the  appellant.   The
aforesaid order dated 18.7.2012 of the High Court has also  been  challenged
by the appellant in the present group of appeals.

3.    We have heard Mr. Santosh Mishra, learned counsel  for  the  appellant
and Mr. Abhinav Mukerji, learned counsel for the State.

4.    As the arguments advanced  on  behalf  of  the  rival  parties  are  a
reiteration of the arguments advanced before the  High  Court  the  detailed
and specific contentions need not be taken note of and it  will  suffice  to
say that while the appellant contends that grant of sanction  under  Section
197 of the Code is a sine qua non  for  his  prosecution  for  the  offences
alleged, according to the State of Bihar  the  appellant  is  not  a  public
servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC and in any case none  of
the offences alleged can be attributed to acts that arise  out  of  or  have
any proximity with the discharge of official duties by the appellant  so  as
to require sanction for his prosecution.

5.    Section 197(1)  of the Code will be required to  be  noticed  at  this
stage and is therefore extracted below.
“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.- (1)  When any  person  who
is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable  from  his
office save by or with the sanction of the  Government  is  accused  of  any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting  to
act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court  shall  take  cognizance
of such offence except with the previous sanction –

(a) in case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was  at  the
time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection  with  the
affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be,  was  at
the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in  connection  with
the affairs of a State, of the State Government :

Provided that  where the alleged offence was committed by a person  referred
to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under  clause
(1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State,  clause  (b)
will apply as if for the expression “State  Government”  occurring  therein,
the expression “Central Government: were substituted].

6.    A reading of the provisions of Section  197(1)  of  the  Code  reveals
that there are three mandatory requirements  under  Section  197(1)  of  the
Code, namely,
(a)   that the accused is a public servant
(b)   that the public servant can be removed from the post by  or  with  the
sanction either of the Central or the State Government, as the case may be
(c)   the act(s) giving rise to the alleged offence had  been  committed  by
the public servant in the actual or  purported  discharge  of  his  official
duties.

7.    Insofar as  the  first  requirement  is  concerned,  the  position  of
officers  belonging  to  the  Indian  Administrative  Service   serving   on
deputation in a cooperative society was decided in S.S. Dhanoa  vs.  MCD[1].
Dealing with clause 12 of Section 21 of the IPC, this Court  had  held  that
the word ‘corporation’ appearing in clause 12(b) of  Section  21  IPC  meant
corporations established by a statute and would have  no  application  to  a
cooperative society.  In the present case, the materials  on  record,  i.e.,
the incorporation of the Bihar State Housing  Cooperative  Federation  under
the provisions of the Bihar Cooperative Societies Act, 1935  would  seem  to
indicate that the said cooperative  federation  is  a  cooperative  society.
The above, however, is a prima facie view  on  the  materials  available  on
record at this stage.  It has been argued on behalf of  the  appellant  that
at the relevant point of time the federation was under supersession  and  it
was being exclusively controlled by the State.  The  above  contention  i.e.
the extent of State control over the management of the  Federation  will  be
required to be established by means of relevant evidence  before  the  legal
effect thereof on the status of the appellant as a  public  servant  can  be
decided.  Possibly it is on account of the said fact that the High Court  in
the impugned order had granted the liberty to the  appellant  to  raise  all
other points as and when they arise and had also required  the  Trial  Court
to decide all such issues, including the requirement  of  sanction,  in  the
light of such subsequent facts that may come on record.

8.    Insofar as the second requirement for  the  applicability  of  Section
197(1) of the Code is concerned,  namely,  whether  the  post  held  by  the
appellant at the relevant time was one from which he could  not  be  removed
except by or with  the  sanction  of  the  State  Government,  no  evidence,
whatsoever, has been led on the said question.  The correct position in  law
with regard to the applicability of the  second  requirement  under  Section
197(1) can, therefore, be answered only at a  subsequent  stage  i.e.  after
evidence on the issue, if any, is forthcoming.

9.    The above discussion will  now  require  the  Court  to  consider  the
question as to whether the acts giving rise  to  the  alleged  offences  had
been committed by the accused in the actual or purported  discharge  of  his
official duties.   In a series of  pronouncements  commencing  with  Satwant
Singh vs. State of Punjab[2]; Harihar  Prasad  vs.  State  of  Bihar[3]  and
Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State  of  Punjab  &  Ors.[4]   it  has  been
consistently held that it can be no part of the duty of a public servant  or
acting in the discharge  of  his  official  duties  to  commit  any  of  the
offences covered by Section 406, 409, 420 etc. and the  official  status  of
the public servant can, at best, only provide an opportunity for  commission
of the offences.  Therefore,  no sanction  for  prosecution  of  the  public
servant for such offences would be required under Section 197 of  the  Code.
Notwithstanding the above,  the  High  Court  had  granted  liberty  to  the
appellant to raise the issue of sanction, if so required, depending  on  the
evidence that may come on record in the course of the  trial.   Despite  the
view taken by this Court in the series of pronouncements referred to  above,
the opportunity that has been provided by the High Court to the  benefit  of
the appellant need not be foreclosed by us inasmuch as in Matajog Dobey  vs.
H.C. Bhari[5], P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim[6] and Prakash  Singh  Badal
(supra) this Court had consistently  held  that  the  question  of  sanction
under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at  any  time  after  cognizance
had been taken and may have to be determined  at  different  stages  of  the
proceeding/trial.  The observations of this Court  in  this  regard  may  be
usefully extracted below.
Matajog Dobey  vs.  H.C. Bhari (para 21)
“The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The  complaint  may
not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported  to
be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming  to
light on a police  or  judicial  inquiry  or  even  in  the  course  of  the
prosecution  evidence  at  the  trial,  may  establish  the  necessity   for
sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may  have  to  be  determined
from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the  course  of  the
progress of the case.”

P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim (para 15)
“It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the  Code
can be raised any time  after  the  cognizance;  may  be  immediately  after
cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion  of  trial
and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases  where  it  may
not  be  possible  to  decide  the  question  effectively   without   giving
opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did  was  in  discharge
of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether  claim  of  the
accused, that the act that he did was in course of the  performance  of  his
duty was reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be  examined
during the  course  of  trial  by  giving  opportunity  to  the  defence  to
establish it. In such an eventuality, the question  of  sanction  should  be
left open to be decided in the main judgment which  may  be  delivered  upon
conclusion of the trial.”


Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [Para 27]

“The question relating to the need of sanction  under  Section  197  of  the
Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is  lodged
and on the allegations contained therein. This question  may  arise  at  any
stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary  or  not
may have to be determined from stage to stage. ...”

10.   In view of the discussions we will  have  no  occasion  to  cause  any
interference with the orders passed by the High  Court  in  the  proceedings
instituted before it by the  appellant  which  have  been  impugned  in  the
appeals under consideration.  Consequently, we dismiss all the  appeals  and
maintain the orders passed by the High Court in all the cases before it.

                       ……..……………........………………………J.
                       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]




                                                ……..……………........………………………J.
                       [RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI,
JULY  7, 2014.

-----------------------
[1]    (1981) 3 SCC 431
[2]    AIR 1960 SC 266
[3]    (1972) 3 SCC 89
[4]    (2007) 1 SCC 1
[5]     AIR 1956 SC 44
[6]    (2001) 6 SCC 704

-----------------------
11


Or.14, rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and Art.10 , 59 ,92 and 96 of Limitation - suit filed against ex trustee for declaration that the settlement deeds dt. 27-3-1978 executed by him infavour of his daughter and grand daughters in respect of Trust Property is null and void - defendant took plea that it is barred by limitation as the suit is filed beyond three years - single judge under preliminary issue dismissed the suit and D.B. bench also confirmed the same - Apex court held that No suit be dismissed on the issue of preliminary issue - when it is a question of law and fact and when suit is not barred by limitation under Art.10 of limitation Act against the trustee or his legal representatives and when it is 12 years from the date of transfer as per Art. 92 - both lower courts committed error and as such allowed the appeal by setting aside the lower court orders = Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Philliar Temple … Appellant Versus M. Sankuntala (D) Tr. Lrs. & Ors. …Respondents = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41772

Or.14, rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and  Art.10 , 59 ,92 and 96 of Limitation - suit filed against ex trustee for declaration that the settlement deeds dt. 27-3-1978 executed by him infavour of his daughter and grand daughters in respect of Trust Property is null and void  - defendant took plea that it is barred by limitation as the suit is filed beyond three years  - single judge under preliminary issue dismissed the suit and D.B. bench also confirmed the same - Apex court held that No suit be dismissed on the issue of preliminary issue -  when it is a question of law and fact and when suit is not barred by limitation under Art.10 of limitation Act against the trustee or his legal representatives and  when  it is 12 years from the date of transfer as per Art. 92  - both lower courts committed error and as such allowed the appeal by setting aside the lower court orders =

plaintiff instituted a suit  for  declaration  seeking  that  the  three
settlement deeds dated 27.3.1978 executed by the former  trustee  in  favour
of his two daughters and a granddaughter as  null  and  void,  and  for  the
relief of recovery of possession of the land to the trust.


The defendant filed  the  written  statement  resisting  the  claim  of  the
plaintiff on many a ground and one of the grounds  was  that  the  suit  was
barred by limitation and, therefore, did not deserve any adjudication.   =

On preliminary Issue - Dismissed the suit        

Accepting the  submission  of  the  defendant,  the  learned
single Judge thought it appropriate  to  take  up  the  issue  No.  1  as  a
preliminary issue.

Before the learned single Judge it was contended by the  defendant  that  in
view of the limitation provided under Articles 56 to 59  of  the  Limitation
Act, the suit was enormously barred by limitation and,  therefore,  deserved
to be  dismissed.   There  was  also  a  reference  to  Article  26  of  the
Limitation Act and the learned single Judge referring  to  the  same  opined
that even under the said Article the suit for  recovery  of  possession  was
also barred by time.  The learned single Judge also referred to  Section  27
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and ruled that the  defendants  or  their  legal
representatives  had  acquired  right,  title  and   interest   by   adverse
possession and,  therefore,  the  suit  was  not  tenable  being  barred  by
limitation.=

Section 10 of the Limitation Act.  It reads as follows: -

“10. Suits against trustees  and  their  representatives  –  Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit  against
a person in whom property has  become  vested  in  trust  for  any  specific
purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being  assigns
for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in  his  or  their
hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or  for  an  account  of  such
property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.



Explanation – For the purpose of this Section any property  comprised  in  a
Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be  deemed
to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose  and  the  manager  of
the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”



He has also drawn our attention to Articles 92  and  96  occurring  in  part
VIII of the Schedule of the Limitation Act.  He has emphasized on  both  the
Articles, namely, Articles 92 and 96.  The said Articles read as under: -

|92       |To recover possession |Twelve   |When the transfer becomes|
|         |of immovable property |years    |known to the plaintiff   |
|         |conveyed or bequeathed|         |                         |
|         |in trust and          |         |                         |
|         |after-wards           |         |                         |
|         |transferred by the    |         |                         |
|         |trustee for a valuable|         |                         |
|         |consideration         |         |                         |
|96       |By the manager of a   |Twelve   |The date of death,       |
|         |Hindu, Muslim or      |years    |resignation or removal of|
|         |Buddhist religious or |         |the transfer or the date |
|         |charitable endow-ment |         |of appointment of the    |
|         |to recover possession |         |plaintiff as manager of  |
|         |of movable or         |         |the endowment, whichever |
|         |immoveable property   |         |is later                 |
|         |comprised in the      |         |                         |
|         |endowment which has   |         |                         |
|         |been transferred by a |         |                         |
|         |previous manager for a|         |                         |
|         |valuable consideration|         |                         |

Article 59 reads as follows: -

|         |Description of suit  |Period of   |Time from which period |
|         |                     |limitation  |begins to run          |
|59       |To cancel or set     |Three years |When the facts         |
|         |aside an instrument  |            |entitling the plaintiff|
|         |or decree or for the |            |to have the instrument |
|         |rescission of a      |            |or decree cancelled or |
|         |contract             |            |set aside or the       |
|         |                     |            |contract rescinded     |
|         |                     |            |first become known to  |
|         |                     |            |him                    |

whether  an  issue  of
limitation could at all have been taken up as a preliminary issue.
 Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that  where  issues  both
of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of  the  opinion
that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of  on  an  issue  of  law
only, it may try  that  issue  first  if  that  issue  relates  to  (a)  the
jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any  law  for
the  time  being  in  force.  The  provisions  of  this  Rule  came  up  for
consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna v.  Brig.  F.J.  Dillon
and it was held as under: (SCR p. 421)

“Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where  issues  both  of  law
and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is  of  opinion  that  the
case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of  law  only,  it
shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if  it  thinks  fit,
postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of  law
have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart  from  the
issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the  court  the
whole suit may be disposed of on the issues  of  law  alone,  but  the  Code
confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of  law
and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should  be
tried by the court; not to do so, especially when  the  decision  on  issues
even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would  result  in  a
lopsided trial of the suit.”

Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule  2
CPC  by  the  amending  Act,  1976  but  the  principle  enunciated  in  the
abovequoted decision still holds good and there can  be  no  departure  from
the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try  a
suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue  and  where  the
decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot  be  tried
as a preliminary issue.”


In the case at hand, we find that unless there is determination of the  fact
which would not protect the plaintiff under Section  10  of  the  Limitation
Act the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation.  It is  not  a
case which will come within the ambit and sweep of Order 14,  Rule  2  which
would enable the court to frame a preliminary issue to  adjudicate  thereof.
The learned single Judge, as it appears, has remained totally  oblivious  of
the said facet and adjudicated the issue as if  it  falls  under  Order  14,
Rule 2.  We repeat that on the scheme of Section 10 of  the  Limitation  Act
we find certain facts are to be  established  to  throw  the  lis  from  the
sphere of the said provision so that it would come  within  the  concept  of
limitation.   The  Division  Bench  has  fallen  into  some  error   without
appreciating the facts in proper  perspective.   That  apart,  the  Division
Bench, by taking recourse of Articles 92  to  96  without  appreciating  the
factum that it uses the words “transferred by the  trustee  for  a  valuable
consideration” in that event the limitation would be  twelve  years  but  in
the instant case the asseveration of the plaintiff is that the  trustee  had
created three settlement  deeds  in  favour  of  his  two  daughters  and  a
granddaughter.  The issue  of  consideration  has  not  yet  emerged.   This
settlement made by the father was whether for consideration or  not  has  to
be gone into and similarly whether the property  belongs  to  the  trust  as
trust is understood within the meaning of Sectin10  of  the  Limitation  Act
has also to be gone into.  Ergo, there can be no shadow of  doubt  that  the
issue No. 1 that was framed by the learned single Judge was  an  issue  that
pertained to fact and law and hence, could not have been  adjudicated  as  a
preliminary issue.  Therefore, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable.



We have not expressed any opinion with regard to  the  issue  of  limitation
except saying that the present issue could not  have  been  taken  up  as  a
preliminary issue.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41772

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5954    2014
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 33200 of 2014)

Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Philliar Temple          … Appellant

                                   Versus

M. Sankuntala (D) Tr. Lrs. & Ors.            …Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra


Leave granted.


In this appeal by  special  leave  the  plaintiff-appellant  has  called  in
question the legal sustainability of the judgment and order  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in OSA No.  229  of
2006 whereby it has affirmed the judgment dated  24.07.2003  passed  by  the
learned single Judge in S.C. No. 673 of 1997 whereunder  he,  after  framing
of issues on the basis of prayer being made  by  the  defendant,  has  dealt
with the issue No. 1 as a preliminary issue and dismissed the suit.

The factual expose’ which arise for disposal of the present appeal are  that
the plaintiff instituted a suit  for  declaration  seeking  that  the  three
settlement deeds dated 27.3.1978 executed by the former  trustee  in  favour
of his two daughters and a granddaughter as  null  and  void,  and  for  the
relief of recovery of possession of the land to the trust.


The defendant filed  the  written  statement  resisting  the  claim  of  the
plaintiff on many a ground and one of the grounds  was  that  the  suit  was
barred by limitation and, therefore, did not deserve any adjudication.


The learned single Judge framed the following issues for consideration: -



“(1)  Whether the suit for declaration that the three settlement deeds,  all
dated 27.3.1978 and registered as Document Nos. 248, 249  and  443  of  1978
with the Sub Registrar’s Office,  Royapuram,  is  barred  by  limitation  of
time?



(2)   Whether the suit properties had ever been in  the  possession  of  Sri
B.S. Ramalingam in his individual capacity?


(3)   Whether there  existed  a  hereditary  trust  in  the  name  of  Satti
Paradesi Samadhi and Pillayar Temple Trust?

(4)   Whether the plaintiff owns the schedule properties?

(5)   Whether the defendants are the owners of the Schedule  Properties  and
in possession and occupation from the date of settlement in the year 1978?

(6)   Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits?

(7)   To what relief the parties are entitled?”


The plaint presented by the plaintiff showed that the suit  for  declaration
of the settlement  deeds  by  the  defendant  in  favour  of  daughters  and
granddaughter which were executed was done 19 years earlier,  the  defendant
made a submission before the learned single Judge that the suit  was  barred
by limitation.  Accepting the  submission  of  the  defendant,  the  learned
single Judge thought it appropriate  to  take  up  the  issue  No.  1  as  a
preliminary issue.

Before the learned single Judge it was contended by the  defendant  that  in
view of the limitation provided under Articles 56 to 59  of  the  Limitation
Act, the suit was enormously barred by limitation and,  therefore,  deserved
to be  dismissed.   There  was  also  a  reference  to  Article  26  of  the
Limitation Act and the learned single Judge referring  to  the  same  opined
that even under the said Article the suit for  recovery  of  possession  was
also barred by time.  The learned single Judge also referred to  Section  27
of the Limitation Act, 1963 and ruled that the  defendants  or  their  legal
representatives  had  acquired  right,  title  and   interest   by   adverse
possession and,  therefore,  the  suit  was  not  tenable  being  barred  by
limitation.



On an appeal being preferred against the  aforesaid  judgment  the  Division
Bench took note of Articles 92 and 96 and came to hold as follows: -

“22.  Taking the property as a trust property, under Article  92,  the  suit
for recovery of possession of immovable property conveyed or  bequeathed  in
the Trust out to have been filed within twelve  years  from  the  time  when
transfer becomes known to the plaintiff.  Under Article  92,  the  plaintiff
should  have  filed  the  suit  within  twelve  years  from  1978  when  the
settlement became known to the plaintiff.


23.   In the  plaint,  at  paragraph  No.  4,  the  appellant/plaintiff  has
clearly alleged that immediately after the death of settler, on  24.12.1978,
the settlement were questioned by  the  appellant  and  the  mother  of  the
appellant and the defendants  –  Vijaya  Saradambal,  who  was  the  earlier
trustee,  promised  to  settle  the  disputes   recovering   the   scheduled
properties to the plaintiff trust; but only the  defendants  influenced  her
and did not deliver the schedule properties to the plaintiff.  By a  reading
of plaint averments, it is clear that the  plaintiff  had  known  about  the
settlement deeds even in 1978.  Having known  about  the  settlement  deeds,
way back in 1978, the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit  to  set  aside
the settlement deeds within twelve years from the  date  of  his  knowledge.
When plaintiff had chosen to file the  suit  only  in  the  year  1977,  the
learned single Judge rightly held that the suit is barred by limitation.



24.   The only grievance of the appellant is that after framing the  issues,
the learned single Judge had taken up   the  question  of  limitation  as  a
preliminary issue and question of limitation is a mixed question of law  and
facts and  the  appellant  ought  to  have  been  given  an  opportunity  to
establish  that  the  suit  property  is  a  trust  property  and  also  the
circumstances under which the plaintiff could not bring the suit within  the
stipulated time and also to show as to how  the  suit  is  well  within  the
time.”



      Being of this view, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal.



We have heard Mr.  R.  Basant  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant and Mr. Himanshu Munshi, learned counsel for the respondent.



Mr. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing for the  appellant,  has  drawn
our attention to Section 10 of the Limitation Act.  It reads as follows: -

“10. Suits against trustees  and  their  representatives  –  Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit  against
a person in whom property has  become  vested  in  trust  for  any  specific
purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being  assigns
for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in  his  or  their
hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or  for  an  account  of  such
property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.



Explanation – For the purpose of this Section any property  comprised  in  a
Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be  deemed
to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose  and  the  manager  of
the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”



He has also drawn our attention to Articles 92  and  96  occurring  in  part
VIII of the Schedule of the Limitation Act.  He has emphasized on  both  the
Articles, namely, Articles 92 and 96.  The said Articles read as under: -

|92       |To recover possession |Twelve   |When the transfer becomes|
|         |of immovable property |years    |known to the plaintiff   |
|         |conveyed or bequeathed|         |                         |
|         |in trust and          |         |                         |
|         |after-wards           |         |                         |
|         |transferred by the    |         |                         |
|         |trustee for a valuable|         |                         |
|         |consideration         |         |                         |
|96       |By the manager of a   |Twelve   |The date of death,       |
|         |Hindu, Muslim or      |years    |resignation or removal of|
|         |Buddhist religious or |         |the transfer or the date |
|         |charitable endow-ment |         |of appointment of the    |
|         |to recover possession |         |plaintiff as manager of  |
|         |of movable or         |         |the endowment, whichever |
|         |immoveable property   |         |is later                 |
|         |comprised in the      |         |                         |
|         |endowment which has   |         |                         |
|         |been transferred by a |         |                         |
|         |previous manager for a|         |                         |
|         |valuable consideration|         |                         |


Learned senior counsel has emphatically put forth that  the  learned  single
Judge as well as the Division Bench has  committed  grave  error  by  taking
recourse to the principle of acquisition of knowledge by the  plaintiff  and
other aspects.  It is absolutely limpid that  if  there  is  a  transfer  by
previous manager for a valuable consideration then only  the  limitation  of
twelve years or any other article would come  into  the  play.   As  far  as
Article 59 is concerned, it is urged by him that the  said  Article  is  not
applicable to the present case.  Article 59 reads as follows: -

|         |Description of suit  |Period of   |Time from which period |
|         |                     |limitation  |begins to run          |
|59       |To cancel or set     |Three years |When the facts         |
|         |aside an instrument  |            |entitling the plaintiff|
|         |or decree or for the |            |to have the instrument |
|         |rescission of a      |            |or decree cancelled or |
|         |contract             |            |set aside or the       |
|         |                     |            |contract rescinded     |
|         |                     |            |first become known to  |
|         |                     |            |him                    |


The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the  plaintiff  is
not a trust as understood  within  the  parameters  of  Section  10  of  the
Limitation Act and, therefore, the learned single Judge has  rightly  opined
that Article 59 would be applicable.  The learned  counsel  further  submits
that assuming Article 59 is not attracted and any  other  Article  contained
in Chapter VIII would be applicable and suit would be barred  by  limitation
inasmuch as it was filed after nineteen years.



The core question that emerges for consideration  is  whether  an  issue  of
limitation could at all have been taken up as a preliminary issue.


In Ramrameshwari Devi and  others  v.  Nirmala  Devi  and  others[1],  while
dealing with Order 14, Rule 2,  observed  that  sub-rule  (2)  of  Order  14
refers to the discretion given to the court  where  the  court  may  try  an
issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court  or  the  bar  to  the  suit
created by any law for the time being in force as a preliminary issue.



The controversy pertaining to the provisions contained in Order  14  Rule  2
had come up for consideration before this Court  in  Major  S.S.  Khanna  v.
Brig. F.J. Dillon[2] wherein it has been ruled thus: -

“Under O 14, r 2 where issues both of law and of  fact  arise  in  the  same
suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof  may  be
disposed of on the issue of law only, it shall try those issues  first,  and
for that purpose may, if it thinks  fit,  postpone  the  settlement  of  the
issues of fact until after the issues of  law  have  been  determined.   The
jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from  the  issues  of  fact  may  be
exercised only where in the opinion of the  Court  the  whole  suit  may  be
disposed  of  on  the  issues  of  law  alone,  but  the  Code  confers   no
jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of  law  and  fact
as preliminary issues.  Normally all issues in a suit  should  be  tried  by
the Court: not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of  law
depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would  result  in  a  lop-sided
trial of the suit.”



Be it stated, the aforesaid pronouncement was made before the  amendment  of
the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976.



In Ramesh D. Desai and others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta  and  others[3],  while
dealing with the issue of limitation,  the  Court  opined  that  a  plea  of
limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law  divorced  from
facts as  in  every  case  the  starting  point  of  limitation  has  to  be
ascertained which is  entirely  a  question  of  fact.   The  Court  further
proceeded to state that a plea of limitation is a  mixed  question  of  fact
and law.  On a plain consideration of the language employed in sub-rule  (2)
of Order 14 it can be stated with certitude that when an issue  requires  an
inquiry into facts it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.  In  the  said
judgment the Court opined as follows: -
“13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that  where  issues  both
of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of  the  opinion
that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of  on  an  issue  of  law
only, it may try  that  issue  first  if  that  issue  relates  to  (a)  the
jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any  law  for
the  time  being  in  force.  The  provisions  of  this  Rule  came  up  for
consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna v.  Brig.  F.J.  Dillon
and it was held as under: (SCR p. 421)

“Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where  issues  both  of  law
and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is  of  opinion  that  the
case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of  law  only,  it
shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if  it  thinks  fit,
postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of  law
have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart  from  the
issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the  court  the
whole suit may be disposed of on the issues  of  law  alone,  but  the  Code
confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of  law
and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should  be
tried by the court; not to do so, especially when  the  decision  on  issues
even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would  result  in  a
lopsided trial of the suit.”

Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule  2
CPC  by  the  amending  Act,  1976  but  the  principle  enunciated  in  the
abovequoted decision still holds good and there can  be  no  departure  from
the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try  a
suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue  and  where  the
decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot  be  tried
as a preliminary issue.”


In the case at hand, we find that unless there is determination of the  fact
which would not protect the plaintiff under Section  10  of  the  Limitation
Act the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation.  It is  not  a
case which will come within the ambit and sweep of Order 14,  Rule  2  which
would enable the court to frame a preliminary issue to  adjudicate  thereof.
The learned single Judge, as it appears, has remained totally  oblivious  of
the said facet and adjudicated the issue as if  it  falls  under  Order  14,
Rule 2.  We repeat that on the scheme of Section 10 of  the  Limitation  Act
we find certain facts are to be  established  to  throw  the  lis  from  the
sphere of the said provision so that it would come  within  the  concept  of
limitation.   The  Division  Bench  has  fallen  into  some  error   without
appreciating the facts in proper  perspective.   That  apart,  the  Division
Bench, by taking recourse of Articles 92  to  96  without  appreciating  the
factum that it uses the words “transferred by the  trustee  for  a  valuable
consideration” in that event the limitation would be  twelve  years  but  in
the instant case the asseveration of the plaintiff is that the  trustee  had
created three settlement  deeds  in  favour  of  his  two  daughters  and  a
granddaughter.  The issue  of  consideration  has  not  yet  emerged.   This
settlement made by the father was whether for consideration or  not  has  to
be gone into and similarly whether the property  belongs  to  the  trust  as
trust is understood within the meaning of Sectin10  of  the  Limitation  Act
has also to be gone into.  Ergo, there can be no shadow of  doubt  that  the
issue No. 1 that was framed by the learned single Judge was  an  issue  that
pertained to fact and law and hence, could not have been  adjudicated  as  a
preliminary issue.  Therefore, the impugned order is wholly unsustainable.



We have not expressed any opinion with regard to  the  issue  of  limitation
except saying that the present issue could not  have  been  taken  up  as  a
preliminary issue.  As the suit is pending since 1997 we would  request  the
learned single Judge of the High Court of Madras to dispose of the  suit  as
expeditiously as possible.





Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments are set  aside
without any order as to costs.



                                                                ……………………….J.

                                                               [Dipak Misra]



                                                                ……………………….J.

                                                           [V. Gopala Gowda]

New Delhi;

July 03, 2014.

-----------------------
[1]



       (2011) 8 SCC 249
[2]    AIR 1964 SC 497 : (1964) 4 SCR 409
[3]    (2006) 5 SCC 638