Or. 47 rule 1 C.P.C. = Review of it's own judgement basing on fresh documents & fresh thoughts - not correct = Or.1, rule 10 impleading a party with out asking for any relief against him is maintainable as the very purpose of impleading is only for having full and final settlement and to avoid multiple proceedings = N.ANANTHA REDDY Petitioner(s) VERSUS ANSHU KATHURIA & ORS. Respondent(s) = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41043

    Or. 47 rule 1 C.P.C. = Review of it's own judgement basing on fresh documents & fresh thoughts - not correct - Review of it's judgement arose only in case of patent errors occurred in earlier judgement but not on fresh out look of the case  - High court confirmed the order of lower court when it allowed the impleading petition - Later at the instance of petitioner and on fresh documents took fresh approach and remanded case to  lower court to dispose the case basing on documents filed - Apex court set aside the orders of review of high court and confirmed the orders of lower court =    
A careful look at the impugned order would  show  that  the
      High Court had a fresh look at  the  question  whether  the  appellant
      could be impleaded in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1  and,  in
      the light of the view which it took, it  recalled  its  earlier  order
      dated 08.06.2011. The course followed by the  High  Court  is  clearly
      flawed.  The  High  Court  exceeded   its   review   jurisdiction   by
      reconsidering the merits of the order  dated  08.06.2011.  The  review
      jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent
      on the face of the  record,  the  order/judgment  does  not  call  for
      review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is  self
      evident, needs no search  and  stares  at  its  face.  Surely,  review
      jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not  permit
      rehearing of the matter on merits.

Or.1, rule 10 impleading a party with out asking for any relief against him is maintainable as the very purpose of impleading is only for having full and final settlement and to avoid multiple proceedings -  a neighbor is necessary party in a suit filed against municipality for  non violation building plan  -suit  for  declaration and perpetual  injunction  against  the  Greater  Hyderabad  Municipal Corporation (respondent No. 2 herein) and the Assistant  City  Planner (respondent  No.  3  herein).  In  the  suit,  the  respondent  No.  1
(plaintiff) prayed that notice dated 23.12.2009 issued  under  Section 452 of the  Greater  Hyderabad  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1955  be declared as illegal, void and not  legally  tenable.  It  was  further prayed that the defendants (respondent Nos. 2 and 3  herein)  have  no right  to  interfere  with  the  construction  being  put  up  by  the plaintiff.   The  plaintiff  also  prayed  for  perpetual   injunction restraining the two defendants, their officers/officials/servants from interfering with the suit scheduled property and by directing them not to demolish or cause any damage to the suit schedule property. =

“No doubt, no relief is sought for against the proposed party in
           the suit.  The object of Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C. to implead  a
           third party to the suit is that the dispute in the suit would be
           resolved in the presence of all, in order to avoid  multiplicity
           of proceedings. There must be some semblance  of  right  to  the
           proposed party. If the petitioner  violates  the  building  plan
           without leaving set backs, cellar etc., then certainly it  would
           cause inconvenience to the neighbours.  The  proposed  party  is
           one of the neighbours. Therefore, to safeguard his interest,  in
           view of the fact that he has got some semblance of right, though
           no relief is claimed against him,  he  would  be  necessary  and
           proper party to come on record.  That is  why  the  trial  Court
           rightly impleaded him as a party to the suit and I.A. and  there
           are no grounds to interfere  with  the  same.  The  revision  is
           devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.”


 11 .       In our view, the High Court was not  at  all  justified  to
      review the order dated 08.06.2011.
      12.        The impugned order dated 13.12.2011  is,  accordingly,  set
      aside. Appeals are allowed as above.  No costs.                

              REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10779-10780 OF 2013
            (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 13098-13099/2012)


      N.ANANTHA REDDY                           Petitioner(s)


                                  VERSUS


      ANSHU KATHURIA & ORS.                     Respondent(s)










                           J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T




      R.M. Lodha, J. :








                 Leave granted.
      2.         The respondent No. 1 herein filed a  suit  for  declaration
      and perpetual  injunction  against  the  Greater  Hyderabad  Municipal
      Corporation (respondent No. 2 herein) and the Assistant  City  Planner
      (respondent  No.  3  herein).  In  the  suit,  the  respondent  No.  1
      (plaintiff) prayed that notice dated 23.12.2009 issued  under  Section
      452 of the  Greater  Hyderabad  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1955  be
      declared as illegal, void and not  legally  tenable.  It  was  further
      prayed that the defendants (respondent Nos. 2 and 3  herein)  have  no
      right  to  interfere  with  the  construction  being  put  up  by  the
      plaintiff.   The  plaintiff  also  prayed  for  perpetual   injunction
      restraining the two defendants, their officers/officials/servants from
      interfering with the suit scheduled property and by directing them not
      to demolish or cause any damage to the suit schedule property.
      3.          The  appellant,  who  is   plaintiff's   neighbour,   made
      applications for his impleadment in the suit and the  application  for
      interim relief. The applicant  did  not  claim  any  right,  title  or
      interest in the suit schedule  property  but  claimed  that  there  is
      infringement of his right of light and air if the construction by  the
      plaintiff is commenced and completed and, therefore, he  is  a  proper
      party in the matter.
      4.         The trial court heard the plaintiff and the proposed  party
      and by order dated 20.07.2010 allowed the said applications. The trial
      court, while allowing  the  said  applications  made  by  the  present
      appellant, observed as follows :-






                 “The claim  of  petitioner  is  that,  though  he  is  not
           claiming right over the property of plaintiff, his grievance  is
           only about the construction being made by the plaintiff  because
           it is effecting his right for light and air.  The  objection  of
           the plaintiff is that  because  he  is  challenging  the  notice
           issued by the Municipality in respect of the construction, since
           the petitioner is not having any right over the  suit  property,
           he is not necessary party. I have considered  other  submissions
           also made and the citations relied by  the either  side.   Under
           Order 1 Rule 10 a party would become necessary party  or  proper
           party if he is  having  only  over  the  subject  matter  to  be
           adjudication under the suit and then can be impleaded.  In  this
           case though the third party petitioner is not claiming any title
           over the property. Even if the pleadings of the  plaintiff  have
           to be considered, the title  of  the  plaintiff  over  the  suit
           property is not in  dispute.   What  is  in  dispute  among  the
           plaintiff and the defendants already on  record   is  about  the
           construction  being  made  by  the   plaintiff.    Because   the
           defendants already on record have said to have issued notice  to
           the  plaintiff  stating  that  the  construction   is   illegal.
           Challenging the said notice the  present  suit  is  filed.   The
           present suit is filed after withdrawing the  previous  suit  for
           injunction filed against Municipality said to  be  filed  before
           issuance of the notice under Section 452 of Municipal  Act.   In
           that case the petitioner  had  already  been  impleaded  on  his
           application  as  he  was  expressing  the   grievance   of   the
           infringement of his right for light  and  air  in  view  of  the
           construction of the plaintiff.  Having considered the  decisions
           relied by either party to my considered  opinion,  the  decision
           relied by the third party petitioner is that similar facts as of
           the present case on hand wherein the Court held that though  the
           said third party is not a necessary  party,  but  he  is  proper
           party in respect of his grievance to the suit proceedings  there
           in and ordered his impleading in the  suit.  The  facts  in  the
           decisions relied by the Learned Counsel for  plaintiff  are  not
           similar to the  facts  on  hand.   Therefore  by  following  the
           decisions relied by Learned Counsel for third  party  petitioner
           in 2005 (6) ALD NOC 223 (Between : Neelam Ajit  Vs.   S.  Suresh
           Reddy and another), I hold that the third party  petitioner  can
           be impleaded in the suit and as  well  as  the  application  for
           injunction  as  Defendant   No.   3   and   Respondent   No.   3
           respectively.”




      5.         The above order of the trial court was  challenged  by  the
      respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) before the High Court.  The  High  Court,
      after hearing the parties, by its order dated 08.06.2011 dismissed the
      Civil Revision Petitions filed by  the  respondent  No.  1  herein  by
      observing as follows :


           “4. It is to be noted that the vendor of the plaintiff  and  the
           vendor of the first respondent  herein  are  neighbours,  having
           purchased  common  property  and  dividing  the  same  into  two
           portions and one portion comprising an extent of 790  sq.  yards
           was purchased by the first  respondent  and  the  other  portion
           comprising of 580 sq. yards was purchased by the vendor  of  the
           plaintiff.  It is further stated  that  both  the  parties  made
           constructions in their  respective  plots  and  allegations  and
           counter allegations  were  made  against  one  another  alleging
           deviations  from  the  sanctioned  plan  and  violation  of  the
           building rules.


           5.     It  is  not  disputed  that  previously  in  the  similar
           circumstances, this Court by common order  dated  25.10.2010  in
           CRP Nos. 2870 and 3882 of  2010,  dismissed  the  said  revision
           petitions and confirmed the orders passed by  the  trial  court,
           permitting the first respondent to come on record  as  defendant
           in the said suit OS No. 960 of 2010 and copy of the  said  order
           is placed on record. The issue raised in  the  present  revision
           petitions virtually covered by  the  said  earlier  order  dated
           25.10.2010 in CRP Nos. 2870 and 3882 of 2010  and  adopting  the
           reasons mentioned therein, the present  revision  petitions  are
           also dismissed.”






      6.         The respondent No. 1 then made applications for  review  of
      the order of the High Court dated 08.06.2011.


      7.         The High Court by the impugned order  recalled its  earlier
      order dated 08.06.2011 and directed the trial court  to  consider  the
      applications for impleadment afresh.
      8.         While recalling the order dated 08.06.2011, the High  Court
      observed thus :


           “11. During enquiry of the review applications, 
 the  petitioner
           filed  several  documents  including  the  sale  deeds  and  the
           sanctioned  plan  and  also  photographs  in  support   of   his
           contention that while making the construction he  has  left  the
           space towards set backs as required  under  the  rules  and  the
           construction is in accordance with the sanctioned plan  and  the
           question of petitioner's construction causing obstruction to the
           free flow of light and air to the first respondent's six storied
           building does not arise.  
The  said  documents  were  not  filed
           before the trial Court and hence, there was no occasion for  the
           trial Court to refer to the same  in  the  impugned  order.  The
           trial court ordered impleadment of the first  respondent  herein
           mainly on the ground that in the earlier suit, which  was  filed
           by the plaintiff against the municipality for  mere  injunction,
           the first respondent was impleaded on his  application.  
 It  is
           stated that the earlier suit  was  withdrawn  and  subsequently,
           plaintiff filed the present suit for declaration that the notice
           issued under section 452 of the  Municipal  Corporation  Act  is
           illegal.  
Admittedly, no relief is sought in  the  present  suit
           against the first respondent. 
The question as to whether or  not
           the first respondent herein would  be  a  proper  and  necessary
           party having regard to the nature of the relief  prayed  for  in
           the present suit is a matter  to  be  considered  independently,
           irrespective of impleadment of the first  respondent  herein  in
           the earlier suit, which was filed only for injunction. 
The trial
           court has to consider the question as  to  whether  or  not  the
           first respondent is a proper and necessary party to the  present
           suit in the light of the documents now sought to be filed by the
           petitioner. 
Order 1 Rule 10 CPC contemplates the impleadment  of
           proper and necessary party, whose presence before the  Court  is
           necessary to enable the  Court  effectually  and  completely  to
           adjudicate upon and settle all the  questions  involved  in  the
           suit.  
The question as to whether or not the first respondent is
           a proper and necessary party, who can be impleaded in  terms  of
           Order 1 Rule 10 CPC has to be considered  keeping  in  view  the
           relief prayed for in the present suit and the  dispute  that  is
           required to be settled pertaining to the impugned notice  issued
           by the Municipal Corporation.  
The impugned order passed by  the
           trial court permitted impleadment of the first respondent on the
           premise that he was previously impleaded in another suit,  which
           was filed for injunction is therefore held unsustainable and the
           same is accordingly set aside.”




      9.         A careful look at the impugned order would  show  that  the
      High Court had a fresh look at  the  question  whether  the  appellant
      could be impleaded in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1  and,  in
      the light of the view which it took, it  recalled  its  earlier  order
      dated 08.06.2011. The course followed by the  High  Court  is  clearly
      flawed.  The  High  Court  exceeded   its   review   jurisdiction   by
      reconsidering the merits of the order  dated  08.06.2011.  The  review
      jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent
      on the face of the  record,  the  order/judgment  does  not  call  for
      review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is  self
      evident, needs no search  and  stares  at  its  face.  Surely,  review
      jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not  permit
      rehearing of the matter on merits.
      10.        The order passed by the High  Court  on  08.06.2011,  on  a
      careful reading, shows that the High Court instead  of  repeating  the
      reasons which it had given in other revision petitions being CRP  Nos.
      2870 and 3882 of 2010, while it was fully conscious of the  fact  that
      those civil revisions arose from a different suit followed  its  order
      in CRP Nos. 2870 and 3882 of 2010.  The High Court was fully conscious
      of the factual and legal position while it was considering  the  civil
      revision petitions filed by the present respondent  No.  1.    In  the
      order  upon  which  reliance  was  placed  by  the  High  Court  while
      dismissing the civil revision petitions, the High Court had noted thus
      :-


           “No doubt, no relief is sought for against the proposed party in
           the suit.  The object of Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C. to implead  a
           third party to the suit is that the dispute in the suit would be
           resolved in the presence of all, in order to avoid  multiplicity
           of proceedings. There must be some semblance  of  right  to  the
           proposed party. If the petitioner  violates  the  building  plan
           without leaving set backs, cellar etc., then certainly it  would
           cause inconvenience to the neighbours.  The  proposed  party  is
           one of the neighbours. Therefore, to safeguard his interest,  in
           view of the fact that he has got some semblance of right, though
           no relief is claimed against him,  he  would  be  necessary  and
           proper party to come on record.  That is  why  the  trial  Court
           rightly impleaded him as a party to the suit and I.A. and  there
           are no grounds to interfere  with  the  same.  The  revision  is
           devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.”


 11 .       In our view, the High Court was not  at  all  justified  to
      review the order dated 08.06.2011.
      12.        The impugned order dated 13.12.2011  is,  accordingly,  set
      aside. Appeals are allowed as above.  No costs.


                                  ..........................J.
                                  ( R.M. LODHA )






      NEW DELHI;         ..........................J.
      DECEMBER  2, 2013  ( SHIVA KIRTI SINGH )

By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of the suit. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff's claim to establish his title by adverse possession. =Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) By LRs. RESPONDENT: Sri Jagadish Kalita & Ors. = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=19379

By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of the suit. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff's claim to establish his title by adverse possession. Adverse possession-Ouster by co-sharer-Plea of-Held, long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession- Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer, shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of other co-sharers, unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers-A co-sharer becomes a constructive trustee of other co-sharers. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 100-Substantial questions of law-Non formulation of-Certain aspects requiring closer examination by High Court- Matter remitted back for fresh consideration. The original owner transferred the premises in question to two brothers who, thus, owned and possessed the same. By a registered deed of partition, the structures standing on the premises being holding Nos. 522 and 523 were divided into two equal halves. Sons of one of the brothers allegedly amalgamated both the said holdings and got them registered in his name as holding No. 121 in the records of Municipality. Subsequently, he sold holding No. 522 and leased out portion of holding no. 523 in favour of respondent No. 3. Upon the death of the original owner, his sons got the lands mutated in their favour. The legal heirs and representatives of the other brother transferred their possessory rights in holding No. 523 including the house to appellant for valuable consideration. At a later stage, the legal representatives of the original owner transferred their right, title and interest in old holding No. 523 to the appellant for a consideration. Thus, upon purchase of the premises in question, the appellant called upon respondent No. 3 to pay rent to him. As respondent No. 3 did not pay rent to the appellant, he filed a money suit for recovery of arrears of rent, which was dismissed. An appeal preferred thereagainst by the appellant was also dismissed. Later on, the appellant filed a suit, inter alia, praying for a decree for declaration of his right, title and interest over the premises in question and for ejectment of respondent No. 3. The Trial Court decreed the said suit against which first appeal was, preferred in the Court of District Judge by some of the respondents. The first Appellate Court invoked the principle of `caveat emptor' and allowed the appeal by respondents holding that the appellant had no right, title and interest over the land in question. Second appeal filed by appellant before High Court was dismissed. Hence the present appeal. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that first appellate court as also the High Court have committed a manifest error in dismissing the suit hodling that the respondents perfected their title by adverse possession, although the contesting respondents did not raise any plea nor proved ouster of other co-sharers. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that appellant having lost the money suit filed by him, the question of title could not have been permitted to be reagitated and was barred under the principles of res judicata; that respondent No. 1 alone having all along been possessing the premises by payment of rent to the municipal authorities, must be held to have acquired title by adverse possession.
Citation:	2003(4 )Suppl.SCR325 ,2004(1 )SCC271 ,2003(8 )SCALE356 ,2003(8 )JT26
Court Name:	Supreme Court

Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter back to High Court, the Court HELD : 1.1. The proposition of law relating to ouster of a co-sharer vis-a- vis adverse possession had been overlooked by the High Court. Therefore, the matter should be considered afresh by the High Court. [336-H, 338-B] 1.2. Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co- sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers; and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that the title of the other co-sharers was denied and disputed. For the purpose of proving adverse possession/ouster the defendant must also prove animus possidendi. Long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession. Even non-participation in the rent and profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to give title by prescription. A co-sharer becomes a constructive trustee of other co-sharer. [334-E-F, 333-H, B-C] Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and Another, [1980] 4 SCC 3961; Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil and OTHERS Etc, Etc. v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (Dead) by LRS. and Heirs and OTHERS Etc Etc., [1995] 2 SCC 543; Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati (Dead) by LRS. v. Prem Prakash and OTHERS , [1995] 4 SCC 496; Darshan Singh and OTHERS v. Gujjar Singh (Dead) by LRS. and Others, [2002] 2 SCC 62, relied on. 1.3. The respondents have failed to raise any plea of ouster. No finding has been arrived at by the High Court as to from which date they began to possess adversely against the plaintiff or his predecessOTHERS in interest. Mere non-payment of rents and taxes may be one of the factOTHERS for proving adverse possession but cannot be said to be the sole factor. [343-C] 2. There are also certain other aspects of the matter which could not be overlooked and probably would require closer examination by the High Court, namely, whether registered deed of partition was acted upon; the effect of amalgamation and whether amalgamation of the two holdings into one, by son of one of the co-owners was within the knowledge of heirs of other co- owners; nature and extent of right transferred to appellant by heirs of one of the co-owners and circumstances in which mutation was done in favour of heirs of original holder when the original holder had already transferred his entire right, title and interest to the two brOTHERS The High Court while determining the question should have formulated substantial questions of law, as aforesaid, in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the matter should be considered afresh by the High Court. [337-C-H, 338-A, B] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12450 of 1996.

CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  12450 of 1996

PETITIONER:
Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) By LRs.

RESPONDENT:
Sri Jagadish Kalita & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/2003

BENCH:
Ashok Bhan & S.B. Sinha.

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T



S.B. SINHA, J :

 
  This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree dated
20.5.1991 passed by Gauhati High Court dismissing the Second Appeal
preferred by the appellant herein.

BACKGROUND FACT
  Md. Sadagar Sheikh was the original owner of the suit premises.
He transferred the same to Gayaram Kalita and Kashiram Kalita.  The
premises in suit, thus, owned and possessed by the said Gayaram Kalita
and Kashiram Kalita, who were brothers.  By reason of a registered deed
of partition dated 1.12.1938, the structures standing on the land in
suit being holding Nos.522 and 523 of the Nalbari Municipality were
divided into half and half, each measuring 5 = lechas. Prafulla Kalita,
son of Gayaram Kalita, allegedly, amalgamated both the said holdings and
got them registered in his name as holding No. 121 in the records of
Nalbari Municipality.  Holding No. 522 was sold and portion of holding
No. 523 was leased out in favour of the respondent No. 3 by Prafulla
Kalita.


  Upon the death of Md. Sadagar Sheikh, however, his sons got the
lands mutated  in their favour in mutation case No. 414/70-71 in terms
of an order of the Sub Divisional Officer of the Nalbari Municipality.

By reason of a registered deed of sale dated 28.11.1972, the
defendants Nos. 7, 8 & 9 transferred their possessory  rights in holding
No. 523 including the house to the appellant for valuable consideration.
On or about 24.9.1977, the legal representatives of Md. Sadagar Sheikh,
being defendant Nos. 10, 11 & 12 transferred their right, title and
interest in old holding No. 523 to the appellant herein on receipt of
the consideration of a sum of Rs. 5000/-.  Upon purchase of the suit
premises in the manner aforementioned, the appellant herein called upon
the respondent No. 3 to pay rent to him which was denied.

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS ;

  Although the name of the plaintiff was initially mutated in
Nalbari Municipality, the same was cancelled by an order dated
26.9.1977.  The taxes deposited by the plaintiff were directed to be
refunded.  As the respondent No. 3 did not pay rent to the appellant, he
filed a money suit for recovery of arrears of rent being No. 83 of 1978
in the Court of Munsif which was dismissed.  An appeal preferred
thereagainst  by the appellant was also dismissed.  In view of the fact
that the name of the appellant was not ultimately mutated in the records
of the Municipality as also in view of dismissal of the said money suit,
the suit was filed wherein the appellant prayed for the following
reliefs :

"(i) For a decree for declaration of right,
title and interest of plaintiff over the suit
land and the house standing thereon.

(ii) A decree may also be passed against the
defendant No. 4 for ejectment from the suit
house by removing its goods and articles
therefrom and also a decree for mesne profit of
Rs. 4350.00 against defendant No. 4.

(iii) A decree for issuing precept to the
Nalbari Municipal Board for mutating the name of
the plaintiff on holding No. 121 (kha) the suit
house.

(iv) The cost of the suit may be decreed
against the contesting defendants.

(v) Any other relief to which the plaintiff is
entitled to may also be decreed."



  In the said suit, there were three sets of defendants.  The first
set being defendants No. 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6 were the legal heirs and
representatives of late Prafulla Kalita.  The second set being
defendants No. 7, 8 & 9 were the legal heirs and representatives of late
Kashi Ram Kalita and the third set being defendants No. 10, 11 & 12 were
the legal heirs and representatives of late Md. Sadagar Sheikh.  The
defendant No. 4 (Respondent no.3 herein) was a cooperative society which
was inducted as a tenant by Prafulla Kalita.  In the said suit the
contesting respondents herein inter alia raised a plea of adverse
possession alleging :

"That right of adverse possession had accrued
upon the predecessor-interest, and these
defendant, as these defendants and their
predecessor interest, had their peaceful and
uninterrupted possession for more than 40 years,
adversely to the interest of defendant No. 10,
11, 12 and their predecessor interest."


  They further set up a plea that the suit house was not actually
partitioned by metes and bounds by and between the Kalita brothers nor
separate physical possession thereof was effected and in fact Kashiram
Kalita and Gayaram Kalita orally gifted the said plot to Prafulla Kalita
and since then he had been in exclusive and peaceful possession thereof
as owner.


  The learned Trial Court in view of the rival contentions
aforesaid, inter alia, framed the following issues:


"3. Whether the plaintiff has right, title and
interest over the suit land as well as the house
thereon?

4. Whether there exists a relationship of
landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and
the defendant No. 4.  If so, whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the rent legally due by
the defendant No. 4?

5. Whether the suit land together with the
house was originally gifted by late Gaya Ram and
Kashi Ram to late Prafulla Kalita as alleged in
the W.S.?"


  The Trial Court decreed the said suit whereagainst Jagdish Kalita,
Dipak Kalita and the Secretary of the Cooperative Society preferred
appeal in the Court of District Judge, Nalbari which was marked as T.A.
No. 69 of 1986.  The first appeallate Court upon consideration of the
materials on record held that the appellants therein could not prove the
factum of oral gift.  It was, however, observed:

"But it may so happen that some sort of mutual
arrangement took place as Gaya Ram and Kashi Ram
left Nalbari for Lumding in quest of their
fortune."


  The first Appellate Court furthermore held that the burden lay
heavily on the plaintiff to prove his title and possession within 12
years since before the date of filing of the suit.  The learned Court of
first appeal invoked the principle of 'caveat emptor' and opined:

"First he purchased the suit holding.  Then he
inquired about the title and found that it was
recorded in the name of Prafulla.  The plaintiff
dared to plunge in the cross currents of legal
intricacies.  But he could not swim across and
then he sank.  The suit is hit by Article 65 of
the Limitation Act.  Hence all these three
issues are decided against the plaintiff."


  As regard Issue No. 4 it was held that the appellant was not
entitled to claim any rent from respondent No. 3 herein.


  On a second appeal filed by the appellant herein the High Court by
its judgment and decree dated 20th May, 1991 dismissed the same holding:


"The learned District Judge having found that
Prafulla did not share the rent with prof.
Defendants 7, 8 and 9 it cannot be said that
these defendants were still co-sharers.  Mr.
T.S. Deka, learned counsel for the respondents
has shown from the records that by Exhibits 12
and 13 Kashiram paid Municipal taxes only upto
the year 1945 and this is not disputed by Mr.
Sarma.  There was, therefore, an open ouster by
Prafulla since 1950.  The plaintiff brought the
suit in 1979.  The case relied on by Mr. Sarma
does not apply to the facts of the instant case.
The learned District Judge, therefore, was
perfectly correct in holding that plaintiff's
suit was barred by Schedule 65 of the Limitation
Act."

(Emphasis supplied)


The appellant is, thus, before us.



  This Court by an order dated 16.8.1986 directed the appellant to
bring the plaint and written statement filed by the parties on records
so as to enable it to decide whether plea of adverse possession taken by
the respondent is sustainable.  Pursuant thereto and in furtherance
thereof the appellants have filed copies of plaint and the written
statement.


SUBMISSIONS :

  Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
would submit that the parties hereto admittedly been co-sharers, the
first appellate court as also the High Court have committed a manifest
error in dismissing the suit holding that the respondents perfected
their title by adverse possession, although the contesting respondents
did not raise any plea nor proved ouster of other co-sharers.


  Mr. Amlan Kumar Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, would support the judgment of the High
Court contending that having regard to the fact that the plaintiff lost
in Money suit No. 83 of 1978 in the Court of Munsif, the question of
title could not have been permitted to be reagitated.  The said issue,
the learned counsel would contend, was barred under the principles of
res judicata. The learned counsel would submit that having regard to the
fact that the respondent no.1 alone having all along been possessing the
suit premises by payment of rent to the municipal authorities, must be
held to have acquired title by adverse possession.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO OUSTER AND ADVERSE POSSESSION :

  The fact of the matter, as noticed hereinbefore, is not much in
dispute.  If it be held that the two brothers Gayaram Kalita and
Kashiram Kalita partitioned the properties in question;  the heirs and
legal representatives of Gayaram Kalita ceased to have any right, title
and interest in respect of the share held by Kashiram Kalita.  The
defendants No. 7, 8 & 9 had, therefore, a transferable title, unless the
same became extinguished.


  On the other hand,  if no partition by meets and bounds took
place, the  respondents herein were bound to plead and prove ouster of
the plaintiff and/ or his predecessors' interest from the land in
question.  For the said purpose, it was obligatory on the part of the
respondents herein to specifically plead and prove as to since when
their possession became adverse to the other co-sharers.  Moreover, if
the possession of  Prafulla Kalita was permissive or he obtained the
same pursuant to some sort of arrangement as had been observed by the
High Court, the plea of adverse possession would fail.


Long and continuous possession by itself, it is trite, would not
constitute adverse possession.  Even non-participation in the rent and
profits of the land to a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to
give title by prescription. A co-sharer, as is well settled, becomes a
constructive trustee of other co-sharer and the right of the appellant
and/or his predecessors in interest would, thus, be deemed to be
protected by the trustee.  As noticed hereinbefore, the respondents in
their written statement raised a plea of adverse possession only against
the third set of the defendants.  A plea of adverse possession set up by
the respondents, as reproduced hereinbefore, do not meet the
requirements of law also in proving ouster of a co-sharer.  But in the
event, the heirs and legal representatives of Gayaram Kalita and
Kashiram Kalita partitioned their properties by meets and bounds, they
would cease to be co-sharers in which event a plea of adverse possession
as contra distinguished from the plea of ouster could be raised.  The
courts in a given situation may on reading of the written statement in
its entirety  come to the conclusion that a proper plea of adverse
possession has been raised if requisite allegations therefor exist.  In
the event the plaintiff proves his title, he need not prove that he was
in possession within 12 years from the date of filing of suit.  If he
fails to prove his title, the  suit fails.


  By reason of Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was
obtaining under the old Act underwent a change.  In a suit governed by
Art. 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act,  the plaintiff will succeed if he
proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove,
unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act,
1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of
the suit.  On the contrary,  it would be for the defendant so to prove
if he wants to defeat the plaintiff's claim to establish his title by
adverse possession.


  For the purpose of proving adverse possession/ ouster the
defendant must also prove animus possidendi.

  However, in the event, the case of the defendant was that the
predecessors in interest of the plaintiff ceased to be his co-sharers
for any reason whatsoever, it was not necessary for them to raise  a
plea of ouster. We  may further observe that in a proper case the court
may have to construe the entire pleadings so as to come to a conclusion
as to whether the proper plea of adverse possession have been raised in
the written statement or not which can also be gathered from the
cumulative effect of the averments made therein.


  The respondents herein, as noticed hereinbefore, has failed to
raise any plea of ouster. No finding has been arrived at by the High
Court as to from which date they began to possess adversely against the
plaintiff or his predecessors in interest.   Mere non-payment of rents
and taxes may be one of the factors for proving adverse possession but
cannot be said to be the sole factor.  The High Court has not assigned
any reason as to how there had been an open ouster by Prafulla Kalita
since 1950.


  Furthermore, the first appellate court applied a wrong principle
of law in relation to interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation
Act, 1963.  The High Court fell into the same error.

  Possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one
co-sharer, it is trite, shall be deemed that he possesses the property
on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster
by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue
records in the name of one co-sharers would not amount to ouster unless
there is a clear declaration that the title of the other co-sharers was
denied and disputed.  No such finding has been arrived at by the High
Court.


  In the instant case, the dispute between the parties as regard
mutation of the name of the appellant was finally decided, as noticed
hereinbefore, only on 26.9.1977.  The Money Suit filed by him was also
dismissed by the Appellate Court on 19.5.1979.  The appellant instituted
title suit on 24.10.1979.  In that view of the matter, the question of
the respondents acquiring title by ouster of the appellant on the basis
of the order of the Municipal Authorities in the mutation proceedings
does not arise.


So far as submission of Mr. Ghosh to the effect that the decision
in the money suit shall operate as res judicata is stated to be
rejected.

  In the aforementioned suit, the only issue which could be raised
and determined was as to whether respondent No. 3 was a tenant of the
plaintiff.  As the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest failed to
show that respondent No.  4 was inducted by them, his claim for arrears
of rent  was rejected but the Court while determining the said issue
could not have gone into a pure question of title as well as the
question as to whether the respondents herein acquired title by adverse
possession.

SOME  CASE  LAWS ON THE QUESTION OF OUSTER/ADVERSE POSSESSION  :


In Karbalai Begum vs. Mohd. Sayeed and Another [(1980) 4 SCC 396],
the law has been stated by this Court in the following terms :


"...It is well settled that mere non-
participation in the rent and profits of the
land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster
so as to give title by adverse possession to the
other co-sharer in possession..."


In Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil and Others etc. etc. Vs. Balwant
alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (Dead) by LRs. and Heirs and Others
etc.etc. [(1995) 2 SCC 543], this Court held:
"15. Where possession can be referred to a
lawful title, it will not be considered to be
adverse. The reason being that a person whose
possession can be referred to a lawful title
will not be permitted to show that his
possession was hostile to another's title. One
who holds possession on behalf of another, does
not by mere denial of that other's title make
his possession adverse so as to give himself the
benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore,
a person who enters into possession having a
lawful title, cannot divest another of that
title by pretending that he had no title at
all."

  In Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Prem Prakash and
Others [(1995) 4 SCC 496] this Court upon referring to a large number of
decisions observed:

"27...it will be seen that in order that the
possession of co-owner may be adverse to others,
it is necessary that there should be ouster or
something equivalent to it. This was also the
observation of the Supreme Court in P. Lakshmi
Reddy case which has since been followed in
Mohd. Zainulabudeen v. Sayed Ahmed Mohideen.
28. 'Ouster' does not mean actual driving out of
the co-sharer from the property. It will,
however, not be complete unless it is coupled
with all other ingredients required to
constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking,
three elements are necessary for establishing
the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They
are (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long
and uninterrupted possession of the person
pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of right of
exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge
of other co-owner. Thus, a co-owner, can under
law, claim title by adverse possession against
another co-owner who can, of course, file
appropriate suit including suit for joint
possession within time prescribed by law."

Yet again in Darshan Singh and Others Vs. Gujjar Singh (Dead) by
LRs. and Others [(2002) 2 SCC 62], it is stated :


"...It is well settled that if a co-sharer is in
possession of the entire property, his
possession cannot be deemed to be adverse for
other co-sharers unless there has been an ouster
of other co-sharers."


It has further been observed that :

 "In our view, the correct  legal position
is that possession of a property belonging to
several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be
deemed that he possesses the property on behalf
of the other co-sharers unless there has been a
clear ouster by denying the title of other co-
sharers and mutation in the revenue records in
the name of one co-sharer would not amount to
ouster unless there is a clear declaration that
title of the other co-sharers was denied."


QUESTIONS OVERLOOKED BY THE HIGH COURT :

The proposition of law relating to ouster of a co-sharer vis-`-vis
adverse possession had been overlooked  by the High Court.  There are
also certain other aspects of the matter which could not be overlooked
and probably would require closer examination by the High Court.

The High Court while determining the question should have
formulated substantial questions of law in terms of Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.  In absence of formulation of such
substantial questions of law,  probably  the High Court committed the
errors as pointed out hereinbefore.


 Prima facie the questions of law which arise for consideration are:

(i) Whether the registered deed of partition was acted upon  so  as
to cause disruption of  the joint family?
(ii) Whether the amalgamation of holding Nos. 522 and 523 as one
holding being holding no. 121 at the instance of Prafulla
Kalita was to the knowledge of the heirs and legal
representatives of Gayaram Kalita or the third set of the
defendants and, if the answer to the aforementioned question is
in affirmative, whether Prafulla Kalita started possessing  the
entire house standing on the plot in question being holding No.
522 and 523 exclusively pursuant to or in furtherance of the
said order; or such possession was referable only to some
adjustment or permission of the heirs of Gayaram Kalita?
(iii) What was nature and extent of right transferred to the
appellant by the heirs of Kashiram Kalita?  (Such a question
arises as the appellants in their list of dates stated that
only possessory rights were transferred.)

(iv) Whether the plaintiff derived any right title and interest in
relation to the suit property by reason of deed of sale
executed by the heirs of Md. Sadagar Sheikh?

(v) If Md. Sadagar Sheikh had transferred his entire right, title
and interest in favour of two brothers by reason of the
aforementioned deed of sale, under what circumstances the names
of defendants No. 10, 11 & 12 were mutated in the records of
Nalbari Municipality in the year 1971.


  These questions were required to be considered upon by the Trial
Court as also the Court of first Appeal so as to arrive at a correct
decision.  However, we hasten to add that we have ourselves not gone
into the materials on record and thus have recorded our tentative
opinion on the basis of the judgment of the High Court and the Court of
Appeal.  It would, thus, be open to the High Court to consider the
matter on its own merit.

CONCLUSION :

  We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should be
considered afresh by the High Court which may proceed to decide the
matter on framing proper substantial questions of law arising in the
second appeal.  The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, set aside.


  This appeal is allowed.  However, in the facts and circumstances
of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim ‘ut lite pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new should be introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. = KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors. …Petitioners Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41041

    Section  52  of  the Transfer of Property Act 1882.     Doctrine of lis  pendens  is  based  on  legal  maxim  ‘ut  lite  pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new  should  be
      introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound  by  the
      decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating  party
      is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency
      of the litigation.  =
High Court of Karnataka  at  Bangalore
      in Writ Appeal No.1421 of 2008 etc.  affirming  the  judgment  of  the
      learned Single Judge dated  17.4.2008  passed  in  Writ  Petition  No.
      11502/2006, by which and whereunder the court had quashed  the   order
      dated  27.2.2004,  passed  by  the  Revenue  Minister,  Government  of
      Karnataka de-notifying the suit land from acquisition. pending appeal, the petitioner purchased the land - Doctrine of lis pendens applies - he is bound by the order - he can not claim any independent right but he is entitled for compensation = 

Doctrine of lis  pendens  is  based  on  legal  maxim  ‘ut  lite
      pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new  should  be
      introduced). 
This  doctrine  stood  embodied  in  Section  52  of  the
      Transfer of Property Act 1882.   
 The principle of ‘lis pendens’ is in
      accordance with the equity, good conscience or  justice  because  they
      rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be  impossible
      to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if  alienations
      are permitted to prevail. 
A transferee pendente lite is bound  by  the
      decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating  party
      is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency
      of the litigation. 
However, it must be clear that mere pendency  of  a
      suit does not prevent  one  of  the  parties  from  dealing  with  the
      property constituting the subject matter of the suit. 
The  law  simply
      postulates a condition that the alienation will, in no manner,  affect
      the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed  in
      the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of  the
      Court. 
The transferee cannot deprive the successful plaintiff  of  the
      fruits of the decree if  he  purchased  the  property  pendente  lite.

 There is ample evidence on record to show that possession of the
      suit land had been  taken  on  6.9.2002.  In  such  a  fact-situation,
      question of de-notifying the acquisition  of  land  could  not  arise.
      
Thus, the order dated 27.2.2004 could not be passed. 
There cannot be a
      dispute in law that upon possession being taken under Section 16 or 17
      of  the  Act  1894,  the  land  vests  in  the  State  free  from  all
      encumbrances. Thus, in case possession of the  land  has  been  taken,
      application for release of land from acquisition is not  maintainable.
      
Once the land is vested in the State free from encumbrances, it cannot
      be divested.                     

   The petitions are  devoid  of  any  merit  and  are  accordingly
      dismissed.  However, it is made clear that the  petitioners  shall  be
      entitled to compensation as determined under the provisions of the Act
      1894.

   REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.22311 of 2012


      KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors.              …Petitioners


                                   Versus


      State of Karnataka & Ors.                              …Respondents


                                    With


                       SLP (C) Nos.22307-22309 of 2012




                               J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
      1.    These petitions have been filed against the judgment  and  order
      dated 24.10.2011, passed by the High Court of Karnataka  at  Bangalore
      in Writ Appeal No.1421 of 2008 etc.  affirming  the  judgment  of  the
      learned Single Judge dated  17.4.2008  passed  in  Writ  Petition  No.
      11502/2006, by which and whereunder the court had quashed  the   order
      dated  27.2.2004,  passed  by  the  Revenue  Minister,  Government  of
      Karnataka de-notifying the suit land from acquisition.


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to these petitions are:
      A.    That a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of  the  Land
      Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘Act  1894’)  was
      issued in respect of huge  chunk  of  land  including  Survey  No.49/1
      admeasuring 15 Acres  on  6.8.1991  for  the  benefit   of  the  State
      Government   Houseless   Harijan   Employees    Association    (Regd.)
      (hereinafter referred to as ‘Society’).  In respect of the  same  land
      declaration under Section 6 of the Act 1894 was issued on 15.5.1992.
      B.    At the behest of the then owners of the suit land the Government
      de-notified the  land  from  acquisition  vide  order  dated  5.8.1993
      issuing notification under Section 48(1) of the Act 1894.
      C.    Aggrieved the respondent no.3-Society challenged the said  order
      of de-notifying the land from  acquisition  by  filing  Writ  Petition
      which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The  said  order  was
      also affirmed  by  the  Division  Bench  dismissing  the  Writ  Appeal
      preferred by the Society. The Society approached this court by  filing
      special leave petitions which were entertained and finally heard Civil
      Appeal No. 5015/1999 etc. and this court vide judgment and order dated
      11.12.2000 quashed the order dated 5.8.1993 de-notifying the suit land
      from acquisition.
      D.    During the pendency of Civil Appeal No.5015 of 1999  etc.  filed
      by the respondent-society, the present petitioners purchased the  suit
      land in the years 1997-1998 and approached the Government of Karnataka
      to de-notify the said land from acquisition. As their application  for
      release was not dealt with by  the  Government,  they  preferred  Writ
      Petition  Nos.19968-97  of  2002  etc.  before  the  High  Court   for
      directions to the Government to release the land.
      E.    The High Court vide judgment and order dated 19.2.2003  disposed
      of the said writ petition, directing the Government  to  decide  their
      application in accordance with law expeditiously.  In pursuance of the
      High Court order, the Government of Karnataka  issued  notice  to  all
      concerned parties and against all  the  parties  the  Hon’ble  Revenue
      Minister passed an order dated 27.2.2004, directing to  de-notify  the
      land from acquisition.
      F.    The order dated 27.2.2004 was not complied with  as  the  Deputy
      Secretary to the Government of Karnataka raised certain objections and
      made an endorsement dated  21.9.2005  that  the  matter  had  attained
      finality after being decided by this Court and possession of the  land
      had already been taken and handed over to  the  respondent-society  on
      6.9.2002, much prior to the order passed by the Hon’ble Minister.
      G.    The present petitioners filed Writ  Petition  No.11502  of  2006
      etc. before the High Court to quash the  endorsement  dated  21.9.2005
      made by the learned Deputy Secretary, Government  of  Karnataka.   The
      writ petition stood dismissed on 17.4.2008 in terms of the judgment of
      the same date in a similar case, i.e. Writ Petition  No.9857  of  2006
      (M.V. Kasturi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.).
      H.    Aggrieved, petitioners preferred a  Writ  Appeal  No.  1421/2008
      which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order.
            Hence, these petitions.


      3.    Shri Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel  appearing  for  the
      petitioners submitted that the courts below have committed an error in
      dismissing the case  of  the  petitioners  as  the  courts  failed  to
      appreciate the legal issues.  This Court set aside the  order  of  de-
      notification dated 5.8.1993 on a technical ground as the order of  de-
      notification was passed without  hearing  the  respondent-society  for
      whose benefit the land had been acquired.  Thus,  there  could  be  no
      prohibition for the State to de-notifying the  land  from  acquisition
      after hearing the concerned parties. More  so,  the  Hon’ble  Minister
      had competence to deal with the acquisition proceedings and  thus  the
      finding recorded by the High Court about his competence  is  perverse.
      More so, as there was no interim order  of  this  court  in  Society’s
      appeal, petitioners could purchase the land.   Hence, these  petitions
      should be accepted.


      4.    Per contra, Shri Rama Jois and Shri K.N.  Bhat,  learned  senior
      counsel for the respondents have opposed the petitions contending that
      this Court has set aside the order  dated  5.8.1993  de-notifying  the
      land  from  acquisition  not  only  on  the  ground  of  violation  of
      principles of natural justice but also on merits as it had  been  held
      by this Court that there was no  justification  for  de-notifying  the
      land.  The present petitioners are purchasers of  land  subsequent  to
      notification under Section 4(1) of the Act 1894, and  they  could  not
      purchase the land at all.  In view of the fact that the  appeal  filed
      by the respondent no.3 against the order dated  5.8.1993  was  pending
      before this Court,  doctrine of lis pendens would  apply.   Thus,  the
      petitions are liable to be  dismissed.
      5.    We have considered the rival submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties and perused the record.
            The facts are not in dispute.
At the time of purchase   of  the
      suit land by the present petitioners the matter was sub-judice  before
      this Court and if the order of de-notification  dated  5.8.1993  stood
      quashed,  it  would  automatically   revive   the   land   acquisition
      proceedings meaning thereby  the  notification  under  Section  4  and
      declaration under Section 6 resurfaced by operation of law.  
In such a
      fact-situation, it is not permissible for the present  petitioners  to
      argue that merely because there was no interim  order  in  the  appeal
      filed by the respondent no.3, petitioners had a right to purchase  the
      land during the pendency of the litigation and would not be  bound  by
      the order of this Court quashing the  de-notification  of  acquisition
      proceedings.


      6.    Doctrine of lis  pendens  is  based  on  legal  maxim  ‘ut  lite
      pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new  should  be
      introduced). 
This  doctrine  stood  embodied  in  Section  52  of  the
      Transfer of Property Act 1882.   
 The principle of ‘lis pendens’ is in
      accordance with the equity, good conscience or  justice  because  they
      rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be  impossible
      to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if  alienations
      are permitted to prevail. 
A transferee pendente lite is bound  by  the
      decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating  party
      is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency
      of the litigation. 
However, it must be clear that mere pendency  of  a
      suit does not prevent  one  of  the  parties  from  dealing  with  the
      property constituting the subject matter of the suit. 
The  law  simply
      postulates a condition that the alienation will, in no manner,  affect
      the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed  in
      the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of  the
      Court. 
The transferee cannot deprive the successful plaintiff  of  the
      fruits of the decree if  he  purchased  the  property  pendente  lite.
      [Vide : K. Adivi Naidu & Ors. vs. E. Duruvasulu Naidu & Ors., (1995) 6
      SCC 150; Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi & Ors. vs. Malatibai & Ors.,  (2003)
      1 SCC 722; Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal & Ors., (2004)  2  SCC  601;  and
      Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1332).
      7.    In Rajender Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh  &  Ors.,  AIR  1973  SC
      2537, while dealing with the application of doctrine of  lis  pendens,
      this court held as under:
                 “The doctrine of lis pendens was  intended  to  strike  at
           attempts  by  parties  to  a  litigation   to   circumvent   the
           jurisdiction of a  court,  in  which  a  dispute  on  rights  or
           interests in immovable property is pending by  private  dealings
           which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit
           of the court’s power to decide a pending  dispute  or  frustrate
           its decree.”


      (See also: T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Anr., (2010) 14 SCC 370).


      8.    In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion  that  it
      is not permissible to say that in case the petitioners  had  purchased
      the  suit  property  during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal  filed  by
      respondent no.3 before this Court, the petitioners are  not  bound  by
      the final orders of this Court.
      9.    By operation of law, as this Court quashed  the  de-notification
      of acquisition proceedings,  the  proceedings  stood  revived.
 In  V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. vs. The Administrative Officer & Ors.,  JT  2012
      (9) SC 260, this Court considered the  right  of   purchaser  of  land
      subsequent to the issuance of Section 4  notification  and  held  that
      any one who deals with the land subsequent to a Section 4 notification
      being issued, does so, at his own peril. Section 4 notification  gives
      a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to  which  it
      has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points
      out that there will be "an impediment to any one to encumber the  land
      acquired thereunder." The alienation  thereafter  does  not  bind  the
      State or the beneficiary under the acquisition. In fact,  purchase  of
      land after publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such
      land, is void against the State and at the most, the purchaser may  be
      a person-interested in compensation, since he steps into the shoes  of
      the erstwhile owner and  may  therefore,  merely  claim  compensation.
      Thus, the purchaser  cannot  challenge  the  acquisition  proceedings.
      While deciding the said case this court  placed  reliance  on  a  very
      large number of its earlier judgments including Leela Ram v. Union  of
      India & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2112; Smt. Sneh  Prabha  etc.  v.  State  of
      Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1996  SC  540;  Meera  Sahni  v.  Lieutenant
      Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177; and Tika  Ram  &  Ors.  v.
      State of U.P. & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 689.
      10.   The law on the issue can be summarised  to  the  effect  that  a
      person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of  a  Section  4
      notification with respect to it, is not  competent  to  challenge  the
      validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever,  for
      the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does  not  confer
      upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation  on  the
      basis of his vendor’s title.
      11.   In order to meet the menace of sale of land after initiation  of
      acquisition proceedings, various States enacted the  Acts  and  making
      such transfers as punishable, e.g., The Delhi Lands  (Restrictions  on
      Transfers) Act, 1972 made the sales permissible only  after  grant  of
      permission for transfer  by  the  authority  prescribed  therein.   In
      absence of such permission if the sale is made in contravention of the
      statutory provisions it is a punishable offence with imprisonment  for
      a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine or with both.
            Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to  accept  any  plea
      taken by the petitioners that they could purchase the suit  land  even
      subsequent to Section 4 notification.


      12.   We do not find force in the  submission  made  by  Shri  Kailash
      Vasdev, learned senior counsel that this Court  had  quashed  the  de-
      notification of acquisition proceedings only on  technical  ground  as
      the respondent-society was not heard.
             This  Court  in  State  Govt.   Houseless   Harijan   Employees
      Association v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR  2001  SC  437  held  as
      under:
           “71. From all this, the ultimate position which emerges is  that
           the  acquisition  in  favour  of  the  appellant  was   properly
           initiated by publication of the Notification under Section  4(1)
           and by the declaration issued under Section 6. The withdrawal of
           the acquisition  under  Section  48(1)  was  vitiated  not  only
           because the appellant was not heard but also because the  reason
           for withdrawal was wrong. The High Court erred in dismissing the
           appellant's writ petition. The decision of  the  High  Court  is
           accordingly set aside. The impugned Notification  under  Section
           48(1)  is  quashed  and  the  appeal  is  allowed  with  costs.”
           (Emphasis added)



      13.   There is ample evidence on record to show that possession of the
      suit land had been  taken  on  6.9.2002.  In  such  a  fact-situation,
      question of de-notifying the acquisition  of  land  could  not  arise.
     
Thus, the order dated 27.2.2004 could not be passed. 
There cannot be a
      dispute in law that upon possession being taken under Section 16 or 17
      of  the  Act  1894,  the  land  vests  in  the  State  free  from  all
      encumbrances. Thus, in case possession of the  land  has  been  taken,
      application for release of land from acquisition is not  maintainable.
      
Once the land is vested in the State free from encumbrances, it cannot
      be divested. (See: LT. Governor of H.P. & Anr. v. Sri Avinash  Sharma,
      AIR 1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
      AIR 1993 SC 2517;  Mandir Shree Sitaramji alias Shree Sitaram  Bhandar
      v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors., AIR  2005  SC  3581;   and  Smt.
      Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport  & Ors., AIR
      2010 SC 2962).


      14.   In view of the above, we do not think it  necessary  to  examine
      the other issues raised in the petitions particularly, the  competence
      of the Hon’ble Minister to deal with the matter.


      15.   The petitions are  devoid  of  any  merit  and  are  accordingly
      dismissed.  However, it is made clear that the  petitioners  shall  be
      entitled to compensation as determined under the provisions of the Act
      1894.
                                         .........................………………..J.
                                                                (DR.    B.S.
      CHAUHAN)



      .............………………………J.
                                                (S.A. BOBDE)
      New Delhi,
      December 2, 2013