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Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Whether she cannot take benefit of reservation in the State of Uttarakhand because she is a Scheduled Caste (Valmiki of Punjab). =She was provisionally selected but her candidature was cancelled by the Commission vide Office Memorandum dated 4.10.2005 on the ground that she cannot take benefit of reservation in the State of Uttarakhand because she is a Scheduled Caste (Valmiki of Punjab).- The Division Bench held that after migration from Punjab, the appellant cannot be treated as a member of Scheduled Caste in the State of Uttarakhand and she is not entitled to be appointed against the post reserved for Scheduled Caste.= Whether Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1) or Article 342(1) of the Constitution has any bearing on the State’s action in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State? - whether a person like the appellant, who is a Scheduled Caste in the State where she was born will not be entitled to the benefit of reservation after marriage in the State where her husband is living despite the fact that the husband also belongs to Scheduled Caste and the particular Caste falls in the same reserved category in the State of migration and that she is a permanent resident of that State. 16. Since the other related matter has been referred to a larger Bench, we think that it would be just and proper to refer this matter also to the larger Bench. Ordered accordingly. 17. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for consideration and appropriate order.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40822

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL No.8225  of 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33724 of 2011)


Ranjana Kumari                                           ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Uttaranchal and others
...Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1.          Leave granted.

2.    The appellant has questioned correctness of order dated  29.8.2011  by
which the Uttarakhand High Court dismissed the writ petition  filed  by  her
in the matter of appointment as District  Information  Officer  against  the
post reserved for Scheduled Caste.

3.    In response to an advertisement issued by Public  Service  Commission,
Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand)  (for  short,  ‘the  Commission’),  which  was
published in newspaper Amar Ujala dated 25.8.2002  for  recruitment  against
833 posts in different cadres, the appellant submitted  an  application  for
appointment as District Information Officer mentioning therein that  she  is
a member of  Scheduled  Caste.  She  cleared  the  Combined  Civil  Services
Examination, 2002, preliminary as well as main.  She was interviewed by  the
Commission in May, 2005. During the interview, the appellant  was  asked  to
indicate her preferences for various advertised posts.  She  gave  her  15th
preference  for  the  post  of  District  Information   Officer.   
She   was
provisionally selected but her candidature was cancelled by  the Commission vide Office Memorandum dated 4.10.2005 on the ground that  she  cannot  take benefit of reservation  in  the  State  of  Uttarakhand  because  she  is  a Scheduled Caste (Valmiki of Punjab).
The  other  ground  indicated  by  the
Commission was that the appellant was not eligible to be  appointed  against
the advertised post because the mark sheet of her examination of Diploma  in
Journalism was issued on 26.10.2002, i.e., after the  last  date  fixed  for
receipt of application.

4.    The appellant challenged  the  decision  of  the  Commission  in  Writ
Petition No.1281(M/B)/2005 (re-numbered as Writ Petition  No.297/2007).  The
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same by observing that  right
to be treated as a member of reserved category is directly  attributable  to
birth and a person can claim the benefit of reservation only  in  the  State
in which he/she is born and not the State to which such person  may  migrate
after marriage or otherwise.  The Division Bench held that  after  migration
from Punjab, the appellant cannot be treated as a member of Scheduled  Caste
in the State of Uttarakhand and she is not entitled to be appointed  against
the post reserved for Scheduled Caste.
5.    Ms. Priya Hingorani, learned counsel for  the  appellant  argued  that
the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the view taken  by  the
High Court on the appellant’s entitlement to be treated as  Scheduled  Caste
of Uttarakhand is not only erroneous, but is also contrary to the  law  laid
down by this Court.  She pointed out that the  appellant  had  married  Shri
Rajesh Gill, who is Valmiki by caste and is a  resident  of  Dehradun  since
1988 and argued that the Commission committed  an  error  by  rejecting  her
plea for appointment against the post reserved for Scheduled  Caste  despite
the fact that Valmiki is recognised as a Scheduled Caste in  the  States  of
Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.  Ms. Hingorani also invited our attention  to
certificates dated 10.9.2002 and 13.6.2005  issued  by  Tahsildar,  Dehradun
showing the appellant as Valmiki of Uttar  Pradesh  and  Uttaranchal  and  a
resident of Dehradun and argued that as on the  last  date  of  application,
the appellant could not be treated as a person belonging to  Punjab  because
she is a permanent resident  of  Dehradun  (Uttarakhand).   Learned  counsel
also assailed  the  other  ground  on  which  the  Commission  rejected  the
appellant’s candidature by pointing out that result of the examination  held
by Rajrshi Tandon Open University,  Allahabad  was  declared  on  15.9.2002,
i.e., one day before the last date fixed for receipt of application and  she
had produced all the documents at the time of interview.

6.    Ms. Rachana Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents  supported
the impugned order and argued that the High Court did not commit  any  error
by negating the appellant’s challenge to the decision of the  Commission  to
cancel her candidature because she cannot be treated as  a  Scheduled  Caste
of Uttarakhand.  In support of her argument, Ms. Srivastava relied upon  the
judgments of the Constitution Bench in Marri Chandra Shekhar  Rao  v.  Dean,
Seth G. S. Medical College and others (1990) 3 SCC 130, Action Committee  on
Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  in  the
State of Maharashtra and another v. Union of India and another (1994) 5  SCC
244 and Subhash Chandra and another v. Delhi Subordinate Services  Selection
Board and others (2009) 15 SCC 458.

7.    We have  considered  the  respective  arguments  and  scrutinized  the
record.

8.    Articles 341 and 342, which  have  bearing  on  the  decision  of  the
question arising in this appeal, read as under:

       “341. Scheduled Castes.—(1) The President may  with  respect  to  any
      State or Union territory, and where it is a State  after  consultation
      with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes,
      races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races  or  tribes
      which shall for the purposes of this  Constitution  be  deemed  to  be
      Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as  the
      case may be.


      (2) Parliament may by law include in  or  exclude  from  the  list  of
      Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under  clause  (1)
      any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or
      tribe, but save as aforesaid a  notification  issued  under  the  said
      clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.


       342. Scheduled Tribes.— (1) The President may  with  respect  to  any
      State or Union territory, and where it is a State, after  consultation
      with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the  tribes
      or tribal communities or parts of or groups within  tribes  or  tribal
      communities which shall for the purpose of this Constitution be deemed
      to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or  Union  territory,
      as the case may be.
      (2) Parliament may by law include in  or  exclude  from  the  list  of
      Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued under  clause  (1)
      any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe  or
      tribal community, but save as aforesaid a  notification  issued  under
      the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.”


9.    The above  reproduced  articles  enjoin  that  the  President  after
consultation with the Governor where the States are concerned,  by  public
notification, may specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of  or
groups of tribes or tribal  communities,  which  shall  be  deemed  to  be
Scheduled Castes in relation to that State under Article 341 or  Scheduled
Tribes in relation to that State under Article 342.


10.   In Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S.  Medical  College  and
others (supra), the Constitution Bench of this  Court  was  called  upon  to
consider whether the petitioner, who was a member of Scheduled Tribe in  the
State of Andhra  Pradesh  was  entitled  to  admission  in  MBBS  course  in
Maharashtra  against  the  quota  reserved  for   Scheduled   Tribes.    The
petitioner was born in Tenali in the State of Andhra  Pradesh  and  belonged
to the Gouda  community  also  known  as  “Goudu”  which  is  recognised  as
“Scheduled Tribe” in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh.  The  father  of  the
petitioner was issued  a  Scheduled  Tribe  Certificate  by  the  Tahsildar,
Tenali, Andhra Pradesh. He was appointed in the  Fertilizer  Corporation  of
India,  a  public  sector  undertaking.  On  the  19th   June,   1978,   the
petitioner's father joined  Rashtriya  Chemicals  and  Fertilizers  Ltd.,  a
Government of India undertaking, under  the  quota  reserved  for  Scheduled
Tribes. He was posted in Bombay. As a consequence,  the  petitioner  started
living  in Bombay.  He completed his education in Bombay. For  the  academic
year 1989-90, he submitted  applications  for  admission  in  three  medical
colleges run by the Bombay Municipal Corporation  and  one  medical  college
run by the State of Maharashtra and sought the  benefit  of  reservation  in
favour of Scheduled Tribes.  His claim was not accepted on the  ground  that
he does not belong to Scheduled Tribe of Maharashtra.  After  examining  the
scheme of the relevant Constitutional provisions, this Court observed:

      “It appears that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in some  States
      had to suffer the social disadvantages and did not have the facilities
      for development and growth. It is, therefore, necessary  in  order  to
      make them equal in those areas where they have so suffered and are  in
      the state of underdevelopment to have reservations  or  protection  in
      their favour so that they can compete on equal  terms  with  the  more
      advantageous or developed sections of the  community.  Extreme  social
      and economic backwardness arising  out  of  traditional  practices  of
      untouchability is normally considered as  criterion  for  including  a
      community in the list of Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled  Tribes.  The
      social conditions of a caste, however, varies from State to State  and
      it will not be proper to generalise  any  caste  or  any  tribe  as  a
      Scheduled Tribe or  Scheduled  Caste  for  the  whole  country.  This,
      however, is a different problem whether  a  member  or  the  Scheduled
      Caste in one part of the country who migrates to another State or  any
      other Union territory should continue to be  treated  as  a  Scheduled
      Caste or Scheduled Tribe in which he has migrated. That  question  has
      to be judged taking into consideration the interest and well-being  of
      the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the country as a whole.


      It has, however, to be borne in mind that a  man  does  not  cease  to
      belong to his caste by migration to a better or more socially free and
      liberal atmosphere. But if sufficiently long time is spent in socially
      advanced area then the inhibitions and handicaps suffered by belonging
      to a socially  disadvantageous  community  do  not  continue  and  the
      natural talent of a man or a woman or a boy or girl gets full scope to
      flourish. These, however, are problems of social adjustment  i.e.  how
      far protection has to be  given  to  a  certain  segment  of  socially
      disadvantaged community and for how long to become equal  with  others
      is a matter of delicate social adjustment. These must be  so  balanced
      in the mosaic of the country’s integrity that no section or  community
      should cause detriment or discontentment to other community or part of
      community or section. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  belonging
      to a particular area of the country must be given protection  so  long
      as and to the extent they are entitled in order to become  equal  with
      others. But equally those who go to other  areas  should  also  ensure
      that they make way for the disadvantaged and disabled of that part  of
      the community who suffer from disabilities in those  areas.  In  other
      words, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes say of Andhra Pradesh  do
      require necessary protection as balanced  between  other  communities.
      But  equally  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  say   of
      Maharashtra in the instant case, do require protection in the State of
      Maharashtra, which will have to be in balance to other communities.”




11.   In Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled  Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra and  another  v.  Union  of
India and another (supra), another Constitution Bench considered  a  similar
issue. The question framed in that case was:

      “Where a person belonging to  a  caste  or  tribe  specified  for  the
      purposes of the Constitution to be a Scheduled Caste  or  a  Scheduled
      Tribe in relation to State A migrates to State  B  where  a  caste  or
      tribe with the same nomenclature is specified for the purposes of  the
      Constitution to be a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in  relation
      to that State B, will that person be entitled to claim the  privileges
      and benefits admissible to the  persons  belonging  to  the  Scheduled
      Castes and/or Scheduled Tribes in State B.”



The aforesaid question  was  considered  in  the  backdrop  of  certificate,
circulars and letters issued by the Government of  India  and  consequential
instructions issued by the State  of  Maharashtra  indicating  that  members
belonging to the Scheduled Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  of  other  States
shall not be entitled to the benefits and privileges accorded by  the  State
of Maharashtra unless he or she is shown to be  permanent  resident  of  the
State of Maharashtra on 10.8.1950  in  the  case  of  Scheduled  Castes  and
6.9.1950 in the case of Scheduled Tribes.  The Constitution  Bench  referred
to the relevant Constitutional provisions including Articles  341  and  342,
the judgment of the earlier Constitution  Bench  in  Marri  Chandra  Shekhar
Rao’s case and observed:

      “We may add that considerations for specifying a particular  caste  or
      tribe or class for inclusion in the list of Scheduled  Castes/Schedule
      Tribes or backward classes in a given State would depend on the nature
      and extent of disadvantages and  social  hardships  suffered  by  that
      caste, tribe or class in that State which may be totally  non  est  in
      another  State  to  which  persons  belonging  thereto  may   migrate.
      Coincidentally it may be that  a  caste  or  tribe  bearing  the  same
      nomenclature is specified in two States but the considerations on  the
      basis of which they have been specified may be totally  different.  So
      also the degree of disadvantages of various elements which  constitute
      the input for specification may also be totally different.  Therefore,
      merely because a given caste is specified in State A  as  a  Scheduled
      Caste does not necessarily mean that if there be another caste bearing
      the same nomenclature in another State the  person  belonging  to  the
      former would be  entitled  to  the  rights,  privileges  and  benefits
      admissible to a member of the Scheduled Caste of the latter State “for
      the purposes of this Constitution”.
12.    The  issue  was  again  considered  in  S.  Pushpa   and   others   v
Sivachanmugavelu and others (2005) 3 SCC 1.  The facts  of  that  case  were
that   the Directorate of Education, Government of  Pondicherry  had  issued
an advertisement for making  recruitment  of  350  General  Central  Service
Group "C" posts of Secondary Grade of  which  56  posts  were  reserved  for
Scheduled Castes. In response to the advertisement, the employment  exchange
sponsored the names of candidates of various categories including  Scheduled
Caste. The employment exchange also sponsored some names of Scheduled  Caste
candidates from neighbouring employment exchanges as  sufficient  number  of
Scheduled Caste candidates were not available in Yanam and  Mahe  region  of
the Union territory  of  Pondicherry.  Out  of  55  selected  candidates  of
Scheduled Caste, 29 produced community certificates from the Governments  of
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, based on which the revenue  authority
of Pondicherry had issued community certificates to them. The  remaining  26
candidates produced community certificates from  the  revenue  authority  of
Pondicherry.  The  respondents  challenged  the   selection   of   aforesaid
Scheduled Caste candidates mainly on the ground  that  a  migrant  Scheduled
Caste candidate belonging to another State is not eligible  for  appointment
on a post which is reserved for  Scheduled  Caste  candidate  of  the  Union
Territory of Pondicherry. The Central Administrative  Tribunal  relied  upon
the judgments in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao’s case and  Action  Committee  on
Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  in  the
State of Maharashtra and another v. Union of India and another  (supra)  and
held that the Scheduled Castes  who  migrated  to  the  Union  Territory  of
Pondicherry after the  issuance  of  Presidential  notification,  which  has
specified Scheduled Castes in terms  of  Article  341  of  the  Constitution
cannot claim the benefit of reservation in the services  of  the  Government
of Pondicherry.  Accordingly,  the  selection  and  appointment  of  migrant
Scheduled Caste candidates was set aside  and  a  direction  was  issued  to
review the selection process. The three Judge Bench of this  Court  referred
to the judgments of the Constitution Bench in Marri  Chandra  Shekhar  Rao’s
case and the Action Committee’s case and observed:

      “Part XVI of the Constitution deals with special  provisions  relating
      to certain classes and contains Articles 330 to 341. Articles 330  and
      332 make provision for reservation of seats in the House of the People
      and Legislative Assemblies of the States respectively,  for  Scheduled
      Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Similar provisions  have  been  made  for
      Anglo-Indian community in Articles 331 and 333. Article  338  provides
      that there will be a Commission for the Scheduled Castes to  be  known
      as National Commission for the Scheduled Castes and it  also  provides
      for its composition, powers and duties.  Clause  (2)  of  Article  330
      provides that the number of seats reserved  in  the  States  or  Union
      Territories for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes  shall  bear,  as
      nearly as may be, the same proportion to the number of seats  allotted
      to that State or Union Territory in the House of  the  People  as  the
      population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or Union Territory  or
      of the Scheduled Tribes in the State or Union Territory, as  the  case
      may be, in respect of which seats are so reserved, bears to the  total
      population of the State or  Union  Territory.  Similar  provision  for
      reservation of seats in favour of SC/ST in the Legislative Assembly of
      any  State  is  contained  in  clause  (3)  of  Article  332  of   the
      Constitution. Therefore, in order to ascertain  the  number  of  seats
      which have to be reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes  in
      the House of  the  People  or  in  the  Legislative  Assembly,  it  is
      absolutely essential to ascertain  precisely  the  population  of  the
      Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in the State or Union  Territory.
      A fortiori, for the purpose  of  identification,  it  becomes  equally
      important to know who  would  be  deemed  to  be  Scheduled  Caste  in
      relation to that State or Union Territory. This  exercise  has  to  be
      done strictly in accordance with the Presidential Order and a  migrant
      Scheduled Caste of another State cannot be  taken  into  consideration
      otherwise it may affect the number of seats which have to be  reserved
      in the House of the People or Legislative Assembly. Though, a  migrant
      SC/ST person of another State may not be deemed to be  so  within  the
      meaning of Articles 341 and 342 after migration to another  State  but
      it does not mean that he ceases to be an SC/ST altogether and  becomes
      a member of a forward caste.


      Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 guarantee equality of opportunity to
      all citizens in the matter of appointment to  any  office  or  of  any
      other employment under the State. Clauses (3)  to  (5),  however,  lay
      down several exceptions  to  the  above  rule  of  equal  opportunity.
      Article 16(4) is an enabling provision  and  confers  a  discretionary
      power on the State to make reservation in the matter  of  appointments
      in favour of “backward classes of citizens” which in its  opinion  are
      not adequately represented  either  numerically  or  qualitatively  in
      services of the State. But it confers no constitutional right upon the
      members of the backward classes to claim reservation. Article 16(4) is
      not controlled by a Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1)  or
      Article 342(1) of the Constitution in the sense  that  reservation  in
      the matter of appointment on posts may be made in  a  State  or  Union
      Territory only for such Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled  Tribes  which
      are mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Presidential  Order  for
      that particular State or Union Territory. This article  does  not  say
      that only  such  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  which  are
      mentioned in the Presidential Order  issued  for  a  particular  State
      alone would be recognised as backward classes  of  citizens  and  none
      else. If a State or Union Territory makes a provision  whereunder  the
      benefit of reservation is extended only to such  Scheduled  Castes  or
      Scheduled Tribes which are recognised as  such  in  relation  to  that
      State or Union Territory then such  a  provision  would  be  perfectly
      valid. However, there would be no infraction of clause (4) of  Article
      16 if a Union Territory by  virtue  of  its  peculiar  position  being
      governed by the President as laid down  in  Article  239  extends  the
      benefit of reservation  even  to  such  migrant  Scheduled  Castes  or
      Scheduled Tribes  who  are  not  mentioned  in  the  Schedule  to  the
      Presidential  Order  issued  for  such  Union  Territory.  The  UT  of
      Pondicherry  having  adopted  a  policy  of  the  Central   Government
      whereunder all Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes,  irrespective  of
      their State are eligible  for  posts  which  are  reserved  for  SC/ST
      candidates, no legal infirmity can be ascribed to such  a  policy  and
      the same cannot be held to be contrary to any provision of law.”


13.   In the case of  Subhash  Chandra  and  another  v.  Delhi  Subordinate
Services Selection Board and  others  (supra),
private  respondents  and/or their parents are migrants to Delhi.
In  their  native  places,  they  were
declared to be the members of the Scheduled Castes.
The  Ministry  of  Home
Affairs issued a circular on or about 2.5.1975, in terms whereof the  manner
in which the claim of a person belonging to Scheduled  Castes  or  Scheduled
Tribes is required to be verified was laid down.
Such  verification  was  to
be made having regard to the Presidential  order  specifying  the  Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in relation to  the  concerned  State.
National
Capital Territory of Delhi issued clarification by  way  of  two  circulars.
Pursuant to directions issued by the Union Territory, an  advertisement  was
issued  by  the  State  Subordinate  Selection  Board   containing   general
instructions  that  Scheduled  Caste  and  OBC   candidates   must   furnish
certificates issued by the competent  authority  of  Government  of  NCT  of
Delhi issued on or before the closing date of receipt of application  forms.
The appellants questioned the legality  and/or  validity  of  the  circulars
issued by the National Capital Territory of Delhi by claiming that they  are
entitled to the benefits of the Presidential  Notification  declaring  their
caste to be Scheduled Castes but keeping in view the nature of  verification
specified by reason of  the  aforementioned  circulars.
The  Government  of
National Capital Territory contended  that  the  notification  involved  two
sets of castes/categories  certificate  one  in  relation  to  the  original
inhabitants and the other relating to the migrants.
The  petitioners  filed
Writ Petition challenging circulars before the High Court.
By  relying  upon
the ratio of Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao’s case and Action Committee on  Issue
of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in  the  State
of Maharashtra v. Union of India (supra), the High Court dismissed the  writ
petition. A two Judge Bench of this Court reversed the  order  of  the  High
Court and declared that the migrants are not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of
reservation in the Union Territories. The  two  Judge  Bench  also  declared
that  the  view  expressed  by  the  three  Judge  Bench  in  S.  Pushpa  v.
Sivachanmugavelu (supra) was per incuriam.

14.   The matter again came up for consideration before a  two  Judge  Bench
in State of Uttaranchal v. Sandeep Kumar Singh (2010) 12 SCC  794.  The  two
Judge Bench did not approve the approach adopted by another two Judge  bench
in Subhash Chandra’s case and referred the matter to larger Bench by  making
the following observations:

      “In our view, a two Judge Bench of this Court could not have held  the
      decision rendered by a three Judge Bench  in  S.  Pushpa  case  to  be
      obiter and per incuriam.

      A very important question of law  as  to  interpretation  of  Articles
      16(4), 341 and 342 arises for consideration in  this  appeal.
 Whether
      Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1) or  Article  342(1)  of   the Constitution has any bearing  on  the  State’s  action  in  making   provision for the reservation of appointments or posts  in  favour  of   any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State,  is  not adequately represented in the services under the State? 
The extent
      and nature of interplay and interaction among Articles  16(4),  341(1)
      and 342(1) of the Constitution is required to be resolved.

      For the aforesaid  reasons,  therefore,  in  our  view,  it  would  be
      appropriate that this case is placed  before  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief
      Justice of India for constituting a Bench of appropriate strength. The
      registry is, accordingly, directed to  place  the  papers  before  the
      Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions.”

15.   The question arising in this appeal  is  
whether  a  person  like  the
appellant, who is a Scheduled Caste in the State where  she  was born  will not be entitled to the benefit of reservation after marriage  in  the  State where her husband is living despite the fact that the husband  also  belongs to Scheduled Caste and the particular  Caste  falls  in  the  same  reserved category in the State of migration and that she is a permanent  resident  of that State.

16.   Since the other related matter has been referred to  a  larger  Bench,
we think that it would be just and proper to refer this matter also  to  the larger Bench. Ordered accordingly.

17.   The Registry is directed to place the papers before  the  Hon’ble  the
Chief Justice of India for consideration and appropriate order.
                                              …………………………..J.
                                              (G.S. SINGHVI)




New Delhi;                                   ………………………….J.
September 23, 2013.                               (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
-----------------------
14


Production of Documents for inspection can be filed under sec. 27 of Arbitration and conciliation Act = scope of Section 27, and the circumstances in which the Arbitral Tribunal or a party before the Arbitral Tribunal can apply to the court for assistance in taking evidence.= a notice to the advocate on record of the appellant on 17.3.2007, calling upon them to give inspection and to produce the following documents before the learned Arbitrator:- (a) All sales tax returns filed by the appellant with the sales tax authorities for the assessment years 1995-1996 to 2001-2002. (b) All sales tax assessment orders passed with regard to the appellant for the above-mentioned period, and all appellate orders, if any passed in any appellate proceedings arising out of the same. (c) The objection, if any, filed by the appellants against the Notice in Form 40, and proposed order at pages 123 & 124 of Volume VI of the documents filed in the arbitration, the order, if any, passed thereon, and the appellate proceedings, if any, therein. (d) The letter dated 26th May 2000 mentioned in the letter at page 32 of Volume III of the documents filed in the arbitration.- The advocate of the appellant vide his reply dated 21.3.2008, protested and objected to the production of these documents, since according to the appellant the same were being sought at a late stage when the proceeding had reached the stage of cross-examination of the witnesses of the respondent No.1. - Inasmuch as the appellant declined to give inspection / and produce the document as sought for, the respondent No. 1 made an application on 26.3.2007 before the learned Arbitrator, and in paragraph No. 5 thereof, sought a direction to produce the documents mentioned at Sl. Nos.(a) to (c) in the notice dated 17.3.2007. The learned Arbitrator by her order dated 27.3.2007 allowed the application only to the extent of the assessment orders relating to the period 1995-1996 to 2001-2002 and the appellate orders mentioned in paragraph 5(b). The prayer for producing the sales tax returns mentioned in paragraph 5(a) was not entertained. Similarly, the prayer to produce the documents as sought in paragraph 5(c) was not entertained. = It is a settled principle of law that the words used in a statute are to be read as they are used, to the extent possible, to ascertain the meaning thereof. Both these provisions contained a bar only against the Government officers from producing the documents mentioned therein. There is no bar therein against a party to produce any such document. In Tulsiram Sanganaria and Another v. Srimati Anni Rai and Ors. reported in 1971 (1) SCC 284, a bench of three Judges of this Court interpreted an identical provision in Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and held that the said provision created a bar on the production of the documents mentioned therein by the officials and other servants of the Income Tax Department, and made it obligatory on them to treat as confidential the records and documents mentioned therein, but the assessee or his representative-in-interest could produce assessment orders as evidence, and such evidence was admissible. Thus, if a claim is to be decided on the basis of an order of assessment, the claimant as well cannot be denied the right to seek a direction to the party concerned to produce the assessment order. It is this very prayer which has been allowed by the earlier order dated 27.3.2007 passed by the then Arbitrator, and also by the subsequent order dated 16.9.2011 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, and in our view rightly so. There is no substance in the second objection as well. 25. There is one more aspect which we must note, i.e., when the first respondent made an application for production of the assessment orders, the defence taken by the appellant in their affidavit dated 16.9.2011 was that those documents were confidential documents, and could not be directed to be produced. It was not stated at that time that the said documents were not available. It is ten months thereafter, that when the second affidavit was filed in the High Court, that the respondent for the first time contended that the said documents were not available. This was clearly an after thought, and this attitude of the Respondent in a way justified the earlier order permitting an application under Section 27 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax of the concerned area was also joined as respondent so that he could be directed to produce the required documents. However, he reported that those documents were old records, and were destroyed. The learned Single Judge did not pass any order against the respondent No.2 to produce the documents, as sought. However, the learned Single Judge rightly allowed the petition as against the appellant in terms of prayer clause ‘A’, directing the appellant to produce the documents which were sought by the respondent no. 1. 26. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

       published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40827
                                                           REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8426 OF 2013
         (@ out of  SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 28418/2012 )


Delta Distilleries Limited                         …   Petitioner

                                    Versus

United Spirits Limited & Anr.                            …   Respondents

                             J U D G  E M E N T


H.L. Gokhale J.

            Leave Granted.

2.          This appeal by Special Leave seeks  to  challenge  the  judgment
and order dated 20.7.2012 rendered by a Single Judge of  Bombay  High  Court
allowing Arbitration Petition No.838 of 2011 filed by  the  respondent  No.1
herein. The said petition sought to invoke the powers  of  the  court  under
Section 27 of the Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,  1996  (herein  after
referred to as the Act of 1996), which provides for  seeking  assistance  of
the court  in  taking  evidence.   The  said  petition  had  been  moved  in
pursuance of the order dated 16.9.2011 passed by  a  three  member  Arbitral
Tribunal permitting the respondent No.1 to file  such  an  application.  The
learned Single Judge allowed the said petition,  and  thereby  directed  the
appellant to produce the documents as sought by the respondent  No.1  before
the Arbitral Tribunal.  This appeal has  been  filed  by  Special  Leave  to
challenge the said judgment and order. The appeal raises the  question  with
respect to the 
scope of Section 27,  and  the  circumstances  in  which  the
Arbitral Tribunal or a party before the Arbitral Tribunal can apply  to  the court for assistance in taking evidence.
Facts leading to this appeal are this wise:-

3.          The respondent No.1 herein  is  a  company  which  owns  certain
brands of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL).  
The  appellant  is  a  company
carrying  on  the  business  of  distilling  and  bottling  of  IMFL.    
The
predecessor of the respondent  No.1  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the
appellant on 25.3.1997, under which the appellant agreed to manufacture  and
supply to the respondent No.1, IMFL of such brands and  quantity,  as  would
be specified from time  to  time  on  the  terms  and  conditions  contained
therein.
Under the said agreement, the contract price  at  which  the  IMFL
was to be sold by the appellant to the respondent  No.1,  was  exclusive  of
sales tax and other taxes, and the respondent No.1 was required to bear  the
same.
4.          It appears that sometimes in 2001-2002, certain  disputes  arose
between  the  parties.   A  major  dispute  between  them  related  to   the
outstanding amount payable at the foot of the running account between  them.
The respondent No.1 claimed that amongst others,  amounts  to  the  tune  of
Rs.1,22,30,692 and Rs.70,23,107.52 were due and payable  to  the  respondent
No.1, whereas the appellant maintained that an amount  of  Rs.39,37,993  was
payable to the appellant. 
According to the first respondent,  the  appellant
had obtained from the Sales Tax Department set-off/refund on the  sales  tax
paid on packaging material, and such set-off/refund operated to  reduce  the
sales tax liability of the appellant, which was ultimately  being  borne  by
the respondent No.1.  
The respondent No.1 therefore,  claimed  that  it  was
entitled to the benefit of the said set-off/refund, and accordingly  debited
the appellant for the amount of set-off/refund.
5.          It was the case  of  the  first  respondent  that  although  the
appellant had accounted for some of these entries in its  accounts,  it  did
not account for a major portion of the same.
Clause  14  of  the  agreement
between the parties provided that  any  dispute  or  difference arising  or relating to or connected with the said agreement,  was to  be  referred  to arbitration.  
The above dispute was, therefore, referred to the  Arbitration
of Hon’ble Mr. Justice  D.M.  Rege,  former  Judge  of  Bombay  High  Court.
However, the Learned  Judge  resigned  as  arbitrator,  and  thereafter  the
proceedings were continued before another arbitrator  Hon’ble  Mrs.  Justice
Sujata Manohar, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India.
6.          Thereafter, the advocates of the respondent No.1 gave  a  notice
to the advocate on record of the appellant on 17.3.2007, calling  upon  them
to give inspection  and  to  produce  the  following  documents  before  the
learned Arbitrator:-
(a)   All sales tax returns filed  by  the  appellant  with  the  sales  tax
authorities for the assessment years 1995-1996 to 2001-2002.
(b)   All sales tax assessment orders passed with regard  to  the  appellant
for the above-mentioned period, and all appellate orders, if any  passed  in
any appellate proceedings arising out of the same.
(c)   The objection, if any, filed by the appellants against the  Notice  in
Form 40, and proposed order  at  pages  123  &  124  of  Volume  VI  of  the
documents filed in the arbitration, the order, if any, passed  thereon,  and
the appellate proceedings, if any, therein.
(d)   The letter dated 26th May 2000 mentioned in the letter at page  32  of
Volume III of the documents filed in the arbitration.
7.          The advocate of the appellant vide his  reply  dated  21.3.2008,
protested  and  objected  to  the  production  of  these  documents,   since
according to the appellant the same were being sought at a late  stage  when
the proceeding had reached the stage of cross-examination of  the  witnesses
of the respondent No.1. 
 In paragraph 3 of this reply the  learned  advocate
stated as follows:-
                 “3. As regards the inspection of documents sought  by  your
           clients, my clients repeat that your clients are not entitled to
           inspection of any documents  at  this  belated  stage.   In  any
           event, my clients are  not  relying  on  any  of  the  documents
           referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of your  letter.   As
           regards the documents referred  to  in  paragraph  (d)  of  your
           letter, the said  document  is  already  on  record  before  the
           Hon’ble Arbitrator and hence a copy  of  the  said  document  is
           already available with you.”

8.          Inasmuch as the appellant declined  to  give  inspection  /  and
produce  the  document  as  sought  for,  the  respondent  No.  1  made   an
application on 26.3.2007 before the learned  Arbitrator,  and  in  paragraph
No. 5 thereof, sought a direction to produce the documents mentioned at  Sl.
Nos.(a) to (c) in the notice dated 17.3.2007.  
The  learned  Arbitrator  by
her order dated 27.3.2007 allowed the application only to the extent of  the
assessment orders relating to the period  1995-1996  to  2001-2002  and  the
appellate orders mentioned in paragraph 5(b). 
The prayer for  producing  the
sales  tax  returns  mentioned  in  paragraph  5(a)  was  not   entertained.
Similarly, the prayer to produce the documents as sought in  paragraph  5(c)
was not entertained.  
The learned Arbitrator held  in  paragraph  4  of  her
order as follows:-
                 “4.   …. The documents in paragraphs 5 (a) and 5 (b) relate
           to Sales Tax Returns filed by  the  Respondents  for  Assessment
           Years 1995-1996 till 2001-2002 and Sales Tax  Assessment  Orders
           passed in respect of the Respondents for this  period  including
           any Appellate Orders.  One of the claims made by  the  Claimants
           in these proceedings against  the  Respondents  related  to  the
           benefit of any sales tax set-off granted to the  Respondents  in
           connection with the goods in question which,  according  to  the
           Claimants, should accrue to their benefit.  Therefore, Sales Tax
           Assessment Orders relating to the period in  dispute  passed  in
           respect of the Respondents  are  relevant  for  the  purpose  of
           determination of  this  aspect  of  the  dispute.   Mr.  Savant,
           learned counsel for the Respondents  has  contended  that  these
           Sales Tax Assessments are not relevant because in any case,  the
           Claimants have quantified the set-off which they  are  claiming,
           and hence, it is not necessary to look at Sales Tax  Assessments
           to   ascertain   the   quantum   of   set-off.    However,   the
           quantification is done by the Claimants on the theoretical basis
           that full set-off must have been granted to the Respondents  and
           hence, 75% of the value of the set-off until May  2000  and  the
           full value of such set-off thereafter should  be  considered  as
           having accrued for the benefit of the Claimants. A  hypothetical
           calculation on such basis should not be resorted to when  actual
           Sales Tax Assessments are available which show  the  quantum  of
           set-off allowed.  This is in the interest of both  the  parties.
           Hence, the argument of Mr. Savant cannot be accepted.”

9.          The appellants were  dissatisfied  with  the  order  passed.  In
their subsequent correspondence they made certain  allegations  against  the
learned Arbitrator, who therefore, resigned from the said  proceeding.   The
parties therefore,  appointed  an  Arbitral  Tribunal  consisting  of  three
Judges, Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Jagannadha  Rao  (Presiding  Arbitrator)  and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava (both former Judges of  the  Supreme  Court
of India), and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.S. Rane (Former Judge  of  Bombay  High
Court).   On reconstitution of the Arbitral  Tribunal  the  respondent  No.1
pointed out that the order passed by the earlier Arbitrator dated  27.3.2007
had not been complied  with.   The  Tribunal,  therefore,  called  upon  the
appellant to state their position on an affidavit.  Thereupon  the  Chairman
of the appellant  filed  an  affidavit  before  the  Tribunal  on  16.9.2011
stating that the appellant  would  not  produce  the  sales  tax  assessment
orders.  In paragraph 3 of his affidavit he specifically stated as follows:-

                  “3.  I humbly and most  respectfully  submit  before  this
           Hon’ble Tribunal that, Sales Tax Returns are the documents which
           are highly confidential and hence the  same  cannot  be  subject
           matter to be produced before this  Hon’ble  Tribunal  especially
           when, sales tax set off is already quantified by  the  Claimants
           and the same is forming a part of their  claim  in  the  present
           arbitration proceedings.  I say that, it  is  not  necessary  to
           inspect the  said  sales  tax  assessment  orders  in  order  to
           ascertain the quantum of set off.  I say  that,  the  Claimants’
           demand of sales tax set off to an extent of  75%  and  somewhere
           also 100% is completely vague and arbitrary and that the same is
           completely  de  hors  the  contents  of  the   agreement   dated
           25.03.1997.  I therefore say that, disclosure of any such  sales
           tax assessment orders shall be  completely  detrimental  to  the
           rights and interest of the Respondent Company.”
10.         In view of this affidavit of the Chairman of the appellant,  the
Tribunal noted that the party in possession of the concerned  documents  was
refusing to produce them, even though it had been directed to  do  so.   The
Tribunal vide its order dated 16.9.2011, held that the earlier  order  dated
27.3.2007 passed by the previous arbitrator could not be reviewed,  nor  did
the Tribunal have any jurisdiction  to  do  so.   The  Tribunal,  therefore,
permitted the respondent No.1 to apply to the court under Section 27 of  the
Act of 1996, and to seek production of the sales tax  assessment  order  for
the period  1995-1996  to  2001-2002,  including  any  appellate  orders  in
support thereof.
The Tribunal observed as follows:-
                 “7.……One would have expected the  Respondent  to  obey  the
           directions  of  this  Tribunal  and  produce  the   above   said
           documents.  However, in as much as they have not  been  produced
           for more than four years and now there is categorical  statement
           by the Chairman of the Respondent Company  that  they  will  not
           produce these documents, the Tribunal is compelled  to  exercise
           the powers under Section 27 of the Act and grant  permission  to
           the Claimant to  apply  to  the  Court  for  production  of  the
           documents   from   the   Respondent   and/or   the   Sales   Tax
           Authorities……”

11.         Pursuant to the said permission granted  by  the  Tribunal,  the
respondent No.1 filed the Arbitration Petition before the  Single  Judge  of
Bombay High Court invoking the powers of the Court under Section 27  of  the
Act of 1996, to seek a direction to the appellants to  produce  the  earlier
mentioned  assessment   orders   and   appellate   orders.   The   Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Pune was  joined  as  respondent  No.  2,  and  a
direction to produce those documents from his records was  as  well  sought.
The appellant herein, opposed the said Arbitration Petition.   Now  for  the
first time, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the  reply  the  appellants  stated  as
follows:-
                 “5. The Petitioner’s demand pertains  to  records  for  the
           period 1995-1996 to 2001-02.  I say and submit  that  these  are
           very  old  records.   The  same  are  not  available  with   the
           Respondent No. 1.  I say and submit that Respondent No. 1 is not
           able to trace these old records.  I say that in fact when I made
           my Affidavit dated 16th September,  2011,  I  had  in  fact  not
           searched the Company’s records to ascertain  whether  the  sales
           tax  orders  were  in  fact  available  with  it.   I  say  that
           accordingly I had made the said Affidavit dated 16th  September,
           2011 opposing the disclosure on the grounds stated  therein.   I
           say that during the pendency of the  present  petition,  I  have
           checked in order to ascertain whether these records were in fact
           available with the Company and have discovered that they  cannot
           be traced.”


                 6. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, I further  say  that
           the information that is being requested for by the petitioner is
           confidential and accordingly the same ought not be disclosed.”
12.         The learned Single Judge thereupon heard the  parties.   It  was
submitted on behalf of the appellant before the Learned Single  Judge,  that
the provisions of Section 27 of the Act of 1996 were  analogous  to  Section
43 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.  A judgment of the Delhi High Court in  the
case of Union of India v. Bhatia Tanning Industries  reported  in  AIR  1986
Delhi 195, on the said Section 43 was relied upon to submit  that  the  said
section applies only to calling witnesses, and not for giving any  direction
to the parties.  It was further submitted that at the  highest,  an  adverse
inference may be drawn against the appellant under  Order  21,  Rule  11  of
Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred as CPC).   Reliance  was  also
placed on the provision of Section 71 of Maharashtra Value  Added  Tax  Act,
2002 (hereinafter referred as the Maharashtra Act)  which  is  pari  materia
with Section 64 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act,  1959,  and  it  was  contended
that the assessment orders were confidential, and could not be  directed  to
be produced. The Assistant Commissioner of  Sales  Tax  who  was  respondent
No.2 to the Writ Petition (and who  is  respondent  No.  2  to  this  appeal
also), submitted that  the  old  record  of  the  relevant  period  was  not
available with the Sales Tax Department, and was already destroyed.  In  any
case it was submitted that in view of the above referred Section 71, such  a
direction could not be issued.
13.         The learned Judge repelled all these arguments.   He  held  that
the appellant was misreading the judgment of Delhi High Court, and  that  it
could not be anybody’s case  that  a  party  in  a  proceeding  can  not  be
examined as a witness.  With respect to Section 71 of the  Maharashtra  Act,
the learned Judge held that it barred only the production of statements  and
returns, and it was not applicable to the assessment  orders.   The  learned
Judge also noted that in the earlier affidavit filed  before  the  Tribunal,
the appellant had not taken any such plea that the  assessment  orders  were
not available, but within ten months thereafter in another affidavit  before
the High Court it was being contended  that  the  said  documents  were  not
traceable.  The learned Judge therefore, allowed the said petition  invoking
Section 27 of the Act of 1996, and directed the appellant herein to  produce
the documents sought for. Being aggrieved by this  judgment  and  order  the
present SLP has been filed.
14.         We have heard Mr. Ravindra Srivastava,  learned  senior  counsel
in support of this appeal,  and  Mr.  Chander  Uday  Singh,  learned  senior
counsel  for  the  respondent  no.  1.   Respondent  no.  2  is  a  proforma
respondent. The challenge in this appeal  is  principally  on  two  grounds.
Firstly, that the type of order which was sought under  Section  27  of  the
Act of 1996, against the appellant was not  within  the  competence  of  the
court, and at the  highest  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  should  have  drawn  an
adverse inference against the appellant under Order 11 and Rule  21  of  CPC
for non-production of the documents, the production of which was  sought  by
the respondent no.1.  The  second  challenge  was  that  in  any  case,  the
documents which were sought were confidential documents, and in view of  the
provision contained in Section 71 of the Maharashtra Value Added  Tax  2002,
and the order compelling the appellant to produce such documents  could  not
have been passed.
15.         As far as  the  first  ground  of  challenge  is  concerned,  as
pointed out earlier, reliance was placed by the  respondent  no.  1  on  the
judgment of  a  Division  Bench  of  Delhi  High  Court  in  Bhatia  Tanning
Industries (supra). Now, what had happened  in  this  matter  was  that  the
respondent/industries were to supply certain material to the appellant,  and
since the respondent  had  committed  default  in  making  the  supply,  the
appellant had raised a claim on account of risk purchase which was  referred
to  arbitration.   The  arbitrator  sent  notices  to  the  address  of  the
respondents on record twice, and on both occasions  the  registered  notices
were  returned  to  the  arbitrator  stating  that  the  addressee  was  not
available.  It was in these circumstances that the arbitrator  ordered  that
there shall be a publication of the notice  in  a  newspaper.   That  having
being done, nobody appeared for the  respondent  thereafter  also,  and  the
arbitrator made an ex-parte award.  After the award was filed in court,  and
notice was sent  to  the  respondent,  an  objection  was  raised  that  the
arbitrator had no power to order service by  means  of  publication  in  the
newspaper.  The learned Single Judge who heard the  matter,  set  aside  the
award on the ground that the arbitrator should have gone to the court  under
Section 43 of the Arbitration  Act,  1940  (Act  of  1940  for  short),  and
obtained an order from the Court for service by publication  which  had  not
been done.
16.         This order was challenged in appeal, and  a  Division  Bench  of
the High Court allowed the said appeal.  The Division Bench  held  that  the
there are two separate sections in the Act of  1940.   One  was  Section  42
which provided service of notice by a party or  arbitrator,  and  the  other
was Section 43.  Section 43 of the Act of 1940 reads as follows:-
                 “43. Power of  Court  to  issue  processes  for  appearance
           before arbitrator – (1) The Court shall issue the same processes
           to the parties and  witnesses  whom  the  arbitrator  or  umpire
           desires to examine as the Court may issue in suits tried  before
           it.

                 (2)   Person failing to  attend  in  accordance  with  such
           process, or making any other default, or refusing to give  their
           evidence, or guilty of any contempt to the arbitrator or  umpire
           during the investigation of the reference, shall be  subject  to
           the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments  by  order  of
           the Court on the representation of the arbitrator or  umpire  as
           they would incur for the like offences in suits tried before the
           Court


                 (3)   In this section the expression  “processes”  includes
           summonses and commissions for the examination of  witnesses  and
           summonses to produce documents.”

The Division Bench in paragraph 9 of its  judgment  noted  that  Section  42
provides for the service of a notice by the arbitrator on a party before  he
proceeds to hear the case.  On the other hand in  paragraph  11,  the  court
held that Section 43 is confined to cases where a person,  whether  a  party
or  a  third  person,  is  required  to  appear  as  a  witness  before  the
arbitrator. Such witnesses whom the arbitrator or umpire desires to  examine
may be summoned
through court.
17.         We, therefore, fail to see as to how this judgment  can  advance
the submission of the appellant, though it was contended that Section 27  of
the Act of 1996 is similar to Section 43 of the Act of 1940.  On  the  other
hand, as stated above, the Division  Bench  judgment  of  Delhi  High  Court
clearly lays down that Section  43  of  the  pre-cursor  Act  permitted  the
arbitrator to call a third person as well as a party as a witness,  and  the
section was not confined only to calling third persons as witnesses.
18.         It was  contended  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  whereas
Section 43 used the phrase “parties  and  witnesses”,  Section  27  did  not
contain such a phrase, and it speaks of calling ‘any person’ as  a  witness.
Section 27(2) (c) does  provide  that  an  application  under  this  section
seeking assistance of the court shall specify the name and  address  of  any
person to be heard as a witness or as an expert  witness.   As  far  as  the
appearance of a party  in  pursuance  to  a  notice  of  the  arbitrator  is
concerned, there is a specific provision for  proceeding  in  the  event  of
default of a party under Section 25.
We may refer to Sections 25 and 27  in this behalf which read as follows:-

                 “25. Default of a party.- Unless otherwise  agreed  by  the
           parties, where, without showing sufficient cause,----


                 (a) the claimant fails  to  communicate  his  statement  of
           claim in accordance with sub-section  (1)  of  section  23,  the
           arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings;


                 (b) the respondent fails to communicate  his  statement  of
           defence in accordance with sub-section (1) of  section  23,  the
           arbitral  tribunal  shall  continue  the   proceedings   without
           treating  that  failure  in  itself  as  an  admission  of   the
           allegations by the claimant.


                 (c) a party fails to  appear  at  an  oral  hearing  or  to
           produce documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal may continue
           the proceedings and make the  arbitral  award  on  the  evidence
           before it.”


                 “27.Court assistance in taking evidence.- (1) The  arbitral
           tribunal, or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal,
           may apply to the Court for assistance in taking evidence.


                 (2) The application shall specify----


                 (a)  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  parties  and  the
           arbitrators.


                 (b) the general nature of the claim and the relief sought;


                 (c) the evidence to the obtained, in particular,----


                 (i) the name and address of  any  person  to  be  heard  as
                 witness or expert witness and a statement of  the  subject-
                 matter of the testimony required;


                 (ii) the description of any  document  to  be  produced  or
                 property to be inspected.


                 (3) The Court may, within its competence and  according  to
           its rules on taking evidence, execute the  request  or  ordering
           that the evidence be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal.




                 (4) The Court may, while making or order under  sub-section
           (3), issue the same processes to witnesses as it  may  issue  in
           suits tried before it.


                 (5) Persons failing  to  attend  in  accordance  with  such
           process, or making any other default, or refusing to give  their
           evidence, or guilty of any contempt  to  the  arbitral  tribunal
           during the conduct of arbitral proceedings, shall be subject  to
           the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments  by  order  of
           the Court on the representation of the arbitral tribunal as they
           would incur for the like offences  is  suits  tried  before  the
           Court.


                 (6) In this section  the  expression  "Processes"  includes
           summonses and commissions for the examination of  witnesses  and
           summonses to produce documents.”


19.         As seen from these two sections, Section 25  (c)  provides  that
in the event a party fails to appear  at  an  oral  hearing  or  to  produce
documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal may  continue  the  proceedings,
and make the arbitral award on the evidence before it.   This  evidence  can
be sought either from any third person or from a  party  to  the  proceeding
itself.  The substitution  of  the  phrase  “parties  and  witnesses”  under
Section 43 of the earlier act by the phrase ‘any  person’  cannot  make  any
difference, or cannot be read to whittle down the  powers  of  the  Arbitral
Tribunal to seek assistance from the court  where  any  person  who  is  not
cooperating with the Arbitral Tribunal or where  any  evidence  is  required
from any person, be it a party to  the  proceedings  or  others.  It  is  an
enabling provision, and it has to be read as such.  The  term  ‘any  person’
appearing under Section 27 (2) (c) is wide enough to cover  not  merely  the
witnesses, but also the parties to the proceeding. It is  undoubtedly  clear
that if a party fails to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal,  the  Tribunal
can proceed ex-parte, as provided under Section 25 (c).  At the  same  time,
it cannot be ignored that the Tribunal is required to make an award  on  the
merits of the claim placed before it.  For that  purpose,  if  any  evidence
becomes necessary,  the  Tribunal  ought  to  have  the  power  to  get  the
evidence, and it is for this purpose only that  this  enabling  section  has
been provided.


20.         The counsel for the appellant tried to  take  advantage  of  the
first sentence of paragraph 12 of the  Delhi  High  Court  judgment,   which
reads as follows:-

                 “(12) Section 43 has no application where the party  to  an
           arbitration agreement has to be summoned for  appearance  before
           the arbitrator so that he may participate in the proceedings and
           state his defense.”

We must however note, what the Division Bench has stated thereafter, in  the
very paragraph which is to the following effect.


                 “The learned  judge  seems  to  have  been  misled  by  the
           expression 'parties' appearing in section 43. The word 'parties'
           is used in the sense where the party itself  is  desired  to  be
           examined  as  a  witness  by  the  arbitrator  or  umpire.   The
           expression 'witnesses' used along with the word 'parties'  makes
           the meaning of the legislature abundantly clear.  The  principle
           of  construction  is  that  words  of  the  same  feather  flock
           together.”

As can be seen from the paragraph, the paragraph itself  says  that  Section
43 has no application for summoning a party to appear to participate in  the
proceeding.  It is meant for securing the presence of third persons as  well
as parties as witnesses.  This position cannot be said to be altered due  to
the absence of these words and use of the words ‘any person’ in  Section  27
of the Act of 1996.
21.         It was  contended  that  if  the  necessary  documents  are  not
produced, at the highest an adverse  inference  may  be  drawn  against  the
appellant.   That  is  a  power,  of  course  available  with  the  Arbitral
Tribunal, and if necessary the same can be used.  However,  as  observed  by
the learned Arbitrator in her order dated 27.3.2007,  the  documents  sought
in the present matter were required to arrive at the decision on  the  claim
of the respondent no. 1, since, the quantification in support of  the  claim
had  been  done  by  the  respondent  no.  1  on  a  theoretical  basis.   A
hypothetical calculation should not be resorted to  when  actual  Sales  Tax
Assessments are available, which would show as to  whether  the  quantum  of
set-off allowed and claimed was in fact justified.
22.         In the  circumstances,  there  is  no  substance  in  the  first
objection viz. an order passed by the earlier  Arbitrator  dated  27.3.2007,
and the subsequent enabling order passed  by  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  dated
16.9.2011 permitting the respondent to apply  under  Section  27  could  not
have been passed.

23.         The  second  objection  was  that  the  assessment  orders  were
confidential documents, and Section 71 of the Maharashtra Value  Added  Tax,
2002 and its pre-cursor Section 64 of the Bombay  Sales  Tax  Act,  did  not
permit production of these documents, and a direction as  sought  could  not
have been granted.  
Since, these two  sections  are  invoked,  the  relevant
part of both the sections are quoted below.


                 “Section  71  (1)  –  All  particulars  contained  in   any
           statement  made,  return  furnished  or  accounts  or  documents
           produced in accordance with  this  Act,  or  in  any  record  of
           evidence given in the course of any proceedings under  this  Act
           (other than proceeding before a Criminal Court) or in any record
           of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to  the
           recovery of a demand, prepared for  the  purposes  of  this  Act
           shall, save as  provided  in  sub-section  (3),  be  treated  as
           confidential; and  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the
           Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), no court  shall  save  as
           aforesaid, be entitled to require any servant of the  Government
           to produce  before  it  any  such  statement,  return,  account,
           document or record or any part thereof,  or  to  given  evidence
           before it in respect thereof.”


                 “Section  64  (1)  –  All  particulars  contained  in   any
           statement  made,  return  furnished  or  accounts  or  documents
           produced in accordance with  this  Act,  or  in  any  record  of
           evidence given in the course of any proceedings under  this  Act
           (other than proceeding before a Criminal Court) or in any record
           of any assessment proceeding, or any proceeding relating to  the
           recovery of a demand, prepared for  the  purposes  of  this  Act
           shall, save as  provided  in  sub-section  (3),  be  treated  as
           confidential; and  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the
           Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), no court  shall  save  as
           aforesaid, be entitled to require any servant of the  Government
           to produce  before  it  any  such  statement,  return,  account,
           document or record or any part thereof,  or  to  given  evidence
           before it in respect thereof.”

24.         If we look at the words used in these two  sections,  they  very
clearly state that particulars contained in any return or statement made  by
a party, or document produced  along  therewith  are  confidential,  and  no
court shall pass any order requiring the Government or a Government  servant
to produce any  such  statement,  document  or  return.
 It  is  a  settled
principle of law that the words used in a statute are to  be  read  as  they
are used, to the extent possible, to ascertain  the  meaning  thereof.  Both
these provisions contained a bar only against the Government  officers  from
producing the documents mentioned therein.  There is no bar therein  against
a party to produce any such document.  In Tulsiram  Sanganaria  and  Another
v. Srimati Anni Rai and Ors. reported in 1971 (1) SCC 284, 
a bench of  three
Judges of this Court interpreted an identical provision in Section 54(1)  of
the Income Tax Act, 1922, and held that the said provision created a bar  on
the production of the documents  mentioned  therein  by  the  officials  and
other servants of the Income Tax Department, and made it obligatory on  them
to treat as confidential the records and documents  mentioned  therein,  but
the assessee or  his  representative-in-interest  could  produce assessment orders as evidence, and such evidence was admissible.
Thus, if a  claim  is
to be decided on the basis of an order of assessment, the claimant as  well cannot be denied the right to seek a direction to  the 
party  concerned  to produce the assessment order.  
It  is  this  very  prayer  which  has  been
allowed by the earlier order dated 27.3.2007 passed by the then Arbitrator, and also by the subsequent order dated  16.9.2011 passed  by  the  Arbitral Tribunal, and in our view rightly so. There is no substance in  the  second objection as well.
25.         There is one more aspect which we  must  note,  i.e.,  when  the
first respondent made  an  application  for  production  of  the  assessment
orders, the  defence  taken  by  the  appellant  in  their  affidavit  dated
16.9.2011 was that those documents were confidential  documents,  and  could
not be directed to be produced.  It was not stated at  that  time  that  the
said documents were not available.  
It is ten months thereafter,  that  when
the second affidavit was filed in the High Court, that  the  respondent  for
the first time contended that the said documents were not  available.  
This was clearly an after thought, and this attitude of the Respondent in  a  way
justified the earlier order  permitting  an  application  under  Section  27
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.
The Assistant Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax
of the concerned area was also joined as respondent  so  that  he  could  be
directed to produce the required documents. 
However, he reported that  those
documents were old records, and were destroyed.
The  learned  Single  Judge
did  not  pass  any  order  against  the  respondent  No.2  to  produce  the
documents, as sought.
However, the learned  Single  Judge  rightly  allowed
the petition as against  the  appellant  in  terms  of  prayer  clause  ‘A’,
directing the appellant to produce the documents which were  sought  by  the
respondent no. 1.
26.         In the circumstances, there is no  merit  in  the  appeal.   
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

                                              …………..……………………..J.
                                       [ A.K. Patnaik]

                                                         ……………………………..J.
                                       [ H.L. Gokhale  ]
New Delhi
Dated : September 23, 2013























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