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Sunday, July 13, 2014

Sec. 304 B of I.P.C.- Dowry Death - "SOON BEFORE THE DEATH " - whether the remaining two ingredients are satisfied looking into the evidence on record. The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific. No specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty or harassment made by the accused-Manohar Lal. Her statement is not reliable and not trustworthy. Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made - none of the witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon before her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. The accused appellant was charge-sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but the Trial Court has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. In this background, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the accused harassed the deceased soon before her death for or in connection with a demand of dowry.= MANOHAR LAL … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA …RESPONDENT= 2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41716

Sec. 304 B of I.P.C.- Dowry Death - "SOON BEFORE THE DEATH " - whether the remaining two ingredients  are  satisfied  looking  into the evidence on record. The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific.  No specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty  or  harassment made by the accused-Manohar Lal. Her  statement  is  not  reliable  and  not trustworthy. Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made - none  of  the witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon  before her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. The accused  appellant was charge-sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but  the  Trial  Court has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. In  this  background,  we are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to  prove  that the  accused  harassed  the  deceased  soon  before  her  death  for  or  in connection with a demand of dowry.=

22.   For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court
dated 26th August, 1994 as upheld by the High  Court  by  impugned  judgment
dated 26th March, 2007, cannot be upheld.  


The  Trial  Court  after  hearing  the  parties  and   on
appreciation of evidence by the  judgment dated 25th August, 1994  convicted
the appellant for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  304B  IPC   and
sentenced him to  undergo RI for seven years.  The rest of the accused  i.e.
his brothers Krishan Lal,  Harbans  Lal,  his  father  Gopal  Dass,   mother
Shanti and wife of the brother Smt.  Champa  were  acquitted  by  the  Trial
Court on the ground  that they were all residing separately at a  far  place
from the place of occurrence where deceased was living with the appellant.=

“soon before”  is  an  expression  which  permits  of  elasticity,  and
therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping  in  view  the  facts
and circumstances of each case. The facts  must  show  the  existence  of  a
proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand  and
the death of the victim.”

20.   In the present case, from the statement of PW.1 it  appears  that  
the
death took place within seven years of marriage. 
Admittedly,  death  of  the
deceased was due to burning i.e. not in normal  circumstances.  
We  have  to
see now whether the remaining two ingredients  are  satisfied  looking  into
the evidence on record.
21.   The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific.  
No
specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty  or  harassment
made by the accused-Manohar Lal. 
Her  statement  is  not  reliable  and  not
trustworthy. 
Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made - none  of  the
witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon  before
her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. 
The accused  appellant
was charge-sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but  the  Trial  Court
has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. 
In  this  background,  we
are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to  prove  that
the  accused  harassed  the  deceased  soon  before  her  death  for  or  in
connection with a demand of dowry.
22.   For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court
dated 26th August, 1994 as upheld by the High  Court  by  impugned  judgment
dated 26th March, 2007, cannot be upheld.  They are accordingly  set  aside.
The accused-Manohar Lal is acquitted from  the  charge  under  Section  304B
IPC. The appeal is allowed.  Bail Bonds, if any, stand discharged.

2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41716


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1188 OF 2009

MANOHAR LAL                                              … APPELLANT
                             VERSUS
STATE OF HARYANA                                   …RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
      This appeal is directed against the judgment dated  26th  March,  2007
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  at  Chandigarh  in  Criminal
Appeal No.529-SB of 1994. By the impugned judgment the High Court  dismissed
the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence  of  the  appellant  under
Section 304B IPC for which he stands  sentenced  to  undergo  RI  for  seven
years.

2.    The case of the prosecution is that  Phullan  @  Darshana,  (deceased)
was married to the accused-Manohar Lal about 5  years  prior  to  her  death
which took place on 27th August, 1991.  She was subjected to harassment  for
dowry and finally she died on account of burn  injuries.  Raj  Rani  (PW-1),
mother of the deceased  on  learning  about  the  incident,  went  to  Civil
Hospital and found the victim dead.  Thereafter she made statement  (Exh.PD)
before the Police at 12.05 P.M. on 28th August, 1991, on the basis of  which
FIR was registered. Apart from the  appellant,  his  brothers  Krishan  Lal,
Harbans Lal, his father Gopal Dass, mother Shanti and wife  of  the  brother
Smt. Champa were also made accused.
 ASI Surat Kant (PW.9) investigated the case  and  recorded  the  D.D.R.-Ex.
P.M. on the statement of Hans Raj(PW.8) and Sat Pal. He then  alongwith  the
above-said persons went  to  the  house  where  the  death  took  place  and
prepared the inquest report -Ex.P.H./1.  He took into  possession  one  pipi
-Ex. P.7, steel bowl -Ex. P-8, burnt match  sticks  Ex.P.9  to  Ex.P.11  and
half burnt piece of cloth alongwith some  cash.  .After  sealing  the   same
into separate parcels with the seal of  SK,  vide  recovery  memo  Ex.  P.N.
attested by PWs  site plan-Ex.P.O. was also prepared  by  him  with  correct
marginal notes. Photographs of the dead  body  were  also  taken  by  Swaran
Kumar (PW.7).  The dead  body  was  sent  to  the  Civil  Hospital,  through
constable Krishan Lal, for post-mortem examination. On  the  next  day,  Raj
Rani(PW.1)  made her statement -Ex.P.D. on which  endorsement  -Ex.PD/1  was
made and on the  basis of which  formal FIR -Ex.P.D./2 was recorded by  ASI-
 Ram Krishna. Krishan Lal,  Constable  produced before him  one pair of  ear
rings of gold which were made into a parcel and sealed with   the  seal   SK
and  taken into possession vide recovery  memo  Ex.P.P..  The  accused  were
arrested on 30th August, 1991 and dowry articles  were  recovered  and  were
taken into possession vide memo Ex.P.O.  Complainant-Raj  Rani  (PW.1)  also
produced before him the list of Kanayadan Mark A. After  completion  of  the
investigation, all the  accused  were  charge-sheeted  for  offence    under
Section 498-A /34 IPC and Section 304B/34 IPC, to which the accused  pleaded
not guilty and claimed trial.
3.    The prosecution examined  altogether  nine  witnesses  and  placed  on
record the documentary  evidence.  Defence  also  produced  Ram  Prakash  as
defence  witness.  The  Trial  Court  after  hearing  the  parties  and   on
appreciation of evidence by the  judgment dated 25th August, 1994  convicted
the appellant for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  304B  IPC   and
sentenced him to  undergo RI for seven years.  The rest of the accused  i.e.
his brothers Krishan Lal,  Harbans  Lal,  his  father  Gopal  Dass,   mother
Shanti and wife of the brother Smt.  Champa  were  acquitted  by  the  Trial
Court on the ground  that they were all residing separately at a  far  place
from the place of occurrence where deceased was living with the appellant.
4.    Learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions:
(a)   There was inordinate delay of twenty hours in lodging FIR.
(b)   The prosecution failed to prove that  accused  harassed  the  deceased
‘soon before the death’ for or in connection with the demand of dowry.
(c)   Satpal, son of Bodha Ram and Puran Chand  in  their  statements  under
Section 174 Cr.P.C. did not say anything about cruelty on account of  demand
of dowry.
(d)   The accused Manohar Lal married with Darshana @  Phoolan  eight  years
prior to her death.  Therefore,  provisions  of  Section  304B  IPC  is  not
attracted in  this case.

5.    Raj Rani (PW.1), mother of  the  deceased-  Darshana  @Phullan  stated
that the accused married her daughter about five  years  back.  The  accused
used to harass her daughter on account of   inadequacy of dowry and used  to
make demands for cash.    According to PW-1, the accused made  a  demand  of
Rs. 10,000/-   which she could not meet.  All the accused  persons  used  to
give beatings to Darshana @ Phullan and she was pressurized  to  bring  more
items of dowry while sufficient dowry was given to the accused at  the  time
of marriage. Initially for about eight days, the accused kept  her  daughter
nicely but thereafter she used to  be harassed and  beaten  by  the  accused
repeatedly. During the life time of father of the deceased, he used to  meet
the dowry demands of the appellant. The deceased used to complain  that  her
husband was not allowing her to stay in the  matrimonial  home  unless  some
payments were made and the complainant(PW.1) had been paying her  money  and
used to sent her back to the matrimonial house by  meeting  the  demands  of
the appellant.

6.    One day prior to the last Rakhi festival, Jindu  Ram-father-in-law  of
PW.1 went to the house of in-laws of Darshana@Phullan to  meet  her  and  on
his return, Jindu Ram (father-in-law of PW.1) informed her that  Darshana  @
Phullan told that she was beaten by the accused after taking liquor  and  it
was not possible for her to live in the matrimonial house. This  information
was given to PW.1 by her father-in-law in presence  of  her  maternal  uncle
Devi Lal.
7.    She further stated that about 8-9 months  after  the  rakhi  festival,
her daughter-Darshana @ Phullan died. She had been  killed  by  her-in-laws.
She then came to Yamuna Nagar and saw the dead body of her  daughter  having
external injuries on her dead person which appeared to have been  caused  on
being strangulated. Policed recorded the statement of PW.1  and  took  thumb
impression which was marked as Ext.PD. The above statement is not  supported
by any evidence and contradictory to post mortem report,  which  shows  that
the death was due to shock resulting from burns.
8.    During the cross-examination, she stated that she made  the  statement
before the police that till the death of her husband,  he  was  meeting  the
demands of the accused through her daughter  and  used  to  give  money  and
other articles. During the cross-examination, she further  stated  that  she
was informed by Jindu, her father-in-law that the deceased was being  beaten
by her husband after consuming liquor and that she wanted the matter  to  be
settled once for all. When confronted  with  the  statement-EX.P.D.  it  was
found that no such statement was given  before  the  police.  Her  statement
that her maternal uncle was also present, when confronted with  Ex.P.D.,  it
was not found recorded. Jindu, father-in-law of PW.1 also  did  not  support
the   case of the   prosecution.  Therefore, he was declared hostile.

9.    PW.5 -Smt. Usha Rani, neighbor of the deceased also  did  not  support
the story of the prosecution. Therefore, she was also declared hostile.
10.   PW.3 -Dr.N.K.Garg had conducted post-mortem examination  of  deceased-
Darshana @Phullan on 28th August, 1991 at  12.30P.M.   Dr.  A.K.  Gupta  was
also present with PW.3. Carbon copy of  post-mortem  report  indicates  that
death was due to shock resulting from burns.  PW.4  -Om  Parkash,  draftsman
had prepared the site plan -Ex.P.J. of the place of occurrence.

11.   PW.5-Usha  Rani  as  stated  above,  informed  that  Manohar  Lal  was
residing with his wife-Darshana @ Phullan and she did not know how deceased-
Darshana @ Phullan was treated by her husband.   In  her  cross-examination,
she stated that when she asked, the  deceased  told  her  that  husband  had
beaten her.  But she did not state the specific date of the  incident.  PW.5
was also declared hostile.
12.   PW.6-Ram Mehar Singh, Constable  tendered  his  affidavit  Ex.P.M.  in
evidence. PW.7-Sarwan Kumar- Photographer went  to  the  house  of  accused-
Manohar Lal and took three photographs- Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.3 and  the  positives
are Ex.P.4 to Ex.P.6.  PW.8-Hans Raj alongwith Sat Pal saw smoke coming  out
from the house of Manohar Lal. They went there and saw  that  one  girl  was
lying burning.  They went to police post  and  lodged  report  Ex.P.M.  Then
they came back with the police and were asked by the police  to  go  to  the
village Antawa to inform the parents of the  accused  that  their  Bahu  had
died.  Then they went there and informed   accordingly.
13.   PW.9-ASI Surat Kant, Investigating Officer supported  the  prosecution
story and submitted the report of FSL as evidence Ex.P.R.
14.   After closing of the prosecution evidence, the accused  were  examined
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on all the material particulars appearing  against
them. Accused-Manohar Lal  admitted  his  marriage  with  the  deceased.  He
denied the other allegations against him. He took specific plea that he  had
separated from his parents just after the marriage and was living at  Yamuna
Nagar. He pleaded innocence and stated that for the last 4 or  5  years,  he
was working with Prakash Transport as driver and  was  living  happily  with
his wife. A daughter was also born out of their wedlock. He never  made  any
demand of dowry and never maltreated the deceased- Darshana  @  Phullan.  He
also stated that his wife-deceased Darshana @ Phullan got her cousin  sister
Santosh engaged  with  his  brother  Kishan  about  2  years  prior  to  the
incident. About 2 ½ months before  the  incident,  his  brother  refused  to
accept the proposal of relationship due to which relations between  his  in-
laws and his parents became strained.  They  stopped  visiting  his  parents
and  his  parents  also  stopped  visiting  his  in-laws.  On  the  day   of
occurrence, he was away and on return in  the  evening  he  found  his  wife
dead. He alleged that his in-laws were demanding  money  which  he  did  not
give, and as a result, false case  of  dowry-death  got  registered  against
him.
15.   In defence,  the  accused  produced  Ram  Prakash,  owner  of  Prakash
Transport. He stated that on 26th  August,  1991,  accused-Manohar  Lal  was
employed with him as driver  of a truck and went to Kaithal.  He  came  back
at 5.00P.M. and told him about the incident.  He handed  over  the  accused-
Manohar Lal to the police.
16.   Section 304B IPC relates to dowry death and reads as follows:
“304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by  any  burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her  death  she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or  any  relative  of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand  for  dowry,  such  death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be  deemed
to have caused her death. Explanation.—For the purpose of this  sub-section,
“dowry”  shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  section  2  of  the  Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment  for  a
term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to
imprisonment for life.”



17.   For the purpose of the said Section, a presumption can be raised  only
on proof of the following essentials:
(a)   Death of the woman was caused by burns  or  bodily  injury  or  occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances.

(b)   Such death took place within seven years of her marriage.

(c)         The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her  husband
or his relatives.

(d)         Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection  with,  any
demand for dowry and

(e)   Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.


In this connection, we may refer decision of this Court in Kaliaperumal  vs.
State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828.

18.   In Sunil Bajaj vs. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 417, this Court held:

“5. We have given our attention and consideration to  the  submissions  made
by the learned counsel for the parties. Normally this  Court  will  be  slow
and reluctant, as it ought to be, to upset the order of  conviction  of  the
trial court as confirmed by the High Court appreciating the evidence  placed
on record. But in cases  where  both  the  courts  concurrently  recorded  a
finding that the accused  was  guilty  of  an  offence  in  the  absence  of
evidence satisfying the  necessary  ingredients  of  an  offence,  in  other
words, when no offence was made out, it becomes necessary  to  disturb  such
an order of conviction and sentence to meet the demand of justice. In  order
to convict an accused for an offence under Section 304-B IPC, the  following
essentials must be satisfied:
[pic](1) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily
injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(2) such death must have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;
(3) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty  or
harassment by her husband or by relatives of her husband;
(4) such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with  demand  of
dowry.
6. It is  only  when  the  aforementioned  ingredients  are  established  by
acceptable evidence such death  shall  be  called  “dowry  death”  and  such
husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. It may  be
noticed that punishment for the offence of dowry death under  Section  304-B
is imprisonment of not less than 7 years, which may extend  to  imprisonment
for life. Unlike under Section 498-A IPC, husband or relative of husband  of
a woman subjecting her to cruelty shall be liable  for  imprisonment  for  a
term which may extend to three years and  shall  also  be  liable  to  fine.
Normally, in a criminal case the accused can be punished for an  offence  on
establishment of commission of that offence on the basis of evidence,  maybe
direct or circumstantial or both. But in case of an  offence  under  Section
304-B IPC, an exception is made by deeming provision as to nature  of  death
as “dowry death” and that the husband or his relative, as the case  may  be,
is deemed to have caused such death, even in  the  absence  of  evidence  to
prove these aspects but on proving the existence of the ingredients  of  the
said offence by convincing evidence. Hence, there is need for  greater  care
and caution, that too  having  regard  to  the  gravity  of  the  punishment
prescribed for the  said  offence,  in  scrutinizing  the  evidence  and  in
arriving at the conclusion as to whether all the abovementioned  ingredients
of the offence are proved by the prosecution.  In  the  case  on  hand,  the
learned counsel for the appellant could  not  dispute  that  the  first  two
ingredients mentioned above are satisfied.”


1 19. The expression “soon before her death” used in the  Section  304B  IPC
and Section 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by this  Court  in  Hira
Lal  & Others vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC  80,which  reads
as under:

“8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows:
“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by  any  burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her  death  she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or  any  relative  of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand  for  dowry,  such  death
shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be  deemed
to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,  ‘dowry’  shall  have  the
same meaning as in Section 2 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  (28  of
1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment  for  a
term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to
imprisonment for life.”
The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by  any  burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her  death  she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or  any  relatives  of
her husband for, or in connection with any demand for  dowry.  In  order  to
attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients  are  as
follows:
(i) The death of a woman should be caused  by  burns  or  bodily  injury  or
otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by  her  husband
or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection  with  demand
of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the  woman
soon before her death.
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for  the  case  at  hand.
Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act  were  inserted
as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act  43  of  1986  with  a
view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths.  Section  113-B  reads
as follows:
“113-B. Presumption as to  dowry  death.—When  the  question  is  whether  a
person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is  shown  that  soon
before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty  or
harassment for, or in connection with,  any  demand  for  dowry,  the  Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
[pic]Explanation.—For the purposes of  this  section,  ‘dowry  death’  shall
have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal  Code  (45  of
1860).”
The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has  been  amply  analysed
by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on  “Dowry
Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view the impediment in  the  pre-existing
law in securing evidence to  prove  dowry-related  deaths,  the  legislature
thought it wise to insert a  provision  relating  to  presumption  of  dowry
death on proof  of  certain  essentials.  It  is  in  this  background  that
presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per  the
definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC  and  the  wording  in  the
presumptive Section  113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act,  one  of  the  essential
ingredients, amongst others, in  both  the  provisions  is  that  the  woman
concerned must have been “soon before her death”  subjected  to  cruelty  or
harassment “for or in connection with  the  demand  of  dowry”.  Presumption
under Section 113-B is a presumption of law.  On  proof  of  the  essentials
mentioned  therein,  it  becomes  obligatory  on  the  court  to   raise   a
presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The  presumption  shall
be raised only on proof of the following essentials:
(1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has  committed
the dowry death of the woman.  (This  means  that  the  presumption  can  be
raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-
B IPC.)
(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or  his
relatives.
(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand  for
dowry.
(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.”


Similar observation was made by this Court in Balwant Singh and Another  vs.
State of Punjab (2004) 7 SCC 724. In the said case this Court held:

“10. These decisions and other decisions of  this  Court  do  lay  down  the
proximity test. It has been reiterated in several decisions  of  this  Court
that “soon before”  is  an  expression  which  permits  of  elasticity,  and
therefore the proximity test has to be applied keeping  in  view  the  facts
and circumstances of each case. The facts  must  show  the  existence  of  a
proximate live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand  and
the death of the victim.”

20.   In the present case, from the statement of PW.1 it  appears  that  the
death took place within seven years of marriage. Admittedly,  death  of  the
deceased was due to burning i.e. not in normal  circumstances.  We  have  to
see now whether the remaining two ingredients  are  satisfied  looking  into
the evidence on record.
21.   The statement of the complainant PW.1 is general and not specific.  No
specific incidence has been indicated suggesting the cruelty  or  harassment
made by the accused-Manohar Lal. Her  statement  is  not  reliable  and  not
trustworthy. Though the allegation of demand of dowry was made none  of  the
witnesses including PW.1 stated that the deceased was harassed “soon  before
her death” for or in connection with demand of dowry. The accused  appellant
was charge-sheeted under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC but  the  Trial  Court
has not convicted the accused under Section 498-A. In  this  background,  we
are of the opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to  prove  that
the  accused  harassed  the  deceased  soon  before  her  death  for  or  in
connection with a demand of dowry.
22.   For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment  passed  by  the  Trial  Court
dated 26th August, 1994 as upheld by the High  Court  by  impugned  judgment
dated 26th March, 2007, cannot be upheld.  They are accordingly  set  aside.
The accused-Manohar Lal is acquitted from  the  charge  under  Section  304B
IPC. The appeal is allowed.  Bail Bonds, if any, stand discharged.

                                            ………………………………………………………………………………J.
                         (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                            ………………………………………………………………………………J.
                                                  (DIPAK MISRA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.



ITEM NO.1E               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IIB

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS



Criminal Appeal No(s). 1188/2009



MANOHAR LAL                                        Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE OF HARYANA                                   Respondent(s)





Date : 01/07/2014      This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
            Judgment today.





For Appellant(s)       Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)            Mrs. Santosh Singh ,Adv.







       Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]








Sec.376 (f)/302/201 I.P.C.- all sentences order to run consecutively - Sec. 31 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code - Apex court held that trial and High court committed error in view of Sec. 31(2) of Cr.P.C.- Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person is sentenced of conviction of several offences, including one that of life imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no consecutive sentence can be imposed.=DURYODHAN ROUT … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF ORISSA … RESPONDENT= 2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41715

 Sec.376 (f)/302/201 I.P.C.- all sentences order to run consecutively - Sec. 31 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code - Apex court held that trial and High court committed error in view of Sec. 31(2) of Cr.P.C.- Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases  of  conviction  of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub  Section  (2)  to  Section  31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for  a period of longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that  life  imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete  span  of  life,  the  question  of
consecutive sentences in case of conviction  for  several  offences  at  one trial  does  not  arise.  Therefore,  in  case  a  person  is  sentenced  of conviction of several offences, including one  that  of  life  imprisonment, the proviso to Section  31(2)  shall  come  into  play  and  no  consecutive
sentence can be imposed.=

whether the judgment passed by the Trial Court  as
affirmed  by  the  High   Court,   that   the   sentences   under   Sections
376(f)/302/201 IPC are to run consecutively is contrary to  the  proviso  to
sub Section (2) of Section 31  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).=
 Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases of  conviction
of several offences at one trial.  Under  proviso  to  Sub  Section  (2)  of
Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no case a person can be sentenced  to  imprisonment
for a period longer than fourteen years and the aggregate  punishment  shall
not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court  is  competent  to
inflict for a single offence.
 Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of  imprisonment.  A
reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433 and 433A  Cr.P.C.  would  indicate
that  only  the  appropriate  Government  can  commute  the   sentence   for
imprisonment of life for a term not exceeding fourteen years or exceeds  the
release for such person unless he has served  at  least  fourteen  years  of
imprisonment.
      Section 57 of the Indian Penal  Code  merely  relates  to  calculating
fractions of terms of punishment by providing a numerical value of 20  years
to life imprisonment.
      Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code lists  the  punishments  to  which
offenders are liable under the Code which reads as follows:
“First-Death;
 Secondly-Imprisonment for life;
 Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two
          Descriptions, namely:-
 (1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
 (2)Simple
 Fifty-Forfeiture of property;
 Sixthly-Fine.”

Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is  bound  to  serve  the
remainder of his life in prison unless  the  sentence  is  commuted  by  the
appropriate Government in terms of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the  Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The question, however, came up for  consideration  in  Zulfiwar  Ali  v.
State of U.P.3 wherein it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)

“25. The opening words ‘In  the  case  of  consecutive  sentences’  in  sub-
section (2) of Section 31 make it clear that this sub-section  refers  to  a
case in which ‘consecutive sentences’ are ordered. After providing  that  in
such a case if an aggregate of punishment for several offences is  found  to
be in excess of punishment which the court is  competent  to  inflict  on  a
conviction of single offence, it shall not be necessary  for  the  court  to
send the offender for trial before a  higher  court.  After  making  such  a
provision, proviso (a) is added to this sub-section to limit  the  aggregate
of  sentences  which  such  a  court  pass  while   making   the   sentences
consecutive. That  is  this  proviso  has  provided  that  in  no  case  the
aggregate of consecutive sentences passed against an  accused  shall  exceed
14 years. In the instant case the aggregate  of  the  two  sentences  passed
against the appellant being 28 years clearly infringes  the  above  proviso.
It is accordingly not liable to be sustained.

11. In view of the proviso appended to Section 31 of the Criminal  Procedure
Code, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a  manifest  error
in sentencing  the  appellant  for  20  years’  rigorous  imprisonment.  The
maximum sentence imposable being 14 years and  having  regard  to  the  fact
that the appellant is in custody for more than 12 years. Now, we are of  the
opinion that interest of justice would be  subserved  if  the  appellant  is
directed to be sentenced to the period already undergone.”
Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases  of  conviction  of
several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub  Section  (2)  to  Section  31
lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for  a
period of longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that  life  imprisonment
means imprisonment for full and complete  span  of  life,  the  question  of
consecutive sentences in case of conviction  for  several  offences  at  one
trial  does  not  arise.  Therefore,  in  case  a  person  is  sentenced  of
conviction of several offences, including one  that  of  life  imprisonment,
the proviso to Section  31(2)  shall  come  into  play  and  no  consecutive
sentence can be imposed.

2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41715


                                                                 REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2277-2278  OF 2009

DURYODHAN ROUT                                     … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF ORISSA                             … RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      These appeals are directed  against  the  common  judgment  dated  8th
January, 2008 passed by the  High  Court  of  Orissa  at  Cuttack  in  Death
Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl. A.No.12 of  2007.  By  the  impugned
judgment, the High Court upheld the conviction  of  the  appellant  for  the
offence  under  Section  376,  302  and  201  IPC.  However,   taking   into
consideration the facts and circumstances  of  the  case,  the  age  of  the
appellant, his family background and the fact  that  the  appellant  had  no
criminal antecedent, the capital sentence for the offence under Section  302
IPC has been commuted to life imprisonment;  and  rest  of  sentence  remain
unaltered.
2.    The case of the prosecution is that on 11th September, 2004, at  about
3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext that the deceased,  Subhasini,
a minor girl aged about 10 years would talk over  phone  with  his  brother,
Bamodev Bhoi took her on a bicycle. When the evening  set  in,  the  accused
alone returned to the village and on enquiry about Subhasini, by Mulia  Bhoi
(PW-5), father of the deceased, he told that she had gone with  a  woman  of
Ranibandha to her house. On the next day, as she did not  return  Mulia  Boi
(PW-5) again questioned  the  accused  regarding  the  where  about  of  the
deceased.  The  accused  confessed  in  presence  of  Rabi  Biswal   (PW-3),
Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that  he  killed  the  deceased  by
pressing her neck. With the help of these three witnesses, Mulia  Bhoi  (PW-
5) took the accused to Thakurgarh P.S. got the FIR  scribed  by  one  Laxman
Senapti and lodged it before Udit Narayan  Pany,  Officer-in-charge  of  the
said Police Station. A P.S. Case No.51  dated  12th  September,  2004  under
Section 302/201 IPC was instituted. The accused was arrested, his  statement
was recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act  on  the  basis  of
which he went to the spot made recovery of the dead body  of  the  deceased,
held inquest over it, seized the Chadi (underwear) of the victim lying  near
the spot, prepared seizure list in respect thereof and sent  the  dead  body
to Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized the  wearing  apparels  of
the accused, forwarded to the Court on 13th December, 2004 and  handed  over
charge of investigation of the case to the C.I. of Police. After  completion
of  investigation,  Investigating  Officer  (I.O.)  submitted  charge  sheet
against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.
3.    Learned Session Judge secured the  presence  of  the  accused,  framed
charges u/s 376/302/201 I.P.C. The accused pleaded not  guilty  and  claimed
to be tried.
4.    In order to  establish  its  case,  the  prosecution  examined       8
witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1 besides examined  DW-2,  his
father to prove his stand. After  assessing  the  evidence  on  record,  the
Trial Court  found  the  accused  guilty  for  the  offence  under  Sections
376(f)/302/201 IPC convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to  death  for
the offence punishable  under  Section  302  IPC.  The  Session  Judge  also
sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay  a  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-
for the offence punishable under Section 376(f)IPC and RI for one  year  and
to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence  punishable  under  Section  201
IPC. It was further ordered that in default of payment of fine, the  convict
would suffer imprisonment for one year  for  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 376(f) IPC  and  three  months  for  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 201 IPC and the substantive sentences would run consecutively.
5.    The High Court, as noticed above in Reference, converted  the  capital
sentenced to life imprisonment but ordered that rest of the sentence  remain
unaltered.
6.    Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence, the  order  of
conviction was based on the circumstantial evidence only. From the  evidence
of Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2),  it  transpires  that
on the date occurrence at about 4 p.m.  while  they  were  making  chips  by
braking boulders by the side of road, they  saw  the  accused  carrying  the
deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they saw him returning alone.  Mulia
Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6),  the  father  and  the  mother  of  the
deceased respectively, stated that the accused took the deceased on a  cycle
on the pretext that  the  later  would  talk  to  her  brother,  working  at
Bargarh, over phone from the house  of  Bijaya  Bhoi  of  village  Anandpur.
While the accused was in Police custody, he confessed his  guilt  which  was
recorded under Ext.7. The  Ext.7  reflects  that  on  11th  September,  2004
afternoon he took the deceased near Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle, undraped  her
and then committed rape on her. When  she  cried.  He  strangulated  her  to
death and left the dead body covering it with  branches  of  trees.  On  the
basis of statement of the accused the I.O recovered the dead  body  and  the
Chadi (underwear) of the deceased  lying  nearby,  from  Arakhkuda  Salabani
Jungle. The statement of the accused made before the  Police  Officer  which
distinctly relates to the facts of recovery is admissible under the law.

7.    Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12th September, 2004  he  was
attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Athamallik as a Specialist in O and  G.
On that date at 5 p.m. on Police requisition, he conducted autopsy over  the
dead body of the deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years  and  found  as
follows:

"(i)  Bleeding from  nostrils  and  mouth  and  both  the  ears  with  small
clotting of blood.
 (ii) Eyes were half opened.
(iii) Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth.
(iv)  Stool had been discharged from anus.
(v)   Thumb marks were present on the front of the neck.
(vi)  Two linear abrasions of size 3” x 4” on the front of the neck  due  to
scratching by some sharp weapon like human nail.
(vii) Finger marks were present on both sides of the neck and  back  of  the
neck.
(viii)      Extravasation of blood in to  the  sub-cutaneous  tissues  under
the thumb and finger marks and adjacent muscles of the neck.
(ix)  Muscles of neck corresponding to  the  thumb  and  finger  marks  were
mildly lacerated.
(x)   Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2”  and  3”  on  both
sides of scapular region. Most probably caused by weapon like human nails.
(xi)  Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks due to friction  on  a
rough surface, like rough ground and  the  abrasions  were  associated  with
very mild bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions varies from ½”  x  ½”  to
¾” x ½”.
(xii) Laceration of the vagina  with  bleeding  with  clots,  most  probably
because of attempt to introduce the penis-forcibly. The penis most  probably
was large in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,  aged  about
10 years was very narrow. The laceration appears  to  have  been  caused  by
several attempts to introduce the penis into the vagine.
(xiii)      All the injuries were ante mortem in nature. The throttling  was
also ante mortem in nature. There was no evidence of  seminal  fluid  in  or
around vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere  in  the  clothings  of
the victim.

According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9),  the  cause  of  death  was  due  to
throttling and probably homicidal in nature.  He  further  stated  that  the
accused might have attempted three to four  times  to  introduce  his  penis
into the vaginal orifice of the deceased.  From  his  evidence,  it  further
transpires that on 13th September, 2004, he examined the accused  and  found
seminal fluid marks on his pant. He also found one linear abrasion  of  size
¼ on the postero-lateral  aspect  of  the  left  elbow  and  another  linear
abrasion of the  same  size  on  the  medial  aspect  of  his  right  knees.
According to him, those injuries might have been caused 12 hours earlier  to
the alleged incident. Therefore, it is not safe to hold that  in  course  of
rape and murder of deceased,  the  accused  sustained  those  injuries.  Dr.
Narayan Udgata (PW-9),however, could not notice any sign  of  recent  sexual
intercourse on the private part of the accused.
8.    Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed  before  him  and
Rabindra Biswal  (PW-3)  and  Dasarathi  Bhoi  (PW-4)  that  he  killed  the
deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi  (PW-4)  turned  hostile
and  did  not  support  the  prosecution.  However,  Kalpana   Bhoi   (PW-6)
corroborated this part of evidence of  Mulia  Bhoi  (PW-5).  When  asked  by
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of  the  deceased,  accused  told
that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which was found to be incorrect.
9.    The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of the  chain  of
circumstantial evidence available against the accused.  It  was  found  that
the accused carried on the deceased  in  his  cycle  at  about  4  p.m.  but
returned alone at 5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the  deceased  before
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). On the basis of the statement  of  the  accused  recorded
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the I.O.  discovered  the  dead  body;
the opion of the Doctor was that the deceased was raped  and  murdered.  The
Doctor examined the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his  pant.  The
accused gave false  statement  that  the  deceased  went  with  a  woman  of
Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1)  and  Pechi  @  Bilas  Bhoi  (PW-2)saw  the
accused carried the deceased on a cycle at about 4 p.m. and  returned  alone
one hour thereafter. Thus, the accused was  last  seen  with  the  deceased.
There is nothing to indicate that within one hour, there was any  scope  for
anybody else, other than the accused  to  commit  rape  and  murder  of  the
deceased. The chain of circumstances  of  the  case  thereby  leads  to  the
hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone  was  the  author  of  the
crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted  the  accused  under
Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.
10.   During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant mainly  argued
on the question of consecutive sentence as passed by  the  Trial  Court  and
upheld by the High Court. It was contended that Trial  Court  and  the  High
Court wrongly held that the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201  IPC  to
run consecutively.
11.   The question arises whether the judgment passed by the Trial Court  as
affirmed  by  the  High   Court,   that   the   sentences   under   Sections
376(f)/302/201 IPC are to run consecutively is contrary to  the  proviso  to
sub Section (2) of Section 31  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).
12.   According to the learned Counsel for the  respondent-State  of  Orissa
proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31  of  the  Cr.P.C.  cannot  be  made
applicable to a conviction for life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.
13.   It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or simple  (Section
60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far  as  life  imprisonment  is  concerned,
there is no such classification. The first classification was  attempted  by
the Law Commission of India  through  its  39th  report  to  qualify  it  as
rigorous but the same  was  never  translated  into  legislation.  But  such
submission is not based on any reasoning.
14.   In order to fully appreciate the  question  involved  in  the  present
case  it  is  desirable  to  notice  the  relevant  provisions  of  Criminal
Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.
15.   Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases of  conviction
of several offences at one trial.  Under  proviso  to  Sub  Section  (2)  of
Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no case a person can be sentenced  to  imprisonment
for a period longer than fourteen years and the aggregate  punishment  shall
not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court  is  competent  to
inflict for a single offence. Section 31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
“31. Sentences in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.

(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two  or  more  offences,  the
Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal  Code
(45 of 1860 ), sentence him for such offences, to  the  several  punishments
prescribed  therefor  which  such  Court  is  competent  to  inflict;   such
punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after
the expiration of the other in such order as the Court  may  direct,  unless
the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.

(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for  the
Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for  the  several  offences
being in excess of the punishment  which  it  is  competent  to  inflict  on
conviction of a single offence, to send the  offender  for  trial  before  a
higher Court:

Provided that-

(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  longer
period than fourteen years;

(b)  the  aggregate  punishment  shall  not  exceed  twice  the  amount   of
punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence.

(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the  aggregate  of  the
consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be  deemed
to be a single sentence.”

16.   Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code defines life as  “The word  “life”
denotes the life of a human being, unless  the  contrary  appears  from  the
context”.
      The word “imprisonment” has not been defined either  in  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code.
       As  per  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897  under  Section  3(27)   –
“imprisonment” shall mean imprisonment of either description as  defined  in
the Indian Penal Code. The definition  of  imprisonment  under  the  General
Clauses  Act  would,  therefore,  in  case   of   life   imprisonment   mean
imprisonment for life/imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s life.
      We are not in agreement with submission made on behalf  of  the  State
that imprisonment for life has not been included in the definition  of  term
‘imprisonment’ under Section 3(27) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
17.   Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of  imprisonment.  A
reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433 and 433A  Cr.P.C.  would  indicate
that  only  the  appropriate  Government  can  commute  the   sentence   for
imprisonment of life for a term not exceeding fourteen years or exceeds  the
release for such person unless he has served  at  least  fourteen  years  of
imprisonment.
      Section 57 of the Indian Penal  Code  merely  relates  to  calculating
fractions of terms of punishment by providing a numerical value of 20  years
to life imprisonment.
      Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code lists  the  punishments  to  which
offenders are liable under the Code which reads as follows:
“First-Death;
 Secondly-Imprisonment for life;
 Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two
          Descriptions, namely:-
 (1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
 (2)Simple
 Fifty-Forfeiture of property;
 Sixthly-Fine.”

Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is  bound  to  serve  the
remainder of his life in prison unless  the  sentence  is  commuted  by  the
appropriate Government in terms of the Section 55, 433 and 433A of the  Code
of Criminal Procedure.
18.   In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.,  AIR  1961
SC 600, the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  while  dealing  with  the
question as to whether there is any provision of law whereunder  a  sentence
for life imprisonment, without  any  formal  remission  by  the  appropriate
Government can be automatically treated as one for  a  definite  period.  In
the said case this Court held:
“5. If so, the next question is whether there is any provision of law  where
under a sentence for life imprisonment,  without  any  formal  remission  by
appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for  a  definite
period. No such provision is  found  in  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  Code  of
Criminal Procedure or the  Prisons  Act.  Though  the  Government  of  India
stated before the Judicial Committee in the case cited  supra  that,  having
regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code, 20  years'  imprisonment  was
equivalent to a sentence of transportation for life, the Judicial  Committee
did not express its final opinion on that question. The  Judicial  Committee
observed in that case thus at p. 10:

“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as one of  twenty  years,  and
subject  to  remission  for  good  conduct,  he  had  not  earned  remission
sufficient to entitle him to discharge at the time of his  application,  and
it was therefore rightly dismissed, but in saying this, Their Lordships  are
not to be taken as meaning that  a  life  sentence  must  in  all  cases  be
treated as one of not more  than  twenty  years,  or  that  the  convict  is
necessarily entitled to remission.”

Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no  real  bearing  on  the  question
raised before us. For calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment  the
section  provides  that  transportation  for  life  shall  be  regarded   as
equivalent  to  imprisonment  for  twenty  years.  It  does  not  say   that
transportation for life shall be deemed  to  be  transportation  for  twenty
years for all purposes; nor does the amended section which  substitutes  the
words “imprisonment for life”  for  “transportation  for  life”  enable  the
drawing of any such all embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation  for
life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as  transportation
or imprisonment for the whole of  the  remaining  period  of  the  convicted
person's natural life.”

19.   In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors., (1976) 3  SCC  470,
this  Court  held  that  sentence  of  imprisonment  for   life   does   not
automatically expire at the end of 20 years. This Court held:
“9. From a review of the authorities and the  statutory  provisions  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure the following propositions emerge:
“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not automatically  expire
at the end of 20 years including the remissions, because the  administrative
rules framed under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act  cannot
supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian Penal Code. A  sentence  of
imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of  the  prisoner
unless the appropriate Government chooses  to  exercise  its  discretion  to
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section  401  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure;”

20.   This Court in Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj  &  Ors.,  (1983)  2  SCC
454, relying upon the judgment made by the Privy  Council  in  ‘Kishor  Lal’
and Constitution Bench decision of this Court in ‘Gopal Vinayak Godse’  held
that the appellant in the said case was liable to serve the  sentence  until
the remainder of his life in prison.
21.   In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India &  Ors.,  (1991)  3  SCC  498,  this
Court held that the expression “life  imprisonment”  must  be  read  in  the
context  of  Section  45  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  which   would   mean
imprisonment for the full or complete span of life. This Court further  held
that the provisions in Section  57  that  imprisonment  for  life  shall  be
reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for  the  purpose  of
working out the fraction of the terms of punishment.
22.   This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in the case  of  Niab
Singh, the Privy Council judgment in Kishori Lal and  the  judgment  in  the
case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992)  4
SCC 172.
23.   In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal &  Ors.,  (2001)  4  SCC  458,  this
Court held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the  whole  of  the
remaining  period  of  the  convicted  person’s  natural  life  unless   the
appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion  to  remit  either
the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401 Cr.P.C.
      Similar was the view taken by this Court in Shri Bhagwan vs. State  of
Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296.
24.   This Court reiterated that life imprisonment  was  not  equivalent  to
imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd. Munna vs. Union  of  India  &
Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 417. The Court held  that  the  life  imprisonment  means
imprisonment for whole of the remaining period  of  the  convicted  person’s
natural life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal  Code  or  in
the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment could be  treated  as
either 14 years or 20 years without there being of formal remission  by  the
appropriate Government.
25.   In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC  767,  this
Court while substituting the sentence of death  to  life  imprisonment  held
that the prisoner shall not be released from prison till  the  rest  of  his
life.
      Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.  vs.  State  of
Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452. In the said case this Court held that a  prisoner
serving a life sentence has no indefeasible right to release  on  completion
of either 14 years or 20  years  imprisonment.  A  convict  undergoing  life
imprisonment is expected to remain in custody  till  the  end  of  his  life
subject to  any  remission  granted  by  the  appropriate  Government  under
Section 432 Cr.P.C.
26.    From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this  Court,  it  is   clear
that a sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence  for  entire  life
of the prisoner unless the appropriate Government chooses  to  exercise  its
discretion to remit either the whole or a part of  the  sentence  under  the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
27.   Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases  of  conviction  of
several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub  Section  (2)  to  Section  31
lays down the embargo whether the aggregate punishment of prisoner is for  a
period of longer than 14 years. In view of the fact that  life  imprisonment
means imprisonment for full and complete  span  of  life,  the  question  of
consecutive sentences in case of conviction  for  several  offences  at  one
trial  does  not  arise.  Therefore,  in  case  a  person  is  sentenced  of
conviction of several offences, including one  that  of  life  imprisonment,
the proviso to Section  31(2)  shall  come  into  play  and  no  consecutive
sentence can be imposed.
28.   In the case of Kamalanantha and others vs. State  of  T.N.,  (2005)  5
SCC 194, this Court held:
“75. Regarding the sentence, the trial court resorted  to  Section  31  CrPC
and ordered the sentence to run consecutively, subject  to  proviso  (a)  of
the said section.

76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the  term  “imprisonment”  enjoined
in Section 31 CrPC does not include imprisonment for life  is  unacceptable.
The  term  “imprisonment”  is  not  defined  under  the  Code  of   Criminal
Procedure. Section 31 of the Code falls under Chapter III of the Code  which
deals with power of courts. Section 28 of the Code empowers the  High  Court
to pass any sentence authorised by law. Similarly, the  Sessions  Judge  and
Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised  by  law,  except
the sentence of death which shall be subject to  confirmation  by  the  High
Court. In our opinion the term “imprisonment” would include the sentence  of
imprisonment for life.”

29.   The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court in  Chatar  Singh
vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 37, and held:
“9. Although, the power of the court to impose  consecutive  sentence  under
Section  31  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  was  also  noticed   by   a
Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Prabhakaran v.  P.  Jayarajan2,  but,
[pic]therein the question of construing proviso  appended  thereto  did  not
and could not have fallen for consideration.
10. The question, however, came up for  consideration  in  Zulfiwar  Ali  v.
State of U.P.3 wherein it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)

“25. The opening words ‘In  the  case  of  consecutive  sentences’  in  sub-
section (2) of Section 31 make it clear that this sub-section  refers  to  a
case in which ‘consecutive sentences’ are ordered. After providing  that  in
such a case if an aggregate of punishment for several offences is  found  to
be in excess of punishment which the court is  competent  to  inflict  on  a
conviction of single offence, it shall not be necessary  for  the  court  to
send the offender for trial before a  higher  court.  After  making  such  a
provision, proviso (a) is added to this sub-section to limit  the  aggregate
of  sentences  which  such  a  court  pass  while   making   the   sentences
consecutive. That  is  this  proviso  has  provided  that  in  no  case  the
aggregate of consecutive sentences passed against an  accused  shall  exceed
14 years. In the instant case the aggregate  of  the  two  sentences  passed
against the appellant being 28 years clearly infringes  the  above  proviso.
It is accordingly not liable to be sustained.”

11. In view of the proviso appended to Section 31 of the Criminal  Procedure
Code, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a  manifest  error
in sentencing  the  appellant  for  20  years’  rigorous  imprisonment.  The
maximum sentence imposable being 14 years and  having  regard  to  the  fact
that the appellant is in custody for more than 12 years. Now, we are of  the
opinion that interest of justice would be  subserved  if  the  appellant  is
directed to be sentenced to the period already undergone.”

30.   In the recent judgment in Ramesh Chilwal alias Bambayya vs.  State  of
Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC  629, this Court held:
“4. Since this Court issued notice only to clarify the sentence  awarded  by
the trial Judge, there is no need to go into all  the  factual  details.  We
are not inclined to modify the sentence. However, considering the fact  that
the trial Judge has awarded life sentence for an offence under Section  302,
in view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,  we  make  it
clear that all the sentences imposed under IPC, the Gangsters  Act  and  the
Arms Act are to run concurrently.”

31.   In view of the aforesaid discussions and decisions  rendered  by  this
Court, we hold that the Trial  Court  was  not  justified  in  imposing  the
sentence under Section 376(f)/302/201 IPC to  run  consecutively.  The  High
court failed to address the said issue.
32.   For the reasons stated above, while we are not inclined  to  interfere
with the order of conviction and the sentence,  considering  the  fact  that
the accused has  been  awarded  life  imprisonment  for  the  offence  under
Section 302, we direct that all the sentences  imposed  under  Indian  Penal
Code are to run concurrently. The judgment passed by the  Session  Judge  as
affirmed by the High Court stands modified to the extent above. The  appeals
are allowed in part with the aforesaid observations.

                                             ……………………………………………………………………………J.
                                     (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                             ……………………………………………………………………………J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.

ITEM NO.1D               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IIB

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS



Criminal Appeal No(s). 2277-2278/2009



DURYODHAN ROUT                                     Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE OF ORISSA                                    Respondent(s)





Date : 01/07/2014      These appeals were called on for pronouncement
            of Judgment today.





For Appellant(s)       Mr. T. N. Singh ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)            Mr. Shibashish Misra ,Adv.





        Hon'ble Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]








Saturday, July 12, 2014

Section 27 of Evidence Act - confessions leads to discovery of incriminating articles - when abduction proved , burden lies on the accused to discloses what happen next when victim found dead - Apex court held that What happened thereafter to deceased is especially within the knowledge of the appellants-accused nos.1 to 3. It was for the appellants-accused nos. 1 to 3 to explain what happened to Mani alias Parai Mani after they took him away but they failed to explain the same. Mani alias Parai Mani was found dead immediately thereafter.= PARAMSIVAM & ORS. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE … RESPONDENT = 2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41714

 Section 27 of Evidence Act - confessions leads to discovery of incriminating articles - when abduction proved , burden lies on the accused to discloses what happen next when victim found dead - Apex court held that  What  happened  thereafter  to  deceased  is especially within the knowledge of the appellants-accused  nos.1  to  3.  It was for the appellants-accused nos. 1 to 3 to explain what happened to  Mani alias Parai Mani after they took him away but they  failed  to  explain  the same.  Mani  alias  Parai  Mani  was  found  dead  immediately   thereafter.=

Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“27. How much of information received from accused may  be  proved.—Provided
that,  when  any  fact  is  deposed  to  as  discovered  in  consequence  of
information received from a person accused of any offence,  in  the  custody
of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it  amounts  to  a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to  the  fact  thereby  discovered,
may be proved.”


21.   In Anil alias Raju Namdev Patil v.  Administration  of  Daman  &  Diu,
Daman and another, (2006) 13 SCC 36, this Court held:

       “23.The  information  disclosed  by  the  evidences  leading  to  the
discovery of a fact which is based on mental state of affair of the  accused
is, thus, admissible in evidence.”



22.   This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh,  (1999)  4  SCC
370 opined that when an object is discovered from an isolated place  pointed
out by the accused, the same would be admissible in evidence.

23.   We have noticed the confessional statement of the appellants,  on  the
basis of which the discovery of material evidence took place.

24.   From the  evidence  on  record,  we  find  that  the  Prosecution  was
successful  in  bringing  on  record  the  circumstantial   evidences   i.e.
existence of motive; the circumstances in which the deceased was  last  seen
alive in the company of appellants-accused nos.1 to 3; death  was  homicidal
and body was found on the railway track mutilated; the body of the  deceased
was  identified  through  DNA  test;  on  arrest  of  accused  incriminating
articles were recovered.

25.   Upon analysis of evidence, we are of the  view  that  prosecution  has
succeeded in proving the facts  that  the  accused  nos.1  to  3  took  away
deceased Mani alias Parai Mani. What  happened  thereafter  to  deceased  is
especially within the knowledge of the appellants-accused  nos.1  to  3.  It
was for the appellants-accused nos. 1 to 3 to explain what happened to  Mani
alias Parai Mani after they took him away but they  failed  to  explain  the
same.  Mani  alias  Parai  Mani  was  found  dead  immediately   thereafter.

2014 – July. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41714


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 593  OF 2010

PARAMSIVAM & ORS.                                   … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE              … RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.


      This appeal is directed against  judgment  dated  27th   April,  2009,
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal  Appeal  No.441
of 2007. By the  impugned  judgment  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellants-
accused nos.1 to 3 has been dismissed and conviction of accused nos.1  to  3
u/s 364 IPC and accused no.1 u/s 302 IPC and accused nos.2  and  3  u/s  302
r/w 34 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment and fine imposed upon  them
have been confirmed.
2.    The case of the prosecution in a nutshell is as follows:
Deceased Mani alias Parai Mani took lease of the land in S.F. No.  427/1  of
Vadapudur village belonging to  PW3-Krishnasamy  and  PW6-Ramasamy.  Accused
No.6-Nagarathinam was the  neighbouring  land  owner.  Since  Accused  No.1-
Paramasivam and Accused No.6-Nagarathinam threatened  the  deceased  not  to
break the stone, deceased Mani alias Parai  Mani  filed  suit  in  O.S.  No.
5/2004 before DMC, Pollachi for  Permanent  Injunction  restraining  Accused
no.6 and PWs.3 and 6 from interfering with quarrying.  There  was  animosity
between the deceased and the family of Accused no.6-Nagarathinam.

About 10 days prior to the date  of  occurrence,  Accused  no.1-Paramasivam,
Accused no.6-Nagarathinam and Accused no.7-Revathi threatened the  deceased.
About 4 days prior to the date of occurrence,  Accused  no.2-Selvaraj  alias
Selvan and another person approached the deceased for purchase of stone  and
since it was late hours, deceased refused to accompany them and  asked  them
to come on some other day.
 Again Accused no.2 and another person approached the deceased on  18.1.2004
and asked for stones and deceased accompanied the  accused  to  the  quarry.
PW1-Kannaiyan and PW2-Kala witnessed that deceased went along  with  Accused
no.2-Selvaraj alias  Selvan  and  Accused  no.3-Nirmal.  On  the  said  date
i.e.18.1.2004, PW8-Sivakumar and PW9-Doraisamy who were returning  from  the
Petrol Pump, saw white colour Maruthi Van bearing registration No.  TN-23  E
5951 (MO1) was parked on the road side. PW9 saw  the  deceased  and  Accused
no.1 were sitting inside the Maruthi Van.

Next day on 19.1.2004, PW23-Pugazhenthi (Railway Key Man), Thirupur saw  the
dead body on the  railway  track  and  informed  PW20-Ramachandran  (Station
Master) who in turn informed the Out-post Police  Station,  Thirupur.  PW24-
Sankaralingam (Head Constable) received the report and registered  the  case
for  'suspicious  death'  in  Cr.  No.  12/2004  u/s  174 Cr.P.C.  PW24-Head
Constable went to the scene of occurrence and found the dead body of a  male
on the railway track, prepared Observation Mahazar (Ex.P15) and  Rough  Plan
(Ex.P16). PW24 also held Inquest on the body of the  deceased  (Ex.P18)  and
sent the dead body for autopsy to  Government  Hospital,  Thirupur.  On  his
request PW27-Nizar Ahemad had taken photographs (MO18 series)  of  the  body
lying on the railway track.

PW33-Dr.Parimala Devi conducted autopsy over the dead  body  and  noted  the
injuries, Dr. Devi opined that death was due to  multiple  injuries  on  the
neck and head injuries about 70 to 80 hours prior to  autopsy.  Since  there
was no clue about the  identity  of  the  dead  body,  body  was  buried  at
Chellandiamman grave yard Tirupur by PW24-Head Constable  with  the  aid  of
PW22-Murugasamy (Grave yard watch man).

Since, deceased not returned home, PWs.1 and  2  searched  for  him  and  on
20.1.2004 PW1 lodged written complaint [Ext.P1]. On  the  basis  of  written
complaint, PW39-Rajendran (Inspector of Police) registered the case  in  Cr.
No. 27/2004 u/s 363 IPC. PW39 went to the scene of occurrence  and  prepared
Observation Mahazar and Rough Plan. He also enquired PWs.1 to 6 and  15  and
recorded their statements.
PW41-Shahul Ahmeed  (Inspector  of  Police)  took  charge  of  the  case  on
26.1.2004 and made further investigation. On 28.1.2004 at about  1.45  P.M.,
PW41 arrested accused  no.2-Selvaraj  near  Vanjipalayam  railway  gate.  On
being interrogated, accused no.2 voluntarily  gave  a  confession  statement
which led to the  recovery  of  Ropes  (MO10  series),  Banian  (MO11),  Bag
(MO12), Diary (MO2) and Money purse containing the  photo  of  the  deceased
(MO3) Seizure Mahazar (Ext.P5) was prepared. Thereafter, along with  accused
 no.2, PW41 went to the scene of occurrence i.e. railway track and  prepared
Observation Mahazar (Ext.P34) and Rough Plan (Ext.P35).

      PW41 on the same day i.e. 28.1.2004  at  6.15  P.M.  arrested  accused
no.5-Gudalingam alias Lingasamy and recorded his confession statement  which
led to recovery of MO1-Maruthi omni van  under  Ex.P37-Seizure  Mahazar.  On
the  same  day,  at  about  8.50   P.M.,   PW41   arrested   accused   no.1-
Paramasivam and recorded his confession statement which led to  recovery  of
Lungi (MO4), Shirt (MO5) and Voters ID Card (MO9) of deceased under  Seizure
Mahazar  (Ext.P39).  Thereafter,  PW41  went  to  Thirupur  Out-post  Police
Station and enquired PW24-Head Constable and received copy  of  FIR  in  Cr.
No. 12/2004. Thereafter,  PW41-Investigating  Officer  altered  the  FIR  in
Criminal    No.    27/2004    from    Section 363 IPC    to    Sections 120-
B, 364 and 302 IPC.
On 17.2.2004, PW41 sent requisition for  exhumation  of  dead  body  of  the
deceased which was exhumed in the presence of PW31-Tahsildar, PW21-R.I.  and
other witnesses. PW41 seized Waist Cord with  Silver  Amulet  under  Seizure
Mahazar (Ext.P12). Observation Mahazar (Ext.P13) was prepared  by  PW-41  in
respect of the place where body was buried. Rough Plan  (Ext.P44)  was  also
prepared. Blood samples of the dead body was taken. Blood  samples  of  PW14
(Manickammal) and PW15 (Subramani) -mother and brother of the deceased  were
taken  and  forwarded  for  DNA  examination.  PW40-Vanaja  (Asst.  Chemical
Examiner and Asst. Director) conducted DNA examination and opined that  "the
bone pieces etc. described belong to a human male  individual".  He  further
opined that "the person Mani alias Parai Mani to whom the bone  pieces  etc.
belong is the biological offspring of Ms.A.Manickammal."-PW14.

Accused  no.3-Nirmal  and  Accused  no.4-Sureshkumar  alias   Suresh   alias
Pambatti surrendered before  Judicial  Magistrate,  Pollachi  on  05.2.2004.
PW41 was permitted to take them  to  police  custody.  Confession  statement
recorded from accused no.3 led to recovery of  Torch  (MO6),  Battery  (MO17
series), Knife (MO16), Hundred rupee Note [MO13], Bag (MO15)  under  Seizure
Mahazar (Ext.P7). Confession statement recorded from  accused  no.4  led  to
recovery of Watch (MO8), Fifty rupee Note (MO14), Plastic bag  (MO19)  under
Seizure Mahazar (Ext.P9).

PW38-Judicial Magistrate No.  II,  Pollachi  conducted  Test  Identification
Parade in respect of Accused nos.2 and  3  on  13.2.2004.  PWs.1,  2  and  5
participated in the Test Identification Parade and identified  the  accused.
On receipt of chemical analysis report and DNA report and  after  completion
of due investigation, PW41 filed final  report  u/s 147, 148, 120-B, 364 and
302 IPC.
3.    To substantiate the charges against the accused, prosecution  examined
42 witnesses and brought on record Exts.P1 to P44 and Mos.1 to  18.  Accused
were questioned u/s 313 Crl.P.C. Accused denied all the charges and  pleaded
not guilty and stated that a false case is foisted against them.
4.    Upon consideration of oral  and  documentary  evidence,  the  Sessions
Court held that the prosecution has adduced cogent and  convincing  evidence
establishing that due to previous enmity in respect  of  quarrying,  accused
nos.1 to 3 abducted the deceased and committed murder of the  deceased.  The
Sessions Court also held that accused nos.1 to  3  were  identified  in  the
Test Identification Parade  and  incriminating  material  objects  recovered
from them would substantiate the charges. With regard to accused nos.4 to  7
the Sessions Court held that the prosecution failed to establish  the  guilt
against them and acquitted them.

5.    Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants  challenged  the
impugned judgment mainly on the following grounds:

There is inconsistency in the prosecution story. For example,  the  evidence
of PW 15-Subramani brother of the deceased is contrary to  the  evidence  of
PW1 and 2.

The Sessions Court failed to consider the question whether  the  prosecution
has proved the fact that the deceased was abducted.

There  is  no  eye  witness  for  the  alleged  murder  in  absence  of  any
contemporaneous evidence to establish that the body  found  on  the  railway
track on Vanjipalayam is that of the deceased-mani.

There are contradictions with regard to exhumed body. For example, while  PW
21 stated that when the body was exhumed it was found in pieces in  a  gunny
bag whereas PW 23 stated that dead body was found in  pieces  and  no  dress
was found on it.

6.     On  the  other  hand,  the  Prosecution  relied  upon  the  following
circumstances to bring home the charges.

(i)   Existence of motive.

(ii)        Circumstance that deceased was last seen alive  in  the  company
of the appellants/accused nos. 1 to 3.

(iii) Death was homicidal and the  body  was  found  on  the  railway  track
mutilated.

(iv)  Body was identified as that of deceased through DNA test.

(v)   Arrest of the accused and recovery of incriminating articles at  their
instance.

7.    PWs.3 and 6 are brothers and accused no.6-Nagarathinam   is  brother's
wife of PWs.3 and 6. Deceased Mani alias Parai Mani took lease of PWs.3  and
6's land in S.F. No. 427/1 (Part) of Vadapudur village for quarrying.  While
the deceased was carrying on quarrying work, accused  no.6-Nagarathinam  and
her son and daughter i.e. accused no.1-Paramasivam and accused  no.7-Revathi
objected for quarrying. Alleging that  without  any  lawful  right,  accused
no.6 was objecting to quarrying, deceased filed suit in O.S. No.  5/2004  on
02.1.2004 on the file of DMC, Pollachi against accused no.6  and  PWs.3  and
6. This is evident from Ext.P-22
pleadings in O.S. No. 5/2004, PWs.1 and 2 have spoken  in  one  voice  about
deceased taking quarry of lease from PWs.3 and  6  and  that  accused  no.6,
accused no.1 and accused no.7 were raising objection to carry out  quarrying
work. Evidence of PWs.3 and 6 also  strengthens  prosecution  version  about
the grant of lease.
8.    Filing of suit on 02.1.2004 about two weeks prior  to  the  occurrence
heightens the probability of prosecution case. In  cases  of  circumstantial
evidence  proof  of  motive  is  material   consideration   and   a   strong
circumstance.
9.    The case of the prosecution is that deceased was last  seen  alive  in
the company of the accused. Evidence of PWs.1 and 2 that accused  nos.2  and
3 had taken the deceased from his house  in  Chikkalampalayam.  Evidence  of
PW9-Doraisamy  is  that  he  saw  the  deceased  along  with  accused  no.1-
Paramasivam in Maruthi Omni Van Registration No. TN-23  E  5951  (MO1)  near
Kinathukadavu Checkpost. PW5-Balan stated that the deceased  had  left  with
accused no.1 from the quarry in Ealoorkarar thottam.
About four days from the date of occurrence, accused nos. 2 and  3  went  to
the house of the deceased asking for size of the stones.  When  being  asked
about them, accused no.2 disclosed his name as Selvaraj. As they  appear  to
be strangers and as it was very late in the evening, deceased asked them  to
come on some other day. After four days thereafter accused nos.2 and 3  went
to the house of the deceased and asked him  to  come  along  with  them  for
seeing the stones. Inspite of disinclination of  deceased,  accused  nos.  2
and 3 insisted the deceased to come  along  with  them  stating  that  their
owner has come and therefore, stones are to be seen. As it was late  in  the
evening, deceased asked his wife for  torch  and  PW2-Kala  gave  him  torch
(MO6) and deceased went along with accused nos.2 and 3.
10.   The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is cogent  and  consistent  which  clearly
brings home the circumstance that deceased went along with  accused  nos.  2
and  3.  In  the  Test  Identification  Parade  conducted  by  PW38-Judicial
Magistrate, PWs.1 and 2 have also identified accused  nos.  2  and  3  which
would strengthen the stand of the prosecution.
11.   Learned counsel for the appellant raised objection with regard to non-
mention of name of accused no.2-Selvaraj in Ext.P1-Complaint  and  submitted
that accused  no.3-Nirmal  accompanied  accused  no.2  would  throw  serious
doubts about the credibility of PWs.1 and 2. But from the  evidence  Ext.P1-
complaint we find that PW1 has clearly stated that two persons had  come  to
their house and took the deceased in Maruthi Omni Van. In  Ext.P1-Complaint,
though PW1 had expressed suspicion about accused nos. 1, 6 and  7,  PW1  has
clearly expressed his doubts that  accused  nos.  1,  6  and  7  might  have
engaged men for abducting the deceased. Such  doubts  expressed  in  Ext.P1-
Complaint is sufficient incriminating circumstance against the accused  nos.
2 and 3. Credibility of PWs.1 and 2 cannot be doubted on the ground of  non-
mention of name of accused no.2 in Ext.P1-Complaint.  The  evidence  of  PW9
also established that the deceased was last seen alive  with  accused  no.1-
Paramasivam in  Maruthi  Omni  Van  (TN-23  E   5951)   near   Kinathukadavu
Checkpost. In his evidence, PW9 has stated that after taking petrol for TVS-
50 in a Petrol Pump near the Checkpost while he was  proceeding  along  with
PW8-Sivakumar, he saw the deceased along  with  accused  no.1-Paramasivam in
Maruthi Omni Van (MO1) and saw the others inside the  Van.  Since,  deceased
and accused no.1-Paramasivam were in inimical terms, PW9 wondered as to  why
accused no.1 and deceased are  seen  together  and  he  asked  PW8-Sivakumar
about the same. Though, PW8-Sivakumar turned hostile,  evidence  of  PW9  is
trustworthy and we do not find any reason to take a different view.
12.   Another circumstances relied upon by the prosecution  is  evidence  of
PW15-Subramani (brother of the deceased) that  accused  no.  1  and  another
person came to the quarry  to  see  stones.  When  they  were  crushing  the
stones, deceased went with them to see the  stones.  No  doubt  evidence  of
PW15 as to how deceased went with the accused might appear  to  be  slightly
different but due to variation of time narrating the events cannot  be  said
in manner the PW15 narrated his statement. We are of the view that  evidence
of PW15 does not make any dent upon the consistent version of  PWs.1  and  2
and the case of prosecution.
13.   Dr.  Perimaladevi-PW33  conducted  autopsy  and  noted  the  following
injuries:

?     Crush injury over the front of  head  and  part  of  brain  comes  out
[liquified].

?     Fracture of left arm bone [upper] and left shoulder joint bones.

?     Fracture of right upper arm bone and cut off from the shoulder joint.

?     Fracture of left leg bones [middle].

?     Fracture of right thigh bone and leg bones.

14.   Dr. Perimaladevi opined that deceased died of 'shock and  haemorrhage'
due to multiple injuries and head injuries about 70-80 hours  prior  to  the
autopsy. Since identity of the body  was  not  known,  body  was  buried  in
Thirupur  Chellandiamman  burial   ground.   Later   at   the   request   of
Investigating Officer, body was exhumed in the presence  of  PW21-Tahsildar.
After the body was exhumed, PW34-Dr.Vallinayagam  collected  the  blood  for
DNA test. Blood samples of PW14-Manickammal and PW15-Subramani  (mother  and
brother of the deceased) were also collected. After conducting DNA test  and
upon analysis of results of DNA typing for the samples, PW40-Asst.  Director
gave Ext.P32-Report and opined that "bone pieces etc. described belong to  a
human male individual". PW40 further opined  that  "the  person  Mani  alias
Paraimani to whom the bone pieces etc. belong is  the  biological  offspring
of Ms. A. Manickammal.". Evidence of PW40 would amply establish identity  of
body recovered from the railway track as that of  the  deceased  Mani  alias
Parai Mani who is the son of PW14-Manickammal.

15.   When deceased is shown to be abducted, it  is  for  the  abductors  to
explain how  they  dealt  with  the  abducted  victim.  In  the  absence  of
explanation, Court is to draw inference that abductors are the murderers.

16.   In State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and  others (2000)  8  SCC  382,
this Court held:

“34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of  the  Court  that  Mahesh  was
abducted by the accused and they took him out  of  that  area,  the  accused
alone knew what happened to him until he was with  them.  If  he  was  found
murdered within a short time after the  abduction  the  permitted  reasoning
process would enable the Court to draw  the  presumption  that  the  accused
have murdered him. Such inference can be  disrupted  if  the  accused  would
tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was  in  their
custody.”

17.   In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 4 SCC 375, this Court held:

“15. The abductors alone could tell the court as to  what  happened  to  the
deceased  after  they  were  abducted.  When  the  abductors  withheld  that
information from the court there is  every  justification  for  drawing  the
inference, in the light of all the preceding  and  succeeding  circumstances
adverted to above, that the abductors are the murderers of the deceased.”

“19. We pointed out that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not intended  to
relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would  apply  to  cases  where  the
prosecution has succeeded in proving facts for which a reasonable  inference
can be drawn regarding the existence of  certain  other  facts,  unless  the
accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts failed to  offer
any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different  inference.”


“21. We are mindful of what  is  frequently  happening  during  these  days.
Persons are kidnapped in the sight of others and are forcibly taken  out  of
the sight of all others and later the  kidnapped  are  killed.  If  a  legal
principle is to be laid down that for the murder  of  such  kidnapped  there
should necessarily be independent  evidence  apart  from  the  circumstances
enumerated above, we would be providing a safe jurisprudence for  protecting
such criminal activities. India cannot now  afford  to  lay  down  any  such
legal principle insulating the marauders  of  their  activities  of  killing
kidnapped innocents outside the ken of others.”


18.   In the present case, the prosecution brought on record  the  evidences
that accused no.1 to 3 had abducted the deceased. Therefore, it  is  accused
nos.1 to 3 alone knew what  happened  to  him  as  the  deceased  was  found
murdered within a short time after abduction.  The accused nos.1 to  3  have
failed to give any explanation and the Court rightly draw  presumption  that
the accused have murdered the deceased Mani alias Parai Mani.

19.   The prosecution relied upon the statement of accused  persons  leading
to discovery of facts as envisaged u/s 27 of Indian Evidence  Act.   Accused
Nos. 1, 2 and 5 were arrested on 28.1.2004 at  different  times.  Confession
statement of accused no.1 led to recovery of Voter ID  Card  of  Mani  (MO9)
and other articles i.e. MOs.4 and  5.  Confession  statement  recorded  from
accused no.2-Selvaraj alias Selvan] led to recovery of Pocket  Diary  (MO2),
Money purse (MO3) with photo of deceased and other  articles-MOs.10  to  12.
Confession statement of accused no.5 Driver  Lingasamy  led  to  seizure  of
Taxi MO1-Maruthi Omni Van (TN-23 E 5951). Accused  no.3-Nirmal  and  accused
no.4-Sureshkumar alias Suresh alias Pambatti  were  surrendered  before  the
Court and on application, PW41-Investigating Officer took  them  for  police
custody. Confession statement recorded from accused no.3 led to recovery  of
Torch light(MO6) which was handed over to the deceased by PW2  at  the  time
when he left the house. PW2 also identified MO6 as the  torch  light  handed
over by her at the time when  the  deceased  left  the  house.  Recovery  of
various articles of the deceased  from  accused  nos.1  to  3  is  a  strong
incriminating circumstance connecting the appellants with the crime.
20.   Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“27. How much of information received from accused may  be  proved.—Provided
that,  when  any  fact  is  deposed  to  as  discovered  in  consequence  of
information received from a person accused of any offence,  in  the  custody
of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it  amounts  to  a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to  the  fact  thereby  discovered,
may be proved.”


21.   In Anil alias Raju Namdev Patil v.  Administration  of  Daman  &  Diu,
Daman and another, (2006) 13 SCC 36, this Court held:

       “23.The  information  disclosed  by  the  evidences  leading  to  the
discovery of a fact which is based on mental state of affair of the  accused
is, thus, admissible in evidence.”



22.   This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh,  (1999)  4  SCC
370 opined that when an object is discovered from an isolated place  pointed
out by the accused, the same would be admissible in evidence.

23.   We have noticed the confessional statement of the appellants,  on  the
basis of which the discovery of material evidence took place.

24.   From the  evidence  on  record,  we  find  that  the  Prosecution  was
successful  in  bringing  on  record  the  circumstantial   evidences   i.e.
existence of motive; the circumstances in which the deceased was  last  seen
alive in the company of appellants-accused nos.1 to 3; death  was  homicidal
and body was found on the railway track mutilated; the body of the  deceased
was  identified  through  DNA  test;  on  arrest  of  accused  incriminating
articles were recovered.

25.   Upon analysis of evidence, we are of the  view  that  prosecution  has
succeeded in proving the facts  that  the  accused  nos.1  to  3  took  away
deceased Mani alias Parai Mani. What  happened  thereafter  to  deceased  is
especially within the knowledge of the appellants-accused  nos.1  to  3.  It
was for the appellants-accused nos. 1 to 3 to explain what happened to  Mani
alias Parai Mani after they took him away but they  failed  to  explain  the
same.  Mani  alias  Parai  Mani  was  found  dead  immediately   thereafter.
Therefore, it is clear that the accused nos.1 to  3  who  abducted  deceased
Mani alias Parai Mani intentionally withhold the information from the  Court
and, therefore, there is every  justification  for  drawing  inference  that
appellants-accused nos.1 to 3 murdered Mani alias Parai Mani. Stand  of  the
appellants is a bare denial of prosecution  case.  In  the  absence  of  any
explanation, the inevitable inference is  that  appellants  are  responsible
for the death of deceased Mani alias Parai Mani.  Thus,  the  guilt  of  the
appellants-accused nos. 1 to 3 has been proved beyond all reasonable  doubt.
We find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.


                                                        ………………………………………………J.
                                     (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                                        ………………………………………………J.
                                             (DIPAK MISRA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014





ITEM NO.1C               COURT NO.6                 SECTION IIA

(For Judgment)



               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS



Criminal Appeal No(s). 593/2010



PARAMSIVAM & ORS.                                  Appellant(s)



                                VERSUS



STATE TR.INSP.OF POLICE                            Respondent(s)



Date : 01/07/2014      This  appeal  was  called  on  for  pronouncement  of
            Judgment today.



For Appellant(s)       Mr. Vijay Kumar ,Adv.



For Respondent(s)            Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna ,Adv.





      Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya  pronounced   the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice Dipak Misra.



      The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.











(MEENAKSHI KOHLI)                               (USHA SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER



             [Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]