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Friday, July 25, 2014

L.A.Act - Sec.28, 23 ( 1A) - the provisions of Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act are mandatory and the claimants-appellants are entitled to 12% enhanced compensation for the period commencing from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The High Court also failed to appreciate that the appellants are entitled to interest @ 15% per annum as contemplated under proviso to Section 28 of the L.A. Act as the compensation was paid after the expiry of period of one year. = JAI KRISHAN (D) Thr. LRs. … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 - July. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41721

       L.A.Act - Sec.28, 23 ( 1A) - the provisions of Section  23(1A) of the L.A. Act are mandatory and the claimants-appellants are  entitled  to 12% enhanced compensation  for  the  period  commencing  from  the  date  of publication of Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The High  Court also failed to appreciate that the appellants are  entitled  to  interest  @ 15% per annum as contemplated under proviso to Section 28 of  the  L.A.  Act as the compensation was paid after the expiry of period of one year. =

The Reference Court awarded enhanced compensation but such amount  was
deposited in the Court after the date of expiry of period of  one  year.  In
the circumstances,  we  hold  that  the  appellants  are  also  entitled  to
interest @ 15% per annum under proviso to Section 28 of the L.A. Act.
18.   The High Court failed to notice that the provisions of Section  23(1A)
of the L.A. Act are mandatory and the claimants-appellants are  entitled  to
12% enhanced compensation  for  the  period  commencing  from  the  date  of
publication of Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The High  Court
also failed to appreciate that the appellants are  entitled  to  interest  @
15% per annum as contemplated under proviso to Section 28 of  the  L.A.  Act
as the compensation was paid after the expiry of period of one year.
19.   The High Court instead of dismissing  the  review  petition  ought  to
have condoned the delay, reason  of  which  was  sufficiently  explained  by
appellant and ought to have allowed the revision application  in  favour  of
the appellant.
20. In view of the findings recorded above, we set aside  the  part  of  the
impugned judgment dated 16th July, 2005 so far as it relates to  payment  of
compensation for the land, uphold the award passed by  the  Reference  Court
to the extent  above  and  direct  the  respondents  to  pay  12%   enhanced
compensation in terms of Section 23(1A) and another 15%  interest  in  terms
of proviso to Section 28 of the L.A.  Act  as  ordered  above  within  three
months..
21.    The  appeals  are  allowed  with  the  aforesaid   observations   and
directions.  There shall be no order as to costs.
2014 - July. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41721

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOs.            OF 2014
                   (@ out of SLP (C) Nos.36299-36303/2010)


JAI KRISHAN (D) Thr. LRs.                     … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS.                  … RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J


      Leave granted.

2.    These appeals are directed against the judgment and order  dated  16th
July, 2005 passed by the High Court  of  Uttaranchal  (now  Uttarakhand)  at
Nainital in first Appeal No. 56 of 2001 (Old No.325/1995). By  the  impugned
judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court  partly  allowed  the  appeal
preferred by the State of U.P., set aside part of  the  judgment  and  award
dated 23rd March, 1995 passed by the Reference Court.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894  was
issued on 14th September, 1977 for the purpose of acquiring  land  measuring
36 acres situated at Glenmire Estate, cosycot  and  cosynook  in  Mussoorie.
The acquisition was so made for the purpose  of  extension  of  Lal  Bahadur
Shastri National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie.    Thereafter  follow
up Notification under Section 6 of the L.A.Act was issued on  30th  January,
1978 which was also published. The possession of the land was taken over  on
3rd July, 1986. The Special Land  Acquisition  Officer,  after  hearing  the
parties passed the award on 27th November, 1984 determining  the  amount  of
compensation at Rs.4,89,615.75.
4.    Col. Jai Krishan (since deceased) represented by Lrs.
(appellant  herein)   and  Mahesh  Chandra-  respondent  no.8,   got   filed
reference  under Section 18  of  the  L.A.  Act.   The  said  reference  No.
L.A.154 of 1985 heard  by  the  Additional  District  Judge,  Dehradun.  The
aforesaid claimants alleged before the Reference Court that considering  the
fact that Mussoorie is a famous  tourist  place,  its  land  is  of  immense
potential value, the market value of the land in question is Rs.25 lakh  per
acre. As such they claimed compensation for 36 acres of acquired land.  They
further claimed that  the  value  of  the  constructed  building  cannot  be
assessed less than Rs. 100/- per sq. feet and,  therefore,  considering  the
plinth area of 3786 sq. feet of Glenmire building, 2528 sq. ft. of  Cosynook
building and other construction, the valuation should be  Rs.6,31,400/-  and
after deducting the amount on account of depreciation factor  the  value  of
building is Rs. 4,73,550/-.  There were  6990  trees  on  the  aforesaid  36
acres of land. The claimants also submitted before the reference court  that
considering the fact that value of the  trees  which  has  been  assessed  @
Rs.15/- per tree, should have been at least Rs.50/- per tree. In reply,  the
stand of the State of U.P. was  that  the  claimants  have  already  claimed
Rs.7,50,000/- as compensation for the acquired land and  as  such  they  are
not entitled to claim any amount more than  that.  It  was  further  pleaded
that the land being sloppy and uneven as such it  cannot  be  assessed  more
than Rs.5,000/- per acre. The respondents based their claim on the basis  of
the rate shown in exemplar sale deed dated 26th December, 1976.
5.    The Reference  Court  after  framing  necessary  issues,  taking  into
consideration the evidence and hearing the parties enhanced  the  amount  of
compensation of land from Rs.1,80,000/- to Rs.19,76,000/- and that of  trees
from Rs.1,05,155.50 to Rs.4,00,000/-. Aggrieved by the order passed  by  the
Reference Court the State and Union of India preferred the appeal.
6.    The Division Bench of Uttarakhand High Court by the impugned  judgment
dated 16th July, 2005 applied the principle of  Belting  area  on  following
presumption:
 “No doubt that Mussoorie is an important tourist place and its land  is  of
immense potential value but simultaneously it is also true that the land  in
Mussoorie is sloppy and hilly.  As such for assessing a  true  market  value
that flat rate, for entire land of 36 acres, cannot be applied.”

7.    The claimants also claimed 12% additional compensation u/s  23(1A)  of
the L.A. Act, which the Court below had  not  granted.  The  claimants  also
claimed that they were entitled to receive a sum of Rs.  7,01,875/-  towards
Fuel value/Timber value of  the  tree  standing  on  the  acquired  land  as
approved  by  the  retired  Forest  Ranger.  They  also  pleaded  that   the
compensation having been paid after more than one  year  from  the  date  on
which possession was taken, they are entitled for interest @ 15%  per  annum
as provided under proviso to Section 28 of the L.A.  Act.   Such  claim  was
made by the appellant and another by means  of  cross-objections.   However,
the High Court without deliberating on such issues as raised  in  the  cross
objections  passed  the  impugned  judgment.   In  the  circumstances,   the
appellant and another preferred Review Petition No. 87 of  2005  before  the
High Court with a petition for condonation of delay.
8.    The impugned judgment was delivered on 16th July, 2005  and  a  review
petition was filed on 15th September, 2005 i.e. after 30  days  delay.   The
appellant and another took specific plea that  their  lawyer  used  to  come
from Allahabad to Nainital  who  when  came  to  know  about  the  judgment,
applied for the  certified  copy  of  it  on  4th  August,  2005  which  was
delivered on 9th August, 2005. Thereafter sometime was  taken  to  file  the
review petition. The High Court dismissed the petition  for  condonation  of
delay and review petition on the ground of non-prosecution. The  restoration
petition filed by the appellant was also dismissed.
9.    Learned counsel for the  appellants  submitted  that  the  High  Court
wrongly applied the principle of belting area.    The 36 acres  of  land  is
adjacent to the Lal Bahadur  Shastri  National  Academy  of  Administration.
Mussoorie and is located at tourist spot.  He  further  contended  that  the
appellants were entitled for  12%  additional  compensation  u/s  23(1A)  in
addition 15% solatium u/s 28 of the L.A.Act in view of  delayed  payment  of
compensation after more than one year. The stand of the learned counsel  for
the respondent-State is that the High Court rightly  applied  the  principle
of belting area as the land is sloppy and  uneven.
10.   As noticed  above,  the  High  Court  noticed  that  Mussoorie  is  an
important tourist place and it is the land of immense potential  value.  But
without any basis or pleadings, the High Court presumed that total  land  in
Mussoorie is sloppy and hilly.  The High Court though noticed  the  exemplar
sale-deed dated 31.3.1977 (paper no. 17-C) which shows the market  value  of
the land at Rs. 54,896/- per acre and the said  sale-deed  pertains  to  the
land nearer to the Lal Bahadur Sastri National  Academy.   But  without  any
basis, the High Court observed as under:
 “We are of the view that the rate mentioned in  this  sale-deed  cannot  be
applied as exemplar for entire land acquired. Value of the  land  cannot  be
said to be same for all the 36 acres acquired as part of the land  would  be
nearer to it and part of it would be a far.”

      The aforesaid observation made by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court is not based on any evidence but  on  presumption  and  surmises.   It
cannot be a ground that the Mussoorie is a hilly  place  and  therefore  the
principle of Belting area is to be applied.  It was  not  the  case  of  the
State of U.P. that in all land  acquisition  proceedings  in  Mussoorie  the
principle  of  Belting  area  is  applied.  In  this  background   on   mere
presumption it was not open to the High Court to apply principle of  belting
area for determination of compensation.  The High Court  has  also  accepted
that the market value of the land in question is Rs. 54,896/-  per  acre  as
decided by the Reference Court; therefore in absence of any pleading on  the
part of State of U.P. it was not open  for  the  High  Court  to  apply  the
principle of belting area.
11.   It has not been disputed that the site of new  town  of  the  acquired
land is almost at the same elevation as Mussoorie as it has  been  developed
as a Hill resort and has immense potential value. It is adjacent to the  Lal
Bahadur  Shastri  National  Academy,  which  is  the  beneficiary  of   such
acquisition.
12.   For the reason aforesaid, the part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated
16th July, 2005 passed by the High Court in so for  as  it  relates  to  the
valuation of land is set aside and the award passed by the Revisional  Court
under Section 18 is upheld.
13.   The provisions of Section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act mandate as follows:
“23  Matters  to  be  considered  in  determining  compensation.  —   (1) In
determining the amount of compensation  to  be  awarded  for  land  acquired
under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration

first, the market value of the land  at  the  date  of  the  publication  of
the notification under section 4, sub-section (1);

secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by  reason  of  the
taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at  the  time
of the Collector's taking possession thereof;

thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the  person  interested,  at  the
time of the  Collector's  taking  possession  of  the  land,  by  reason  of
severing such land from his other land;

fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person  interested,  at  the
time of the Collector's taking possession of the  land,  by  reason  of  the
acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or  immovable,
in any other manner, or his earnings;

fifthly,  if,  in  consequence  of  the  acquisition  of  the  land  by  the
Collector, the person interested is compelled to  change  his  residence  or
place of business, the reasonable  expenses  (if  any)  incidental  to  such
change; and

sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide  resulting  from  diminution  of  the
profits of the land between the time of the publication of  the  declaration
under section 6 and the time of the Collector's  taking  possession  of  the
land.

[(1A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as  above  provided,  the
Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate  of  twelve
per cent per annum on such market value for the  period  commencing  on  and
from the date of the publication of the notification under Section  4,  sub-
Section (1), in respect of such land to the date of award to  the  Collector
or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.”

Explanation- In computing the period referred to in  this  sub-section,  any
period or periods during which the proceedings for the  acquisition  of  the
land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order  of  any
Court shall be excluded.]”

14.   In Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of India, (2006)  8  SCC  457  this  Court
noticed the  claim  which  envisages  award  of  compensation  at  different
stages. In all the stages, it is necessary to take note  of  the  provisions
of Sections 23(1) and 23(1-A). In Gurpreet Singh (supra) this Court held  as
under:
“32. In the scheme of the Act, it is seen that the award of compensation  is
at different stages. The first  stage  occurs  when  the  award  is  passed.
Obviously, the award takes  in  all  the  amounts  contemplated  by  Section
23(1), Section 23(1-A), Section  23(2)  and  the  interest  contemplated  by
Section 34 of the Act. The whole of that amount is paid or deposited by  the
Collector in [pic]terms of  Section  31  of  the  Act.  At  this  stage,  no
shortfall in deposit is contemplated, since the  Collector  has  to  pay  or
deposit the amount awarded by him. If a shortfall is  pointed  out,  it  may
have to be made up at that stage and  the  principle  of  appropriation  may
apply, though it is difficult to  contemplate  a  partial  deposit  at  that
stage. On the deposit by the Collector under Section  31  of  the  Act,  the
first stage comes to an end subject to the right of the claimant  to  notice
of the deposit and withdrawal or acceptance of the amount  with  or  without
protest.
33. The second stage occurs on a reference under  Section  18  of  the  Act.
When the Reference Court awards enhanced compensation,  it  has  necessarily
to take note of the enhanced amounts payable under  Section  23(1),  Section
23(1-A), Section 23(2) and interest on the enhanced amount  as  provided  in
Section 28 of the Act and costs in terms of Section 27.  The  Collector  has
the duty to deposit  these  amounts  pursuant  to  the  deemed  decree  thus
passed. This has nothing to do with the earlier deposit made or to  be  made
under and after  the  award.  If  the  deposit  made,  falls  short  of  the
enhancement decreed, there can arise the question of appropriation  at  that
stage, in relation to the amount enhanced on the reference.”

      In view of the decision in Gurpreet Singh(Supra),  we  hold  that  the
claimants are entitled  to  additional  compensation  @  12%  per  annum  as
provided u/s 23(1A) of the L.A. Act.
15.   Section 28 of the L.A. Act  deals  with  interest  payable  on  excess
compensation which reads as under:
 “28. Collector may be directed to pay  interest  on  excess  compensation.-
—If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to  have
awarded as compensation is in excess of the  sum  which  the  Collector  did
award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the  Collector
shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 67 [nine  per  centum]  per
annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the  date  of
payment of such excess into Court:

[Provided that the award of the  Court  may  also  direct  that  where  such
excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of  a
period of one year from the date on which possession is taken,  interest  at
the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the  date  of
expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess  or  part
thereof which has  not  been  paid  into  Court  before  the  date  of  such
expiry.].”

16.   In Sunder vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 this  Court  held  that
the interested persons are also interested on amount of solatium. The  Court
further observed as under:
“15. When the court is  of  the  opinion  that  the  Collector  should  have
awarded a larger sum as compensation the court has to direct  the  Collector
to pay interest on such excess amount. The rate of  interest  is  on  a  par
with the rate indicated in Section 34. This is so provided in Section 28  of
the Act. x x x x x x”

      In Gurpreet Singh (supra) the reasons in this regard was explained  as
under:

“54. One other question also was sought to be raised and  answered  by  this
Bench though not referred to it. Considering that  the  question  arises  in
various cases pending in courts all  over  the  country,  we  permitted  the
counsel to address us on that question. That  question  is  whether  in  the
light of the decision in Sunder(supra) the  awardee/decree-holder  would  be
entitled to claim interest  on  solatium  in  execution  though  it  is  not
specifically granted by the decree. It is well  settled  that  an  execution
court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest  on
solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either  expressly  or
by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of  the  Reference  Court
or of the appellate court, the execution  court  will  have  necessarily  to
reject the claim for interest on solatium  based  on  Sunder(Supra)  on  the
ground that the execution court cannot go behind  the  decree.  But  if  the
award of the Reference Court  or  that  of  the  appellate  court  does  not
specifically refer to the question of  interest  on  solatium  or  in  cases
where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly  by
the  Reference  Court  or  the  appellate  court,  and  merely  interest  on
compensation is awarded, then it would be open to  the  execution  court  to
apply the ratio of Sunder(supra)  and  say  that  the  compensation  awarded
includes solatium and in such an event  interest  on  the  amount  could  be
directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify  that
such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and  not
in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit  its
recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder (Supra)(19-9-2001) and  not
for any prior period.  We  also  clarify  that  this  will  not  entail  any
reappropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder.  This  we  have
indicated by way of clarification  also  in  exercise  of  our  power  under
Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of  India  with  a  view  to  avoid
multiplicity of litigation on this question.”

      The aforesaid principle has  also  been  followed  by  this  Court  in
Chhanga Singh and Another vs. Union of India and Another (2012) 5 SCC 763.
17.   The Reference Court awarded enhanced compensation but such amount  was
deposited in the Court after the date of expiry of period of  one  year.  In
the circumstances,  we  hold  that  the  appellants  are  also  entitled  to
interest @ 15% per annum under proviso to Section 28 of the L.A. Act.
18.   The High Court failed to notice that the provisions of Section  23(1A)
of the L.A. Act are mandatory and the claimants-appellants are  entitled  to
12% enhanced compensation  for  the  period  commencing  from  the  date  of
publication of Notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act. The High  Court
also failed to appreciate that the appellants are  entitled  to  interest  @
15% per annum as contemplated under proviso to Section 28 of  the  L.A.  Act
as the compensation was paid after the expiry of period of one year.
19.   The High Court instead of dismissing  the  review  petition  ought  to
have condoned the delay, reason  of  which  was  sufficiently  explained  by
appellant and ought to have allowed the revision application  in  favour  of
the appellant.
20. In view of the findings recorded above, we set aside  the  part  of  the
impugned judgment dated 16th July, 2005 so far as it relates to  payment  of
compensation for the land, uphold the award passed by  the  Reference  Court
to the extent  above  and  direct  the  respondents  to  pay  12%   enhanced
compensation in terms of Section 23(1A) and another 15%  interest  in  terms
of proviso to Section 28 of the L.A.  Act  as  ordered  above  within  three
months..
21.    The  appeals  are  allowed  with  the  aforesaid   observations   and
directions.  There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                (DIPAK MISRA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.

ITEM NO.1G               COURT NO.6                 SECTION X

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s). …............/2014

(@SLP (C) No 36299-36303/2010



JAI KRISHAN(D) TR.LRS.                             Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS.                        Respondent(s)





Date : 01/07/2014       These  appeals  were  called  on  for  pronouncement
            of Judgment today.



For Appellant(s)       Mr. Mohit D. Ram ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)            Mrs. Anil Katiyar ,Adv.

                         Mr. Saurabh Trivedi ,Adv.

                         Mr. Rahul Narayan ,Adv.





       Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]


Service matter - Regularization of Unpaid revenue clerks - candidates who were engaged to work on payment of fees were popularly known as “unpaid candidates’- kept in the waiting list, were called upon to work on payment of nominal fees under the control of different departments like revenue Department, Settlement Commissioner, Land Records Department, city survey office, etc. -The Tribunal by its judgment dated 20th December, 1992 allowed the application directing the respondents to absorb unpaid candidates, who had put in more than ten years of service as such, by giving preference and by relaxation of age, if they otherwise fulfill other eligibility criteria. - challenged in appeal - Meanwhile, services of certain unpaid candidates were terminated by the respondents. The appellant’s service was also terminated by order dated 20th April, 1998.- Appeal allowed - set aside their respective orders of termination with direction to the respondents to take action for regularisation of services of all the applicants including the appellant herein in accordance with GR dated 10th March, 2005. It was directed to pass appropriate orders within three months - Division Bench set aside the orders - Apex court held that The respondents are directed to comply with the order and directions passed by the Tribunal on 24th November, 2011 in OA No. 293/1998 and regularize the services of the appellant with retrospective effect within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid direction and observation. No costs.= SANDHYA … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 - July. part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41720

Service matter - Regularization of Unpaid revenue clerks - candidates who  were
engaged to  work  on  payment  of  fees  were  popularly  known  as  “unpaid candidates’- kept in the waiting  list,   were called upon to work on  payment  of  nominal  fees   under  the  control  of
different departments  like  revenue  Department,  Settlement  Commissioner,
Land Records Department, city survey office, etc. -The Tribunal by its judgment dated 20th  December,  1992  allowed the application directing  the respondents to absorb unpaid candidates,  who had put in more than ten years of service as such, by giving preference  and
by relaxation of age, if they otherwise fulfill other eligibility criteria. - challenged in appeal - Meanwhile, services of certain unpaid candidates  were  terminated  by the respondents.  The appellant’s  service  was  also  terminated  by  order dated 20th April, 1998.- Appeal allowed - set  aside their respective orders of termination with direction to the respondents  to take action for regularisation of services  of all the applicants  including the appellant herein in accordance with GR dated 10th March,  2005.  It  was directed to pass appropriate orders within three months - Division Bench set aside the orders - Apex court held that The respondents are directed to comply  with the order and directions passed by the Tribunal on 24th  November,  2011  in OA  No.  293/1998  and  regularize  the  services  of  the  appellant   with retrospective effect within two months from the date of receipt of  copy  of this judgment. The appeal  is  allowed  with  the  aforesaid  direction  and observation. No costs.=

The Government of Maharashtra vide GR dated  30th  June,  1961  framed
recruitment  rules  of  revenue   clerks   from   amongst   persons   having
qualification S.S.C. and within the age limit of 23  years  (relaxable  upto
26 years for reserved category candidates). Selected candidates were  to  be
appointed in their office to work against clerical post.   Those  who  could
not be adjusted against the post  but were kept in the waiting  list,   were
called upon to work on  payment  of  nominal  fees   under  the  control  of
different departments  like  revenue  Department,  Settlement  Commissioner,
Land Records Department, city survey office, etc. Those candidates who  were
engaged to  work  on  payment  of  fees  were  popularly  known  as  “unpaid
candidates’.
Their  payments  are  being  made  out  of  copying  fees  received  by  the
department, 70% of which was  for  payment  of  wages  to  the  said  unpaid
candidates and 30% share was credited to the Government.
4.    The applications were called for appointment to  Clerical  posts.  The
appellant and others were  declared  successful.   Those  whose  names  were
appearing in the main selection list were  appointed  against  the  Clerical
post. Rest in the waiting list were allowed to work  as  unpaid  candidates.
Since 4th July, 1985, the appellant is working as unpaid  candidate  in  the
City Survey Office at Dhule, Maharasthra.=
The Secretary of Bhumi Abhilekh Bina Vetan Sangthana (Union of  Unpaid
Candidates  belonging  to  Land  Records  Department)  filed   an   Original
Application No.153 of 1991 before the Maharashtra  Administrative  Tribunal,
Mumbai.   They  prayed  for  direction  on  the  respondents   for   regular
absorption of  its  members  i.e.  unpaid  candidates  against  the  regular
vacancies. The Tribunal by its judgment dated 20th  December,  1992  allowed
the application directing  the respondents to absorb unpaid candidates,  who
had put in more than ten years of service as such, by giving preference  and
by relaxation of age, if they otherwise fulfill other eligibility criteria.=
 The aforesaid judgment was challenged by those unpaid candidates,  who
were appointed on and after 13th  February,  1987,  in  view  of  denial  of
relief given by the Division Bench of the  Bombay  High  Court.   The  Civil
Appeals preferred by those unpaid candidates were allowed  by  this  Court's
order dated 11th August, 2011 directing the respondents to take  action  for
regularization of services of the appellants in  accordance  with  GR  dated
10th March, 2005.
11.   Meanwhile, services of certain unpaid candidates  were  terminated  by
the respondents.  The appellant’s  service  was  also  terminated  by  order
dated 20th April, 1998.
12.   The  appellant  and  others  challenged  their  respective  orders  of
termination before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench  at
Aurangabad and prayed for directions on respondents  for  regularisation  of
their services.
13.   After hearing the parties,  the Tribunal by its common judgment  dated
24th November, 2011 passed in Original Application No.202/1998 (Smt.  Rajani
vs.  Government  of  Maharashtra  etc.),  including   Original   Application
No.293/1998 preferred by the appellant, allowed the applications, set  aside
their respective orders of termination with direction to the respondents  to
take action for regularisation of services  of all the applicants  including
the appellant herein in accordance with GR dated 10th March,  2005.  It  was
directed to pass appropriate orders within three months.=
The order of termination dated 20th April, 1998 was set aside by  the
Tribunal by its order dated 24th November, 2011.  The Tribunal directed  the
respondents to consider the case of appellant for  regularization  in  terms
of Government Resolution dated 10th March, 2005.  The order  of  termination
being set aside, in the eye of law the  appellant  shall  be  deemed  to  be
continued in service even on 10th March,   2005   i.e.  the  date  when  the
Government Resolution was issued.  Such  being  the  position  of  law,  the
appellant is entitled  for  regularization.  But  the  High  Court  was  not
correct in  holding that the appellant was not in  service  on  10th  March,
2005  and wrongly rejected her claim for regularization.
19.   For the reason aforesaid, the impugned judgment  passed  by  the  High
Court cannot be upheld. The impugned judgment dated 15th March, 2013  passed
by the High Court is set aside. The respondents are directed to comply  with
the order and directions passed by the Tribunal on 24th  November,  2011  in
OA  No.  293/1998  and  regularize  the  services  of  the  appellant   with
retrospective effect within two months from the date of receipt of  copy  of
this judgment. The appeal  is  allowed  with  the  aforesaid  direction  and
observation. No costs.

2014 - July. part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41720
                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.               OF 2014
                    (arising out of SLP©No.24083 of 2013)

SANDHYA                                             … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.                   … RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against the  judgment  and  order  dated  15th
March, 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature  of
Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No.1047  of  2013  whereby  the
High Court held that the appellant is not  entitled  for  regularization  of
her service  as  per  Government  Resolution  dated  10th  March,  2005  and
dismissed the writ petition.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      The Government of Maharashtra vide GR dated  30th  June,  1961  framed
recruitment  rules  of  revenue   clerks   from   amongst   persons   having
qualification S.S.C. and within the age limit of 23  years  (relaxable  upto
26 years for reserved category candidates). Selected candidates were  to  be
appointed in their office to work against clerical post.   Those  who  could
not be adjusted against the post  but were kept in the waiting  list,   were
called upon to work on  payment  of  nominal  fees   under  the  control  of
different departments  like  revenue  Department,  Settlement  Commissioner,
Land Records Department, city survey office, etc. Those candidates who  were
engaged to  work  on  payment  of  fees  were  popularly  known  as  “unpaid
candidates’.
Their  payments  are  being  made  out  of  copying  fees  received  by  the
department, 70% of which was  for  payment  of  wages  to  the  said  unpaid
candidates and 30% share was credited to the Government.
4.    The applications were called for appointment to  Clerical  posts.  The
appellant and others were  declared  successful.   Those  whose  names  were
appearing in the main selection list were  appointed  against  the  Clerical
post. Rest in the waiting list were allowed to work  as  unpaid  candidates.
Since 4th July, 1985, the appellant is working as unpaid  candidate  in  the
City Survey Office at Dhule, Maharasthra.
5.    The Secretary of Bhumi Abhilekh Bina Vetan Sangthana (Union of  Unpaid
Candidates  belonging  to  Land  Records  Department)  filed   an   Original
Application No.153 of 1991 before the Maharashtra  Administrative  Tribunal,
Mumbai.   They  prayed  for  direction  on  the  respondents   for   regular
absorption of  its  members  i.e.  unpaid  candidates  against  the  regular
vacancies. The Tribunal by its judgment dated 20th  December,  1992  allowed
the application directing  the respondents to absorb unpaid candidates,  who
had put in more than ten years of service as such, by giving preference  and
by relaxation of age, if they otherwise fulfill other eligibility criteria.
6.    The said judgment was challenged by the State Government  before  this
Court and the SLP was dismissed on 14th July, 1995. Consequently, the  State
Government issued G.R. dated 21st October, 1995, for implementation  of  the
directions of the Tribunal in Original Application No.153 of 1991.
7.    The other candidates of revenue department thereafter  approached  the
Tribunal at Aurangabad by filing Original Application No.895 of  1995.   The
said application was also decided in their favour  by  judgment  dated  30th
November, 1995. The Tribunal  directed  the  State  Government  to  frame  a
scheme as envisaged in its earlier judgment dated 20th  December,  1992  for
absorption of unpaid candidates. In order  to  comply  with  the  directions
issued by  the  Tribunal,  the  State  Government  issued  G.R.  dated  22nd
October, 1996 for absorption of unpaid candidates in the revenue  department
and fixed 30th November, 1995  as  the  cutoff  date.  Consequently,  unpaid
candidates who had completed 10 years of service as  such,  became  eligible
for absorption, subject to the satisfaction of other  conditions  prescribed
in the said GR.
8.    In Writ Petition No.2150 of 1998, the Division  Bench  of  the  Bombay
High Court passed an order on 16th October, 2002 directing the State to  pay
a minimum salary  of  Rs.3,200/-  per  month  to    the  unpaid  candidates.
Pursuant to the said direction, the benefit of minimum salary of  Rs.3,200/-
was given by the State Government to all  unpaid candidates.
9.    Subsequently, a group of writ petitions were also  disposed  of  by  a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shivshankar  Gundu  Jawanlal  and
another vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2007 (3) Mh.L.J.  43.   In  the
said case, the petitioners were seeking a common relief for  being  absorbed
as permanent Class III employees of the State Government with  retrospective
effect in the light of  judgment of the  Tribunal  in  Original  Application
No.153 of 1991 and  GRs dated 21st October, 1995,  22nd  October,  1996  and
10th March, 2005.  A group of writ petitions were disposed of by the  Bombay
High Court with observation that all the unpaid  candidates  appointed  till
12th February, 1987 cannot be termed as backdoor entrants and declared  that
they are eligible for  the  scheme  formulated  under  the  GRs  dated  21st
October, 1995 and 22nd October, 1996. The High Court also held  that  unpaid
candidates  appointed from 13th February, 1987 onwards are not entitled  for
the benefit of  any of the GRs dated 21st October, 1995, 22nd October,  1996
and 10th March, 2005.
10.   The aforesaid judgment was challenged by those unpaid candidates,  who
were appointed on and after 13th  February,  1987,  in  view  of  denial  of
relief given by the Division Bench of the  Bombay  High  Court.   The  Civil
Appeals preferred by those unpaid candidates were allowed  by  this  Court's
order dated 11th August, 2011 directing the respondents to take  action  for
regularization of services of the appellants in  accordance  with  GR  dated
10th March, 2005.
11.   Meanwhile, services of certain unpaid candidates  were  terminated  by
the respondents.  The appellant’s  service  was  also  terminated  by  order
dated 20th April, 1998.
12.   The  appellant  and  others  challenged  their  respective  orders  of
termination before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench  at
Aurangabad and prayed for directions on respondents  for  regularisation  of
their services.
13.   After hearing the parties,  the Tribunal by its common judgment  dated
24th November, 2011 passed in Original Application No.202/1998 (Smt.  Rajani
vs.  Government  of  Maharashtra  etc.),  including   Original   Application
No.293/1998 preferred by the appellant, allowed the applications, set  aside
their respective orders of termination with direction to the respondents  to
take action for regularisation of services  of all the applicants  including
the appellant herein in accordance with GR dated 10th March,  2005.  It  was
directed to pass appropriate orders within three months.
14.   Thereafter, respondent no. 3 vide his letter dated 7th  August,  2012,
intimated the appellant that her service cannot be  regularized  because  of
non-fulfillment of  condition  in   GR  dated  10th  March,  2005.   It  was
alleged that the appellant was not working on the date  when  GR  came  into
force.
15. The appellant being aggrieved, filed a  contempt  petition  in  Original
Application No.  292/1998.  The  same  was  rejected  by  order  dated  18th
December, 2012. The order passed by  the  Tribunal  was  challenged  by  the
appellant before the High Court in writ petition no. 1047  of  2013.   After
hearing the parties, the High  Court  rejected  the  writ  petition  on  the
ground that the appellant did not  fulfill  the  requirement  as  laid  down
under GR dated 10th March, 2005.
16.   In the said writ petition, the respondents took a similar plea  before
the High Court that the appellant did not attend the office since 8th  July,
2002. She ceased to be in employment since then. It was  contended  that  on
the date of issuance of Government Resolution dated 10th March, 2005,  since
the  appellant  was  not  in  employment  the  benefits  as  per  Government
Resolution cannot be extended in her favour.  The  Division  Bench  accepted
the said plea and upheld the order passed by the Tribunal.
17.         Learned counsel for the appellant  rightly  contended  that  the
High Court has misguided itself by holding that the  appellant  was  not  in
service since July, 2002 and was not  working  on  the  date  of  Government
Resolution dated 10th March, 2005.
18.    The order of termination dated 20th April, 1998 was set aside by  the
Tribunal by its order dated 24th November, 2011.  The Tribunal directed  the
respondents to consider the case of appellant for  regularization  in  terms
of Government Resolution dated 10th March, 2005.  The order  of  termination
being set aside, in the eye of law the  appellant  shall  be  deemed  to  be
continued in service even on 10th March,   2005   i.e.  the  date  when  the
Government Resolution was issued.  Such  being  the  position  of  law,  the
appellant is entitled  for  regularization.  But  the  High  Court  was  not
correct in  holding that the appellant was not in  service  on  10th  March,
2005  and wrongly rejected her claim for regularization.
19.   For the reason aforesaid, the impugned judgment  passed  by  the  High
Court cannot be upheld. The impugned judgment dated 15th March, 2013  passed
by the High Court is set aside. The respondents are directed to comply  with
the order and directions passed by the Tribunal on 24th  November,  2011  in
OA  No.  293/1998  and  regularize  the  services  of  the  appellant   with
retrospective effect within two months from the date of receipt of  copy  of
this judgment. The appeal  is  allowed  with  the  aforesaid  direction  and
observation. No costs.

                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                       (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.
ITEM NO.1F               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IX

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS



Civil Appeal No(s). 24083/2013



SANDHYA                                            Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.                        Respondent(s)





Date : 01/07/2014      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            Judgment today.





For Appellant(s)       Dr. Kailash Chand ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)







       Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]


Sunday, July 20, 2014

Last seen theory - not established - 6 days gap not explained properly - prosecution failed to explain about the presence of deceased at police station when deceased aunt visited the police station - the last seen theory lost it's sanctity - when some of the accused are acquitted , the same benefit doubt applies to the accused also as the case was found on last seen theory - Apex court held that n the present case as noticed above, the Sessions Judge convicted the accused Nos.1 to 3 on the basis of last seen evidence, the correctness of last seen version emanating from Valarmathi (PW-1), Amirthavalli (PW-3) and Murugan (PW-4) and as per the prosecution case is also doubtful, there being contradiction about place where the accused were last seen with the deceased Manikandan. The High Court had failed to appreciate the aforesaid fact and erred in affirming the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Judge. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 31st March, 2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No.1009 of 2005 and impugned order of conviction and sentence dated 17th November, 2005 passed by the Sessions Judge in Session Case No.61 of 2005. The appeal is allowed. = KRISHNAN @ RAMASAMY & ORS. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU … RESPONDENT = 2014 - July Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41717

Last seen theory - not established - 6 days gap not explained properly - prosecution failed to explain about the presence of deceased at police station when deceased aunt visited the police station - the last seen theory lost it's sanctity - when some of the accused are acquitted , the same benefit doubt applies to the accused also as the case was found on last seen theory - Apex court held that n the present case as noticed above,  the  Sessions  Judge  convicted the accused Nos.1 to 3 on the basis of last seen evidence,  the  correctness of last seen version emanating from Valarmathi (PW-1),  Amirthavalli  (PW-3) and Murugan (PW-4) and as per the prosecution case is also  doubtful,  there being contradiction about place where the accused were last  seen  with  the deceased Manikandan. The High Court had failed to appreciate  the  aforesaid fact and erred in affirming the order of conviction passed by  the  Sessions Judge. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the  impugned  judgment  dated 31st March, 2008 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  in Criminal Appeal No.1009  of  2005  and  impugned  order  of  conviction  and sentence dated 17th November, 2005 passed by the Sessions Judge  in  Session Case No.61 of 2005. The appeal is allowed. =

 the  deceased
Manikandan expressed his love to one Rajeswari, daughter  of  accused  No.1,
Krishnan @ Ramasamy and accused No.5, Selvam. For  the  said  reason,  there
was a commotion which resulted in enmity between  the  accused  on  the  one
side and the deceased Manikandan on the other side. The deceased was  driven
out of Neyveli area. =

Learned counsel for the appellants  would  submit  that  the  Sessions
Judge accepted the testimony of the interested witness and on the  basis  of
circumstantial  evidence  the  appellants  have  been  convicted.  He  would
further submit that the prosecution  case  rests  only  upon  circumstantial
evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove such circumstances  without
any breakage of link, convicted the appellants only on  the  basis  of  last
seen theory and the confession of accused No.3. He also submitted  that  the
appellants (accused Nos.1 to 3) also stand on the same footing  as  that  of
accused Nos. 4 and 5, who were given benefit of doubt, such benefit was  not
extended to accused Nos.1 to 3.=
 This Court in Bodhraj vs. State of Jammu and  Kashmir,  (2002)  8  SCC
45, held that the last seen theory comes into play  where  time-gap  between
the point of time when the accused and the deceased  were  seen  last  alive
and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility  of  any  person
other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.  It
will be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in cases where  there  is
no other positive evidence to conclude that the  accused  and  the  deceased
were last seen together.
23.   There is unexplained delay of six days in  lodging  the  FIR.  As  per
prosecution story the deceased Manikandan was last seen on 4th  April,  2004
at Vadakkumelur  village  during  Panguni  Uthiram  Festival  at  Mariyamman
Temple. The body of the deceased was taken from the  borewell  by  the  fire
service personnel after more than seven days. There  is  no  other  positive
material on record to show that the deceased was  last  seen  together  with
the accused and intervening  period  of  seven  days  there  was  nobody  in
contact with the deceased.=
She  saw  her  son  being
beaten up by the accused and at that time her  son  was  in  an  unconscious
state. She went and brought the village headman. Thereafter, Manikandan  was
taken  from  the  said  place  in  an  autorickshaw  by  the  accused.   She
immediately informed the village elder. The village  Head  came  along  with
her and prevented such beating. He told the accused to leave her son at  the
Police Station. The accused had kept Manikandan till  7.30  p.m.  They  sent
Chinnu @ Rajendiran, accused No.2 to bring the auto, accused Nos.1,2  and  3
had taken her son in that auto. Her son had not returned next day.   Accused
No.1, Ramasamy later on crossed her house from whom she enquired as  to  the
whereabouts of her son to which he replied that her son would return  within
two days. When she further enquired from accused No.1, he had  replied  that
he had sent him to Kerala, on paying him Rs.100/-. On  the  next  day,  i.e.
6th day she had again asked accused No.1 about her  son  and  she  told  him
that  she  would  file  a  complaint  alleging  the  missing  of  her   son.
Subsequently, after a lapse of 6 days, she had filed a  complaint  with  the
Police Station (Neyveli Township at 8th Block). The Police  having  come  to
know that they were  already  conducting  enquiry  from  accused  No.3  with
regard to this case, on the basis of the statement given  by  accused  No.3,
Ramalingam, the dead body of her son was retrieved from a deep  borewell  by
the fire service personnel.=
The  testimony  of  an  accomplice  cannot  be  used  against  another
accused. On the basis of  testimony  of  accused  No.3,  if  dead  body  was
recovered, on that basis the accused Nos.1 and 2  cannot  be  convicted.  If
accused No.4, Rajendiran @ Sakkarai was also last  seen  with  the  deceased
Manikandan along with accused Nos. 1 to 3,  the  Trial  Court  having  given
benefit of doubt to accused No.4 it is not clear as to why the same  benefit
has not been given to accused Nos.1 to 3.=
In Arjun Marik and others vs.  State  of  Bihar,
(1994) Supp.(2) SCC 372, this Court held as follows:
“31. Thus the evidence that  the  appellant  had  gone  to  Sitaram  in  the
evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the  house  of  deceased
Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it  is  accepted  that  they
were there it would at best amount to be  the  evidence  of  the  appellants
having been seen last together with the deceased.  But  it  is  settled  law
that the only circumstance of last seen  will  not  complete  the  chain  of
circumstances to record the finding that it  is  consistent  only  with  the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused  and,  therefore,  no  conviction  on
that basis alone can be founded.”=
24.   In Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab, (2005)  12  SCC  438,  this  Court
held that in absence of any other  links  in  the  chain  of  circumstantial
evidence, the appellant cannot be convicted solely on  the  basis  of  “last
seen together” even if version of the prosecution witness in this regard  is
believed.
25.   In the present case as noticed above,  the  Sessions  Judge  convicted
the accused Nos.1 to 3 on the basis of last seen evidence,  the  correctness
of last seen version emanating from Valarmathi (PW-1),  Amirthavalli  (PW-3)
and Murugan (PW-4) and as per the prosecution case is also  doubtful,  there
being contradiction about place where the accused were last  seen  with  the
deceased Manikandan. The High Court had failed to appreciate  the  aforesaid
fact and erred in affirming the order of conviction passed by  the  Sessions
Judge.
26.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the  impugned  judgment  dated
31st March, 2008 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  in
Criminal Appeal No.1009  of  2005  and  impugned  order  of  conviction  and
sentence dated 17th November, 2005 passed by the Sessions Judge  in  Session
Case No.61 of 2005. The appeal is allowed. The appellants  are  directed  to
be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
2014 - July Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41717

                                                                 REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 512  OF 2010

KRISHNAN @ RAMASAMY & ORS.                     … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF TAMIL NADU                                … RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.


      This appeal is directed against the judgment dated  31st  March,  2008
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal  No.1009
of 2005. By the impugned judgment the High Court dismissed  the  appeal  and
affirmed the judgment of conviction  and  sentence  passed  by  the  learned
Sessions Judge against the appellants for the  offence  under  Section  364,
302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC.
2.    The case of the prosecution in nutshell is as follows:
      Prior  to  4th  April,  2004,  the  date  of  incident,  the  deceased
Manikandan expressed his love to one Rajeswari, daughter  of  accused  No.1,
Krishnan @ Ramasamy and accused No.5, Selvam. For  the  said  reason,  there
was a commotion which resulted in enmity between  the  accused  on  the  one
side and the deceased Manikandan on the other side. The deceased was  driven
out of Neyveli area. Subsequently, on 4th April, 2004 during Panguni  Uthram
Kaavadi Festival at Veludaiyanpattu village, the deceased  visited  for  the
festival. On the said date at about 6.30 p.m., the deceased along  with  his
friends was  talking  behind  the  school  at  Vadakkumelur.  At  that  time
accused No.1,  Krishnan  @  Ramasamy,  accused  No.2  Rajendiran  @  Chinnu,
accused No.3, Ramalingam and accused No.5, Selvam came there  and  took  the
deceased Manikandan to the place near Mariyamman Temple  and  attacked  him.
Later, they took him in an autorickshaw bearing Registration No.TN 31Y  2376
and abducted him under the pretext that the  deceased  was  being  taken  to
Police Station.   On the way, the accused purchased brandy and at 6.15  p.m.
in the cashew thope belong to one Vijeyendiran  the deceased was  taken  out
of the autorickshaw. Vijeyendiran told the accused not  to  assemble  there.
Then, accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 took the deceased Manikandan  to  the  side  of
the road leading to Vadakkumelur and under a  margosa  tree  Manikandan  was
compelled to drink  brandy.  At  about  12  midnight  accused  Nos.1  and  2
strangulated the deceased Manikandan by putting his towel  around  his  neck
and done him to death. Thereafter, accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 put the dead  body
into a borewell.
3.    On 10th April, 2004, based on the complaint given  by  the  mother  of
the deceased Manikandan a complaint was  registered  for  an  offence  under
Section 365 IPC. On 13th April, 2004,  the  Police  arrested  accused  No.3-
Ramasamy, who gave a voluntary confession statement in  pursuance  of  which
accused No.3 took the Police to the borewell where they had hidden the  dead
body. Upon the identification of the borewell by accused No.3 with the  help
of Kurinjipadi fire service personnel, the dead body was taken  out  by  the
Police from the borewell. The body  was  identified  by  Valarmathi  (PW.1),
Amrthavalli (PW-2) Gopal (PW-3), Murugan (PW-4) and Rajeswari (PW-5)  to  be
that of Manikandan. The body was sent to Panruti Government  Hospital  where
inquest was conducted by Kabbadasan (PW-13) on 14th March, 2004  at  6  a.m.
in the presence of  witnesses  and  panchayatdars.  The  inquest  report  is
Ex.P.17. Ex.P.9 is the post mortem certificate and Ex.P.10  is  the  opinion
given by the Doctor who conducted  postmortem.  The  Investigating  Officer,
Kannadasan  (PW-13)  came  to  know  that  the  other  accused   surrendered
themselves before the Court. After concluding the enquiry,  Kannadasan  (PW-
13) laid charge sheet against the accused before  the  Court  on  26th  May,
2004 for the offence under Sections 364, 365, 302 and 201 IPC. The  Sessions
Judge secured the presence of the accused,  framed  charges  under  Sections
364, 365, 302 and 201 IPC. All the accused pleaded not  guilty  and  claimed
to be tried.
4.    The prosecution in all examined 13 witnesses, produced Ex.P.1 to  P.22
and marked MOS 1 to 4 to prove its case. When the  accused  were  questioned
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the incriminating  materials  made
available against them, they denied  each  and  every  circumstance  put  up
against them as false and contrary to the facts. Neither any  oral  evidence
nor  any  documentary  evidence  was  produced  on   their   behalf.   After
considering all  the  material  on  record  and  hearing  the  parties,  the
Sessions Court had come to the conclusion that the  prosecution  has  proved
its case only against accused Nos.1 to 3  for  the  offence  under  Sections
364, 302 and 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and  acquitted  accused  Nos.4
and 5 of the charges levelled against them.
5.    To challenge their conviction and sentence accused Nos.1  to  3  moved
before the High Court, which dismissed the appeal by the impugned  judgment.

6.    Learned counsel for the appellants  would  submit  that  the  Sessions
Judge accepted the testimony of the interested witness and on the  basis  of
circumstantial  evidence  the  appellants  have  been  convicted.  He  would
further submit that the prosecution  case  rests  only  upon  circumstantial
evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove such circumstances  without
any breakage of link, convicted the appellants only on  the  basis  of  last
seen theory and the confession of accused No.3. He also submitted  that  the
appellants (accused Nos.1 to 3) also stand on the same footing  as  that  of
accused Nos. 4 and 5, who were given benefit of doubt, such benefit was  not
extended to accused Nos.1 to 3.
7.    From the judgment passed by the Sessions  Judge  as  affirmed  by  the
High  Court,  we  find  that  the  prosecution  case  rests  only  upon  the
circumstantial evidence. The  Court  mainly  relied  upon  the  evidence  of
Valarmathi (PW-1), mother of  deceased  Manikandan,  confession  of  accused
No.3 and the postmortem report.
8.    The evidence of Valarmathi (PW-1)  is  to  the  effect  that  her  son
Manikandan was said to have given a flower to the daughter of  accused  No.1
and since accused No.1 was very much annoyed with Manikandan, she  sent  her
son to Kerala for employment in order to save him from  the  accused.  After
sometime, Manikandan had come to his native village for celebrating  Panguni
Uthiram Festival and when he was talking to his friends on one  evening,  he
was taken by accused Nos. 1 to 4 for questioning and  on  hearing  the  same
Valarmathi (PW-1) went  to  said  place,  namely,  Mariyamman  Temple  where
accused Nos.1 to 4 had been examining Manikandan.  She  saw  her  son  being
beaten up by the accused and at that time her  son  was  in  an  unconscious
state. She went and brought the village headman. Thereafter, Manikandan  was
taken  from  the  said  place  in  an  autorickshaw  by  the  accused.   She
immediately informed the village elder. The village  Head  came  along  with
her and prevented such beating. He told the accused to leave her son at  the
Police Station. The accused had kept Manikandan till  7.30  p.m.  They  sent
Chinnu @ Rajendiran, accused No.2 to bring the auto, accused Nos.1,2  and  3
had taken her son in that auto. Her son had not returned next day.   Accused
No.1, Ramasamy later on crossed her house from whom she enquired as  to  the
whereabouts of her son to which he replied that her son would return  within
two days. When she further enquired from accused No.1, he had  replied  that
he had sent him to Kerala, on paying him Rs.100/-. On  the  next  day,  i.e.
6th day she had again asked accused No.1 about her  son  and  she  told  him
that  she  would  file  a  complaint  alleging  the  missing  of  her   son.
Subsequently, after a lapse of 6 days, she had filed a  complaint  with  the
Police Station (Neyveli Township at 8th Block). The Police  having  come  to
know that they were  already  conducting  enquiry  from  accused  No.3  with
regard to this case, on the basis of the statement given  by  accused  No.3,
Ramalingam, the dead body of her son was retrieved from a deep  borewell  by
the fire service personnel.
9.    During the cross-examination,  Valarmathi  (PW-1)  accepted  that  she
lodged the complaint after lapse of six days of  missing  of  her  son.  She
further accepted that she had not stated in the complaint  that  during  the
Inspector’s enquiry that while she had asked accused No.1 about her son,  he
had replied that her son would return within two days.  She  further  stated
that when she dictated the complaint Ex.P.1, one auto driver had reduced  it
in writing. Auto driver was not examined.
10.    Amirthavalli  (PW-2)  is  the  elder  sister  of  Valarmathi  (PW-1),
complainant. She stated that Manikandan went to Kerala and had returned  for
Panguni Uthiram Festival last year. When he was lying  at  the  entrance  of
the house at about 6  o’clock,  all  the  five  accused  who  were  present,
descended  down  to  Valarmathi’s  (PW-1)  house  and  taken  Manikandan  to
Mariyammam Temple for enquiry. They had beaten  up  Manikandan  there.  Then
the village head had told not to beat him and asked them to  hand  him  over
to the Police  Station.  Subsequently,  at  8  hrs  accused  Rajendiran  had
brought  the  auto.  Then  accused  Rajendiran,  Chakkarai,   Ramasamy   and
Ramalingam had taken Manikandan in that Auto. They had not gone  along  with
them, since there was a darkness.
11.   During her cross-examination, she stated that when  they  had  made  a
visit to Police Station, accused No.1, Ramasamy had  brought  the   deceased
 Manikandan  to  Police Station.
Therefore, they asked as  to  whether  Manikandan  was  present  there.  The
Police had replied that Manikandan was not handed over to them.
12.   Murugan (PW-4), a coolie at Neyveli, stated that he was  a  friend  of
Manikandan. He further stated that there was an enmity between the  deceased
and the accused as Manikandan had love with Rajeswari, daughter  of  accused
Nos.1 and 5. Due to the threat from accused No.1, Manikandan  had  left  the
village. He stated that about 6 p.m., he had gone to the  temple.  Then  all
the accused and Ramasamy had  found  to  have  examined  Manikandan  in  the
Temple. When they were making such enquiry, they had beaten  up  Manikandan.
During the  cross-examination,  he  accepted  that  he  has  not  given  any
information about Manikandan to anybody. He had not engaged in a  search  as
to the disappearance  of  Manikandan.  He  had  enquired  with  Manikandan’s
mother as to his disappearance on the third day and she  informed  him  that
there was no information as to Manikandan. He further accepted that on  11th
April, 2004, the Police had  enquired  him  about  Manikandan,  he  had  not
mentioned to anyone as the occurrence happened  between  4th  day  and  11th
day, with regard to Manikandan.
13.   In the FIR, Valarmathi  (PW-1)  had  not  disclosed  the  presence  of
Amirthavalli (PW-2) and  Murugan  (PW-4)  at  the  scene  of  occurrence  at
Mariyamman Temple. Nothing was stated with  regard  to  Amirthavalli  (PW-2)
and Murugan (PW-4). Valarmathi (PW-1)  did  not  disclose  the  presence  of
Amirthavalli (PW-2) at the scene of occurrence. The deceased was  last  seen
with accused Nos.1 and 4 by Village headman by name, super  supparayan,  who
said to had been present at the place where the deceased was  last  seen  in
the company of  accused,  was  neither  named  as  prosecution  witness  nor
examined. There was inordinate delay of more than six  days  in  filing  the
complaint about the missing of Manikandan  but  Valarmathi  (PW-1)  has  not
explained the delay in lodging such complaint.
14.    Valarmathi  (PW-1)  in  her  statement  stated  that   the   deceased
Manikandan was lastly seen  with  the  accused  Nos.1  to  4  in  Mariyamman
Temple. Amirthavalli (PW-2) in her statement stated that  the  deceased  was
last seen in the Police Station. The case of the  prosecution  is  that  the
deceased Manikandan was last seen  in  the  autorickshaw  by  which  he  was
abducted from the house of accused No.1.
15.   In the complaint, Ex.P.1, Valarmathi (PW-1) intimated that  Manikandan
was sleeping in the night. In the FIR, Ex.P.13, the motive  of  the  accused
was not disclosed. The accused No.3 was not even named in the FIR.
16.   The manner in which Valarmathi (PW-1), mother of  deceased  Manikandan
gave the detail of occurrence which took place on 4th April, 2004  shows  as
if she had seen every stage, the manner in which the  accused  abducted  the
deceased Manikandan, beaten up  in  the  Mariyamman  Temple,  taken  in  the
autorickshaw, reached from one place to another place and then went  to  the
Police Station. The statement of Valarmathi (PW-1) about accused No.3 is  an
improvement which was not explained. The story of accused  to  the  deceased
in the autorickshaw as narrated in the deposition of  Valarmathi  (PW-1)  is
another improvement which she has not disclosed in the FIR, Ex.P.13.
17.    Referring  to  the  material  on  record,  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants submitted that there  is  a  doubt  about  the  place  where  the
deceased Manikandan was last seen and the time when he was last  seen  along
with the accused.
18.   The case of the prosecution rests mainly on the scene  of  occurrence;
the deceased Manikandan was last seen in the company of accused Nos.1 to  3.
As per Valarmathi (PW-1), deceased Manikandan was last  seen  in  Mariyamman
Temple in the company of  accused  Nos.  1  to  4.  Amirthavalli  (PW-2)  is
maternal aunt of the  deceased.  Valarmathi  (PW-1)  did  not  disclose  the
presence of Amirthavalli  (PW-2)  at  the  scene  of  occurrence  where  the
deceased was last seen in the company of accused Nos.1 to  4.  Even  if  the
statement of Amirthavalli (PW-2) is accepted,  then  according  to  her  the
deceased was last seen in  the  Police  Station  along  with  accused  No.1,
Ramasamy who had brought the deceased Manikandan there.
19.    The  prosecution  has  failed  to  explain  the  statement  given  by
Amrithavalli (PW-2) during her cross-examination  wherein  she  stated  that
when she asked the Police about Manikandan,  they  replied  that  Manikandan
was not handed over to them. Therefore, the presence of Amrithavalli  (PW-2)
at the scene of occurrence is doubtful.  She  being  the  highly  interested
witness and in view of contradictions aforesaid,  her  statement  cannot  be
relied upon.
20.   The  testimony  of  an  accomplice  cannot  be  used  against  another
accused. On the basis of  testimony  of  accused  No.3,  if  dead  body  was
recovered, on that basis the accused Nos.1 and 2  cannot  be  convicted.  If
accused No.4, Rajendiran @ Sakkarai was also last  seen  with  the  deceased
Manikandan along with accused Nos. 1 to 3,  the  Trial  Court  having  given
benefit of doubt to accused No.4 it is not clear as to why the same  benefit
has not been given to accused Nos.1 to 3.
21.   The conviction cannot be based  only  on  circumstance  of  last  seen
together with the deceased. In Arjun Marik and others vs.  State  of  Bihar,
(1994) Supp.(2) SCC 372, this Court held as follows:
“31. Thus the evidence that  the  appellant  had  gone  to  Sitaram  in  the
evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the  house  of  deceased
Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it  is  accepted  that  they
were there it would at best amount to be  the  evidence  of  the  appellants
having been seen last together with the deceased.  But  it  is  settled  law
that the only circumstance of last seen  will  not  complete  the  chain  of
circumstances to record the finding that it  is  consistent  only  with  the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused  and,  therefore,  no  conviction  on
that basis alone can be founded.”


22.   This Court in Bodhraj vs. State of Jammu and  Kashmir,  (2002)  8  SCC
45, held that the last seen theory comes into play  where  time-gap  between
the point of time when the accused and the deceased  were  seen  last  alive
and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility  of  any  person
other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.  It
will be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in cases where  there  is
no other positive evidence to conclude that the  accused  and  the  deceased
were last seen together.
23.   There is unexplained delay of six days in  lodging  the  FIR.  As  per
prosecution story the deceased Manikandan was last seen on 4th  April,  2004
at Vadakkumelur  village  during  Panguni  Uthiram  Festival  at  Mariyamman
Temple. The body of the deceased was taken from the  borewell  by  the  fire
service personnel after more than seven days. There  is  no  other  positive
material on record to show that the deceased was  last  seen  together  with
the accused and intervening  period  of  seven  days  there  was  nobody  in
contact with the deceased.
24.   In Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab, (2005)  12  SCC  438,  this  Court
held that in absence of any other  links  in  the  chain  of  circumstantial
evidence, the appellant cannot be convicted solely on  the  basis  of  “last
seen together” even if version of the prosecution witness in this regard  is
believed.
25.   In the present case as noticed above,  the  Sessions  Judge  convicted
the accused Nos.1 to 3 on the basis of last seen evidence,  the  correctness
of last seen version emanating from Valarmathi (PW-1),  Amirthavalli  (PW-3)
and Murugan (PW-4) and as per the prosecution case is also  doubtful,  there
being contradiction about place where the accused were last  seen  with  the
deceased Manikandan. The High Court had failed to appreciate  the  aforesaid
fact and erred in affirming the order of conviction passed by  the  Sessions
Judge.
26.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the  impugned  judgment  dated
31st March, 2008 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  in
Criminal Appeal No.1009  of  2005  and  impugned  order  of  conviction  and
sentence dated 17th November, 2005 passed by the Sessions Judge  in  Session
Case No.61 of 2005. The appeal is allowed. The appellants  are  directed  to
be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

                                                        ………………………………………………J.
                                     (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                                        ………………………………………………J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI,
                                                              JULY 01, 2014.
ITEM NO.1H               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IIA

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS



Criminal Appeal No(s). 512/2010



KRISHNAN & RAMASAMY & ORS.                         Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE OF TAMILNADU                                 Respondent(s)



Date : 01/07/2014      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            Judgment today.



For Appellant(s)       Mr. K. V. Vijayakumar ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)            Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna ,Adv.







       Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]