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Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Land acquisition Act - Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = when acquisition was not for house sites, no deduction can be done for amenities = claimants are entitled interest on solatium also = Since claimed less amount , the apex court fixed compensation as prayed by claimant= Himmat Singh and others ....Appellants versus State of M.P. and another ....Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41038

  Land acquisition Act - 
Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ]
Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = 
when acquisition was  not for house sites, no deduction can be done for amenities = 
claimants are entitled interest on solatium also =
Since claimed less amount , the apex court fixed compensation as prayed by claimant=

Whether the Reference Court and the  High  Court  committed  serious  error  by excluding various sale instances  only  on  the  ground  that  the  contents thereof were not proved by examining the buyer and the  seller. =
 Shri  Lalit
invited the Court’s attention to Section 51-A of the Act and  the  judgments
in Land Acquisition Officer and  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  v.  V.  Narasaiah
(2001) 3 SCC 530, Cement Corporation of India v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270  and
Deputy  Collector,  Land  Acquisition,  Gujarat  and  another  v.   Madhubai
Gobarbhai and another (2009) 15 SCC 125 and argued that the  view  expressed
by the Reference Court and approved by the learned Single Judge of the  High
Court on the admissibility and relevance of the  copies  of  the  registered
sale deeds is liable to be overturned.

 Since all the sale deeds produced by the  appellants  were  registered
documents  and  authenticity  thereof  had  not  been  questioned   by   the
respondents, the Reference Court and the High Court could not  have  ignored
the provisions of Section 51-A and discarded majority  of  the  sale  deeds.
This issue is no longer res integra and must be answered in  favour  of  the
appellants in view of the judgments in Land Acquisition Officer  and  Mandal
Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah (supra),  Cement  Corporation  of  India  v.
Purya (supra) and Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition,  Gujarat  and  another
v. Madhubai Gobarbhai and another (supra).

Whether the Reference Court and the High Court committed serious  error  by  not  taking
into consideration the highest value reflected in the  sale  deeds  Exhibits
P4 and P5 for the purpose of determination of compensation. =
 In  support  of
this argument,  Shri  Lalit  relied  upon  the  judgments  in  Rao  Bahadur,
Collector of Madras 1969 1 MLJ 45, State of Punjab v. Hansraj (1994)  5  SCC
734, Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa (2010) 13 SCC 710, Mehrawal  Khewaji
Trust (Registered), Faridkot and  others  v.  State  of  Punjab  and  others
(2012) 5 SCC 432. 

“It is clear that when there are several exemplars with  reference  to
      similar lands, it  is  the  general  rule  that  the  highest  of  the
      exemplars, if it is satisfied that it is a bona fide transaction,  has
      to be considered and accepted. When the  land  is  being  compulsorily
      taken away from a person, he is entitled to the  highest  value  which
      similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a  bona  fide
      transaction entered into between a willing  purchaser  and  a  willing
      seller near about the time of the acquisition. In our view,  it  seems
      to be  only  fair  that  where  sale  deeds  pertaining  to  different
      transactions are relied on behalf of the Government,  the  transaction
      representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest  unless
      there are strong circumstances justifying a different  course.  It  is
      not desirable to take an average of various sale deeds  placed  before
      the authority/court for fixing fair compensation.”
Whether the  deductions  made  by  the
Reference Court and approved by the High  Court  are  clearly  impermissible
because the land had been acquired for  construction  of  Broad  Gauge  Rail
Line and not for carving out  a  lay  out  for  residential,  industrial  or
commercial purpose which  necessarily  involves  construction  of  road  and
providing of basic amenities like electricity, water and sewerage and  large
area is required to be left out as open spaces.  =

In Nelson Fernandes v. Land Acquisition  Officer  this  Court  has
      discussed the question of development charges. That was a  case  where
      the acquisition was for laying a railway line. This Court  found  that
      the land under acquisition was situated in an area which was  adjacent
      to the land already acquired for the same purpose i.e.  for  laying  a
      railway line. In para 29, the Court observed that the Land Acquisition
      Officer, the District Judge and the High Court had  failed  to  notice
      that the purpose of acquisition was for  the  Railways  and  that  the
      purpose is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for fixing
      the compensation.

Shri  Lalit  also  referred
to documents produced by the appellants showing damage  to  their  land  and
argued that the Reference Court and the High Court committed  serious  error
by not awarding compensation for severance caused  due  to  construction  of
railway line and damage caused due to  digging.   
Whether   the  appellants  are entitled to interest on solatium.=




          we would adopt the first mode and hold that  the  appellants
are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.8.93 per sq. ft.

33.   We may have ordained payment of compensation to the appellants at  the rate of 8.93 per sq. ft. (rounded off to  Rs.9  per  sq.  ft.),  
but  having
regard to the fact that in the claim filed before the Reference Court,  they had limited their claim to Rs.5 per sq. ft. and  no  application  was  filed either  before  the  High  Court  or  this  Court  for  payment  of   higher compensation, we would restrict the enhancement to Rs.5 per sq.ft.

34.   We agree with Shri Lalit that in view of the law laid down  in  Sunder
v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC  211,  Chimanlal  Kuberdas  Modi  v.  Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation (2010)  10  SCC  635,  Nadirsha  Shapurji
Patel v. Collector and LAO (2010) 13  SCC  234,  R.  Saragapani  v.  Special
Tahsildar, Karur – Dindigul Broadguage Line (2011) 14  SCC  177  and  Bharat
Heavy Electricals Limited v. R.S. Avtar Singh and Company (2013) 1 SCC  243,
the appellants are entitled to interest on solatium.

35.   So far as the appellants’ plea for award of damages caused on  account
of removal of fencing of Sant  Farm,  loss  of  earning  due  to  damage  to
crops/farming operation and destruction of well  existing  on  the  land  is
concerned, we do not consider it necessary to deal  with  the  same  because
the issue is being dealt with in C.A. No.1248 of 2007.

36.   In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned  judgment  and  the
award of the Reference Court are set aside  and  it  is  declared  that  the
appellants are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.5 per sq.ft.  with
other statutory benefits.  They shall also be entitled to  interest  on  the
element of solatium.             

           NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1247 OF 2007


Himmat Singh and others                                  ....Appellants

                                   versus

State of M.P. and another
....Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.


1.    Feeling dissatisfied  with  the  meagre  enhancement  granted  by  the
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh  High  Court  in  the  amount  of
compensation  determined  by  II   Additional   District   Judge,   Shivpuri
(hereinafter described as,  ‘the  Reference  Court’),  the  appellants  have
filed this appeal.

2.    By notification dated 28.5.1987 issued under Section 4(1) of the  Land
Acquisition Act, 1894  (for  short,  ‘the  Act’),  which  was  published  on
12.6.1987, the Government of Madhya Pradesh acquired  the  appellants’  land
measuring 3.627 hectares comprised in Survey Nos.2, 10, 20, 22, 46,  48  and
166 of Village Jagatpur, Tehsil Kolaras, District Shivpuri for  construction
of Broad Gauge Rail Line by the Central  Railway.
Another  parcel  of  land
measuring 0.951 hectares comprised in Survey No.18, of which the  appellants
were the occupancy tenants, was also acquired by the same notification.  The
possession  of  the  acquired  land  was  taken  on  30.11.1987.  The   Land
Acquisition Officer passed an award dated 26.8.1989 and held  that  for  the
land measuring  3.627  hectares,  the  appellants   are  entitled  to  total
compensation of Rs.16,419 with solatium of Rs.4,926 and  interest  amounting
to Rs.985.  For the land comprised in  Survey  No.18,  no  compensation  was
awarded to the appellants. Instead,  compensation  was  paid  to  respondent
Nos.3 and 4, namely, Jagdish Narayan s/o Mool Chand and  Chandra  Mohan  s/o
Ram Dayal, whose names were recorded in the revenue records.

3.    The appellants did not feel satisfied  and  filed  applications  under
Section 18 of the Act for determination of the  amount  of  compensation  by
the Court. They also filed an application under Section 30 of  the  Act  and
pleaded that respondent  Nos.3  and  4  are  not  entitled  to  receive  any
compensation.  Thereupon, the Collector made a reference to District  Judge,
Shivpuri.  The latter assigned  the  cases  to  the  Reference  Court.   The
reference applications filed by the  appellants  were  registered  as  Civil
Miscellaneous Case No.3/1991 and 13/1998 respectively  and  the  application
filed  under  Section  30  was  registered  as  Civil   Miscellaneous   Suit
No.12/1998.

4.    In Civil Miscellaneous  Case  No.3/1991,  the  appellants  prayed  for
award of compensation at the rate of Rs.5 per  square  yard.   They  pleaded
that  the  acquired  land  has  good  development  potential  and  the  Land
Acquisition  Officer  committed  serious  error  by  treating  the  same  as
agricultural land. 
The appellants also claimed compensation  of  Rs.18  lacs
by alleging that due to laying of railway line, their lands were  bifurcated
and its value was considerably diminished. They  further  alleged  that  the
authorities of Central Railway had  illegally  taken  possession  of   their
land and the earth was dug out from an area measuring 6  hectares  rendering
the entire land unfit for cultivation.

5.     The respondents contested the claim petition  and  pleaded  that  the
Land Acquisition Officer did not commit  any  illegality  by  fixing  market
value of the acquired land by  relying  upon  the  sale  deeds  relating  to
agricultural lands.

6.    On the pleadings of  the  parties,  the  Reference  Court  framed  the
following issues:

      “(i) Whether compensation determined by the Land  Acquisition  Officer
      is insufficient and improper and contrary to the provisions of Section
      23 of the Land Acquisition Act?

      (ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to higher  compensation?  If
      yes, to what extent?

      (iii) Relief and costs.”



7.    In support of the  claim,  appellant  No.1  -  Himmat  Singh  examined
himself as PW-1 and produced a number  of  documents  including  sale  deeds
marked as Exhibits P1 to P12.
He stated that on  the  date  of  acquisition,
the land was fully developed for  agricultural  purposes;  that  there  were
several Government offices / establishments and  residential  premises  near
the acquired land. PW-1 further stated that there are metalled roads of  the
PWD on the North and South  of  the  acquired  land  and  that  90%  of  the
Government offices of Kolaras Sub-Division are situated at  Jagatpur,  which
was on Agra-Mumbai National Highway.  Still further,  PW-1  stated  that  he
and his brothers have a farmhouse known as ‘Sant Farm’ at Jagatpur.  In  the
cross-examination, PW-1 admitted  that  the  acquired  land  does  not  fall
within Kolaras Municipality and that he had never sold  his  land  prior  to
the  disputed  acquisition.  PW-1  denied  the  suggestion   that   in   the
application filed by him, value of the  land  was  shown  as  Rs.50,000  per
hectare.
The second witness examined by  the  appellants,  namely,  Rajender
Kumar Srivastava stated that distance  between  the  Dak  Bungalow  and  the
railway station is  about  one  kilometer  and  Agra-Bombay  Road  is  at  a
distance of about one furlong from the Dak Bungalow.  He  also  stated  that
water,  electricity  and  scavenging  facilities  have  been   provided   by
Municipal  Committee,  Jagatpur.   In  cross-examination,  Shri   Srivastava
admitted that Jagatpur has been divided into two parts, one of  which  comes
under the Municipal Committee and the other is in the village and  that  the
Municipal Committee does not  provide  any  facility  to  the  area  falling
outside its jurisdiction.
Another witness examined  by  the  appellants  was
Damodar Prasad.  In cross-examination,
he  admitted  that  large  number  of
Government offices of Kolaras come under the jurisdiction of  the  Municipal
Committee and that a specific notification had been issued for inclusion  of
Sant Farm within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Committee. Rishabh  Chand
(PW-5) stated that he had sold land measuring 825 sq. ft. for  Rs.9,000  and
market value of that land is Rs.6,600 per hectare. In cross-examination, PW-
5 gave out that his land was not fit for agricultural purposes and that  the
same can be utilised for building construction.

8.    On behalf of the  respondents,  seven  witnesses  were  examined.  Ram
Niwas Sharma (DW-1) stated that Kolaras, Gayatri Colony and Sant  Farm  come
within  the  jurisdiction  of  Kolaras  Municipal   Committee.   In   cross-
examination, DW-1 admitted  that  large  number  of  Government  offices  of
Kolaras are situated in Village Jagatpur. Gaya  Prasad  (DW-3)  stated  that
Jagatpur and Kolaras are  abutting  each  other;  that  there  were  several
Government offices, Court buildings and Advocates’ offices  and  that  there
were metalled roads on the North and  South  of  the  acquired  land  and  a
private colony has been constructed in the vicinity. Dharmender (DW-7)  made
general statement about the nature of the acquired land.

9.    After analysing the evidence produced before it, the  Reference  Court
decided the matter vide judgment dated 23.12.1999 and  held  that  the  Land
Acquisition Officer committed  an  error  by  fixing  market  value  on  the
assumption that the acquired  land  could  be  used  only  for  agricultural
purposes. In the opinion of the Reference Court, the determination  made  by
the Land Acquisition Officer was  unfair,  arbitrary  and  contrary  to  the
provisions of Section 23(1) of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  The  Reference
Court then referred to the judgments of this Court in Chiman Lal v.  Special
Execution Officer, Poona AIR 1988 SC 1652, M/s. Printer House Pvt.  Ltd.  v.
Siyedan AIR 1995 SC  1160,  Shivamma  v.  Assistant  Commissioner  and  Land
Acquisition Officer AIR 1996 SC 2886 and held that  only  three  sale  deeds
marked as Exhibits P7 to P9 can be taken into consideration for the  purpose
of determination of compensation. 
The Reference Court  held  that  value  of
the acquired land cannot be less than Rs.3 per sq. ft. 
The  Reference  Court
made 25% deduction towards development  charges  and  25%  towards  cost  of
development. 
In this manner, the rate of compensation was reduced from  Rs.3
to Rs.1.5 per sq. ft. 
The Reference Court made further deduction of  50%  on
the ground that the sale instances relied upon by  the  appellants  were  in
respect of very small parcels of land as compared to the acquired  land  and
held that the appellants are entitled to Rs.3,08,295  as  market  value  for
3.627 hectares land, 
an additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum  from
12.6.1987 to 30.11.1987, i.e., the date on which possession was taken  along with interest at the rate of 9% for a period of one year from 1.12.1987  and thereafter  at  the  rate  of  15%  per  annum.  
The  Reference  Court  also
determined the shares of the private respondents.

10.   By another judgment dated 11.8.2000, the Reference Court  disposed  of
Civil Miscellaneous Suit No.12/1998, registered on the basis of  application
filed by the appellants under Section 30 of the Act and Civil  Miscellaneous
Suit No.13/1998 registered on the basis of application filed  under  Section
18 of the Act in respect  of  land  measuring  0.951  hectare  comprised  in
Survey No.18.

11.   After considering the pleadings of the parties,  the  Reference  Court
framed the following issues:

      “(i)  Whether compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Officer,
      Shivpuri, is insufficient and improper and contrary to the  provisions
      of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act?
      (ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to higher  compensation?  If
      yes, to what extent?
      (iii) Whether the application for reference made by the petitioners is
      within limitation?

      (iv)  Relief and Costs.
      Additional                                                      Issue:


      (v) Whether petitioners are in cultivatory possession of the  acquired
      lands and hence the owners  of  the  lands  under  law  and  therefore
      entitled to receive amount of compensation?”


The Reference Court took cognizance of the  oral  and  documentary  evidence
produced by the parties and held that being legal heirs of  Sant  Singh  and
farmers in occupation the appellants are owners of the lands. The  Reference
Court noted that at the time of entering  his  name  in  Panch  Sala  Khasra
(Exhibit P4), Chandra Mohan (respondent No.4 therein) was only 5  years  old
and held that he could not be  treated  as  farmer  in  occupation  for  the
purpose of being treated as a person  entitled  to  receive  the  amount  of
compensation. The Reference Court then considered the question  whether  the
compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer  was  insufficient  and
answered the same in affirmative.  For  arriving  at  this  conclusion,  the
Reference Court assigned the following reasons:

      “Now  what  is  to  be  seen  is  ‘
Whether  future   potentiality   of
      construction of buildings existed in the lands acquired?’  Petitioners
      have examined Himmat Singh (P.W.1) who has stated  that  the  date  on
      which the lands were acquired, it was fully developed for agricultural
      purposes and there were several government offices e.g. Tehsil, S.D.O.
      Office, B.D.O. Office, Forest Department, Residence  of  Civil  Judge,
      Sub-Jail, Silk Industry Center, Rest House, Hospitals etc.,  near  the
      acquired lands and all of the above  are  residential  houses  wherein
      Doctors and Advocates are also living. Apart from  this,  there  is  a
      metalled road of P.W.D. on the south of the lands towards Village  Rai
      and on the north there is a metalled  road  of  P.W.D.  going  towards
      Village Mohara. On the south there is an ancient  temple  on  which  a
      huge fair is celebrated every year. More than 90%  of  the  Government
      Offices of the Kolaras Sub  Division  are  situated  in  Jagatpur  and
      Jagatpur is situated near  the  Agra-Mumbai  National  Highway  and  a
      metalled road goes upto  Sant  Farm  from  this  Agra-Mumbai  National
      Highway. These statements of the  witness  have  not  been  challenged
      during his cross examination.


      Apart from him, another witness of the petitioner namely Rishabh Chand
      (P.W.2) in his statement has  stated  that  he  is  an  Ex-M.L.A.  and
      Chairman of Kolaras. The entire development of  Kolaras  is  presently
      towards Jagatpur side. Sant Farm is only 1/2 Km. from  the  A.B.  Road
      and there are Quarters of Jail employees, Indira Colony and  Residence
      of the Judge, Quarters and houses of the Railway  employees  near  the
      farm. The entire development activities of Jagatpur  is  taking  place
      towards Sant Farm. Patwari has also stated that Jagatpur  and  Kolaras
      are  abutting  each  other.  There  are  several  government  offices,
      Advocates' offices, Court buildings  in  Jagatpur.  Residence  of  the
      Judge is adjoining Sant Farm. College too is very near to it and there
      is a large habitation around Sant Farm. There is a road and habitation
      on the north of Sant Farm and on the  south  there  is  a  temple  and
      several persons of Kolaras are visiting this temple. On the south is a
      metalled road of P.W.D. going towards village Rai and on the  east  of
      the Sant Farm there are several government houses.  A  Private  colony
      has been constructed on Survey nos. 161 and 163.  Hence  it  is  clear
      from the above that the acquired lands are close  to  the  residential
      lands and bore potential of construction of buildings at the  time  of
      acquisition. In the circumstances it is clear that  the  determination
      of compensation of these lands by treating them as agricultural  lands
      is unfair,  arbitrary  and  insufficient  and  also  contrary  to  the
      provisions of Section 23[1] of the Land Acquisition Act.  Resultantly,
      Issue no.l is hereby decided in affirmative i.e. Yes.”

The Reference Court relied upon sale deeds Exhibits P7 to P9  and  concluded
that market value of the acquired land is Rs.3 per  sq.  ft.  The  Reference
Court then  applied various deductions and  held  that  the  appellants  are
entitled to compensation of Rs.80,240/- for land measuring 1,69,805 sq.  ft.
and by adding 12% per annum from 12.6.1987 up to the date of  taking  lawful
possession, i.e., 30.11.1987,  the  appellants  are  entitled  to  Rs.4,493.
The Reference Court also awarded solatium at the rate of 30% of  the  market
value in terms of Section 23(2) of the Act and declared that the  appellants
are entitled to total compensation of Rs.1,08,904 with interest at the  rate
of 9% per annum for the first year and  15%  per  annum  for  the  remaining
period till the date of actual payment.  However, Civil  Miscellaneous  Suit
No.13/1998 registered on the basis of reference made by the Collector  under
Section 18 was held to be barred by time.

12.   The appellants and Union of India  challenged  the  judgments  of  the
Reference Court by filing appeals under Section 54 of the Act.  The  learned
Single Judge referred to the oral and documentary evidence produced  by  the
parties and held that the Reference  Court  did  not  commit  any  error  by
holding that market value of the acquired land cannot be more than Rs.6  per
sq. ft.  The learned Judge made various  deductions  and  held  that  market
value of the acquired land would  be  Re.1  per  sq.ft.   The  appeals  were
accordingly disposed of by declaring that the  appellants  are  entitled  to
compensation for the land acquired vide notification dated 28.5.1987 at  the
rate of Re.1 per sq. ft with other  statutory  benefits  like  solatium  and
interest.

13.   Shri U. U. Lalit, learned senior counsel  for  the  appellants  argued
that the Reference Court and the  High  Court  committed  serious  error  by excluding various sale instances  only  on  the  ground  that  the  contents thereof were not proved by examining the buyer and the  seller.
 Shri  Lalit
invited the Court’s attention to Section 51-A of the Act and  the  judgments
in Land Acquisition Officer and  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  v.  V.  Narasaiah
(2001) 3 SCC 530, Cement Corporation of India v. Purya (2004) 8 SCC 270  and
Deputy  Collector,  Land  Acquisition,  Gujarat  and  another  v.   Madhubai
Gobarbhai and another (2009) 15 SCC 125 and argued that the  view  expressed
by the Reference Court and approved by the learned Single Judge of the  High
Court on the admissibility and relevance of the  copies  of  the  registered
sale deeds is liable to be overturned.
 Shri Lalit further argued  that  the
Reference Court and the High Court committed serious  error  by  not  taking
into consideration the highest value reflected in the  sale  deeds  Exhibits
P4 and P5 for the purpose of determination of compensation. 
 In  support  of
this argument,  Shri  Lalit  relied  upon  the  judgments  in  Rao  Bahadur,
Collector of Madras 1969 1 MLJ 45, State of Punjab v. Hansraj (1994)  5  SCC
734, Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa (2010) 13 SCC 710, Mehrawal  Khewaji
Trust (Registered), Faridkot and  others  v.  State  of  Punjab  and  others
(2012) 5 SCC 432. 
Shri Lalit then argued that the  deductions  made  by  the
Reference Court and approved by the High  Court  are  clearly  impermissible
because the land had been acquired for  construction  of  Broad  Gauge  Rail
Line and not for carving out  a  lay  out  for  residential,  industrial  or
commercial purpose which  necessarily  involves  construction  of  road  and
providing of basic amenities like electricity, water and sewerage and  large
area is required to be left out as open spaces.
Shri  Lalit  also  referred
to documents produced by the appellants showing damage  to  their  land  and
argued that the Reference Court and the High Court committed  serious  error
by not awarding compensation for severance caused  due  to  construction  of
railway line and damage caused due to  digging.  
In  the  end,  Shri  Lalit
relied upon the judgments of this Court in Sunder v. Union of  India  (2001)
7 SCC  211  and  R.  Saragapani  v.  Special  Tahsildar,  Karur  –  Dindigul
Broadguage Line (2011) 14  SCC  177  and  argued  that  the  appellants  are
entitled to interest on solatium.

14.   Shri R. K. Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing  for
the Union of India supported the  impugned  judgment  and  argued  that  the
appellants are not entitled  to  further  enhancement  in  the  compensation
determined by the High Court. Shri Khanna argued  that  the  sale  instances
produced by the appellants were in respect of very  small  parcels  of  land
and the same could not supply basis for fixing market value  of  big  chunks
of land measuring 3.627 hectares and 0.951 hectare.  He further argued  that
the deductions made by the Reference Court and the High  Court  in  lieu  of
the cost of development and other charges are legally correct and  the  High
Court did not commit any error by fixing market value of the  acquired  land
for the  purpose  of  determination  of  the  compensation  payable  to  the
appellants.

15.   In support of his arguments, Shri Khanna relied upon the judgments  in
 Land Acquiring Body, Ahmedabad v. Ramprasad H. Maharaj (2007) 15  SCC  593,
Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v.  State  of  Maharashtra  (2009)  11  SCC  141,
Sabhia Mohammad Yusuf Abdul  Hamid  Mulla  (dead)  by  Lrs.  and  others  v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer and others (2012) 7  SCC  595,  Bhagwathula
Samanna and others  v.  Special  Tahsildar  and  Land  Acquisition  Officer,
Visakhapatnam Municipality, Visakhapatnam (1991) 4 SCC 506,   V.  Hanumantha
Reddy (dead) by Lrs. v. Land  Acquisition  officer  and  Mandal  R.  Officer
(2003) 12 SCC 642,  Valliyammal  and  another  v.  Special  Tahsildar  (Land
Acquisition) and another (2011) 8 SCC 91 and K. S. Shivdevamma v.  Assistant
Collector AIR  1996 SC 2886.

16.   Before  considering  the  respective  arguments,  we  may  notice  the
principles laid down by this Court for determination of market value of  the
acquired land.
In Shaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.  (2001)  7  SCC
650, this Court held:

      “It is no doubt true that courts  adopt  comparable  sales  method  of
      valuation of land while fixing the market value of the acquired  land.
      While fixing the market value of the acquired land,  comparable  sales
      method of valuation is preferred than other methods  of  valuation  of
      land such as capitalisation of net income  method  or  expert  opinion
      method. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred  because  it
      furnishes the evidence for determination of the market  value  of  the
      acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the  acquired
      land if it had been sold in the open market at the time  of  issue  of
      notification under Section 4 of the  Act.  However,  comparable  sales
      method of valuation of  land  for  fixing  the  market  value  of  the
      acquired land is not always  conclusive.  There  are  certain  factors
      which are required to be fulfilled and on fulfilment of those  factors
      the compensation can be awarded, according to the value  of  the  land
      reflected in the sales. 
The factors laid down inter alia are:
 (1)  the
      sale must be a genuine transaction,
 (2) that the sale deed  must  have
      been  executed  at  the  time  proximate  to  the  date  of  issue  of
      notification under Section 4 of the Act,
 (3) that the land covered  by
      the sale must be in the vicinity of the acquired land, 
 (4)  that  the
      land covered by the sales must be similar to the  acquired  land,  and
      
(5) that the size of  plot  of  the  land  covered  by  the  sales  be
      comparable to the land acquired. 
If all these factors  are  satisfied,
      then there is no reason why the sale value of the land covered by  the
      sales be not given for the acquired  land.  
However,  if  there  is  a
      dissimilarity in regard to locality, shape, site  or  nature  of  land
      between land covered by sales and land acquired, it  is  open  to  the
      court to proportionately reduce the  compensation  for  acquired  land
      than what is reflected in the sales depending upon  the  disadvantages
      attached with the acquired land.”




17.   In Viluben Jhalejar Contractor v. State of Gujarat (2005) 4  SCC  789,
this Court elaborately considered the matter and culled  out  the  following
principles:
      “One of the principles for determination of the amount of compensation
      for acquisition of land would be the willingness of an informed  buyer
      to offer the price therefor. It is beyond any cavil that the price  of
      the land which a willing and  informed  buyer  would  offer  would  be
      different in the cases where the owner is in possession and  enjoyment
      of the property and in the cases where he is not.


      Market value is ordinarily the price the property  may  fetch  in  the
      open market if sold by a willing  seller  unaffected  by  the  special
      needs of  a  particular  purchase.  Where  definite  material  is  not
      forthcoming either in the shape of  sales  of  similar  lands  in  the
      neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under Section  4(1)
      or otherwise, other sale instances as well as other evidences have  to
      be considered.

  The amount of compensation cannot  be  ascertained  with  mathematical
      accuracy. 
A comparable instance has to be identified having regard  to
      the proximity from time angle as  well  as  proximity  from  situation
      angle.
 For determining the market value of the land under acquisition,
      suitable adjustment has to be made having regard to  various  positive
      and negative factors vis-à-vis the land under acquisition  by  placing
      the two in juxtaposition. 
The positive and  negative  factors  are  as
      under:


      Positive factors             Negative factors


      (i) smallness of size          (i) largeness of area


      (ii) proximity to a road            (ii) situation in the interior  at
      a                                    distance from the road


      (iii) frontage on a road            (iii) narrow strip  of  land  with
      very                                 small frontage compared to depth


      (iv) nearness to developed area     (iv)  lower  level  requiring  the
                                     depressed portion to be filled up


      (v)  regular  shape                   (v)  remoteness  from  developed
                                 locality


      (vi) level vis-à-vis land under   (vi)  some  special  disadvantageous
      acquisition                              factors which would  deter  a
                                          purchaser


      (vii) special value for an owner of
      an adjoining property to whom it
      may have some very special advantage


      Whereas a smaller plot may be within the reach of many, a large  block
      of land will have to be developed preparing a layout plan, carving out
      roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out smaller  plots,  waiting  for
      purchasers and  the  hazards  of  an  entrepreneur.  Such  development
      charges may range between 20% and 50% of the total price.”


18.   In Atma Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568, the Court held:
      “In order to determine the compensation which the  tenure-holders  are
      entitled to get for their land  which  has  been  acquired,  the  main
      question to be considered is what is the market  value  of  the  land.
      Section 23(1) of the Act lays down what the court  has  to  take  into
      consideration while Section 24 lays down what the court shall not take
      into consideration and have to be neglected. The main  object  of  the
      enquiry before the court is to determine the market value of the  land
      acquired. The expression ‘market value’ has been the subject-matter of
      consideration by this Court in several cases. The market value is  the
      price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller  for  the
      property having due regard to its  existing  condition  with  all  its
      existing advantages and its potential possibilities when  led  out  in
      most advantageous manner excluding any advantage due to  carrying  out
      of the scheme for which the  property  is  compulsorily  acquired.  In
      considering market value disinclination of the vendor to part with his
      land and the urgent necessity  of  the  purchaser  to  buy  should  be
      disregarded. The guiding star would be  the  conduct  of  hypothetical
      willing vendor who would offer the land  and  a  purchaser  in  normal
      human conduct would be willing to buy  as  a  prudent  man  in  normal
      market conditions but not an  anxious  dealing  at  arm’s  length  nor
      facade of sale nor fictitious sale brought about in  quick  succession
      or otherwise to inflate the market value. The determination of  market
      value is the prediction of an economic event viz. a price  outcome  of
      hypothetical sale expressed  in  terms  of  probabilities.  See  Kamta
      Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 3 SCC 772, Prithvi Raj Taneja v.
      State of M.P. (1977) 1 SCC  684,  Administrator  General  of  W.B.  v.
      Collector (1988) 2 SCC 150 and  Periyar  Pareekanni  Rubbers  Ltd.  v.
      State of Kerala (1991) 4 SCC 195.


      For ascertaining the market value of the land, the potentiality of the
      acquired land should also be taken  into  consideration.  Potentiality
      means capacity or possibility for changing or developing into state of
      actuality. It is well settled that market value of a property  has  to
      be determined having due regard to its existing condition with all its
      existing advantages and its potential possibility when led out in  its
      most advantageous manner. The question whether a  land  has  potential
      value or not, is primarily one of fact depending upon  its  condition,
      situation, user to which it is put or is reasonably capable  of  being
      put and proximity to residential, commercial or  industrial  areas  or
      institutions.  The  existing  amenities   like   water,   electricity,
      possibility of their further extension, whether near about a  town  is
      developing or has prospect  of  development  have  to  be  taken  into
      consideration. See Collector v. Dr. Harisingh Thakur (1979) 1 SCC 236,
      Raghubans Narain Singh v. U.P. Govt. AIR 1967 SC 465 and Administrator
      General of W.B. v. Collector (1988) 2 SCC 150. It  has  been  held  in
      Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer (1984) 2 SCC  324  and
      Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust (1989) 2 SCC 329  that  failing
      to consider potential value of  the  acquired  land  is  an  error  of
      principle.”




19.   We shall now deal with the question whether the  Reference  Court  was
legally entitled to discard the sale deeds Exhibits P1 to P6 and P10 to  P12
and whether the market value could have been determined only  on  the  basis
of Exhibits P7 to P9 and also whether the learned Single Judge of  the  High
Court was right in relying upon Exhibits P1 and P7 to  P9  for  recording  a
finding that the Reference Court had correctly treated market value  of  the
acquired land as Rs.6 per sq. ft. for the purpose of determining the  amount
of compensation.

20.   Admittedly, the appellants had produced as many as 12 sale deeds,  the
details of which (as contained in the written note filed by learned  counsel
for the appellants on 27.11.2013) are given below:

|“Exhibi|Date         |Area      |Total       |Rate           |
|t No.  |             |          |consideratio|               |
|       |             |          |n           |               |
|P1     |10.07.1986   |2000 Sqft |6000/-      |Rs.3.00/-      |
|P2     |13.10.1992   |1168 Sqft |47,000/-    |Rs.40.02/-     |
|P3     |25.02.1986   |600 Sqft  |5000/-      |Rs.8.33/-      |
|P4     |10.02.1984   |112 Sqft  |2000/-      |Rs.17.86/-     |
|P5     |24.08.1984   |112 Sqft  |2000/-      |Rs. 17.86/-    |
|P6     |19.01.1987   |1200 Sqft |9600/-      |Rs.8.00/-      |
|P7     |08.07.1986   |1980 Sqft |16,000/-    |Rs.8.08/-      |
|P8     |13.08.1986   |1980 Sqft |16,000/-    |Rs.8.08/-      |
|P9     |08.08.1986   |825 Sqft  |6,600/-     |Rs.8.00/-      |
|P10    |17.02.1992   |900 Sqft  |49,500/-    |Rs.55.00/-     |
|P11    |19.01.1987   |1200 Sqft |9600/-      |Rs.8.00/-      |
|P12    |25.02.1986   |53928 Sqft|0.51        |Re.0.09        |
|       |             |          |hectares    |(Being an      |
|       |             |          |            |example rural  |
|       |             |          |            |agricultural   |
|       |             |          |            |land beyond    |
|       |             |          |            |Jagatpur cited |
|       |             |          |            |as a contrast  |
|       |             |          |            |example)”      |

21.   Since all the sale deeds produced by the  appellants  were  registered
documents  and  authenticity  thereof  had  not  been  questioned   by   the
respondents, the Reference Court and the High Court could not  have  ignored
the provisions of Section 51-A and discarded majority  of  the  sale  deeds.
This issue is no longer res integra and must be answered in  favour  of  the
appellants in view of the judgments in Land Acquisition Officer  and  Mandal
Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah (supra),  Cement  Corporation  of  India  v.
Purya (supra) and Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition,  Gujarat  and  another
v. Madhubai Gobarbhai and another (supra).

22.   Notwithstanding  the  above  conclusion,  we  are  of  the  view  that
Exhibits P2 and P10 cannot be relied upon for determination  of  the  amount
of  compensation  because  the  same  were  executed  after  the  issue   of
notification under Section 4.  The remaining sale deeds show that  different
parcels of land were sold between  10.2.1984  and  19.1.1987.   The  highest
value for which the land was sold was Rs.17.86 per sq.  ft  and  the  lowest
was Rs.3 per sq. ft.  In Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa (supra),  a  two
Judge Bench considered the methodology which should be followed  for  fixing
market value of the acquired land where large number of sale  instances  are
produced  by  the  parties,  referred  to  the  earlier  judgments   in   M.
Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector (1969) 1 MLJ 45, State  of  Punjab
v. Hans Raj (1994) 5 SCC 734 and held:

      “The legal position is that even where  there  are  several  exemplars
      with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars,
      which is a bona fide transaction, will be  considered.  Where  however
      there are several sales of similar  lands  whose  prices  range  in  a
      narrow bandwidth, the average thereof can be  taken,  as  representing
      the market price. But where the values disclosed  in  respect  of  two
      sales are markedly different, it can only lead to  an  inference  that
      they are with reference to dissimilar lands or that  the  lower  value
      sale is  on  account  of  undervaluation  or  other  price  depressing
      reasons. Consequently, averaging cannot be resorted to.”



23.   In Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot and others  v.  State
of Punjab and others (supra), another two Judge Bench re-stated the  law  in
the following words:

      “It is clear that when there are several exemplars with  reference  to
      similar lands, it  is  the  general  rule  that  the  highest  of  the
      exemplars, if it is satisfied that it is a bona fide transaction,  has
      to be considered and accepted. When the  land  is  being  compulsorily
      taken away from a person, he is entitled to the  highest  value  which
      similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a  bona  fide
      transaction entered into between a willing  purchaser  and  a  willing
      seller near about the time of the acquisition. In our view,  it  seems
      to be  only  fair  that  where  sale  deeds  pertaining  to  different
      transactions are relied on behalf of the Government,  the  transaction
      representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest  unless
      there are strong circumstances justifying a different  course.  It  is
      not desirable to take an average of various sale deeds  placed  before
      the authority/court for fixing fair compensation.”





24.   The same view was reiterated in Chindha Fakira Patil  v.  The  Special
Land Acquisition officer, Jalgaon 2011 (12) SCALE 321.
25.   It was neither the pleaded case of the respondents  nor  any  evidence
was produced by them before the Reference  Court  to  prove  that  the  sale
transactions Exhibits P4 and P5 were not genuine  or  that  the  vendor  and
vendee had colluded to inflate value of the land with oblique motive. It  is
also not the case of the respondents  that  the  lands  specified  in  other
exhibits was sold at the rate of Rs.8.33, Rs.8.08 or Rs.8 per sq.  ft.  with
ulterior motive to get higher compensation in the  subsequent  acquisitions.
Therefore, we can safely rely upon Exhibits P4 and P5  for  determining  the
amount of compensation.  Even if those sale deeds are kept  aside,  one  can
rely upon Exhibits P3, P7 and P8 for recording a finding that  market  value
of the acquired land cannot be less than anything between Rs.8  and  Rs.8.33
per sq. ft. If the rule of averaging is applied, then market  value  of  the
acquired land would be anything between Rs.9 and Rs.10 per sq. ft.

26.   The next issue which merits consideration  is  whether  the  Reference
Court and the High Court had  correctly  made  deductions  in  the  name  of
development charges/cost of development.  The Reference  Court  made  three-
tier deduction.  In the first  place,  25%  was  deducted  in  the  name  of
leaving out portions of the acquired land for the purpose of  laying  roads,
drains, sewer line, parks, electricity line etc.  Thereafter, 25%  deduction
was made towards expenses for development work.  Finally, 50% deduction  was
made because of smallness of the plots sold vide Exhibits P1  to  P12.   The
learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  approved  the  deduction   and
determined market value of the acquired land at the rate  of  Re.1  per  sq.
ft.

27.   The approach adopted by the Reference Court  and  the  High  Court  in
making deductions towards the cost  of  development  /  development  charges
from the market value determined on the basis of the sale deeds produced  by
the appellants was clearly wrong. The respondents  had  not  even  suggested
that the development envisaged by  the  Reference  Court,  i.e.,  laying  of
roads, drains, sewer lines, parks,  electricity  lines  etc.  or  any  other
development work was required to be undertaken for laying the Railway  line.
Therefore, 25% deduction made by the Reference Court  and  approved  by  the
High Court under two different heads is legally unsustainable.

28.       In  Nelson  Fernandes  and  others  v.  Special  Land  Acquisition
Officer, South Goa and others (2007) 9 SCC 447,
this  Court  considered  the
question whether any deduction could be made towards development cost  where
the land is acquired for laying  railway  line  and  answered  the  same  in
negative.  In that case, the appellant had challenged the judgments  of  the
Reference Court and the Division Bench  of  the  High  Court  fixing  market
value of the acquired land and contended that no  deduction  could  be  made
because the land had been acquired for  laying  railway  line.   This  Court
reversed the judgments of  the  Reference  Court  and  the  High  Court  and
observed:

      “29.  Both the Special Land Acquisition Officer,  the  District  Judge
      and of the High Court have  failed  to  notice  that  the  purpose  of
      acquisition is for Railways and that the purpose is a relevant  factor
      to be taken into consideration for fixing the  compensation.  In  this
      context, we may usefully refer the judgment of this Court  in  Viluben
      Jhalejar Contractor v. State of Gujarat.  This  Court  held  that  the
      purpose for which the  land  is  acquired  must  also  be  taken  into
      consideration  in  fixing  the  market  value  and  the  deduction  of
      development charges. In  the  above  case,  the  lands  were  acquired
      because they were submerged under  water  of  a  dam.  Owners  claimed
      compensation of Rs 40 per sq ft. LAO awarded compensation ranging from
      Rs 35 to Rs 60 per sq m. Reference Court fixed the market value of the
      land at Rs 200 per sq m and after deduction  of  development  charges,
      determined the compensation @ Rs 134 per sq  m.  In  arriving  at  the
      compensation, Reference Court placed reliance on the comparative  sale
      of a piece of land measuring 46.30 sq m @ Rs 270 per sq m. On  appeal,
      the High Court awarded compensation of Rs 180 per sq m in  respect  of
      large plots and Rs 200 per sq  m  in  respect  of  smaller  plots.  On
      further appeal, this Court held that since the lands were acquired for
      being submerged in water of dam and had no  potential  value  and  the
      sale instance relied was a small plot measuring 46.30 sq m whereas the
      acquisition in the present case was in respect of large area, interest
      of justice would be subserved by awarding compensation of Rs  160  per
      sq m in respect of larger plots and Rs 175 per sq m for smaller plots.
      In Basavva v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer this Court held  that  the
      purpose for which acquisition is made is also a  relevant  factor  for
      determining the market value.


      30.   We are not, however, oblivious of the fact that  normally  1/3rd
      deduction of further amount of compensation has been directed in  some
      cases. However, the purpose for which the land is acquired  must  also
      be taken into  consideration.  In  the  instant  case,  the  land  was
      acquired for the construction of new BG line for the Konkan  Railways.
      This Court in Hasanali Khanbhai & Sons v. State of  Gujarat  and  Land
      Acquisition Officer v. Nookala Rajamallu had noticed that where  lands
      are acquired for specific purposes, deduction by  way  of  development
      charges is permissible. In the instant case, acquisition is for laying
      a railway line. Therefore, the question of development  thereof  would
      not arise. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court is liable  to
      be set aside and in view of the availability of basic civic  amenities
      such as school,  bank,  police  station,  water  supply,  electricity,
      highway, transport, post, petrol pump, industry, telecommunication and
      other businesses, the claim of compensation should reasonably be fixed
      @ Rs 250 per sq m with the deduction of 20%. The  appellant  shall  be
      entitled to all other statutory benefits such as  solatium,  interest,
      etc. etc. The appellants also will be entitled to compensation for the
      trees standing on the said land in a sum of Rs.59,192 as fixed. IA No.
      1 of 2006 for substitution is ordered as prayed for.”



29.   In C.R. Nagaraja  Shetty  v.  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  and
Estate Officer and another (2009) 11 SCC  75,  the  Court  referred  to  the
judgment  in  Nelson  Fernandes  and  others  v.  Special  Land  Acquisition
Officer, South Goa and others (supra) and observed:

      “15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the  respondents  was
      also unable to point out any  such  evidence  regarding  the  proposed
      development. We cannot ignore the fact that the land is acquired  only
      for the widening of the national highway. There would,  therefore,  be
      no question of any such development or any costs therefor.


      16. In Nelson Fernandes v. Land Acquisition  Officer  this  Court  has
      discussed the question of development charges. That was a  case  where
      the acquisition was for laying a railway line. This Court  found  that
      the land under acquisition was situated in an area which was  adjacent
      to the land already acquired for the same purpose i.e.  for  laying  a
      railway line. In para 29, the Court observed that the Land Acquisition
      Officer, the District Judge and the High Court had  failed  to  notice
      that the purpose of acquisition was for  the  Railways  and  that  the
      purpose is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for fixing
      the compensation.


      17.  The  Court  in  Nelson  Fernandes  relied  on  Viluben   Jhalejar
      Contractor v. State of Gujarat where it was held that:


           “29. … the purpose for which the land is acquired must  also  be
           taken into consideration in fixing  the  market  value  and  the
           deduction of development charges.”


      Further, in para 30, the Court specifically referred to the  deduction
      for the development charges and observed:


           “30. We are not, however, oblivious of the  fact  that  normally
           1/3rd deduction of  further  amount  of  compensation  has  been
           directed in some cases. However, the purpose for which the  land
           is acquired must  also  be  taken  into  consideration.  In  the
           instant case, the land was acquired for the construction of  new
           BG line  for  the  Konkan  Railways.  …  In  the  instant  case,
           acquisition  is  for  laying  a  railway  line.  Therefore,  the
           question of development thereof would not arise.”


      The Court made a reference to two other cases viz. Hasanali Khanbhai &
      Sons v. State of Gujarat  and  Land  Acquisition  Officer  v.  Nookala
      Rajamallu where the deduction by way of development charges  was  held
      permissible.


      18. The situation is no different in the present case.  All  that  the
      acquiring body has to achieve is to widen the national highway.  There
      is no further question of any development. We again, even at the  cost
      of repetition, reiterate that no  evidence  was  shown  before  us  in
      support of the plea of the proposed development. We,  therefore,  hold
      that the High Court has erred in directing the deduction on account of
      the developmental charges at the rate of Rs 25 per square foot out  of
      the ordered compensation at the rate of Rs 75 per square foot. We  set
      aside the judgment to that extent.”



30.   However, keeping in view the smallness of the plots  which  were  sold
by Exhibits P1, P3 to P8, P11 and P12, we would  approve  the  deduction  of
50% for the purpose of determining compensation payable for  3.627  hectares
comprised in Survey Nos.2, 10, 20, 22, 46, 48  and  106  and  0.951  hectare
comprised in Survey No.18.

31.   The issue which remains to be considered  relates  to
 the  amount  of
compensation payable to the appellants.
 For  this  purpose,  we  shall  make
calculation by adopting the following modes:

      i)    If sale deeds Exhibits  P4  and  P5  are  relied  upon  and  50%
           deduction is made on account of smallness of the  land  sold  by
           these exhibits, the amount of compensation would come to Rs.8.93
           per sq. ft., and

      ii)   If sale deeds Exhibits P3, P6 to  P9  and  P11  are  taken  into
           consideration and 50% deduction is made due to smallness of  the
           plots, the appellants would be entitled to compensation  at  the
           rate of Rs.4.04 per sq. ft.

32.    However,  keeping  in  view  the  proposition   laid   down   in   M.
Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur v. Collector (supra), State of Punjab  v.  Hans
Raj (supra), Anjani Molu  Dessai  v.  State  of  Goa  (supra)  and  Mehrawal
Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot and  others  v.  State  of  Punjab  and
others (supra), we would adopt the first mode and hold that  the  appellants
are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.8.93 per sq. ft.

33.   We may have ordained payment of compensation to the appellants at  the rate of 8.93 per sq. ft. (rounded off to  Rs.9  per  sq.  ft.),  
but  having
regard to the fact that in the claim filed before the Reference Court,  they had limited their claim to Rs.5 per sq. ft. and  no  application  was  filed either  before  the  High  Court  or  this  Court  for  payment  of   higher compensation, we would restrict the enhancement to Rs.5 per sq.ft.

34.   We agree with Shri Lalit that in view of the law laid down  in  Sunder
v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC  211,  Chimanlal  Kuberdas  Modi  v.  Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation (2010)  10  SCC  635,  Nadirsha  Shapurji
Patel v. Collector and LAO (2010) 13  SCC  234,  R.  Saragapani  v.  Special
Tahsildar, Karur – Dindigul Broadguage Line (2011) 14  SCC  177  and  Bharat
Heavy Electricals Limited v. R.S. Avtar Singh and Company (2013) 1 SCC  243,
the appellants are entitled to interest on solatium.

35.   So far as the appellants’ plea for award of damages caused on  account
of removal of fencing of Sant  Farm,  loss  of  earning  due  to  damage  to
crops/farming operation and destruction of well  existing  on  the  land  is
concerned, we do not consider it necessary to deal  with  the  same  because
the issue is being dealt with in C.A. No.1248 of 2007.

36.   In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned  judgment  and  the
award of the Reference Court are set aside  and  it  is  declared  that  the
appellants are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.5 per sq.ft.  with
other statutory benefits.  They shall also be entitled to  interest  on  the
element of solatium.

37.    The  respondents  are  directed  to  pay  the  amount   of   enhanced
compensation and other statutory benefits including  solatium  and  interest
to the appellants within a period of six months from today.


...............................................J.
                                             (G.S. SINGHVI)



                           ...............................................J.
                                             (SHIVA KIRTI SINGH)



                           ...............................................J.
                                             (C. NAGAPPAN)
New Delhi;
November 29, 2013.



-----------------------
25


Allotment of civic amenity sites = Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976 a civic amenity site could not have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other than the one for which such area is reserved. Since the site in question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have been allotted for use as a petrol pump. - High court declared the allotment as null and void- Apex court confirmed the same and dismiss the appeal = Civil Appeal No.10747/2013 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).31690/2011 PURUSHOTHAM Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. Respondent(s) = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41037

 Allotment of civic amenity sites = 
Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976  a civic amenity site could  not
         have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other
        than the one for which such area is reserved.  Since  the  site  in
        question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have  been
        allotted for use as a petrol pump. - High court declared the allotment as null and void- Apex court confirmed the same and dismiss the appeal =

the High Court has concluded -


           “We are satisfied that civil amenity site no. 2, at the time  of
           its allotment to respondent no.3 was expressly earmarked for use
           as “bank”. The aforesaid position has remained unaltered to this
           day. In terms of the mandate contained in Section  38-A  of  the
           Bangalore Development Authority Act, 19776  it  could  not  have
           been leased, sold or otherwise, transferred  for  purpose  other
           than the one “….for which such  area  is  reserved”.  Since  the
           civil  amenity  site  in  question  was  earmarked/reserved  for
           “bank”, we are satisfied that it could not  have  been  allotted
           for use as a “petrol station”.


      16.        From the above, it is evident that in fact,  the  site  had
      been originally earmarked to be developed as a public  park/playground
      in 1984. However, since the same has been converted to  a  residential
      area, respondents Nos. 4 to 14 have very fairly stated that  it  could
      not at this stage be restored to its original purpose without  causing
      havoc in the  lives  of  the  residents.  They  have,  therefore,  not
      insisted that the site be restored to its original purpose.


      17.        We also do not find any merit in the  submission  that  the
      term civic amenities would permit BDA to change the  reservation  from
      one particular user to another without the necessary amendment in  the
      development plan.  This would be contrary to the law laid down by this
      Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).
      18.        We also do not find any substance in the  submissions  that
      the High Court has wrongly distinguished the judgment of  the  earlier
      Division Bench of the High Court in Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents  Welfare
      Association (supra). 
A perusal of the paragraph 10  of  the  aforesaid
      judgment clearly shows that in that case, the  High  Court  considered
      the legality of allotment of civic amenity site no.3.  
There  was,  in
      fact, no change in the activity/purpose, as  the  site  had  not  been
      reserved for any specific purpose. 
The other question was 
whether  the
      lease in favour of the government company for opening  of  petrol  and
      diesel outlet would fall within the definition of  civic  amenity. 
 In
      the present case, it was not the case of the respondent nos. 4  to  14
      that petrol pump is not a civic amenity, therefore, the site could not
      have been allotted to  open  a  petrol  pump.  
The  grievance  of  the respondents (writ petitioners  in  the  High  Court)  was  that  civic amenity site no.2 had been earmarked for  a  bank  and  could  not  be allotted for a petrol pump without making necessary amendment  in  the site.  
Therefore,  the  High  Court  has  rightly  distinguished   the
      aforesaid judgment and not relied upon the same.
      19.        We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals  and  the  same
      are hereby dismissed.

ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.9             SECTION IVA

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.10747/2013 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).31690/2011

PURUSHOTHAM                                       Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.                         Respondent(s)

WITH Civil Appeal No.10748/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 31695 of 2011

Civil Appeal No.10749/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33184 of 2011

Civil Appeal No.10750/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33319 of 2011

Date: 29/11/2013  These matters were called on for pronouncement of
    Judgment today.
For Petitioner(s)
                     Dr. Sushil Balwada,Adv.

                        Mr. Rajeev Mishra, Adv.
                     Mr. Sanand Ramakrishnan
For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Ankur S. Kulkarni,Adv.
                     Ms. Anitha Shenoy ,Adv
                     Mr. Rajesh Mahale ,Adv

                        Mr. Rajeev Mishra, Adv.
                     Mr. Sanand Ramakrishnan ,Adv

           UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R

                 Leave granted.


                 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh  Nijjar  pronounced  the
        Judgment of the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
        Justice A.K. Sikri.
                 For the reasons recorded in the signed Reportable Judgment,
        the Appeals are dismissed.


        |(Vishal Anand)                        | |(Indu Bala Kapur)                   |
|Court Master                          | |Court Master                        |


             (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10747 OF 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 31690 of 2011)


      Purushottam                                            …Appellant
      VERSUS
      State of Karnataka & Ors.                        ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10748 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 31695 of 2011)


      Mrs. Ramadevi                                          …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10749 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 33184 of 2011)


      Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited     …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Subramanya & Ors.                                  ...Respondents


                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10750 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 33319 of 2011)


      Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited    …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Dr. Harish V. Iyer & Ors.                          ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.

     2. These four appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.31690 of 2011, SLP (C)
        No.31695 of 2011, SLP (C) No.33184 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.33319  of
        2011, impugn the judgment of a Division  Bench  of  Karnataka  High
        Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 5428  of  2006  (BDA-PIL),  and
        Writ Petition No. 5173 of 2006 (GM-RES/PIL), whereby the High Court
        has declared the allotment of civic amenity site no.  2  to  Bharat
        Petroleum Corporation (respondent No. 3)  for  establishment  of  a
        petrol pump, null and void.  The writ petitions have been  allowed.
         The allotment dated 4th August, 2005 made in favour of  respondent
        No. 3 has been set aside.

     3. The facts as narrated in C.A. No. 10747 of 2013 arising out of  SLP
        (C) No. 31690 of 2011 are as under:-

            • On 29th August, 1990 a Notification was issued by  the  State
              of  Karnataka  Government  under  Section  2bb(vi)   of   the
              Bangalore  Development  Authority  Act,   1976   (hereinafter
              referred to as “BDA  Act,  1976”)  to  the  effect  that  the
              amenities such as liquefied  petroleum  gas  godowns,  retail
              domestic fuel depots, petrol retail outlets  are  the  “civic
              amenities”  for the purposes of the aforesaid Act.

            • Thereafter, the State Government issued another  Notification
              on 29th April, 1994, inviting objections  or  suggestions  to
              the Revised Comprehensive Development Plan of Bangalore  City
              Planning Area, prepared  under  Karnataka  Town  and  Country
              Planning Act, 1961, (Karnataka Act 11  of  1963),  which  had
              been provisionally approved by the Government.

            • On 5th  January,  1995,  Site  No.2  is  reserved  for  civic
              amenities (hereinafter referred to as “CA Site No.2”)

            •  On  31st  January,  2000,  Bangalore  Development  Authority
              (hereinafter referred to as “BDA”) passed Resolution  No.  28
              of 2000 empowering the Chairman or the Commissioner to  allot
              Civil Amenity Site to any Government Body, State  or  Central
              Government undertaking.

            • On 1st January, 2001, BDA allotted CA Site No.2 and 3 in HRBR
              Layout III Block each measuring 2195.35 sq. mtrs. and  629.18
              sq. mtrs. in favour of Bangalore Water  Supply  and  Sewerage
              Board (hereinafter referred to as “BWSSB”)  on  lease  for  a
              period of 30 years for the purpose  of  service  station  and
              pump house.




            • On 28th March, 2002, a detailed representation was  submitted
              by one Mr. Padmanabha Reddy on the subject : Requisition  for
              Allotment of Civic Amenity Site No.2 & 3 in  HRBR  UI  Block,
              Bangalore  –  43  as  park.   It  was  pointed  out  in  this
              representation that the III Block of the  HRBR  Layout  is  a
              residential layout, with homes situated, chock-a-block,  with
              absolutely no ventilation space.  It was pointed out that  in
              these circumstances, the  provision  for  a  park/ventilation
              space is a crying-need of the locality.   The  representation
              also mentions that the objectors had  an  opportunity  to  go
              through the Revised Comprehensive  Development  Plan  –  2011
              (RCDP) pertaining to  District  No.7,  which  clearly  showed
              that, a squarish block of land, situated on the western  side
              of Civic Amenity site wherein the BWSSB  has  already  housed
              the Twin Ground Level reservoirs had  been  earmarked  for  a
              park. The other  surprise  in  store  in  the  RCDP  was  the
              earmarking of CA Site No.2, which was the bone of contention,
              as Commercial Area/Zone.  It is pointed out that in  reality,
              much before 1995, when the RCDP had allegedly been finalized,
              the BDA had already accomplished the task of converting  this
              squarish block of land  into  residential  sites  and  either
              allotted or auctioned such sites.  The land had been  clearly
              shown as earmarked for  a  park  or  a  playground.   Another
              similar block  of  land,  which  was  also  earmarked  to  be
              developed as a park has continued to  be  used  as  a  burial
              ground.  The representationist also brought to the notice  of
              the BDA sentiments expressed by this Court  in  the  case  of
              Bangalore  Medical  Trust  Vs.  B.S.   Muddappa   &   Ors.[1]
              Particular  attention  of  the  authorities  was   drawn   to
              Paragraphs 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 37 and  48  with  the  comment
              that  the  observations  made  in  the  aforesaid  paragraphs
              reflect the aspirations  of  the  respondent  Nos.  4  to  14
              (petitioners in the High Court).  Legally it was stated  that
              the action of the BDA is contrary to Section  38A(2)  of  the
              BDA Act, 1976.  It was ultimately stated  that  the  land  on
              which,  now,  reservoirs  had  been  developed   was   beyond
              “redemption and resumption”.  The other  area  earmarked  for
              the park can not be used as a park since it has already  been
              used as a graveyard.  Their only intention was  to  save  the
              remaining part which has now been allotted for the use as the
              petrol pump.

            • On 9th February, 2005, the State Government passed  an  order
              for continuation of revised CDP 1995 till 2015.

            • On 30th June, 2005, Bharat Petroleum Corporation  (respondent
              No.3) requested BDA to allot land for development of a retail
              outlet.

            • On 4th August, 2005, BDA allotted CA Site No.2 in  favour  of
              respondent No.3.

            • Thereafter, on 7th October, 2005, the  lease  deed  was  duly
              executed between BDA and respondent No.3 for a period  of  30
              years.  Dealership licence was granted in favour of  wife  of
              the appellant by respondent No.3 on 4th February, 2006.

            • Thereafter on 21st February, 2006, BDA has approved the  plan
              for establishment of petrol  pump  in  favour  of  respondent
              No.3.  Aggrieved by the aforesaid action, Writ  Petition  No.
              5428 of 2006 and others were  filed  in  public  interest  to
              challenge the  decision  of    BDA
              dated  21st  February,  2006  with  a  prayer  to  quash  the
              allotment of CA Site No.2 in favour of  respondent  No.3  for
              establishing a petrol pump and to convert the same to a  park
              for the elderly and a playground for the young.

     4. By the impugned judgment, the  Division  Bench  of  Karnataka  High
        Court on interpretation of Section 38A concluded that the allotment
        was in violation of Section 38A sub-section (2).   The  High  Court
        has concluded that CA Site No.2 at the time  of  its  allotment  to
        respondent  No.3  was  expressly  earmarked  for  use  as   “bank”.
        Therefore, in terms of Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976  could  not
        have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other
        than the one for which such area is reserved.  Since  the  site  in
        question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have  been
        allotted for use as a petrol pump. The High Court  also  held  that
        the allotment of the site was null  and  void  as  it  was  not  in
        consonance of Section 38A sub-section (2).  The High Court  further
        observed that even though both “bank” and “petrol pump”  are  civic
        amenities within the meaning of Section 2(bb) of the BDA Act, 1976,
        yet the mandate of Section 38A is clear and unambiguous.  It is for
        the very civic amenity, for which the area is reserved,  for  which
        it has to be put to use.

     5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
     6. It is submitted by the learned counsel  that  the  High  Court  has
        erred in holding that any area of particular civic  amenity  cannot
        be subsequently changed to another user which also falls within the
        definition of a civic amenity.  It  is  submitted  by  the  learned
        senior counsel appearing for all the appellants that the High Court
        has failed to appreciate that the sites still remain allotted to  a
        civic amenity.  Merely, because the  user  has  been  changed  from
        public park to bank and now to petrol pump would  not  violate  the
        provisions contained in Section 38A(1) and (2).   It  is  submitted
        that since the Notification was duly issued that petrol pump  would
        be a civic amenity as provided under Section 2(bb)(vi) of the  Act,
        there was no violation of Section 38A(2).
     7. Learned counsel for the appellants  have  submitted  that  in  fact
        there is no resolution passed by the BDA to show that the  site  in
        question has been earmarked for a bank.  It  is  further  submitted
        that the change of purpose or user for a particular piece  of  land
        as a civic amenity is permissible under Rule 3(1) of the  Bangalore
        Development Authority (Civic Amenity Site)  Allotment  Rules,  1989
        (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “BDAA  Rules,  1989”)  as  amended.
        According to the learned senior counsel, once the land is  reserved
        as  a  civic  amenity  and  allotted  in  favour  of  a  Government
        department or statutory authority of the  Central  Government,  the
        BDA Rules, 1989 has no application.  It was further submitted  that
        the Division Bench has erred in distinguishing the earlier judgment
        of the Division Bench of the same  Court  Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents
        Welfare Association & Anr.  Vs.  Bangalore  Development  Authority,
        Bangalore & Anr.[2] in which it has been  clearly  laid  down  that
        “the use of site  as  a  civic  amenity  for  the  distribution  of
        petroleum products also  would  come  within  the  scope  of  civic
        amenity”.
     8. Learned counsel appearing for the BDA and the  State  of  Karnataka
        have supported the case pleaded by the appellants. Learned  counsel
        appearing for respondent Nos. 4 to 14, however, submitted that  the
        High Court has correctly interpreted Section 38A(1)  and  (2)  that
        any area reserved for a particular civic amenity cannot be diverted
        to any other civic amenity on the ground that civic  amenity  is  a
        general term.  According to the learned counsel,  the  judgment  of
        the High Court is in consonance with the  law  laid  down  by  this
        Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).  The aforesaid judgment
        has been subsequently followed by this Court in R.K. Mittal &  Ors.
        Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[3]  It has been submitted that in
        view of the law declared by this Court, the  impugned  judgment  of
        the High Court does not call for any interference.
     9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel  for
        the parties.
    10. In our opinion, it is no longer necessary for us  to  consider  the
        issues raised by the appellants on first principle, as the issue is
        no longer res integra.  In the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra),  this
        Court examined the entire issue wherein, it has been held “that the
        legislative  intent  of   the   Bangalore   Development   Authority
        (Amendment) Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “BDA  (Amendment)
        Act, 1991”), which came into force w.e.f. 16th January, 1991 is  to
        prevent the diversion of the user of an area reserved for a  public
        park or playground or civic amenity to another user.
    11. Original Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976 has been substituted with
        the present Section 38A w.e.f. 21st April,  1984,  which  reads  as
        under:-
           “‘38-A. Grant of area reserved for civic amenities etc.—


           (1) The Authority  shall  have  the  power  to  lease,  sell  or
           otherwise transfer any area reserved for civic amenities for the
           purpose for which such area is reserved.


           (2) The Authority shall not sell or  otherwise  dispose  of  any
           area  reserved  for  public  parks  and  playgrounds  and  civic
           amenities, for any other purpose and  any  disposition  so  made
           shall be null and void:


           Provided that where the allottee commits breach of  any  of  the
           conditions of allotment,  the  Authority  shall  have  right  to
           resume such site after affording an opportunity of  being  heard
           to such allottee.”
    12. Interpreting the aforesaid provision, this Court has held as under:-


           “This new Section 38-A, as clarified in the Statement of Objects
           and Reasons and in the Explanatory Statement  attached  to  L.A.
           Bill 6 of 1991, removed the prohibition against lease or sale or
           any other transfer of any area reserved  for  a  civic  amenity,
           provided the transfer is for the same purpose for which the area
           has been reserved. This means that once an area has been stamped
           with the character of a particular civic amenity by  reservation
           of that area for purpose, it cannot be diverted to any other use
           even when it is transferred to another party. The  rationale  of
           this restriction is that  the  scheme  once  sanctioned  by  the
           government must operate universally and the areas allocated  for
           particular objects must not be diverted to other  objects.  This
           means that a site for a school or hospital or  any  other  civic
           amenity must remain reserved for that purpose, although the site
           itself may change hands. This is the purpose of sub-section  (1)
           of Section 38-A as now substituted. Sub-section (2)  of  Section
           38-A, on the other hand, emphasises the  conceptual  distinction
           between ‘public parks and playgrounds’ forming one  category  of
           ‘space’ and ‘civic amenities’ forming another category of sites.
           While public parks and playgrounds cannot be parted with by  the
           BDA for transfer to private hands by reason of  their  statutory
           dedication to the general public, other areas reserved for civic
           amenities may be transferred to private parties for the specific
           purposes for  which  those  areas  are  reserved.  There  is  no
           prohibition, as such, against transfer of open  spaces  reserved
           for  public  parks  or   playgrounds,   whether   or   not   for
           consideration, but the transfer is limited to public authorities
           and their user is limited to the purposes  for  which  they  are
           reserved under the scheme. The distinction is that while  public
           parks and playgrounds are dedicated to the public at  large  for
           common use, and must therefore remain  with  the  State  or  its
           instrumentalities, such as the BDA or a Municipal Corporation or
           any other authority, the civic amenities are not  so  dedicated,
           but only reserved for particular or special purposes……………………


           24. Protection of the environment, open  spaces  for  recreation
           and fresh air,  playgrounds  for  children,  promenade  for  the
           residents, and other conveniences or amenities  are  matters  of
           great public concern and of vital interest to be taken  care  of
           in a development scheme. It is that  public  interest  which  is
           sought to be promoted by the Act by establishing  the  BDA.  The
           public interest in the  reservation  and  preservation  of  open
           spaces for parks and playgrounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing
           or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to  some
           other user. Any such act would be contrary  to  the  legislative
           intent  and  inconsistent  with  the   statutory   requirements.
           Furthermore,  it  would  be  in   direct   conflict   with   the
           constitutional mandate  to  ensure  that  any  State  action  is
           inspired by the basic values of individual freedom  and  dignity
           and addressed to the attainment of a quality of life which makes
           the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens.

           25. Reservation of open spaces  for  parks  and  playgrounds  is
           universally recognised as a  legitimate  exercise  of  statutory
           power rationally related to the protection of the  residents  of
           the locality from the ill-effects of urbanisation.


           27. The statutes in force in India  and  abroad  reserving  open
           spaces for parks and playgrounds are the legislative attempt  to
           eliminate the misery of disreputable housing condition caused by
           urbanisation. Crowded urban areas tend to spread disease,  crime
           and immorality. As stated by the U.S. Supreme  Court  in  Samuel
           Berman v. Andrew Parker: (L Ed pp. 37-38 : US pp. 32-33)


                 “… They may also  suffocate  the  spirit  by  reducing  the
                 people who live there to the status  of  cattle.  They  may
                 indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They  may
                 also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which  robs
                 it of charm, which makes it a place from  which  men  turn.
                 The misery of housing may despoil a community  as  an  open
                 sewer may ruin a river.


                 … The concept of the public welfare is broad and  inclusive
                 …. The values  it  represents  are  spiritual  as  well  as
                 physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is  within  the
                 power of the legislature to determine  that  the  community
                 should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
                 clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the
                 present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
                 made determinations that take into account a  wide  variety
                 of values ….” (Per Douglas, J.).”
    13. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations are a complete answer to
        all the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants.




    14. This apart on the interpretation of Section  38A(1)  and  (2),  the
        inescapable conclusion is that under Section  38A  (1),  BDA  would
        have the authority to lease, sell or otherwise  transfer  any  area
        reserved for the purpose for which such area is  reserved,  and  no
        other.  This clearly means that the  Government  can  pass  on  the
        responsibility to another concern, be  it  individual,  company  or
        corporation for the purposes of carrying on the activity for  which
        the plot has been reserved as a civic amenity.  It does not give  a
        licence to the BDA to convert the area reserved for civic amenities
        for activities which do not fall within  the  definition  of  civic
        amenities.  Sub-section (2) of Section 38 is an embargo  that  even
        such sale or disposal otherwise of  an  area  reserved  for  public
        parks, playground  would  not  be  permitted  to  private  parties.
        Though such spaces, playgrounds and parks  can  be  transferred  to
        public authorities, but their user would be limited to the purposes
        for  which  they  are  reserved  under  the  scheme.   In  case,  a
        disposition is made for a purpose other than the one for  which  it
        is reserved, the Act has declared that, it shall be null and  void.
        In our opinion, Rule 3 of  which  the  support  is  sought  by  the
        appellants can not be permitted to override the statutory provision
        contained in Section 38A(1) and (2).  Even otherwise, the rule only
        reiterates the statutory provision in Section 38A(1) and  (2).   We
        also do not find any substance in the submission that the site  was
        never allotted as a bank, and, therefore, it could be allotted as a
        petrol pump. The High Court upon perusal of the pleadings  as  well
        as annexure ‘c’ appended to the  writ  petition  has  recorded  the
        following facts :
           “In so far as the factual matrix is concerned, it  is  necessary
           to record that the site in question was originally earmarked  as
           park/playground  in   1984.   This   factual   position   stands
           acknowledged at the hands of the Bangalore Development Authority
           in paragraph 5 of its  counter  affidavit.  Subsequently,  three
           civic amenity sites came to be carved out, in the  area  earlier
           earmarked for park/play ground. The first of these is  presently
           being used by the Bangalore Water supply and Sewerage Board. The
           second site, which is the one in question was earmarked for  use
           as a “bank”. So far as the  instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is
           concerned, our attention has been invited to Annexure-C appended
           to the writ petition, wherein civic amenity site no.2  has  been
           shown as earmarked for “bank”. The aforesaid Annexure-C came  to
           be executed on 06.01.1996. Civil amenity site no.2  is  indicted
           therein, as measuring 2195.35 sq. meters. In the  column  titled
           “purpose for which earmarked”, Annexure-C specifies  “bank”.  It
           is the contention of the petitioners that,  civic  amenity  site
           no.2 which was earmarked exclusively for use as “bank” has never
           undergone any change at the hands of the  Bangalore  Development
           Authority. Civic amenity site no. 3  is  not  relevant  for  the
           instant case, and as such we refrain, for  reasons  of  brevity,
           from recording any details in connection therewith.”


      15.  Upon consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel  for
      the parties,
 the High Court has concluded -


           “We are satisfied that civil amenity site no. 2, at the time  of
           its allotment to respondent no.3 was expressly earmarked for use
           as “bank”. The aforesaid position has remained unaltered to this
           day. In terms of the mandate contained in Section  38-A  of  the
           Bangalore Development Authority Act, 19776  it  could  not  have
           been leased, sold or otherwise, transferred  for  purpose  other
           than the one “….for which such  area  is  reserved”.  Since  the
           civil  amenity  site  in  question  was  earmarked/reserved  for
           “bank”, we are satisfied that it could not  have  been  allotted
           for use as a “petrol station”.


      16.        From the above, it is evident that in fact,  the  site  had
      been originally earmarked to be developed as a public  park/playground
      in 1984. However, since the same has been converted to  a  residential
      area, respondents Nos. 4 to 14 have very fairly stated that  it  could
      not at this stage be restored to its original purpose without  causing
      havoc in the  lives  of  the  residents.  They  have,  therefore,  not
      insisted that the site be restored to its original purpose.


      17.        We also do not find any merit in the  submission  that  the
      term civic amenities would permit BDA to change the  reservation  from
      one particular user to another without the necessary amendment in  the
      development plan.  This would be contrary to the law laid down by this
      Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).
      18.        We also do not find any substance in the  submissions  that
      the High Court has wrongly distinguished the judgment of  the  earlier
      Division Bench of the High Court in Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents  Welfare
      Association (supra). 
A perusal of the paragraph 10  of  the  aforesaid
      judgment clearly shows that in that case, the  High  Court  considered
      the legality of allotment of civic amenity site no.3.  
There  was,  in
      fact, no change in the activity/purpose, as  the  site  had  not  been
      reserved for any specific purpose. 
The other question was 
whether  the
      lease in favour of the government company for opening  of  petrol  and
      diesel outlet would fall within the definition of  civic  amenity. 
 In
      the present case, it was not the case of the respondent nos. 4  to  14
      that petrol pump is not a civic amenity, therefore, the site could not
      have been allotted to  open  a  petrol  pump.  
The  grievance  of  the respondents (writ petitioners  in  the  High  Court)  was  that  civic amenity site no.2 had been earmarked for  a  bank  and  could  not  be allotted for a petrol pump without making necessary amendment  in  the site.  
Therefore,  the  High  Court  has  rightly  distinguished   the
      aforesaid judgment and not relied upon the same.
      19.        We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals  and  the  same
      are hereby dismissed.



                                             ...………………….….….J.
                                                      [Surinder  Singh
                                             Nijjar]








                                             ………………………….J.
                                             [A.K.Sikri]
        New Delhi;
        November 29, 2013.

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[1]      (1991`) 4 SCC 54
[2]      ILR 2002 Kar. 4705
[3]      (2012) 2 SCC 232