2014 judis.nic.in/s.c/filename=41130 = KICHHA SUGAR COMPANY LIMITED TH. GEN. MANG. … APPELLANT VERSUS TARAI CHINI MILL MAJDOOR UNION, UTTARKHAND …RESPONDENT=Industrial Dispute - Govt. order to pay Hill Development allowance to its employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15% of the basic wage - Worker demanded to pay not only on basic wage but also on other allowances - Tribunal decided in favour of workers, High court confirmed - Apex court set aside the Orders - Holding that Basic wage does not include other allowances =

                                           2014 judis.nic.in/s.c/filename=41130 
Industrial Dispute - Govt. order to pay Hill Development allowance to its employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15% of the basic wage - Worker demanded to pay not only on basic wage but also on other allowances - Tribunal decided in favour of workers, High court confirmed - Apex court set aside the Orders - Holding that Basic wage does not include other allowances =
 The Government of Uttar Pradesh, by its order dated  5th  of  January,
1981, had  directed  for  payment  of  Hill  Development  Allowance  to  its
employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15%  of  the  basic wage.  
The  workmen
demanded calculation of 15% of the said allowance  by  taking  into  account the amount paid as overtime, leave  encashment  and  all  other  allowances.

Whether the exclusion of payment of overtime, leave encashment,
             bonus  and  retaining  allowance  while  calculating  the  Hill
             Development Allowance by the Employer is legal  and  justified?
             If not, to what relief,  the  workmen  concerned  are  entitled
             to get?

=

   The
expression ‘basic wage’ has not been explained  by  the  Government  in  the
order granting Hill Development Allowance.  It has been defined  only  under
Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous  Provisions
Act, 1952.  Therefore, we have to see what meaning is to be  given  to  this
expression  in  the  present  context.   Section  2(b)  of  the   Employees’
Provident Funds  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions  Act,  1952  defines  ‘basic
wages’ as follows:


             “2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless  the  context  otherwise
             requires, -
             (a)    xxx      xxx        xxx


             (b) “basic wages” means all emoluments which are earned  by  an
             employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays with wages in
             either case in accordance with the terms  of  the  contract  of
             employment and which are paid or payable in cash  to  him,  but
             does not include-


                  i) the cash value of any food concession;


                 ii) any dearness  allowance  that  is  to  say,  all  cash
                     payments by whatever name called paid to  an  employee
                     on account of a rise in the cost of living, house-rent
                     allowance, overtime allowance, bonus commission or any
                     other similar allowance payable  to  the  employee  in
                     respect of his employment or  of  work  done  in  such
                     employment;

                iii) any presents made by the employer;”




      According   to   http://www.merriam-webster.com    (Merriam    Webster
Dictionary) the word ‘basic wage’ means as follows:


             “1. A wage or salary based on the cost of living and used as  a
             standard for calculating rates of pay


             2. A rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive  of  such
             additional payments as bonuses and overtime.”

 It also finds support from a judgment of this Court  in  the  case  of
Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Provident Fund  Commr.,(2008)  5  SCC
428 in which it has been held as follows:

             “10. The basic principles as laid down in Bridge & Roofs  case,
             AIR 1963 SC 1474, on a combined reading of Sections 2(b) and  6
             are as follows:


             (a) Where the wage is universally, necessarily  and  ordinarily
             paid to all across the board such emoluments are basic wages.


             (b) Where the payment is available  to  be  specially  paid  to
             those who avail of the opportunity is not basic wages.  By  way
             of example it was held that overtime allowance,  though  it  is
             generally in force  in  all  concerns  is  not  earned  by  all
             employees of a concern. It is also earned  in  accordance  with
             the terms of the contract of employment but because it may  not
             be earned by all employees of a concern, it  is  excluded  from
             basic wages.


             (c) Conversely, any payment by way of a  special  incentive  or
             work is not basic wages.”




      In view of what we have observed above, the  impugned  award  and  the
judgment of the High Court are illegal and cannot be allowed to stand.


      In the result, we allow this appeal,  set  aside  the  award  and  the
judgment of the High Court  and  hold  that  overtime  allowance  and  leave
encashment are not fit to be taken into account  for  calculating  the  Hill
Development Allowance.  No costs.

                                                      REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.77 OF 2014
            (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL.) NO. 16382 OF 2009)


KICHHA SUGAR COMPANY LIMITED
TH. GEN. MANG.                               … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS


TARAI CHINI MILL MAJDOOR
UNION, UTTARKHAND                                  …RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T



CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.



      Kichha Sugar Company Limited aggrieved by  the  order  dated  24th  of
June, 2008 passed by the Uttarakhand High  Court in WPMS No. 3717  of  2001,
affirming the award dated 12th of November, 1992 
directing payment  of  Hill Development Allowance after taking  into  account  the  amount  received  as
“leave encashment and overtime wages”,  has  preferred  this  special  leave
petition.


      Leave granted.


      Facts lie in a narrow compass;


      The Government of Uttar Pradesh, by its order dated  5th  of  January,
1981, had  directed  for  payment  of  Hill  Development  Allowance  to  its
employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15%  of  the  basic wage.  
Kichha Sugar  Company  Limited,  the  appellant  herein  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the employer’),  being  a  unit  of  a  subsidiary  of  U.P.
Government  Corporation,  adopted  the  same   and   started   paying   Hill
Development Allowance at the rate of 15% of the  basic  wage.  
The  workmen
demanded calculation of 15% of the said allowance  by  taking  into  account the amount paid as overtime, leave  encashment  and  all  other  allowances.
When the employer did not agree to the calculation of the  Hill  Development
Allowance as suggested by  the  workmen,  a  dispute  was  raised.   
It  was
referred to conciliation and on its failure,  the competent Government  made
the following reference.


             Whether the exclusion of payment of overtime, leave encashment,
             bonus  and  retaining  allowance  while  calculating  the  Hill
             Development Allowance by the Employer is legal  and  justified?
             If not, to what relief,  the  workmen  concerned  are  entitled
             to get?


      It is common ground that while calculating Hill Development Allowance,
the employer has not taken into account any other  amount  including  amount
received as bonus, leave encashment, retaining allowance or overtime  wages.
 It is the claim of the workmen that 15% of the Hill  Development  Allowance
is to be calculated and paid after taking into  account  the  payments  made
under the aforesaid headings.   The  employer  repudiated  their  claim  and
according to it, the workmen shall be entitled to 15% of the basic wages  as
Hill Development Allowance.
 The Industrial  Tribunal  gave  opportunity  to
both the employer and the workmen to file their claim and  produce  material and on consideration of the same, gave award dated 12th  of  November,  1992 directing  the  employer  to  “give  Hill  Development  Allowance  to  their permanent and  regular  workers  on  the  amount  received  regarding  leave
encashment and overtime wages.”  However, the Tribunal observed  that  “Hill Development Allowance shall not be payable on bonus and retaining  allowance
or  on  any  other  allowances”.  
The  employer,  aggrieved  by  the  award
preferred writ petition before the  High  Court,  which  affirmed  the  same
without any discussion or assigning any reason in the following words:


             “9. After going through the aforesaid finding recorded  by  the
             tribunal concerned, I find no infirmity or  illegality  in  the
             impugned award passed by the tribunal concerned and the same is
             hereby confirmed.”


      Before we enter into the merit of the case, it is  apt  to  understand
what Hill Development  Allowance  is.  
In  our  opinion,  Hill  Development
Allowances  is  nothing  but  a  compensatory  allowance.   
A   compensatory
allowance broadly falls into three categories; 
(i)  allowance  to  meet  the
high cost of living in certain, specially  costly  cities  and  other  local
areas; 
(ii) allowance to compensate for the hardship of service  in  certain
areas, e.g. areas which have a bad climate and/or difficult to  access;  and
(iii) allowances granted in areas, e.g. field service areas, where,  because
of special conditions of living or  service,  an  employee  cannot,  besides
other disadvantages, have his family with him.
There may be cases in  which
more than one of these conditions for grant  of  compensatory  allowance  is
fulfilled.  It seems that taking into account bad  climate  and  remote  and
difficult access, the decision was  taken  to  grant  the  Hill  Development
Allowance at the rate of 15% of the basic wage.


      We have heard Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal for  the  appellant  and  Mr.  Jatin
Zaveri for the respondent.  Mr. Agarwal submits that  basic  wage  will  not
include  the  amount  received  as  leave  encashment  and  overtime  wages.
According to him, basic wage would mean the wage which is paid  to  all  the
employees.  He submits that leave encashment and overtime wages  would  vary
from workman  to  workman                and,  therefore,  those  cannot  be
included in the  basic  wage.   In  support  of  the  submission  he  placed
reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Muir Mills Co.  Ltd.  v.
Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 985 and our attention has been drawn to  the  following
passage from Paragraph 11 of the judgment, which reads as follows:


             “11. Thus understood “basic wage” never includes the additional
             emoluments which some workmen may  earn,  on  the  basis  of  a
             system of bonuses related to the  production.  The  quantum  of
             earnings in such bonuses varies from individual  to  individual
             according to their  efficiency  and  diligence;  it  will  vary
             sometimes from season to season with the variations of  working
             conditions in the factory or other  place  where  the  work  is
             done; it will vary also with variations in the rate of supplies
             of raw material or in the assistance obtainable from machinery.
             This very element of variation, excludes this part of workmen's
             emoluments from the connotation of “basic wages”.”




      Mr. Garg, however submits that any amount including the amount paid as
leave encashment and overtime wages do come  within  the  expression  ‘basic
wage’ and, hence, have to be accounted for the purpose  of  calculating  15%
of the basic pay.




      In view of the rival submissions, the question  which  falls  for  our
determination is as to the meaning of  the  expression  ‘basic  wage’.   The
expression ‘basic wage’ has not been explained  by  the  Government  in  the
order granting Hill Development Allowance.  It has been defined  only  under
Section 2(b) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous  Provisions
Act, 1952.  Therefore, we have to see what meaning is to be  given  to  this
expression  in  the  present  context.   Section  2(b)  of  the   Employees’
Provident Funds  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions  Act,  1952  defines  ‘basic
wages’ as follows:


             “2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless  the  context  otherwise
             requires, -
             (a)    xxx      xxx        xxx


             (b) “basic wages” means all emoluments which are earned  by  an
             employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays with wages in
             either case in accordance with the terms  of  the  contract  of
             employment and which are paid or payable in cash  to  him,  but
             does not include-


                  i) the cash value of any food concession;


                 ii) any dearness  allowance  that  is  to  say,  all  cash
                     payments by whatever name called paid to  an  employee
                     on account of a rise in the cost of living, house-rent
                     allowance, overtime allowance, bonus commission or any
                     other similar allowance payable  to  the  employee  in
                     respect of his employment or  of  work  done  in  such
                     employment;

                iii) any presents made by the employer;”




      According   to   http://www.merriam-webster.com    (Merriam    Webster
Dictionary) the word ‘basic wage’ means as follows:


             “1. A wage or salary based on the cost of living and used as  a
             standard for calculating rates of pay


             2. A rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive  of  such
             additional payments as bonuses and overtime.”


      When an expression is not defined,  one  can  take  into  account  the
definition given to such expression in a  statute  as  also  the  dictionary
meaning.  In our opinion, those wages  which  are  universally,  necessarily
and ordinarily paid to all the employees across the board  are  basic  wage.
Where the payment is available to those who avail the opportunity more  than
others, the amount paid for that cannot be included in the basic  wage.   As
for example, the overtime allowance, though it is generally enforced  across
the board but not earned by all employees equally.  Overtime  wages  or  for
that matter, leave encashment may be available to each workman  but  it  may
vary from one workman to other.  The extra  bonus  depends  upon  the  extra
hour of work done by the workman whereas leave encashment shall depend  upon
the number of days of leave available to workman.  Both  are  variable.   In
view of what we have observed above, we are of the opinion that  the  amount
received as leave encashment and overtime wages is not fit  to  be  included
for calculating 15% of the Hill Development Allowance.  The  view  which  we
have taken finds support from the judgment of this Court in Muir  Mills  Co.
Ltd. (supra), relied on by the appellant, in which it has been  specifically
held that the basic wage shall not include bonus.


      It also finds support from a judgment of this Court  in  the  case  of
Manipal Academy of Higher Education v. Provident Fund  Commr.,(2008)  5  SCC
428 in which it has been held as follows:

             “10. The basic principles as laid down in Bridge & Roofs  case,
             AIR 1963 SC 1474, on a combined reading of Sections 2(b) and  6
             are as follows:


             (a) Where the wage is universally, necessarily  and  ordinarily
             paid to all across the board such emoluments are basic wages.


             (b) Where the payment is available  to  be  specially  paid  to
             those who avail of the opportunity is not basic wages.  By  way
             of example it was held that overtime allowance,  though  it  is
             generally in force  in  all  concerns  is  not  earned  by  all
             employees of a concern. It is also earned  in  accordance  with
             the terms of the contract of employment but because it may  not
             be earned by all employees of a concern, it  is  excluded  from
             basic wages.


             (c) Conversely, any payment by way of a  special  incentive  or
             work is not basic wages.”




      In view of what we have observed above, the  impugned  award  and  the
judgment of the High Court are illegal and cannot be allowed to stand.


      In the result, we allow this appeal,  set  aside  the  award  and  the
judgment of the High Court  and  hold  that  overtime  allowance  and  leave
encashment are not fit to be taken into account  for  calculating  the  Hill
Development Allowance.  No costs.
                                   ..………..……………………………….J.
                                                   (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)


                                                    ………………….………………………………….J.
                                                      (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI,
JANUARY 06, 2014.





-----------------------
13

Evidence Act sec.112 and sec. 45 - conflict between sec.112 and DNA TEST - DNA TEST PREVAILS OVER THE PRESUMPTION - Presumption of paternity when the husband and wife have access - husband pleaded non accesses - wife pleaded that there was restoration of relationship - No finding from the lower courts - DNA test shows that husband is not the father of daughter of wife - Apex court held that In our opinion, when there is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former. = NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK ..... APPELLANT VERSUS LATA NANDLAL BADWAIK & ANR. ..... RESPONDENTS = Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41129

2014 judis.nic.in/s.c./filename=41129
Evidence Act sec.112 and sec. 45 - conflict between sec.112 and DNA TEST - DNA TEST PREVAILS OVER THE PRESUMPTION - Presumption of paternity when the husband and wife have access - husband pleaded non accesses - wife pleaded that there was restoration of relationship - No finding from the lower courts - DNA test shows that husband is not the father of daughter of wife - Apex court held that In our opinion, when there  is  a  conflict  between  a conclusive proof envisaged under  law  and  a  proof  based  on  scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter  must prevail over the former. =
whether the DNA test would be  sufficient
to hold that the appellant is not the biological father of  respondent  no.
2, in the face of what has been provided under Section 112 of the  Evidence
Act, which reads as follows:


             “112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of  legitimacy.-
             The fact that any person was born during the continuance of  a
             valid marriage between his mother and any man, or  within  two
             hundred and eighty days  after  its  dissolution,  the  mother
             remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is  the
             legitimate son of that man, unless it can be  shown  that  the
             parties to the marriage had no access to  each  other  at  any
             time when he could have been begotten.”




     From a plain reading of the aforesaid, it is evident that a child  born
during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be a conclusive proof that
the child is a legitimate child of the man to whom the lady giving birth is
married. The provision makes the legitimacy of the child to be a conclusive
proof, if the conditions aforesaid are satisfied.  It can be denied only if
it is shown that the parties to the marriage have no access to  each  other
at any time when the child could have been begotten.  Here, in the  present
case, the wife had pleaded that the husband had access to her and, in fact,
the child was born in the said wedlock, but the  husband  had  specifically
pleaded that after his wife left the matrimonial home, she did  not  return
and thereafter, he had no access to her.  The wife has  admitted  that  she
had left the matrimonial home but again joined her husband.  Unfortunately,
none of the courts below have given any finding with regard to this plea of
the husband that he had or had not any access to his wife at the time  when
the child could have         been begotten.


     As stated earlier, the DNA test is an accurate test and on  that  basis
it is clear that the appellant is not the biological father  of  the  girl-
child.  
However, at the same time, the condition precedent  for  invocation
of Section 112 of the Evidence Act has been established and no finding with
regard to the plea of the husband that he had no access to his wife at  the
time  when  the  child  could  have  been  begotten  has   been   recorded.
Admittedly, the child has been born  during  the  continuance  of  a  valid
marriage.  
Therefore, the provisions of Section 112  of  the  Evidence  Act
conclusively prove that respondent No. 2 is the daughter of the  appellant.
At the same time, the DNA test reports, based on scientific analysis, in no
uncertain terms suggest that the appellant is not  the  biological  father.
In such circumstance, which would give  way  to  the  other  is  a  complex
question posed before us.


     We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted  at  a
time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA test were not  even  in
contemplation of the Legislature.  
The result of DNA test  is  said  to  be
scientifically accurate.  
Although Section  112  raises  a  presumption  of
conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated  therein  but
the same is rebuttable. 
The presumption  may  afford  legitimate  means  of
arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion.  
While the truth  or  fact  is
known, in our opinion, there is no need or room for any presumption.  
Where
there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable  and  must
yield to proof.  
Interest of justice is best  served  by  ascertaining  the
truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and
may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer  to
the facts in issue. 
In our opinion, when there  is  a  conflict  between  a
conclusive proof envisaged under  law  and  a  proof  based  on  scientific
advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter  must
prevail over the former.


     We must understand the distinction between  a  legal  fiction  and  the
presumption of a fact.    Legal fiction assumes existence of a  fact  which
may  not  really  exist.   However  presumption  of  a  fact   depends   on
satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those circumstances logically  would
lead to the fact sought to be presumed.  Section 112 of  the  Evidence  Act
does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption.
     The husband’s plea that he had no access to the wife when the child was
begotten stands proved by the DNA test report and in the  face  of  it,  we
cannot compel the appellant to bear the fatherhood of  a  child,  when  the
scientific reports prove to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent
child may not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and  father
was subsisting at the time of her birth,  but  in  view  of  the  DNA  test
reports  and  what  we  have  observed  above,  we  cannot  forestall   the
consequence.  It is  denying  the  truth.   “Truth  must  triumph”  is  the
hallmark of justice.


     As regards the authority of this  Court  in  the  case  of  Kamti  Devi
(Supra), this Court on appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that
the husband had no opportunity whatsoever to have liaison  with  the  wife.
There was no DNA test held in the case.  In the said background  i.e.  non-
access of the husband with the wife, this Court held that the result of DNA
test “is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the
Act”.  The judgment has to be understood in the  factual  scenario  of  the
said case.  The said judgment has not held that DNA test is to be  ignored.
In fact,  this  Court  has  taken  note  of  the  fact  that  DNA  test  is
scientifically accurate.  We hasten to  add  that  in  none  of  the  cases
referred to above, this Court was confronted with a situation in which  DNA
test  report,  in  fact,  was  available  and  was  in  conflict  with  the
presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy of the  child  under  Section
112 of the Evidence Act. In view of what  we  have  observed  above,  these
judgments in no way advance the case of the respondents.


     In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment so
far as it directs payment of maintenance to respondent no. 2.  However,  we
direct that the payments already made  shall  not  be  recovered  from  the
respondents.
                                                           
     REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                         CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.24 OF 2014
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.8852 of 2008)


NANDLAL WASUDEO BADWAIK             ..... APPELLANT


                                   VERSUS


LATA NANDLAL BADWAIK & ANR.     ..... RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T



CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

      Petitioner happens to  be  the  husband  of  respondent  no.  1,  Lata
Nandlal Badwaik and alleged to be the father of girl child Netra alias  Neha
Nandlal Badwaik, respondent no. 2, herein.
The marriage  between  them  was
solemnized on 30th of June, 1990 at Chandrapur.
Wife filed  an  application
for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  but
the same was dismissed  by  the  learned  Magistrate  by  order  dated  10th
December, 1993.  
Thereafter, the wife resorted to a fresh  proceeding  under
Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter  referred  to  as
the ‘Code’) claiming maintenance for herself and her daughter,  inter  alia,
alleging that she started living with her husband from 20th  of  June,  1996
and stayed with  him  for  about  two  years  and  during  that  period  got
pregnant.  She was sent for delivery at her parents’ place  where  she  gave
birth to a girl child,  the  respondent  no.  2  herein.
 Petitioner-husband
resisted the claim and alleged that the  assertion  of  the  wife  that  she
stayed with him  since  20th  of  June,  1996  is  false.
He  denied  that
respondent no. 2 is his daughter.  After 1991, according to the husband,  he
had  no  physical  relationship  with  his  wife.
The  learned  Magistrate
accepted the plea of the  wife  and  granted  maintenance  at  the  rate  of
Rs.900/- per month to the wife and at the rate of Rs.500/- per month to  the
daughter.
The challenge to the said order in revision has failed so also  a
petition under Section 482 of the Code, challenging those orders.

      It is against these orders, the petitioner has preferred this  special
leave petition.

      Leave granted.

      Taking note of the challenge to  the  paternity  of  the  child,  this
Court by order dated 10th of January, 2011 passed the following order:

            “…………However,  the  petitioner-husband   had   challenged   the
            paternity of the child and  had  claimed  that  no  maintenance
            ought to have been awarded to the child.   The  petitioner  had
            also applied for referring the child for DNA  test,  which  was
            refused.  It is against the said  order  of  refusal  that  the
            present Special  Leave  was  filed  and  the  same  prayer  for
            conducting the DNA test was made before us.  On  8th  November,
            2010 we had accordingly,  directed  the  petitioner-husband  to
            deposit all dues, both arrear and current, in  respect  of  the
            maintenance awarded to the wife  and  child  to  enable  us  to
            consider the prayer for holding of such DNA test.  Such deposit
            having been made on 3rd January, 2011, we had agreed  to  allow
            the  petitioner’s  prayer   for   conducting   DNA   test   for
            ascertaining the paternity of the child.


                 We have since been informed by counsel for the parties that
            a Forensic Science Laboratory in Nagpur conducts the very  same
            test, as has been asked for, by the  Petitioner.   
Accordingly,
            we  direct  the  petitioner-Nandlal  Wasudeo  Badwaik  and  the
            respondent No. 1-Ms. Lata  Nandlal  Badwaik  to  make  a  joint
            application  to  the  Forensic  Science   Laboratory,   Nagpur,
            situated at Jail Road, Dhantoli, for conducting such test.  
The
            petitioner, as well as the  respondent  No.  1,  shall  present
            themselves at the Laboratory with respondent No. 2 for the said
            purpose on the  date  to  be  fixed  by  the  laboratory,  and,
            thereafter, the laboratory is directed to send  the  result  of
            such test to this Court  within  four  weeks  thereafter.   The
            expenses for the test to be conducted shall  be  borne  by  the
               petitioner-husband.”




     In the light of the aforesaid  order,  the  Regional  Forensic  Science
Laboratory, Nagpur has submitted the result of DNA testing and opined  that
appellant “Nandlal Vasudev Badwaik is excluded to be the biological  father
of Netra alias Neha Nandlal Badwaik”, respondent no. 2 herein.


     Respondents, not being satisfied with  the  aforesaid  report,  made  a
request for re-test.  The said prayer of the respondents was  accepted  and
this Court by order dated 22nd of July, 2011 gave the following direction:


            “Despite the fact that the report of the DNA Test conducted  at
            the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Maharashtra,
            Nagpur-12, indicates that the petitioner is not the  biological
            father of the respondent No. 2, on the prayer made on behalf of
            the respondents for a re-test, we are of the view that  such  a
            prayer may be allowed having regard to the serious consequences
            of the Report which has been filed.


            Accordingly, we direct that a further DNA Test be conducted  at
            the Central Forensic  Laboratory,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,
            Government of India at Hyderabad and for the said  purpose  the
            parties are directed to appear before the  Laboratory  on  24th
            August, 2011 at 11.00 a.m.”




     As  directed,  the  Central  Forensic  Science  Laboratory,   Hyderabad
submitted its report and on that basis opined that the appellant,  “Nandlal
Wasudeo Badwaik can be excluded from being the biological  father  of  Miss
Neha Nandlal Badwaik”, respondent no. 2 herein.


      At the  outset,  Mr.  Manish  Pitale  appearing  for  the  respondents
submits that the appellant having failed to establish that he had no  access
to his wife at any time when she could have begotten respondent no.  2,  the
direction for DNA test ought not  to  have  been  given.
 In  view  of  the
aforesaid he submits that the result of such a test is fit  to  be  ignored.
In support of the submission he has placed reliance on a  judgment  of  this
Court in Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B., (1993) 3 SCC 418, relevant  portions
whereof read as under:

             “24. This section requires the party disputing  the  paternity
             to prove  non-access  in  order  to  dispel  the  presumption.
             “Access” and “non-access” mean the existence or  non-existence
             of opportunities for sexual  intercourse;  it  does  not  mean
             actual “cohabitation”.


             26. From the above discussion it emerges—


             (1) That courts in India cannot order blood test as  a  matter
             of course;


             (2) wherever applications are made for such prayers  in  order
             to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood  test  cannot  be
             entertained.


             (3) there must be a  strong  prima  facie  case  in  that  the
             husband must establish  non-access  in  order  to  dispel  the
             presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.


             (4) the court must carefully examine as to what would  be  the
             consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it  will  have
             the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother  as
             an unchaste woman.


             (5) no one can be  compelled  to  give  sample  of  blood  for
             analysis.


             27. Examined in the light of the above, we find no  difficulty
             in upholding the impugned order of the High Court,  confirming
             the order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore
             in rejecting the application for blood test…………….”

     Yet another decision on which reliance has been placed is the  decision
of this Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta, (2005) 4 SCC 449,
paragraph 13, which is relevant for the purpose is quoted below:


             “13. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act  was
             enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancements with
             deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as well as ribonucleic acid  (RNA)
             tests were not even in contemplation of the  legislature.  The
             result of a genuine DNA test  is  said  to  be  scientifically
             accurate. But even that is  not  enough  to  escape  from  the
             conclusiveness of Section 112 of the Evidence Act  e.g.  if  a
             husband and wife were  living  together  during  the  time  of
             conception but the DNA test revealed that the  child  was  not
             born to the husband, the conclusiveness in  law  would  remain
             irrebuttable. This may look hard from the point of view of the
             husband who would be compelled to bear  the  fatherhood  of  a
             child of which he may be innocent. But even in such a case the
             law  leans  in  favour  of  the  innocent  child  from   being
             bastardised if his mother and her spouse were living  together
             during the time of conception. Hence  the  question  regarding
             the  degree  of  proof  of  non-access   for   rebutting   the
             conclusiveness must be answered in the light of what is  meant
             by access or non-access as delineated above. (See  Kamti  Devi
             v. Poshi Ram, 2001 (5) SCC 311.)”




     Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in  the  case
of Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010)  8  SCC
633, in which it has been held as follows:


             “22. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between  the
             right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly to
             medical examination and duty of the court to reach the  truth,
             the court must exercise its discretion  only  after  balancing
             the interests of the parties and on due consideration  whether
             for a just decision in  the  matter,  DNA  test  is  eminently
             needed. DNA test in a matter relating to paternity of a  child
             should not be directed by the court as a matter of  course  or
             in a routine manner, whenever such  a  request  is  made.  The
             court has to consider diverse  aspects  including  presumption
             under Section 112 of the Evidence Act; pros and cons  of  such
             order and the  test  of  “eminent  need”  whether  it  is  not
             possible for the court to reach the truth without use of  such
             test.”


      Miss Anagha S. Desai appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that
this Court twice ordered for  DNA  test  and,  hence,  the  question  as  to
whether this was a fit case in which DNA  profiling  should  or  should  not
have been ordered is academic.  We find substance in the submission  of  Ms.
Desai.
Fact of the matter is that this Court not only once, but twice  gave
directions for DNA test.  The respondents, in  fact,  had  not  opposed  the
prayer of DNA test when such a prayer was  being  considered.   It  is  only
after the reports of the DNA test had been received, which  was  adverse  to
the respondents, that they are challenging it on  the  ground  that  such  a
test ought not to have been directed.  We cannot go  into  the  validity  of
the orders passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court  at  this  stage.   It
has attained finality.  Hence, we do not find any merit  in  the  submission
of the learned counsel for the respondents.
 As  regards  the  decision  of
this Court in the cases of Goutam Kundu (supra), Banarsi  Dass  (supra)  and
Bhabani Prasad Jena (supra), the same have  no  bearing  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case.  In all these cases, the  court  was  considering
as to whether facts of those cases justify  passing  of  an  order  for  DNA
test.  When the order for DNA test has already been passed, at  this  stage,
we are not  concerned  with  this  issue  and  we  have  to  proceed  on  an
assumption that a valid direction for DNA test was given.


      Ms. Desai submits that in view of the opinions, based on DNA profiling
that appellant is not the biological father, he cannot be fastened with  the
liability to pay maintenance to  the  girl-child  born  to  the  wife.   Mr.
Pitale,  however, submits that the marriage  between  the  parties  has  not
been dissolved, and the birth of the child having  taken  place  during  the
subsistence of a valid marriage and the husband having access to  the  wife,
conclusively prove that the girl-child is the  legitimate  daughter  of  the
appellant.
According to him, the  DNA  test  cannot  rebut  the  conclusive
presumption envisaged under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.   
According  to
him, respondent no. 2, therefore, has to  be  held  to  be  the  appellant’s
legitimate daughter.  In  support  of  the  submission,  reliance  has  been
placed on a decision of this Court in the case of
Kamti Devi v.  Poshi  Ram,
(2001) 5 SCC 311, and reference  has  been  made  to  paragraph  10  of  the
judgment, which reads as follows:


             “10. ………The result of  a  genuine  DNA  test  is  said  to  be
             scientifically accurate. But even that is not enough to escape
             from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the Act  e.g.  if  a
             husband and wife were  living  together  during  the  time  of
             conception but the DNA test revealed that the  child  was  not
             born to the husband, the conclusiveness in  law  would  remain
             irrebuttable. This may look hard from the point of view of the
             husband who would be compelled to bear  the  fatherhood  of  a
             child of which he may be innocent. But even in such a case the
             law  leans  in  favour  of  the  innocent  child  from   being
             bastardised if his mother and her spouse were living  together
             during the time of conception……….”




     Before we proceed  to  consider  the  rival  submissions,  we  deem  it
necessary to understand  what  exactly  DNA  test  is  and  ultimately  its
accuracy. All living beings are composed of cells which  are  the  smallest
and basic unit of life.  An average human body has  trillion  of  cells  of
different sizes.  DNA  (Deoxyribonucleic  Acid),  which  is  found  in  the
chromosomes of  the  cells  of  living  beings,  is  the  blueprint  of  an
individual.  Human cells contain 46 chromosomes and  those  46  chromosomes
contain a total of six billion base pair in 46 duplex threads of DNA.   DNA
consists of four nitrogenous bases – adenine,  thymine,  cytosine,  guanine
and phosphoric acid arranged in a regular structure.   When  two  unrelated
people possessing the same DNA pattern have been compared, the  chances  of
complete similarity are 1 in 30 billion to 300  billion.   Given  that  the
Earth’s population is about  5  billion,  this  test  shall  have  accurate
result.  It has been recognized by this Court in the  case  of  Kamti  Devi
(supra) that the result of a genuine DNA test is  scientifically  accurate.
It is nobody’s case that the result of the DNA test  is  not  genuine  and,
therefore, we have to proceed on an assumption that the result of  the  DNA
test is accurate. The DNA test reports show that the appellant is  not  the
biological father of the     girl-child.






     Now we have to consider as to whether the DNA test would be  sufficient
to hold that the appellant is not the biological father of  respondent  no.
2, in the face of what has been provided under Section 112 of the  Evidence
Act, which reads as follows:


             “112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of  legitimacy.-
             The fact that any person was born during the continuance of  a
             valid marriage between his mother and any man, or  within  two
             hundred and eighty days  after  its  dissolution,  the  mother
             remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is  the
             legitimate son of that man, unless it can be  shown  that  the
             parties to the marriage had no access to  each  other  at  any
             time when he could have been begotten.”




     From a plain reading of the aforesaid, it is evident that a child  born
during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be a conclusive proof that
the child is a legitimate child of the man to whom the lady giving birth is
married. The provision makes the legitimacy of the child to be a conclusive
proof, if the conditions aforesaid are satisfied.  It can be denied only if
it is shown that the parties to the marriage have no access to  each  other
at any time when the child could have been begotten.  Here, in the  present
case, the wife had pleaded that the husband had access to her and, in fact,
the child was born in the said wedlock, but the  husband  had  specifically
pleaded that after his wife left the matrimonial home, she did  not  return
and thereafter, he had no access to her.  The wife has  admitted  that  she
had left the matrimonial home but again joined her husband.  Unfortunately,
none of the courts below have given any finding with regard to this plea of
the husband that he had or had not any access to his wife at the time  when
the child could have         been begotten.


     As stated earlier, the DNA test is an accurate test and on  that  basis
it is clear that the appellant is not the biological father  of  the  girl-
child.  
However, at the same time, the condition precedent  for  invocation
of Section 112 of the Evidence Act has been established and no finding with
regard to the plea of the husband that he had no access to his wife at  the
time  when  the  child  could  have  been  begotten  has   been   recorded.
Admittedly, the child has been born  during  the  continuance  of  a  valid
marriage.
Therefore, the provisions of Section 112  of  the  Evidence  Act
conclusively prove that respondent No. 2 is the daughter of the  appellant.
At the same time, the DNA test reports, based on scientific analysis, in no
uncertain terms suggest that the appellant is not  the  biological  father.
In such circumstance, which would give  way  to  the  other  is  a  complex
question posed before us.


     We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted  at  a
time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA test were not  even  in
contemplation of the Legislature.
The result of DNA test  is  said  to  be
scientifically accurate.  
Although Section  112  raises  a  presumption  of
conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated  therein  but
the same is rebuttable.
The presumption  may  afford  legitimate  means  of
arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion.
While the truth  or  fact  is
known, in our opinion, there is no need or room for any presumption.
Where
there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable  and  must
yield to proof.
Interest of justice is best  served  by  ascertaining  the
truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and
may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer  to
the facts in issue.
In our opinion, when there  is  a  conflict  between  a
conclusive proof envisaged under  law  and  a  proof  based  on  scientific
advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter  must
prevail over the former.


     We must understand the distinction between  a  legal  fiction  and  the
presumption of a fact.    Legal fiction assumes existence of a  fact  which
may  not  really  exist.   However  presumption  of  a  fact   depends   on
satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those circumstances logically  would
lead to the fact sought to be presumed.  Section 112 of  the  Evidence  Act
does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption.
     The husband’s plea that he had no access to the wife when the child was
begotten stands proved by the DNA test report and in the  face  of  it,  we
cannot compel the appellant to bear the fatherhood of  a  child,  when  the
scientific reports prove to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent
child may not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and  father
was subsisting at the time of her birth,  but  in  view  of  the  DNA  test
reports  and  what  we  have  observed  above,  we  cannot  forestall   the
consequence.  It is  denying  the  truth.   “Truth  must  triumph”  is  the
hallmark of justice.


     As regards the authority of this  Court  in  the  case  of  Kamti  Devi
(Supra), this Court on appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that
the husband had no opportunity whatsoever to have liaison  with  the  wife.
There was no DNA test held in the case.  In the said background  i.e.  non-
access of the husband with the wife, this Court held that the result of DNA
test “is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the
Act”.  The judgment has to be understood in the  factual  scenario  of  the
said case.  The said judgment has not held that DNA test is to be  ignored.
In fact,  this  Court  has  taken  note  of  the  fact  that  DNA  test  is
scientifically accurate.  We hasten to  add  that  in  none  of  the  cases
referred to above, this Court was confronted with a situation in which  DNA
test  report,  in  fact,  was  available  and  was  in  conflict  with  the
presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy of the  child  under  Section
112 of the Evidence Act. In view of what  we  have  observed  above,  these
judgments in no way advance the case of the respondents.


     In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment so
far as it directs payment of maintenance to respondent no. 2.  However,  we
direct that the payments already made  shall  not  be  recovered  from  the
respondents.
                           ........................J
                                           [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD]



                            .......................J
                                           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 06, 2014



   -----------------------
3

Service matter -Part III of The Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 Penalty 6(vii)- Disproportionate penalty - Removed from service for the bribe of petty amount - Punishment is disproportionate - not habitual briber-demanded petty amounts for issuing Fit Certificates - Apex court order for compulsory retirement as suitable penalty and order for payment of retirement benefits as he rendered service for 23 years = Ishwar Chandra Jayaswal …..Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. …..Respondents = Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41126

   Service matter - Part  III  of   The   Railway   Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 Penalty 6(vii)- Disproportionate penalty - Removed from service for the bribe of petty amount - Punishment is disproportionate - not habitual briber-demanded petty amounts for issuing Fit Certificates - Apex court order for compulsory retirement as suitable penalty and order for payment of retirement benefits as he rendered service for 23 years =

“whether  the  punishment
           of removal of service of the petitioner on the alleged demand of
           meagre amount  of  Rs.18-45  is  contrary  to  the  doctrine  of
           proportionality”.=
   In the present case, the Appellant has served  the
           Respondents for a period of twenty three years and removal  from
           service for the two charges  levelled  against  him  shocks  our
           judicial  conscience.   
Part  III  of   The   Railway   Servants
           (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 contains  the  penalties  that
           can be imposed against a Railway servant, both  Minor  Penalties
           as well as Major Penalties.  
We have already noted that  it  has
           not been established that the Appellant  had,  as  a  matter  of
           habit or on a wide scale,  made  illegal  demands  from  Railway
           servants desirous of  obtaining  a  Fit  Certificate.   
However,
           since two of the three charges have been proved, we are  of  the
           considered opinion that the imposition of compulsory  retirement
           i.e. Penalty 6(vii) would have better and more appropriately met
           the ends of justice.  
While this would have instilled sufficient
           degree of fear in the mind of the employees, it would  also  not
           have set at naught several years of service which the  Appellant
           had already given to the Respondent-Indian Railways.   
We  think
           that deprivation of retiral benefits  in  addition  to  loss  of
           service is  entirely  incommensurate  with  the  charge  of  the
           Appellant having taken very small sums of money for the issuance
           of Fit Certificate to other Railway employees.``
        7. It is in these premises that the Appeals are  accepted  and  the
           impugned Order dated 11.10.2010 is  set  aside.   The  Appellant
           shall be deemed to  have  compulsorily  retired  under  Part-III
           Penalty 6(vii) of the aforementioned Railway Rules  with  effect
           from 22.1.1991.  If he is entitled to retiral or other  benefits
           on the said date, the Respondents shall make  necessary  payment
           within three months from today.  This decision is restricted  to
           the facts of the present case.     

                                                       REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs.   48-49  OF 2014
              [Arising out of S.L.P.(C)Nos.20506-20507 of 2012]


      Ishwar Chandra Jayaswal                           …..Appellant


            Versus


      Union of India & Ors.                             …..Respondents








                               J U D G M E N T








      VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.


        1.  Leave  granted.   These  Appeals  assail  the  Judgment   dated
           11.10.2010 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
           at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.38190  of  2004  as
           well as the subsequent Order dated 28.3.2012 by which  a  Review
           Application in respect of the former was dismissed.
        2. The Division  Bench  was  confronted  with  the  dismissal  from
           service of the Appellant Dr.  Ishwar  Chandra  Jayaswal  against
           whom three Articles of Charge had been  framed.   Article-I  was
           that he demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.26/- from  Shri  Pyare
           Ram, Khalasi for  issuing  in  his  favour  a  Fit  Certificate.
           Article-II, in similar vein was that the Appellant demanded  and
           accepted a  sum  of  Rs.34/-  from  Shri  Nandlal,  Semi-skilled
           Revetter for issuing him a  Fit  Certificate.   Article-III  was
           that the Appellant had demanded and accepted Rs.18/-  from  Shri
           Balroop, Semi-skilled Revetter for issuing of  Fit  Certificate.
           The Inquiry Officer, after duly perusing  the  entire  evidence,
           returned a finding that Charges 1 and 3  had  been  proved.  The
           Disciplinary Authority, after considering the  response  of  the
           Appellant, by its Order dated 22.1.1991 imposed the  penalty  of
           removal of the Appellant from service.
        3. A Revision came to be filed which appears to have attracted  the
           gravamen  of  challenge  before  the  Division   Bench.    After
           considering the manner in  which  the  Revision  was  heard  and
           decided, the Division Bench in the impugned Order, has  come  to
           the conclusion that the President had decided  the  Revision  in
           accordance with law.
        4. In these proceedings, learned  counsel  for  the  Appellant  has
           confined his arguments to the ground –
“whether  the  punishment
           of removal of service of the petitioner on the alleged demand of
           meagre amount  of  Rs.18-45  is  contrary  to  the  doctrine  of
           proportionality”.
        5. It is now well settled that it is open  to  the  Court,  in  all
           circumstances, to consider whether the punishment imposed on the
           delinquent  workman  or  officer,  as  the  case  may   be,   is
           commensurate with the Articles of Charge levelled  against  him.
           There is a deluge of decisions on this question and  we  do  not
           propose to travel beyond
Union of India v. S.S. Ahluwalia (2007)   7 SCC 257
in which this Court had held that if the conscience of
           the Court is shocked as to the severity or inappropriateness  of
           the punishment imposed, it can remand the matter back for  fresh
           consideration to the Disciplinary Authority concerned.  In  that
           case, the punishment that had been imposed was the deduction  of
           10% from the pension for a period of one year.  The  High  Court
           had set aside that order.  In those premises, this Court did not
           think it expedient to remand the matter back to the Disciplinary
           Authority and instead approved the decision of the High Court.
        6. The Appellant before us is presently 75 years of  age.   At  the
           time when the Articles of Charge had been served  upon  him,  he
           had already given the best part of his life to  the  service  of
           the Respondent-Indian Railways.  It has been contended before us
           that the three charges that  have  been  sustained  against  the
           Appellant reflected only the tip of the iceberg; however,  there
           is no material  on  record  to  substantiate  this  argument  of
           Respondents. 
 In the present case, the Appellant has served  the
           Respondents for a period of twenty three years and removal  from
           service for the two charges  levelled  against  him  shocks  our
           judicial  conscience.   
Part  III  of   The   Railway   Servants
           (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 contains  the  penalties  that
           can be imposed against a Railway servant, both  Minor  Penalties
           as well as Major Penalties.  
We have already noted that  it  has
           not been established that the Appellant  had,  as  a  matter  of
           habit or on a wide scale,  made  illegal  demands  from  Railway
           servants desirous of  obtaining  a  Fit  Certificate.   
However,
           since two of the three charges have been proved, we are  of  the
           considered opinion that the imposition of compulsory  retirement
           i.e. Penalty 6(vii) would have better and more appropriately met
           the ends of justice.  
While this would have instilled sufficient
           degree of fear in the mind of the employees, it would  also  not
           have set at naught several years of service which the  Appellant
           had already given to the Respondent-Indian Railways.   
We  think
           that deprivation of retiral benefits  in  addition  to  loss  of
           service is  entirely  incommensurate  with  the  charge  of  the
           Appellant having taken very small sums of money for the issuance
           of Fit Certificate to other Railway employees.``
        7. It is in these premises that the Appeals are  accepted  and  the
           impugned Order dated 11.10.2010 is  set  aside.   The  Appellant
           shall be deemed to  have  compulsorily  retired  under  Part-III
           Penalty 6(vii) of the aforementioned Railway Rules  with  effect
           from 22.1.1991.  If he is entitled to retiral or other  benefits
           on the said date, the Respondents shall make  necessary  payment
           within three months from today.  This decision is restricted  to
           the facts of the present case.


      ............................................J.
                                             [T.S. THAKUR]



      ............................................J.
                                             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]


      New Delhi
      January 3, 2014.


      -----------------------
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