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Friday, July 11, 2014

Payment of interest on the refund of amount after cancellation of auction sale -Apex court held that But for the reasons mentioned by the High Court the sale has been cancelled. It has been ordered to refund amount in favour of the auction purchaser-appellant(s). We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants should not get interest on the said amount. Taking into consideration the aforesaid factor while working out equities, it would, therefore, be appropriate to direct the State to pay interest at the rate of 6% on the amount to be refunded as per the High Court’s order with effect from 27th April, 2001 and 3rd September, 2001, the day, the High Court passed the impugned order. The concerned respondents are directed accordingly.= STATE OF U.P. & ORS. … APPELLANTS VERSUS M/S. JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ORS.ETC. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41730

 Payment of interest on the refund of amount after cancellation of auction sale -Apex court held that  But  for  the  reasons mentioned by the High Court  the  sale  has  been  cancelled.  It  has  been ordered to refund amount in favour of  the  auction  purchaser-appellant(s). We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants  should  not get interest on the said amount. Taking  into  consideration  the  aforesaid factor while working out equities, it would, therefore,  be  appropriate  to direct the State to pay interest at the rate of  6%  on  the  amount  to  be refunded as per the High Court’s order with effect  from  27th  April,  2001 and 3rd September, 2001, the day, the High Court passed the impugned  order. The concerned respondents are directed accordingly.=

A piece of land of the Company was put  to  auction  for  recovery  of
dues of the Company. It was challenged by  the  Company  by  filing  a  writ
petition. The High  Court  by  impugned  judgment  dated  27th  April,  2001
cancelled the auction sale and  allowed  the  writ  petition.  In  a  review
application preferred by auction purchaser, the High Court  by  order  dated
3rd September, 2001 directed the respondents to refund  the  amount  to  the
auction purchasers.   
The Company was in heavy arrears  as  on  3rd  January,  1977  to  the
extent of  Rs.1.14  crores.  Accordingly,  the  District  Collector,  Meerut
appointed a Receiver under Section 286-A of  U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition  and
Land Reforms  Act,(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  “Zamindari  Abolition
Act”).
5.    Subsequently, the Company was acquired by the State on  28th  October,
1984 as per provisions of the  U.P.  State  Sugar  Undertakings  Acquisition
Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  “Acquisition  Act,  1971”),  as
amended in the year 1984, free from all encumbrances and the said  Unit  was
vested with the U.P. State Sugar Corporation  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
the “Corporation”).=

The  writ  petitions

were disposed of by the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High  Court  by  a
common judgment dated 1st March, 2011. By the said judgment, the High  Court
directed the State Government to pay the Company  the  compensation  on  the
basis of the compromise reached between the State Government and the  tenure
holder  Company  for  acquisition  of  their  land  by  Meerut   Development
Authority.
 It is also directed that out of compensation paid by  the  Meerut
Development Authority (about Rs.4.33 crores) an  amount  of  Rs.1.62  crores
shall be deducted and the remaining amount shall be  paid  to  the  Company.
The State has been given liberty to  realize  the  said  amount  from  those
authorities to whom it was wrongly paid by  the  previous  Collector,  Tulsi
Gaur, under his order dated  20th  February,  1992. =

 No interest on refund of auction amount after cancellation of sale =
We have heard the parties only on the limited question as to  why  the
amount which has been directed to be refunded  to  the  auction  purchasers-
appellants herein should not bear reasonable interest.
42.   In a situation like in the  present  case,  one  cannot  hold  of  any
statute entitling the auction purchasers to  claim  interest,  in  case  the
auction got cancelled or set aside by the Court  of  law.
Counsel  for  the
parties also could not refer any  of  the  clauses  of  auction  prescribing
interest on refund of amount in case of cancellation  of  auction  or  sale.
The question arises as to whether in such a situation an  auction  purchaser
can claim interest on equitable ground.

Payment of Interest on Rental compensation if any delay occurred , 
in the absence of any contract to pay interest =

In State of Maharashtra and others vs. Maimuma Banu and  others,  (2003)
7 SCC 448, the question arose as to whether interest was payable  on  rental
compensation. In the said case, Government resolution provided  for  payment
of rental compensation expeditiously  but  no  provision  was  made  to  pay
interest in case of delayed payment. This Court in the said case held:

“10. The crucial  question  is  whether  there  can  be  any  direction  for
interest on rental compensation once it is held that  the  same  has  to  be
paid within the time frame,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  is  no
statutory obligation.

11. It is not in dispute that in certain cases payments  have  already  been
made. Though the inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  High  Court  is  not
justified in directing grant of interest on the logic of various  provisions
contained in the Act, yet there is an element of equity  in  favour  of  the
landowners.
 It is, however, seen that the writ applications were filed  long
after the possession was taken. This factor cannot be lost  sight  of  while
working out the  equities.  It  would,  therefore,  be  appropriate  if  the
appellants pay interest @ 6% from 1-4-2000 till amounts  payable  as  rental
compensation are paid to the landowners concerned. This direction shall  not
apply to those cases where the payments have already been made prior to 1-4-
2000. Appeals are allowed to the extent indicated  without  any  stipulation
of costs.”

44.   In the present case, we find that there was no  mis-representation  on
the part of the auction purchasers; they deposited the total auction  amount
within the time stipulated. It has not been in dispute  that  the  title  of
the land  was  also  transferred  in  their  favour.  But  for  the  reasons
mentioned by the High Court  the  sale  has  been  cancelled.  It  has  been
ordered to refund amount in favour of  the  auction  purchaser-appellant(s).
We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants  should  not
get interest on the said amount. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  aforesaid
factor while working out equities, it would, therefore,  be  appropriate  to
direct the State to pay interest at the rate of  6%  on  the  amount  to  be
refunded as per the High Court’s order with effect  from  27th  April,  2001
and 3rd September, 2001, the day, the High Court passed the impugned  order.
The concerned respondents are directed accordingly.

2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41730


                                                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6169-6171 OF 2013

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                         … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

M/S. JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ORS.ETC.     … RESPONDENTS

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.6172-6174 OF 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7122 OF 2003
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7123-7124 OF 2003
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7125 OF 2003
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7126-7129 OF 2003


                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.


      In these appeals  the  dispute  relates  to  payment  of  compensation
pursuant to acquisition of land of respondent-M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills  Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the “Company”) and auction of part of  the  land
of the Company. There being cross-claims, all of these  appeals  were  heard
together for determination by a common judgment.
2.    The Company  preferred  two  writ  petitions  challenging  the  orders
passed by the District Magistrate/Collector, Meerut  and  Board  of  Revenue
dated 18th December, 1995 and 3rd August, 1996 respectively.  The  aforesaid
orders were also challenged by the  State  Government.  The  writ  petitions
were disposed of by the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High  Court  by  a
common judgment dated 1st March, 2011. By the said judgment, the High  Court
directed the State Government to pay the Company  the  compensation  on  the
basis of the compromise reached between the State Government and the  tenure
holder  Company  for  acquisition  of  their  land  by  Meerut   Development
Authority. It is also directed that out of compensation paid by  the  Meerut
Development Authority (about Rs.4.33 crores) an  amount  of  Rs.1.62  crores
shall be deducted and the remaining amount shall be  paid  to  the  Company.
The State has been given liberty to  realize  the  said  amount  from  those
authorities to whom it was wrongly paid by  the  previous  Collector,  Tulsi
Gaur, under his order dated  20th  February,  1992.  The  impugned  judgment
dated 1st March, 2011 has been challenged by  the  State  of  U.P.  in  C.A.
Nos.6169-6171 of 2013 (State of U.P. & ors. Vs.  M/s.  Jaswant  Sugar  Mills
Ltd. & Ors.etc.), as also by M/s. Jaswant Sugar  Mills  Ltd.  in  C.A.  Nos.
6172-6174  of  2013  &  Ors.  (M/s.  Jaswant  Sugar  Mills   Ltd.   vs   The
Colletor/District Magistrate & Ors.).
3.    A piece of land of the Company was put  to  auction  for  recovery  of
dues of the Company. It was challenged by  the  Company  by  filing  a  writ
petition. The High  Court  by  impugned  judgment  dated  27th  April,  2001
cancelled the auction sale and  allowed  the  writ  petition.  In  a  review
application preferred by auction purchaser, the High Court  by  order  dated
3rd September, 2001 directed the respondents to refund  the  amount  to  the
auction purchasers. The aforesaid judgment and orders  are  under  challenge
in C.A. Nos.7122 of 2003, 7123-7124 of 2003, 7125 of 2003 and  7126-7129  of
2003.

      C.A.Nos.6169-6171 of 2013 and C.A.Nos.6172-6174 of 2013.

4.          For determination of the issue involved  in  C.A.  Nos.6169-6171
of 2013 and C.A. Nos. 6172-6174 of  2013,  it  is  desirable  to  refer  the
relevant factual matrix of the case which is as follows:
      The proprietors of  respondent  Company,  namely  M/s.  Jaswant  Sugar
Mills Ltd. had six business units as under:
M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills.
Meerut Straw Board Mills.
Pootha Farm.
Northern India Paper Mills.
Bindal Vanaspati Ghee Mills.
Meduwala Open Pan Sugar, Bijnor.

      The Company was in heavy arrears  as  on  3rd  January,  1977  to  the
extent of  Rs.1.14  crores.  Accordingly,  the  District  Collector,  Meerut
appointed a Receiver under Section 286-A of  U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition  and
Land Reforms  Act,(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  “Zamindari  Abolition
Act”).
5.    Subsequently, the Company was acquired by the State on  28th  October,
1984 as per provisions of the  U.P.  State  Sugar  Undertakings  Acquisition
Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  “Acquisition  Act,  1971”),  as
amended in the year 1984, free from all encumbrances and the said  Unit  was
vested with the U.P. State Sugar Corporation  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
the “Corporation”).
6.    Since, the Company was in arrears to the  extent  of  Rs.1.29  crores,
the District Collector, Meerut by order dated 28th November, 1984,  attached
all the remaining five constituent units except the Sugar Mill. The  General
Manger of the  aforesaid  Sugar  unit  was  appointed  as  a  Receiver  with
reference to all the aforesaid remaining five  units.  In  between  1977  to
1984, for  smooth  functioning  of  the  Sugar  Mill,  payment  of  dues  to
sugarcane grower, repairing  of  machinery  etc.,  on  the  request  of  the
Receiver, the State  Government  granted  loan  of  Rs.6.13  crores  to  the
Company, and was to be recovered as the arrears of Land Revenue  along  with
interest.
7.    The District Collector, Meerut taking into consideration the  dues  to
the extent of Rs.1.62 crores as on 24th October, 1990 were  to  be  paid  by
the Company, extended the tenure of the Receiver till  further  orders.  The
order of the extension of tenure of the Receiver was challenged by  the  ex-
proprietors of the Company in a Writ Petition  No.18496/1991.  Subsequently,
the Receiver was withdrawn on  18th  December,  1995,  therefore,  the  writ
petition was also withdrawn.
8.    Pursuant to “Uttar Pradesh imposition  of  Ceiling  of  Land  Holdings
Act” (hereinafter referred to as the “Ceiling Act”), land admeasuring  723.3
bigha belonging to the Company was declared  surplus.  Against  the  same  a
Writ Petition No.3905/1987 was preferred by the Company.
9.     During  the  pendency  of  the  aforesaid  writ  petition  the  State
Government issued a Notification dated 14th August,  1987  under  Section  4
read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894  for  the  Meerut
Development  Authority.  It  was  followed  by  a  Notification  dated   4th
September, 1987 issued u/s 6 of the Acquisition Act. The  said  Notification
included the land of M/s Pootha Farm, a constituent unit of the Company.  In
the said case compensation amount of Rs.4.33 crores was awarded  by  Special
Land Acquisition Officer vide award dated 22nd February, 1990.
10. The District Collector, Meerut, pursuant to a report of  the  Tehsildar,
ordered to pay the compensation amount after adjustment  of  different  dues
payable by the Company.
11.   Pursuant to a Court’s order, the District Collector, Meerut  passed  a
speaking order dated 20th February, 1992 showing the details of  adjustments
to be made out of compensation amount  of  Rs.4.34  crores  payable  by  the
Company, as detailed below:
                 1.Labour Dues and others  Rs.1,39,72,300.83
                 2.Sales Tax                  Rs.  40,18,401.00
                 3.Payments towards Loan      Rs.2,54,04,080.57
                             -----------------
                                      Total                Rs.4,33,94,783.40
       =================

      The District Collector in the said order  dated  20th  February,  1992
concluded that after such adjustment the following dues  were  still  to  be
paid by the Company.

Payments towards loan       Rs.3,59,83,381.43
Income Tax                        Rs.  79,14,781.00
Levy Price(Central Govt)    Rs.  38,64,000.00
House Tax                         Rs.   6,23,605.49
Railway Dues                      Rs.   2,54,570.40
Cane Commissioner                 Rs.  45,11,400.00
Provident Fund                    Rs.  55,25,769.59
Labour Dues                 Rs.      44,856.60
E.S.I.                            Rs.     72,624.00
10.Labour Dues(other units)       Rs.  20,73,704.78
11.Purchase Tax                   Rs.   1,05,518.69
                                      -----------------
                       Total      Rs. 6,09,74,211.98
                                      =================”

12.   The State Government filed the deduction  statement  for  recovery  of
the dues before  the  prescribed  authority  constituted  under  U.P.  Sugar
Undertaking (Acquisition)  Act,  1971.  However,  the  aforesaid  claim  was
rejected by the prescribed authority by order dated  4th  October,  1994  in
Claim No.13 of 1999.
13.   Against  the  said  order  dated  4th  October,  1994  passed  by  the
prescribed  authority,  the  appellant  filed  Appeal  No.1/95  before   the
Appellate Tribunal.  By  order  dated  12th  October,  1995,  the  Appellate
Tribunal directed the appellant to file a fresh deduction claim  before  the
prescribed authority.
14.   The Company  moved  an  application  before  the  District  Collector,
Meerut stating therein that  as  on  date  there  are  no  arrears/liability
payable by the Company, therefore, requested to remove the Receiver.
15.   The District Collector, Meerut by order  dated  18th  December,  1995,
allowed the case  No.30/1995  with  observation  that  as  on  the  date  no
recovery  certificate  was  pending  against   the   Company.   Hence,   the
appointment of  Receiver  was  terminated  with  immediate  effect.  It  was
further ordered that a detailed list of the assets be  prepared  and  signed
by both the parties and the assets be transferred to the Company.  An  order
was passed to appoint a Chartered Accountant to complete the  audit  of  the
accounts.
16.   As the order  dated  18th  December,  1995,  passed  by  the  District
Collector, Meerut is silent about the amount payable to the Company, the Ex-
Proprietor of the Company  moved an application before  the  Chairman  Board
of Revenue and requested to refund the compensation amount to the Company.
17.   The Company filed a Writ Petition No.10220/1996 before High Court  for
modification of the order of  the  District  Collector,  Meerut  dated  18th
December, 1995.
18.   During the pendency of the said case, the Chairman, Board of  Revenue,
by order dated 3rd August, 1996 directed that out of  the  total  amount  of
Rs.4.33 crores received as compensation from Meerut  Development  Authority,
after deduction  of  a  sum  of  Rs.1.62  crores  along  with  interest  and
collection charges the balance amount shall be refunded to the Company.
19.   Against the aforesaid order dated  3rd  August,  1996  passed  by  the
Chairman, Board of Revenue, the Company filed  Writ  Petition  No.31378/1996
on the ground that there is no dues payable by  the  Company.  In  the  said
case the U.P.  State  Sugar  Corporation  Ltd.  filed  a  counter  affidavit
refuting such stand taken by the Company.
20.   A separate counter affidavit was filed by the Deputy Secretary,  Sugar
and Cane Development,  Lucknow,  giving  details  of  dues  payable  by  the
Company as detailed by the District Collector, Meerut  by  his  order  dated
18th December, 1995.
21.   The High Court initially passed an interim order on  17th  July,  1997
as under:
“Considering the facts and the circumstances of the  case,  the  respondents
are directed to pay to M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut  the  amount  of
compensation money amounting to Rs.4,33,94,783.40 after deducting a  sum  of
Rs.1,62,02,402.20 + interest and collection charges within a period  of  two
months from today. Payments so made shall be subject to  final  decision  of
the Writ Petition.”

22.   Against the interim  order,  the  appellant-State  filed  the  Special
Appeals.
23.   By judgment and order dated 7th July, 2010 passed  in  Special  Appeal
Nos.5179-80/2010, the High Court quashed the interim order dated 17th  July,
1997 passed by the learned Single Judge. It was ordered to  dispose  of  the
writ petition expeditiously.
24.   In the meantime, the District  Collector  by  its  notice  dated  22nd
August, 2005, directed the  Company  to  refund  certain  amount.  The  said
notice was also challenged by the Company.
25.   The High Court  by  judgment  and  order  dated  23rd  February,  2011
quashed the notice dated 22nd August, 2005 with direction to  the  appellant
to pay the compensation amount to the Company.  However,  it  was  clarified
that if the land, which have been acquired finally,  does  not  fall  within
the ceiling limit of the Company, then it will be  open  for  the  State  to
recover it after the finalisation of the ceiling proceedings,  as  per  law.
Subsequently, impugned common judgment and order dated 1st March,  2011  was
passed  in  Writ  Petition  No.31378/1996,  etc.,   with   observation   and
directions as referred to above.
26.   The grievance of the appellant-State is  that  the  High  Court  while
passing the impugned order has not noticed the  liability  incurred  by  the
undertaking and the loan paid to the Company. According  to  the  appellant,
the aforesaid issue has not been decided.
27.   On the other hand,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  made  the
following submissions:
(i)   No amount, whatsoever, is due  and  payable  by  the  Company  to  the
State. Till date, there has not been a single determination/adjudication  by
any Court/Authority of any dues against the Company nor is there  any  claim
pending before any Authority or before any Court, on date. Furthermore,  the
State has  not  been  able  to  produce  any  recovery  certificate  of  any
department showing any dues against the Company.
(ii)  The Collector has no power to  adjudicate  the  dues  under  the  U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Revenue Act and is merely a recovery  agent  to
recover sums payable as arrears of land revenue, upon  receipt  of  a  valid
Recovery Certificate.

28.   We have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  perused  the
records.
29.   It is not in dispute that the Company was under heavy  arrears  as  on
3rd January, 1977. Therefore, the District Collector, Meerut  appointed  the
Receiver. Subsequently, Sugar Mill of  the  Company  was  acquired  on  28th
October, 1984 under Sugar Undertakings Acquisition Act, 1971  and  the  unit
was vested with the U.P. State Sugar Corporation.
30.    Till  28th  November,  1984,  the  Company  was  the  owner  of   the
units/Sugar Mill.  It was in  arrears  to  the  extent  of  Rs.1.29  crores.
Therefore,  the  District  Collector,   Meerut   attached   remaining   five
constituent units and the General Manager of the sugar  unit  was  appointed
as a Receiver. In between 1979 and 1984, the  State  Government  extended  a
facility of loan to the extent of Rs.6.13 crores to the  Receiver  appointed
by the State Government for smooth functioning of the Sugar Mill,  including
payment of dues to sugarcane grower, repairing  of  machinery,  etc.  It  is
also not in dispute that labour and other dues were payable by  the  Company
apart from Sale Tax dues and the loan was  given  by  the  State  Government
between 1977-1984 for payment of such dues.
31.   The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 1st March, 2011,  though
noticed the aforesaid facts including the fact  that  the  Collector,  Tulsi
Gaur by order dated 20th February, 1992 held that there were dues  of  about
Rs.10.44 crores payable by the Company, part of which can be  adjusted  from
the compensation amount paid  by  the  Meerut  Development  Authority,  even
thereafter an amount of Rs.6.09 crores will remain payable by  the  Company,
but the High Court failed to address  such  issue.  The  High  Court  though
noticed that Section 8 of the  U.P.  State  Sugar  Undertakings  Acquisition
Act, 1971 empowers the prescribed authority to decide any dispute  regarding
the amount payable  to  any  person  or  authority  in  respect  of  earlier
liabilities of the undertaking, but it wrongly held  that  in  view  of  the
provisions  of  the  U.P.  Sugar  Undertakings  Acquisition  Act,  1971  any
liability incurred by the Company or loan etc. taken by the receiver is  not
payable by the Company.
32.   It is always open to the competent authority to seek recovery  of  the
amount if due from the Company or to adjust the dues.
33.   The Collector, Tulsi Gaur was not a party by  name.  The  order  dated
20th February, 1992 passed by the Collector was also  not  under  challenge,
inspite  of  the  same  the  High  Court  declared  the  order  dated   20th
February,1992 as illegal.
34.   For the reason aforesaid, the impugned order  dated  1st  March,  2011
passed by the High Court in W.P. No.10220 of 1996  etc.  cannot  be  upheld.
The same is accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted  to  the  District
Collector, Meerut to determine the liability of the Company  upto  the  date
of vesting i.e.  28th  October,  1984  after  notice  to  the  parties.  The
authority while so determining shall take into consideration  the  liability
of the Company as on 28th October, 1984,  including  labour  charges,  Sales
Tax, loan amount given by  the  State  Government  etc.  if  payable.  After
determination of liabilities and adjustment of the dues which is payable  by
the Company, if any amount is found payable to the  Company,  the  appellant
shall pay the amount within four months from the date of  determination.  On
the other hand,  if  any  amount  is  found  payable  by  the  Company,  the
Competent authority may recover the amount, in accordance with law.
C.A.No.7122 of 2003, C.A.Nos.7123-7124 of 2003 and C.A.No.7125 of 2003.

35.    For determination of the issue involved in  C.A.  Nos.7122  of  2003,
7123-7124 of 2003, 7125 of 2003  and  7126-7129  of  2003  relevant  factual
matrix of the case is as follows:
      After giving credit of Rs.4.33 crores payable by the State  Government
on account of amounts towards compensation  for  acquisition  of  land,  the
liability of the Company was determined at Rs.6.09 crores on 20th  February,
1992. A sale proclamation was accordingly issued. The land  of  the  Company
measuring 1.391 Hectares  in  village  Maliyana  was  put  to  auction.  The
appellants-M/s.  Rudra  Estate  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  another  were  the  highest
bidders. According to Auction purchasers, the entire amount was paid as  per
highest bid. Title to the land was also transferred in their favour.

36.   The Company being aggrieved preferred  a  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition
No.16451  of  1999  before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at   Allahabad
challenging the sale proclamation dated 28th March, 1992, order  dated  30th
May, 1992 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut  confirming  the  sale
of the properties owned by the Company and the order dated 5th  April,  1999
passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut whereby  the  objections
filed by the Company under  Rule  285-1  of  the  Rules  framed  under  U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
“Land Reforms Act”) was rejected. The said writ petition was allowed by  the
learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order  dated  27th  April,
2001 with following observations:

      “For the facts and reasons stated above, this  petition  succeeds  and
is hereby allowed. The order dated  05.04.1999  (annexure-23),  order  dated
30.05.1992 (Annexure-7), sale proclamation dated 28.3.1992 (Annexure-2)  are
hereby quashed and the respondents are directed to restore back  status  quo
ante as on before the auction sale  dated  28.04.1992  was  held,  within  a
period of two weeks from  the  date  a  certified  copy  of  this  order  is
communicated to the competent authority.”



37.   M/s. Rudra Estate Pvt. Ltd.  being  aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment
preferred review application under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC for review of  the
judgment and order dated 27th April, 2001 passed  by  the  High  Court.  The
review application was disposed of by an order  dated  3rd  September,  2001
with the following observations:

      “In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in my  opinion,  it
will meet the  ends  of  justice  if  I  grant  three  months  time  to  the
respondent no.2 and 3 to refund  the  amount  in  question  to  the  auction
purchasers/application, during this time the said  amount  shall  positively
be paid to them. It is ordered accordingly.”



      Another application was filed by M/s. Rudra  Estate  Pvt.  Ltd.  under
Order XIVII Rule 1 CPC for review of the order dated  3rd  September,  2001.
The said review application was dismissed by  the  impugned  judgment  dated
15th March, 2002.

38.   The aforesaid orders have been challenged  in  C.A.  No.7122  of  2003
(M/s. Rudra Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s.  Jaswant  Sugar  Mills  Ltd.  &
Ors.), C.A. Nos. 7123-7124 of 2003, C.A.  No.7125  of  2003  (Shri  Munindra
Singh & Anr. vs. M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. & Ors.)  and  C.A.  Nos.7126-
7129 of 2003 (Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vs.  M/s  Jaswant  Sugar
Mills Ltd.).

      On 30th October, 2002 C.A. No.7122 of 2003  preferred  by  M/s.  Rudra
Estate Pvt. Ltd. was taken up and this Court passed the following order:

      “Delay condoned.

      Out of the 3 special leave petitions, the only special leave  petition
which we find worth being entertained,  after  hearing  the  learned  senior
counsel for the petitioners, is as against the order dated 15.3.2002.  Issue
notice to respondents No.2 to 4 only limited to the question as to  why  the
amount directed to be refunded to the petitioner should not bear  reasonable
interest. Dasti service in addition is permitted.

      The other two special leave petitions are dismissed.”



      On 24th January, 2003, C.A. Nos. 7123-24 of  2003  preferred  by  Shri
Munindra Singh & Anr. were taken up and  this  Court  passed  the  following
order:

      “Delay condoned .

      Permission to file the Special Leave Petition is granted.

      After  hearing  the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners,  we  are
satisfied that no fault can be found with the impugned judgment of the  High
Court so far as the setting aside of the sale is concerned.

      The learned counsel for the petitioners invites our attention  to  the
Order dated 20.10.2002 (page  94C  of  the  Paper  Book).  Issue  notice  to
respondent nos.1 to 4 limited to the question as to  why  the  amount  which
will be directed to be refunded to the petitioners  herein  consequent  upon
the sale having been set aside should not bear reasonable interest.

      Tag with SLP(C)No.21540/2002.”



39.    As against the  said  order  C.A.  Nos.  7126-29/2003  (Commissioner,
Meerut Division, Meerut & Ors. Vs. M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd.) have  been
preferred by  the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The said  case  was
also tagged with the aforesaid appeals.

40.   In view of the fact that this Court vide order dated 27th April,  2003
in C.A. Nos. 7123-7124 of 2003 held that this Court  is  satisfied  that  no
fault can be found with the impugned judgment of the High Court  so  far  as
the setting aside of the sale is concerned, we dismiss the appeals,  so  far
it relates to cancellation of auction sale.

41.   We have heard the parties only on the limited question as to  why  the
amount which has been directed to be refunded  to  the  auction  purchasers-
appellants herein should not bear reasonable interest.
42.   In a situation like in the  present  case,  one  cannot  hold  of  any
statute entitling the auction purchasers to  claim  interest,  in  case  the
auction got cancelled or set aside by the Court  of  law.  Counsel  for  the
parties also could not refer any  of  the  clauses  of  auction  prescribing
interest on refund of amount in case of cancellation  of  auction  or  sale.
The question arises as to whether in such a situation an  auction  purchaser
can claim interest on equitable ground.
43. In State of Maharashtra and others vs. Maimuma Banu and  others,  (2003)
7 SCC 448, the question arose as to whether interest was payable  on  rental
compensation. In the said case, Government resolution provided  for  payment
of rental compensation expeditiously  but  no  provision  was  made  to  pay
interest in case of delayed payment. This Court in the said case held:

“10. The crucial  question  is  whether  there  can  be  any  direction  for
interest on rental compensation once it is held that  the  same  has  to  be
paid within the time frame,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  is  no
statutory obligation.

11. It is not in dispute that in certain cases payments  have  already  been
made. Though the inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  High  Court  is  not
justified in directing grant of interest on the logic of various  provisions
contained in the Act, yet there is an element of equity  in  favour  of  the
landowners. It is, however, seen that the writ applications were filed  long
after the possession was taken. This factor cannot be lost  sight  of  while
working out the  equities.  It  would,  therefore,  be  appropriate  if  the
appellants pay interest @ 6% from 1-4-2000 till amounts  payable  as  rental
compensation are paid to the landowners concerned. This direction shall  not
apply to those cases where the payments have already been made prior to 1-4-
2000. Appeals are allowed to the extent indicated  without  any  stipulation
of costs.”

44.   In the present case, we find that there was no  mis-representation  on
the part of the auction purchasers; they deposited the total auction  amount
within the time stipulated. It has not been in dispute  that  the  title  of
the land  was  also  transferred  in  their  favour.  But  for  the  reasons
mentioned by the High Court  the  sale  has  been  cancelled.  It  has  been
ordered to refund amount in favour of  the  auction  purchaser-appellant(s).
We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants  should  not
get interest on the said amount. Taking  into  consideration  the  aforesaid
factor while working out equities, it would, therefore,  be  appropriate  to
direct the State to pay interest at the rate of  6%  on  the  amount  to  be
refunded as per the High Court’s order with effect  from  27th  April,  2001
and 3rd September, 2001, the day, the High Court passed the impugned  order.
The concerned respondents are directed accordingly.
45.   C.A. Nos. 6169-6171 of 2013, C.A. Nos. 6172-6174 of 2013,  C.A.No.7122
of 2003, C.A.Nos.7123-7124 of 2003,  C.A.No.7125  of  2003  are  allowed  in
terms of the directions as above. The appeals  (C.A.Nos.7126-7129  of  2003)
filed by the Commissioner, Meerut are dismissed. No costs.

                                              ……………………………………………………………………….J.
                                      (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                              ……………………………………………………………………….J.
                                            (KURIAN JOSEPH)

NEW DELHI,
JUNE 30, 2014.


Service matter - fresh appointment under direct recruit - Deputy Register selected and appointed as Registrar - in letter of appointment, it was typed as promotion and central pay scale was fixed as he adopted central pay scale while he was as Deputy registrar in the same institution - Disciplinary proceedings issued - found guilty of bias - challenged - Apex court held that The appellant-Institute when discovered that respondent No.1 was drawing salary in a higher scale of pay than the scale of pay to which he was entitled constituted a five-members Enquiry Committee to look into the matter headed by Dr.Balaveera Reddy. Though allegation of bias has been made against Dr.Balaveera Reddy, no allegation has been made against rest of the four Members of the Committee. Even the other members were not impleaded as a party. In this background, it was not open for the High Court to give finding of bias against one or other member of the Committee, who decided the issue pursuant to which the notice was issued to respondent no.1. The Division Bench of the High Court while wrongly held that the enquiry was tainted with bias, erred in holding that respondent no.1 was entitled to the Central scale of pay.= NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY … APPELLANT VERSUS U. DINAKAR AND ANR. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41719

Service matter - fresh appointment under direct recruit - Deputy Register selected and appointed as Registrar - in letter of appointment, it was typed as promotion and central pay scale was fixed as he adopted central pay scale while he was as Deputy registrar in the same institution - Disciplinary proceedings issued - found guilty of bias - challenged - Apex court held that The   appellant-Institute   when discovered that respondent No.1 was drawing salary in a higher scale of  pay than the scale of pay to which he was entitled  constituted  a  five-members Enquiry Committee to look into the  matter  headed  by  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy. Though allegation of bias has  been  made  against  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy,  no allegation has been made against rest of the four Members of the  Committee. Even the other members were not impleaded as a party.  In  this  background, it was not open for the High Court to give finding of bias  against  one  or other member of the Committee, who decided the issue pursuant to  which  the notice was issued to respondent no.1. The Division Bench of the  High  Court while wrongly held that the enquiry was tainted with bias, erred in  holding that respondent no.1 was entitled to the Central scale of pay.=

It  is  alleged  that  he  colluded  with  the
officers  of  the  appellant-Institute  to  issue  an   appointment   letter
prescribing the Central scale of pay i.e. Rs.3000-100-3500-125-4500  instead
of the State pay scale of Rs.2375-75-2900-100-3700-125-4450 as  provided  in
the advertisement notification dated 29th July, 1994.
11.   When the  appellant-Institute  discovered  that  respondent  No.1  was
drawing a salary higher than what he was entitled to due to the  anomaly  in
the advertisement and the  letter  of  appointment,  it  appointed  a  five-
members Enquiry Committee, which comprised of respondent No.2 herein as  the
Chairman and  4  other  Members,  to  look  into  the  matter.  The  Enquiry
Committee issued a show cause notice dated 23rd January, 1998 to  respondent
No.1 seeking explanation for the  aforesaid  anomaly.  Later,  another  show
cause notice was issued to respondent No.1  by  the  appellant-Institute  on
9th February, 1999 to which respondent no.1 sent a reply on  15th  February,
1999. The Enquiry Committee considered all the aspects  of  the  matter  and
submitted a  report  dated  24th  February,  1999  recommending  appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent No.1.=
Accordingly, the  pay  scale  of  Rs.3000-
4500 mentioned in the appointment  letter  dated  16th  February,  1995  was
deleted and same was substituted with pay  scale  of  Rs.2375-4450  and  the
salary was refixed as per the said pay scale.=
Though
the order of refixing was challenged, respondent No.1 did not challenge  the
Government of India notification  dated  19th  July,  1988  whereby  it  was
decided to grant  State  scale  of  pay  to  the  newly  appointed/recruited
persons.During the pendency of the writ  petition  the  appellant-Institute
issued Office Memorandum dated  7th  February,  2000  requesting  respondent
No.1 to refund the excess salary of  Rs.4,763.50  paise  paid  to  him.  
According  to  appellant,  there  was  a
mistake in the order of appointment issued in favour of respondent no.1,  it
was open to the competent authority to rectify the mistake.
21.   On the other hand, stand taken by  respondent  no.1  is  that  he  was
rightly granted Central scale of pay, the order  recalling  the  benefit  is
illegal. =
We do not intend to go  into  the  question  whether  respondent  no.1
manipulated and inserted the word promoted in  the  letter  of  appointment.
Admittedly,  the  appointment  order  has  been  issued  pursuant   to   the
notification of direct recruitment,  therefore,  it  should  be  treated  as
direct recruitment. Mistake if any committed by clerical staff or any  other
authority in mentioning the  word  ‘promoted  and  appointed’  in  place  of
‘appointed’ and showing higher scale of pay of  Rs.3000-100-3500-125-4500,it
is always open to the competent authority to correct the mistake.=
 The bias or malafide plea is generally raised by an interested  party,
the Court cannot draw any conclusion unless  allegations  are  substantiated
beyond doubt. 
In this connection, one may refer decision in  M.V.  Thimmaiah
and others v. Union Public Service Commission and others (2008) 2  SCC  119.
So  far  as  the  allegation  of  malafide  against  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy  is
concerned, though he was impleaded as a party, no  specific  allegation  was
made  to  substantiate  such  allegation.   
The   appellant-Institute   when
discovered that respondent No.1 was drawing salary in a higher scale of  pay
than the scale of pay to which he was entitled  constituted  a  five-members
Enquiry Committee to look into the  matter  headed  by  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy.
Though allegation of bias has  been  made  against  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy,  no
allegation has been made against rest of the four Members of the  Committee.
Even the other members were not impleaded as a party.  In  this  background,
it was not open for the High Court to give finding of bias  against  one  or
other member of the Committee, who decided the issue pursuant to  which  the
notice was issued to respondent no.1. The Division Bench of the  High  Court
while wrongly held that the enquiry was tainted with bias, erred in  holding
that respondent no.1 was entitled to the Central scale of pay.
29. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and  order
dated 8th November, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High  Court  of
Karnataka in Writ Appeal No.1030 of 2006. The appeal is allowed.  No  costs. 

 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41719

                                                              REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5854 OF 2014
                  (arising out of SLP(C) No.31621 of 2012)

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY              … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

U. DINAKAR AND ANR.                                … RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  8th
November, 2011 passed by the High Court  of  Karnataka,  Bangalore  in  Writ
Appeal No.1030 of 2006. By the impugned judgment,  the  High  Court  allowed
the appeal preferred by the respondent no.1 and held that he is entitled  to
the Central pay scale and denial of such scale would be bad in law.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      Respondent No.1 was selected and  appointed  as  Deputy  Registrar  of
Karnataka Regional Engineering College,  Suratkal  (now  known  as  National
Institute of  Technology,  Karnataka)  in  March,  1979.  While  he  was  so
performing the duty the Department of Education, Ministry of Human  Resource
Development,  Government   of   India   issued   a   communication   bearing
No.F.No.A11014/2/87/T-4 dated 5th February, 1988 to the  Principals  of  all
Regional Engineering Colleges (except  Srinagar  and  Jaipur)  revising  the
scales of pay attached to  the  Senior  Administrative  posts  carrying  the
Central scales of pay on the basis of  the  recommendations  of  the  Fourth
Central  Pay  Commission  w.e.f.  01.01.1986.  Thereafter,  the   Board   of
Governors of the appellant-Institute resolved to accept the proposal of  the
Central Government regarding revision of pay scale attached  to  the  Senior
Administrative posts.
4.    On 19th April, 1988, the Department of Education,  Ministry  of  Human
Resource Development, Government of  India,  issued  another  order  to  the
effect that the non-academic post of Registrar,  Librarian  and  Foremen  in
the Regional Engineering Colleges be given State pay  scales  comparable  to
pay scales in similar other institutions in the State. It was  decided  that
an option may be sought from the present incumbents whether they would  like
to opt for the Central scales of pay or State scales of pay. Those  who  may
opt for Central Scales of pay their posts may be  convened  into  the  State
Scales of pay as and when the present incumbents to the posts leave the  job
or retire. In due course of time all the  posts  are  converted  into  State
scales of pay. Thus, for new incumbents it was ordered to give State  scales
of pay.  The relevant extract of the order dated 19th April, 1988  which  is
necessary for adjudication of this appeal is as under:
“In the meeting it was observed that  the  incumbents  to  the  non-academic
post of Registrar, Librarian and Foreman in the RECs are on  Central  scales
of pay, put drawing D.a. and other allowances  of  State  Government  rates.
The matter was discussed at length and it was observed  that  incumbents  to
these posts are mostly recruited locally. It was  accordingly  decided  that
incumbents to all these posts may be given State pay  scales  comparable  to
pay scales in similar other institutions in the State keeping  in  view  the
size of the RECs and duties and responsibilities assigned  accordingly  draw
State scales and State Government allowances. To obviate any  difficulty  in
implementing this decision, it was decided that  an  option  may  be  sought
from the present incumbents whether they would like to opt for  the  Central
scales of pay or State scales  of  pay.  However,  for  these  who  opt  for
central scales of pay, those posts may be convened into State scales of  pay
as and when the present incumbents to the posts leave  the  job  or  retire.
Thus in due course of time all these posts be converted  into  State  scales
of pay.”

5.    According to appellant, the aforesaid order dated  19th  April,  1988,
was adopted and applied in respect of the appellant-Institute  with  respect
to the Senior Administrative Posts in the appellant-Institute.
6.    The Department of Education,  Government  of  India  issued  an  order
dated 23rd June, 1990 granting its  approval  to  the  Government  of  India
notification dated 5th February, 1988 and giving an option to  the  existing
incumbents either to continue in the Central pay scale or opt for State  pay
scale. It further provided that the State pay scale suggested therein  would
be applicable to the future incumbents, who will be appointed as  and  when,
the existing incumbents would  cease  to  hold  the  respective  posts.  The
relevant portion of the letter dated 23rd June, 1990 reads as under:
”Pay to the aforesaid no academic posts into the Karnataka Regional
Engineering college, Surthkal, as indicated in Column 4 of the Statement
below:


|S. No.    |Names of the  |Present scale now|Revised 1986 scale|
|          |post          |approved (w.e.f. |of pay as approved|
|          |              |of pay)          |by Govt. Of India |
|1.        |Registrar     |Rs.3000-100-3500-|Rs.2200-5-2300-75-|
|          |              |125-4500         |2900-90-2350-100-3|
|          |              |                 |950-120-4070      |
|2.        |Workshop      |Rs.3000-100-3500-|Rs.2200-5-2300-75-|
|          |Supdt.        |125-4500         |2900-90-2350-100-3|
|          |              |                 |950-120-4070      |
|3.        |Deputy        |Rs.2200-75-2800-E|Rs.1900-50-2300-75|
|          |Registrar     |B-100-4000       |-2900-90-3350-100-|
|          |              |                 |3650              |
|4.        |Librarian     |Rs.2200-075-2800-|Rs.1900-50-2300-75|
|          |              |EB-100-4000      |-2900-90-3350-100-|
|          |              |                 |3650              |

7.      Respondent  No.1,  who  was  working  as  Deputy  Registrar  in  the
appellant-Institute opted for the Central pay  scale  with  respect  to  the
post of Deputy Registrar vide his letter dated 7th July, 1993.
8.    Several posts, including the post  of  the  Registrar,  became  vacant
during this period. Therefore, the appellant-Institute  issued  notification
No.5295/ESTT/12/B1  dated  29th  July,  1994   inviting   applications   for
appointment to various posts,  including  the  post  of  the  Registrar,  by
direct recruitment. The notification unequivocally stated that the scale  of
 pay applicable to the post  of  Registrar  is  Rs.2375-75-200-100-3700-125-
4450 and that besides the basic pay in the applicable time scale of  pay  of
the respective posts, admissible allowances  in  accordance  with  Karnataka
Government Rules as in  force  from  time  to  time  are  payable.  Relevant
extract of the advertisement dated 29th July, 1994 reads as under:
“4.   Registrar: 1 post (Principal’s office)
(Scale of pay Rs.2375-75-200-100-3700-125-4450).

II.   Details of qualification/Experience/ specialization required:

      xxx   xxx  xxx   xxx   xxx

General Instructions:
In case a candidate for the advertised post is not suitable  for  the  post,
the next lower position may be offered to the candidates,  it  he  is  found
suitable for the lower position.

      xxx   xxx  xxx   xxx   xxx

IV.   Besides the basic pay in the applicable  time  scale  of  pay  of  the
respective  posts  admissible  allowances  in  accordance   with   Karnataka
Government Rules in force from time to time are payable.”

9.    Pursuant to the said advertisement, respondent No.1  applied  for  the
post of Registrar of the appellant Institute.  The  Selection  Committee  of
the appellant-Institute selected respondent  No.1  for  the  said  post  and
issued the appointment  letter  No.5487/ESTT/1994/91  dated  16th  February,
1995.
10.   As respondent No.1 was already holding the post  of  Deputy  Registrar
in the  appellant-Institute.  It  is  alleged  that  he  colluded  with  the
officers  of  the  appellant-Institute  to  issue  an   appointment   letter
prescribing the Central scale of pay i.e. Rs.3000-100-3500-125-4500  instead
of the State pay scale of Rs.2375-75-2900-100-3700-125-4450 as  provided  in
the advertisement notification dated 29th July, 1994.
11.   When the  appellant-Institute  discovered  that  respondent  No.1  was
drawing a salary higher than what he was entitled to due to the  anomaly  in
the advertisement and the  letter  of  appointment,  it  appointed  a  five-
members Enquiry Committee, which comprised of respondent No.2 herein as  the
Chairman and  4  other  Members,  to  look  into  the  matter.  The  Enquiry
Committee issued a show cause notice dated 23rd January, 1998 to  respondent
No.1 seeking explanation for the  aforesaid  anomaly.  Later,  another  show
cause notice was issued to respondent No.1  by  the  appellant-Institute  on
9th February, 1999 to which respondent no.1 sent a reply on  15th  February,
1999. The Enquiry Committee considered all the aspects  of  the  matter  and
submitted a  report  dated  24th  February,  1999  recommending  appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent No.1.
12.   Based on the  recommendation  of  the  Enquiry  Committee  dated  24th
February, 1999, a show cause notice dated  10th  May,  1999  was  issued  to
respondent  No.1  seeking  an  explanation  as  to  why  the  pay  scale  of
respondent No.1 as shown in the appointment letter should not  be  rectified
by amending the appointment letter dated 16th February, 1995 issued  to  him
by deleting the scale of pay of Rs.3000-4500 and substituting the same  with
the scale of Rs.2375-4450. The show cause notice  also  sought  to  fix  his
salary accordingly and sought explanation  as  to  recovery  of  excess  pay
drawn by respondent No.1 be not made.
13.   On 5th  June,  1999,  respondent  No.1  submitted  his  reply  to  the
aforesaid show cause notice dated 10th May, 1999.
14.    Thereafter,  on  6th  July,  1999  the   appellant-Institute,   after
considering the reply filed by respondent No.1 issued  an  order  rectifying
the pay scale of respondent No.1. Accordingly, the  pay  scale  of  Rs.3000-
4500 mentioned in the appointment  letter  dated  16th  February,  1995  was
deleted and same was substituted with pay  scale  of  Rs.2375-4450  and  the
salary was refixed as per the said pay scale.
15.    Aggrieved by the order dated 6th July, 1999, passed by the appellant-
Institute, respondent No.1 filed an appeal challenging the  aforesaid  order
and claiming the pay scale  which  he  was  drawing  under  the  appointment
order. The Board of Governors in its 128th  meeting  dated  30th  September,
1999/13th October, 1999 rejected the appeal filed  by  respondent  No.1  and
upheld the pay scale rectification order dated 6th July, 1999.
16.   Pursuant to the above order, the appellant-Institute issued  an  order
dated 13th October, 1999 whereby the pay scale of respondent No.1 was  fixed
in the State pay  scale  of  Rs.2375-75-2900-100-3700-125-4450  with  effect
from 20th February, 1995. He was granted the revised  equivalent  pay  scale
of Rs.7400-200-8800-260-10880-320-12320.
17.   Being aggrieved, respondent No.1 filed a Writ  Petition  No.40037/1999
before the High Court of Karnataka challenging the action of the  appellant-
Institute refixing his salary on the basis of the State  pay  scale.  Though
the order of refixing was challenged, respondent No.1 did not challenge  the
Government of India notification  dated  19th  July,  1988  whereby  it  was
decided to grant  State  scale  of  pay  to  the  newly  appointed/recruited
persons. During the pendency of the writ  petition  the  appellant-Institute
issued Office Memorandum dated  7th  February,  2000  requesting  respondent
No.1 to refund the excess salary of  Rs.4,763.50  paise  paid  to  him.  The
appellant-Institute also filed a  counter-affidavit  in  the  writ  petition
denying all the allegations and justifying the order impugned.
18.   Learned Single Judge of the High Court by  judgment  and  order  dated
30th May, 2006 dismissed the writ petition.
19.   Against the order of dismissal respondent no.1 preferred  Writ  Appeal
No.1030 of 2006, which was  allowed  by  the  impugned  judgment  dated  8th
November, 2011.
20.   Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellant  submitted  that
respondent no.1 had not taken any plea of bias  before  the  learned  Single
Judge as apparent from the judgment and order dated 30th  May,  2006  passed
by the learned Single  Judge.  However,  such  plea  was  taken  before  the
Division Bench which allowed the writ appeal inter alia on the  ground  that
the enquiry was tainted  by  bias.  According  to  appellant,  there  was  a
mistake in the order of appointment issued in favour of respondent no.1,  it
was open to the competent authority to rectify the mistake.
21.   On the other hand, stand taken by  respondent  no.1  is  that  he  was
rightly granted Central scale of pay, the order  recalling  the  benefit  is
illegal.
22.   Appointment to the post of Registrar was  made  by  the  Institute  by
direct recruitment pursuant to notification  No.5295/ESTT/12/B1  dated  29th
July, 1994. The notification unequivocally stated  that  the  scale  of  pay
applicable to the post of Registrar is Rs.2375-75-200-100-3700-125-4450  and
that besides the basic pay in the  applicable  time  scale  of  pay  of  the
respective  posts,  admissible  allowances  in  accordance  with   Karnataka
Government Rules as in force from time to time are payable. Pursuant to  the
said notification respondent no.1  was  appointed  as  Registrar  by  letter
No.5487/ESTT/1994/91 dated 16th  July,  1995.  However,  in  the  letter  of
appointment the Central  scale  of  pay  of  Rs.3000-100-3500-125-4500  with
other allowances were mentioned.
23.   It is not the case of respondent no.1 that the Central  scale  of  pay
of Rs.3000-4500 as shown in his letter of appointment was  notified  by  the
Institute. The case of respondent no.1 is also not a case  of  promotion  so
as to enable him to claim  Central  scale  of  pay,  which  he  was  drawing
against lower post of Deputy Registrar. The case of  respondent  no.1  being
that of the direct recruitment pursuant to  notification  dated  29th  July,
1994, respondent no.1 cannot claim that he  was  promoted  to  the  post  of
Registrar. In the letter of appointment, it was  mentioned  that  respondent
no.1 i.e. “Sh. U. Dinakar is promoted and appointed  as  Registrar”  in  the
office of the Karnataka Regional Engineering College, Surathkal.
24.   We do not intend to go  into  the  question  whether  respondent  no.1
manipulated and inserted the word promoted in  the  letter  of  appointment.
Admittedly,  the  appointment  order  has  been  issued  pursuant   to   the
notification of direct recruitment,  therefore,  it  should  be  treated  as
direct recruitment. Mistake if any committed by clerical staff or any  other
authority in mentioning the  word  ‘promoted  and  appointed’  in  place  of
‘appointed’ and showing higher scale of pay of  Rs.3000-100-3500-125-4500,it
is always open to the competent authority to correct the mistake.
25.   However, before such correction it is incumbent to  the  part  of  the
authority to inform the officer concerned that there is  a  mistake  in  his
order of appointment and competent authority intends to correct the same  so
as to enable the officer to submit an effective reply and show that  it  was
not a mistake but the order was genuine and in accordance with law.
26.   In the present case, the authority  had  given  notice  to  respondent
no.1 and brought to his notice that  there  is  a  genuine  mistake  in  his
letter of appointment and he has been wrongly given a higher  pay  of  scale
of Rs.3000-4500. Respondent no.1 submitted his reply and not taken any  plea
that he has not applied pursuant to the notification of  direct  recruitment
but his case was considered by way of promotion. In that view of the  matter
we hold that the competent authority  has  inherent  power  to  correct  the
mistake if any committed in the order of  appointment  after  giving  proper
opportunity to the concerned employee/officer.
27.   In view of the aforesaid  finding  we  hold  that  the  appellant  had
committed no error in correcting the letter of appointment by replacing  the
correct scale of pay to which respondent no.1 was entitled i.e.  Rs.2375-75-
2900-100-3700-125-4450 as provided in the  advertisement/notification  dated
29th July, 1994.
28.   The bias or malafide plea is generally raised by an interested  party,
the Court cannot draw any conclusion unless  allegations  are  substantiated
beyond doubt. In this connection, one may refer decision in  M.V.  Thimmaiah
and others v. Union Public Service Commission and others (2008) 2  SCC  119.
So  far  as  the  allegation  of  malafide  against  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy  is
concerned, though he was impleaded as a party, no  specific  allegation  was
made  to  substantiate  such  allegation.   The   appellant-Institute   when
discovered that respondent No.1 was drawing salary in a higher scale of  pay
than the scale of pay to which he was entitled  constituted  a  five-members
Enquiry Committee to look into the  matter  headed  by  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy.
Though allegation of bias has  been  made  against  Dr.Balaveera  Reddy,  no
allegation has been made against rest of the four Members of the  Committee.
Even the other members were not impleaded as a party.  In  this  background,
it was not open for the High Court to give finding of bias  against  one  or
other member of the Committee, who decided the issue pursuant to  which  the
notice was issued to respondent no.1. The Division Bench of the  High  Court
while wrongly held that the enquiry was tainted with bias, erred in  holding
that respondent no.1 was entitled to the Central scale of pay.
29. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and  order
dated 8th November, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High  Court  of
Karnataka in Writ Appeal No.1030 of 2006. The appeal is allowed.  No  costs.

                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                       (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                               …………………………………………………………………….J.
                                            (KURIAN JOSEPH)

NEW DELHI,
JUNE 30,2014.

Wednesday, July 9, 2014

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 - sec.42, 66 and 175 - the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after about 31 years of the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding for restoration of land initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was not maintainable. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment dated 2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court as well as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the Single Judge. The appeal is allowed. No costs.= Ram Karan (Dead) Through LRs. & ors. … APPELLANTS VERSUS State of Rajasthan and Ors. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41718

   Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955 - sec.42, 66 and 175 - the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed  prior  to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after  about  31  years  of  the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding  for  restoration  of  land
initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was  not maintainable.  We,  accordingly,  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  dated 2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court  as  well as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed  by  the  Single  Judge.  The appeal is allowed. No costs.=
The suit property is an agricultural land  admeasuring  10  bighas  13
biswa situated in village Med, Jaipur, Rajasthan. The said land was sold  by
its recorded Khatedar, Dalu (hereinafter referred to  as  the  “vendor”)  to
Ram Karan (since deceased) and Mahendra Kumar  who  belong  to  upper  caste
vide a registered  sale  deed  dated  12th  January,  1962.  Ram  Karan  and
Mahendra Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the “vendee”) were both  landless
persons on the date of sale of disputed land. The said vendees had  been  in
cultivator possession of the disputed land prior to 12th January, 1962.
4.    Subsequently, Gram Panchayat allowed the land to  be  mutated  in  the
name of the vendee, Ram Karan and Mahendra Kumar. It  was  mutated  on  10th
September, 1966 and they became Khatedar.
5.    After lapse of more than 31  years,  Tehsildar,  Viratnagar,  District
Jaipur,  instituted  Case  No.1681/1993  before  the  Assistant   Collector,
Shahpura, District Jaipur, u/s  175  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) seeking  ejectment  of  the  vendee.
The said suit was filed on the ground that the  vendor;Dalu  belonged  to  a
Scheduled Caste category (Nayak) and consequently the  disputed  land  could
not be sold to the vendees who belonged to an upper caste of ‘Mahajan’.  The
contention was that the sale was void being in contravention of  Section  42
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the  Act’).
The Tehsildar also moved an application u/s 112 of the Act  for  appointment
of a receiver. The Assistant Collector by order dated 1.1.1994 rejected  the
application  made  by  Tehsildar  for  appointment  of  receiver   to   take
possession of the suit land. He held that the vendee had been in  possession
and cultivating the suit land for 32 years and had otherwise matured  rights
by adverse possession. He further held that there was no  prima  facie  case
in favour of the State and also the balance of convenience was in favour  of
the vendee.   
Proviso to Section 42  inserted  by  Section  4  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy
(Second Amendment) Act No.28 of 1956, giving Section  42  retrospective  has
been declared violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of  India  by  the
Rajasthan High Court in Triveni Shyam Sharma v. Board  of  Revenue  &  Ors.,
[AIR 1965 Raj.54] which having not challenged reached finality. In  view  of
such decision, the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed  prior  to
1.5.1964 cannot be held to be void.
The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after  about  31  years  of  the
sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.
 In the present case, neither any  objection  was
raised nor was any application filed by vendors for restoration of  land  in
their favour. The suit was filed by the  Tehsildar,  Viratnagar  after  more
than 31 years.  No ground is shown to file such petition  after  long  delay
nor it was mentioned as to whether the  vendors  i.e.  original  landholders
made any application for restoration of land in their favour.
39.   In view of the matter, we hold that the suit being  filed  beyond  the
reasonable period  was  fit  to  be  dismissed.   The  Additional  Collector
rightly dismissed the suit being barred by limitation.
40.   Counsel for the appellant  submitted  that  under  notification  dated
20.09.1977 “Nayak” were not declared as  Scheduled  Castes  and,  therefore,
there was no occasion for the Tehsildar to file a  suit  in  the  year  1993
i.e.  16  years  after  notification  dated  20.09.1977  on  the  ground  of
violation of Section 42.. This question has not been dealt with by the  High
Court and the fact aforesaid has not been disputed by the respondents.
41.   Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding  for  restoration  of  land
initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was  not
maintainable.  We,  accordingly,  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  dated
2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court  as  well
as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed  by  the  Single  Judge.  The
appeal is allowed. No costs.

2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41718


                                                              REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5853 OF 2014
                  (arising out of SLP (C) No.16638 of 2012)


Ram Karan (Dead) Through LRs. & ors.          … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

State of Rajasthan and Ors.                 … RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  2nd
February, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of  Judicature
for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in  D.B.  Civil  Special  Appeal  (Writ)
No.557/2002. By the impugned judgment the High Court  dismissed  the  appeal
preferred by the appellant and upheld the order dated 23rd May, 2002  passed
by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.639 of 1996.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      The suit property is an agricultural land  admeasuring  10  bighas  13
biswa situated in village Med, Jaipur, Rajasthan. The said land was sold  by
its recorded Khatedar, Dalu (hereinafter referred to  as  the  “vendor”)  to
Ram Karan (since deceased) and Mahendra Kumar  who  belong  to  upper  caste
vide a registered  sale  deed  dated  12th  January,  1962.  Ram  Karan  and
Mahendra Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the “vendee”) were both  landless
persons on the date of sale of disputed land. The said vendees had  been  in
cultivator possession of the disputed land prior to 12th January, 1962.
4.    Subsequently, Gram Panchayat allowed the land to  be  mutated  in  the
name of the vendee, Ram Karan and Mahendra Kumar. It  was  mutated  on  10th
September, 1966 and they became Khatedar.
5.    After lapse of more than 31  years,  Tehsildar,  Viratnagar,  District
Jaipur,  instituted  Case  No.1681/1993  before  the  Assistant   Collector,
Shahpura, District Jaipur, u/s  175  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) seeking  ejectment  of  the  vendee.
The said suit was filed on the ground that the  vendor;Dalu  belonged  to  a
Scheduled Caste category (Nayak) and consequently the  disputed  land  could
not be sold to the vendees who belonged to an upper caste of ‘Mahajan’.  The
contention was that the sale was void being in contravention of  Section  42
of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the  Act’).
The Tehsildar also moved an application u/s 112 of the Act  for  appointment
of a receiver. The Assistant Collector by order dated 1.1.1994 rejected  the
application  made  by  Tehsildar  for  appointment  of  receiver   to   take
possession of the suit land. He held that the vendee had been in  possession
and cultivating the suit land for 32 years and had otherwise matured  rights
by adverse possession. He further held that there was no  prima  facie  case
in favour of the State and also the balance of convenience was in favour  of
the vendee.
6.    Against the aforesaid order dated 1.1.1994,  the  Tehsildar  filed  an
appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority and the  same  was  registered  as
Appeal No.9 of 1994. The Revenue Appellate Authority  by  order  dated  28th
January, 1994 held that in order to effectuate the social objective  u/s  42
of the Act, the State Government has enhanced the time for instituting  suit
u/s 175 so that old cases of sale may be reopened. The  appeal  was  allowed
and order dated 1.1.1994 passed by the Assistant Collector was set aside.
7.    The Tehsildar was appointed  as  receiver  of  the  said  land  having
Khasra nos.2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2318,  2326,  2327,  2328  total  9
Tulka 25 hectares.
8.    The Vendee, Ram Karan and Mahendra,  challenged  the  aforesaid  order
dated 28.4.1994 in  revision  before  the  Board  of  Revenue  which  remain
pending.
9.    During the pendency of  the  proceedings  u/s  175  of  the  Act,  the
Tehsildar filed a reference under Rule 82 of the Land  Record  Rules  before
1st Additional Collector, Viratnagar, District Jaipur  seeking  cancellation
of the mutation dated 10.09.1963.  The  same  was  registered  as  Reference
No.261/94/LR/Jaipur of 1994.  The  ground  taken  was  that  the  sale  deed
executed by the vendor, Dalu was in contravention of provisions  of  Section
42 of the Act.
10.   On 26.06.1994, the appellant-vendee moved an  application  before  the
Collector,  Jaipur  seeking  to  stay   reference   proceedings   till   the
adjudication of the proceedings u/s 175 of the Act  or  to  consolidate  the
reference and the proceedings u/s 175 of the Act. In reply to the notice  on
reference the  appellant-vendee  stated  that  the  sale  deed  executed  on
12.01.1962 by Dalu is not in breach of Section  42  of  the  Act.   It  was,
inter alia, contended that the proceedings u/s 175 of the  Act  was  pending
and consequently the reference was liable to be dismissed as  the  same  was
not maintainable.
11.   The  First  Additional  Collector  vide  his  order  dated  19.10.1994
directed to place the matter before the Board of Revenue for passing  orders
to cancel the mutation in favour of the vendee and held  that  the  transfer
was in breach of Section 42 of the Act and there was  no  limitation  for  a
reference to the Board. It was further held that a pending  application  for
ejectment u/s 175 of the Act is no bar to a reference.
12.   On 26.06.1995, the Single Member,  Board  of  Revenue  held  that  the
vendor, Dalu being “Nayak” by caste was from Scheduled  Caste  category  and
the sale deed executed being in  favour  of  General  category  person,  the
mutation carried out on the basis of said sale deed was null  and  void.  He
further held  that  the  sale  deed  dated  12.01.1962  was  void  being  in
contravention of Section 42 of the Act and, therefore,  consequent  mutation
was illegal. The Member,  Board  of  Revenue  set  aside  the  sanction  for
mutation granted by the Gram Panchayat and directed striking off  the  names
of the vendees, Ram Karan and Mahendra and in their place the  name  of  the
vendor/heirs was directed to be recorded.
13.   Against the  aforesaid  order  dated  26.06.1995,  the  Vendees  filed
Special Appeal No.1A/95RLAct/Jaipur before the Division Bench of  the  Board
of Revenue. The Division Bench of  the  Board  of  Revenue  by  order  dated
16.11.1995 affirmed the  order  of  the  Single  Member  and  dismissed  the
appeal.
14.   The appellant-vendees subsequently  filed  S.B.  Civil  Writ  Petition
No.639 of 1996 challenging order dated 19.10.1994 passed by  the  Additional
Collector; order dated 26.06.1995 passed by the Single Member of  the  Board
of Revenue and order dated 16.11.1995 passed by the Division Bench of  Board
of Revenue.
15.   Learned Single Judge of the  High  Court  by  order  dated  23.05.2002
dismissed the writ petition and held that as the sale deed was  executed  in
violation of Section 42 of the Act, the dismissal of application u/s 175  of
the Act does not create any right in favour of the vendees.
16.   Against the aforesaid order dated  23.05.2002,  the  vendee  preferred
D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.557 of  2002.   The  Division  Bench  of  High
Court by impugned judgment and order dated 2.2.2012 dismissed the same.  The
Division Bench held that the vendor, Dalu, was a member of  Scheduled  Caste
category and further held as follows:-
      “Coming to the submission that no steps were taken by the  respondents
u/s 183 of the Tenancy Act, in our considered opinion,  even  if  no  action
was taken, power could have been exercised to annul mutation as  transaction
was illegal and void u/s 42 of the Tenancy Act.   There  was  no  effect  of
dismissal of the application u/s 175 of the  Tenancy  Act  being  barred  by
limitation as no right has accrued  in  favour  of  the  appellants  on  the
strength of sale deed which was void.  The power has been rightly  exercised
and there is no infirmity or  illegality  in  the  orders  which  have  been
impugned in the intra-court appeal.”

17.   Learned counsel for the appellants submitted as follows:
Transfer of land by Scheduled Caste in  favour  of  a  non  Scheduled  Caste
prior to 1964 may be voidable but not void ab initio.
Proviso to Section 42  inserted  by  Section  4  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy
(Second Amendment) Act No.28 of 1956, giving Section  42  retrospective  has
been declared violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of  India  by  the
Rajasthan High Court in Triveni Shyam Sharma v. Board  of  Revenue  &  Ors.,
[AIR 1965 Raj.54] which having not challenged reached finality. In  view  of
such decision, the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed  prior  to
1.5.1964 cannot be held to be void.
The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after  about  31  years  of  the
sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.
18.   On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-State  referred
to legislative history of Section 42 and contended as follows:
The sale deed dated 12.01.1962 was covered u/s 42 of the Act  and  therefore
void.
Void sale deed does not create any right in favour of the appellants
Mutation proceeding had not created any right or  title  in  favour  of  the
appellants
19.   For determining the issues, it is desirable to notice the  Legislative
History of Section 42, as amended from time to time.
Original Section 42 came into force w.e.f. 15.10.1955 reads as under:
“Section 42-Sale or Gift-Except with the general or  special  permission  of
the State Government, no khatedar tenant shall have the  right  to  transfer
by sale or gift his interest in the whole or a part of his  holding  to  any
person who at the date of such transfer is already  in  possession  of  land
which together with the land so transferred  will  exceed  90  acres  of  un
irrigated or 30 acres of irrigated land.
Explanation- If such land is partly irrigated and  party  un-irrigated,  one
acre of irrigated land, shall, for calculating the  area  of  land  for  the
purposes of this Section, be deemed to be equivalent to three acres  of  un-
irrigated land.”

20.   The Act was for the first time amended by  Act  No.27  of  1956  dated
22.09.1956. By this amendment Section 42 remained  untouched.  The  Act  was
again amended by the Rajasthan Tenancy (Second) Amendment Act, 1956 (Act  28
of 1956) which came into force  on  22.09.1956.  By  this  amendment  Act  a
proviso to Section 42 was added as under:
      “Provided that no khatedar tenant being a member  of  Scheduled  Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe shall so transfer these rights in the whole or  a  part
of his holding to any person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste  or  a
Scheduled Tribe.”

      Thereafter, Section 42 was amended and  substituted  w.e.f.  1.05.1964
as under:
“Section 42 General restriction on sale, gift and bequest-  The  sale,  gift
or bequest by a khatedar tenant of his interest in  the  whole  or  part  of
holding shall be void if:
It is not of a survey number except when the area of the  survey  number  so
sold, gifted or bequeathed is in excess of the minimum area  prescribed  for
the purpose of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.53,  in  which  case  also  the  area  not
transferred shall not be fragment:
Provided that this restriction shall not apply if the  area  so  transferred
becomes merged into a contiguous survey number.
Provided further that the restriction shall not apply if the sale,  gift  or
bequest is of the entire interest of a tenant in the survey number;

such sale gift or bequest is by a member of a Scheduled caste in  favour  of
a person who is not a member of the scheduled caste, or by  a  member  of  a
schedule tribe in favour of a person who is not a  member  of  the  schedule
tribe.”

21.   Subsequently, the said Section was amended  by  Rajasthan  Act  15  of
1970 w.e.f. 18.08.1970; Rajasthan Act  22  of  1992  w.e.f.  11.11.1994  and
Rajasthan Act 18 of 1999 w.e.f. 30.09.1999. On such  amendments  Section  42
reads as below:
“42. General  restrictions  on  sale,gift  and  bequest-The  sale,  gift  or
bequest by a khatedar tenants of his interest in the whole or  part  of  his
holding shall be void, if

[(a)...deleted w.e.f. 11.11.1992]
(b) such sale, gift or bequest is by a member of Scheduled Caste  in  favour
of a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Caste, or by  member  of  a
Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a member  of  the  Schedule
Tribe.
[(c) Omitted by Raj. Act 15 of 1970, published in Raj. Gaz.  Ext.,  Part  IV
(ka), dated 18.8.1970 and shall always be deemed to have been omitted].

(bb) Such sale, gift  or  bequest,  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in
clause (b), is by a member of Saharia Scheduled Tribe in favour of a  person
who is not a member of the said Saharai  tribe.   [inserted  vide  Rajasthan
Act 18 of 1999 with effect from 30.09.1999]

22.   According to respondents, sale deed  in  question  was  registered  on
12.01.1962. The second amendment in Section 42 by which a proviso was  added
to Section 42 was brought into force on 22.9.1956 and the sale  in  question
had been effected on 12.01.1962 which is much later to coming into force  of
the second Amendment in Section 42  of  the  Act.   Since  after  22.09.1956
there was clear prohibition in making any sale  by  a  member  of  Scheduled
Castes or Schedules Tribes in favour of a  person  who  was  not  member  of
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, the transfer  made  on  12.01.1962  is
against the said prohibition as well as provisions  of  Section  23  of  the
Contract Act.
23.   So far as amendment made by  Act  No.12  of  1964  dated  1.5.1964  in
Section 42 is concerned the only change made  was  that  a  declaration  was
given that the sale, gift or bequest by a khatedar tenant  in  violation  of
Section 42 “shall be void”.
24.   The amendment Act  No.  12  of  1964  though  brought  into  force  on
1.05.1964 after the alleged sale on 12.1.1962, the fact  remains  that  even
the earlier proviso which was added to Section 42 by  second  Amendment  Act
No. 28 of 1956, also prohibits any transfer of  interest  in  holding  by  a
Member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes to any person who was  not  a
member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.  The  second  amendment  Act
No.28 of 1956 which came into force on 22.09.1956 was in force at  the  time
of alleged sale, The sale being  forbidden  by  law  and  being  opposed  to
public policy within the meaning of Section 23 of the  Contract  Act,  1872,
it was not enforceable by law in view of proviso to Section  42.  Section  2
of the Contract Act, 1872 also provides  that  an  agreement  which  is  not
enforceable by law is said to be void.
25.   Hence, the question that arises for our consideration  is  whether  in
view of proviso to Section 42 inserted by  Second  Amendment  Act  No.28  of
1956, the sale deed executed on 12.01.1962 is void or not.
26.   Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Division  Bench  of  the
Rajasthan High Court decision in Triveni Shyam Sharma v. Board of Revenue  &
Ors, AIR 1965 Raj.54 and submitted  that  in  view  of  the  said  decision,
retrospective effect of proviso having  been  declared  ulta  vires  is  not
applicable to the sale in question. But such submission cannot be accepted.
27. In the case of Triveni Shyam Sharma(Supra), the Division  Bench  of  the
Rajasthan  High  Court  considered  the  effect  of  amendment  on  sale  of
proprietary right prior to the Second amendment and held as follows:
      “10. The main question for determination is whether the  sale  of  the
proprietary right made  by  Gyarsia  in  favour  of  the  petitioner  became
invalid on account of the subsequent legislation,  namely  the  addition  of
the proviso to Section 42 by the Second Amendment Act.   A  perusal  of  the
language of the proviso which was added to Section 42, would  show  that  if
it is read without the context of the deeming  clause,  it  cannot  be  said
that it was to be applied retrospectively. The difficulty was  created  only
because of the words  “shall  be  deemed  always  to  have  been  so  added”
inserted in Section 4 of the second Act while introducing the proviso.”

28.   The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court further held:
“14..........It is contended by him that  the  proviso  was  added  for  the
protection of the interests of the  members  of  the  Scheduled  tribe  and,
therefore, it was saved by this Clause. In our opinion, this  contention  is
not tenable because even, according to Clause (5),  reasonable  restrictions
on the fundamental rights embodied in Article 19(1)(f) can be  imposed  only
for the protection of the interests of the members of the  scheduled  tribe.
The word 'interests' appearing in  the  said  Clause  refers  to  subsisting
interests and not to those interests which cease to exist  even  before  the
law is enacted. The term  'protection'  is  also  suggestive  of  subsisting
interests. If the interests already  cease  to  exist,  there  would  remain
nothing which may be protected by law. In the case of interests which  cease
to exist, it would be revival  of  the  interests  and  not  the  protection
thereof. In a  case  like  the  present  one,  where  Gyarsia   had  already
transferred his interests  before  the  second  Act  came  into  force,  the
deeming clause, if held to be valid,  would  not  protect  the  vendor,  but
would tend to deprive the vendee, i. e., the petitioner of  the  rights  and
interests which had already vested in him. The  deeming  clause  would  not,
therefore,  be  saved  by  Clause  (5)  and  it  would   be   violative   of
Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.

15. In this view of the matter there seems to be no force in the  contention
raised by learned counsel for the contending respondents,  because   Gyarsia
had parted with his  Khatedari  rights  in  the  property  long  before  the
proviso was added to Section 42. The insertion  of  the  proviso  could  not
revive  his  interest  merely  because  the  deeming  clause  rendered   its
operation retrospective. His interest had already ceased to exist and  there
remained nothing to be protected  by  law.  We,  therefore,  hold  that  the
deeming clause was violative of Article 19 in  so  far  as  it  resulted  in
divesting the petitioner in whom  the  vendor's  rights  and  interests  had
vested before the second amendment.”

“18. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that according to  Clause
(b) of the amended section, the sale in favour of the  petitioner  was  void
since he was not a member of a Scheduled Caste  or  a  Scheduled  Tribe.  It
would suffice to say that while substituting  Section  42,  the  Legislature
took good care in not making the  change  to  operate  retrospectively.  The
plain reading  of  Section  3  would  show  that  the  new  Section  42  was
substituted in place of the old one with effect from the date  this  amended
Act came into force namely, 1st May, 1964. This Act also does  not  seek  to
validate the deeming clause appearing in Section 4 of the second Act,  which
was invalid from the very  date  it  was  introduced,  as  held  above.  The
Constitution (Seventeenth  Amendment)  Act,  1964,  protects  the  Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 as it  stood  on  the  date  the  said  amendment  of  the
Constitution of India, came into force.”

29.   The Rajasthan Tenancy (Second) Amendment Act, 1956 (Act  28  of  1956)
came into force on 22.09.1956. The vendor executed the sale deed  in  favour
of the vendee, predecessor in interest of the appellant on  12.01.1962  i.e.
after the second amendment. The appellants cannot  claim  that  their  right
was created much prior to  the  second  amendment  i.e.  before  proviso  to
Section 42 was inserted. Counsel for the respondents rightly contended  that
the alleged sale deed dated 12.01.1962 was effected much after the  date  of
coming into force (22.09.1956) of proviso to Section  42.  There  was  clear
prohibition in making any sale by a member of Scheduled Castes or  Scheduled
Tribes in favour of person  who  was  not  member  of  Scheduled  Castes  or
Scheduled Tribes since after 22.09.1956. The  transfer  made  on  12.01.1962
was against the said prohibition.
30.   Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as follows:
      “23. What consideration and objects  are  lawful,  and  what  not.—The
consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless—

it is forbidden by law;  or is of such  a  nature  that,  if  permitted,  it
would defeat the provisions of  any  law;  or  is  fraudulent;  involves  or
implies, injury to the person or property of another; or the  Court  regards
it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is  said
to be unlawful.  Every agreement of which the  object  or  consideration  is
unlawful is void."

31.   In the present case, the sale deed in question was alleged to be  made
when it was forbidden  by  law  (proviso  to  Section  42).  Therefore,  the
appellant cannot derive advantage of  decision  rendered  by  the  Rajasthan
High Court in Trivei Shyam Sharma(Supra).
32.   To determine the  second  issue  in  relation  to  limitation,  it  is
desirable to notice the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 175  of  the
Act deals with ejectment for illegal transfer or sub-letting  and  reads  as
follows:

“175. Ejectment  for  illegal  transfer  or  sub-letting.-(1)  If  a  tenant
transfers or sub-lets, or executes an instrument purporting to  transfer  or
sublet, the whole or any part of his holding otherwise  than  in  accordance
with the provisions of this Act and the  transferee  or  sub-lessee  or  the
purported such part in pursuance of such transfer or  sub  lease,  both  the
tenant and any person  who  may  have  thus  obtained  or  may  thus  be  in
possession of the  holding  or  any  part  of  the  holding,  shall  on  the
application of the land holder, be liable to  ejectment  from  the  area  so
transferred or sub-let or purported to be transferred or sub-let.


(2) To every application, under this Section  the  transferee  or  the  sub-
tenant or the purported transferee or the sub-tenant, as the  case  may  be,
shall be joined as a party.


(3) On an application being made under this section, the court  shall  issue
a notice to the opposite  party  to  appear  within  such  time  as  may  be
specified therein and show cause why he should not be ejected from the  area
so transferred or sublet or purported to be transferred or sub-let.]


(4) If appearance is made within the time specified in the  notice  and  the
liability to ejectment is contested, the court  shall,  on  payment  of  the
proper court fees, treat the application to be a suit and proceed  with  the
case as a suit:


Provided that in the  event  of  the  application  having  been  made  by  a
Tehsildar in respect of land held directly  from  the  State  Government  no
court-fee shall be payable.


 (5) If no such appearance  is  made  or  if  appearance  is  made  but  the
liability to ejectment is not contested the court shall pass  order  on  the
application as it may deem proper.”

33.   As per Schedule 3 read with Section 214 of the Act the limitation  for
filing a suit for any illegal transfer was  30  years.  The  relevant  entry
which was in Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1967 Edition reads as follows:
|S.NO. |Section of   |Description of suit, application  |Period of    |
|      |Act          |or appeal                         |Limitation   |
|1     |2            |3                                 |4            |
|66    |175          |Application for ejectment for     |Thirty years |
|      |             |illegal transfer or sub-letting   |             |

|Time from which period |Proper Court fees      |Court/officer competent|
|begins to run          |                       |to dispose of          |
|5                      |6                      |7                      |
|Date of transfer or    |50 Paise               |Assistant Collector    |
|sub-lease              |                       |                       |

34.   Counsel for the appellants referred  to  decision  of  this  Court  in
Nathuram v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 13 SCC 585 and in the said case  this
Court held:
“4. The contention urged by the appellant’s counsel is  that  by  virtue  of
Section  42  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  any  transaction   made   in
contravention has been declared to be void and,  therefore,  the  period  of
limitation is not applicable and that the authority should  have  held  that
the [pic]appellants are entitled to get possession. It may be  noticed  that
for taking an action  under  Section  175  of  the  Act,  the  procedure  as
prescribed under sub-section 4(A) of Section 175 has to be  adopted.  It  is
also to be noticed that under Section 214  of  the  Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,
period of limitation is prescribed for initiating action under Section  175.
Under Section 214, it is stated that:
“214. (1) The suits and applications specified in the Third  Schedule  shall
be instituted and made within the  time  prescribed  therein  for  them  and
every such suit instituted or application  made  after  the  expiry  of  the
period of limitation so prescribed shall be dismissed:”

Under the Third Schedule, in clause 66, for  an  application  for  ejectment
for  illegal  transfer  or  sub-letting,  the  period  of  twelve  years  is
originally prescribed for filing  such  an  application  from  the  date  of
transfer or sub-lease. The provision relating to the  period  of  limitation
was later  on  amended  with  effect  from  5-10-1981  and  the  period  was
prescribed as 30 years. So far as the present transaction is concerned,  the
period of limitation applicable is twelve years. The transfers being one  on
2-4-1964 and another on 4-5-1964, the proper application  should  have  been
filed within twelve years,  but  it  was  filed  before  the  Sub-Divisional
Officer only on 22-11-1976. In that view  of  the  matter,  the  proceedings
were initiated beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, it was barred  by
limitation and the finding of the SDO is  correct  which  has  been  rightly
confirmed by the authorities right up to the High Court.”

35.   Learned counsel for the appellants also referred to  decision of  this
Court in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda  District  Cooperative  Milk  Producers
Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363.  In the said case this  Court  while  noticed
that no period of limitation was prescribed under the statute held:

 “18. It is trite that if no  period  of  limitation  has  been  prescribed,
statutory authority must  exercise  its  jurisdiction  within  a  reasonable
period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon  the
nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other  relevant
factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be  exercised
within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of  the
said Act. In any event, the same  should  not  exceed  the  period  of  five
years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be  unreasonable.
Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made  hereinbefore,  must
be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated  hereinbefore,  maximum
period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section  11  of  the
Act is five years.”

36.   In the present case, no action was taken either by the  Vendor  or  by
the State for more than 31 years.  The sale deed was executed on  12.01.1962
and the land was mutated in the  name  of  the  appellants’  predecessor  in
interest on 10.09.1963.  It was after about 31 years, on 6.07.1993 the  suit
was filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar being Case No.1681 of 1993.   In  the
said suit for the first time an application was  filed  for  appointment  of
receiver.  The said application was rejected  by  the  Assistant  Collector,
Shahpura vide order dated 1.1.1994 holding  that  the  vendee  has  been  in
possession and cultivating the suit land for 32 years.
37.   In view of the position of law, as noticed above, it is not  necessary
to see whether the petition for cancellation of mutation was filed  on  time
or not.  The decision of this Court in Nathu Ram (supra) relates to  Section
42 of the Act and the transaction made in contravention with the  provisions
of the said Act. In the said case similar plea were taken  by  the  parties,
having noticed sub-section 4(A) of Section 175 and Section 214 of  the  Act,
this Court held that as the transaction was made much beyond the  period  of
12  years,  the  proceeding  was  beyond  the  period  of  limitation   and,
therefore, barred by limitation.
38.   In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk  Union
Ltd. (supra) this Court held that  if  no  period  of  limitation  has  been
prescribed, statutory authority must  exercise  its  jurisdiction  within  a
reasonable period. However,  what  shall  be  the  reasonable  period  would
depend upon the nature of the statute,  rights  and  liabilities  thereunder
and other relevant factors. In the present case, neither any  objection  was
raised nor was any application filed by vendors for restoration of  land  in
their favour. The suit was filed by the  Tehsildar,  Viratnagar  after  more
than 31 years.  No ground is shown to file such petition  after  long  delay
nor it was mentioned as to whether the  vendors  i.e.  original  landholders
made any application for restoration of land in their favour.
39.   In view of the matter, we hold that the suit being  filed  beyond  the
reasonable period  was  fit  to  be  dismissed.   The  Additional  Collector
rightly dismissed the suit being barred by limitation.
40.   Counsel for the appellant  submitted  that  under  notification  dated
20.09.1977 “Nayak” were not declared as  Scheduled  Castes  and,  therefore,
there was no occasion for the Tehsildar to file a  suit  in  the  year  1993
i.e.  16  years  after  notification  dated  20.09.1977  on  the  ground  of
violation of Section 42.. This question has not been dealt with by the  High
Court and the fact aforesaid has not been disputed by the respondents.
41.   Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding  for  restoration  of  land
initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was  not
maintainable.  We,  accordingly,  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  dated
2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court  as  well
as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed  by  the  Single  Judge.  The
appeal is allowed. No costs.

                                              ……………………………………………………………………….J.
                                      (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                              ……………………………………………………………………….J.
NEW DELHI,                           (KURIAN JOSEPH)
JUNE 30, 2014.