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Friday, April 25, 2014

Encroachment of the street - Hotel constructed in a private place - Town planing scheme to widen roads - notice issued - disputes arose - as per the High court directions objections were heard and rejected - Apex court held that we modify the order of the High Court to the extent that there shall be fresh demarcation done at the site through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if it is found that in the revenue record 30 feet road exists, that area will be clearly demarcated and delineated, and thereafter the Scheme would be implemented. The aforesaid exercise shall be carried out within a period of two months from today. The appellant shall be associated in the exercise of demarcation. Once this demarcation, is done the parties shall abide by the same. Appeal disposed of in the aforesaid terms.= M/s. Sepal Hotel Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant (s) Versus State of Punjab & Anr. …. Respondent (s) = 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41443

Encroachment of the street - Hotel constructed in a private place - Town planing scheme to widen roads - notice issued - disputes arose - as per the High court directions objections were heard and rejected - Apex court held that we modify the order of the  High  Court  to the extent that there shall be  fresh  demarcation  done  at  the  site through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if it is found  that in the revenue record 30 feet road exists, that area  will  be  clearly demarcated  and  delineated,  and  thereafter  the  Scheme   would   be implemented. The aforesaid exercise  shall  be  carried  out  within  a period of two months from today. The appellant shall be  associated  in the exercise of demarcation. Once this demarcation, is done the parties shall abide by the same. Appeal disposed of in the aforesaid terms.=
Shri Som Chand Katia and  Shri
     Vijay Katia were original owners of land measuring 44 bighas  6  biswas
     comprised in Khasra No. 2001 situated at Bhatinda. Out of the said land
     a part comprising of 255 fts x 450 fts was licensed  to  the  appellant
     for construction of a 3 Star Hotel on 15.7.1974. The appellant  applied
     for grant of layout plan for the construction of  a  hotel,  which  was
     granted by the Municipal Committee. After the  receipt  of  the  layout
     plan the appellant herein constructed the hotel on the said land. Since
     then  the  hotel  has  been  in  existence  and  running  its  business
     therefrom. The total area of the hotel was covered by a  boundary  wall
     and is in possession of the appellant herein.
  4. The Municipal Committee framed a new Scheme i.e  Town  Planning  Scheme
     No. 2, Part I, in the year 1975. This  Scheme  was  sanctioned  by  the
     State Government. As per the said Scheme, a part of the land covered by
     the Appellant's hotel was required for the construction/widening of the
     road. The Municipal Committee issued a notice  dated  7.6.1978  to  the
     appellant herein directing the appellant to demolish the boundary  wall
     of the hotel and transfer that  part  of  the  land  to  the  Municipal
     Committee.
Disputes arose =
whether  the  Scheme  had
     attained finality and answer to  this  question  depends  upon  another
     issue viz. whether objections of  the  appellant  to  the  Scheme  were
     disposed of by Respondent No. 2 or not, in compliance  with  directions
     dated 19.6.1980 of the High Court.=
Conclusion 
From the  aforesaid,  we  cannot  agree  with  the  contention  of  the
     appellant that objections of the appellant were still pending.  At  the
     same time it becomes clear that the only issue which remained was about
     the demarcation and demarcation was also carried out  and  the  Patwari
     submitted his Report dated 19.8.1986.
 34. Having said so, what we  find  is  that  this  demarcation  report  has
     altered the position. As per the demarcation Report of the Patwari,  30
     feet road as set out in the Town Planning Scheme does not exist in  the
     revenue record. Once that be the position,  how  the  Scheme  would  be
     implemented is  the  poser.  The  High  Court  has  remarked  that  the
     appellant managed to get a wrong Report. At the same time, what is  the
     correct position at the  site  has  also  not  come  on  record.  In  a
     situation like this, we are of the opinion that  once  the  High  Court
     observed that there was  an  error  in  the  demarcation  Report,  more
     appropriate action was to order fresh demarcation.
 35. In view of the above though  we  reject  all  the  contentions  of  the
     appellant, at the same time we modify the order of the  High  Court  to
     the extent that there shall be  fresh  demarcation  done  at  the  site
     through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if it is found  that
     in the revenue record 30 feet road exists, that area  will  be  clearly
     demarcated  and  delineated,  and  thereafter  the  Scheme   would   be
     implemented. The aforesaid exercise  shall  be  carried  out  within  a
     period of two months from today. The appellant shall be  associated  in
     the exercise of demarcation. Once this demarcation, is done the parties
     shall abide by the same.
 36. Appeal disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41443
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, A.K. SIKRI
                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4678/ 2014
      [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 12025 of 2006]

     M/s. Sepal Hotel Pvt. Ltd.                         …. Appellant (s)
                                   Versus
     State of Punjab & Anr.                             …. Respondent (s)


                               J U D G M E N T
     A.K. SIKRI, J.
  1. Leave granted.
  2. The origin of the  lis  in  this  appeal  can  be  treated  to  earlier
     proceedings which started sometime in  1970's  and  culminated  in  the
     judgment of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Yogender  Pal  &  Ors.  v.
     Municipality, Bhatinda reported in 1994 (5) SCC 709.  We  would  revert
     back to the said case  with  detailed  discussion  at  the  appropriate
     stage, Suffice it is to  mention  at  the  stage  that  vide  the  said
     judgment this  Court  declared  Section  192  (1)  (c)  of  the  Punjab
     Municipal Act {This provision conforms to Section 203 (1)  (c)  of  the
     Haryana Municipal Act} as void, being violative of Article  14  of  the
     Constitution of India. However, overruling of the  said  provision  was
     prospective i.e. from the date of the decision rendered on 15.7.1994.
  3. Coming to the facts of the present case, Shri Som Chand Katia and  Shri
     Vijay Katia were original owners of land measuring 44 bighas  6  biswas
     comprised in Khasra No. 2001 situated at Bhatinda. Out of the said land
     a part comprising of 255 fts x 450 fts was licensed  to  the  appellant
     for construction of a 3 Star Hotel on 15.7.1974. The appellant  applied
     for grant of layout plan for the construction of  a  hotel,  which  was
     granted by the Municipal Committee. After the  receipt  of  the  layout
     plan the appellant herein constructed the hotel on the said land. Since
     then  the  hotel  has  been  in  existence  and  running  its  business
     therefrom. The total area of the hotel was covered by a  boundary  wall
     and is in possession of the appellant herein.
  4. The Municipal Committee framed a new Scheme i.e  Town  Planning  Scheme
     No. 2, Part I, in the year 1975. This  Scheme  was  sanctioned  by  the
     State Government. As per the said Scheme, a part of the land covered by
     the Appellant's hotel was required for the construction/widening of the
     road. The Municipal Committee issued a notice  dated  7.6.1978  to  the
     appellant herein directing the appellant to demolish the boundary  wall
     of the hotel and transfer that  part  of  the  land  to  the  Municipal
     Committee. Apprehending an  action  at  the  behest  of  the  Municipal
     Committee, the appellant filed a suit for grant of  injunction  against
     execution of the  aforesaid  notice.  The  Counsel  for  the  Committee
     appeared and gave an undertaking not to demolish the boundary wall  and
     based on this statement the  said  suit  was  withdrawn  on  5.12.1979.
     However, the Municipal  Committee  again  threatened  to  demolish  the
     boundary wall, thereby impelling the appellant to  file  another  suit,
     being No. 386 dated 18.12.1979. This suit  was  decreed  on  11.12.1981
     with an observation that Town Planning Scheme qua the appellant  having
     not finalised, therefore, the land belonging to the appellant could not
     vest in the Municipal Committee.
  5. At the same time, the appellant also challenged the  vires  of  Section
     192 (1) (c) of the Municipal Act by way of a Writ Petition No.  226  of
     1979. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by  a  Division  Bench  of
     Punjab and Haryana High Court on 16.1.1980  alongwith  other  connected
     matters whereby it directed the Committee to consider the objections of
     affected landowners under the provisions of Section 192 (1) (c) of  the
     Act which would be filed within 12 weeks before the Committee  and  the
     Committee would then proceed to consider the said objection and dispose
     them of within three months. Thereafter, it could make a recommendation
     to the Government in accordance with provisions of Section 192  of  the
     Act. It was made clear that till the objections are decided, the rights
     of the landowners would not be affected. However, it was stated that if
     the objections were rejected the  provisions  of  Scheme  shall  become
     final and shall be forwarded to the State Government for  amending  the
     Scheme in accordance with law.
  6. As per the directions, the appellant filed its  objections  before  the
     Municipal Committee, stating therein that as per the measurement at the
     spot, the road which starts from 40 feet wide Namdev Road and  proposes
     to connect 30 feet wide road at the end of the hotel boundary and which
     passes through Khasra No. 2001 is at a distance of  275  feet  but  was
     wrongly shown in the Scheme at 224 feet. So, it was requested that  the
     said discrepancy in the  Scheme  be  corrected  so  that  there  is  no
     dispute. The above objections of the appellant were considered  by  the
     Municipal Committee and a Resolution No. 306 dated 9.7.1980 was passed.
     The relevant portion concerning the objections  of  the  petitioner  in
     Item No. 11 is as under:
           “Item No. 11:
           Vide this objection, the objector had stated  that  for  joining
           the 30 feet and 40 feet wide road, the length of  the  road  has
           been shown as per the Scheme as 224 feet whereas at the spot the
           length is 275 feet. Therefore, it was decided that the  plan  of
           the Sepal Hotel, which has  been  sanctioned  by  the  Municipal
           Committee be checked at the site and after inspecting  the  site
           as per the objections raised by the objector, the survey plan of
           the one part be corrected. The aforesaid resolution  was  signed
           by Shri Gopal Singh, President,  Municpal  Committee,  Bathinda,
           Mukhtiar Singh, Divisional Town Planner, Bathinda and Shri  L.D.
           Gupta, Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Bathinda.




  7. As per the appellant, after  passing  of  the  above  Resolution  dated
     9.7.1980, no further action was taken by  the  Municipal  Committee  to
     amend the Scheme nor any communication was received  by  the  appellant
     conveying its decision by the Municipal Committee with  regard  to  the
     objections.
  8. In the meantime, the suit bearing  no.  386  of  1979  was  decreed  on
     11.12.1981, wherein it was observed by  the  learned  Senior  Sub-Judge
     that the Town Planning Scheme qua the appellant had  not  become  final
     and, therefore, the subject land cannot vest in the Municipal Committee
     and the disputed land on which construction exists cannot  be  said  to
     belong to the Municipal Committee.
  9. The appellant filed another Civil Suit bearing no.  641/  1983  against
     the Municipal Committee for permanent injunction not to  demolish  four
     rooms, which are in the premises of the hotel itself. However, the said
     suit was dismissed and the appellant herein filed an appeal before  the
     learned  District  Judge,  Bhatinda,  which  was  withdrawn  upon   the
     statements  of  the  Counsel  for  the  parties.  It  was  agreed  that
     demarcation of the disputed rooms  be  made  in  the  presence  of  the
     parties to verify as to whether the same are part of the street or not.
     The demarcation of the disputed rooms was to be made in the presence of
     the parties. Municipal Committee was restrained to demolish  the  rooms
     till demarcation is completed.
 10. Pursuant to the above order, Shri Hem Raj, Patwari, Halqua carried  out
     the demarcation of the disputed rooms and submitted  his  report  dated
     19.8.1986 to the Tehsildar on the basis of which an  order  was  passed
     wherein it was held that there exists no passage or roads in Khasra No.
     2001 in the revenue report. In the meantime, the provisions of  Section
     192 (1) (c) of the Act were interpreted by this Court in  the  case  of
     Yogendra Pal (supra) in which Section 192 (1) (c) providing vesting  of
     land  in  the  Municipal  Committee  was  declared  ultra  vires   and,
     therefore, these provisions were struck down w.e.f. the  judgment  i.e.
     15.7.1994.
 11. However, the matter did not rest there. The appellant  received  notice
     dated  9.9.2003  from  the  successor  of  the  Municipal  Corporation-
     Respondent No. 2, directing the appellant to leave the street within 10
     days in terms of the same Town Planning Scheme  No. 2, Part  I,  framed
     in the year 1977. The appellant sent reply dated  16.9.2003  which  was
     followed by another reply dated  27.9.2003.  It  is  the  case  of  the
     appellant that without considering  these  replies,  Respondent  No.  2
     issued notice dated 9.10.2004 to the appellant under Sections  246  and
     246A of the Act seeking to  leave  30  feet  street  as  per  the  Town
     Planning Scheme No. 2, Part I, on or before 13.10.2003.  The  appellant
     replied to that notice on 13.10.2004 alleging that the proposed  action
     was illegal and amounted to the abuse of powers. Immediately thereafter
     the appellant also filed  the  Writ  Petition  No.  16377  of  2004  on
     13.10.2004 in the High Court seeking quashing of the said notice  dated
     9.10.2004 and that the Town Planning Scheme No. 2, Part I  be  declared
     as lapsed  due  to  non-implementation.  As  per  the  appellant,  this
     planning Scheme was not implemented even after 30 years of framing  and
     had, therefore, lapsed.  However,  the  appellant  withdrew  this  writ
     petition on 30.11.2004 with liberty  to  file  fresh  petitions.  Fresh
     petition No. 19790 of 2004 was filed on 15.12.2004 challenging the said
     notice dated 9.5.2004. This Writ Petition has  been  dismissed  by  the
     High Court vide judgment dated 2.5.2006. That judgment is  impugned  by
     filing Special Leave Petition under Article 136, out of  which  present
     appeal arises.
 12. As pointed out above main contention of the appellant before  the  High
     Court was that as the Scheme was not implemented for the last more than
     30 years and objections filed by the appellant had  not  been  decided,
     the said Scheme had lapsed and Respondent No. 2  had  no  authority  to
     implement the same. This contention has not found favour with the  High
     Court. The High Court took note of the  fact  that  the  appellant  had
     earlier filed Civil Writ No. 226 of 1979 in the said court  challenging
     that very Scheme. That writ petition along with many other similar writ
     petitions, were disposed of holding that the Scheme under challenge was
     rightly promulgated after passing an appropriate Resolution. Matter was
     remitted to  Respondent No. 2 to decide objections, if any filed by the
     appellant and others similarly situated persons, with  clear  direction
     that in case the objections are rejected, the provision of  the  Scheme
     shall become final.
 13. The High Court further noted that in order  to  dispose  of  objections
     filed by various individuals, matter was put up  before  the  Municipal
     Committee on 9.7.1980.  Many  objections  were  disposed  of  including
     Objection Nos. 10 and 11 which were filed by the Managing  Director  of
     the appellant and the appellant respectively. In so far  as  objections
     of the appellant are concerned, it was ordered that to ascertain length
     of road left in the Scheme, measurement be done at the spot. Therefore,
     the only dispute which remained was with respect to measurement of  the
     property at the spot. As such the appellant was not right in contending
     that its objections were not disposed of and were  still  pending.  The
     High Court also went through the record and discussed the same. On that
     basis, the High Court has further observed that  some  demarcation  was
     got done by the appellant from the Revenue Department on the  basis  of
     aks – Shajra. In that report, it was observed that there is  no  street
     in Khasra No. 2001, in  which  Hotel  of  the  appellant  is  situated.
     However, the High Court chose to discard that Report  got  prepared  by
     the appellant, giving following reasons
           “The appellant is now placing reliance upon the said demarcation
           report to say  that  there  existed  no  street  which,  as  per
           allegation of respondent  no.  2  has  been  encroached  by  the
           appellant.  No  benefit  of  that  report  can  be  extended  to
           appellant, as the demarcation was not done keeping in  view  the
           Town Planning Scheme. Report seems to have been  made  on  wrong
           facts. Admittedly in  revenue  record,  the  street  is  not  in
           existence as the same has been carved out only in  the  approved
           Scheme, which is under challenge. Thereafter,  when  notice  was
           sent to the petitioner to remove encroachment from  the  street,
           he again tried to delay the matter and subsequent thereto, filed
           the present writ petition”.


 14. On the basis of these facts as recorded by the High Court, it  came  to
     the conclusion that the challenge to the Scheme had  attained  finality
     and  the  objections  were  also  considered  and  taken   to   logical
     conclusion. Nothing remained thereafter and it could not be  said  that
     the Scheme had not become final  and  cannot  be  implemented  now.  To
     recapitulate in brief,  the  High  Court  has  in  the  impugned  order
     recorded that:
           i.    The demarcation report seems to be made on wrong facts and
           that in the revenue record there was no street.


           ii.   It was further wrongly  recorded  that  the  earlier  writ
           petition had been dismissed by the High Court on 16.1.1980.
           iii.  With regard to the appellate order dated 20.5.1986, it was
           held that pursuant to the said order, the Managing  Director  of
           the Petitioner  “managed  to  get  a  wrong  report”,  i.e.  the
           demarcation report dated 19.8.1986.
           iv.   Finally, the High Court held that the Scheme had  attained
           finality in view of the judgment of  the  Civil  Court  and  the
           appeal had been dismissed as withdrawn and,  therefore,  it  was
           not open to the appellant to say that the Scheme had not  become
           final and could not be implemented after a period of 30 years.
    These are the reasons given by the High Court for dismissing  the  writ
    petition.
 15. Before we proceed to record the submissions of the  counsel  on  either
     side, we would like to point out the  ratio  of  Yogender  Pal  (supra)
     mention to which has been made in the beginning. As pointed  out  above
     that was a case where the vires of Section 192 (1) (c)  of  the  Punjab
     Municipal Act were  challenged  as  violative  of  Article  14  of  the
     Constitution of India and  the  appellants  therein  succeed  in  their
     challenge. Aforesaid provision was held to be unconstitutional as under
     this provision, to implement a Scheme land of the  landowner  could  be
     taken away without even paying any compensation. At the same  time,  it
     is  noteworthy  that  the  overruling  of  this  provision   was   made
     prospective i.e. from the date of the decision rendered on 15.7.1994.
 16. It was noticed in para 29 that various lands had been acquired for Town
     Planing  Schemes  and  “in  many  cases  the  Schemes  have  also  been
     completed.” In view of the said fact, it was held that it would not  be
     in public interest to unsettle the settled state of affairs as it would
     create a total chaos. The court was, therefore,  mindful  of  the  fact
     that there would be cases where the Schemes had  been  implemented  and
     constructions etc. had already been carried out in terms of the Scheme.
     Those Schemes which were already carried out were, thus, protected.


 17. It is, in this scenario the moot question which falls for consideration
     is as to whether in the present case the Scheme in  question  had  been
     finalised or not.
 18. When the Scheme in the present case were framed in  the  year  1975  to
     implement the same,  the  Municipal  Committee  issued  notice  to  the
     appellant on 7.6.1978 for demolition of boundary wall of the hotel  and
     transfer the same to the Committee, which was required  for  the  road.
     The appellant challenged the same by filing the writ  petition  in  the
     High Court. In  fact  various  Town  Planning  Schemes  framed  by  the
     Municipal Committees of Amritsar and Bhatinda were the  subject  matter
     of challenge before the  High  Court  by  way  of  various  Civil  Writ
     Petitions. These were disposed of by a common order dated 16.1.1980. It
     was made clear that the provisions of the Scheme  in  so  far  as  they
     affect the rights of the writ petitioners, will  not  be  taken  to  be
     final and  the  said  provisions  will  only  become  final  after  the
     objections filed by the appellants are considered by the Committees and
     disposed of.
 19. Thus, a conjoint reading  of  the  judgment  in  Yogender  Pal  (Supra)
     decided by this Court as well as  judgment  dated  16.1.1980  by  which
     aforesaid writ petitions were decided by the High Court would  make  it
     clear that in those cases where the Scheme  had  been  finalised,  they
     remain protected and Respondent No. 2 shall have right to go ahead with
     the implementation of the said Scheme.
 20. It is the common case of the parties that the High Court had  permitted
     the appellants and others to file their objections and the  Scheme  was
     to become final only  after  the  objections  were  considered  by  the
     Committee and disposed of. However, whereas  Respondent No. 2 maintains
     that the objections of the appellants were disposed of/  rejected,  the
     appellant argues otherwise and it is pleaded that the  matter  remained
     in limbo without any decision on its objections.  The  outcome  of  the
     present appeal would depend upon this aspect.
 21. In his endeavour to demonstrate that no final decision was taken on the
     objections of the appellant Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned  Senior  Counsel
     for the appellant submitted that these objections  were  considered  on
     30.6.1980 and 8.7.1980. A perusal of the  proceedings  dated  30.6.1980
     makes it clear that it was decided “that verification be  done  at  the
     spot and in case there is any mistake in the plan of  the  Scheme,  the
     same be got rectified.” The objection  regarding  the  demarcation  was
     rejected by placing reliance on Section 192  of  the  Punjab  Municipal
     Act, 1911, which permitted land to  the  extent  of  25%  to  be  taken
     without payment of compensation and additional 10% to  be  taken  after
     payment of compensation.
 22. In the proceeding  dated  9.7.1980  the  claim  of  the  appellant  for
     compensation was noticed and the said objection was rejected.  However,
     it was also decided that the plan of Sepal Hotel as sanctioned  by  the
     Municipal Committee would be checked and  after  inspecting  the  spot,
     survey plan would  be  corrected  in  view  of  the  objection  of  the
     objector.
 23. In the meantime, Civil Suit No. 386 of  1979  filed  by  the  appellant
     herein was also decided. A perusal of the judgment dated 11.12.1981  in
     the suit makes it clear that the contention  of  the  counsel  for  the
     appellant herein that the objections had  to  be  considered,  was  not
     disputed by the counsel of the Municipal  Committee  and  “he  conceded
     that the Scheme framed by the Municipal Committee has  not  yet  become
     final.” It was also held that “it is obvious from copies of  resolution
     that the Municipal Committee is seized of the objections filed  by  the
     plaintiff.”
 24. As per Mr. Gupta, this makes it clear that even after  the  resolutions
     of 30.6.1980 and  8.7.1980,  the  objections  of  the  plaintiff  were,
     admittedly, yet to be decided and the Scheme had not yet become final.
 25. It is further submitted that since in spite of  the  aforesaid  orders,
     the Municipal Committee was seeking to  pursue  the  action  under  the
     Scheme  without  deciding  the  objections,  another  Suit  No.  64  of
     23.12.1983 was filed by the appellant herein. After the suit  had  been
     dismissed, the appellate court passed a consent order  dated  20.5.1986
     wherein it was agreed that the appeal will be  dismissed  as  withdrawn
     and an application for demarcation will be submitted  within  a  month.
     The Municipal Committee agreed that demarcation shall be  made  in  the
     presence of the parties and they will not demolish the  disputed  rooms
     till the demarcation was done. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn in
     view of the said statement.
 26. Thereafter, a demarcation was done on 19.8.1986. A perusal of the  same
     makes it clear that it was noticed therein that  there  was  no  street
     falling in the concerned Khasra number as per the revenue  record  and,
     therefore, the street could not be demarcated.
 27. Mr. Gupta, questioned the correctness of the finding  of  the  impugned
     order by making the following submissions:
           i.    The order dated 16.1.1980 categorically records  that  the
           provisions of the Scheme in so far as they affect the rights  of
           the petitioners will not be final and the provisions  will  only
           become final after the objections filed  by  the  appellant  are
           considered by the committee and disposed of.
           ii.   A perusal of the proceedings dated 30.6.1980 and  8.7.1980
           makes it clear  that  the  objections  were  still  pending  and
           demarcation etc. had still to be carried out.
           iii.  This fact stood admitted in  the  order  dated  11.12.1981
           wherein the counsel for the  Municipal  Committee  had  conceded
           that the Scheme framed had not yet become  final  and  that  the
           Municiapl Committee was seized of the objections.
           iv.   It is submitted that after the aforesaid  date,  the  only
           progress was the report dated 19.8.1986, as per which report the
           demarcation of the street could not be done since there  was  no
           street as per the revenue record. Assuming there was an error in
           the said demarcation, at best a  fresh  demarcation  could  have
           been ordered. In any event, it could not be said that the Scheme
           had been finalised, as recorded by the High Court.
           v.    A perusal of the order passed by the appellate court dated
           20.5.1986 also makes it absolutely clear that it was agreed that
           there  will  no  demolition  till  the  demarcation  was   done.
           Accordingly, without any demarcation having admittedly been done
           thereafter, there was no question of the  Scheme  having  become
           final.
           vi.   That the aforesaid facts  are  further  reinforced  for  a
           consideration of the agenda item dated 27.12.1995,  pursuant  to
           the judgment of this court. A perusal of the resolution makes it
           clear that the Municipal Committee had “decided that the Schemes
           which are pending are hereby dropped by the  Municipal  Council,
           Bathinda and the office is directed to act  accordingly.”  Thus,
           all  pending  Schemes  stand  dropped  as  per   the   aforesaid
           resolution.


 28. Per contra, Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for
     Municipal Corporation, Bhatinda (Respondent No. 2) submitted  that  the
     judgment in the case of Yogender Pal had no applicability  as  the  law
     declared therein was made prospective by observing that it would not be
     in public interest to unsettle the settled state of  affairs.  It  was,
     thus, a case of prospective overruling. He further  submitted  that  as
     per the judgment dated 16.1.1980 of the High Court, the  provisions  of
     the Scheme were not to become final unless the objections filed by  the
     appellants are disposed of by the Committee. A fortiorari,  the  Scheme
     was to attain finality if the objections were to be rejected  and  that
     was specially observed by the High Court.  Countering  the  submissions
     that the objections had not been decided/ rejected  Mr.  Mahabir  Singh
     argued  that  these  objections  were  specifically  rejected  by   the
     Municipal Committee way back on 30.6.1980 and on 9.7.1980.  He  further
     submitted that this rejection was never challenged  by  the  appellant.
     Instead he preferred a civil suit for permanent injunction  which  was,
     however, dismissed on 4.11.1985. A reading of this order  would  reveal
     that the objections were duly considered by the Committee and the  same
     were dismissed. Even appeal was filed against this judgment and  decree
     of the trial court but the appellant withdrew the same and,  therefore,
     finding of the trial court that objections  were  rejected  had  become
     final. His further plea was that these are pure finding of facts  which
     have been arrived at against the  appellant  who  has  dragged  on  the
     matter for last 30 years after successfully encroaching upon  the  land
     which was duly carved under Town Planning Scheme for public street.  He
     further  submitted  that  the  appellant  had  suppressed   all   these
     proceedings including filing of Civil Writ No. 19812 of 1996 which  was
     subsequently withdrawn by him.
 29. We have given our anxious  thought  to  the  aforesaid  submissions  of
     learned Counsel for the parties. It is a common  case  of  the  parties
     that the judgment in Yogender Pal (Supra) is prospective i.e  from  the
     date of judgment which is 15.7.1994. It is also a common  case  of  the
     parties that the Scheme in question was framed much earlier.  Thus,  as
     pointed out above, the only issue is  as  to  whether  the  Scheme  had
     attained finality and answer to  this  question  depends  upon  another
     issue viz. whether objections of  the  appellant  to  the  Scheme  were
     disposed of by Respondent No. 2 or not, in compliance  with  directions
     dated 19.6.1980 of the High Court.
 30. It is borne from the record that these objections were duly  considered
     on 30.6.1980 and 8.7.1980. In the proceedings of  30.6.1980  objections
     of the appellant regarding demarcation were rejected. At the same  time
     it was decided that verification be done at the spot and in case  there
     is any mistake in the plan of the Scheme, the same be got rectified. It
     was so done.  Thereafter,  matter  came  up  before  the  Committee  on
     9.7.1980  and  after  considering  the  entire  matter  the   Committee
     specifically  rejected  the  objections  of  the  appellant.  Operative
     portion of the minutes of  the  meeting  dated  30.6.1980  as  well  as
     9.7.1980 are as under:
           “Minutes of the Meeting dated 30.6.1980:
           Shri Som Chand Katia, Writ Petitioner No. 226/79 is present.  He
           has stated that his total land  measuring  31550  sq.  yards  is
           covered under the Scheme and his land to the extent of  35%  has
           been taken under the Scheme and  some  of  his  land  thus  goes
           waste. The objector has been asked to get the demarcation of the
           total land at the spot and produce the plan  in  the  office  of
           Municipal Committee by 7.7.1980 and should  also  get  the  spot
           inspection of the land so that in spot inspection  it  could  be
           verified as to how much of his land falls under the  Scheme.  In
           case any area more than 25% of his total land  comes  under  the
           park/ road, the same may be adjusted. The  objector  has  stated
           that he is not ready to give any land for road or  park  without
           compensation. Thus objection of the objector is rejected because
           under Section 192 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 land to  the
           extent of 25% without payment of compensation and an  additional
           10% with payment of compensation can be taken for the purpose or
           roads and parks under the proposed Town Planning Scheme.”


           Minutes of the Meeting dated 9.7.1980
           “As per decision dated 30.6.1980, the objector  Shri  Som  Chand
           Katia was required to get the measurement of  his  land  at  the
           spot. He  has  produced  a  photostat  copy  of  revenue  record
           relating to Khasra No. 2001 which has  been  attested  by  Halqa
           Patwari. As per the same, their total area in the  Scheme  comes
           to 44300 sq. yards. The plea of objector is that the Sepal Hotel
           whose area is 12750 sq. yards has different  out  of  the  total
           area and the land for roads  and  parks  be  taken  out  of  the
           remaining area as per law. But he should be  given  compensation
           of the same as well. On perusal of  record,  it  is  found  that
           sanction of building plan of Sepal Hotel has also been given  to
           them who were the original owners of total land. Therefore,  the
           Sepal Hotel had also been adjusted in the Scheme. Therefore, the
           Sepal Hotel had also been adjusted in the Scheme. Therefore,  it
           is decided that the plot of Sepal Hotel cannot be treated to  be
           different from the land belonging to the said family  under  the
           purposes of Scheme and in this way out of total ownership  land,
           the land under the road and parks does not form  more  than  25%
           which is as per law, therefore, this objection is rejected.
           Therefore, in this objection, the objector has written that  the
           length of road joining the 30' x 40' wide roads has  been  shown
           to be 224 under the Scheme whereas the sport the  same  is  275.
           therefore, it is  decided  that  plan  of  the  Sepal  Hotel  as
           sanctioned by Municipal Committee be checked  at  the  spot  and
           after inspecting the spot survey plan be got corrected  in  view
           of the above objection of objector.”


     31.    It is clear from the above  that  objections  were  specifically
     rejected. Only thing which the Municipal Committee wanted was to  check
     the plan of Sepal Hotel as sanctioned by the Municipal Committee at the
     spot and after inspecting the spot the survey plan be corrected. It  is
     also clear from the above  that  main  objection  was  for  payment  of
     compensation which was rejected on the ground that the land  under  the
     road and the parks does not form more than 25% and, therefore, in  view
     of Section 192 of the Act no compensation was payable.
 32. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is right  in  his  submission
     that these orders were not challenged.  Instead,  the  appellant  filed
     Civil Suit No. 614 of 1983. However, this suit  was  dismissed  by  the
     trial court. The appellant preferred appeal there against. This  appeal
     was dismissed as withdrawn. It was the contention of the appellant that
     this appeal was withdrawn in view  of  consent  order  dated  20.5.1986
     wherein it was agreed that  an  application  for  demarcation  will  be
     submitted within a month and demarcation shall be made in the  presence
     of the parties and till then respondent shall not demolish the disputed
     rooms. However, from this the appellant cannot be  allowed  to  contend
     that objections had not  been  decided.  The  at  the  most,  issue  of
     demarcation was to be settled as the appellant was raising  this  issue
     time and again. However, it is accepted by the  appellant  itself  that
     demarcation was done on 19.8.1986.
 33. From the  aforesaid,  we  cannot  agree  with  the  contention  of  the
     appellant that objections of the appellant were still pending.  At  the
     same time it becomes clear that the only issue which remained was about
     the demarcation and demarcation was also carried out  and  the  Patwari
     submitted his Report dated 19.8.1986.
 34. Having said so, what we  find  is  that  this  demarcation  report  has
     altered the position. As per the demarcation Report of the Patwari,  30
     feet road as set out in the Town Planning Scheme does not exist in  the
     revenue record. Once that be the position,  how  the  Scheme  would  be
     implemented is  the  poser.  The  High  Court  has  remarked  that  the
     appellant managed to get a wrong Report. At the same time, what is  the
     correct position at the  site  has  also  not  come  on  record.  In  a
     situation like this, we are of the opinion that  once  the  High  Court
     observed that there was  an  error  in  the  demarcation  Report,  more
     appropriate action was to order fresh demarcation.
 35. In view of the above though  we  reject  all  the  contentions  of  the
     appellant, at the same time we modify the order of the  High  Court  to
     the extent that there shall be  fresh  demarcation  done  at  the  site
     through Patwari. On the basis of said demarcation, if it is found  that
     in the revenue record 30 feet road exists, that area  will  be  clearly
     demarcated  and  delineated,  and  thereafter  the  Scheme   would   be
     implemented. The aforesaid exercise  shall  be  carried  out  within  a
     period of two months from today. The appellant shall be  associated  in
     the exercise of demarcation. Once this demarcation, is done the parties
     shall abide by the same.
 36. Appeal disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


                                             ...….........................J.
                                                     [Surinder Singh Nijjar]




                                              …...........................J.
                                                                [A.K. Sikri]


     New Delhi
     April 22, 2014


Thursday, April 24, 2014

The maxim res ipsa loquitur- Patient admitted in hospital while strolling in the Hosptial received major injuries by fall - Hospital trust is liable to pay compensation due to inadequacy of vigilance on the principles of IPSA LOQUITUR - suit decreed for 7 lakhs - appeal and cross appeal - appeal was dismissed cross appeal for enhancement was allowed to 11 lakhs - second appeal and cross appeal - Apex court held that as the trial court and appellant court not accepted the plea of defendant that the plaintiff himself voluntarily jumped through the Window on sound discussion and upheld the application of IPSA LOQUITUR = ASHISH KUMAR MAZUMDAR ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS AISHI RAM BATRA CHARITABLE HOSPITAL TRUST & ORS. ... RESPONDENT (S) = 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41442

The maxim res ipsa loquitur- Patient admitted in hospital while strolling in the Hosptial received major injuries by fall - Hospital trust is liable to pay compensation due to inadequacy of vigilance on the principles of IPSA LOQUITUR - suit decreed for 7 lakhs - appeal and cross appeal - appeal was dismissed cross appeal for enhancement was allowed to 11 lakhs - second appeal and cross appeal - Apex court held that as the trial court and appellant court not accepted the plea of defendant that the plaintiff himself voluntarily jumped through the Window on sound discussion and upheld the application of IPSA LOQUITUR  =

Suit No. 3413 of 1991 filed by one Ashish Kumar Mazumdar  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the plaintiff’) was decreed by a  learned  Single  Judge  of
the High Court of Delhi awarding a sum of Rs. 7 lakhs with  interest  @  12%
per annum on account of damages  for  injuries  suffered  by  the  plaintiff
while undergoing treatment in the  Batra  Hospital,  Delhi.
The Division Bench of  the
High Court by a common order dated 23.12.2009 dismissed the appeal filed  by
the defendant trust and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff  enhancing
the amount of damages awarded from Rs. 7 lakhs to  Rs.  11  lakhs  alongwith
interest @ 12% per annum.  Not satisfied,  the  plaintiff  has  filed  Civil
Appeal No.4010 of 2010, whereas aggrieved by the dismissal  of  its  appeal,
the defendant trust has filed the connected appeals (Civil Appeal Nos. 4011-
4012 of 2010).
The learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that, having regard  to
the layout of the room and the  location  of  the  window  and  also  having
regard to the precarious health condition of the plaintiff  on  the  day  of
the incident (he was running high fever), it was not possible to accept  the
contention of the defendant that the plaintiff had  himself  jumped  out  of
the window resulting  in  the  injuries  sustained.=

The maxim res ipsa loquitur in its classic form  has  been  stated  by
Erle C.J.

      (1)   “……..where the thing is shown to be under the management of  the
           defendant or his servants, and the accident is such  as  in  the
           ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have  the
           management use proper care, it affords reasonable  evidence,  in
           the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the  accident
           arose from want of care.”[1]


      The maxim applies to a case in  which  certain  facts  proved  by  the
plaintiff, by itself, would call  for  an  explanation  from  the  defendant
without the plaintiff having  to  allege  and  prove  any  specific  act  or
omission of the defendant.

9.    In Shyam Sunder and Others vs. The State of Rajasthan[2] it  has  been
explained that the principal function of the maxim is to  prevent  injustice
which would result if the plaintiff was invariably  required  to  prove  the
precise cause of the accident when the relevant facts  are  unknown  to  him
but are within the knowledge of the defendant.  It was also  explained  that
the doctrine would apply to a situation  when  the  mere  happening  of  the
accident is more consistent with the negligence of the defendant  than  with
other causes.=
 On a consideration of the facts of the present  case  we  do
not find any error in the application of the principle of res ipsa  loquitur
to the present case.  In so far as the findings of  negligence  and  absence
of due care of the defendant is concerned, we are  of  the  view  that  such
findings being concurrent  findings  of  fact  the  same  ought  not  to  be
reopened by us in the appeal filed by the defendant-hospital  under  Article
136 of the Constitution.  Any such exercise would  be  wholly  inappropriate
to the extraordinary and highly discretionary jurisdiction  vested  in  this
Court  by  the  Constitution.  Even  otherwise,  we  do  not  find  anything
inherently improbable or outrageously illogical in the  conclusions  reached
by the learned Trial Judge as affirmed in appeal.  The appeals filed by  the
defendant-hospital are, therefore, dismissed.

11.   Insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned,  we  are  of  the
view that the three broad heads considered by the Division Bench  for  award
of damages are sufficiently representative of the claim  of  the  plaintiff.
The precise quantum of compensation that should  be  awarded  in  any  given
case  cannot  and,  in  fact,  need  not  be  determined  with  mathematical
exactitude or arithmetical precision.   So  long  the  compensation  awarded
broadly represents what could be the entitlement of a claimant in any  given
case the discretion  vested  in  the  trial  court  and  the  regular  first
appellate court ought not to be lightly  interfered.   Taking  into  account
the facts before us and having regard to the basis  on  which  damages  have
been awarded, we do not  consider  the  same  to  be  either  inadequate  or
inappropriate so as to justify interference.  Accordingly, the appeal  filed
by the plaintiff is also dismissed.

12.  Consequently and in the light of the aforegoing discussions, both  sets
of appeals are dismissed.

2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41442
P SATHASIVAM, RANJAN GOGOI, N.V. RAMANA
                                REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 4010 OF 2010


ASHISH KUMAR MAZUMDAR        ...  APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS
AISHI RAM BATRA CHARITABLE
HOSPITAL TRUST & ORS.             ...   RESPONDENT (S)

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4011-4012 of 2010


                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.    Suit No. 3413 of 1991 filed by one Ashish Kumar Mazumdar  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the plaintiff’) was decreed by a  learned  Single  Judge  of
the High Court of Delhi awarding a sum of Rs. 7 lakhs with  interest  @  12%
per annum on account of damages  for  injuries  suffered  by  the  plaintiff
while undergoing treatment in the  Batra  Hospital,  Delhi.   The  aforesaid
judgment and decree passed on 02.12.2008 was  challenged  in  appeal  before
the Division Bench of the High Court by the defendant in the suit  i.e.  the
trust managing the hospital (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘the  defendant’).
The plaintiff had also filed a separate appeal challenging  the  quantum  of
damages awarded and seeking enhancement thereof.  The Division Bench of  the
High Court by a common order dated 23.12.2009 dismissed the appeal filed  by
the defendant trust and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff  enhancing
the amount of damages awarded from Rs. 7 lakhs to  Rs.  11  lakhs  alongwith
interest @ 12% per annum.  Not satisfied,  the  plaintiff  has  filed  Civil
Appeal No.4010 of 2010, whereas aggrieved by the dismissal  of  its  appeal,
the defendant trust has filed the connected appeals (Civil Appeal Nos. 4011-
4012 of 2010).

2.    We have heard Mr.  S.B.  Upadhyay,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
plaintiff and Mr. S.S. Khanjuda, learned counsel for the defendant.

3.    According to the plaintiff, he was admitted as an  indoor  patient  in
the Batra Hospital on 27.10.1988 and was lodged in Room No.305 on the  third
floor of the hospital.  He was running high fever and  was  in  a  delirious
state.  In the night intervening 31.10.1988 and 01.11.1988,  at  about  2.20
a.m., the plaintiff’s sister, one Kajal, who was staying  with  him  in  the
room had noticed the absence of the plaintiff from the room.   She  promptly
informed the staff nurse on duty and a search was  conducted  to  trace  out
the plaintiff in the course of which a security guard, Hans Raj,  found  the
plaintiff lying on the ground floor in the oncology gallery of the  hospital
and at a distance of 50 yards from a point immediately below the  window  of
room No. 305.  The plaintiff suffered multiple fracture of lumbar  vertebrae
with complete dislocation of  the  spinal  cord  and  despite  treatment  he
became a paraplegic i.e. 100% disabled below the waist.  Though  the  plaint
is silent on the circumstances in which the  injuries  were  caused  or  the
manner in which the same were sustained, according to the plaintiff,  as  at
the time of the incident he was an indoor patient in  the  hospital  it  was
the duty and responsibility of the hospital authorities to take care of  the
plaintiff who was suffering from high fever and was in  a  delirious  state.
The plaintiff had alleged that it is on account of the absence  of  due  and
reasonable care on the part of the hospital authorities  that  the  incident
could occur disabling the plaintiff for the rest of his life.  According  to
the plaintiff though the  injuries  suffered  by  him  had  not  immediately
affected his employment as a Junior Assistant in Punjab  National  Bank  the
same had severely affected his service prospects.  Accordingly, the suit  in
question was filed seeking damages to  the  extent  of  Rs.  58  lakhs;  the
claim,  however,  was  restricted  to  Rs.  25  lakhs  on  account  of   the
plaintiff’s inability to pay the requisite court fee  on  the  rest  of  the
amount.

4.    The defendant trust, in its written statement,  took  the  stand  that
the hospital had permitted the plaintiff’s sister to stay in the room as  an
attendant and that the plaintiff had himself jumped out  of  the  window  of
his room despite  the  presence  of  his  sister  leading  to  the  injuries
suffered.   On the said broad facts the defendant denied the  allegation  of
negligence and absence of due care on its part as claimed by  the  plaintiff
in the suit.

5.    On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial  Judge
framed four issues for trial in  the  suit.  Five  witnesses  including  the
plaintiff himself (PW-1), his sister    (PW-2) and his brother  (PW-3)  were
examined.  One Dr. R.K. Srivastava (PW-5) was also  examined  to  prove  the
disability  certificate  showing  the  extent  of  the  disability  of   the
plaintiff.  To controvert the case  of  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  had
examined one Dr. Arun Dewan (DW-1) who had treated  the  plaintiff  and  the
security guard Hans Raj (DW-2) who had found the  plaintiff  in  an  injured
state.

6.    The learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that, having regard  to
the layout of the room and the  location  of  the  window  and  also  having
regard to the precarious health condition of the plaintiff  on  the  day  of
the incident (he was running high fever), it was not possible to accept  the
contention of the defendant that the plaintiff had  himself  jumped  out  of
the window resulting  in  the  injuries  sustained.   On  the  contrary  the
learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that  the  facts  established  by
the evidence on record attracted the principle of  res  ipsa  loquitur  and,
therefore, it was for the defendant to prove the absence of  any  negligence
and due care and attention on  its  part.   Proceeding,  the  learned  Trial
Judge was also of the view that  duty  of  a  hospital  is  not  limited  to
diagnosis and  treatment  but  extends  to  looking  after  the  safety  and
security of  the  patients,  particularly,  those  who  are  sick  or  under
medication and therefore can become delirious and incoherent.  Adverting  to
the facts before him, the learned Judge took the view  that  it  is  evident
that in the present case the plaintiff, who was suffering from  high  fever,
had gone out for a stroll in the middle of the night being unable to  sleep.
 His absence from the room on being noticed by his sister  (PW-2)  a  search
was organized and the plaintiff was found lying on the ground floor  in  the
oncology gallery of the hospital with the  injuries  in  question.   On  the
said basis, the learned Trial Judge concluded that,  in  the  present  case,
the hospital should be held liable for not maintaining the  necessary  vigil
in the hospital premises to ensure the safety of its patients and it  is  on
account of the absence of such vigil that the plaintiff,  despite  his  poor
health, was able to walk  around  and  in  the  process  had  sustained  the
injuries in question.  So far as the quantum of damages  is  concerned,  the
learned Trial Judge quantified the same at Rs.7 lakhs  along  with  interest
at 12% per annum thereon.

7.    In appeal, the Division Bench reiterated the findings recorded by  the
learned Trial Judge holding the same to be justified in the totality of  the
facts proved in the case.  Additionally, the Division Bench was of the  view
that the plaintiff was entitled to a total amount of Rs.11 lakhs by  way  of
damages which was quantified in the following manner :

|(i)       |For loss of future prospects in   |Rs. 4,00,000.00       |
|          |employment                        |                      |
|(ii)      |For keeping an attendant          |Rs. 4,00,000.00       |
|(iii)     |For non-pecuniary loss including  |Rs. 3,00,000.00       |
|          |pain and suffering, loss of limb  |                      |
|          |etc.                              |                      |



      The aforesaid amount of damages was directed to carry interest  @  12%
from the date of filing of the suit i.e. 29.10.1991.

 8.   The maxim res ipsa loquitur in its classic form  has  been  stated  by
Erle C.J.

      (1)   “……..where the thing is shown to be under the management of  the
           defendant or his servants, and the accident is such  as  in  the
           ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have  the
           management use proper care, it affords reasonable  evidence,  in
           the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the  accident
           arose from want of care.”[1]


      The maxim applies to a case in  which  certain  facts  proved  by  the
plaintiff, by itself, would call  for  an  explanation  from  the  defendant
without the plaintiff having  to  allege  and  prove  any  specific  act  or
omission of the defendant.

9.    In Shyam Sunder and Others vs. The State of Rajasthan[2] it  has  been
explained that the principal function of the maxim is to  prevent  injustice
which would result if the plaintiff was invariably  required  to  prove  the
precise cause of the accident when the relevant facts  are  unknown  to  him
but are within the knowledge of the defendant.  It was also  explained  that
the doctrine would apply to a situation  when  the  mere  happening  of  the
accident is more consistent with the negligence of the defendant  than  with
other causes.

10.   We have  considered  the  case  of  the  respective  parties  and  the
evidence adduced in support thereof; the judgment under appeal  as  well  as
the view taken  by  the  learned  Trial  Judge  besides  the  arguments  and
contentions advanced  before  us.   The  learned  courts  have  applied  the
principle of res ipsa loquitur to the present case to  cast  the  burden  of
proving that there was no negligence  on  the  defendant.   Thereafter,  the
learned Trial Judge as well as the Division Bench  of  the  High  Court  has
held the defendant liable for negligence and failure to  take  due  care  of
the plaintiff who was an indoor patient  in  the  hospital.   The  aforesaid
conclusions reached is on an elaborate consideration  of  the  evidence  and
materials on record and after a detailed discussion  of  the  stand  of  the
rival parties.  On a consideration of the facts of the present  case  we  do
not find any error in the application of the principle of res ipsa  loquitur
to the present case.  In so far as the findings of  negligence  and  absence
of due care of the defendant is concerned, we are  of  the  view  that  such
findings being concurrent  findings  of  fact  the  same  ought  not  to  be
reopened by us in the appeal filed by the defendant-hospital  under  Article
136 of the Constitution.  Any such exercise would  be  wholly  inappropriate
to the extraordinary and highly discretionary jurisdiction  vested  in  this
Court  by  the  Constitution.  Even  otherwise,  we  do  not  find  anything
inherently improbable or outrageously illogical in the  conclusions  reached
by the learned Trial Judge as affirmed in appeal.  The appeals filed by  the
defendant-hospital are, therefore, dismissed.

11.   Insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned,  we  are  of  the
view that the three broad heads considered by the Division Bench  for  award
of damages are sufficiently representative of the claim  of  the  plaintiff.
The precise quantum of compensation that should  be  awarded  in  any  given
case  cannot  and,  in  fact,  need  not  be  determined  with  mathematical
exactitude or arithmetical precision.   So  long  the  compensation  awarded
broadly represents what could be the entitlement of a claimant in any  given
case the discretion  vested  in  the  trial  court  and  the  regular  first
appellate court ought not to be lightly  interfered.   Taking  into  account
the facts before us and having regard to the basis  on  which  damages  have
been awarded, we do not  consider  the  same  to  be  either  inadequate  or
inappropriate so as to justify interference.  Accordingly, the appeal  filed
by the plaintiff is also dismissed.

12.  Consequently and in the light of the aforegoing discussions, both  sets
of appeals are dismissed.


                                  ...…………………………CJI.
                                        [P. SATHASIVAM]


                                  .........………………………J.
                                        [RANJAN GOGOI]

                                                       …..........……………………J.
                                        [N.V. RAMANA]

NEW DELHI,
APRIL   22, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]     Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks, (1865) 3 H & C 596, 601
[2]    1974 (1) SCC 690

-----------------------
7


Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC - powers of appellant court --- not to disturb acquittal due to possibility of other view - Trial court acquitted the accused - High court reversed the judgement and convicted - Apex court held that Finally, we must note that the High Court has not stated why it felt that the trial court’s view was perverse. It has not stated what were the compelling reasons, which persuaded it to disturb the order of acquittal. As noted by this Court in several decisions if two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court shall not disturb the order of acquittal because it feels that some other view is possible. The reasonable view which reinforces the presumption of innocence of the accused must be preferred. In our opinion the trial court’s view was not perverse. It was taken after thorough marshalling of evidence. It was a reasonably possible view. The High Court erred in disturbing it. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. = Nallabothu Ramulu @ Seetharamaiah & Ors. … Appellants Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh … Respondents= 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41440

 Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC  - powers of appellant court --- not to disturb acquittal  due to possibility of other view - Trial court acquitted the accused - High court reversed the judgement and convicted - Apex court held that Finally, we must note that the High Court has not stated why  it  felt that the trial court’s view was perverse.  It has not stated what  were  the compelling reasons, which persuaded it to disturb the  order  of  acquittal. As noted by this Court in several decisions  if  two  reasonable  views  are possible, the appellate court shall  not  disturb  the  order  of  acquittal because it feels that some other view  is  possible.   The  reasonable  view which reinforces the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  must  be preferred.  In our opinion the trial court’s view was not perverse.  It  was taken after thorough marshalling of evidence.  It was a reasonably  possible view.  The High Court erred in disturbing it.  In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. =

The appellants were charged and tried by the IInd Additional  Sessions
Judge, Guntur in Sessions Case No.967 of 1994 inter alia for offences  under
Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC.   Learned
Sessions Judge by judgment dated 11/2/2000 acquitted all the  accused.   The
State of Andhra Pradesh carried an appeal from the said order  to  the  High
Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   By  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated
24/07/2003, the High Court set aside the order of  acquittal  and  convicted
the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1424 of 2003  viz.  A1-Nallabothu,  A3-
Rayidi Brahmaiah, A4-Rayidi Purnaiah, A11-Nallabothu  Sreenivasa  Rao,  A14-
Rayidi Kotiah, A15-Rayidi Veera Mallaiah,  A16-Mupalla  Ramaiah,  A21-Rayidi
Lingiah,  A23-Rayidi  Sreenivasarao,   A24-Duggineni   Peraiah,   A25-Mannem
Hanumantha Rao,  A27-Rayidi  Ramarao  and  A29-Rayidi  Venkateswarlu,  under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”) and sentenced each  one  of
them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.  In addition,  Accused  No.3
and Accused No.4 were convicted under Section 324 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each.   Accused  No.25  was
convicted under Section 324 of the IPC and also under Section 324 read  with
Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for
one year on each count.  The appellants in Criminal  Appeal  No.15  of  2004
viz.  A38-Chalamala  Veeraiah  and  A39-Chalamala  Subbarao  were,  however,
convicted under Section 324 read with Section 149 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each.  The appellants  in  both
the appeals were also convicted under Section 148 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  each.  The  substantive
sentences were ordered  to  run  concurrently.   Being  aggrieved  by  their
conviction and sentence, the appellants have approached  this  Court.    For
the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the accused and  the  prosecution
witnesses as per the numbers assigned to them by the trial court.=
        In Chandrappa &  Ors.
 v. State of Karnataka[1], this Court laid down the principles as under:


        “42.  From  the  above  decisions,  in  our  considered  view,  the
      following general principles regarding powers of the  appellate  court
      while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:


        (1) An appellate court has full power to review,  reappreciate  and
      reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.


        (2) The Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  puts  no  limitation,
      restriction or condition on exercise of such power  and  an  appellate
      court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both  on
      questions of fact and of law.


        (3) Various  expressions,  such  as,  ‘substantial  and  compelling
      reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong  circumstances’,
      ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended  to
      curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in  an  appeal  against
      acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of
      language’ to  emphasise  the  reluctance  of  an  appellate  court  to
      interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power  of  the  court  to
      review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.


        (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case  of
      acquittal, there is double  presumption  in  favour  of  the  accused.
      Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to  him  under  the
      fundamental principle of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  every  person
      shall be presumed to be innocent unless  he  is  proved  guilty  by  a
      competent court of law.  Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  his
      acquittal, the presumption of his  innocence  is  further  reinforced,
      reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.


        (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of  the
      evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
      of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”=


 Finally, we must note that the High Court has not stated why  it  felt
that the trial court’s view was perverse.  It has not stated what  were  the
compelling reasons, which persuaded it to disturb the  order  of  acquittal.
As noted by this Court in several decisions  if  two  reasonable  views  are
possible, the appellate court shall  not  disturb  the  order  of  acquittal
because it feels that some other view  is  possible.   The  reasonable  view
which reinforces the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  must  be
preferred.  In our opinion the trial court’s view was not perverse.  It  was
taken after thorough marshalling of evidence.  It was a reasonably  possible
view.  The High Court erred in disturbing it.





21.   In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed.  The impugned  judgment
and order is set aside.  The appellants in both the  appeals  are  acquitted
of all the charges.  They are on bail.  Their bail bonds stand discharged.
 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41440
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI
                                                   NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1424 OF 2003

Nallabothu Ramulu @
Seetharamaiah & Ors.                    …                Appellants

                 Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh                 …                Respondents

                                    WITH
                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.15 OF 2004

Chalamala Veeraiah & Anr.               …                 Appellants

            Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh                 …                Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1.    Both these appeals are  directed  against  judgment  and  order  dated
24/07/2003 passed by the High Court of Andhra  Pradesh  in  Criminal  Appeal
No.921 of 2000 and, hence,  they  are  being  disposed  of  by  this  common
judgment.

2.    The appellants were charged and tried by the IInd Additional  Sessions
Judge, Guntur in Sessions Case No.967 of 1994 inter alia for offences  under
Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC.   Learned
Sessions Judge by judgment dated 11/2/2000 acquitted all the  accused.   The
State of Andhra Pradesh carried an appeal from the said order  to  the  High
Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   By  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated
24/07/2003, the High Court set aside the order of  acquittal  and  convicted
the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1424 of 2003  viz.  A1-Nallabothu,  A3-
Rayidi Brahmaiah, A4-Rayidi Purnaiah, A11-Nallabothu  Sreenivasa  Rao,  A14-
Rayidi Kotiah, A15-Rayidi Veera Mallaiah,  A16-Mupalla  Ramaiah,  A21-Rayidi
Lingiah,  A23-Rayidi  Sreenivasarao,   A24-Duggineni   Peraiah,   A25-Mannem
Hanumantha Rao,  A27-Rayidi  Ramarao  and  A29-Rayidi  Venkateswarlu,  under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”) and sentenced each  one  of
them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.  In addition,  Accused  No.3
and Accused No.4 were convicted under Section 324 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each.   Accused  No.25  was
convicted under Section 324 of the IPC and also under Section 324 read  with
Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for
one year on each count.  The appellants in Criminal  Appeal  No.15  of  2004
viz.  A38-Chalamala  Veeraiah  and  A39-Chalamala  Subbarao  were,  however,
convicted under Section 324 read with Section 149 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each.  The appellants  in  both
the appeals were also convicted under Section 148 of the IPC  and  sentenced
to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  each.  The  substantive
sentences were ordered  to  run  concurrently.   Being  aggrieved  by  their
conviction and sentence, the appellants have approached  this  Court.    For
the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the accused and  the  prosecution
witnesses as per the numbers assigned to them by the trial court.


3.    Tondepi village is a  faction-ridden  village  within  the  limits  of
Muppala Police Station.  There were  two  groups  in  the  village,  against
whom, cases and  counter-cases  were  pending.   There  were  land  disputes
between A28-Rayidi Anjaiah and his father Rayidi Venkatappaiah.   One  group
was supporting A28-Rayidi Anjaiah and the other  group  was  supporting  his
father.

4.    On 16/3/1993, at about 1.30 p.m., some of the accused  abducted  PW-19
V. Seshagiri Rao and tried  to  kill  him.    However,  due  to  the  timely
intervention of the police, he was saved  and  admitted  in  the  Government
Hospital, Settenapalli.  In this connection, the police  registered  a  case
being Crime No.5 of 1993 for offences punishable under  Sections  147,  148,
323, 324, 364 and 307 read with Section 149 of the IPC against some  of  the
accused in this case.  As they were unsuccessful in their  attempt  to  kill
PW-19 V. Seshagiri Rao, they armed with iron rods, axes, spears, sticks  and
bombs waylaid in Dammalapadu Donka and formed themselves  into  an  unlawful
assembly  with  a  common  object  of  killing  the  persons  belonging   to
Nallabothu Venkaiah group.  After admitting PW-19 V. Seshagiri Rao,  in  the
Hospital at Sattenapally, Challa Singaiah and Rachankonda Chanchiah and  PW-
1 to PW-10 and some others were returning to their village in a  tractor  in
the  night  intervening  16/3/1993  and  17/3/1993.   The  accused  attacked
Singaiah and Chanchiah and PWs-1 to 16 when they reached Dammalapadu  Donka.
 Bombs were hurled.  Singaiah succumbed to the injuries at the  spot.   PW-1
to PW-10 and  Chanchiah,  who  sustained  injuries,  were  admitted  in  the
Government Hospital, Sattenapally.  Chanchiah succumbed to the  injuries  on
17/3/1993 while he was undergoing treatment.  The hospital authorities  sent
an intimation to the Additional Munsiff Magistrate, Sattenapally.   Pursuant
to the said information, the learned Magistrate went  to  the  hospital  and
recorded the statement of PW-1 R. Venkata Rao,  on  the  same  day,  in  the
presence of the Duty Medical Officer.  On receipt of the statement of  PW-1,
the Sub Inspector of Police, Sattenapally, registered  a  case  being  Crime
No.43 of 1993 for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 324, 307  and
302 read with Section 149 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 5 of  the  Explosive
Substances Act and transferred the case to Muppala  Police  Station,  within
whose jurisdiction the incident occurred.  On receipt of  the  copy  of  the
FIR, Muppala Police re-registered it as Crime No.6 of 1993 of  their  police
station.    PW-29,   the   Circle   Inspector,   Muppala,   conducted    the
investigation.  After completion of investigation, the accused  came  to  be
charged as aforesaid.   At the trial, the prosecution examined  as  many  as
31 witnesses.  The accused denied the prosecution case.  As earlier  stated,
the trial court rejected the prosecution case,  held  that  the  prosecution
has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted  the  accused.
The High Court reversed the order of acquittal and convicted the accused  as
aforesaid.  Hence, these appeals.

5.     We have heard learned senior counsel appearing  for  the  appellants.
Counsel submitted that the High Court  erred  in  disturbing  the  acquittal
order passed by the trial court.  Counsel submitted that the view  taken  by
the trial court was a reasonably possible  view.   It  was  not  a  perverse
view.  The High Court ought not to have set aside the acquittal  order  just
because it felt that some other view was also possible.   Counsel  submitted
that the High Court has not indicated in the impugned judgment  the  reasons
why it felt that the  trial  court’s  view  was  not  sustainable.   Counsel
submitted that the trial court has meticulously considered the  evidence  of
every witness, marshaled the facts correctly and held that  the  prosecution
has not  proved  its  case  beyond  reasonable  doubt.   It  is,  therefore,
necessary to set aside the impugned order  and  restore  the  trial  court’s
order.

6.    Mr. A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, learned senior counsel  for  the  State  of
Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand,  supported  the  impugned  judgment.   He
submitted that the trial court gave undue  importance  to  trivial  matters.
It wrongly disbelieved the evidence of injured eye-witnesses on  account  of
minor discrepancies.  The trial court’s judgment rested on  conjectures  and
surmises.  It was  a  perverse  judgment  and,  therefore,  the  High  Court
rightly set it aside.  No interference is,  therefore,  necessary  with  the
impugned order.  Counsel urged that the appeals be dismissed.

7.    The High Court reversed the order of acquittal  passed  by  the  trial
court.  The question is whether the High Court justified in doing that.   To
answer this question, it would be necessary to refresh our memory  and  have
a look at the principles laid down by this Court for guidance of  the  Court
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.  In Chandrappa &  Ors.
 v. State of Karnataka[1], this Court laid down the principles as under:


        “42.  From  the  above  decisions,  in  our  considered  view,  the
      following general principles regarding powers of the  appellate  court
      while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:


        (1) An appellate court has full power to review,  reappreciate  and
      reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.


        (2) The Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  puts  no  limitation,
      restriction or condition on exercise of such power  and  an  appellate
      court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both  on
      questions of fact and of law.


        (3) Various  expressions,  such  as,  ‘substantial  and  compelling
      reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong  circumstances’,
      ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended  to
      curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in  an  appeal  against
      acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of
      language’ to  emphasise  the  reluctance  of  an  appellate  court  to
      interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power  of  the  court  to
      review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.


        (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case  of
      acquittal, there is double  presumption  in  favour  of  the  accused.
      Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to  him  under  the
      fundamental principle of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  every  person
      shall be presumed to be innocent unless  he  is  proved  guilty  by  a
      competent court of law.  Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  his
      acquittal, the presumption of his  innocence  is  further  reinforced,
      reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.


        (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of  the
      evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
      of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

8.    In Dwarka Dass & Ors.  v.  State of Haryana[2],  this  Court  observed
as under:

      “2.   While there cannot be any denial of the factum  that  the  power
      and authority to appraise the evidence in an  appeal,  either  against
      acquittal or conviction stands out to be very comprehensive and  wide,
      but if two views are reasonably possible, on the  state  of  evidence:
      one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then
      and  in  that  event,  the  High  Court  would  not  be  justified  in
      interfering with an order of acquittal, merely because it  feels  that
      it, sitting as a trial court, would have taken the other  view.  While
      reappreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence  requires  that  the
      High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of
      the trial Judge. But  if  the  judgment  of  the  Sessions  Judge  was
      absolutely  perverse,  legally  erroneous  and  based   on   a   wrong
      appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the
      High Court to reverse the  judgment  of  acquittal,  recorded  by  the
      Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there  would  be  gross  miscarriage  of
      justice.”


9.    In Bihari Nath Goswami  v. Shiv Kumar  Singh  &  Ors.[3],  this  Court
observed as under:

      “8.   There is  no  embargo  on  the  appellate  court  reviewing  the
      evidence upon which an order of acquittal  is  based.  Generally,  the
      order  of  acquittal  shall  not  be  interfered  with   because   the
      presumption of innocence of the accused  is  further  strengthened  by
      acquittal.  The  golden  thread  which  runs  through   the   web   of
      administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two  views  are
      possible on the evidence adduced in the  case,  one  pointing  to  the
      guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
      favourable  to  the  accused  should   be   adopted.   The   paramount
      consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is
      prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal  of
      the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent.”

      Keeping the above principles in mind, we shall  approach  the  present
case.

10.   We shall examine the trial court’s view on each salient aspect of  the
case and see whether it was perverse, warranting High Court’s  interference.
 It must be borne in mind that the incident took place at dead of night  and
in an area which was away from town.  Admittedly, there  were  two  factions
in the village and the relations between the  two  factions  were  strained.
In an earlier incident, PW-19 was attacked by the  opposite  group.   Hence,
the possibility of witnesses trying to falsely implicate  persons  belonging
to the rival group cannot be ruled out.  Also important  is  the  fact  that
according to the  prosecution,  50  persons  were  involved  in  the  brutal
attack.  In a case of this nature, availability of light for  identification
of the accused would assume great importance.  The trial court  meticulously
scanned the evidence and opined that there was no sufficient  light  at  the
scene of offence to enable the witnesses to  identify  the  accused.   On  a
reading of evidence of witnesses and noticing some discrepancies, the  trial
court arrived at a finding that the story that the assault was witnessed  by
the witnesses in torch light or tractor  light  is  not  acceptable.   While
coming to this conclusion, the trial court further noted that  in  the  FIR,
in the observation report and in the inquest report, there is no mention  of
availability of light.

11.   The  High  Court  overturned  the  findings  of  the  trial  court  on
availability of light on the ground inter alia that witnesses were  deposing
5½ years after the incident and there are bound to be some discrepancies  in
their evidence.  The High Court also observed that at  night,  vehicles  are
not driven without lights.   The  High  Court  noted  that  the  prosecution
witnesses have stated that they knew the accused as  they  belonged  to  the
opposite group and, therefore, it was possible  for  them  to  identify  the
accused.  The High Court also noted that PW-1 was injured so  he  might  not
have mentioned  about  availability  of  light  in  Ex-P/1.   Moreover,  the
witnesses have not identified all the accused.  This  gives  credibility  to
their evidence.  The High Court also noted that four torches were  found  at
the scene of offence and, hence, there was sufficient light at the scene  of
offence.  We feel that the High Court was not right  in  setting  aside  the
trial court’s reasonable view on  availability  of  light.   The  fact  that
neither in the FIR nor in the observation report nor in the  inquest  report
there is mention of availability of light, is important.  By itself each  of
these circumstances may not be significant.  But, taken  with  other  facts,
they assume importance.

12.   The  trial  court  rightly  observed  that  assuming  the  prosecution
witnesses had torches in their hands, they would  not  switch  them  on  for
fear of being spotted and subjected to attack.  Besides,  according  to  the
prosecution, there were 50  accused.  Some  of  them  hurled  bombs  at  the
witnesses.  Therefore, the attack must  have  resulted  in  smoke  and  dust
rising in the air.  In such a situation, it would not be  possible  for  the
prosecution witnesses to identify the assailants out  of  50  persons,  who,
according to the prosecution, launched the attack.  In any  case,  it  would
not be possible for the witnesses to note what  role  each  accused  played.
The overt  acts  attributed  by  the  witnesses  to  the  accused  must  be,
therefore, taken with a pinch of salt.  All the accused were  not  known  to
the witnesses, because some witnesses stated that  they  would  be  able  to
identify them if they are shown to them.  But even assuming  they  knew  the
accused and there was some light at  the  scene  of  offence,  it  does  not
appear that it was sufficient  to  enable  the  witnesses  to  identify  the
accused  and  note  overt  act  of  each  of  them.   Possibility  of  wrong
identification cannot be ruled out.  The view taken by the  trial  court  on
this aspect is reasonably possible  view.   The  High  Court  was  wrong  in
disturbing it in an appeal against acquittal.

13.   According to the prosecution, after admitting  PW-19  at  Sattenapally
Government Hospital, PW-1  to  PW-16,  the  two  deceased  and  others  were
returning to Tondepi village.  At  that  time,  at  Dammalapadu  Donka,  the
incident occurred.  PW-1 is an important witness because he was  injured  in
the incident.  His dying declaration was recorded, which is at  Ex-P/1.   On
the basis of that dying declaration, Ex-P/26,  the  FIR  was  registered  at
P.S.  Sattenapally.   PW-1  stated  that  the  police  came  to   the   spot
immediately and within 15 minutes of their arrival,  they  were  shifted  to
Sattenapally Government Hospital.  He stated that PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala
came there.  He also stated that there was a police camp at  Gram  Panchayat
Office of Tondepi village.  PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala  confirmed  that  there
was police camp at the Gram Panchayat Office.  He was  posted  on  bandobast
duty on account of the  incident  in  which  PW-19  was  injured.    He  had
recorded the statements of witnesses in the earlier case from 5.00  p.m.  to
8.00 p.m. on 16/3/1993.  Evidence of witnesses shows that they had  informed
the police about the incident in  question.   PW-2  an  injured  eye-witness
stated that he informed the police about the  incident,  but  his  statement
was not recorded.  PW-3 the Head Constable, who  had  accompanied  PW-19  to
the hospital on 16/3/1993 stated that PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala  and  other
police staff came to the place of occurrence and injured were taken  to  the
village and then to the hospital within  an  hour.   He  stated  that  PW-28
S.I., P.S. Muppala did not record his statement.  PW-3 was attached to  P.S.
Muppala.  PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala should have recorded  his  statement  and
registered a case but he did  not  do  so.   PW-8  stated  that  S.I.,  P.S.
Muppala came to the spot but he did not record his statement.  PW-9 and  PW-
10 made similar statements.  PW-12 stated that he escaped from the scene  of
offence, went to the village and came back to the scene of offence with  the
villagers.  He stated that he informed the police about the  incident.   PW-
13 stated that he escaped from the scene of offence and  returned  with  the
police.  He stated that when he revealed the incident to  the  police,  they
recorded his statement.   PW-14  stated  that  he  had  informed  about  the
incident to the police but he does not know whether the police  had  reduced
his information into writing.   PW-15  stated  that  he  had  witnessed  the
occurrence for about three minutes.  He had informed the  police  about  the
incident but the police did not record his statement.

14.   PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala admitted that he shifted the injured  to  the
hospital and the injured informed him that the opposite group  had  attacked
them.  He stated that when he went to the village to get a tractor to  shift
the injured, he had informed his superiors about the incident on phone.   He
further stated that PW-29 Circle Inspector (IO) came to the village at  3.00
a.m. and he assisted him in the investigation at the spot.   Thereafter,  he
proceeded to the Police Station, Muppala and there, he received copy of  the
FIR from S.H.O., Sattenapally.  The evidence of  all  these  witnesses  read
with evidence of PW-28 S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala  show  that  the  witnesses  had
informed PW-28 about the incident and the fact that the opposite  party  had
attacked them.  While  statements  of  some  witnesses  were  not  recorded,
statements of some witnesses were recorded, but they were not produced.  PW-
28 S.I., P.S. Muppala ought to have registered  the  FIR  on  the  basis  of
statements of injured eye-witnesses.  PW-3  Head  Constable  was,  in  fact,
attached to the P.S.,  Muppala  and  was  working  under  him.   It  is  not
understood why his FIR  was  not  recorded.   The  omission  to  record  the
statement of any of the injured witnesses as FIR or to record statements  of
witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by PW-28 casts a shadow of  doubt
on the prosecution case.  There was no need  for  the  police  to  wait  for
recording of the statement of PW-1, treat  that  as  dying  declaration  and
then register the FIR on that basis.  While, according to  the  prosecution,
the incident took place at 1.00 a.m. on  17/3/1993,  PW-1’s  statement  [Ex-
P/1] was recorded at 3.15 a.m.  In the facts of this case,  not  registering
FIR on the basis of statement of injured witnesses at the spot  of  incident
and the delay in registering FIR give rise to a suspicion that  the  injured
witnesses were unable to name the accused on account of  darkness  and  that
the FIR was doctored in the form of dying  declaration  of  PW-1  which  was
subsequently converted into Ex-P/26.  This  reasoning  of  the  trial  court
appears to be correct and ought not to  have  been  disturbed  by  the  High
Court.

15.   Pertinently, the High Court also took note  of  the  fact  that  PW-28
S.I., P.S. Muppala did not record the  statements  of  witnesses.   But  the
High Court brushed aside this serious lacuna in a perfunctory  manner.   The
High Court noted that even though injured persons were present, PW-28  S.I.,
P.S. Muppala did not record their statements, he did not obtain any  written
complaint,  he  did  not  register  any  complaint  and  did  not  send  any
requisition for medical treatment.  The High Court further noted that  PW-28
S.I., P.S. Muppala did not make any enquiry with PW-2  and  PW-4  about  the
incident.  The High Court observed that PW-2 and PW-4 would have  given  the
earliest version  of  the  incident.   But,  surprisingly,  the  High  Court
explained away  PW-28  S.I.,  P.S.  Muppala’s  inaction  by  observing  that
probably, he might not have brought any papers  to  the  scene  of  offence.
The High Court observed that since the witnesses were injured,  PW-28  S.I.,
P.S. Muppala’s first duty was to shift  them  to  the  hospital.   The  High
Court then observed that PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala might be aware that  being
only Sub-Inspector, he could not have conducted investigation  of  a  murder
case and that he was perhaps expecting the Inspector of Police  to  take  up
investigation as he had informed him  on  phone.   The  High  Court  further
observed  that  at  best  not  recording  statements  of  witnesses  is   an
irregularity and cannot affect the veracity of prosecution case.  We are  of
the  opinion  that  the  High  Court  treated  this  gross  lacuna  in   the
prosecution case lightly.  In this case, where  relations  between  the  two
sides were strained, there was an earlier incident of attack and there  were
about 50 accused involved in the  incident,  the  earliest  version  of  the
prosecution case was most crucial but it was not noted down.

16.   The evidence of PW-29, the Circle Inspector,  P.S.  Muppala,  who  was
the Investigating Officer, would also throw some light on this  aspect.   It
is clear from his evidence that he received the information with  regard  to
the incident much prior to Ex-P/1.  He was  informed  by  PW-28  S.I.,  P.S.
Muppala about the several statements made by the witnesses.  He stated  that
he instructed PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala to send the  injured  witnesses  viz.
PW-11, PW-12 and PW-13 to Government  Hospital,  Sattenapally  and  then  he
examined PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16.  He admitted that he did not note down  the
information received about the occurrence anywhere.  He further stated  that
on the night intervening 16/3/1993 and 17/3/1993, he did not  visit  Tondepi
village at all and he did not ascertain from the police  picket  at  Tondepi
village as to whether any report was received by the police picket  on  that
night regarding the incident.  He stated that he did not  make  any  further
enquiry.  He stated that when he reached P.S. Muppala between 7.00 p.m.  and
8.00 p.m., the Sentry talked to him and told him  about  the  incident.   He
admitted that he did not give any instructions to  the  Sentry  to  register
the case on the basis of that information.  He admitted that after  visiting
the scene of offence where PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala  and  other  staff  were
present, he did not register the case  nor  did  he  ask  PW-28  S.I.,  P.S.
Muppala to register the case.  He further admitted  that  PW-28  S.I.,  P.S.
Muppala had informed him that the injured persons had told him  that  people
from  Rayudu group waylaid and attacked them with  country  made  bombs  and
they could identify them.  But, he did not register any FIR nor did  he  ask
PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala to register the FIR.  He tried to explain  this  by
stating that since the dying declaration was being recorded, he directed PW-
28 S.I., P.S. Muppala to  register  the  FIR  on  the  basis  of  the  dying
declaration.  He admitted that by the time he conducted the inquest  of  the
dead body of Singaiah at the place of offence, he had examined and  recorded
the statements of PW-1 to PW-11  and  after  the  inquest  he  recorded  the
statements of PW-12 to PW-16.  He admitted that the FIR was  not  registered
even at the time of examination of PW-1 to PW-6  by  him  in  the  hospital.
The evidence of this witness also shows that  though  the  earliest  version
was available, it was suppressed.  This makes the investigation of the  case
suspect.

17.    PW-21  is  the  doctor   attached   to   the   Government   Hospital,
Sattenapally.  He stated that he sent an intimation to the  Police  Station,
Sattenapally  in  respect  of  admission  of  PW-1,  PW-3  and  PW-4.    The
intimation is at Ex-P/20.  It bears the date 16/3/1993 but  does  not  state
the time.  It also bears the signature of PW-21.  PW-21 further stated  that
on 17/3/1993 at 3.05  a.m.,  he  sent  requisition  to  the  Magistrate  for
recording the dying declaration of PW-1.  It is at Ex-P/18.   Admittedly  on
this requisition, the date was originally put as 16/3/1993.  But, later  on,
‘6’ is overwritten as ‘7’.  Thus, Ex-P/20 and  Ex-P/18  create  doubt  about
the time and date of the incident. If PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 were  admitted  in
the Government Hospital on 16/3/1993  then,  the  incident  could  not  have
happened at 1.00 a.m. on 17/3/1993. The explanation given by PW-21  that  he
changed the date from 16/3/1993 to 17/3/1993 as  it  crossed  midnight  does
not stand to reason.  It is pertinent to note that PW-21 did  not  send  any
intimation to the police in  respect  of  other  injured  witnesses.   PW-28
S.I., P.S. Muppala and PW-29 the Circle Inspector,  P.S.  Muppala  also  did
not send any requisition to the hospital with respect to the  other  injured
witnesses.  PW-27 S.I., P.S. Sattenapally stated that  he  received  Ex-P/20
i.e. intimation in respect of admission of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 bearing  date
‘16/3/1993’ and the signature  of  PW-21  at  10.30  p.m.   This  means  the
injured were in the hospital by the time  of  preparation  of  Ex-P/20  i.e.
before 12.00 midnight.  The trial  court’s  view  that  this  creates  doubt
about the prosecution’s claim that the incident happened  at  1.00  a.m.  on
17/3/1993 cannot be called perverse.  Moreover, if PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4  were
admitted in the hospital on 16/3/1993 much prior to midnight and  if  PW-1’s
dying declaration had to be recorded, requisition should have been  sent  to
the Magistrate by PW-21 immediately and  not  at  3.05  a.m.  on  17/3/1993.
Consequently, Ex-P/1 i.e. the dying declaration of  PW-1  recorded  at  3.15
a.m. on 17/3/1993 gives scope to criticism that after prolonged  discussion,
the  investigating  officer  through  PW-21  sent  the  requisition  to  the
Magistrate and the dying declaration was recorded after  much  deliberation.
Pertinently, PW-8 stated that some of their party leaders had  visited  them
in Sattenapalli hospital.  Besides, PW-19, who was  attacked  prior  to  the
incident in question, was already there in the hospital.   Therefore,  there
is basis for the criticism that there was deliberation before recording  the
dying declaration.  The High Court has referred to the evidence of  PW-4  to
the effect that no leaders from the party of the prosecution  witnesses  had
visited the hospital.  The High Court held that therefore, there can  be  no
tutoring.  It is difficult to accept this submission given  the  history  of
this incident.  PW-19 was attacked by the other group prior to the  incident
in question.  His presence in the hospital at the time of recording  of  PW-
1’s dying declaration and other statements itself is  sufficient  to  create
doubt about the credibility of the prosecution case.

18.   It is also pertinent to note that  while  PW-13,  the  Head  Constable
stated that the injured were first taken to the  village  and  then  to  the
hospital, PW-28 S.I., P.S. Muppala stated that  the  injured  were  directly
taken to the hospital.  If, as stated by PW-13 the  injured  witnesses  were
first taken to the village and then to the hospital,  then  it  is  possible
that after consultation with villagers they implicated  the  accused.   This
makes a dent in the prosecution story.

19.   There are certain other aspects which add up to the weaknesses of  the
prosecution case.  Ex-P/1 states that  Challa  Narasimha  Rao  went  to  the
hospital along with PW-1, but his name was not  in  the  charge-sheet  as  a
witness.  Ex-P/1 refers to Somapalli Kotaiah as an assailant  but  his  name
does not figure in the  charge-sheet  as  an  accused.   Ex-P/1,  which  was
recorded at 3.15 a.m. on 17/3/1993, states that two persons  were  murdered.
As per intimation  [Ex-P/19],  deceased-Chanchaiah  died  at  4.50  a.m.  on
17/3/1993.  It is not understood  how  it  is  stated  in  Ex-P/1  that  two
persons were dead.  PW-1 stated in his cross-examination  that  he  did  not
get down from the tractor at any stage. But in his  dying  declaration  [Ex-
P/1], he stated that he fell down in the bushes.  Moreover, in  the  inquest
report prepared by PW-29, the name of one Challa Koteshwar Rao is  shown  as
the person who first saw deceased-Singhaiah dead.   In  column  4,  name  of
Challa Koteshwar Rao is mentioned as the person who had last seen  deceased-
Singhaiah alive and that he was traveling in the tractor  along  with  other
witnesses.  However, PW-17 Cholla Mangammao, the wife of deceased  Singhaiah
stated that on that day, Challa Koteshwar Rao was in the  village.   Seizure
of weapons has been disbelieved by the trial  court  as  well  as  the  High
Court. It is also important to note that  PW-1  stated  in  Ex-P/1  that  30
people attacked them.  But names of only A1 to A12 and A15 figured  therein.
 Names of all the accused were not stated by  the  witnesses.   They  stated
that  they  would  be  able  to   identify   the   accused.    However,   no
identification parade was held. Therefore, it cannot be said with  certainty
which accused attacked whom.  Moreover, there  are  so  many  omissions  and
contradictions in the evidence of prosecution  witnesses,  that  the  entire
fabric of prosecution case appears to be ridden with  gaping  holes.   These
discrepancies have been meticulously noted by the  trial  court.   The  High
Court, however, holds that the witnesses were examined 5½  years  after  the
incident and, therefore, such discrepancies are natural.  It  is  true  that
due to passage of time, witnesses do deviate from  their  police  statements
as their memory fades to some extent.  Reasonable allowance can be made  for
such discrepancies.  But when such  discrepancies  make  the  foundation  of
prosecution case shaky, Court has to take  strict  note  thereof.   In  this
case, the trial court has meticulously located the discrepancies and  opined
that the witnesses have discredited themselves.  The High  Court  ought  not
to have overlooked this reasoning of the trial court.

20.   Finally, we must note that the High Court has not stated why  it  felt
that the trial court’s view was perverse.  It has not stated what  were  the
compelling reasons, which persuaded it to disturb the  order  of  acquittal.
As noted by this Court in several decisions  if  two  reasonable  views  are
possible, the appellate court shall  not  disturb  the  order  of  acquittal
because it feels that some other view  is  possible.   The  reasonable  view
which reinforces the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  must  be
preferred.  In our opinion the trial court’s view was not perverse.  It  was
taken after thorough marshalling of evidence.  It was a reasonably  possible
view.  The High Court erred in disturbing it.





21.   In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed.  The impugned  judgment
and order is set aside.  The appellants in both the  appeals  are  acquitted
of all the charges.  They are on bail.  Their bail bonds stand discharged.



                                                      …..……...…………………………..J.
                                               (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

                               .…………………………..J.
                           (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

New Delhi;
April 22, 2014.

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[1]    (2007) 4 SCC 415
[2]    (2003) 1 SCC 204
[3]    (2004) 9 SCC 186

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