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Monday, April 21, 2014

Dacoity - under sec.379 I.P.C r/w sec.102 B of I.P.C - No proper arrest - No proper test identification - No proper recovery - No conspiracy was proved - Trial court rightly acquitted the accused on benefit of doubts - where as high court committed error - High court not discussed the evidence except mentioning chief examination and with out discussing the evidence - Apex court set aside the order of the high court and acquit the accused = Thimmareddy & Ors. …..Appellants Vs. State of Karnataka …..Respondent = 2014 (April.Part)judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41434

   Dacoity - under sec.379 I.P.C r/w sec.102 B of I.P.C - No proper arrest - No proper test identification - No proper recovery - No conspiracy was proved - Trial court rightly acquitted the accused on benefit of doubts - where as high court committed error - High court not discussed the evidence except mentioning chief examination and with out discussing the evidence - Apex court set aside the order of the high court and acquit the accused =

 “1) Whether the prosecution proves that  the  accused  conspired
together in order to commit robbery on CW-3Y Yousuf in KSRTC bus.  While  he
was travelling and also to other passengers in the bus?

The relevant discussion in the judgment of  the
learned trial court on this aspect reads as under:

                  “The requirement of criminal conspiracy, there must be  an
           existence of an agreement to commit an  offence.  The  conspiracy
           can be proved by the direct evidence though the  same  is  rarely
           available, or by circumstantial evidence. As could be  seen  from
           the requirement of law there must be  an  agreement  between  the
           accused  to  commit  an  unlawful  act  lead  to   inference   of
           conspiracy. The evidence of this Allabakash is  not  corroborated
           with any other evidence. He never speaks about anything  unlawful
           act to be done  and  anything  about  an  agreement  between  the
           parties with  regard  to  the  commission  of  an  unlawful  act.
           Necessary ingredients are not established by leading the evidence
           of this PW-19 during  the  course  of  cross-examination  he  has
           admitted that the accused were talking in open space. The publics
           were passing besides the accused. He did not hear what they  were
           talking. He did not suspect about the accused. Two  months  after
           the incident the police came and enquired him. Seetharama A-6  is
           a merchant and good man. On that day whatever  the  accused  were
           talking was not in respect of any wrongdoing.  These  answers  of
           this witness during the course of cross-examination clearly gives
           goodbye to the theory  of  criminal  conspiracy.  Therefore,  the
           materials available on record are  not  sufficient  to  establish
           that there was a criminal conspiracy among the accused  in  order
           to commit the offence.”
For want of establishment of charge of conspiracy A-6 and  A-4  are
let off by the High Court also as they were not named  by  any  of  the  eye
witnesses. We are, therefore, quite in agreement with the conclusion of  the
trial court that charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B  of  IPC  has  not
been proved.

            2) Whether the prosecution proves  that  as  a  result  of  said
conspiracy the accused committed the  dacoity  in  the  bus  bearing  No.KA-
36/3453 by showing the deadly weapons like sickle, knives near Kapgal  Seema
at Bailmerchad cross on Raichur Manvi road and committed Dacoity?


The  trial  court  referred  to  Karnataka
Police  Manual  and  observed  that  the  investigation  was  not  done   in
accordance with the procedure for  identifications  contained  therein.  His
analysis in this behalf reads as under:-

 “After seeing the above statement the victims of  the  incident,
           before the police, it is clear that none of the victim has given
           any clue to identify the accused persons. Now  the  question  is
           what are the materials available with the police to search these
           accused has to be looked into. Here I would like  to  refer  the
           Karnataka Police Manual, where  a  chapter  is  provided,  which
           gives the procedure for identifications. They have to  ascertain
           the kind of light, which was present at the  time  of  incident.
           The details of the opportunities of seeing the  accused  at  the
           time of offence. Anything outstanding in the features or conduct
           of the accused which impressed him  (identifier).  The  distance
           from which he saw the accused and the context of time during  he
           say the accused.     It is mandatory on the part of the I.O.  to
           record in the case diary, the description  in  detail  with  the
           above said ingredients. As could be seen  from  the  case  diary
           available on  record  there  are  no  materials  placed  by  the
           prosecution to show that they had identification feature of  the
           accused with them after the incident. Therfore, there is a lapse
           on the part of the investigating agency  to collect the material
           information, which gives to the prosecution an opportunities  to
           identify the accused. But they  have  failed  to  establish  the
           identify of the accused persons  of  this  case.  Therefore,  as
           could be seen from the  statements  of  eye  witnesses  who  had
           suffered injuries in  the  hands  of  the  Dacoits  who  had  an
           opportunity of seeing the accused with very close range have not
           given any description  of  the  identification  feature  of  the
           accused.

There is another important aspect  which  cannot  be  lost  sight  of,
 namely as per PW-1 the faces of all the accused persons were  covered  with
 kerchief. It is not at all stated by any of the witnesses as to when  these
 persons removed those kerchief and their faces became naked which could  be
 seen by  these  witnesses.  
Recovery and Arrest 

 In so far as  recovery  on  the  basis  of  purported  voluntary
statement of the accused persons is concerned, the trial  court  found  that
while  recording  alleged  voluntary  statement  of  the  accused   persons,
procedure as laid down under Sections 165 and 166 of the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure  was not  followed.  The  accused  from  outside  the  State  were
arrested within the limits of some other police  station  without  following
the procedure under Section 166 Cr.P.C. It is further pointed out that  when
the  accused  persons  were  brought  in  Manvi  Police  Station  and  their
voluntary statements were allegedly recorded,  the  police  committed  major
irregularities which  were  incurable. 
  “Now the question that would  arise  is  whey  the  police
           officer  has  requested  the  Tahsildar  to  provide  Government
           official to act as panchas. 
What is the reason  for  taking  the
           Government  official  to  act  as  panchas.  According  to   the
           procedure, the police officer has  to  take  the  assistance  of
           local people as panchas, and he must give reasons if he does not
           take the  assistance  of  local  people.  
Before  recording  the
           voluntary  statements  he  requests  the  Tahsildar  for  giving
           panchs. How he came to know whether these accused persons  would
           give voluntary statements regarding recovery of the cast. 
Then o
           the basis of those voluntary statements the amount was recovered
           from the respective houses  and  subsequently,  the  amount  was
           recovered from other accused  persons  as  per  their  voluntary
           statements. 
The I.O. has not stated about  the  details  of  the
           panchnamas under which the recovery  was  made.  It  has  to  be
           proved by the prosecution by leading cogent evidence.”


        3) What order?”

High Court has committed grave error in recording the conviction solely  on
 the basis of the statement of the so  called  eye  witnesses,  and  wrongly
 believing their version. From the discussion contained in the  judgment  of
 the High  Court,  it  becomes  apparent  that  except  stating  what  these
 witnesses  have  mentioned  in  their  examination-in-chief,   no   further
 discussion is there in the judgment and  the  testimony  is  of  all  these
 persons are believed as gospel truth. The High  Court  was  duty  bound  to
 consider  their  testimonies  in  entirety  i.e.  along  with  the   cross-
 examination in order to find out their  truthfulness  and  to  see  whether
 their version in examination in chief has remained unshaken and  worthy  of
 credence. No such exercise is done at all. No doubt, the  trial  court  has
 indulged in wholesome discussion while  discarding  the  testimony  of  eye
 witnesses. Fact remains that while doing so, the trial court discussed  the
 infirmities in the procedure adopted which led to the disbelieving  of  all
 these witnesses. The discussion of the  trial  court  adversely  commenting
 upon the faulty procedure and imperfect investigation is completely ignored
 and sidelined by the High Court.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the High  Court
 holding the appellants guilty of the offence is unsustainable. The same  is
 accordingly set aside.  This appeal is allowed holding that charge  against
 the appellants under Section 397 IPC read with Section 120-B has  not  been
 proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 2014 (April.Part)judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41434
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, A.K. SIKRI

                                                       [REPORTABLE]

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.903/2014
                 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 6943/2011)

Thimmareddy & Ors.                                 …..Appellants

                 Vs.

State of Karnataka                                       …..Respondent



                       J U D G  M E N T



A.K.SIKRI,J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, matter was heard
finally.

3.    Instant is an appeal filed  by  three  persons  who  were  accused  of
committing offence punishable under Section 397 read with Section 120-B  IPC
along with five others.  After the  trial  of  these  accused  persons,  the
Sessions Court had acquitted all the  accused  person  holding  that  charge
under the aforesaid provisions had not been  proved  against  these  accused
persons beyond reasonable doubt. The State had questioned  the  validity  of
the judgment of the trial court  by  preferring  the  appeal  under  Section
378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  During  the  pendency  of
the appeal, one of the accused persons, namely P.Laxman (A-3) died.   Appeal
was heard qua remaining seven accused  persons.  The  High  Court  vide  its
judgment dated 1st December 2010 has convicted five  of  the  seven  accused
persons for the offence punishable under Section 397 read with Section  120-
B of the IPC and have imposed the sentence of rigorous  imprisonment  for  a
period of seven years.  They have also been directed to pay compensation  of
Rs.50,000/- each  for  the  aforesaid   offences  and  in  default  of  such
payment, to undergo simple imprisonment  for  a  period  of  one  year.  The
persons who were convicted are accused No.1 to 5, 7 and  8.  In  respect  of
accused No.4 and 6,  the  judgment  of  the  Sessions  Judge  is  maintained
holding that the charges against them are not proved and appeal  in  respect
of the said two persons is dismissed.  As mentioned above, out of  the  five
accused convicted, only  three  have  approached  this  Court  with  present
appeal, who are A-1, A-2 and A-5.

4.    The case of the prosecution has been stated by the High Court  in  the
impugned  judgment,  which  can  be   reproduced   without   any   fear   or
contradiction, is as follows:-

           “On  8.10.2004  at  about  10.30  p.m.,  a  KSRTC  bus   bearing
           No.KA.36/3453 was proceeding  on  the  Manvi-Raichur  Road  near
           Kapagal village. At that time, accused No.4 and accused No.6 who
           had  conspired  together  andplanned  to  commit  dacoity,  gave
           information to accused No.1, accused No.2, accused No.3, accused
           No.7 & 8 and all of them committed  the  offence  as  per  their
           plan. Accordingly, they went by bus from Gadwal and travelled in
           the Raichur Mantralayam-Hubli bus as passengers. A-2 by  holding
           a sickle to the neck of the driver PW.2, asked him to  stop  the
           bus by assaulting him and threatening to injure him. Immediately
           the bus was stopped. Accused No.5 took  the  knife  and  accused
           No.1 took dagger and pressed on the chest of PW3 and  threatened
           him with dire consequences. Then, accused No.3 robbed  the  suit
           case of PW6 and A-7  took  out  a  knife  and  threatened  PW15,
           Udaykumar, who suffered injuries on his left hand. A-8  snatched
           a bag containing money from PW1. Then A-1, A-5  and  A-8  robbed
           the two suit cases of PW13 Jagadeesh and PW7 Jeelani. They  also
           snatched the bag of PW20 Hanumanthappa. A-1,A-7 and A-8 snatched
           the cash bag from the complainant namely the  conductor  of  the
           bus. They went at a distance opened the suit  cases,  took  away
           the money and threw away the articles. Thereby all  the  accused
           committed dacoity of an amount of Rs.4,47,100/-. Thereafter, the
           complainant went to  the  Manvi  Police  Station  and  lodged  a
           complaint. PWs.2, 6,7,13 and 15 accompanied him. The  statements
           of PWs.2,6,7,13 and 15 were also recorded. Accordingly,  a  case
           in Crime No.182/2004 was registered by the Manvi Police  Station
           for offences punishable under Section 120-B read  with  397  IPC
           and  investigation  commenced.  Thereafter  the   accused   were
           arrested and a sum of Rs.28,000/- was recovered from A-1, a  sum
           of  Rs.54,000/- from A-2, a sum of Rs.32,000/- from A-3,  a  sum
           of Rs.36,000/- from A-4, a sum of Rs.35,000/- from A-5, a sum of
           Rs.12,000/- from A-6, a sum of Rs.500/- from A-7 and  a  sum  of
           Rs.9,600/- from  A-8.  The  weapons  used  in  the  offence  was
           recovered on their voluntary statement.  Various  articles  were
           also recovered. On completion of investigation, a  charge  sheet
           was filed by the prosecution and the accused  were  charged  for
           the offence punishable under Section 120-B and 397 of the Indian
           Penal Code. “




5.    The prosecution examined 24 witnesses and produced 78 documents  which
were exhibited.  The  prosecution  also  marked  37  material  objects.  The
accused persons in their defence examined two witnesses  and  produced  five
documents.

6.     As is  clear  from  the  provisions  of  IPC,  charge  whereupon  was
pressed, it was the case of the prosecution that eight accused  persons  had
hatched a conspiracy to commit the dacoity and in furtherance  of  the  said
conspiracy they committed dacoity by  intercepting  KSRTC  on  8.10.2004  at
about 10.30 p.m.  The trial court, accordingly, formulated following  points
which arose for consideration:

            “1) Whether the prosecution proves that  the  accused  conspired
together in order to commit robbery on CW-3Y Yousuf in KSRTC bus.  While  he
was travelling and also to other passengers in the bus?

            2) Whether the prosecution proves  that  as  a  result  of  said
conspiracy the accused committed the  dacoity  in  the  bus  bearing  No.KA-
36/3453 by showing the deadly weapons like sickle, knives near Kapgal  Seema
at Bailmerchad cross on Raichur Manvi road and committed Dacoity?

            3) What order?”

      7.    Obviously, the first question which fell for  consideration  was
as to whether  the accused  persons  had  conspired  together  in  order  to
commit robbery on Yousuf (PW-6). Second aspect  of  the  matter  was  as  to
whether prosecution was able to prove that as  a  result  of  the  aforesaid
conspiracy these accused persons had, in  fact,  committed  dacoity  in  the
said bus on the given date and time.

8.    In so far as charge of conspiracy is concerned, it was  noted  by  the
trial court that the evidence produced in support of this charge  was  PW-19
Allabaksh and Yusuf (PW-6). The statement of PW-19 was that  he  knew  Yusuf
(PW-6) and Sitaramulu (A-6). One day before 9.30  a.m.  before  the  alleged
incident, eight accused persons were seen standing near the shop of  Accused
No.1 which was 50 km away from the shop  of  A-6  Siddaramyiah  beneath  the
tree. A-6 was telling other accused persons that on  the  next  date  Yousuf
was going out of town and other accused had to  do  their  work.  Thereafter
they dispersed. On the next day, this witness  (PW-19)  came  to  know  that
there was a robbery in  which  Yousuf  was  robbed  of  Rs.3.60  Lakh.   The
learned Sessions Judge, after analyzing the testimony of PW-19, as  well  as
PW-6 on this aspect came to the conclusion that  the  charge  of  conspiracy
was not proved inasmuch as, the mere fact that eight  accused  persons  were
gathered on  the  previous  day  could  not  automatically  connect  to  the
commission of alleged crime. The relevant discussion in the judgment of  the
learned trial court on this aspect reads as under:

                  “The requirement of criminal conspiracy, there must be  an
           existence of an agreement to commit an  offence.  The  conspiracy
           can be proved by the direct evidence though the  same  is  rarely
           available, or by circumstantial evidence. As could be  seen  from
           the requirement of law there must be  an  agreement  between  the
           accused  to  commit  an  unlawful  act  lead  to   inference   of
           conspiracy. The evidence of this Allabakash is  not  corroborated
           with any other evidence. He never speaks about anything  unlawful
           act to be done  and  anything  about  an  agreement  between  the
           parties with  regard  to  the  commission  of  an  unlawful  act.
           Necessary ingredients are not established by leading the evidence
           of this PW-19 during  the  course  of  cross-examination  he  has
           admitted that the accused were talking in open space. The publics
           were passing besides the accused. He did not hear what they  were
           talking. He did not suspect about the accused. Two  months  after
           the incident the police came and enquired him. Seetharama A-6  is
           a merchant and good man. On that day whatever  the  accused  were
           talking was not in respect of any wrongdoing.  These  answers  of
           this witness during the course of cross-examination clearly gives
           goodbye to the theory  of  criminal  conspiracy.  Therefore,  the
           materials available on record are  not  sufficient  to  establish
           that there was a criminal conspiracy among the accused  in  order
           to commit the offence.”



9.    It would be pertinent to mention that even  the  High  Court  has  not
discarded the aforesaid findings  of  the  trial  court  on  the  charge  of
conspiracy. As would be seen hereinafter, the  reason  for  convicting  five
accused persons, out of eight who stood trial, is that testimonies of  other
witnesses who were in the bus and had  purportedly  seen  the  said  accused
persons. For want of establishment of charge of conspiracy A-6 and  A-4  are
let off by the High Court also as they were not named  by  any  of  the  eye
witnesses. We are, therefore, quite in agreement with the conclusion of  the
trial court that charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B  of  IPC  has  not
been proved.

10.   In so far as the charge  under  Section  397  IPC  is  concerned,  the
prosecution had relied upon the testimony of PW-1 ( conductor of  the  bus),
PW-2 (driver of the bus), PW-6 Yusuf (one of the victims), PW-7(owner  of  a
hotel), PW-9 (cleaner in a tempo), PW-16. Testimony of  PW-9  has  not  been
believed either by the trial court  or  the  High  Court  and  therefore  no
discussion about his deposition is necessitated.

11.   PW-1 who is the conductor of the  bus  and  an  eye  witness  was  the
complainant as well. Apart from  narrating  the  incident  of  dacoity,  the
material part of his testimony is that he had identified  A-1  and  A-5  and
their overt acts.  As  per  him,  six  persons  boarded  the  bus  near  the
Bailmerchad Cross and accused 1and 5 came near  the  driver.  A-1  assaulted
and threatened him with a sickle and asked him to stop the bus.  PW-1  while
deposing in Court identified A-1 and A-5 who had snatched his cash bag.

12.   PW-2 (driver), likewise, deposed that he was hit from  the  back  side
by hand and  a chopper was put on his neck. When he turned around he saw  it
was accused No.2 who hit him with his hand and put a  chopper  on  his  neck
and as a result he suffered an injury. According to him he identified A-2.

13.   PW-6 who is the main victim and one of the passengers deposed  to  the
effect that he was carrying with him cash of Rs.3,53,000/-. He  boarded  the
bus which was forcibly stopped by two persons who came near him  and  put  a
dragger on the left side of his chest. These two persons were  A-1  and  A-3
whom he identified.

14.   PW-7 is owner of a hotel and according to  him,  accused  persons  had
come and stayed there and he identified two of them,  namely,  A-1  and  A-2
(at this stage we would like to point out that even the High Court  has  not
returned the finding of guilt by referring to his  testimony  which  in  any
case is not connected with the actual commission of offence).

15.    PW-15(Udayakumar)  is  a  Sales  Executive  Manager  in  Hubli   Pipe
Corporation. He deposed that he was also in the bus and was assaulted  by  a
knife on his left hand wrist by A-7 and his bag was snatched away. When  A-7
took his bag he  stood  up  but  was  again  assaulted.  He  identified  two
persons, namely A-7 and A-8 stating that  A-7  caused  injuries  on  him  by
knife and A-8 also assaulted him.

16.   Apart from relying  upon  the  aforesaid  eye  witnesses  who  deposed
against thee accused persons at the time  of  trial,  the  prosecution  also
stated that after the arrest of  the  accused  persons  Test  Identification
Parades (TIPs) had been conducted. In these TIPs, PW-2, PW-6 and PW-16  were
called and participated who identified A-2, A-1 and A-3, as well as A-7  and
A-8 respectively.

17.   The trial  court  after  analyzing  the  testimony  of  the  aforesaid
witnesses refused to believe them. Pertinent observation which  is  made  by
the trial court in  this  behalf  is  that  when  the  statements  of  these
witnesses  were  recorded  under  Section  161,Cr.P.C.,  at  the   time   of
investigation by the police officer, none of  these  witnesses  stated  that
they had seen the accused persons and were in a position  to  identify  them
if they were brought before them. The  trial  court  referred  to  Karnataka
Police  Manual  and  observed  that  the  investigation  was  not  done   in
accordance with the procedure for  identifications  contained  therein.  His
analysis in this behalf reads as under:-

           “After seeing the above statement the victims of  the  incident,
           before the police, it is clear that none of the victim has given
           any clue to identify the accused persons. Now  the  question  is
           what are the materials available with the police to search these
           accused has to be looked into. Here I would like  to  refer  the
           Karnataka Police Manual, where  a  chapter  is  provided,  which
           gives the procedure for identifications. They have to  ascertain
           the kind of light, which was present at the  time  of  incident.
           The details of the opportunities of seeing the  accused  at  the
           time of offence. Anything outstanding in the features or conduct
           of the accused which impressed him  (identifier).  The  distance
           from which he saw the accused and the context of time during  he
           say the accused.     It is mandatory on the part of the I.O.  to
           record in the case diary, the description  in  detail  with  the
           above said ingredients. As could be seen  from  the  case  diary
           available on  record  there  are  no  materials  placed  by  the
           prosecution to show that they had identification feature of  the
           accused with them after the incident. Therfore, there is a lapse
           on the part of the investigating agency  to collect the material
           information, which gives to the prosecution an opportunities  to
           identify the accused. But they  have  failed  to  establish  the
           identify of the accused persons  of  this  case.  Therefore,  as
           could be seen from the  statements  of  eye  witnesses  who  had
           suffered injuries in  the  hands  of  the  Dacoits  who  had  an
           opportunity of seeing the accused with very close range have not
           given any description  of  the  identification  feature  of  the
           accused.

                 The next stage comes where the I.O. gets an opportunity of
           examining the witnesses who have said to have seen  the  accused
           persons. The important witnesses are PW-8  Shankrappa  and  PW-9
           Khaja Pasha. Their statements were also recorded by the  police.
           The said Khaja Pasha who is the Tempo cleaner, who says that  he
           came near Gorkal cross at about 7.00 a.m. there 6  persons  were
           boarded his tempo. Three of them were not wearing  chappals  and
           they were talking in telgue, aged about 25 to 30 years,  wearing
           pant and shirt and holding a plastic bag and legs of the persons
           were with full of mud. They were also taken the tickets and  got
           down in Gilleasugur. Again they boarded to Mantralayam  bus.  He
           says that if the person were shown to him he  can  identify  the
           persons. Therefore, this witness had an  opportunity to see  the
           accused persons from very nearer point and  he  was  capable  of
           giving the identification feature of the accused, which were not
           recorded in his statement by the I.O.”



18.   The trial court also found serious loopholes in the  manner  in  which
investigation was carried out, leaving  serious  flaws  and  the  discussion
exposing these flaws in the judgment of  the  trial  court  which  reads  as
under:

                  “In this case the prosecution has  lost  several  valuable
           opportunities where they could very good material for finding out
           those  culprits.  I  have  already  discussed  above   that   the
           fingerprints of the accused persons were available on the handles
           of the bus fixed near  the  door.  These  fingerprints  were  not
           lifted by the I.O. for comparing with  the  fingerprints  of  the
           accused persons. Secondly, the footprints of the accused  persons
           were available in the land at Kurdi village they  were  also  not
           collected by the agency in order to compare them with the accused
           persons. The prosecution should  have  collected  some  important
           identification features in  order  to  fix  the  accused  in  the
           offence. The materials aspects are absent then how he can connect
           this accused to the crime  is  a  big  question.  Therefore,  the
           circle is incomplete. The link to connect the  accused  with  the
           crime has lost at Mantralayam.   Because all of a sudden the I.O.
           visits to Swagat Lodge and verified  the  register  and  he  gets
           suspicion in the name of one Timmareddy. The  contention  of  the
           defence Advocate is that Mantralayam is such a place,  where  the
           passangers come from various places, where  the  passengers  come
           from various places, and there is no direct bus  facility  to  go
           their place. Therefore, they got down at Mantralayam and take the
           rooms for bathing and performing the Pooja. After  completion  of
           pooja, immediately they will vacate the rooms and  they  continue
           their travel to their respective places. Can we cannot  rule  out
           and we have to differentiate from such type  of  passengers  with
           the accused. Then, how the I.O. came to know that Timmareddy  was
           one of the accused persons, who gave the information to  him.  As
           could  be  seen  from  the   eye   witnesses   have   given   any
           identification feature with regard to the  accused.  Even  during
           the second stage of the investigation neither the Shankarappa nor
           Khaja Pasha have given identification  feature  of  the  accused.
           Then the I.O. says that an information has given the clue of  the
           accused. The only he will capable to give the clue with regard to
           the  accused  persons.  Under  such   circumstances,   there   is
           incomplete investigation and without that link we cannot  connect
           the  crime  with  the  accused  and  here  the  prosecution   has
           completely failed to establish the link of the offence  with  the
           accused. Therefore, the decision relied upon  by  the  prosecutor
           are not applicable to the present circumstances of  the  case  at
           hand. Because the connecting link is lost in  order  to  identify
           the accused.”



19.         In so far as  recovery  on  the  basis  of  purported  voluntary
statement of the accused persons is concerned, the trial  court  found  that
while  recording  alleged  voluntary  statement  of  the  accused   persons,
procedure as laid down under Sections 165 and 166 of the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure  was not  followed.  The  accused  from  outside  the  State  were
arrested within the limits of some other police  station  without  following
the procedure under Section 166 Cr.P.C. It is further pointed out that  when
the  accused  persons  were  brought  in  Manvi  Police  Station  and  their
voluntary statements were allegedly recorded,  the  police  committed  major
irregularities which  were  incurable.  According  to  the  prosecution  the
voluntary statements were recorded on 29.10.2004 in respect  of  Timmareddy,
Venkateshagouda, T.Laxman, Anjaneyallu, P.Devanna by PW-23. PW-23 says  that
after the arrest  of  the  above  said  accused  persons  he  requested  the
Tahsildar  Manvi  to  provide  2  official  panchas  at  4.00  A.M.  In  the
meanwhile, he recorded the voluntary statements of A-1 to 5 as  per  Ex.p-66
to P-70. Thereafter, on the basis of the said voluntary  statements  and  in
the presence of 2 official  panchas  deputed  by  the  Tahsildar  Manvi,  he
proceeded to recover the cash from their houses under the panchanamas.

20.    The aforesaid procedure is  commented  by  the  trial  court  in  the
following manner:

                 “Now the question that would  arise  is  whey  the  police
           officer  has  requested  the  Tahsildar  to  provide  Government
           official to act as panchas. What is the reason  for  taking  the
           Government  official  to  act  as  panchas.  According  to   the
           procedure, the police officer has  to  take  the  assistance  of
           local people as panchas, and he must give reasons if he does not
           take the  assistance  of  local  people.  Before  recording  the
           voluntary  statements  he  requests  the  Tahsildar  for  giving
           panchs. How he came to know whether these accused persons  would
           give voluntary statements regarding recovery of the cast. Then o
           the basis of those voluntary statements the amount was recovered
           from the respective houses  and  subsequently,  the  amount  was
           recovered from other accused  persons  as  per  their  voluntary
           statements. The I.O. has not stated about  the  details  of  the
           panchnamas under which the recovery  was  made.  It  has  to  be
           proved by the prosecution by leading cogent evidence.”




 21.  On the basis of the  aforesaid  analysis,  the  trial  court  did  not
 believe the version of eye witnesses, faulty TIP as well as legality of the
 recoveries at the instance of the accused persons.  With  this  discussion,
 the trial court  concluded  that  even  if  there  was  some  incriminating
 material against the accused persons that was not sufficient to  prove  the
 guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt as cogent evidence was
 not produced and  the  investigation  was  faulty.  This  resulted  in  the
 acquittal of all the persons by the trial court.

 22.  Coming to the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High  Court
 has referred to the  testimonies  of  PW-1,2  ,6,  7  and  15  briefly  and
 highlighted the fact that they had identified, between  themselves,  A-1,A-
 2,A-5,A-7 and A-8. Since these are the eye  witnesses  who  had  identified
 these five  accused  persons,  the  trial  court  failed  to  consider  the
 statements of these witnesses and a generalized finding  was   recorded  to
 the effect that  the accused persons had not been identified. Primarily, on
 this ground and believing the aforesaid persons’  version as eye witnesses,
 the High Court has convicted these five accused persons.

 23.  Mr.  K.L.  Janjani,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants
 questioned the wisdom of the High Court in arriving the  aforesaid  finding
 by making following submissions:

      (1) The date of alleged offence was 8.10.2004 and the accused  persons
 were arrested on 28.10.2004. However, first TIP was conducted on  9.11.2004
 and second TIP on 30.1. 2005.  Therefore, this abnormal delay in conducting
 the TIPs, that too when the accused persons were not  previously  known  to
 the alleged eye witnesses rendered the entire exercise of TIPs  as  invalid
 to which no credence could be  given.  He  referred  to  few  judgments  in
 support:                                                                 In
 Hari Nath vs. State of U.P. 1988 (1) SCC 14 wherein reliance was placed  on
 the following observations:


           “Even on the premise that there was no such  prior  acquaintance,
           the evidence establishing the identity of  the  culprits  assumes
           particular materiality in a case, as here, of a dacoity occurring
           in  the  darkness  of  the  night.  The  evidence  of  the   test
           identification would call for a careful scrutiny. In  a  case  of
           this kind where the eyewitnesses, on their own admission, did not
           know the appellants before the occurrence,  their  identification
           of the accused persons for the first time in  the  dock  after  a
           long lapse of time would have been improper. In  Halsbury’s  Laws
           of England (Fourth Edn., Vol. 11, para 363) this  passage  occurs
           and is worth recalling:


           “It is undesirable that witnesses should be asked to  identify  a
           defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and  as  a
           general practice it is preferable that he should have been placed
           previously on a parade with  other  persons,  so  that  potential
           witnesses can be asked to pick him out.”





Other judgment relied upon  was  on  Rajesh  Govind  Jagesha  vs.  State  of
Maharashtra 1999 (8) SCC 428 wherein the proposal of  law  is  discussed  as
under:

            “This Court in State of A.P. v. M.V. Ramana Reddy (Dr) held that
           where there is unexplained delay in  holding  the  identification
           parade, the evidence of the prosecution regarding identity of  an
           accused cannot be held absolutely reliable and in such a case the
           accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The explanation  for
           delay  in  holding  the  identification  parade  offered  by  the
           prosecution in the instant case  is  not  trustworthy.  The  non-
           availability of a Magistrate in a city like  Bombay  for  over  a
           period of five weeks from the date of the arrest of Accused 1 and
           2 and three weeks from the arrest of Accused 3 and  4  cannot  be
           accepted. It  is  not  denied  that  scores  of  Magistrates  are
           available in the city of Bombay and that the investigating agency
           was not obliged to get the  parade  conducted  from  a  specified
           Magistrate. The High Court was not justified in holding that  the
           parade could not be held early on account of alleged difficulties
           of the Special Executive Magistrate. It was not for  the  defence
           to  prove  that  the  parade  held  was  suffering   from   legal
           infirmities because, admittedly, the onus of  proof  in  criminal
           case never shifts as the accused is presumed to be innocent  till
           proved  otherwise,  beyond  all   reasonable   doubts,   by   the
           prosecution. In cases where a person is alleged to have committed
           the offence and is not previously known to the witnesses,  it  is
           obligatory on the  part  of  the  investigating  agency  to  hold
           identification parade for the purposes of enabling the  witnesses
           to identify the person alleged to have committed the offence. The
           absence of test identification may not be fatal if the accused is
           known or sufficiently described in the complaint leaving no doubt
           in the mind of the court regarding his involvement. Such a parade
           may not be necessary in  a  case  where  the  accused  person  is
           arrested on  the  spot  immediately  after  the  occurrence.  The
           evidence of identifying the accused person at the trial, for  the
           first time, is  from  its  very  nature,  inherently  of  a  weak
           character. This Court in Budhsen v. State of U.P. held  that  the
           evidence in order to carry conviction should  ordinarily  clarify
           as to how and under what circumstances  the  complainant  or  the
           witnesses came to pick out the accused person and the details  of
           the part which such persons played in the crime in question  with
           reasonable particularity. The test identification  is  considered
           as a safe rule of prudence for corroboration. Though the  holding
           of  the  identification  proceedings  may  not   be   substantive
           evidence,  yet  such  proceedings  are  used  for   corroboration
           purposes in order to believe or not the involvement of the person
           brought before the court for the commission  of  the  crime.  The
           holding of identification parade being  a  rule  of  prudence  is
           required to be followed strictly in accordance with  the  settled
           position of law and expeditiously. The delay, if any, has  to  be
           explained satisfactorily by the prosecution.”


            (2) His next submission was that PW-1 and PW-7 had identified A-
 1 and A-5 in the court and PW-7 had identified A-1 and A-2  in  the  court.
 However, they were never called at the time of conducting TIP.

            (3) In respect of all these eye witnesses, namely PW-1,PW-2, PW-
 6, PW-7 and PW-15 his submission was that the High Court had  simply  taken
 into account their version in the examination-in-chief and did not  discuss
 the cross-examination at all, which exposed the falsity of their statement.

            (4) It was further argued that PW-2 (driver)  had  categorically
 stated that the faces of all these persons who  boarded  the  bus  gathered
 with kerchief and since their faces were hidden there was  no  question  of
 identifying these persons by any of the witnesses.

            (5) It was also submitted that there is  no  discussion  in  the
 judgment at all as to how the trial court went wrong and the reasons  given
 by the trial court particularly with reference to Karnataka  Police  Manual
 and faulty investigation are not dealt with at all.

            (6) Another submission of the learned counsel was  that  at  the
 time when their statements were recorded under Section 161,Cr.P.C. none  of
 these witnesses stated that  they  were  in  a  position  to  identify  the
 culprits. There was, thus, clear violation of the  procedure  contained  in
 Karnataka Police Manual and it was a clear case  of  improvement  by  these
 witnesses at a later stage either in  belated TIPs or before the court when
 they were examined as witnesses.

 24.  Mr. C.B.Gururaj, learned counsel appearing for the State  referred  to
 the testimonies of the aforesaid eye witnesses  and  argued  that  the  eye
 witnesses were believable and the conviction based on their  testimony  was
 just and legal.  In a sense, he relied upon the discussion contained in the
 judgment of the High Court returning  the  finding  of  guilt  against  the
 appellants.

 25.  After considering the respective submissions  and  going  through  the
 record, we are inclined to accept this appeal as we are of the opinion that
 High Court has committed grave error in recording the conviction solely  on
 the basis of the statement of the so  called  eye  witnesses,  and  wrongly
 believing their version. From the discussion contained in the  judgment  of
 the High  Court,  it  becomes  apparent  that  except  stating  what  these
 witnesses  have  mentioned  in  their  examination-in-chief,   no   further
 discussion is there in the judgment and  the  testimony  is  of  all  these
 persons are believed as gospel truth. The High  Court  was  duty  bound  to
 consider  their  testimonies  in  entirety  i.e.  along  with  the   cross-
 examination in order to find out their  truthfulness  and  to  see  whether
 their version in examination in chief has remained unshaken and  worthy  of
 credence. No such exercise is done at all. No doubt, the  trial  court  has
 indulged in wholesome discussion while  discarding  the  testimony  of  eye
 witnesses. Fact remains that while doing so, the trial court discussed  the
 infirmities in the procedure adopted which led to the disbelieving  of  all
 these witnesses. The discussion of the  trial  court  adversely  commenting
 upon the faulty procedure and imperfect investigation is completely ignored
 and sidelined by the High Court.

 26.  In so far as eye witnesses are concerned, as pointed  out  above,  the
 High Court has accepted his truthfulness and relied upon the testimonies of
 PW-1 (conductor who had identified A-1 and A-5), PW-2 (the driver  who  had
 identified A-2), PW-6 (victim who had identified A-1  and  A-3)  and  PW-15
 (passenger who had identified A-7 and A-8). It is stated by the High  Court
 that  these  witnesses  stood  by  their  statement,  their   evidence   is
 unimpeachable and there are no discrepancies in their evidence. However, as
 pointed out, these observations are on the basis of examination in chief of
 these witnesses without taking into consideration their  cross-examination.
 In so far as PW-1 is concerned, in his cross-examination  he  has  accepted
 the faces of the two persons covered with kerchief. If that was so, he  has
 not at all explained as to whether their faces were uncovered at any  point
 of time how and when he was able to see their faces. He did not explain  in
 his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as to why he did not state
 he would be in a position to identify two persons. In that statement, he is
 conspicuously silent about having seen two persons.

 27.  Likewise, in so far PW-2, driver is concerned, apart from the features
 pointed out qua  PW-1  which  apply  in  his  case,  he  mentioned  in  his
 examination in chief that “somebody hit me from back side by means of hand.
 They put chopper on neck from back side.” In his cross-examination  he  not
 only accepted that when he was hit on the back of  the  neck,  he  did  not
 shout, he further specifically stated that “there was no chance for  me  to
 see back side since the vehicle was in a running vehicle. The  vehicle  was
 moving at the speed of 20 kms. I did not turn back  till  the  accused  get
 down from the bus.”

 28.  In so far as PW-6 is concerned, he has allegedly identified A1 and  A-
 3. Out of these two i.e. A-1 is identified by PW-1  as  well.  However,  as
 stated above PW-1 mentioned that face of A-1 was covered. Again, he had not
 explained as to under what circumstances he could  identify  these  accused
 persons. PW-15 was another passenger in the bus who has identified A-7  and
 A-8. He, inter-alia, has stated that two persons had knife on the chest  of
 PW-6 and snatched his bag and came towards him. He was assaulted  by  means
 of knife on his left hand wrist and his bag  was  also  snatched.  The  two
 persons who snatched the bag from PW-6, according to PW-6 were A1 and  A-3.
 However, PW-15 identified two other persons namely A-7 and A-8. That  apart
 he has also admitted that one of them had covered his face that one  person
 has  closed  his  face  upto  nose  by  means  of  the  cloth.   In   these
 circumstances, how he could identify that person is not explained.

 29.  There is another important aspect  which  cannot  be  lost  sight  of,
 namely as per PW-1 the faces of all the accused persons were  covered  with
 kerchief. It is not at all stated by any of the witnesses as to when  these
 persons removed those kerchief and their faces became naked which could  be
 seen by  these  witnesses.   PW-1  was  subsequently  confronted  with  the
 statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. to this  effect  that  in  the  cross-
 examination he accepted that he made the statement. Therefore, it  was  for
 him to clarify as to under what circumstances he could see the faces of A-1
 and A-5 on the  same  ground  how  their  faces  could  be  seen  by  other
 witnesses, remains a mystery which is not explained by the prosecution.

 30.  In this backdrop, the flaws in the investigation pointed  out  by  the
 trial court become crucial.  Curiously, High Court has not even adverted to
 those flaws.

 31.  We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the High  Court
 holding the appellants guilty of the offence is unsustainable. The same  is
 accordingly set aside.  This appeal is allowed holding that charge  against
 the appellants under Section 397 IPC read with Section 120-B has  not  been
 proved beyond reasonable doubt.

 32.  The appellants are  entitled  to  be  released  forthwith  and  it  is
 directed accordingly.




                                        ………………………………….J.
                                                          (Surinder    Singh
 Nijjar)






                                        ………………………………….J.
                                                                       (A.K.
 Sikri)
 New Delhi,
 April 21, 2014


Burden lies on Husband when took plea that he was already married Under the law, a second wife whose marriage is void on account of survival of the previous marriage of her husband with a living wife is not a legally wedded wife and she is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for the sole reason that "law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy1". But, the law also presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a man and woman have cohabited continuously for a long number of years and when the man and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage. PYLA MUTYALAMMA @ SATYAVATHI .. Appellant Versus PYLA SURI DEMUDU & ANR. ..Respondents= 2011 (Aug. Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=38394

Burden lies on Husband when took plea that he was already married 

 Under the law, a second   wife   whose marriage is void 



on   account   of   survival     of   the   previous   marriage   of   her 



husband with a living wife is not a legally wedded wife and 



she is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under Section 



125 Cr.P.C. for the sole reason that "law leans in favour of 



legitimacy   and frowns upon bastardy1".   But, the law also 



presumes   in   favour   of     marriage   and   against   concubinage 



when a man and woman   have  cohabited continuously  for 



a long number of years and when the man and woman are 



proved to have lived together  as man and wife, the law will 



presume,   unless   the   contrary     is   clearly   proved,   that   they 



were   living     together     in   consequence     of   a   valid   marriage 



and   not   in   a     state   of   concubinage. =

 When   the   appellant's   case   is   tested   on   the   anvil 



of the aforesaid legal position, it is sufficiently clear that the 



appellant     has   succeeded   in   proving     that   she   was   the 



legally   married wife of the respondent   with three children 



out   of   which   one   had   expired   while   the   other   two   who   are 



major and well-settled.   It has further been proved that the 



respondent-husband   started   deserting   the   appellant-wife 



after almost 25 years of marriage and in order to avert the 



claim of maintenance, a story of previous marriage was set 



up for which he failed to furnish any proof much less clear 



proof.  Thus,  it  was  not open  for  the High Court   under  its 



revisional   jurisdiction   to   set   aside   the   finding   of   the   trial 



court     and   absolve   the   respondent   from   paying     the 



maintenance of Rs.500/- per month to the appellant-wife. 




16.          Having     thus     considered   the   contradictory 



versions of the contesting parties and deliberating over the 



arguments   advanced     by   them   in   the   light   of   the   evidence 



and   circumstances,   we   are     clearly   led   to   the     irresistible 



conclusion   that   the   High   Court       wrongly   exercised   its 



jurisdiction while  entertaining the revision petition  against 



an   order       granting     maintenance   to   the   appellant-wife 


                                                                       



under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.     We,   therefore,   set   aside   the 



judgment     and   order   of   the   High   Court     and   restore   the 



order passed by the Magistrate in favour of     the appellant 



granting   her   maintenance.     The   appeal     accordingly   is 



allowed.
2011 (Aug. Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=38394
HARJIT SINGH BEDI, GYAN SUDHA MISRA

                                                        REPORTABLE



                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 219 OF 2007




PYLA MUTYALAMMA @ SATYAVATHI                            .. Appellant



                                Versus



PYLA SURI DEMUDU & ANR.                                  ..Respondents





                         J U D G M E N T





GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.





        Under the law, a second   wife   whose marriage is void 



on   account   of   survival     of   the   previous   marriage   of   her 



husband with a living wife is not a legally wedded wife and 



she is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under Section 



125 Cr.P.C. for the sole reason that "law leans in favour of 



legitimacy   and frowns upon bastardy1".   But, the law also 



presumes   in   favour   of     marriage   and   against   concubinage 



when a man and woman   have  cohabited continuously  for 




1 AIR 1929 P.C. 135


                                                                             2



a long number of years and when the man and woman are 



proved to have lived together  as man and wife, the law will 



presume,   unless   the   contrary     is   clearly   proved,   that   they 



were   living     together     in   consequence     of   a   valid   marriage 



and   not   in   a     state   of   concubinage.     Several   judicial



pronouncements     right   from   the   Privy   Council   up   to   this



stage,   have   considered     the   scope   of   the   presumption   that



could be drawn as to the   relationship of marriage between



two persons living together.  But, when an attempt is made



by the husband   to negative the claim of the neglected wife



depicting her as a kept mistress  on the specious plea  that



he     was   already   married,   the   court   would   insist   on   strict



proof of the  earlier marriage and this is intended to protect



women   and   children   from     living   as   destitutes   and   this   is



also   clearly   the     object     of   incorporation   of   Section   125   of



the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   providing   for     grant   of



maintenance.




2.           This appeal at the instance of an estranged wife,



once again has beseeched this Court to delve and decide the



question regarding grant of maintenance under Section 125



Cr.   P.C.   which   arises   after   grant   of   special   leave   under


                                                                          3



Article   136   of   the   Constitution   and   is   directed   against   the



judgment and order dated  19.09.2005 passed by a learned



single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of     Andhra   Pradesh   at



Hyderabad in Criminal Revision No. 234/2004 whereby the



learned single Judge had been pleased to set aside the order



of   the   Family   Court,   Visakhapatnam   awarding   a   sum   of



Rs.500/-   per   month   to   the   appellant-wife     by   way   of



maintenance   to   her   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.   The



respondent-husband   assailed   this   order   by   way   of   a



criminal   revision   before   the   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh



which was allowed and   the order granting   maintenance to



the appellant-wife was set aside.




3.           The   appellant-Pyla   Mutyalamma   @   Satyavathi



initially   filed   an   application   bearing   M.C.No.145/2002



under   Section   125,   Cr.P.C.   claiming   Rs.500/-   per   month



from   her   husband   Pyla   Suri   Demudu-the   respondent



herein,   on   the   ground   that   she   married   him   in   the   year



1974 at Jagannadha Swamy Temple at Visakahapatnam as



per the Hindu rites and customs after which they lived as a



normal   couple   and   out   of   the   wedlock     they   were   blessed



with two daughters and   a son of whom one daughter died.


                                                                            4



The   surviving   daughter   is   married     and   the   son   aged   22



years is also employed in the Dock Labour Board who was



engaged   as   such   by   his   father   the   respondent-husband



himself.  However, the relationship of the appellant-wife and



the   respondent-husband   subsequently   got   strained   when



the   respondent   got   addicted   to   vices   and   started   ignoring



and neglecting the appellant-wife as he failed to provide her



even   the     basic   amenities   like   food   and   clothing   and



indulged   in   beating   her   frequently   under   the     influence   of



liquor.     He   thus   deserted   her   and   also   started   living     with



another   woman   due   to   which   the   appellant   was   compelled



to   claim   maintenance   from   the   husband-the   respondent



herein.




4.           The   respondent-husband   herein,   however,   flatly



denied the allegations and went to the extent of stating that



the appellant is not his wife   as he was already married   to



one   Kolupuru Mutyalamma   in a native of Lankivanipalem



in   the   year   1970   and   had   children   through   her   first



marriage   and   that  he   never   married   the   present   appellant.



He also     alleged that the appellant   is married   to another



man   and   as   she     owns   a     sum   of   Rs.2.50   lac   to   the


                                                                            5



respondent which he had given to her by way of   a loan at



the   time   of     construction   of   her     house   in   the   year   1991-



1992, she started the litigation in order to evade making the



repayment of loan amount.




5.           The   learned   trial   Magistrate   on   an   appreciation



and   scrutiny   of   evidence   held   that   the   appellant   in   fact   is



the   wife   of   respondent   No.1   who     was   deserted   by   the



respondent and, therefore, fixed a maintenance of Rs.500/-



per   month   to   the   appellant   and   the   respondent-husband



was directed to pay this   amount to the appellant-wife.   As



already   stated,   this   was   resisted   by   the   respondent-



husband who assailed the order of the trial court by filing  a



revision petition before the High Court.   The learned single



Judge of the High Court was pleased to hold that there was



no     valid   marriage   between   the   respondent-husband     and



the   appellant-wife,   as   an   earlier   marriage     between     the



appellant and one another lady-Kolupuru Mutyalamma was



subsisting   and   as   the   marriage   with   the   appellant   was



performed   without   repudiation   of   the   earlier     marriage   of



1970,   the   subsequent   marriage   was     not   a   valid   one   and



hence   no maintenance could be paid to the appellant-wife.


                                                                           6



Feeling   aggrieved     with   this   view   of   the   High   Court,



expressed   in   the   impugned   order,   the   appellant-wife   has



preferred this appeal.  




6.           Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant-wife                in



substance has  contended    that the  learned  single Judge of



the   High   Court   erred   in   reversing     the   finding   of   fact



rendered   by   the   trail   court     and   interfered   with   a   pure



question   of   fact   in   spite   of   clinching   evidence   available   on



record   to   show   that   the   appellant   was   the   legally   married



wife   of   the   respondent-husband   who   had   been   living



together   ever   since   their   marriage   in   1974   as   any   other



usual couple and it is only in the year 2001, the respondent



started  deserting   the appellant     due to  his  vices  which he



picked up much after  his marriage with the appellant.   The



High   Court   also   ignored   the   evidence   of   the   son   and   the



daughter   of   the   appellant     but   relied   upon   the   evidence   of



Respondent-husband.  The High Court further relied on the



defence   case   of   the   respondent   -husband   that     he   was



already  married to another lady in the year 1970, although



no   other   witness   except   the   so-called   first   wife   was



produced as a witness before the courts below.


                                                                          7





7.              The   counsel   for   the   appellant   further   laid   much



emphasis on the fact that the order granting maintenance to



the   appellant   by   the   trial   court     should   not   have   been



interfered with by the High Court as it was merely raised to



circumvent the order granting maintenance by setting up  a



false story regarding     the existence of previous marriage of



the   appellant     in   the   year   1970   ignoring   the   clinching



evidence  led by the appellant regarding her marriage which



was creditworthy. In support of his submission, the counsel



also     relied   upon   a   decision     delivered   in   the   matter   of



Vimala (K)  vs.  Veeraswamy  (K)2, wherein   a   Bench of three



learned Judges of this Court had been pleased to hold  that



when     a   husband   takes   a   plea   that   the   marriage   was   void



due   to   subsistence     of   an   earlier   marriage,   the   same



requires clear  and strict proof and the burden of strict proof



of   earlier marriage   is on the husband to discharge. It may



be   relevant   and   worthwhile   at   this   stage   to   quote   the



observations   of   their   Lordships   in   the   aforesaid   matter



which was to the following effect:



            "Section   125     of   the   Code   of   Criminal

            Procedure       is   meant   to   achieve   a   social


2 (1991) 2 SCC 375


                                                                            8



          purpose.     The   object   is   to   prevent   vagrancy

          and destitution.  It provides  a speedy remedy

          for the supply of food, clothing  and shelter to

          the deserted wife.   When an attempt is made

          by the husband   to negative  the claim of the

          neglected   wife   depicting   her   as   a   kept

          mistress   on   the   specious   plea     that   he   was

          already   married,   the   court   would   insist   on

          strict   proof   of   the   earlier   marriage.       Under

          the Hindu Law, a second marriage  is void  on

          account  of  the    survival  of the  first   marriage

          and   is   not   a   legally   wedded   wife.       She   is,

          therefore,   not   entitled   to   maintenance   under

          Section 125.   Such a provision in  law  which

          disentitles     a   second     wife     from   receiving

          maintenance   from     her   husband     under

          Section 125, Cr.P.C., for the sole reason that

          the   marriage   ceremony   though   performed   in

          the customary  form  lacks legal  sanctity   can

          be   applied          only   when   the   husband

          satisfactorily     proves   the   subsistence   of   a

          legal   and   valid   marriage   particularly   when

          Section   125   is   a   measure   of   social   justice

          intended to protect women and children."



   

8.           In   the   case   under   consideration   herein,   the



respondent-husband  has  sought to repudiate the marriage



of   the appellant as void   on account of subsistence   of an



earlier   marriage.     But   while     doing   so   he   has   also   set   up



another   cooked   up   story     that   the   appellant     is   already



married to another woman and as she is owing an amount



of Rs.2.50 lakhs to the appellant  which he had advanced to



her  by  way of  a  loan, the appellant  has raised  a false  plea


                                                                                  9



of claim of maintenance.  Thus, the respondent-husband  in



one   breath     states   that   the     second   marriage     with   the



appellant   is   void  in  view  of  the   subsistence       of  his  earlier



marriage and in  the next one he states  that the appellant-



wife  has set up a false plea  as she wants to  get away from



the   liability   of   repayment   of   the   amount   which   she   was



owing  to the respondent.




9.     In   fact,     we   also   find   sufficient   substance   in   the   plea



that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction   ought not



to have entered into   a scrutiny of the finding recorded   by



the Magistrate that the appellant was a married wife of the



respondent,     before   allowing     an   application   determining



maintenance   as   it   is   well-settled   that   the   revisional   court



can   interfere   only   if   there   is   any   illegality   in   the   order     or



there is any material irregularity  in the procedure  or there



is   an   error   of   jurisdiction.     The   High   Court   under   its



revisional   jurisdiction   is   not   required   to   enter   into   re-



appreciation   of   evidence   recorded   in   the   order   granting



maintenance; at the most it could correct a patent   error of



jurisdiction.   It has been laid down in a series of decisions


                                                                          10



including  Suresh   Mondal  vs.  State   of   Jharkhand3  that   in   a



case where the learned Magistrate has granted maintenance



holding   that the wife had been neglected and the wife was



entitled   to   maintenance,   the   scope   of   interference   by   the



revisional court  is very limited.  The revisional court  would



not substitute its own finding   and upset the maintenance



order recorded by the Magistrate.




10.     In   revision   against   the   maintenance   order   passed   in



proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C., the revisional court



has no power to re-assess evidence and substitute   its own



findings.     Under   revisional   jurisdiction,   the   questions



whether   the   applicant     is   a   married   wife,   the   children   are



legitimate/illegitimate,   being     pre-eminently   questions   of



fact,   cannot   be   reopened   and   the   revisional   court     cannot



substitute its own views.   The High Court, therefore, is not



required in revision to interfere with the positive finding   in



favour of the marriage and patronage of a child.  But where



finding is   a negative one, the High Court   would entertain



the   revision,   re-evaluate     the   evidence     and   come   to   a



conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by




3 2006 (1) AIR Jhar. R. 153


                                                                             11



the   Magistrate   are   legally   sustainable   or   not     as   negative



finding has evil consequences   on the life of both child and



the   woman.     This  was   the   view   expressed  by   the   Supreme



Court   in  the   matter   of   Santosh  (Smt.)  vs.  Naresh  Pal4  ,   as



also   in   the   case   of  Parvathy   Rani   Sahu  vs.  Bishnu   Sahu5.



Thus, the  ratio  decidendi  which emerges out of a catena of



authorities   on  the   efficacy     and  value  of    the   order   passed



by   the   Magistrate   while   determining   maintenance   under



Section 125, Cr.P.C. is that it should not be disturbed while



exercising revisional jurisdiction.




11.              However,     learned   counsel   for   the   respondent-



husband  on his part has also cited the case  of   Savitaben



Somabhai   Bhatiya   vs.  State  of  Gujarat  &  Ors.6, in support



of his plea    that claim  of  maintenance    by the  second wife



cannot     be   sustained   unless   the   previous   marriage   of   the



husband   performed   in   accordance   with   the     Hindu   rites



having     a   living   spouse   is   proved   to   be   a   nullity   and   the



second   wife,   therefore,   is   not   entitled     to     the   benefit   of



Section of 125 Cr.P.C. or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.





4  (1998)  8 SCC 447

5  (2002) 10 SCC 510

6  (2005) 3 SCC 636


                                                                                12





12.           It is no doubt true that the learned Judges in this



cited  case  had  been  pleased   to  hold  that    scope  of Section



125     cannot   be   enlarged   by   introducing     any   artificial



definition   to   include  a  second  woman    not  legally   married,



in   the   expression   `wife'.     But   it  has   also   been  held   therein



that   evidence   showing   that   the   respondent-husband     was



having   a living spouse at the time of alleged marriage with



the second wife, will have to be discharged by the husband.



       Hence, this authority is of no assistance to the counsel



for   the   respondent-husband   herein   as   it   is   nobody's   case



that   the   appellant-wife   should   be   held   entitled   to



maintenance   even   though     the   first   marriage   of   her



husband   was   subsisting   and   the   respondent-husband   was



having     a   living   wife   as   there   is     no  quarrel   with   the   legal



position   that   during   the   subsistence   of   the   first   marriage



and   existence     of   a   living   wife   (first   wife),   the   claim   of



maintenance     by   the   second   wife   cannot   be   entertained.



But   proof   and   evidence   of     subsistence   of   an   earlier



marriage   at   the   time   of   solemnizing     the   second   marriage,



has   to   be   adduced   by   the   husband     taking   the   plea   of



subsistence   of   an   earlier   marriage   and   when   a   plea   of


                                                                             13



subsisting marriage is raised by the respondent-husband, it



has to be satisfactorily proved by tendering  evidence.   This



was   the   view   taken   by   the     learned   Judges   in  Savitaben's



case     (supra)   also   which   has   been   relied   upon   by   the



respondent-husband.   Hence, even   if the ratio of this case



relied   upon   by   the   respondent-husband   is   applied,   the



respondent-husband herein has failed to establish his plea



that his earlier marriage was at all in subsistence which he



claims to have performed in the year 1970 as he has not led



even   an   iota   of   evidence   in   support   of   his   earlier   marriage



including the fact that he has not produced a single witness



except the so-called first wife   as a witness   of proof of his



earlier   marriage.     This  strong   circumstance   apart  from   the



facts   recorded   herein   above,   goes   heavily   against   the



respondent-husband.




13.              We   may   further   take   note   of   an   important   legal



aspect as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of



Jamuna   Bai  vs.  Anant   Rai7,  that  the  nature  of  the   proof   of



marriage   required   for   a   proceeding   under   Section   125,



Cr.P.C. need not be so strong or conclusive as in a  criminal




7  AIR 1988 SC 793 (paras 4, 5 and 8)


                                                                             14



proceeding for an offence under Section  494 IPC since, the



jurisdiction   of   the   Magistrate   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.



being preventive in nature, the Magistrate cannot usurp the



jurisdiction   in   matrimonial   dispute     possessed   by   the   civil



court.     The   object   of   the   section   being     to   afford   a   swift



remedy, and the determination by the Magistrate   as to the



status of the parties   being subject to a final determination



of   the   civil   court,   when   the   husband   denies   that     the



applicant is not his wife, all that the Magistrate has to find,



in   a       proceeding   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.,   is   whether



there   was   some   marriage   ceremony   between   the   parties,



whether they have lived as husband and wife in the eyes of



their   neighbours,   whether   children   were   borne   out   of   the



union.




14.            It was still  further laid down in the case of Sethu



Rathinam vs. Barbara8 that if there was affirmative evidence



on the aforesaid points, the Magistrate would not enter into



complicated   questions   of   law   as   to   the   validity     of   the



marriage   according   to   the   sacrament     element   or   personal



law and the like, which are questions for determination by




8  (1970) 1 SCWR 589


                                                                             15



the   civil   court.     If   the   evidence   led   in   a   proceeding   under



Section 125 Cr.P.C. raises a presumption that the applicant



was the wife of the respondent, it would be sufficient for the



Magistrate   to   pass   an   order   granting     maintenance   under



the proceeding.  But if the husband   wishes to impeach the



validity  of the marriage, he will have to  bring a declaratory



suit   in   the   civil   court     where   the   whole   questions   may   be



gone into wherein he can contend that the marriage was not



a valid marriage or was a fraud or  coercion practiced upon



him.     Fortifying   this   view,   it   was   further   laid   down   by   the



Supreme   Court   in   the   matter   of  Rajathi  vs.  C.   Ganesan9



also,   that   in   a   case   under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.,   the



Magistrate has to take prima facie view   of the matter   and



it is not necessary for the Magistrate to go into  matrimonial



disparity   between   the   parties   in   detail   in   order   to   deny



maintenance     to   the   claimant     wife.     Section   125,   Cr.P.C.



proceeds   on  de   facto  marriage   and   not   marriage  de  jure.



Thus,   validity   of   the   marriage   will   not   be   a   ground   for



refusal of maintenance if other requirements of Section 125



Cr.P.C. are fulfilled.





9  AIR 1999 SC 2374


                                                                            16



15.          When   the   appellant's   case   is   tested   on   the   anvil 



of the aforesaid legal position, it is sufficiently clear that the 



appellant     has   succeeded   in   proving     that   she   was   the 



legally   married wife of the respondent   with three children 



out   of   which   one   had   expired   while   the   other   two   who   are 



major and well-settled.   It has further been proved that the 



respondent-husband   started   deserting   the   appellant-wife 



after almost 25 years of marriage and in order to avert the 



claim of maintenance, a story of previous marriage was set 



up for which he failed to furnish any proof much less clear 



proof.  Thus,  it  was  not open  for  the High Court   under  its 



revisional   jurisdiction   to   set   aside   the   finding   of   the   trial 



court     and   absolve   the   respondent   from   paying     the 



maintenance of Rs.500/- per month to the appellant-wife. 




16.          Having     thus     considered   the   contradictory 



versions of the contesting parties and deliberating over the 



arguments   advanced     by   them   in   the   light   of   the   evidence 



and   circumstances,   we   are     clearly   led   to   the     irresistible 



conclusion   that   the   High   Court       wrongly   exercised   its 



jurisdiction while  entertaining the revision petition  against 



an   order       granting     maintenance   to   the   appellant-wife 


                                                                        17



under   Section   125   Cr.P.C.     We,   therefore,   set   aside   the 



judgment     and   order   of   the   High   Court     and   restore   the 



order passed by the Magistrate in favour of     the appellant 



granting   her   maintenance.     The   appeal     accordingly   is 



allowed.




                                                       ..........................

                                                                        J

                                                    (Harjit Singh Bedi)





                                                   ...........................J

                                                   (Gyan Sudha Misra



New Delhi,

August 9, 2011




Sunday, April 20, 2014

service matter - Recovery orders and reduce of pension - after retirement and after the lapse of few years - order to recover the excess payment and also order to reduce the pension as the salary was re fixed - challanged High court dismissed - Apex court held that we quash the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court and direct the respondents not to recover any amount of salary which had been paid to the appellant in pursuance of some mistake committed in pay fixation in 1986. The amount of pension shall also not be reduced and the appellant shall be paid pension as fixed earlier at the time of his retirement. It is pertinent to note that the Government had framed such a policy under its G.O. dated 16th January, 2007 and therefore, the respondent authorities could not have taken a different view in the matter of re-fixing pension of the appellant. and allowed the civil appeal =SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL …APPELLANT VERSUS PRAMUKH SACHIV IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT & OTHERS ....RESPONDENTS=2014 (April.Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41431

   service matter - Recovery orders and reduce of pension - after retirement and after the lapse of   few years - order to recover the excess payment and also order to reduce the pension as the salary was re fixed - challanged High court dismissed - Apex court held that  we  quash  the  impugned  judgment delivered by the High Court  and  direct  the  respondents  not  to recover any amount of salary which had been paid to  the  appellant in pursuance of some mistake committed in  pay  fixation  in  1986. The amount of pension shall also not be reduced and  the  appellant shall be paid  pension  as  fixed  earlier  at  the  time  of   his   retirement.  It is pertinent to note that the Government had framed  such  a  policy  under  its  G.O.  dated  16th  January,  2007  and  therefore, the  respondent  authorities  could  not  have  taken  a different view in the matter of re-fixing pension of the appellant. and allowed the civil appeal =

 this appeal has been filed by  the  appellant-employee,  from
        whom excess amount of salary, which had been  paid  by  mistake  is
        sought to be recovered and whose  pension  is  also  sought  to  be
        reduced.      =
The appellant retired  on  31st  December,  2003  as  an  Assistant
        Engineer and on the basis of his last salary drawn, his pension had
        been  fixed.  At  the  time  of  his  retirement,  his  salary  was
        Rs.11,625/- and on the basis of the said salary,  his  pension  had
        been fixed.
     3. After a few years of his retirement, it was found by the respondent-
        employer that salary of the appellant had  been  wrongly  fixed  in
        1986 and therefore, his salary had been re-fixed by an order  dated
        23.03.2005.  On  the   basis  of  the  re-fixed  salary  a  sum  of
        Rs.99,522/- was sought to be  recovered  and  for  that  purpose  a
        notice  had  been  issued  to  the  appellant  on  23.04.2005.   In
        pursuance of the incorrect fixation of his  salary  in  1986,   his
        salary at the time of his retirement had  also  been  reduced  from
        Rs.11625/- to Rs.10,975/- and therefore, his pension had also  been
        reduced. =
Challenged
 The High Court was pleased  to  reject  the
        petition as it had come to the  conclusion  that  the  pay  of  the
        appellant had been wrongly fixed and therefore, the impugned action
        of the respondent-employer with regard to recovery  of  the  excess
        salary paid and reduction in the pension was justified.=
the  High  Court  did  not
        consider  the  G.O.  dated   16.1.2007   bearing   No.S-3-35/10-07-
        101(6)/2005 which reads as under:


                 “[1].  Pension  Fixation  Authority  shall   inquire   into
                 emoluments of only last 10 months prior to  retirement  and
                 for that examine  the  records  of  only  two  years  prior
                 thereto i.e.  only  the  records  of  34  months  would  be
                 examined for the purpose of grant of pension, as  has  been
                 provided  in   the   aforesaid   Government   order   dated
                 13.12.1977.


                 [2].  Pension Allowing Authority shall not be  entitled  to
                 correct the mistake in determining the pay  during  service
                 tenure beyond the period  prescribed  in  para  (1)  above.
                 Mistakes  in  pay  determination  of  an  employee  can  be
                 effectively  removed  through  the   process   of   general
                 inquiry/audit only when the employee is still in service.”

Conclusion
we  quash  the  impugned  judgment
        delivered by the High Court  and  direct  the  respondents  not  to
        recover any amount of salary which had been paid to  the  appellant
        in pursuance of some mistake committed in  pay  fixation  in  1986.
        The amount of pension shall also not be reduced and  the  appellant
        shall be paid  pension  as  fixed  earlier  at  the  time  of   his
        retirement.  It is pertinent to note that the Government had framed
        such  a  policy  under  its  G.O.  dated  16th  January,  2007  and
        therefore, the  respondent  authorities  could  not  have  taken  a
        different view in the matter of re-fixing pension of the appellant.


   11.      The submission made on behalf of the learned  counsel  appearing
        for the respondent that the appellant would be getting more  amount
        than what he was entitled to cannot be  accepted  in  view  of  the
        policy laid down by the Government  in  G.O.  dated  16th  January,
        2007.  If the Government feels that  mistakes  are  committed  very
        often, it would be open to the Government to change its policy  but
        as far as the G.O. dated  16th  January,  2007  is  in  force,  the
        respondent-employer could not have passed any order for recovery of
        the excess salary paid to the appellant or for reducing pension  of
        the appellant.


   12.      For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we quash and set aside the
        impugned judgment as well as the order   dated  23.03.2005  whereby
        salary of the appellant was re-fixed  and  order  dated  23.04.2005
        whereby recovery of excess amount of Rs.99,522/- was ordered to  be
        recovered from the appellant.   The appellant shall be paid pension
        which had been determined at  the  time  of  his  retirement,  i.e.
        immediately after 31st December, 2003.  The appeal is  disposed  of
        as allowed with no order as to costs.

     2014 (April.Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41431                               
ANIL R. DAVE, VIKRAMAJIT SEN
 NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5262 OF 2008




SUSHIL KUMAR SINGHAL                …APPELLANT


                                VERSUS

PRAMUKH SACHIV IRRIGATION
DEPARTMENT & OTHERS                 ....RESPONDENTS




                              1 J U D G M E N T



1 ANIL R. DAVE, J.




     1. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered in Writ Petition No.95 of
        2005 by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital on 14th November,
        2006, this appeal has been filed by  the  appellant-employee,  from
        whom excess amount of salary, which had been  paid  by  mistake  is
        sought to be recovered and whose  pension  is  also  sought  to  be
        reduced.
     2. The appellant retired  on  31st  December,  2003  as  an  Assistant
        Engineer and on the basis of his last salary drawn, his pension had
        been  fixed.  At  the  time  of  his  retirement,  his  salary  was
        Rs.11,625/- and on the basis of the said salary,  his  pension  had
        been fixed.
     3. After a few years of his retirement, it was found by the respondent-
        employer that salary of the appellant had  been  wrongly  fixed  in
        1986 and therefore, his salary had been re-fixed by an order  dated
        23.03.2005.  On  the   basis  of  the  re-fixed  salary  a  sum  of
        Rs.99,522/- was sought to be  recovered  and  for  that  purpose  a
        notice  had  been  issued  to  the  appellant  on  23.04.2005.   In
        pursuance of the incorrect fixation of his  salary  in  1986,   his
        salary at the time of his retirement had  also  been  reduced  from
        Rs.11625/- to Rs.10,975/- and therefore, his pension had also  been
        reduced.
     4.  The  aforestated  action  of  the  respondent-employer  had   been
        challenged by the appellant by filing the aforestated Writ Petition
        before the High Court.  The High Court was pleased  to  reject  the
        petition as it had come to the  conclusion  that  the  pay  of  the
        appellant had been wrongly fixed and therefore, the impugned action
        of the respondent-employer with regard to recovery  of  the  excess
        salary paid and reduction in the pension was justified.
     5. It had been submitted by the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
        appellant employee that the impugned judgment delivered by the High
        Court is incorrect for the reason  that  the  High  Court  did  not
        consider  the  G.O.  dated   16.1.2007   bearing   No.S-3-35/10-07-
        101(6)/2005 which reads as under:


                 “[1].  Pension  Fixation  Authority  shall   inquire   into
                 emoluments of only last 10 months prior to  retirement  and
                 for that examine  the  records  of  only  two  years  prior
                 thereto i.e.  only  the  records  of  34  months  would  be
                 examined for the purpose of grant of pension, as  has  been
                 provided  in   the   aforesaid   Government   order   dated
                 13.12.1977.


                 [2].  Pension Allowing Authority shall not be  entitled  to
                 correct the mistake in determining the pay  during  service
                 tenure beyond the period  prescribed  in  para  (1)  above.
                 Mistakes  in  pay  determination  of  an  employee  can  be
                 effectively  removed  through  the   process   of   general
                 inquiry/audit only when the employee is still in service.”






   6. It had been submitted by the learned counsel that  the  appellant  had
        retired on 31st December, 2003 and somewhere in the month of March,
        2005 it was revealed that a mistake had been committed while fixing
        pay of the appellant in 1986.  It had been further  submitted  that
        by virtue of the aforestated G.O. dated 16th   January,  2007,  the
        mistake committed in pay fixation beyond period of 34 months  prior
        to retirement of the appellant  could  not  have  been  taken  into
        account by the  respondent  employer  and  therefore,  neither  any
        recovery could have been sought by the respondents nor there  could
        have been any reduction in the pension on the basis of reduction of
        salary.


   7. Upon perusal of the aforestated G.O. and the submission  made  by  the
        learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it is not  in  dispute
        that the appellant had retired on 31st December, 2003  and  at  the
        time of his retirement his salary was Rs.11,625/- and on the  basis
        of the said  salary  his  pension  had  been  fixed  as  Rs.9000/-.
        Admittedly, if any mistake had been committed in pay fixation,  the
        mistake had  been  committed  in  1986,  i.e.  much  prior  to  the
        retirement of  the  appellant  and  therefore,  by  virtue  of  the
        aforestated G.O. dated 16th January, 2007, neither any salary  paid
        by mistake to the appellant could have been recovered  nor  pension
        of the appellant could have been reduced.


   8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent  employer  could  not
        deny any of the facts stated hereinabove.


   9. In the aforestated circumstances, the High Court was not correct while
        permitting the respondent authorities to reduce the pension payable
        to the appellant by not setting aside   the  order  whereby  excess
        amount of salary paid to the appellant was sought to be recovered.


   10.      For the aforestated reasons,  we  quash  the  impugned  judgment
        delivered by the High Court  and  direct  the  respondents  not  to
        recover any amount of salary which had been paid to  the  appellant
        in pursuance of some mistake committed in  pay  fixation  in  1986.
        The amount of pension shall also not be reduced and  the  appellant
        shall be paid  pension  as  fixed  earlier  at  the  time  of   his
        retirement.  It is pertinent to note that the Government had framed
        such  a  policy  under  its  G.O.  dated  16th  January,  2007  and
        therefore, the  respondent  authorities  could  not  have  taken  a
        different view in the matter of re-fixing pension of the appellant.


   11.      The submission made on behalf of the learned  counsel  appearing
        for the respondent that the appellant would be getting more  amount
        than what he was entitled to cannot be  accepted  in  view  of  the
        policy laid down by the Government  in  G.O.  dated  16th  January,
        2007.  If the Government feels that  mistakes  are  committed  very
        often, it would be open to the Government to change its policy  but
        as far as the G.O. dated  16th  January,  2007  is  in  force,  the
        respondent-employer could not have passed any order for recovery of
        the excess salary paid to the appellant or for reducing pension  of
        the appellant.


   12.      For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we quash and set aside the
        impugned judgment as well as the order   dated  23.03.2005  whereby
        salary of the appellant was re-fixed  and  order  dated  23.04.2005
        whereby recovery of excess amount of Rs.99,522/- was ordered to  be
        recovered from the appellant.   The appellant shall be paid pension
        which had been determined at  the  time  of  his  retirement,  i.e.
        immediately after 31st December, 2003.  The appeal is  disposed  of
        as allowed with no order as to costs.


                                             .…..……………............J.
                                                                 (ANIL    R.
DAVE)



                                       .……..............................J.
                                                                 (VIKRAMAJIT
SEN)
   New Delhi
   April 17,  2014.

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