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Friday, September 27, 2013

Elections - Right of voter to vote none Candidates contested in Elections = None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters= challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (in short ‘the Rules’) to the extent that these provisions violate the secrecy of voting which is fundamental to the free and fair elections and is required to be maintained as per Section 128 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (in short ‘the RP Act’) and Rules 39 and 49-M of the Rules.- In the above backdrop, the petitioners herein prayed for declaring Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules ultra vires and unconstitutional and also prayed for a direction to the Election Commission of India- Respondent No. 2 herein, to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers as well as in the electronic voting machines for the protection of the right of not to vote in order to keep the exercise of such right a secret under the existing RP Act/the Rules or under Article 324 of the Constitution.= we hold that Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules are ultra vires Section 128 of the RP Act and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to the extent they violate secrecy of voting. In view of our conclusion, we direct the Election Commission to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers/EVMs and another button called “None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters, who come to the polling booth and decide not to vote for any of the candidates in the fray, are able to exercise their right not to vote while maintaining their right of secrecy. Inasmuch as the Election Commission itself is in favour of the provision for NOTA in EVMs, we direct the Election Commission to implement the same either in a phased manner or at a time with the assistance of the Government of India. We also direct the Government of India to provide necessary help for implementation of the above direction. Besides, we also direct the Election Commission to undertake awareness programmes to educate the masses. 62) The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40835
                                    REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                   1 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 161 OF 2004




People’s Union for Civil
Liberties & Anr.                                  .... Petitioner (s)

            Versus

Union of India & Anr.                             .... Respondent(s)

                                      2







                               J U D G M E N T


P.Sathasivam, CJI.

1)    The present writ petition, under Article 32  of  the  Constitution  of
India,  has  been  filed  by  the   petitioners   herein   
challenging   the
constitutional validity of Rules 41(2) & (3) and  49-O  of  the  Conduct  of Election Rules, 1961 (in  short  ‘the  Rules’)  to  the  extent  that  these provisions violate the secrecy of voting which is fundamental  to  the  free and fair elections and is required to be maintained as per  Section  128  of the Representation of the People Act, 1951  (in  short  ‘the  RP  Act’)  and Rules 39 and 49-M of the Rules.

2)    The petitioners herein have preferred this petition for  the  issuance
of a writ or direction(s) of like nature  on  the  ground  that  though  the
above said Rules, viz., Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O, recognize the  right  of
a voter not to vote but still the secrecy of his having  not  voted  is  not
maintained in its implementation and thus the impugned rules, to the  extent
of such violation of the right to secrecy, are not only ultra vires  to  the
said  Rules  but  also  violative  of  Articles  19(1)(a)  and  21  of   the
Constitution of India besides International Covenants.

3)    In the above backdrop, the petitioners  herein  prayed  for  declaring
Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules  ultra  vires  and  unconstitutional
and also prayed for  a  direction  to  the  Election  Commission  of  India-
Respondent No. 2 herein,  to  provide  necessary  provision  in  the  ballot
papers as well as in the electronic voting machines for  the  protection  of
the right of not to vote in order to keep  the  exercise  of  such  right  a
secret under the existing RP Act/the Rules  or  under  Article  324  of  the
Constitution.

4)    On 23.02.2009, a Division Bench of this Court, on  an  objection  with
regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that  right  to
vote is not a fundamental right but is a statutory right, after  considering
Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr. (2002) 5  SCC
294 and People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India (2003)  4  SCC
399 held that even though the judgment in Kuldip Nayar & Ors. vs.  Union  of
India & Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1 did not overrule or discard the ratio laid  down
in the judgments mentioned above,  however,  it  creates  a  doubt  in  this
regard, referred the matter to a larger Bench to arrive at a decision.

5)    One Centre for  Consumer  Education  and  Association  for  Democratic
Reforms have filed applications  for  impleadment  in  this  Writ  Petition.
Impleadment applications are allowed.


6)     Heard  Mr.  Rajinder  Sachhar,  learned  senior   counsel   for   the
petitioners, Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  for
the Union of India-Respondent No. 1 herein,  Ms.  Meenakshi  Arora,  learned
counsel for the Election Commission of India-Respondent  No.  2  herein,  Ms
Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for  the  impleading
parties.

Contentions:


7)    Mr. Rajinder Sachhar, learned senior counsel for the  petitioners,  by
taking us through various provisions, particularly, Section 128  of  the  RP
Act as well as Rules 39, 41, 49-M and 49-O of the Rules  submitted  that  in
terms of Rule 41(2) of the Rules, an elector has a right  not  to  vote  but
still the secrecy of his having not voted  is  not  maintained  under  Rules
41(2) and (3) thereof.  He further pointed out that similarly  according  to
Rule 49-O of the Rules, the right of a voter who decides  not  to  vote  has
been accepted but the secrecy is not maintained.  According to him, in  case
an elector decides not to record his vote, a remark to this effect shall  be
made against the said entry in Form 17-A by the Presiding  Officer  and  the
signature or thumb impression of the elector shall be obtained against  such
remark.  Hence, if  a  voter  decides  not  to  vote,  his  record  will  be
maintained by the Presiding Officer which will thereby disclose that he  has
decided not to vote.  The main substance of the arguments of learned  senior
counsel for the petitioners is that though right not to vote  is  recognized
by Rules 41 and 49-O of the Rules and is also  a  part  of  the  freedom  of
expression of a voter, if a voter chooses to exercise  the  said  right,  it
has to be kept secret.  Learned senior counsel further submitted  that  both
the above provisions, to the extent of such violation of the secrecy  clause
are not only ultra vires but also contrary to Section 128  of  the  RP  Act,
Rules 39 and 49-M of the Rules as well as Articles 19(1)(a) and  21  of  the
Constitution.


8)    On the other hand, Mr. P.P.  Malhotra,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General appearing for the Union of India submitted that the  right  to  vote
is neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional right nor a  common  law
right but is a pure and simple statutory right.  He  asserted  that  neither
the RP Act nor the Constitution of India  declares  the  right  to  vote  as
anything more than a statutory right and hence the present writ petition  is
not maintainable.  He further pointed out that in view of  the  decision  of
the Constitution Bench in Kuldip Nayar (supra), the reference  for  deciding
the same by a larger Bench was unnecessary.  He further pointed out that  in
view of the above decision, the earlier two decisions of this  Court,  viz.,
Association for Democratic Reforms and Another (supra)  and  People’s  Union
for Civil Liberties (supra),  stood  impliedly  overruled,  hence,  on  this
ground also reference to a  larger  Bench  was  not  required.   He  further
pointed out that though the power of Election Commission under  Article  324
of the Constitution is wide enough, but still the same can,  in  no  manner,
be construed as to cover those areas,  which  are  already  covered  by  the
statutory provisions.  He further pointed out that even  from  the  existing
provisions, it is clear that secrecy of ballot  is  a  principle  which  has
been formulated to ensure  that  in  no  case  it  shall  be  known  to  the
candidates or their representatives that in whose favour a particular  voter
has voted so that he can exercise his right to vote freely  and  fearlessly.
He also pointed out that the right of secrecy  has  been  extended  to  only
those voters who have exercised their right to vote  and  the  same,  in  no
manner, can be extended to those who have not voted  at  all.   Finally,  he
submitted that since  Section  2(d)  of  the  RP  Act  specifically  defines
“election” to mean an election to fill a seat, it cannot be construed as  an
election not to fill a seat.


9)    Ms. Meenakshi  Arora,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  Election
Commission of India – Respondent No.  2  herein,  by  pointing  out  various
provisions both from the RP Act and the Rules  submitted  that  inasmuch  as
secrecy is an essential feature of “free and fair elections”, Rules 41(2)  &
(3) and 49-O of the Rules violate the requirement of secrecy.


10)   Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel  appearing
for  the  impleading  parties,  while  agreeing  with  the  stand   of   the
petitioners as well  as  the  Election  Commission  of  India,  prayed  that
necessary directions may be issued for providing another button viz.,  “None
of the Above” (NOTA) in the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs)  so  that  the
voters who come to the polling booth and decide not to vote for any  of  the
candidates, are able to exercise their right not to vote  while  maintaining
their right of secrecy.


11)   We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  the
relevant provisions of the RP Act and the Rules.


Discussion:


12)   In order to answer the above contentions, it is vital to refer to  the
relevant provisions of the RP Act and the Rules.  Sections 79(d) and 128  of
the RP Act read as under:


      “79(d)--“electoral right” means the right of a person to stand or  not
      to stand as,  or  to  withdraw  or  not  to  withdraw  from  being,  a
      candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting at an election.


      128 - Maintenance of secrecy  of  voting--(1)  Every  officer,  clerk,
      agent or other person who performs any duty  in  connection  with  the
      recording or counting of votes at an election shall maintain, and  aid
      in maintaining, the secrecy of the voting and shall  not  (except  for
      some purpose authorized by or under any law) communicate to any person
      any information calculated to violate such secrecy:


      Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall  not  apply  to
      such officer, clerk, agent or other person who performs any such  duty
      at an election to fill a seat or seats in the Council of States.


      (2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall
      be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  three
      months or with fine or with both.”


      Rules 39(1), 41, 49-M and 49-O of the Rules read as under:


      “39. Maintenance of secrecy  of  voting  by  electors  within  polling
      station and voting procedure.--(1) Every  elector  to  whom  a  ballot
      paper has been issued under rule 38 or under any  other  provision  of
      these rules, shall maintain  secrecy  of  voting  within  the  polling
      station and for that purpose observe the voting procedure  hereinafter
      laid down.


      41.   Spoilt and returned  ballot  papers.--(1)  An  elector  who  has
      inadvertently dealt with his ballot  paper  in  such  manner  that  it
      cannot be conveniently used as a ballot paper may, on returning it  to
      the presiding officer and on satisfying him of  the  inadvertence,  be
      given another ballot paper, and the ballot paper so returned  and  the
      counterfoil of such ballot paper shall be marked  "Spoilt:  cancelled"
      by the presiding officer.


      (2) If an elector after obtaining a ballot paper decides  not  to  use
      it, he shall return it to the presiding officer, and the ballot  paper
      so returned and the counterfoil of such ballot paper shall  be  marked
      as "Returned: cancelled" by the presiding officer.


      (3) All ballot papers cancelled under sub-rule  (1)  or  sub-rule  (2)
      shall be kept in a separate packet.


      49M. Maintenance of secrecy of voting by electors within  the  polling
      station  and  voting  procedures.--(1)  Every  elector  who  has  been
      permitted to vote under rule 49L  shall  maintain  secrecy  of  voting
      within the polling station and for that  purpose  observe  the  voting
      procedure hereinafter laid down.


      (2) Immediately on being permitted to vote the elector  shall  proceed
      to the presiding officer  or  the  polling  officer  incharge  of  the
      control unit  of  the  voting  machine  who  shall,  by  pressing  the
      appropriate button on the control unit, activate the  balloting  unit;
      for recording of elector's vote.


      (3) The elector shall thereafter forthwith--


      (a) proceed to the voting compartment;


      (b) record his vote by pressing  the  button  on  the  balloting  unit
      against the name and symbol of the candidate for whom  he  intends  to
      vote; and


      (c) come out of the voting compartment and leave the polling station.


      (4) Every elector shall vote without undue delay.


      (5) No elector shall be allowed to enter the voting  compartment  when
      another elector is inside it.


      (6) If an elector who has been permitted to vote  under  rule  49L  or
      rule 49P refuses after warning  given  by  the  presiding  officer  to
      observe the procedure laid down in sub-rule (3) of the said rules, the
      presiding officer or a polling officer  under  the  direction  of  the
      presiding officer shall not allow such elector to vote.


      (7) Where an elector is not allowed to  vote  under  sub-rule  (6),  a
      remark to the effect that voting procedure has been violated shall  be
      made against the elector's name in the register of voters in Form  17A
      by the presiding officer under his signature.


      49-O.  Elector  deciding  not  to  vote.--If  an  elector,  after  his
      electoral roll number has been duly entered in the register of  voters
      in Form 17A and has put his signature or thumb impression  thereon  as
      required under sub-rule (1) of rule 49L,  decide  not  to  record  his
      vote, a remark to this effect shall be made against the said entry  in
      Form  17A  by  the  presiding  officer  and  the  signature  or  thumb
      impression of the elector shall be obtained against such remark.”






13)   Apart from the above provisions, it is also relevant to refer  Article
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25(b) of  the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which read as under:


      “21(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the  authority  of
      government; this will shall  be  expressed  in  periodic  and  genuine
      elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall  be
      held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”


      “25.  Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,  without
      any  of  the  distinctions  mentioned  in  article   2   and   without
      unreasonable restrictions:


      (a) ***     ***        ***;


      (b) To vote and to be elected  at  genuine  periodic  elections  which
      shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held  by  secret
      ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;”


14)    Articles  19(1)(a)  and  21  of  the  Constitution,  which  are  also
pertinent for this matter, are as under:


      “19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.--
       (1) All citizens shall have the right-


      (a) to freedom of speech and expression;


      xxxxx


      21 - Protection of life  and  personal  liberty--No  person  shall  be
      deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
      established by law.”






15)   From the above provisions,  it  is  clear  that  in  case  an  elector
decides not to record his vote, a remark to this effect  shall  be  made  in
Form 17-A by the Presiding Officer and the signature or thumb impression  of
the elector shall be obtained against  such  remark.   Form  17-A  reads  as
under:

                                  “FORM 17A
                               [See rule 49L)
                             REGISTER OF VOTERS
      Election to the House of  the  People/  Legislative  Assembly  of  the
State/ Union territory ……………from………………Constituency No. and Name  of  Polling
Station……………Part No. of Electoral Roll…………

|Sl.  |Sl. No. of      |Details of the     |Signature/    |Remarks  |
|No.  |elector in the  |document produced  |Thumb         |         |
|     |electoral roll  |by the elector in  |impression of |         |
|     |                |proof of his/ her  |elector       |         |
|     |                |identification     |              |         |
|(1)  |(2)             |(3)                |(4)           |(5)      |
|1.   |                |                   |              |         |
|2.   |                |                   |              |         |
|3.   |                |                   |              |         |
|4.   |                |                   |              |         |


etc.




                                  Signature of the Presiding Officer”





16)   Before elaborating the contentions relating to  the  above  provisions
with reference to the secrecy of voting, let us first consider the issue  of
maintainability of the Writ Petition as raised by the Union  of  India.   In
the present Writ Petition, which is of the year 2004, the  petitioners  have
prayed for the following reliefs:


      “(i)  declaring that Rules 41(2) & (3) and  49-O  of  the  Conduct  of
      Election Rules, 1961 are  ultra  vires  and  unconstitutional  to  the
      extent they violate secrecy of vote;


      (ii)  direct the Election Commission under the existing Representation
      of People Act, 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules,  1961  and/  or
      under Article 324 to provide necessary provision in the ballot  papers
      and the voting machines for protection of right not  to  vote  and  to
      keep the exercise of such right secret;”


17)   It is relevant to point out that initially the present  Writ  Petition
came up for hearing before a Bench of  two-Judges.   During  the  course  of
hearing, an objection was raised with regard to the maintainability  of  the
Writ Petition under Article 32 on the ground that the right claimed  by  the
petitioners is not a fundamental right as  enshrined  in  Part  III  of  the
Constitution.  It is the categorical objection of the Union  of  India  that
inasmuch as the writ petition under Article 32 would lie to this Court  only
for the violation of fundamental rights and since the right to vote  is  not
a fundamental right, the present Writ  Petition  under  Article  32  is  not
maintainable.  It is the specific stand of the Union of India that right  to
vote is not a fundamental  right  but  merely  a  statutory  right.   It  is
further pointed out that this Court, in Para 20 of the referral order  dated
23.02.2009, reported in (2009) 3 SCC 200,  observed  that  since  in  Kuldip
Nayar (supra), the judgments of this Court  in  Association  for  Democratic
Reforms (supra) and People’s Union for  Civil  Liberties  (supra)  have  not
been specifically overruled which tend to create a doubt whether  the  right
to vote is a fundamental right or not and referred  the  same  to  a  larger
Bench stating that the issue requires clarity.  In view  of  the  reference,
we have to decide:


(i)   Whether there is any doubt or confusion with regard to the right of  a
voter in Kuldip Nayar (supra);


(ii)   Whether  earlier  two  judgments  viz.,  Association  for  Democratic
Reforms (supra) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (supra)  referred  to
by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Kuldip  Nayar  (supra)   stand   impliedly
overruled.


18)   Though, Mr. Malhotra relied on a large number of decisions, we are  of
the view that there is  no  need  to  refer  to  those  decisions  except  a
reference  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Kuldip   Nayar   (supra),
Association for Democratic Reforms (supra)  and  People’s  Union  for  Civil
Liberties (supra).


19)   A three-Judge Bench of this Court comprising M.B Shah, P.  Venkatarama
Reddi  and  D.M.  Dharmadhikari,  JJ.  expressed  separate  but   concurring
opinions in the People’s Union for Civil  Liberties  (supra).  In  para  97,
Reddi, J made an observation as to the right to vote being a  Constitutional
right if not a fundamental right which reads as under:


      “97. In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal [1982] 3 SCR 318  this  Court  again
      pointed out in no uncertain terms that:


           8 "a right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy,  is,
           anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law
           right. It is pure and simple a statutory right."


      With great reverence to the eminent Judges, I would  like  to  clarify
      that the right to vote, if not a fundamental  right,  is  certainly  a
      constitutional right. The right originates from the  Constitution  and
      in accordance with the constitutional  mandate  contained  in  Article
      326, the right has been shaped by the statute, namely, R.P. act. That,
      in my understanding, is the correct  legal  position  as  regards  the
      nature of the right to vote in elections to the House  of  the  People
      and Legislative Assemblies. It is not very accurate to describe it  as
      a statutory right, pure and simple. Even with this clarification,  the
      argument of the learned Solicitor General that the right to  vote  not
      being a fundamental right, the information which at  best  facilitates
      meaningful exercise of that right cannot be read as an  integral  part
      of any fundamental right, remains to be squarely met….”


Similarly, in para 123, point No. 2 Reddi, J., held as under:-


      “(2) The right to vote at the elections to the House of the People  or
      Legislative Assembly is  a  constitutional  right  but  not  merely  a
      statutory right; freedom of voting as distinct from right to vote is a
      facet of the fundamental right enshrined  in  Article  19(1)(a).   The
      casting of vote in favour of one or  the  other  candidate  marks  the
      accomplishment of freedom of expression of the voter.”


Except the above two paragraphs, this aspect has nowhere been  discussed  or
elaborated wherein all the three Judges, in their  separate  but  concurring
judgments, have taken the pains to specifically  distinguish  between  right
to vote and freedom of voting as a species  of  freedom  of  expression.  In
succinct, the ratio of the judgment was that though the right to vote  is  a
statutory right but the decision  taken  by  a  voter  after  verifying  the
credentials of the  candidate  either  to  vote  or  not  is  his  right  of
expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.


20)   As a result, the  judgments  in  Association  for  Democratic  Reforms
(supra) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (supra)  have  not  disturbed
the position that right to vote is a statutory right.   Both  the  judgments
have only added that the right to know the background of a  candidate  is  a
fundamental right of a voter so that he can  take  a  rational  decision  of
expressing himself  while  exercising  the  statutory  right  to  vote.   In
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (supra), Shah J., in para  78D,  held  as
under:-


      “…However, voters’ fundamental right to  know  the  antecedents  of  a
      candidate is independent of statutory rights under the election law. A
      voter is first citizen  of  this  country  and  apart  from  statutory
      rights,  he  is   having   fundamental   rights   conferred   by   the
      Constitution…”


P. Venkatrama Reddi, J., in Para 97, held as under:-


      “…Though the initial right cannot be  placed  on  the  pedestal  of  a
      fundamental right, but, at the  stage  when  the  voter  goes  to  the
      polling booth and casts his vote, his freedom to express  arises.  The
      casting of vote in favour of one or the other candidate tantamounts to
      expression of his opinion and preference and that final stage  in  the
      exercise of voting  right  marks  the  accomplishment  of  freedom  of
      expression of the voter. That is where Article 19(1)(a) is  attracted.
      Freedom of voting as distinct from right to vote is thus a species  of
      freedom of expression and therefore carries with it the auxiliary  and
      complementary rights such as right to  secure  information  about  the
      candidate which are conducive to the freedom…”


Dharmadhikari, J., in para 127, held as under:-


      “…This freedom of a citizen to participate and choose a  candidate  at
      an election is distinct from exercise of his right as a voter which is
      to be regulated by statutory law on the election like the RP Act…”






In view of the above, Para 362 in Kuldip Nayar (supra) does not hold to  the
contrary, which reads as under:-


      “We do not agree with the above submission. It is clear  that  a  fine
      distinction was drawn between the right to vote  and  the  freedom  of
      voting as a species of freedom of expression,  while  reiterating  the
      view in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal that a right to  elect,  fundamental
      though it is to democracy, is neither a fundamental right nor a common
      law right, but pure and simple, a statutory right”.


21)   After a careful perusal of the verdicts of this Court in Kuldip  Nayar
(supra), Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and People’s  Union  for
Civil Liberties (supra), we are of the considered  view  that  Kuldip  Nayar
(supra) does not overrule the other two decisions rather it  only  reaffirms
what has already  been  said  by  the  two  aforesaid  decisions.  The  said
paragraphs recognize that right to vote is a statutory  right  and  also  in
People’s Union for  Civil  Liberties  (supra)  it  was  held  that  “a  fine
distinction was drawn between the right to vote and the  freedom  of  voting
as a species of freedom of expression”.  Therefore, it cannot be  said  that
Kuldip Nayar (supra) has observed anything to the contrary.  In view of  the
whole debate of whether these two  decisions  were  overruled  or  discarded
because of the opening line in Para 362 of Kuldip Nayar  (supra)  i.e.,  “we
do not agree with the above submissions…” we are of the  opinion  that  this
line must be read as a whole and not in isolation.  The  contention  of  the
petitioners in Kuldip Nayar (supra)  was  that  majority  view  in  People’s
Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (supra)  held  that  right  to   vote   is   a
Constitutional right besides that it is also a facet  of  fundamental  right
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is this contention  on  which
the Constitution Bench did not agree too in the opening  line  in  para  362
and thereafter went on to clarify that in fact in People’s Union  for  Civil
Liberties (supra), a fine distinction was drawn between the  right  to  vote
and the freedom of voting as a  species  of  freedom  of  expression.  Thus,
there is no contradiction as to the fact that right to  vote  is  neither  a
fundamental  right  nor  a  Constitutional  right  but  a  pure  and  simple
statutory right. The same has been settled in a catena of cases  and  it  is
clearly not an issue  in  dispute  in  the  present  case.  With  the  above
observation, we hold that there is no doubt or confusion persisting  in  the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Kuldip Nayar  (supra)  and  the
decisions in Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and  People’s  Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) (supra) do not stand impliedly overruled.


Whether the present writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable:


22)   In the earlier part of  our  judgment,  we  have  quoted  the  reliefs
prayed for by the petitioners in the writ petition.  Mr.  Malhotra,  learned
Additional Solicitor General, by citing  various  decisions  submitted  that
since right to vote is not a fundamental right but  is  merely  a  statutory
right,  hence,  the  present  writ  petition  under  Article   32   is   not
maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.  He referred  to  the  following
decisions of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami vs. Returning officer,  1952  SCR
218, Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya vs. Lachhi Ram, 1955 (1)  SCR  608,  University
of Delhi vs. Anand Vardhan Chandal, (2000) 10 SCC 648, Kuldip Nayar  (supra)
and K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) vs. Union of India, (2010) 7  SCC  202,  wherein
it has been held that the right to vote is not a fundamental  right  but  is
merely a statutory right.


23)   In Kochunni vs. State of Madras, 1959 (2) Supp. SCR  316,  this  Court
held that the right to move before this  Court  under  Article  32,  when  a
fundamental right has been breached, is a substantive fundamental  right  by
itself.  In a series of cases, this Court has held that it is  the  duty  of
this Court to enforce the  guaranteed  fundamental  rights.[Vide  Daryo  vs.
State of U.P. 1962 (1) SCR 574].


24)   The decision taken by a voter after verifying the credentials  of  the
candidate either to vote or not  is  a  form  of  expression  under  Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.  The fundamental right under Article  19(1)(a)
read with statutory right under Section 79(d) of the  RP  Act   is  violated
unreasonably if right not to vote  effectively  is  denied  and  secrecy  is
breached.  This is how Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) are required to be read  for
deciding the issue raised in this writ petition.  The casting  of  the  vote
is a facet of the right of expression of an individual and  the  said  right
is provided under Article 19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution  of  India  (Vide:
Association for Democratic Reforms (supra)  and  People’s  Union  for  Civil
Liberties (supra).  Therefore, any violation of the said  rights  gives  the
aggrieved person the right to approach this Court under Article  32  of  the
Constitution of India. In view of the above said decisions as  well  as  the
observations of the Constitution Bench in  Kuldip  Nayar  (supra),  a  prima
facie case exists for the exercise  of  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under
Article 32.


25)   Apart from the  above,  we  would  not  be  justified  in  asking  the
petitioners to approach the High Court to vindicate their grievance  by  way
of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of  India  at  this
juncture.  Considering the reliefs prayed for which relate to the  right  of
a voter and applicable to all eligible voters, it may not be appropriate  to
direct the petitioners  to  go  to  each  and  every  High  Court  and  seek
appropriate relief.  Accordingly, apart from our conclusion on legal  issue,
in view of the fact that the writ petition is pending before this Court  for
the last more than nine years, it may not be proper to reject  the  same  on
the ground, as pleaded by learned ASG.  For the reasons mentioned above,  we
reject the said contention and hold that this Court  is  competent  to  hear
the issues raised in this writ  petition  filed  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution.


Discussion about the relief prayed for in the writ petition:


26)   We have already quoted the relevant provisions, particularly,  Section
128 of the RP Act, Rules 39, 41, 49M and 49-O of the  Rules.   It  is  clear
from the above provisions that secrecy of casting vote  is  duly  recognized
and is necessary for strengthening democracy. We are  of  the  opinion  that
paragraph Nos. 441, 442 and 452 to 454 of the decision of  the  Constitution
Bench in Kuldip Nayar (supra), are  relevant  for  this  purpose  which  are
extracted hereinbelow:


      “441. Voting at elections to the Council of States cannot be  compared
      with a general election. In a general election, the electors  have  to
      vote in a secret  manner  without  fear  that  their  votes  would  be
      disclosed to anyone or would result  in  victimisation.  There  is  no
      party affiliation and hence the choice is  entirely  with  the  voter.
      This is not the case when elections are held to the Council of  States
      as the electors are elected Members of the Legislative Assemblies  who
      in turn have party affiliations.


      442. The electoral systems world over contemplate variations.  No  one
      yardstick can be applied to an electoral system. The question  whether
      election is direct or indirect and for which House members are  to  be
      chosen is a relevant  aspect.  All  over  the  world  in  democracies,
      members of the House of Representatives are chosen directly by popular
      vote. Secrecy there is a must and  insisted  upon;  in  representative
      democracy, particularly  to  the  upper  chamber,  indirect  means  of
      election adopted on party lines is well accepted practice.


      452. Parliamentary democracy and multi-party system  are  an  inherent
      part of the basic structure of the  Indian  Constitution.  It  is  the
      political parties that set  up  candidates  at  an  election  who  are
      predominantly elected  as  Members  of  the  State  Legislatures.  The
      context in which general elections are held, secrecy of  the  vote  is
      necessary in order to maintain the purity  of  the  electoral  system.
      Every voter has a right to vote in a free  and  fair  manner  and  not
      disclose to any person how he has voted. But  here  we  are  concerned
      with a voter who is elected on the ticket of  a  political  party.  In
      this view, the context entirely changes.


      453.  That  the  concept  of  “constituency-based  representation”  is
      different  from  “proportional  representation”  has  been  eloquently
      brought out in United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic
      of South Africa where the  question  before  the  Supreme  Court  was:
      whether “floor crossing” was fundamental to the Constitution of  South
      Africa. In this judgment the concept  of  proportional  representation
      vis-à-vis constituency-based representation is highlighted…


      454.   The   distinguishing   feature   between    “constituency-based
      representation” and “proportional representation” in a  representative
      democracy is that in the case  of  the  list  system  of  proportional
      representation, members are elected on party lines. They  are  subject
      to party discipline. They are liable to  be  expelled  for  breach  of
      discipline. Therefore, to give effect to the concept  of  proportional
      representation, Parliament can suggest “open ballot”. In such a  case,
      it cannot be said that “free and fair elections” would stand  defeated
      by “open ballot”. As stated above, in a constituency-based election it
      is the people who vote whereas in proportional  representation  it  is
      the elector who votes. This  distinction  is  indicated  also  in  the
      Australian  judgment   in   R.   v.   Jones.   In   constituency-based
      representation,  “secrecy”  is  the  basis  whereas  in  the  case  of
      proportional representation in a representative  democracy  the  basis
      can be “open ballot” and it would not violate the concept of “free and
      fair elections”, which concept is one of the pillars of democracy.”


27)   The above discussion in the cited paragraphs makes it  clear  that  in
direct elections to Lok Sabha or State Legislatures, maintenance of  secrecy
is a must and is insisted upon all  over  the  world  in  democracies  where
direct elections are involved to ensure that a voter casts his vote  without
any fear of being victimized if his vote is disclosed.


28)   After referring to Section 128 of the  RP  Act  and  Rule  39  of  the
Rules, this Court in S. Raghbir Singh Gill vs. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra  and
Others 1980 (Supp) SCC 53 held as under:


      “14…Secrecy of ballot can be appropriately styled as  a  postulate  of
      constitutional  democracy.  It  enshrines   a   vital   principle   of
      parliamentary institutions set up under the Constitution. It subserves
      a very vital public interest in that an elector or a voter  should  be
      absolutely free in exercise  of  his  franchise  untrammelled  by  any
      constraint, which includes constraint as to the disclosure.  A  remote
      or distinct possibility that  at  some  point  a  voter  may  under  a
      compulsion of law be forced to disclose for whom he  has  voted  would
      act as a positive constraint and check on his freedom to exercise  his
      franchise in the manner he freely chooses to exercise.  Therefore,  it
      can be said with confidence  that  this  postulate  of  constitutional
      democracy rests on public policy.”






29)   In the earlier part of this judgment,  we  have  referred  to  Article
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25(b) of  the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which  also  recognize
the right of secrecy.


30)   With regard to the first prayer of the  petitioners,  viz.,  extension
of principle of secrecy of ballot to those voters who decide  not  to  vote,
Mr. Malhotra, learned ASG submitted that principle of secrecy of  ballot  is
extended only to those voters who have cast their votes in favour of one  or
the other candidates, but the same, in no manner, can be  read  as  extended
to even those voters who have not voted in the election. He further  pointed
out that the principle of secrecy of ballot pre-supposes validly  cast  vote
and the object of secrecy is to assure a voter to  allow  him  to  cast  his
vote without any fear and in no manner it will be disclosed  that  in  whose
favour he has voted or he will not be compelled to disclose in whose  favour
he voted.  The pith and substance of his argument is that secrecy of  ballot
is a principle which  has  been  formulated  to  ensure  a  voter  (who  has
exercised his right to vote) that in no  case  it  shall  be  known  to  the
candidates or their representatives that in whose favour a particular  voter
has voted so that he can exercise his right to vote freely  and  fearlessly.
The stand of the Union of India as projected by  learned  ASG  is  that  the
principle of secrecy of ballot is extended only to  those  voters  who  have
cast their vote and the same in no manner can be extended to those who  have
not voted at all.


31)   Right to vote as well as right  not  to  vote  have  been  statutorily
recognized under Section 79(d) of the RP Act and Rules 41(2) & (3) and  49-O
of the Rules respectively.  Whether a voter decides  to  cast  his  vote  or
decides not to cast his vote, in both cases, secrecy has to  be  maintained.
It cannot be said that if a voter decides to cast his vote, secrecy will  be
maintained under Section 128 of the RP Act read with Rules  39  and  49M  of
the Rules and if in case a voter decides not to cast his vote, secrecy  will
not be maintained.  Therefore, a part of Rule  49-O  read  with  Form  17-A,
which treats a voter who decides  not  to  cast  his  vote  differently  and
allows the secrecy to be violated, is arbitrary, unreasonable and  violative
of Article 19 and is also ultra vires Sections 79(d) and 128 of the RP Act.


32)   As regards the question as to whether the right  of  expression  under
Article 19 stands infringed when secrecy of the poll is not  maintained,  it
is useful to refer S. Raghbir Singh (supra) wherein this  Court  deliberated
on the interpretation of Section 94 of the RP Act  which  mandates  that  no
elector can be compelled as a witness to disclose his vote.  In  that  case,
this Court found that the “secrecy of ballots  constitutes  a  postulate  of
constitutional democracy…A remote or distinct possibility that the voter  at
some point of time may under a compulsion of law be forced to  disclose  for
whom he has voted would act as  a  positive  constraint  and  check  on  his
freedom to exercise his  franchise  in  the  manner  he  freely  chooses  to
exercise”.  Secrecy of ballot, thus, was held to be a privilege  granted  in
public interest to an individual.  It is pertinent to note that in the  said
case, the issue of the disclosure by an elector of his  vote  arose  in  the
first place because there was an allegation that the  postal  ballot  of  an
MLA was tampered with to secure the victory of one of the candidates to  the
Rajya Sabha.  Therefore, seemingly there was a conflict  between  the  “fair
vote” and “secret ballot”.


33)   In Kuldip Nayar (supra),  this  Court  held  that  though  secrecy  of
ballots is a vital principle for  ensuring  free  and  fair  elections,  the
higher principle is free and fair elections.  However,  in  the  same  case,
this  Court  made  a  copious  distinction   between   “constituency   based
representation” and “proportional representation”.  It was held  that  while
in the former, secrecy is the basis,  in  the  latter  the  system  of  open
ballot and it would not be violative of “free and fair elections”.   In  the
said case, R vs. Jones, (1972) 128 CLR 221 and United  Democractic  Movement
vs. President of the Republic of South Africa, (2003) 1  SA  495  were  also
cited with approval.


34)   Therefore, in view of the decisions  of  this  Court  in  S.  Raghubir
Singh Gill (supra) and Kuldip  Nayar  (supra),  the  policy  is  clear  that
secrecy principle is integral to  free  and  fair  elections  which  can  be
removed only when it can  be  shown  that  there  is  any  conflict  between
secrecy and the “higher principle” of  free  elections.   The  instant  case
concerns elections to Central and State Legislatures  that  are  undoubtedly
“constituency based”.  No discernible public interest  shall  be  served  by
disclosing the elector’s vote or his identity.   Therefore,  secrecy  is  an
essential  feature  of  the  “free  and  fair  elections”  and   Rule   49-O
undoubtedly violates that requirement.


35)   In Lily Thomas vs. Speaker, Lok Sabha, (1993) 4 SCC  234,  this  Court
held that “voting is a formal expression of will or opinion  by  the  person
entitled to exercise the right on the subject  or  issue  in  question”  and
that “right to vote means right to  exercise  the  right  in  favour  of  or
against the motion or resolution.  Such a  right  implies  right  to  remain
neutral as well”.


36)   In view of the same, this Court also  referred  to  the  Practice  and
Procedure of the Parliament for voting which  provides  for  three  buttons:
viz., AYES, NOES and ABSTAIN whereby a member can  abstain  or  refuse  from
expressing his opinion by casting vote in  favour  or  against  the  motion.
The constitutional interpretation given by this Court was based on  inherent
philosophy of parliamentary sovereignty.


37)   A perusal of Section 79(d) of the RP Act, Rules 41(2) & (3)  and  Rule
49-O of the Rules  make  it  clear  that  a  right  not  to  vote  has  been
recognized both under the RP Act and the Rules.  A positive  ‘right  not  to
vote’ is a part of expression of a voter in a  parliamentary  democracy  and
it has to be recognized and given effect to in the same manner as ‘right  to
vote’.  A voter may refrain from voting at an election for  several  reasons
including the reason that he does not consider any of the candidates in  the
field worthy of his vote. One of the ways  of  such  expression  may  be  to
abstain from voting, which is not an ideal option for  a  conscientious  and
responsible citizen. Thus, the only way by which it can  be  made  effectual
is by providing a button in the EVMs to express that  right.   This  is  the
basic requirement if the lasting values in a healthy democracy  have  to  be
sustained, which the Election Commission has not  only  recognized  but  has
also asserted.


38)   The Law Commission of India, in its 170th Report  relating  to  Reform
of the Electoral Laws recommended  for  implementation  of  the  concept  of
negative vote and also pointed out its advantages.


39)   In India, elections traditionally have been held with  ballot  papers.
As explained by the Election Commission, from 1998 onwards,  the  Electronic
Voting Machines (EVMs) were introduced on a large  scale.   Formerly,  under
the  ballots  paper  system,  it   was   possible   to   secretly   cast   a
neutral/negative vote by going to the polling booth,  marking  presence  and
dropping one’s ballot in the ballot box  without  making  any  mark  on  the
same.  However, under the system of EVMs, such secret neutral voting is  not
possible, in view of the provision of Rule 49B of the Rules and  the  design
of the EVM and other related voting  procedures.   Rule  49B  of  the  Rules
mandates that  the  names  of  the  candidates  shall  be  arranged  on  the
balloting unit in the same order  in  which  they  appear  in  the  list  of
contesting candidates and there is no provision for a neutral button.


40)    It  was  further  clarified  by  the  Election  Commission  that  EVM
comprises of  two  units,  i.e.  control  and  balloting  units,  which  are
interconnected by a  cable.   While  the  balloting  unit  is  placed  in  a
screened enclosure where an elector  may  cast  his  vote  in  secrecy,  the
control unit remains under the  charge  of  the  Presiding  Officer  and  so
placed that all polling agents and others present have  an  unhindered  view
of all the operations.  The  balloting  unit,  placed  inside  the  screened
compartment at the polling station gets activated for recording  votes  only
when the button marked “Ballot” on  the  control  unit  is  pressed  by  the
presiding officer/polling officer in charge.   Once  the  ballot  button  is
pressed, the Control unit emanates red light while  the  ballot  unit  which
has been activated to receive  the  vote  emanates  green  light.   Once  an
elector casts his vote by pressing balloting button  against  the  candidate
of his choice, he can see a red light glow against the name  and  symbol  of
that candidate and a high-pitched beep  sound  emanates  from  the  machine.
Upon such casting of vote,  the  balloting  unit  is  blocked,  green  light
emanates on the control unit, which is in public gaze, and the high  pitched
beep sound is heard by one and all.  Thereafter, the EVM has to  re-activate
for the next elector  by  pressing  “ballot  button”.   However,  should  an
elector choose not to cast his vote in  favour  of  any  of  the  candidates
labeled on the EVM, and consequently, not press any of  the  labeled  button
neither will the light on the control unit change  from  red  to  green  nor
will the beep sound emanate.  Hence, all present in the poll  booth  at  the
relevant time will come to know that  a  vote  has  not  been  cast  by  the
elector.


41)   Rule 49-O of  the  Rules  provides  that  if  an  elector,  after  his
electoral roll number has been entered in the register of electors  in  Form
17-A, decides not to record his vote on the EVM, a  remark  to  this  effect
shall be made against the said entry in Form 17-A by the  Presiding  Officer
and signature/thumb impression of the  elector  shall  be  obtained  against
such remark.  As is apparent, mechanism of  casting  vote  through  EVM  and
Rule 49-O compromise on the secrecy of  the  vote  as  the  elector  is  not
provided any privacy when the fact of the neutral/negative voting goes  into
record.


42)   Rules 49A to 49X of the Rules come under Chapter II of Part IV of  the
Rules.  Chapter II deals with voting by  Electronic  Voting  Machines  only.
Therefore, Rule 49-O, which talks about Form 17-A,  is  applicable  only  in
cases of voting by EVMs.  The said Chapter was introduced in  the  Rules  by
way of an amendment dated 24.03.1992.  Voting by ballot papers  is  governed
by Chapter I of Part IV of the Rules.  Rule 39  talks  about  secrecy  while
voting by ballot and Rule 41 talks about ballot papers.   However,  as  said
earlier, in the case of voting by ballot paper,  the  candidate  always  had
the option of not putting the cross mark against the names  of  any  of  the
candidates and thereby record his disapproval for all the candidates in  the
fray.  Even though such a ballot paper would be  considered  as  an  invalid
vote, the voter still  had  the  right  not  to  vote  for  anybody  without
compromising on his/her right of secrecy.  However,  with  the  introduction
of EVMs, the said option of not voting for anybody without compromising  the
right of secrecy is not available to the voter  since  the  voting  machines
did not have ‘None of the Above’ (NOTA) button.


43)   It is also pointed out that in order to rectify this  serious  defect,
on 10.12.2001, the Election Commission addressed a letter to the  Secretary,
Ministry of Law and Justice stating, inter alia, that the “electoral  right”
under Section 79(d) includes a right not to cast vote and sought to  provide
a panel in the EVMs so that an elector may indicate that he  does  not  wish
to vote for any of the aforementioned candidates.  The  letter  also  stated
that  such  number  of  votes  expressing  dissatisfaction  with   all   the
candidates may be recorded in a result sheet.  It is  also  brought  to  our
notice that no action was taken on the said letter dated 10.12.2001.


44)   The Election  Commission  further  pointed  out  that  in  the  larger
interest of promoting democracy, a provision for  “None  of  the  Above”  or
“NOTA” button should be made  in  the  EVMs/  ballot  papers.   It  is  also
highlighted that  such  an  action,  apart  from  promoting  free  and  fair
elections in a democracy, will provide an  opportunity  to  the  elector  to
express his dissent/disapproval against the contesting candidates  and  will
have the benefit of reducing bogus voting.


45) Democracy and free elections are part of  the  basic  structure  of  the
Constitution.  In Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp 1  SCC  198,
Khanna, J., held that democracy postulates that  there  should  be  periodic
elections where the people should be in a position  to  re-elect  their  old
representatives or change the representatives or elect in  their  place  new
representatives.  It was also held that democracy  can  function  only  when
elections are free and fair  and  the  people  are  free  to  vote  for  the
candidates of their choice.  In the said case, Article 19 was not  in  issue
and the  observations  were  in  the  context  of  basic  structure  of  the
Constitution.  Thereafter, this  Court  reiterated  that  democracy  is  the
basic structure of the Constitution in Mohinder Singh Gill and  Another  vs.
Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others,  (1978)  1  SCC  405  and
Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachillhu and Others, 1992 (Supp) 2 SCC 651.


46)   In order to protect the right in terms of Section 79(d) and  Rule  49-
O, viz., “right not to vote”,  we  are  of  the  view  that  this  Court  is
competent/well within its power to issue directions that secrecy of a  voter
who decides not to cast his vote has to be protected in the same  manner  as
the  Statute has protected the right of a voter  who  decides  to  cast  his
vote in favour of a candidate.  This Court is also justified in giving  such
directions in order to give effect to the right of expression under  Article
19(1)(a)  and  to  avoid  any  discrimination  by  directing  the   Election
Commission to provide NOTA button in the EVMs.


47)   With regard to the above, Mr. Malhotra, learned ASG,  by  drawing  our
attention to Section 62 of the RP Act, contended that this  Section  enables
a person to cast a vote and it has no scope for  negative  voting.   Section
62(1) of the RP Act reads as under:


      “62. Right to vote.(1) No person who is not, and except  as  expressly
      provided by this Act, every person who is, for the time being  entered
      in the electoral roll of any constituency shall be entitled to vote in
      that constituency.”






48)   Mr. Malhotra, learned ASG has also  pointed  out  that  elections  are
conducted to fill a seat by electing a person by a positive  voting  in  his
favour and there is  no  concept  of  negative  voting  under  the  RP  Act.
According to him, the Act does not envisage that a voter has  any  right  to
cast a negative vote if he does not like any of the  candidates.   Referring
to Section 2(d) of the RP Act, he asserted that election is only a means  of
choice or election between various candidates to fill a seat.   Finally,  he
concluded that negative voting (NOTA) has no  legal  consequence  and  there
shall be no motivation for the voters to travel to  the  polling  booth  and
reject all the candidates, which would have the same effect of not going  to
the polling station at all.


49)   However, correspondingly, we should also appreciate that the  election
is a mechanism, which ultimately represents the  will  of  the  people.  The
essence of the electoral system should be to ensure  freedom  of  voters  to
exercise their free choice. Article 19 guarantees all individuals the  right
to speak, criticize, and disagree on a particular issue. It  stands  on  the
spirit of tolerance and allows people  to  have  diverse  views,  ideas  and
ideologies. Not allowing a person to cast vote negatively defeats  the  very
freedom of expression and the right ensured in Article 21  i.e.,  the  right
to liberty.


50)    Eventually,  voters’  participation  explains  the  strength  of  the
democracy. Lesser voter participation is  the  rejection  of  commitment  to
democracy slowly but definitely whereas larger participation is  better  for
the democracy. But, there is no yardstick to determine what the correct  and
right voter participation is. If introducing a NOTA button can increase  the
participation of democracy then, in our cogent  view,  nothing  should  stop
the  same.  The  voters’  participation  in  the  election  is  indeed   the
participation in the democracy itself. Non-participation causes  frustration
and disinterest, which is not a healthy sign of  a  growing  democracy  like
India.


Conclusion:


51)    Democracy being the basic  feature  of  our  constitutional  set  up,
there can be no two opinions  that  free  and  fair  elections  would  alone
guarantee the growth of a healthy  democracy  in  the  country.  The  ‘Fair’
denotes equal opportunity to all people. Universal adult suffrage  conferred
on the citizens of India by the Constitution has made it possible for  these
millions of individual voters to go to the polls  and  thus  participate  in
the governance of our country. For democracy to  survive,  it  is  essential
that the best available men should be  chosen  as  people’s  representatives
for proper governance of the country. This can be best achieved through  men
of high moral and ethical values, who win the elections on a positive  vote.
Thus in a vibrant democracy, the voter  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to
choose none of the  above  (NOTA)  button,  which  will  indeed  compel  the
political parties to nominate a sound  candidate.  This  situation  palpably
tells us the dire need of negative voting.


52)   No doubt, the right to vote is a statutory right  but  it  is  equally
vital to recollect that this statutory right is the  essence  of  democracy.
Without this, democracy will fail to thrive. Therefore, even  if  the  right
to vote is statutory, the significance attached with the right  is  massive.
Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind these facets while deciding the  issue
at hand.


53)   Democracy is all about choice. This choice can be better expressed  by
giving the voters an opportunity to verbalize  themselves  unreservedly  and
by imposing least restrictions on their ability to make such  a  choice.  By
providing NOTA  button  in  the  EVMs,  it  will  accelerate  the  effective
political participation in the present state of democratic  system  and  the
voters in fact will be empowered. We are of  the  considered  view  that  in
bringing out this right to cast negative vote at a time when  electioneering
is in full swing, it will foster the purity of  the  electoral  process  and
also fulfill one of its objective, namely, wide participation of people.


54)   Free and fair election is a basic structure of  the  Constitution  and
necessarily includes within its ambit the right of an elector  to  cast  his
vote without fear of reprisal, duress or coercion. Protection  of  elector’s
identity and affording secrecy  is  therefore  integral  to  free  and  fair
elections and an arbitrary distinction between the voter who casts his  vote
and the voter who does not cast his vote is violative of Article  14.  Thus,
secrecy is required to be maintained for both categories of persons.


55)   Giving  right  to  a  voter  not  to  vote  for  any  candidate  while
protecting his right of secrecy  is  extremely  important  in  a  democracy.
Such an option gives the voter the right to  express  his  disapproval  with
the kind of candidates that are being  put  up  by  the  political  parties.
When the political parties will realize that a large number  of  people  are
expressing their disapproval with the  candidates  being  put  up  by  them,
gradually there will be a systemic change and the political parties will  be
forced to accept the will of the people and field candidates who  are  known
for their integrity.


56)   The direction can also be supported by the fact that in  the  existing
system a dissatisfied voter ordinarily does not turn up for voting which  in
turn  provides  a  chance  to  unscrupulous  elements  to  impersonate   the
dissatisfied voter and cast a vote, be it a  negative  one.  Furthermore,  a
provision  of  negative  voting  would  be  in  the  interest  of  promoting
democracy as it would send clear signals  to  political  parties  and  their
candidates as to what the electorate think about them.


57)   As mentioned above, the voting machines in the Parliament  have  three
buttons, namely, AYES, NOES, and ABSTAIN.  Therefore, it can  be  seen  that
an option has been given  to  the  members  to  press  the  ABSTAIN  button.
Similarly, the NOTA button being sought for by the  petitioners  is  exactly
similar to the ABSTAIN button since by pressing the NOTA  button  the  voter
is in effect saying that he is abstaining from  voting  since  he  does  not
find any of the candidates to be worthy of his vote.


58)   The mechanism of negative voting, thus, serves a very fundamental  and
essential  part  of  a  vibrant  democracy.  The  following  countries  have
provided for neutral/protest/negative voting in their electoral systems:


|S.No |Name of the Country    |Method of Voting   |Form of Negative |
|     |                       |                   |Vote             |
|1.   |France                 |Electronic         |NOTA             |
|2.   |Belgium                |Electronic         |NOTA             |
|3.   |Brazil                 |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|4.   |Greece                 |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|5.   |Ukraine                |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|6.   |Chile                  |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|7.   |Bangladesh             |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|8.   |State of Nevada, USA   |Ballot Paper       |NOTA             |
|9.   |Finland                |Ballot Paper       |Blank Vote and/or|
|     |                       |                   |‘write in*’      |
|10.  |Sweden                 |Ballot Paper       |Blank Vote and/or|
|     |                       |                   |‘write in*’      |
|11.  |United States of       |Electronic/Ballot  |Blank Vote and/or|
|     |America                |(Depending on      |‘write in*’      |
|     |                       |State)             |                 |
|12.  |Colombia               |Ballot Paper       |Blank Vote       |
|13.  |Spain                  |Ballot Paper       |Blank Vote       |


* Write-in’ – The ‘write-in’ form of negative voting allows a voter to  cast
a vote in favour of any fictional name/candidate.


59)   The Election Commission also brought to the notice of this Court  that
the present electronic voting machines can be used in a  constituency  where
the number of contesting candidates is up to 64. However, in  the  event  of
there being more than 64 candidates  in  the  poll  fray,  the  conventional
system of ballot paper is resorted to. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
Election Commission also asserted through supplementary  written  submission
that  the  Election  Commission  of  India  is   presently   exploring   the
possibility of developing balloting unit with 200 panels. Therefore, it  was
submitted that if in case this Court decides to uphold the  prayers  of  the
petitioners herein, the additional panel on the  balloting  unit  after  the
last panel containing the name and election symbol of  the  last  contesting
candidate can be utilized as the NOTA button.  Further,  it  was  explicitly
asserted in  the  written  submission  that  the  provision  for  the  above
facility for a negative or neutral vote can  be  provided  in  the  existing
electronic voting machines without any  additional  cost  or  administrative
effort or change in design or technology  of  the  existing  machines.   For
illustration, if there are 12 candidates contesting an  election,  the  13th
panel on the balloting unit will contain the words like “None of the  above”
and the ballot button against this panel will be kept open and  the  elector
who does not wish to vote  for  any  of  the  abovementioned  12  contesting
candidates, can press the button against the 13th panel and  his  vote  will
be accordingly recorded by the control unit. At the time  of  the  counting,
the votes recorded against serial number 13 will indicate  as  to  how  many
electors have decided not to vote for any candidate.


60)   Taking note of the submissions of Election Commission, we are  of  the
view that the implementation of  the  NOTA  button  will  not  require  much
effort except for allotting the last panel in the EVM for the same.


61)   In the light of the above discussion, we hold that Rules 41(2)  &  (3)
and 49-O of the Rules are ultra vires Section 128 of the RP Act and  Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to the extent they violate secrecy  of  voting.
In view of our conclusion, we direct  the  Election  Commission  to  provide
necessary provision in the ballot  papers/EVMs  and  another  button  called
“None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the  voters,  who come to the polling booth and decide not to vote for any of  the  candidates in the fray, are able to exercise their right not to vote while  maintaining their right of secrecy.  
Inasmuch as the Election Commission  itself  is  in
favour of the provision for NOTA in EVMs, we direct the Election  Commission
to implement the same either in a phased  manner  or  at  a  time  with  the
assistance of the Government of India.  
We also  direct  the  Government  of
India to provide necessary help for implementation of the  above  direction.
Besides, we also direct  the  Election  Commission  to  undertake  awareness
programmes to educate the masses.


62)   The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.

                                  ……….…………………………CJI.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)
































                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)







                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                      (RANJAN GOGOI)



NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 27, 2013.
-----------------------
50


Whether the State Government had no jurisdiction to authorise the Special Judge to try these cases under FERA. on transfer from Magistrate court by way of Notification ? =Section 62 of FERA made the offence under Section 56 non-cognizable. Besides, Section 61 (1) of FERA stated that ‘it shall be lawful’ for the Magistrate to pass the necessary sentence under Section 56. It does not state that the Magistrate alone is empowered to pass the necessary sentence, in which case the proceeding cannot be transferred from his Court. = The error in A.S. Impex was correctly understood by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahender Singh v. High Court of Delhi, (2009) 151 Comp Cas 485 (Delhi) and in N.G. Sheth v. C.B.I., 151 (2008) DLT 89. The Division Bench in both cases took a view different from that in A.S. Impex. However, both decisions having been rendered by Division Benches, A.S. Impex, could not be overruled. Therefore, I complete the formality and overrule A.S. Impex since it does not lay down the correct law in this regard. For the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the objections raised by the petitioners. The High Court has looked into Section 407 of Cr.P.C., referred to Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution of India, and thereafter in its impugned judgment has observed as follows:- “Having perused Section 407 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 and 235, I have no hesitation to hold that this Court either in the administration side or in the judicial side has absolute jurisdiction to transfer any criminal cases pending before one competent Court to be heard and decided by another Court within the jurisdiction of this Court. This Court in its administrative power can issue direction that cases of particular nature shall be heard by particular court having jurisdiction.” For the reasons above mentioned, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.

         published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40834
                                                         REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


          SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) Nos. 6219-6220 OF 2012


Kamlesh Kumar & Ors.                         …     Petitioners

                                    Versus

The State of Jharkhand & Ors.                …     Respondents





                          J  U  D  G  E  M  E  N  T


H.L. GOKHALE, J

            These Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) seek to  challenge  the
judgment and order dated 19.7.2012, whereby a Learned Single  Judge  of  the
Jharkhand High Court dismissed the two  Writ  Petitions  bearing  Nos.  Writ
Petition Nos.95 & 112 of 2003 filed by Shri Kamlesh Kumar and three  others,
all children of one Dr. K.M. Prasad who worked earlier as  the  Director  of
Animal  Husbandry  department  in  Government  of  Bihar.  
They  are  being
prosecuted under the provisions of Foreign  Exchange  Regulation  Act,  1973
(in short FERA), and those cases have been transferred to the Special Judge  hearing  the  Fodder  scam cases. 
 In the above referred Criminal Writ Petitions  they  had  challenged
the transfer of those cases to the Special  Court  by  contending  that  the
transfer order was bad on various grounds,
  the principal amongst them  being
that the State Government had  no  jurisdiction  to  authorise  the  Special Judge to try these cases under FERA.  
Those  Criminal  Writ  Petitions  have
been rejected, and hence these Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) have  been
filed.

Facts leading this Criminal Petition are as follows:-
2.          The above referred Dr. K.M. Prasad, father of  the  petitioners,
was  working  earlier  as  the  Director  of  Animal  Husbandry  department,
Government of Bihar.  He is being prosecuted along with some others  by  the
Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) in the Court of  Special  Judge  at
Ranchi for conspiracy to defraud the  State  Government  to  the  extent  of
Rs.7,09,92,000/- during 1980-90 on  the  basis  of  fake  allotment  letters
purportedly issued by him for the purchase  of  medicines.   It  is  claimed
that fake supplies were shown as  made  by  the  suppliers,  and  the  money
withdrawn towards such fake allotments was misappropriated  by  the  accused
persons.


3.          During the course of investigation  it  was  realized  that  the
amount involved was much more, i.e.  Rs.19,81,66,460/-  approximately,   and
that the accused Dr. K.M. Prasad  had  acquired  huge  movable  as  well  as
immovable assets in his own name, and  in  the  name  of  his  children  and
others at different places.  
The said Dr. K.M. Prasad and his children  were
also therefore prosecuted in the case arising  out  of  this  investigation,
and charges have already been submitted by the CBI  against  them,  and  the
cases are pending in the court of Special Judge CBI at Ranchi.

4.          It was further revealed  during  the  course  of  investigation,
that Mr. Kamlesh Kumar and three others, children of Dr.  K.M.  Prasad,  had
received huge amounts of Foreign Exchange over U.S.  $3,15,000  and  British
£1000.  
It was suspected that these remittances were  not  actually  genuine
gifts as claimed by them, but  were  amounts  arranged  by  certain  persons
involved in the animal husbandry scam in  violation  of  the  provisions  of
FERA.  
It was alleged that they had violated the provisions of Section  9(1)
(a) and (b) and 64(2) of the FERA, and  rendered  themselves  liable  to  be
prosecuted under Section 56 of
the said Act.




5.          The Enforcement Director accordingly  filed  cases  against  the
petitioners  before  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  Ranchi   for   taking
cognizance under Section 56 of  FERA.  
The  Enforcement  Director  however,
realized that many of the offenders in the FERA cases were also  accused  in
the cases which were pending before the Special Judge  in  the  Fodder  scam
cases, and the documents relied upon and the witnesses to be  examined  were
common.   
The  Director,  therefore,  wrote  to  the  State  Government   on
25.1.2002  seeking  to  have  these  cases  tried   by   the   same   court.
Accordingly, the Law Secretary of the Government of Jharkhand wrote  to  the
Registrar  General  of  the  High  Court  on  2.3.2002  and  on   25.4.2002.
Thereafter, the full Court of Jharkhand High Court passed  a  resolution  on
25.4.2002, to empower the Special Judge, CBI Animal  Husbandry  scam  cases,
to try the cases of FEMA, 1999. 
(This is  because  in  the  meanwhile,  from
1.6.2000, FERA had been replaced by the  Foreign  Exchange  Management  Act,
1999 – FEMA for short).  
Accordingly a notification was issued by the  State
of Jharkhand on 17.5.2002,  empowering  the  Special  Judge  CBI  (AHD  Scam
cases) to try the cases under FEMA.   Pursuant  to  that  notification,  the
Complaint filed on 23.5.2002 before the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Ranchi
was transferred by  order dated 31.5.2002, for trial  to  the  court  of  the  Learned  Additional  Judicial Commissioner cum Special Judge CBI (AHD Scam cases) Ranchi.

6.          This made the petitioners file the above referred Criminal  Writ
Petitions to quash the notification dated  17.5.2002.   The  Learned  Single
Judge of the  Jharkhand  High  Court  at  Ranchi  dismissed  the  said  Writ
Petitions by his judgment and order  dated  19.7.2012.   It  is  this  order
which is under challenge in the present Special Leave Petitions (Criminal).

7.          The  notification  issued  by  the  Jharkhand  Government  dated
17.5.2002 reads as follows:-
                            “JHARKHAND GOVERNMENT
                          LAW (JUSTICE), DEPARTMENT

                                NOTIFICATION


                                   RANCHI dated 17th May, 2002


      Sr. Prabhu Tiwari, Special Judge, CBI (A.H.D Scam cases),  Ranchi,  is
      being authorized for disposal of cases of FEMA, 1979, in  addition  to
      his own works in the light of letter No. 3449/APPTT  dated  06/05/2002
      of Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi.

                                                    By the order of Governor
                                    (Prashant Kumar) Secretary to Government
                                                     Law(Justice) Department
                                                           Jharkhand, Ranchi

      Memo No. 1-A/court-Gathan-103/2001-1111/J Ranchi dated 17th May 2002


      Copy  to,  Superintendent,  State  Press,  Post-Doranda,  Ranchi   for
      publishing the same in the next state gazette.

                                                     Secretary to Government
                                                    Law (Justice) Department
                                                          Jharkhand, Ranchi”

This notification had been issued in the  light  of  letter  dated  6.5.2002
from the Registrar General of the High Court of Jharkhand,  which  reads  as
follows:-
                                                             “Office:-501449
                                                                 Res:-503024
                                                         Fax No: 0651-501114
                                                               No. 3449/APPT

                                                    Dated, Ranchi 06/05/2002

      IBRAR HASSAN
      Registrar General High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi

      To
      The Secretary to the Government
      Law (Judl.) Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi

      Sir
           With reference to your Letter No. 1/A/Court-Estab-103/2001 J 531
      dated 02/03/2002, I am directed to say that the Court has been pleased
      to resolve that Sri Prabhu Tiwary, Special  Judge,  C.B.I.  (AHD  Scam
      cases) at Ranchi be vested with the Powers to try cases under  Foreign
      Exchange Management Act, 1999.

           I am further directed to say that  since  the  vesting  of  this
      power has to be effective before 31st May, 2002 immediate notification
      to this effect may be issued.

                                                            Yours faithfully
                                                           Registrar General
                                                                 06.05.2002”


Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners:-
8.          It was firstly submitted on behalf of the petitioners  that  the
transfer of appellants’ prosecution under FERA / FEMA from the  Magistrate’s
Court to the Court of the Special Judge was  unlawful,  since  the  disputed
transfer was being made to a Court which had  no  jurisdiction  to  try  the
offence.  
In this context, it was submitted by learned  senior  counsel  Mr.
Shekhar Naphade appearing for the petitioners  that  for  the  offences  for
which the petitioners were being prosecuted under Section 56  of  FERA,  the
punishment did not exceed 7 years of imprisonment.
Since we  are  concerned
with sub-section (1) of Section 56, we may reproduce the  said  sub-section.
We may note at this stage that though FERA came to be repealed and  replaced
by FEMA with effect from 1.6.2000, in view of Section 49 (4)  of  FEMA,  all
offences committed under FERA continue to be governed by the  provisions  of
FERA, as if that Act had not been repealed.  
This Section  56  (1)  of  FERA
reads as follows:-

                 “56. Offences and prosecution- 
(1) Without prejudice to any
           award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under this Act,  if
           any person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act  [other
           than section 13, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of  [section  18,
           section 18A], clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 19,  sub-
           section (2) of section  44 and sections 57 and 58],  or  of  any
           rule,  direction  or  order  made  thereunder  he  shall,   upon
           conviction by a court, be punishable-

           
(i)   in the case of an offence the amount or value involved  in
           which exceeds one lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for  a  term
           which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to
           seven years and with fine:


          
Provided that the  court  may,  for  any  adequate  and  special
           reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose  a  sentence  of
           imprisonment for a term of less than six months;


           
(ii)  in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which  may
           extend to three years or with fine or with both.”

9.          It was then submitted that the  punishment  being  less  than  7
years, as provided under the second entry of Part-II of  First  Schedule  to
Cr.P.C., the offences which  are  punishable  with  imprisonment  for  three
years and upwards but not more than seven years, and are cognizable and non-
bailable offences,  are triable by the Magistrate of the  first  class.
The
State Government was therefore, not competent to  transfer  the  prosecution
under Section 56 of FERA from the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate to  the
Court of the Special Judge.  
This is because if so permitted it will  result into denial of one right of appeal to the petitioner.
10.   (i)   Reliance was placed  in  support  of  this  proposition  on  the
judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of A.R.

Antulay  v.  R.S.  Nayak  and  Anr.  reported  in  1988  (2)  SCC  602,  and
particularly paragraphs 55, 56, 77, 78 and 91 thereof to  submit  that  this
transfer will reduce the right of appellants to  appeal.   
The  transfer  of the prosecution against the petitioner A.R. Antulay, from the Court  of  the
Special Judge to the High Court of Bombay was held to  be  in  violation  of
the  Fundamental  Rights  of  the   petitioner,   and   therefore,   without
jurisdiction and null  and  void.   It  was  held  that  the  right  of  the
petitioner to prefer an appeal against the decision of the Special Judge  to
the High Court was taken away by such a transfer.
(ii)  Reliance was also placed in this behalf on a judgment  of  a  Division
Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of A.S. Impex Limited & Ors. v.  Delhi
High Court & Ors. reported in 107 (2003)  Delhi  Law  Times  734.   In  that
matter, the Court was concerned with the administrative order passed by  the
High Court to transfer cases filed  under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881, from the  Courts  of  Magistrates  to  the  Courts  of
Additional Sessions  Judges.   The  High  Court  relied  upon  A.R.  Antulay
(supra) and held that to deal with  the  dishonour  of  cheques,  a  special
jurisdiction was conferred  on  the  Metropolitan  Magistrates  or  Judicial
Magistrates First Class, to try  the  offences  under  Section  138  of  the
Negotiable Instrument Act 1881, and that jurisdiction could not be taken away by transferring these  matters to the Sessions Courts.
11.         It was also submitted, that the transfer of the cases could  not
have been effected by the High Court without following  the  procedure  laid
down under Section 407 of the Cr.P.C., and impugned orders  of  transfer  of
cases were therefore bad in law.
Reply on behalf of the Respondents:-
12.         The arguments of the learned counsel  for  the  petitioner  were
countered  by  Mr.  P.P.  Malhotra,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General
appearing for the respondents.
He firstly drew our attention  to  the  fact
that in Antulay’s case, as recorded in paragraph 19 of  that  judgment,  the
petitioner was being prosecuted under  Section  7(1)  of  the  Criminal  Law
Amendment Act 1952, and Section 7(1) of the said Act  specifically  mandated
that offences in such cases shall be tried by a Special Judge only.

13.         Mr. Malhotra  submitted  that  when  the  statute  made  such  a
specific  provision,  the  prosecution  could  not  be  withdrawn  from  the
specified court and transferred even to the High  Court.
 It  was  in  this
context that Shri A.R. Antulay had suffered a prejudice in as  much  as  his
right of appeal to the High Court would get affected.  
In the present
case, there was no such specific provision that the offence shall  be  tried
by a Magistrate only.  
In support of his submissions Mr. Malhotra  drew  our
attention to a specific judgment of this Court in Ranvir Yadav v.  State  of
Bihar reported in 1995 (4) SCC 392 
where the legal proposition as stated  in
A.R. Antulay (supra) came to  be  explained  in  paragraph  14  thereof.  In
Ranvir Yadav (supra) this Court was concerned with the administrative  power
of the  High  Court  to  transfer  cases.  
While  upholding  the  order  of
transfer, this is what this Court observed in paragraph 14 thereof:-
               “14. Coming now to  A.R.  Antulay  case  we  find  that  the
           principles of law laid down in the majority judgment,  to  which
           Mr. Jethmalani drew our attention have no manner of  application
           herein. There questions arose as to 
whether (i) the  High  Court
           could  transfer  a  case  triable  according  to  Criminal   Law
           Amendment Act, 1952 (“1952 Act” for short) by  a  Special  Court
           constituted thereunder to another court, which was not a Special
           Court  and  
(ii)  the  earlier  order  of  the   Supreme   Court
           transferring the case pending before the Special  Court  to  the
           High Court was valid and proper. In answering both the questions
           in the negative the  learned  Judges,  expressing  the  majority
           view, observed that (i) Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act  created  a
           condition which was sine qua non for the trial of offences under
           Section  6(1)  of  the  said  Act.  
The   condition   was   that
           notwithstanding anything  contained  in  the  Code  of  Criminal
           Procedure or any other law the said offence shall be triable  by
           Special Judges only. 
By express terms therefore it took away the
           right of transfer of cases contained in the Code  to  any  other
           court which was not a Special Court and this was notwithstanding
           anything contained in Sections 406 and 407 of the Code and  (ii)
           the earlier order of the Supreme Court transferring the case  to
           the High Court was not authorised by law, namely,  Section  7(1)
           of the 1952 Act and the Supreme Court, by its  direction,  could
           not confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Bombay to  try  any
           case for which it did not possess such  jurisdiction  under  the
           scheme of the 1952 Act. 
As in the present case the 5th Court was
           competent under the Code to  conduct  the  sessions  trial,  the
           order of transfer conferring jurisdiction on that court and  the
           trial that followed cannot be said to be bad in law.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)



 14.        One of the submissions for the petitioners was  that  since  the
offences under Section 56(1) are punishable with  imprisonment  for  a  term
which may extend to seven years only, they are  triable  by  Magistrates  of
the First Class only.  Mr. Malhotra, pointed out that it would be so if  the
offences are cognizable  as  per  the  second  entry  of  Part-II  of  First
Schedule to Cr.P.C.  In the present case, the offences  were  non-cognizable
under Section  56  of  FERA,  and  the  petitioners  were  being  prosecuted
thereunder.  Section 62 of the FERA had made the offences  punishable  under
Section 56 as non-cognizable ones.  Section 62 of FERA reads as follows:-
                 “62. Certain offences to be non-cognizable- Subject to  the
           provisions of section 45 and notwithstanding anything  contained
           in the [Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974], an offence
           punishable under section 56 shall be deemed to be non-cognizable
           within the meaning of that Code.”

Consideration of rival submissions
15.         It had been submitted on behalf of the petitioner  that  one  of
the submissions accepted in A.R. Antulay (supra) was that his right to  file
an appeal would be affected.  Mr. Malhotra pointed out that in  the  present
case such a situation would not arise.  An appeal  would  lie  certainly  to
the High Court against the decision of the Special Judge.  It  would  always
be argued that if the prosecution was conducted  before  the  Court  of  the
Magistrate, an appeal would lie  to  the  Court  of  Sessions,  and  then  a
revision would be available to the High  Court.  Thus  by  transferring  the
case from the Court of Magistrate to a Sessions Judge,  the  opportunity  of
the petitioner to avail of a  revision  would  be  affected.   Mr.  Malhotra
however pointed out that there was no right to file a revision as  such,  as
distinguished from the right of filing an appeal to  the  High  Court.   The
petitioner can not claim to have  suffered  any  prejudice  on  that  count,
since there was no vested right to file a  revision.   In  support  of  this
proposition he relied upon the following  paragraph  from  the  Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra  v.  The  State  of  West
Bengal and Anr. reported in 1959 Supp 1 SCR 63 at page 70:-
               “In our opinion, in the absence of statutory provisions,  in
           terms applying to an application in revision, as there are those
           in s. 431 in respect of criminal appeals, the High Court has the
           power to pass such orders as to it may seem fit and  proper,  in
           exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested in it by  s.  439
           of the Code.  Indeed, it is a discretionary power which  has  to
           be exercised in aid of justice.  Whether or not the  High  Court
           will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given case,  must
           depend upon the facts  and  circumstances  of  that  case.   The
           revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by  s.  439  of
           the Code, read with s. 435, do  not  create  any  right  in  the
           litigant, but only conserve the power of the High court  to  see
           that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules  of
           Criminal Jurisprudence, and that subordinate criminal courts  do
           not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers  vested  in
           them by the Code. On the other  hand,  as  already  indicated  a
           right of appeal is  a  statutory  right  which  has  got  to  be
           recognised by the courts, and the  right  to  appeal,  where  on
           exists, cannot be denied in exercise of the discretionary  power
           even of the High Court……”

16.         It was further pointed out by Mr. Malhotra that  this  view  had
been followed by the High  Courts,  and  for  reference  he  referred  to  a
Division Bench judgment of Bombay High  Court  in  Suraj  Prakash  Seth  and
another v. R.K. Gurnani and another reported in 1975 Mh.L.J 588,  where  the
proposition laid down  in  P.K.  Mitra  (supra)  had  been  referred  to  in
support.  The High Court observed in paragraph 15 which reads as follows:-
                 “15. …. The point which we wish to emphasise,  however,  is
           that a party to a proceeding cannot as a matter of right come to
           this Court for revision of any order passed by the lower  Court,
           but it is a  matter  of  practice  that  such  applications  are
           entertained by this Court as a matter  of  expediency.   But  no
           party has any vested right either in procedure or in practice.”

17.         The First Schedule to Cr.P.C. deals with the  Classification  of
Offences.  Part-1 thereof deals with the offences  under  the  Indian  Penal
Code, Part-II deals with classification  of  offences  against  other  laws,
which would include offences under laws such as FERA.  The petitioners  were
being prosecuted under Section 56 of FERA, wherein  the  maximum  punishment
that could be awarded was up to seven years.  The second entry of this Part-
II laid down that such offences were triable by Magistrate of  first  Class,
provided  those  offences  were  cognizable  offences.   As  noted  earlier,
Section 62 of  FERA  made  the  offence  under  Section  56  non-cognizable.
Besides, Section 61 (1) of FERA stated that ‘it shall  be  lawful’  for  the
Magistrate to pass the necessary sentence under Section  56.   It  does  not
state  that  the  Magistrate  alone  is  empowered  to  pass  the  necessary
sentence, in which case  the  proceeding  cannot  be  transferred  from  his
Court.  
This provision is not like the one  in  the  case  of  A.R.  Antulay
(supra) where under Section 7(1) of Criminal Law  Amendment  1952  Act,  the
offence was ‘triable by special judge only’.  In the  instant  case  it  was
merely lawful for the Magistrate to try the offences under Section 61,   but
 the Court of Magistrate  was  not  a  court  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  as  in
Antulay’s case.  
The offence was a non-cognizable one, and therefore it  was
not mandatory that it ought to have been tried only  by  the  Magistrate  of
the First Class.  
Thus the petitioner could not claim  that  the  Magistrate
had the special jurisdiction to try the offence, and that  the  State  could
not transfer the case to the Sessions Judge.  In  view  of  what  is  stated
above, it cannot be said  that  the  Magistrate’s  Court  had  an  exclusive
jurisdiction to try the cases relating to violations of  the  provisions  of
FERA, and those cases could not be transferred to  the  Special  Judge.  
In
the present case the accused were common, many of  the  witnesses  would  be
common, and so also their evidence.
The administrative power  of  the  High
Court in such a situation to effect transfer has been upheld in the case  of
Ranvir Yadav (supra), and there is no  reason  for  this  Court  to  take  a
different view in the facts of the present case.

18.          The petitioner had relied  upon  the  judgment  of  a  Division
Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of A.S. Impex Limited (supra), on  the
question of transfer  of  a  proceeding.   Mr.  Malhotra  pointed  out  that
although the judgment in Ranvir Yadav (supra) was brought to the  notice  of
the  Division Bench in that  matter,  the  Division  Bench  had
erroneously held that the reliance thereon to be a ‘misplaced’ one,  as  can
be seen from the sentence at the end  of  paragraph  12  of  that  judgment.
This judgment has been distinguished and found to be not laying down a  good
law by another Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Mahender Singh v.  High
Court of Delhi and Anr. reported in 2009 (151) Company  Cases  485  (Delhi).
In that matter, the Court was concerned with transfer of prosecutions  under
Securities and Exchange Board Act,  1992  from  the  Magistrate’s  Court  to
Court of Sessions,  and  the  High  Court  has  held  it  to  be  valid  and
permissible.  The Division Bench in Mahender  Singh  (supra)  has  in  terms
held that reliance on the judgment in A.R. Antulay (supra)  to  oppose  such
transfer was of no help, and rightly so.  There is no difficulty in  stating
that A.S. Impex Limited (supra) does not lay down  the  correct  proposition
of law.

19.         The High Court does have the power to  transfer  the  cases  and
appeals under Section 407 of the Cr.P.C. which  is  essentially  a  judicial
power.  Section 407 (1) (c) of Cr.P.C. lays down that, where  it  will  tend
to the general convenience of the parties or  witnesses,  or  where  it  was
expedient for the ends of justice, the High  Court  could  transfer  such  a
case for trial to a  Court of  Sessions.   That  does  not mean  that  the  High  Court  cannot  transfer  cases  by   exercising   its administrative power of superintendence  which  is  available  to  it  under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  While repelling the objection  to
the exercise of this power, this Court observed in paragraph  13  of  Ranvir
Yadav (supra) as follows:-

                 “13.  We  are  unable  to  share  the  above  view  of  Mr.
           Jethmalani.  So long as power can be and is exercised purely for
           administrative exigency without impinging upon and prejudicially
           affecting the rights or interests of the parties to any judicial
           proceeding we do not find any reason to hold that administrative
           powers must yield place to judicial powers simply because  in  a
           given circumstance they coexist……”




20.         For the reasons stated above,  there  is  no  substance  in  the
objections raised by  the  petitioners.  
The  High  Court  has  looked  into
Section  407  of  Cr.P.C.,  referred  to  Articles  227  and  235   of   the
Constitution of India, and thereafter in its impugned judgment has  observed
as follows:-
                 “Having perused Section 407 Cr.P.C.  and  Article  227  and
           235, I have no hesitation to hold that this Court either in  the
           administration  side  or  in  the  judicial  side  has  absolute
           jurisdiction to transfer any criminal cases pending  before  one
           competent Court to be heard and decided by another Court  within
           the  jurisdiction  of   this   Court.    This   Court   in   its
           administrative  power  can  issue  direction   that   cases   of
           particular nature shall be  heard  by  particular  court  having
           jurisdiction.”

In view of what is stated  earlier,  we  have  no  reason  to  take  a  view
different from the one taken by the High Court.

21.          Both  the  Special  Leave  Petitions  (Crl.)  are,   therefore,
dismissed.


                                                          …………..……………………..J.
                                            [ H.L. Gokhale ]


New Delhi
Dated : September 26, 2013

























                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 6219-6220 OF 2012

Kamlesh Kumar & Ors.                                   … Petitioners
                                   Versus

The State of Jharkhand & Ors.                                …Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T
MADAN B. LOKUR, J

      While I endorse the views  of  my  learned  Brother  Gokhale,  I  have
thought it appropriate to separately express my opinion in the matter.
2.    The facts of the case have been succinctly brought out by  my  learned
Brother and it is not necessary to repeat them.
Validity of the notification of transfer

3.    The notification authorizing the Special Judge  to  dispose  of  cases
under the Foreign Exchange Management  Act,  1999  and  thereby  effectively
transferring the petitioners’ case pending  before  the  Magistrate  to  the
Special Judge is said to be unlawful since the   transfer   is  to  a  court
that has no

jurisdiction to try the offence.
4.    Part II of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973
(for  short  the  Code)  provides  that  for  an  offence  punishable   with
imprisonment for three years and upwards but not more than seven years,  the
case would be triable by a Magistrate of the first class. Section 56 of  the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (for short the FERA) now  repealed  by
the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides, inter alia, that  for  a
violation of its provisions, the maximum punishment  would  be  imprisonment
which may extend to  seven  years  and  with  fine.  Therefore,  effectively
transferring the petitioners’ case to a Special Judge  (of  the  rank  of  a
Sessions Judge, Additional  Sessions  Judge  or  Assistant  Sessions  Judge)
functioning under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (for  short  the  CLA
Act) meant its trial by a court that lacked jurisdiction  over  the  subject
matter. In support of this contention, great reliance  was  placed  on  some
passages in A.R. Antulay v.  R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602.
5.    The question in Antulay (to the  extent  relevant)  was  whether  this
Court could have transferred the  case  against  Antulay  from  the  Special
Judge appointed under the Criminal Law  Amendment  Act,  1952  to  the  High
Court. (See R.S. Nayak v. A.R.  Antulay,  (1984)  2  SCC  183).  This  Court
answered the question in the negative and three principal reasons,  relevant
to the present

case, were given for this conclusion.
6.    Firstly, it was noted that Section 7 of the  CLA  Act  gave  exclusive
jurisdiction to the Special Judge to try the offences under sub-section  (1)
of Section 6 of the CLA Act.  Section 7 of CLA Act reads as follows:-
      “Cases triable by Special  Judges:  -  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything
      contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), or  in
      any other law the offences specified in sub-section (1) of Section  6
      shall be triable by Special Judges only.
      (2) Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of Section 6 shall  be
      tried by  the  Special  Judge  for  the  area  within  which  it  was
      committed, or where there are more Special Judges than one  for  such
      area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf  by  the
      State Government.
      (3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also  try  any  offence
      other than an offence specified in Section 6 with which  the  accused
      may, under the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1898  (5  of  1898),  be
      charged at the same trial.”



7.    This Court noted that since it is only the  Special  Judge  who  could
try offences under Section 6 of CLA Act, the case against Antulay could  not
have been transferred to the High Court.  It was noted that the trial  by  a
Special Judge is a sine qua non for the trial of offences  under  Section  6
of CLA Act and even this Court could not pass an  order  not  authorized  by
law.
8.    Secondly, Section 7(1) of CLA Act provides for trial of  the  case  by
the  Special  Judge  notwithstanding  anything  contained   in   the   Code.
Therefore, the statutory power available to this  Court  to  transfer  cases
under Section 406 of

the Code was statutorily taken away.  Additionally, Section 406 of the  Code
only enabled this Court to transfer cases and appeals from  one  High  Court
to another High Court or from one criminal court  subordinate  to  one  High
Court  to  another  criminal  court  of  equal  or   superior   jurisdiction
subordinate to another High Court.  Section 406 of the Code did not  empower
this Court to transfer a case from the Special Judge under the  CLA  Act  to
the High Court and even if it did, that power was  taken  away  by  the  CLA
Act.  Section 406 of the Code reads as follows:-
       “406. Power  of  Supreme  Court  to  transfer  cases  and  appeals:-
                   (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the  Supreme  Court
       that an order under this  section  is  expedient  for  the  ends  of
       justice, it may  direct  that  any  particular  case  or  appeal  be
       transferred from one High Court to another  High  Court  or  from  a
       Criminal Court subordinate to one High  Court  to  another  Criminal
       Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another  High
       Court.
       (2) The Supreme Court  may  act  under  this  section  only  on  the
       application  of  the  Attorney-General  of  India  or  of  a  partly
       interested, and every such application  shall  be  made  by  motion,
       which shall, except when the applicant is  the  Attorney-General  of
       India  or  the  Advocate-General  of  the  State,  be  supported  by
       affidavit or affirmation.
       (3)  Where any application for the exercise of the powers  conferred
       by this section is dismissed, the Supreme Court may,  if  it  is  of
       opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious,  order  the
       applicant to pay by way  of  compensation  to  any  person  who  has
       opposed the application such sum not exceeding one  thousand  rupees
       as it may consider appropriate in the circumstances of the case.”












9.    The third reason related to the power of transfer  available  to  this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.   In  this  context,  reference
was made to a
Constitution Bench decision of this Court  in  Prem  Chand  Garg  v.  Excise
Commissioner, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885 wherein it was observed that:
      “The powers of this Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended
      to be and will always be exercised in the  interest  of  justice.  But
      that is not to say that an order can be made by this  Court  which  is
      inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the
      Constitution. An order which this  Court  can  make  in  order  to  do
      complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with
      the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but  it  cannot
      even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of  the  relevant
      statutory laws.”


10.   Since the order of this Court transferring the case from  the  Special
Judge to the High Court was contrary to the statutory law and (as held in  a
later part in Antulay)  contrary  to  Article  14  and  Article  19  of  the
Constitution, the order of transfer was liable to be set aside.
11.   In this context, this Court also noted that the  power  to  create  or
enlarge jurisdiction is legislative  in  character  and  no  court,  whether
superior or inferior or both combined, could enlarge the jurisdiction  of  a
court. On this basis, inter alia, this Court concluded that the transfer  of
Antulay’s case from the Special Judge to the High  Court  was  erroneous  in
law.
12.   Antulay subsequently came up for  consideration  in  Ranbir  Yadav  v.
State of Bihar, (1995) 4 SCC 392.   In  paragraph 14  of  the   Report,   it
was

noted that the express language of Section 7(1) of the CLA  Act,  took  away
the right of transfer of cases contained in the  Code  to  any  other  court
which was not a Special Court and
that this was notwithstanding anything contained in Section 406 and  Section
407 of the Code. This is what was said in this regard:
      “Coming now to A.R. Antulay case we find that the  principles  of  law
      laid down in the majority judgment, to which Mr. Jethmalani  drew  our
      attention have no manner of application herein. There questions  arose
      as to whether (i)  the  High  Court  could  transfer  a  case  triable
      according to Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (“1952 Act”  for  short)
      by a Special Court constituted thereunder to another court, which  was
      not a Special Court and (ii) the earlier order of  the  Supreme  Court
      transferring the case pending before the Special  Court  to  the  High
      Court was valid and proper. In answering both  the  questions  in  the
      negative the learned Judges, expressing the  majority  view,  observed
      that (i) Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act created a  condition  which  was
      sine qua non for the trial of offences under Section 6(1) of the  said
      Act. The condition was that notwithstanding anything contained in  the
      Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law the said offence shall  be
      triable by Special Judges only. By express  terms  therefore  it  took
      away the right of transfer of cases contained in the Code to any other
      court which was not a  Special  Court  and  this  was  notwithstanding
      anything contained in Sections 406 and 407 of the Code  and  (ii)  the
      earlier order of the Supreme Court transferring the case to  the  High
      Court was not authorised by law, namely, Section 7(1) of the 1952  Act
      and the Supreme Court, by its direction, could not confer jurisdiction
      on the High Court of Bombay to try any  case  for  which  it  did  not
      possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the 1952 Act.”





13.   In so far as the present case is concerned,  it  is  apparent  from  a
reading of Section 56 of the FERA as  also  Section  61  of  the  FERA  that
exclusive jurisdiction has not been  conferred  on  the  Magistrate  to  try
cases relating to  a  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  FERA.  Absent
jurisdictional exclusivity, the principle of law laid  down  in  Antulay  is
not applicable and the Special Judge could have been conferred  jurisdiction
to try the case against the petitioners.

Right of appeal
14.   It was contended that assuming that at  law  the  case  could  validly
have been transferred to the Special Judge, the  petitioners  are  seriously
prejudiced in as much as their right  of  appeal  from  the  decision  of  a
Magistrate to a Sessions Judge  is  taken  away.  Due  to  this  prejudicial
action, which was taken by the High Court without hearing  the  petitioners,
the notification conferring power on the  Special  Judge  to  try  the  case
should be struck down.
15.   The right of appeal available to the petitioners in the  present  case
is not taken away by transferring  the  case  from  the  Magistrate  to  the
Special Judge.  The petitioners continue to have the right  to  appeal,  but
it is only the forum that has changed. They can now prefer  an  appeal  from
the order of the Special Judge to the High Court.  Therefore, it is  not  as
if the petitioners are denuded of any right to  agitate  their  cause  in  a
superior forum by the  transfer  of the

case to the Special Judge.
16.    It is now well settled that a litigant has neither a right to  appeal
to a particular  forum  nor  to  insist  on  a  particular  procedure  being
followed in his case.  This was settled way back in Rao Shiv  Bahadur  Singh
v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1953 SCR 118 wherein a  Constitution  Bench  of
this Court held:
      “A person accused of the commission of an offence has  no  fundamental
      right to trial by a particular court or by a particular
      procedure, except insofar as any constitutional objection  by  way  of
      discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may  be
      involved.”


17.   This dictum was followed in Union of India v.    Sukumar   Pyne,   AIR
1966 SC 1206.
18.   Similarly, In Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder v. Amria  Zurana  Pereira
Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92 it was held somewhat more elaborately:
      “It is no doubt well-settled that the right of appeal is a substantive
      right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is  commenced
      in the Court of the first instance, and such right or  any  remedy  in
      respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal  of  the  enactment
      conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either  expressly
      or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect
      thereof…….. This position, has also been settled by the  decisions  of
      the Privy Council and this Court (vide Colonial Sugar Refining Company
      Ltd. v. Irving, [1905] AC 369 and Garikapatti Veeraya  v.  N.  Subbiah
      Choudhury, 1957 SCR 488 but the forum where such appeal can be  lodged
      is indubitably a procedural matter and,  therefore,  the  appeal,  the
      right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged
      in a forum provided for by the repealing Act.”


19.   In T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1  SCC  177  it  was  observed  in
paragraph 17 of the Report that a person accused of  the  commission  of  an
offence has no right to trial by  a  particular  procedure.  This  view  was
followed in M/s  Rai  Bahadur  Seth  Shreeram  Durgaprasad  v.  Director  of
Enforcement, (1987) 3 SCC 27.
20.   Therefore, it cannot be seriously  urged  that  the  petitioners  were
prejudiced by a change of the appellate forum.
Procedure for transfer:
21.   Was the transfer of the case by the High Court at all  permissible  in
law without following the procedure laid down in Section 407 of the Code?
22.   A similar question came up for consideration in Ranbir Yadav and  this
Court noted the duality of power in the High Court.  It  was  observed  that
the High Court has the judicial power of transfer of a case from  one  court
to another under Section 407 of the Code.  It also  has  the  administrative
power to transfer a case from one court to another under Article 227 of  the
Constitution.
23.   In the  context  of  Article  227  of  the  Constitution,  this  Court
observed  in  paragraph  12  of  Ranbir  Yadav  that  the  High  Court   has
superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories  in
relation to  which  it  exercises  jurisdiction  and  that  in  its  plenary
administrative power, the High Court could transfer a case  from  one  court
to another.  It was further held that


so long as the power  is  exercised  for  administrative  exigency,  without
impinging upon or prejudicially affecting the rights and  interests  of  the
parties to any  judicial  proceeding,  there  is  no  reason  to  hold  that
administrative powers must yield to judicial  powers  simply  because  in  a
given circumstance they coexist.
24.   In the present case, the High Court could have exercised its  judicial
power of transfer under Section 407 of the Code (if called upon  to  do  so)
and it could also have exercised its administrative power of transfer  under
Article 227 of the Constitution, which  it  did,  as  is  evident  from  the
letter dated 6th May 2002 issued by the Registrar General of the High  Court
of Jharkhand to the Secretary to the  Government,  Law  (Judl.)  Department,
Government of Jharkhand.  The fact that for an administrative exigency,  the
High Court decided to exercise its plenary  administrative  power  does  not
per se lead to the conclusion  that  the  transfer  of  the  case  from  the
Magistrate to the Special Judge was unlawful. The  legality  of  the  action
cannot be called in question in  this  case  since  no  prejudice  has  been
caused to the petitioners by such a transfer.





Right of revision

25.   Is the petitioners’ right of revision taken away if the case is
transferred from the Magistrate to the Special Judge?
26.   This question proceeds on the assumption that  there  is  a  right  of
revision.  
A Constitution Bench of this  Court  in  Pranab  Kumar  Mitra  v.
State of West Bengal 1959(1) Suppl. SCR 63 set the  “right”  issue  at  rest
several decades ago.
It was held that the power to revise  an  order  is  a
discretionary power which is to be exercised  in  aid  of  justice  and  the
exercise of that power will depend on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  a
given case.
 It was held:


      “The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by  Section  439
      of the Code, read with Section 435, do not create  any  right  in  the
      litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court  to  see  that
      justice is done in accordance with the recognized  rules  of  criminal
      jurisprudence, and that subordinate  Criminal  Courts  do  not  exceed
      their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code.”



27.   In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 
this  Court  once  again
adverted to  the  power  of  revision  invested  in  a  superior  Court  and
described it as an “extraordinary discretionary power” to  set  right  grave
injustice. 
Clearly, therefore, it cannot be  said  that  a  litigant  has  a
“right” to have an adverse  order  revised  by  a  superior  court.  On  the
contrary, if there is any “right” to revise, it is invested in the  superior
court.
28.   While the revisional power of a superior court actually enables it  to
correct a  grave error,  the  existence of  that  power  does  not    confer
 any corresponding right on a litigant.
This is the reason why, in a given  case,
a superior court may decline to exercise  its  power  of  revision,  if  the
facts and circumstances of the case do  not  warrant  the  exercise  of  its
discretion.
This is also the reason why it is felicitously  stated  that  a
revision is not a right but only a  “procedural  facility”  available  to  a
party. If the matter is looked at in this light,  the  transfer  of  a  case
from a Magistrate to a Special Judge does  not  take  away  this  procedural
facility available to the petitioners.
It only changes  the  forum  and  as
already held above, the petitioners have no right to  choose  the  forum  in
which to file an appeal or move a petition  for  revising  an  interlocutory
order.
29.   Reliance was placed by  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  on  a
Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in A.S. Impex Ltd. v.  Delhi
High Court, 107 (2003) DLT 734.
This reliance is not only misplaced but,  in
my opinion, that decision  should  be  overruled  as  not  laying  down  the
correct law.
30.   In that case, the High  Court  administratively  decided  to  transfer
cases filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on  or
before 31st  December  2001  and  pending  before  the  Magistrates  to  the
Additional Sessions Judges.  
A  notification  for  transfer  of  cases  was
accordingly issued and this was struck down by  the  Delhi  High  Court  by,
inter alia, relying on the law laid  down  in  Antulay.  
As  already  noted
above, the law laid down in
Antulay has limited application and is not relevant to  cases  such  as  the
one we are dealing with.
This was clearly explained in Ranbir Yadav but  the
Delhi High Court ignored the observations of this Court without much ado  by
holding: 
“In that case the Court transferred the case from the Court of  one
Magistrate to the Court of another Magistrate for the reason that there  was
shortage of accommodation in the first Court. 
That is not the case in  hand.
It was not a case where the jurisdiction was transferred from the  Court  of
Magistrate to the Court of Sessions.”  
The Delhi High Court  also  proceeded
on an erroneous basis that the  exercise  of  plenary  administrative  power
available to the High  Court  to  transfer  cases  meant  the  bypassing  or
circumventing of statutory provisions empowering Magistrates to try
cases under  Section  138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881  and
conferring that jurisdiction on Additional Sessions Judges. 
The  High  Court
did not correctly appreciate the power  available  to  a  High  Court  under
Article 227 of the Constitution.
31.   The error in A.S. Impex  was  correctly  understood  by  the  Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahender Singh  v.  High  Court  of  Delhi,
(2009) 151 Comp Cas 485 (Delhi) and in N.G. Sheth v. C.B.I., 151 (2008)  DLT
89. 
The Division Bench in both cases took a  view  different  from  that  in
A.S.  Impex.    
However,   both   decisions   having  been    rendered    by
Division Benches, A.S. Impex, could not be  overruled.   
Therefore,  I  complete  the
formality and overrule A.S. Impex since it does not  lay  down  the  correct
law in this regard.
32.   For the  reasons  above mentioned,  the  Special  Leave  Petitions  are
dismissed.


                                                                 ……………………..J
                                                          ( Madan B. Lokur )
New Delhi;
September 26, 2013

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