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Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Pension Scheme by Autonomous University with out approval of Governor which depends for Grants on Govt. - not valid = 39. Statutes how made – 1. Statutes under this Act shall be proposed by the Board and submitted to the Chancellor for his assent and shall come into force only after the assent is received and notified by the Vice-Chancellor. 2. Any statutes may be amended or repealed by the Board with the assent of the Chancellor. 3. All Statutes made under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette.”= Section 39 of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the Board of Management of the University to submit the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 to the Chancellor i.e. to the Governor of the State of Rajasthan before inviting options from the employees. If the assent of the Chancellor, i.e. the Governor of the State of Rajasthan is not received by the University, the amended statute would not come into force.- Upon carefully going through the statutory provisions, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have constrained the University to continue to pay pension to the respondent-employees, especially in view of the fact that the change effected in the payment of retiral benefits to the employees was never approved by the Chancellor of the University as required under Section 39 of the Act.- though the University is an autonomous body, it is much dependent on the State of Rajasthan in its financial matters. It gets substantial funds from the State for performing its duties and possibly for the said reason the State has control over it in the financial affairs. Be that as it may, Section 39 of the Act makes it mandatory to get approval or assent of the Chancellor of the University before effecting any change in the Statute.= For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant, whereby both the resolutions passed by the University in relation to giving options to its employees for changing the Contributory Provident Fund scheme to the Pension Scheme, is absolutely just and legal. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not correct while quashing and setting aside the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State of Rajasthan.= whether the University can continue to give pension to the employees? Answer to the question would be in the negative. If issuance of show cause notice is a mere formality, in our opinion, that would not affect the decision taken by the University in pursuance of the order dated 3rd June, 2011 because the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State is absolutely legal and by virtue of the said order, the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 passed by the University have been quashed. In the aforestated circumstances, we quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, which has confirmed the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge. The order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State shall operate and the employees shall be given retiral benefits as per the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme which was in force prior to 7th December, 2000. So far as the retired employees are concerned, they must have been paid pension in pursuance of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court. As all the appeals have been allowed, some financial adjustments will have to be made and possibly there would be some recovery from some of the employees. We clarify that upon overall adjustment of the entire amount, if any employee has to return any amount to the University, as a special case, no demand shall be raised by the University in view of the fact that the employees must have retired long back and they must have adjusted their financial affairs upon knowing the fact that they had a regular income of pension.

        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40829
                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8469       OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.12350 of 2013)


State of Rajasthan                                 …APPELLANT


                                VERSUS

A.N. Mathur & Ors.                           ....RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH

C.A.No.8470/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12351/2013, C.A.No.8471/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12352
/2013, C.A.No.8472/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12353/2013, C.A.No.8473/2013 @
SLP(C)No.12354/2013, C.A.No.8474/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12355/2013,
C.A.No.8475/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12356/2013,
C.A.No.8476/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12357/2013,C.A.No.8477/2013 @
SLP(C)No.12358/2013, C.A.No.8478/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12361/2013,
C.A.No.8479/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12362/2013 & C.A.No.8480/2013 @
SLP(C)No.14191/2013.


                              1 J U D G M E N T



1 ANIL R. DAVE, J.



1.    Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.


2.    Being aggrieved by  the  judgment  delivered  in  D.B.  Civil  Special
Appeal (Writ) No.431 of 2012 in S.B. Civil Writ  Petition  No.9843  of  2011
dated 19th July, 2012,  delivered  by  the  High  Court  of  Rajasthan,  the
appellant-State of Rajasthan has filed the present set of appeals.


3.    As all the appeals arise out of a common  judgment  delivered  by  the
Rajasthan High Court, all the appeals were heard together at the request  of
the learned counsel appearing for the concerned parties.





4.    The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in  a  nutshell,  are
as under:

      Maharana Pratap University of Agriculture and Technology  (hereinafter
called ‘the University’) is an autonomous body performing the   function  of
making provisions for imparting education in different  branches  of  study,
particularly   Agriculture,   Horticulture,   Veterinary   Science,   Animal
Husbandry etc. to the students and is constituted under  the  provisions  of
the  Rajasthan  Agricultural  University,  Udaipur  Act,  2000  (hereinafter
referred to as  ‘the  Act’).  
The  University  is  the  employer  of  other
respondents, who had been  either  working  under  the  University  and  now
retired or they are still in the employment of the University.


5.    The University had framed a Provident Fund Scheme for  its  employees.
Accordingly, in the past, upon retirement, the employees of  the  University
used  to  get  their  own  contribution  as  well  as  contribution  of  the
University by  way  of  retiral  benefits  as  per  the  provisions  of  the
Contributory Provident Fund Scheme.  
On 7th December,  2000,  the  Board  of
Management of the University passed a resolution whereby it gave  an  option
to its employees to either continue under the  Contributory  Provident  Fund Scheme or to opt for  a  pension  scheme  under  the  Pension  Rules,  1990.
Certain employees had opted for the pension scheme.  
Once again,  the  Board
of Management of the University passed another resolution on 18th  December,
2009 inviting options from the employees as to whether they wanted  to  join
the Pension Scheme or wanted to continue under  the  Contributory  Provident
Fund Scheme. In pursuance of the second resolution, some more employees  had
opted for the pension scheme.


6.    Though the University is an  autonomous  body  constituted  under  the
provisions of ‘the Act’, it is dependant on the appellant in  its  financial
matters, as the University is unable to generate sufficient  funds  to  meet
with its expenditure.
According to Section 36 of the  Act,  the  appellant-
has to provide grant to the University to meet its  expenditure,  especially
in relation to the expenditure pertaining to salary and allowances given  to
its employees.  
Thus,  the  University  gets  substantial  funds  from  the
appellant. Due to the option exercised by several  employees  in  favour  of
the  pension  scheme,  financial  burden  of   the   University   had   been
substantially increased and the said burden was ultimately to be  discharged
by the appellant.  
It is pertinent to note here and it is an  admitted  fact
that before giving such an option under the resolutions dated 7th  December,
2000 and 18th December, 2009,  the  University  did  not  even  consult  the appellant in the matter of changing the scheme with  regard  to  payment  of retiral benefits to its employees.





7.    The appellant was unaware of the resolutions passed by  the  Board  of
Management  of  the  University,  whereby  its  employees  were  offered  an
opportunity to opt for the pension  scheme,
but  upon  getting  information
about the change effected by the University regarding implementation of  the Pension Scheme, upon due deliberation  by  the  Finance  Department  of  the appellant, under its order dated 3rd  June,  2011,  the  appellant  did  not approve the same.





8.    When the order dated 3rd June, 2011 issued by the appellant  had  been
communicated to the University, by an order dated 30th November,  2011,  the
University withdrew its  resolutions  dated  7th  December,  2000  and  18th
December, 2009.





9.    As  a  result  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  two  resolutions  by  the
University on 30th November, 2011, the employees,  who  had  opted  for  the
pension scheme were deprived of the benefit of the pension scheme,  and  the
University had to make necessary accounting adjustments for  making  payment
of the provident fund to the employees, which the  employees  were  entitled
to upon their retirement.  Some of the employees are very  much  in  service
and therefore, there was no question of any recovery and the University  had
to merely pass necessary book entries.





10.   Upon the Pension Scheme being abolished and as the  employees  had  to
either pay back the amount of pension received from the University  or  they
had to accept the Contributory Provident Fund scheme,  they  had  approached
the High Court of Rajasthan by filing several writ petitions.
Some  of  the
employees, who had  not  opted  for  the  pension  scheme,  had  also  filed
petitions praying that they be permitted to opt for the pension scheme  even
if there was delay in opting for the same.
The said writ petitions had  been
heard together by the learned single Judge of the High Court  and  they  had
been allowed by a common judgment dated 5th April, 2012.  
By virtue of  the
said judgment, the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the  appellant-  the
Government of Rajasthan had been  quashed  and  as  a  result  thereof,  the
employees who had opted for the Pension Scheme were to be  paid  pension  by
the University in accordance with the Pension Rules.





11.   Being aggrieved by the aforestated judgment delivered by  the  learned
Single Judge, the University preferred  intra-court  appeals  and  the  said
appeals have been dismissed by the Division  Bench  of  the  Rajasthan  High Court by virtue of  the  impugned  judgment  and  therefore,  the  State  of Rajasthan has filed these appeals because ultimately, the burden of  payment of pension to the employees would be passed over to the State  of  Rajasthan
as per Section 36 of the Act.


12.   The learned counsel appearing for  the  appellant,  while  challenging
the validity of the impugned judgment as well as the judgment  delivered  by
the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court  had  mainly  submitted
that the Resolutions passed by the Board of  Management  of  the  University
inviting options in relation to the Pension Scheme were in violation of  the
provisions of Section 39 of the Act.  Extracts of Sections 38 and 39 of  the
Acts are reproduced hereinbelow:

      “38.  Statutes – Subject to the provisions of this Act,  the  Statutes
      of the university may  provide  for  any  matter  connected  with  the
      affairs of  the  university  and  shall  in  particular,  provide  the
      following namely:-
           1. to 6.   xxx xxx xxx.
           7. Establishment  of  pension  and  insurance  schemes  for  the
           benefit  of  officers,  teachers  and  other  employees  of  the
           University and the rules, terms and conditions of such schemes.
           8 to 14.  xxx xxx xxx”
      “39.  Statutes how made –
           1. Statutes under this Act shall be proposed by  the  Board  and
              submitted to the Chancellor for his  assent  and  shall  come
              into force only after the assent is received and notified  by
              the Vice-Chancellor.
           2. Any statutes may be amended or repealed by the Board with the
              assent of the Chancellor.
           3. All Statutes made under this Act shall be  published  in  the
              official Gazette.”

  13. Section 38 of the  Act  clearly  indicates  that  the  University  can
      provide for any matter connected with the affairs  of  the  University
      and in particular, the matters  which  have  been  referred  to  under
      Section 38 of the Act.  
In the instant case,  we  are  concerned  with
      clause  7  of  Section  38  of  the  Act,  which  also   pertains   to
      establishment of pension scheme for the benefit of  the  employees  of
      the University.  
Thus, it is open to the University to frame or change
      any  scheme  with  regard  to  payment  of  retiral  benefits  to  its
      employees.





  14. In the instant case, the University wanted to change  the  scheme–from  the Contributory Provident Fund scheme  to  the  Pension  Scheme.
The
      University had given option to its employees to  opt  either  for  the
      Pension Scheme or to continue with  the  Contributory  Provident  Fund
      scheme and for that purpose, two resolutions, viz.  resolutions  dated
      7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009  had  been  passed  by  the
      Board of Management of the University.  
 In  the  said  process,  the
      University missed to look at the provisions of Section 39, which makes
      it obligatory for the Board of Management of the University to  submit
      the proposed amendment to  the  Chancellor  for  his  assent  and  the
      amended statute would  come  into  force  only  after  the  assent  is
      received and notified by the Vice-Chancellor of  the  University.
The
      Chancellor, as per the provisions of Section 2(h) read with
Section 8 of the Act, is the Governor of the State of Rajasthan.





15.   According to the aforestated provision of Section 39 of  the  Act,  it
was obligatory on the part of the Board of Management of the  University  to
submit the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December,  2009  to
the Chancellor i.e. to  the  Governor  of  the  State  of  Rajasthan  before
inviting options from the employees.  If the assent of the Chancellor,  i.e.
the Governor of the State of Rajasthan is not received  by  the  University,
the amended statute would not come into force.





16.   The aforestated provisions in Section 39  of  the  Act  are  of  vital
importance because the legislature wanted to  have  some  control  over  the
University, though the University is an autonomous body.
The reason  behind
having such a control could be for the fact that  the  University  is  given
substantial financial assistance by the appellant as one can  see  from  the
provisions of Section 36 of the Act.
Any financial  liability  is  incurred
by the University that is to be  ultimately  discharged  by  the  University
with the financial help of the State.





17.   The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  had  vehemently
submitted that before considering the change in the scheme  with  regard  to
giving different retiral benefits to its employees, the Board of  Management
of the University ought to have taken consent of the  Chancellor,  i.e.  the
Governor of the State of Rajasthan because the  increased  financial  burden
was to be borne by the State of Rajasthan.  Thus,  without  consent  of  the
State of Rajasthan,  who  is  ultimately  going  to  be  burdened  with  the
financial  liability  relating  to  payment  of  retirement  benefits,   the
University could not have changed the policy with regard to payment  of  the
retirement benefits.





18.    When  the  facts  about  the  resolutions  passed  by  the  Board  of
Management  of  the  University,  which  had  not  been  approved   by   the
Chancellor, were brought to the notice of the State of Rajasthan,  the  said
resolutions were duly considered by the State of Rajasthan and when  it  was
found that because of the said resolutions financial liability of the  State
was being increased for no justifiable reason, the State was constrained  to
pass the order dated 3rd June, 2011, whereby both the resolutions passed  by
the Board of Management of the University had been quashed and set aside.





19.   Thus, the  short  but  forceful  submission  of  the  learned  counsel
appearing for the State was that the change effected  in  the  scheme  under
which the employees were given retiral benefits was not legal or was not  in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and therefore, the  employees  who
had opted for the Pension Scheme cannot be given pension and they will  have
to  continue  with  the  Contributory  Provident  Fund   scheme.    In   the
circumstances, he had prayed that the appeals  should  be  allowed  and  the
impugned judgment confirming  the  judgment  of  the  learned  single  Judge
should be quashed and set aside.





20.   On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing  for  the  University
had  passively  supported  the  submissions  made  by  the  learned  counsel
appearing for the State and he had to admit the fact  that  before  inviting
options from the employees in pursuance of the two resolutions  referred  to
hereinabove, approval of the Chancellor, i.e. the Governor of the  State  of
Rajasthan  had  not  been  obtained  by  the  Board  of  Management  of  the
University.





21.   The appeal was vehemently opposed on behalf of the  employees  of  the
respondent- University.





22.   The learned counsel appearing for the  employees  had  submitted  that
the employees had opted for the Pension Scheme within the period  prescribed
by the resolutions passed by the Board of Management of the  University  and
therefore, the University had no right to make  any  change  in  the  policy
thereafter.





23.   It had been further submitted that some of  the  respondent  employees
had also started getting pension upon their retirement in pursuance  of  the
option exercised by them.
According to the learned  counsel,  it  would  be
unjust to change the scheme with regard to the retiral benefits  considering
the lapse of time and it would be unfair to the employees  who  are  getting
pension as per the option exercised by them. 
 It had been further  submitted
that the change effected in the policy with regard  to  payment  of  retiral
benefits by the University was retrospective in  nature  and  therefore,  it
was bad in law.





24.   The learned counsel appearing for the  employees  had  also  submitted
that before effecting change in the scheme, no notice  was  ever  issued  to
the employees and therefore, the action of the  withdrawal  of  the  Pension
Scheme was against the principles of natural justice.





25.   The learned counsel appearing for  the  employees  had  supported  the
reasons given in the impugned judgment and had also submitted  that  certain
other universities in the State of Rajasthan were also giving benefit  of  a
pension scheme to its employees and therefore, there  was  no  justification
on the part of the University from preventing  its  employees  from  getting
the benefit of the Pension Scheme.  He had, therefore,  submitted  that  the
appeals should be dismissed.





26.   We have heard  the  learned  counsel  at  length  and  have  carefully
considered the provisions of the Act, and  the  resolutions  passed  by  the
University as well  as  the  order  dated  3rd  June,  2011  passed  by  the
appellant-State.





27.   Upon carefully going through the statutory provisions, we are  of  the view that the High Court ought not to have  constrained  the  University  to continue to pay pension to the respondent-employees, especially in  view  of the fact that the change effected in the payment of retiral benefits to  the employees was  never  approved  by  the  Chancellor  of  the  University  as required under Section 39 of the Act.





28.   As stated hereinabove, though the University is  an  autonomous  body,
it is much dependent on the State of Rajasthan  in  its  financial  matters.
It gets substantial funds from the  State  for  performing  its  duties  and
possibly for the said reason the State has control over it in the  financial
affairs. Be that as it may, Section 39 of the Act makes it mandatory to  get
approval or assent of the Chancellor of the University before effecting  any
change in the Statute.


29.   In spite of clear and unambiguous provisions  of  Section  39  of  the
Act, the Board of Management of the University did not get necessary  assent
of the Chancellor, i.e. the  Governor  of  the  State  of  Rajasthan  before
effecting the change in  the  scheme  with  regard  to  payment  of  retiral
benefits to its employees.  The change in scheme would result  into  a  huge
financial liability on the University, which  ultimately  will  have  to  be
borne by the appellant- the State of Rajasthan.   Had  the  University  been
having complete autonomy  and  had  been  not  dependent  on  the  State  of
Rajasthan in its financial matters, possibly Section 39  of  the  Act  would
not have been incorporated in the  Act  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  at
present.  When the appellant is reimbursing the expenditure incurred by  the
University by giving grants or financial aids in one form or the other,  the
control exercised by the State on the University in  the  financial  matters
is completely justified. The University cannot unilaterally decide  to  give
huge financial benefit to  its  employees  without  taking  consent  of  the
Chancellor, i.e. the Governor of the State of Rajasthan in violation of  the
provisions of Section 39 of the Act.





30.   From the contents of the order dated 3rd June,  2011,  passed  by  the
State of Rajasthan it is clear that because of the  changed  policy  adopted
by the University in the matter of payment of the retiral  benefits  to  its
employees,  financial  burden  on  the  University  would  be  substantially
increased and ultimately that burden will  have  to  be  discharged  by  the
State of Rajasthan.  As the University had taken the  decision  to  give  an
option to its employees for changing the manner in which  they  were  to  be
given retiral benefits in violation of Section 39 of the Act, the  State  of
Rajasthan was entitled to reject the change effected by the University.





31.   For the aforestated reasons, in  our  opinion,  the  order  dated  3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant, whereby both the resolutions  passed  by the University in relation to giving options to its employees  for  changing the Contributory Provident Fund scheme to the Pension Scheme, is  absolutely just and legal.
We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was  not
correct while quashing and setting aside the  order  dated  3rd  June,  2011
passed by the appellant-State of Rajasthan.


32.   A submission had been made on behalf of the employees that some  other
universities in the State of Rajasthan are giving pension to its  employees.
 Be that as it may, each University has a different  set  of  rules  and  if
another university had adopted a different policy in accordance with law  or
as per its rules and regulations, we cannot say that  the  order  dated  3rd
June, 2011 passed by the appellant is incorrect.  According to us, the  said
submission is not  relevant  and  therefore,  we  do  not  accept  the  said
submission.





33.   So far as the submission with regard to violation  of  the  principles
of natural justice is concerned, in our opinion, by not  giving  hearing  to
the concerned employees, the action  of  the  University  would  not  become
void. Violation of one of the principles of natural justice would  make  the
action voidable and not void.





34.   Let us see as to what would happen if the University gives notices  to
all the employees calling upon them to show  cause  as  to  why  the  option
exercised by them should not be cancelled so  as  to  restore  the  original
scheme of the Contributory  Provident  Fund.  
Even  after  considering  the
replies of the  employees,  the  question  is
whether  the  University  can continue to give pension to the employees?  
Answer to the question would  be
in the negative.  If issuance of show cause notice is a mere  formality,  in
our opinion, that would not affect the decision taken by the  University  in
pursuance of the order dated 3rd June, 2011  because  the  order  dated  3rd
June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State is absolutely legal and  by  virtue
of the said order,  the  resolutions  dated  7th  December,  2000  and  18th
December, 2009 passed by the University have been quashed.





35.   In view of the above circumstances, we are of the view  that  even  if
the employees were not given any notice, the final  decision  taken  by  the
University is not bad in law.





36.   In the aforestated circumstances, we quash and set aside the  impugned
judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court,  which
has confirmed the judgment delivered  by  the  learned  single  Judge.   
The
order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State shall  operate  and
the employees shall be  given  retiral  benefits  as  per  the  Contributory
Provident Fund Scheme which was in force prior to 7th  December,  2000.  
 So
far as the retired  employees  are  concerned,  they  must  have  been  paid
pension in pursuance of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of  the
High  Court.   
As  all  the  appeals  have  been  allowed,  some   financial
adjustments will have to be made and possibly there would be  some  recovery
from some of the employees.  
We clarify that upon overall adjustment of  the
entire amount, if any employee has to return any amount to  the  University,
as a special case, no demand shall be raised by the University  in  view  of
the fact that the employees must have retired long back and they  must  have
adjusted their financial affairs upon knowing  the  fact  that  they  had  a
regular income of pension.  
We also clarify that if  prior  to  passing  the
resolution dated 7th December, 2000  by  the  Board  of  Management  of  the
University, if there  was  any  scheme  about  payment  of  pension  to  its
employees and if some of the  employees  had  opted  for  the  said  scheme,
payment of pension to such employees would not  be  affected  by  virtue  of
this judgment.


37.   The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.



…..……………................J.

(ANIL R. DAVE)



                                          ….................................
                                          ....J.

(DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi
September 23,  2013.


ITEM NO.1A                COURT NO.12            SECTION XV
(For judgment)

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12350/2013

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                         Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

A.N. MATHUR & ORS.                          Respondent(s)

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12351 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12352 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12353 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12354 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12355 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12356 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12357 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12358 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12361 of 2013,
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).12362 of 2013 &
CIVIL APPEAL No........../2013 @ SLP(C)No(s).14191 of 2013.

Date: 23/09/2013  These Appeals were called on for
                    pronouncement of Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)      Dr. Manish Singhvi,AAG
                       Mr. Amit Lubhaya,Adv.
                    Ms. Pragati Neekhra,AOR

For Respondent(s)      Mr. Vivek Tankha,Sr.Adv.
                    Mr. T. Mahipal,AOR
                       Mr. Rishabh Sancheti,Adv.
                     Mr. Padmapriya,Adv.

                     Mr. Milind Kumar,AOR
                     Ms. Charu Mathur,AOR
                        Mr. Mukul Kumar,AOR
                                                                       ..2/-
                                     .2.



            Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave pronounced the reportable  judgment  of
      the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra and His Lordship.
            The appeals are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  reportable
      judgment.




    |(Sarita Purohit)                        | |(Indu Pokhriyal)                  |
|Court Master                            | |Court Master                      |



             (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)


Monday, September 23, 2013

One accused is acquitted due to non-mention of his name in FIR and also no attributions or overt acts against him ; Death penalty converted in imprisonment to life = Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan Singh is sound counsel on this count which shall stand us in good stead – whenever in the given circumstances, there is difference of opinion with respect to any sentencing prop (sic)/rationale, or subjectivity involved in the determining factors, or lack of thoroughness in complying with the sentencing procedure, it would be advisable to fall in favour of the “rule” of life imprisonment rather than invoking the “exception” of death punishment.”= In the present case, even if we decide to ignore the similar deficiencies in the prosecution, and look into the oral evidence which has come on record, the case of prosecution against appellant no: 2, Naresh Paswan is rather weak. His name was not mentioned in the FIR. PW-2 Birendra Singh who is an injured witness, though states in the dock that he had seen the appellants slitting the throats, he failed to identify Naresh Paswan in Court. None of the other witnesses including PW-3 Lawlesh Singh, who is another injured witness, have attributed any role to him. None of them said that he was a member of MCC. It is material to note that Madhusudan who was named at Sr. No.5 in the FIR also faced a similar allegation. It was PW-2 Birendra Singh who named Madhusudan as one of the accused who slit the throats of the deceased, but had failed to identify him in the dock. In the absence of other witnesses throwing any light on his participation in the occurrence, Madhusudan was acquitted by the learned designated Judge. = (i) In the circumstances, Crl. Appeal No.791 of 2009 is allowed in part. The judgment convicting appellant no.2, accused Naresh Paswan is set- aside, and he will stand acquitted. He is acquitted of the offences for which he was charged, and it is ordered that he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. (ii) As far as appellant nos.1 and 3, accused Vyas Ram and Bugal Mochi are concerned, although their conviction under the offences for which they were charged is upheld, the death sentence awarded to them is commuted to imprisonment for life, which is to mean the rest of their natural life. (iii) Consequently, the Death Reference Case (R) No.2 of 2011 filed by State of Bihar is hereby dismissed.

          published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40818
                                                        REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       Criminal Appeal No.791 OF 2009

Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar & Ors.                 ...     Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Bihar                                     ...        Respondent

                                    With

                    Death Reference Case (R) No.2 of 2011


State of Bihar                                     ...       Applicant

                                   Versus


Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar & Ors.                 ...        Respondents



                          J  U  D  G  E  M  E  N  T



H.L. Gokhale J.

            This Criminal Appeal No. 791/2009 filed by Vyas Kahar alias Vyas-
jee, Naresh Paswan and Bugal Mochi alias Bugal Ravidas
 seeks  to  challenge
the Death sentence awarded to them by the Sessions  Judge-of  the-Designated
Court, Gaya, State of Bihar, by his judgment and order dated  11.02.2009  in
C.R Case No.430 of 1992 arising out of Tekri PS  Case  No.19/1992.
All  of
them have been convicted and sentenced to death under Section  3(1)  of  The
Terrorists and  Disruptive  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1987  (hereafter
referred to as  TADA),  and  for  life  imprisonment  on  each  count  under
Sections 302 read with 149, 364 r/w 149, 307 r/w 149 of  Indian  Penal  Code
(IPC in short), for rigorous imprisonment for 10  years  under  Section  436
r/w 149 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for 1 year under Section 435 r/w  149
IPC.  The Death Reference Case (R) No.2 of 2011 arises out of the  award  of
death sentence made by the said learned Judge under Section 366 of the  Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) r/w Section 19 of TADA.

The initiation of prosecution
2.          As per the First  Information  Report  (FIR)  dated  13.02.1992,
there was a gruesome carnage in which 35 persons were killed, and 7  persons
were injured.
All of them belonged to the  Bhumihar  community  of  village
Bara, police station Tekari, District Gaya, State of  Bihar.
The  FIR  was
lodged on the basis of  the  fard-bayan  of  the  informant  Satendra  Kumar
Sharma who had stated that at 9:30 pm on 12.02.92, when  the  informant  was
preparing to go to bed, he heard sounds of explosions and  firing.   He  saw
the village ablaze.
About 10-15 unknown people knocked at the door  of  his
house violently, and told him that they had come to  pick  up  one  Dayanand
and Haridwar Singh, as according to them they were  hidden  in  one  of  the
houses.
When the informant opened the door, he was  forcibly  taken  to  the
north-eastern side of the village, near a  temple.  He  found  many  of  his
relatives sitting there, and their hands  were  tied  at  the  back  by  the
extremists.  
Soon thereafter 5-6 people including  one  of  the  appellants,
viz. Bugal Mochi came there, and told the  other  extremists  to  bring  all
those people near  the  canal  since  their  leader  one  Kirani  Yadav  had
directed so. The ladies were sent home, and these  people  were  taken  near
the canal.  The informant  claims  that  he  had  overheard  the  extremists
saying that they did not  intend  to  spare  any  person  belonging  to  the
Bhumihar caste. Some firing was  heard  from  the  west,  and  some  of  the
extremists, including Bugal Mochi fearing  the  arrival  of  police  started
slitting the necks of people.
The  informant  somehow  managed  to  escape,
though he lists some 37 persons whose dead bodies he claims  to  have  seen.
He also mentions the name of 8  injured  people.
The  extremists  retreated
soon  after  the  arrival  of  police,  shouting  slogans  of  “MCC  (Maoist
Communist  Centre)  zindabad”.
According  to  him  there  were  about  500
extremists in all, out of  whom  some  300  were  armed  with  firearms  and
explosives, and many were in police uniform.  
He named 34 people in the  FIR
including two of the appellants viz. Vyas Ram and Bugal Mochi, but the  name
of Naresh Paswan is not mentioned.
3.          On the statement of the informant,  the  police  registered  the
case under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA, and under Sections  147,  148,  149,
302, 307, 326, 436, 452, 341 and 342 of IPC.
During the investigation,  many
arrests were made, and the  confessional  statement  of  Bihari  Manjhi  was
recorded.
After  further  investigation  the  charge-sheet  was   submitted
against as many as 119 persons, out  of  whom  13  were  brought  to  trial,
showing the remaining persons as absconders.

Proceeding of the trial at the earlier stage
4.           The learned Designated Judge who conducted  the  trial  of  the
Case C.R. No.430  of  1992,  by  his  judgment  and  order  dated  8.6.2001,
acquitted four of these  accused  viz.  Nanhey  Yadav,  Nanak  Teli,  Naresh
Chamar  and  Ramashish  Mahto.
Four  other  accused  viz.  Krishna  Mochi,
Dharmendra Singh alias Dharu Singh, Nanhey Lal Mochi and  Veer  Kuer  Paswan
alias Veer Kuer Dusadh were sentenced to death under Section 3(1)  of  TADA,
and for life imprisonment under Section 302 r/w 149  of  IPC.   
Their  death
sentence was confirmed by a bench  of  three  judges  of  this  Court  by  a
majority of two versus one, on 15.04.2002 in Criminal Appeal No.761 of  2001
read with Death Reference No.1 of 2001 i.e.  Krishna  Mochi  and  Others  v.
State of Bihar reported in 2002 (6) SCC 81 (wherein the Senior Judge on  the
bench viz. Hon’ble Mr. Justice  M.B.  Shah,  rendered  a  separate  judgment
acquitting Dharmendra Singh and commuting the death sentence  of  the  other
three to life imprisonment).
5.           Another group of accused facing  the  said  trial  viz.  Bihari
Manjhi, Ramautar Dusadh alias  Lakhan  Dusadh,  Rajendra  Paswan  and  Wakil
Yadav though convicted  under  Section  3(1)  of  TADA,  were  sentenced  to
rigorous imprisonment for  life  on  each  count.  
Bihari  Manjhi,  Ramautar
Dusadh and Wakil Yadav  filed  one  appeal,  and  Rajendra  Paswan  filed  a separate one. 
Both these appeals were  heard  together  and  allowed.  
Their
conviction and sentence was set aside by this Court in a unanimous  judgment of the same bench of three judges rendered on the same day  i.e.  15.04.2002 in Bihari Manjhi and Others v. State of Bihar and Rajendra Paswan  v.  State of Bihar, reported in 2002 (4) SCC 352.

Acquittal of three other accused in the present proceeding
6.          Three other accused viz. Tyagi  Manjhi  alias  Tyagi-jee,  Vijay
Yadav and Madhusudan Sharma, were tried along with  the  present  appellants
subsequently, as all of them were absconding at  the  time  of  the  earlier
mentioned proceeding. The charges were framed against them on  15.04.04.  As
reflected in the presently impugned judgment  and  order,  all  the  accused
pleaded to be not guilty, and took the defence  of  false  implication.   At
the end of the trial, the above  referred  Tyagi  Manjhi,  Vijay  Yadav  and
Madhusudan Sharma were acquitted for want of sufficient evidence. The  three
appellants herein were, however, held guilty and sentenced to death  amongst
other punishments as mentioned earlier.
7.          The designated court observed that as far as the accused,  Tyagi
Manjhi and Vijay Yadav were concerned, both of them had been  named  in  the
confessional  statement  of  Bihari  Manjhi  but  that  confession  was  not accepted to be reliable by the Supreme Court in Bihari Manjhi and Others  v. State of Bihar (supra). 
The aforesaid confessional statement  had  not  been
produced before  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  while  producing  the  accused Bihari Manjhi before him, and the said statement was produced for the  first time at the time of the trial i.e. after a lapse  of  five  years  from  the date of its  alleged  recording.  
Thus  it  was  hit  by  rule  15  of  TADA (Prevention) Rules, 1987. 
In  the  absence  of  other  evidence,  these  two
accused were therefore acquitted, as it was held that  the  prosecution  had not been able to prove the charges against them. 
As far  as  Madhusudan  was
concerned, he was named in the FIR at  serial  no.5.  The  only  prosecution witness, 
PW2, Birendra Singh who had named him as one  of  the  accused  who had slit throats of the deceased, had failed to identify him  in  the  dock.
There was no other evidence to throw light  on  his  participation  in  this
incident. Madhusudan was also accordingly acquitted.
Prosecution case against the present appellants
8.          Appellant No.1 Vyas Ram who was named in the FIR at serial  no.1
had been identified by PW-2, Birendra Singh. He had identified  him  in  the
dock also. He had also been identified by PW-16  Brajesh  Kumar,  and  PW-17
Bunda Singh who had identified all the appellants in  the  dock.   Appellant
No.3 Bugal Mochi had been identified by PW-2, PW-3 Lawlesh Singh  and  PW-15
Ram Sagar Singh apart from PW-16 and PW-17.  Appellant  No.2  Naresh  Paswan
was also identified by all of these witnesses except PW-3.
9.          The evidence of these  prosecution  witnesses  was  held  to  be
sufficient to show their participation in the crime since they were held  to
be members of an unlawful  assembly,  and  were  sentenced  to  death  under
Section 3(1) of  TADA,  and  for  life  imprisonment  on  each  count  under
Sections 302 r/w 149, 364 r/w 149, 307 r/w 149 of I.P.C,  and  for  rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years  under  Section  436  r/w  149  IPC  and  rigorous
imprisonment for 1 year under Section 435 r/w 149 IPC.

Submissions by the appellants
10.          The  main  grounds  raised  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants Ms. Kamini Jaiswal to challenge the impugned order  are  the
 non
application of TADA in the present case, the effect of the  amended  Section
20A of TADA, unreliable investigation especially in the  light  of  the  non
examination of the informant, and the belated recording of the statement  of
the witnesses. The learned counsel for the appellants, has referred  to  the
supplementing opinion of Katju J. in Vijay Kumar Baldev Sharma v.  State  of
Maharashtra reported in 2007 (12) SCC 687, and  submitted  that  after  TADA
came to an automatic end on  24.05.1995,  and  when  there  was  no  further
extension of the period for  which  the  act  would  remain  in  force,  the
continuation of the   proceeding thereafter was  clearly  violative  of  the
constitution.
11.         It was further submitted that the prosecution had not been  able
to prove the notification of the notified area  as  required  under  Section
2(f) of TADA, and therefore, the constitution of the  designated  court  for
this area under Section 9(1) of the act was bad.
Section 9(1) of  the  TADA
lays down that “The Central  Government  or  the  State  Government  may  by
notification in the official  Gazette  constitute  one  or  more  designated
courts, for such an area or areas or for such case  or  class  or  group  of
cases as may be specified in the Notification.” It is, therefore,  necessary
to prove that the area/district where the occurrence took place is  notified
under Section 2(f) to invoke TADA.
12.         The learned counsel for appellants also relied
 on  the  amended
Section 20A which came into existence on 22-05-1993.  According  to  Section
20A(1) no information in the form of FIR  can  be  recorded  by  the  police
without prior  written  approval  of  the  District  Superintendent  of  the
police.  
That is the condition precedent for recording of the  FIR,  and  no
cognizance of an offence can be taken without compliance of Section  20A(1).
 It was contended that in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur  v.  State  of  Maharashtra
reported in AIR 1994 SC 2623, this Court has held that the  amended  Section
20A had retrospective effect.
13.         However, most of these arguments have already been  rejected  by
the relevant observations in the majority judgment of this  Court  in  Death
reference 1/2001, i.e. Krishna Mochi’s case  (supra)  decided  on  15.04.02.
Besides as far as applicability of Section 20A is concerned, the  submission
on behalf of the appellant is not wholly correct.  
In fact  at  the  end  of
paragraph 25 of Hitendra Thakur  (supra),  this  court  has  held  that  the
amendment of 1993 would apply to the cases which were pending  investigation
on 22.5.1993, and in which the challan had not  been  filed  in  Court  till
then. The present case was registered on 13.02.1992,  the  charge-sheet  was
submitted on 12.02.1993, and the cognizance  was  taken  6  days  thereafter
i.e. on 18.02.1993. Thus, all these steps  were  taken  before  coming  into
force of the amendment act.  Therefore,  the  appellants  cannot  claim  the
benefit of the amendment, nor does the case cited  by  them  come  to  their
rescue.
14.         Non-examination of the informant is once again stressed  by  the
appellants in defence. The informant is, as claimed  by  the  appellants,  a
member of Sawarna Liberation Front, and  was  the  accused  in  the  carnage
known as Miyanpur Narsanghar. Non examination of S.I. Ram Japit  Kumar  also
weakens the  prosecution’s  case,  because  according  to  the  counsel  for
appellants he was entrusted with the preliminary investigation, but  neither
the case diary was brought in, nor was he examined.
15.         The learned senior counsel for the State Mr. Rai  on  the  other
hand submitted that the above submission  is  completely  misconceived,  and
reiterated the findings of the Apex Court in para 35  of  Krishna  Mochi  v.
State (supra) viz. that an F.I.R is not a  substantial  piece  of  evidence,
and non-examination of the informant would not entitle the appellants to  an
order of acquittal on this ground alone.  The case  should  be  examined  on
the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution.  The carnage  of  Miyanpur
had taken place after the carnage  in  the  present  case.  The  prosecution
witnesses in the present case had supported the Fard-Bayan. As far  as  non-
examination of Ram Japit Kumar is concerned, it was submitted  that  he  was
directed to investigate the case  under  the  verbal  orders  of  Suptd.  of
Police, Gaya.  However, Ram Japit Kumar never  made  himself  available  for
taking over the investigation of the case, and then  the  investigation  was
consequently entrusted to Suresh Chander Sharma, who had been examined as  a
prosecution witness (PW-21).  This has also been observed in para 36 of  the
judgment in Krishna Mochi (supra).
16.         Furthermore, the appellants have stressed upon the fact that  no
particular role was assigned to them, and in such a  scenario  there  cannot
be any conviction, leave aside the death sentence, for merely being  present
in the unlawful assembly at the place of incident. In Baladin  v.  State  of
U.P reported in AIR 1956 SC 181 a bench of three Judges  held  in  paragraph
19 as follows:-

                 “19.  … It  is  well  settled  that  mere  presence  in  an
           assembly does not make such a person a  member  of  an  unlawful
           assembly unless it is  shown  that  he  had  done  something  or
           omitted to do something which would make  him  a  member  of  an
           unlawful assembly, or unless the case falls under  section  142,
           Indian Penal Code.”

The Court was concerned with a trial of some 57  persons  for  murder  of  6
persons, out of whom 36 were  convicted  under  Sections  148,  201/149  and
302/149 IPC, and 9 of whom were sentenced to death, and  others  were  given
different punishments for the roles assigned to them.  This  court  examined
the evidence, and  upheld  their  sentences  including  death.   Where  some
specific role was attributed to some of the accused like inciting  the  mob,
the court held in paragraph 24 of  the  judgment  that  the  theory  of  the
person being a mere sight-seer will not help them.   However,  at  the  same
time, where the court found  that  four  of  the  appellants  had  not  been
assigned any particular part in the occurrence, nor any overt act  had  been
attributed to them, they were given benefit  of  doubt  and  acquitted.  The
court held in paragraph 28 that “they might possibly  have  been  spectators
who got mixed up in the crowd.”
17.         In Masalti v. State of U.P. reported in AIR  1965  SC  202,  the
accused had brutally killed one Gayadin and four members of his family,  and
then set the bodies on fire in the middle of the field.  This  had  happened
due  to  rivalry  between  two  factions.  F.I.R  disclosed  35  persons  as
assailants and five more persons were added to  the  list  by  a  subsequent
committal order leading to the charges being framed against all 40  persons.
A bench of four judges of  this  Court  did  not  accept  the  defence  that
specific role had not been attributed to the  accused,  and  that  the  mere
presence of the accused  in  the  unlawful  assembly  at  the  time  of  the
incident does not justify the imposition of death sentence.  However,  as  a
rule of prudence, the court fixed the minimum number of witnesses needed  to
accept prosecution case to base a conviction on.  It was emphasised  by  the
court that it was unsafe to rely  on  the  evidence  of  persons  who  spoke
generally without specific reference to the  identity  of  the  individuals,
and their overt acts that  took  place  in  the  course  of  incident.  This
judgment laid down the principle of common  liability  viz.,  that  where  a
crowd of assailants, who were the members of an  unlawful  assembly  proceed
to commit a crime, in pursuance of the common object of  that  assembly,  it
is often not possible for the witnesses to describe the actual  part  played
by each one of them, and when a large crowd of persons  armed  with  weapons
assaults the intended victims, it may not be  necessary  that  all  of  them
have to take part in the actual assault. In that case several  weapons  were
carried by different members of the unlawful assembly, and  an  accused  who
was the member of such  an  assembly  and  was  carrying  firearms  was  not
permitted to take any advantage of the  fact  that  he  did  not  use  those
firearms, though  other  members  of  the  assembly  used  their  respective
firearms.
18.         Thus,  the  defining  ingredient  for  the  involvement  of  the
accused would be the common intention.  Section-149 of I.P.C makes it  amply
clear that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful  assembly
in prosecution of the common  object  of  that  assembly,  or  such  as  the
members of that assembly knew to be likely to be  committed  in  prosecution
of that object, every person who, at the time  of  the  committing  of  that
offence is a member of  the  same  assembly,  is  guilty  of  that  offence.
Masalti (supra) emphatically brings home the principle that  the  punishment
prescribed by Section-149 is in a  sense  vicarious,  and  does  not  always
proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed  by  every
member of the unlawful assembly.   At the same time  we  cannot  ignore  the
law as laid down in Baladin (supra) that if a person is  a  mere  bystander,
and no specific role is attributed to him, he may not come  under  the  wide
sweep of Section 149.
19.         The submission of  the  appellants  which  does  merit  a  close
scrutiny and a thorough examination by the  court  is,  however,  concerning
the  allegedly  faulty  investigation,  especially  the   failure   of   the
prosecution to conduct a  Test  Identification  Parade,  and  the  delay  in
recording the statements of the witnesses which according to  them  rendered
the  entire  alleged  identification  of  the   appellants   doubtful.   The
appellants claim to be entitled to the benefit of doubt as it  is  dangerous
to uphold the death sentence of the appellants on such shaky  evidence.  The
appellants draw support from a judgment in the case of Jamuna  Chaudhary  v.
State of Bihar reported in AIR 1974 SC 1822. In that case benefit  of  doubt
was given to some of the accused in view of the unsatisfactory  material  on
record. At the same time, we must also note that in that very  matter  where
there was evidence of an injured witness, deposing against the accused,  the
same was accepted. The appellants have  also  drawn  the  attention  of  the
court to the fact that a set of persons who were accused in  the  same  case
had been acquitted in  the  case  of  Bihari  Manjhi  and  Others  v.  State
(supra).  However, here the bone of contention  is  with  respect  to  their
participation itself, in the light of the deficiency in  the  investigation.
Those  deficiencies  also  find  a  place  in  Hon’ble  Mr.  Justice  Shah’s
observations in the Krishna Mochi
case (supra).

Deficiencies in the prosecution:-

Non examination  of  Investigating  Officer,  Non  submission  of  his  case
records

20.          Suresh  Chander  Sharma  (PW21)  who   had   taken   over   the
investigation after Ram Japit Kumar, had admitted in his  cross  examination
that the entire investigation had been conducted by Ram Japit Kumar.  PW  21
had not recorded the  statements  of  many  witnesses  including  the  three
chowkidaars who were the first to meet  inspector  Vijay  Pratap  Singh  the
then Station Incharge, and report the incident to him when he  had  come  on
patrolling, and heard the sounds of firing and explosion. The  investigation
conducted by Ram Japit had never been brought on record  nor  was  his  case
diary submitted. PW21 had also admitted that the case  diary  was  not  with
him, and that he had not seen the notification under TADA (para 61). It  was
also admitted that investigation has been done on the oral  instructions  of
the Superintendent of Police without the necessary written orders  from  him
or Director General of Police.
Statement of the SP
21.         According to the  statement  of  the  Superintendent  of  Police
Sunil Kumar, he received  the  information  of  Bihari  Manjhi’s  arrest  on
27.2.1992, and he went there to record the statement. He claims to have  met
Bihari Manjhi and told him to make his statement  without  fear  or  favour,
and Bihari Manjhi did  so.  However,  the  same  officer  was  not  able  to
identify Bihari Manjhi in the Court.   Moreover,  the  police  personnel  of
P.S. Tekari were busy in  making  arrests,  and  a  number  of  V.I.Ps  were
visiting.  So  the  investigation  had  been  entrusted  to  Suresh  Chander
Sharma, Inspector from Chandauti Police Station. Surprisingly, he  does  not
remember whether written permission, to invoke TADA was taken  or  not,  and
whether under TADA the investigation had  to  be  carried  out  only  by  an
officer of rank of DSP or above.
Station in-charge of Police Station Bodh Gaya, Virendra Kumar Singh.

22.         He  admitted that he was an  accused  in  the  murder  case   of
Vasuki Yadav, nephew of Vakil Yadav, (one of  the  accused  in  the  present
case), and had filed a petition before the Supreme Court  for  quashing  the
cognizance taken against him in that case.
23.         Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shah had drawn support  from  the  principle
laid down in Masalti’s case to emphasise the  impossibility  of  basing  the
conviction on such shaky investigation. Such a view  had  been  taken  in  a
catena of other judgments, like Kamaksha Rai v. State of U.P.,  reported  in
1999 (8) SCC 701. These principles were also followed in Binay  Kumar  Singh
v. State of Bihar reported in 1997(1) SCC 283.
24.         The delay in  recording  the  statements  of  witnesses  by  the
Investigating Officer and absence of the  Test  Identification  Parade  were
also instrumental in demolishing the credibility of the  investigation,  and
thus led to Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shah’s dissenting opinion.
Analysis of the evidence on record
25.         In the present case, as  per  the  statement  of  PW  21  Suresh
Chander Sharma the investigation prior to him had been  conducted  by  PW22,
Vijay Pratap Singh who was the sub inspector and  the  officer  incharge  of
Tekari Police station at the time  of  occurrence,  as  Ram  Japit  who  had
originally been entrusted with the investigation had fallen ill. He  further
adds that case diary from para 1- 222 had been  recorded  by  PW22  and  the
rest, from 223 to 538, by himself. He does not know whether  S.P  wrote  any
letter to the government for the invocation of TADA. PW 22 was the  one  who
was the officer incharge of the Tekari P.S, and had gone for routine  patrol
at about 9 p.m. on 12.2.92, when he heard  sounds  of  explosion.  He  heard
from the Mukhia Sideshwar Yadav, whom he met on the way, that explosion  was
taking place in the  north.  On  going  there,  he  met  three  chowkidaars,
Krishna Yadav, Bhola Paswan and Dafadar Ramparwesh Singh who told  him  that
‘partywalas’ had come, and set the village on  fire,  and  were  terrorising
people by firing and exploding bombs. Interestingly, none of  these  people,
through whom the police had come to know of  the  incident,  were  examined.
Their fard bayan was not taken. PW 22 has stated in his deposition  that  he
informed the SP of the gravity of the situation, and  the  SP  came  at  the
place of occurrence with his force and they all proceeded further.  At  this
point of time, they were approached  by  one  Sarwan  Kumar,  who  had  come
running to them, after coming to know that they were  police  officers.  His
hands were tied at his back, he told them that extremists had  come  to  the
village, and had proceeded toward  the  east.  Sarwan  Kumar  was  also  not
examined. The reason given for this by PW22 is that  Sarwan  Kumar  did  not
give the entire account of the happening, and  because  the  entire  village
was on fire. The statements of none of the women who were weeping  near  the
culvert were recorded either. Understandably,  they  were  very  upset,  and
possibly not in the position to give their statements.  However,  this  does
not explain as to why the statements of none of those people from  whom  the
police had originally come to know of the incident, had been  recorded,  and
why the F.I.R was recorded on the Fard  bayan  of  the  informant  Satyendra
Sharma later at 3 a.m. in the morning when the chowkidaars, the mukhiya  and
Sarwan Singh had much earlier informed the police  about  the  incident.  In
fact statements  of  none  of  the  women,  and  persons  belonging  to  the
communities of Brahmans, schedule castes or Yadavs were recorded by PW-22.
26.         PW 22 claims to have taken  over  the  investigation  after  Ram
Japit Kumar was not available at the place of occurrence,  but  he  did  not
have any written orders or approval for proceeding with  the  investigation.
In para 28 of his deposition it is also revealed that none of  the  material
exhibits of the case were submitted to the Court as the  Malkhana  had  been
attacked by the extremists in 1996, and all its articles were,  consequently
destroyed. In para 35 of his cross examination he had admitted that  it  had
been recorded in para 23 of the police case diary that Ram  Japit  was  busy
with the investigation.  In para 2 of the case diary it was  mentioned  that
investigation of this case had been endorsed by the SP to  Ram  Japit  Kumar
who was at the place of occurrence. This  contradicts  his  statement  (para
26) that Ram Japit was not available at the place of occurrence.
27.         In para 43, PW22 admits that  no  T.I.P  was  conducted  of  any
suspect. PW22 investigated the case for only 8 days,  and  did  not  mention
any time and place of the examination of any of  the  witnesses.  There  are
also discrepancies in the depositions of PW21 and PW22 as far as the  extent
of case diary recorded by PW22 is concerned. PW 21 has stated it to be  from
para 1-222, while PW22 has stated it to be from 2-22  in  para  27,  and  in
para 40, he has stated it to be from 1-212. In addition to this, no  seizure
list was prepared.  In the deposition of PW 20, it was found that  informant
was never seen after the recording of fard bayan and further  statement.  In
para 12 he also states that there was no need for  obtaining  sanction  from
government for invoking TADA as there was provision to that effect.  He  did
not specify the provision.
With evidence being in such a state, the question would be -  who  could  be
convicted ?

28.         We cannot forget that in Krishna Mochi (supra) the accused  were
tried on the basis of same FIR, and two Judges in a bench  of  three  upheld
the conviction of Krishna Mochi, Dharmendra Singh, Nanhe Lal Mochi and  Veer
Kuer Paswan.  Hon’ble  Mr.  Justice  M.B.  Shah,  in  paragraph  96  of  his
judgment, noted that the investigation was totally defective, the  witnesses
had exaggerated to a large extent, they had not assigned any  specific  role
to the accused except their presence in the mob  at  the  time  of  offence,
they nowhere stated that the identified accused were having  any  weapon  of
offence, and the investigating officers had  not  recovered  any  weapon  of
offence or any incriminating article from their  possession.   In  paragraph
96 (2) he referred to Dilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat 1991 (1)  SCC  253
and observed that when the accused are charged with heinous  brutal  murders
punishable with highest penalty, the judicial approach in such cases has  to
be cautious, circumspect and careful.   He acquitted Dharmendra  Singh.   As
far  as  the  other  accused  were  concerned,  although  he   upheld   that
conviction, presumably in view of the oral evidence on record,  in  view  of
the deficiencies noted by him, he  altered  their  death  sentence  to  life
imprisonment.
29.         In the present case, even if we decide  to  ignore  the  similar
deficiencies in the prosecution, and look into the oral evidence  which  has
come on record, the case of prosecution  against  appellant  no:  2,  Naresh
Paswan is rather weak.  His  name  was  not  mentioned  in  the  FIR.   PW-2
Birendra Singh who is an injured witness, though states in the dock that  he
had seen the appellants slitting the throats, he failed to  identify  Naresh
Paswan in Court.  
None of the other witnesses including PW-3 Lawlesh  Singh,
who is another injured witness, have attributed any role to  him.   None  of
them said that he was a  member  of  MCC.   
It  is  material  to  note  that
Madhusudan who was named at Sr.  No.5  in  the  FIR  also  faced  a  similar
allegation.  It was PW-2 Birendra Singh who named Madhusudan as one  of  the
accused who slit the throats of the deceased, but  had  failed  to  identify
him in the dock.  
In the absence of other witnesses throwing  any  light  on
his participation  in  the  occurrence,  Madhusudan  was  acquitted  by  the
learned designated Judge. 
 In paragraph 39 of his judgment in Krishna  Mochi
(supra) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Aggarwal, rejected the theory  of  some  of  the
accused  being  mere  sight-seers.
This  was  because,  as  the  paragraph
indicates, a specific role was attributed to them such as entering into  the
houses by breaking open the doors, and forcibly taking  the  inmates,  tying
their hands and taking them to the temple and thereafter near to the  canal,
where their legs were tied, and thereafter killing some of them.  As far  as
Naresh Paswan is concerned, no such role is attributed to him by any of  the
witnesses.  This being so, Naresh  Paswan  is  entitled  to  have  the  same
yardstick  applied  to  him  as  was   applied   to   Madhusudan.   In   the
circumstances, in our view, Naresh Paswan deserves an acquittal.
30.          As far as the other appellant no.3, Bugal Mochi  is  concerned,
in addition to his name being mentioned in the FIR as one who  was  slitting
the throats, he was identified by PW-2 injured  witness  Birendra  Singh  in
Court.  Bugal Mochi is attributed  the  role  of  slitting  the  throats  by
Birendra Singh in his oral  deposition.   Though  other  witnesses  did  not
attribute any specific  role  to  him,  he  was  identified  by  them  as  a
participant in the crime.
31.          As far as appellant no.1, Vyas Ram  is  concerned,  though  his
name was mentioned in the FIR, the heinous act of slitting the  throats  was
not attributed to him in the FIR.  PW-2, Birendra Singh has  however  stated
in oral evidence that Vyas Ram was slitting the throats, and  he  identified
him in the court as  well,  though  no  other  witness  has  attributed  any
particular role to him.   Birendra  Singh  being  an  injured  witness,  his
testimony cannot be  ignored.   It  is  true  that  his  testimony  was  not
accepted in Krishna Mochi, but that was so with respect  to  other  accused.
In the present case,  he  has  attributed  a  specific  role  to  these  two
accused.  There is no reason to discard  his  evidence.  The  conviction  of
these two accused under Section 302 of IPC and other charges  will  have  to
be upheld.


Question of sentence
32.         Then comes the question of sentence to  appellant  nos.1  and  3
i.e. Vyas Ram and Bugal Mochi.  It is true that in  Krishna  Mochi  (supra),
by a majority of two versus one, the crime in the instant case was  held  to
be one which deserved the extreme penalty of death.  
This was apparently  on
the lines of the judgment of the  Constitution  Bench  in  Bachan  Singh  v.
State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCC 684 as being one belonging  to  the  rarest  of
the rare category.
We have, however, to note that as  far  as  the  present
trial is concerned, the occurrence of the crime is of February 1992 and  the
charges were framed in May 2004.
More than nine years have gone  thereafter
also, and the appellants have been facing the trauma of the  crime  and  the
trial all this period.  Besides, as noted earlier, the manner in  which  the
investigation has proceeded was far from satisfactory.
In all  cases  where
death sentences are to be awarded, the  circumstances  of  the  accused  are
also required to be considered as laid down by  the  Constitution  Bench  in
Bachan Singh (supra) and later by a bench of three Judges in Machi Singh  v.
State of Punjab 1983 (3) SCC 470.
The leading  judgment  of  conviction  in
Krishna Mochi (supra), was rendered by Hon’ble Aggarwal J., and he noted  in
para 33 of his judgment that in the present case there was more  or  less  a
caste war between the haves and the have nots. The  appellants  belonged  to
the latter category.
The present incident was claimed to  be  a  retaliatory
attack by the members of MCC.  They are essentially  the  persons  belonging
to the scheduled castes and backward classes, and  economically  weaker  and
exploited  sections  of  society.
The  attack  was  supposed  to   be   in
retaliation to an earlier attack by  the  Bhumihar  community,  led  by  the
Ranvir Sena.  It must  also  be  noted  that  none  of  the  witnesses  have
attributed to these appellants that they belonged to the MCC.
It  is  quite
possible that due to their poverty and caste conflict in the  villages  they
were drawn in the melee and participated in the crime.
At the same time  no
harm was done to women and children.  Appellant No.1 Vyas  Ram  worked  with
one Jamuna Singh.  No harm was done to any member from  his  family  either.
This is not to say that such acts are to be condoned, but at the  same  time
we  have  to  consider  as  to  whether  after  taking  into  account  these
circumstances of the accused, death  sentence  was  warranted.   We  do  not
think so.
33.         It was emphasised before us on  behalf  of  the  State  that  in
Krishna Mochi (supra),  the  death  sentence  was  upheld  as  against  four
accused, by a majority of two versus one, on the basis of an  FIR  which  is
common to the present case, and that this was so done by relying  upon  oral
testimonies recorded in that case which are somewhat  similar  to  those  in
the present case. In this connection we must state that though the  FIR  was
common, the testimonies in the two cases are in fact different, and  on  the
analysis thereof we have come to the conclusion that one of the  accused  is
not guilty, however, the other two are , but considering  the  circumstances
in their case the death sentence is not warranted.

34.         Even with respect to  the  death  sentence  awarded  in  Krishna
Mochi(supra), having considered the dissenting opinion rendered  by  Hon’ble
Shah J., we must note the approach adopted by this Court,  subsequently,  in
a judgment of three judges in  the  case  of  Swamy  Shraddananda  @  Murali
Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka  reported  in  AIR  2008  SC  3040.   A
Sessions Court and  the  High  Court  had  imposed  death  sentence  on  the
appellant in that matter, and two judges of this court who heard the  matter
had differed on the issue of sentence.  The matter  was  referred  to  three
judges. The Court substituted the death sentence by imprisonment  for  life,
though directed that the appellant shall not be released till  the  rest  of
his life.  It was observed in paragraph 37 of the judgment as follows:-
                 “37….. The absolute irrevocability  of  the  death  penalty
           renders it completely incompatible to the  slightest  hesitation
           on the part of the court…..”

 We may as well profitably refer  to  what  was  observed  in  para  149  of
Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v.  State  of  Maharashtra  reported  in
2009 (6) SCC 498 which is to the following effect:-
                 “149. Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan Singh  is
           sound counsel on this count which shall stand us in good stead –
           whenever in the given  circumstances,  there  is  difference  of
           opinion with respect to any sentencing prop (sic)/rationale,  or
           subjectivity involved in the determining  factors,  or  lack  of
           thoroughness in complying  with  the  sentencing  procedure,  it
           would be advisable to fall in  favour  of  the  “rule”  of  life
           imprisonment rather  than  invoking  the  “exception”  of  death
           punishment.”

35.   (i)   In the circumstances, Crl. Appeal No.791 of 2009 is  allowed  in
part.  The judgment convicting appellant no.2, accused Naresh Paswan is set-
aside, and he will stand acquitted.  
He is acquitted  of  the  offences  for
which he was charged, and it is ordered that he  be  released  forthwith  if
not required in any other case.
(ii)  As far as appellant nos.1 and 3, accused Vyas Ram and Bugal Mochi  are
concerned, although their conviction under the offences for which they  were
charged is upheld, the  death  sentence  awarded  to  them  is  commuted  to
imprisonment for life, which is to mean the rest of their natural life.
(iii) Consequently, the Death Reference Case  (R)  No.2  of  2011  filed  by
State of Bihar is hereby dismissed.


                                       …………..……………………..J.
                                       [ A.K. Patnaik ]


                                       …………………………………..J.
                                       [ H.L. Gokhale ]

New Delhi
Dated: September 20, 2013


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                                     27







Execution Petition = The High Court, by an interim order dated 11th May, 1970 gave an opportunity to the appellant/judgment debtor to pay the entire decretal amount within two months from the date of passing of the interim order, failing which it was directed that the said order would stand automatically vacated. 10. The entire decretal amount was admittedly not paid by the judgment debtor and therefore, finally by an order dated 2nd February, 2006, the Execution Second Appeal No. 742 of 1970 has been dismissed by the High Court and being aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtor has filed this appeal.= It is really deplorable that the heirs of the plaintiff who had filed the original suit somewhere in 1955 are still unable to get the decretal amount. In our opinion, sufficient opportunities had been provided to the judgment debtor to pay the decretal amount but every time the appellant failed to pay the decretal amount within the period prescribed, this matter should have an end at this stage and therefore, we dismiss the appeal and the stay granted by this Court also stands vacated.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40819

                                                              NON REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8398  OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 6094  of 2007)


Manju Swarup (D) through Lrs.                      .....Appellants



                                Versus

Bhupenshwar Prasad (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.   …..Respondents



                              1 J U D G M E N T





1 ANIL R. DAVE, J.


   1. Leave granted.
   2. This is one of the cases which shows how miserable  a  decree  holder
      becomes in the execution proceedings.
This is a Second Appeal in the
      execution proceedings filed by the judgment debtor whose property was
      ordered to be sold in the execution proceedings.
In pursuance  of  a
      suit, which had been filed in 1955, the final decree was  passed  and
      the property of the appellant had been  attached  on  21st  December,
      1962.  
The execution proceedings had been continuing since then.  The
      facts, in a nutshell, are that
 the Execution Case No. 29 of 1962  was
      filed for recovery of  the  decretal  amount  by  the  decree-holder.
      
Auction notice was published on  16th  April,  1964.   
The  appellant
      herein,  the judgment debtor had filed  an  application  under  Order
      XXI, Rule 83 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  (for  short  ‘the
      CPC’) for postponement of the  sale,  
as  it  was  possible  for  the
      judgment debtor to raise the decretal amount and pay the same to  the
      decree-holder.
   3. Ultimately, on 8th October,  1964,  the  parties  had  come  to  some
      understanding, which had been recorded by the Court as under:


        “The parties agree that time of four months be given to  JD  should
        he deposit Rs.2000/- per month & deposits the entire  amount  in  4
        (four) months.  (…illegible) under Order 21 Rule 83 CPC  be  given.
        If amount is not deposited in four months then the JD  agrees  that
        property be sold without proclamation.”


   4. The amount was not  deposited  by  the  judgment  debtor  within  the
      specified time and ultimately the  executing  court  had  passed  the
      following order on 3rd August, 1965:
        “In case the JD has committed default  in  not  making  payment  in
        time, the execution has to proceed unless the  decree  holder  (DH)
        condones the delay.  Let DH disclose by 19.08.1965 if he  wants  to
        proceed or condone the delay of JD.”


   5. The amount was still not paid by the judgment debtor and the judgment
      debtor filed an application for extension of time  and  on  the  said
      application, the court passed the following  order  on  28th  August,
      1965:
        “I have heard learned counsel  and  gone  through  the  proceeding.
        There are no grounds why the JD should be allowed any further time.
        47C2 is rejected.
        Issue sale proclamation 28.10.1964.  Deposit by 01.11.1965.”


   6. An application made for stay of the auction proceedings, filed by the
      judgment debtor, had been rejected by the order dated  23rd  October,
      1965 and ultimately the  attached  property  was  auctioned  on  29th
      October, 1965.  At the time of the auction, 35 bidders  were  present
      and the property was sold for Rs.13,700/-.
   7.  Thereafter,  on  10th  May,  1969,  the  judgment  debtor  filed  an
      application under Order  XXI,  Rule  90  of  the  CPC  alleging  that
      irregularities were committed in the conduct of the auction  and  the
      attached  property  had  been  sold  at  a  lower  price.   The  said
      application was allowed by the executing court on the ground that the
      sale price was inadequate.
   8. Being aggrieved by the aforestated order dated  10th  May,  1969,  an
      appeal had been filed, which had been allowed by the order dated  5th
      February, 1970.
   9. The validity of the aforestated order dated 5th  February,  1970  was
      challenged by the judgment  debtor  by  filing  an  Execution  Second
      Appeal No. 742 of 1970 before the High Court of Allahabad.  The  High
      Court, by an interim order dated 11th May, 1970 gave  an  opportunity
      to the appellant/judgment debtor to pay the  entire  decretal  amount
      within two months from the date of  passing  of  the  interim  order,
      failing which it  was  directed  that  the  said  order  would  stand
      automatically vacated.
  10. The entire decretal amount was admittedly not paid  by  the  judgment
      debtor and therefore, finally by an order dated 2nd  February,  2006,
      the Execution Second Appeal No. 742 of 1970 has been dismissed by the
      High Court and being aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtor
      has filed this appeal.
  11.  The learned counsel appearing for the judgment debtor- the appellant
      had mainly submitted that the decretal amount had been  deposited  by
      the appellant in the court after the period  specified  by  the  High
      Court was over and therefore, the sale should be  cancelled  and  the
      present appeal should be allowed so that the appellant  can  get  his
      property back.
  12. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the  respondents
      had submitted that the stay had been granted by the High Court by  an
      interim order  dated  11th  May,  1970  on  the  condition  that  the
      appellant would pay the decretal amount within  a  specified  period,
      but that had not been paid or deposited within the time prescribed by
      the High Court and therefore, the Execution Second  Appeal  has  been
      dismissed by the  High  Court.  
In  the  circumstances,  no  further
      opportunity be given to the appellant.
  13. We have heard the learned counsel and have also considered the  facts
      of the case.  It is really deplorable that the heirs of the plaintiff
      who had filed the original suit somewhere in 1955 are still unable to
      get the decretal amount.  In our  opinion,  sufficient  opportunities
      had been provided to the judgment debtor to pay the  decretal  amount
      but every time the appellant failed to pay the decretal amount within
      the period prescribed, this matter should have an end at  this  stage
      and therefore, we dismiss the appeal and the  stay  granted  by  this
      Court also stands vacated.
  14. The appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs.


                             ……...........................................J.
                                                       (ANIL R. DAVE)


                             ……...........................................J.
                                                          (A.K. SIKRI)
New Delhi
September 20, 2013
-----------------------
7


Sunday, September 22, 2013

Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs.

        published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772
                                                    NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182  OF 2003

                 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)



Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board              .....APPELLANT



                                VERSUS


Punjab National Bank & Ors.                         ....RESPONDENTS



                              1 J U D G M E N T




1 ANIL R. DAVE, J.



   1. Leave granted.
   2. Being aggrieved by  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  High  Court  of
      Karnataka in Regular First Appeal No. 1684 of 2004  dated  29th  July,
      2005,
this appeal has been filed by  the  Karnataka  State  Khadi  and
      Village Industries Board, who was defendant No. 3 in the  Suit,  which
      had been filed by Punjab National Bank, who is respondent No. 1   (for
      sake of convenience, the  creditor-  Punjab  National  Bank  has  been
      described as ‘the Bank’ whereas the appellant has  been  described  as
      the ‘Board’ and the principal  debtor  Shevashakti  Gramodyoga  Sangh,
      Gulbarga, who had borrowed funds from the Bank has been  described  as
      the ‘Borrower’).
   3. The facts, giving rise to the present litigation, in a  nutshell,  are
      as under :
      The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and  as
per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured  the  Bank  that
by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to  the
Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount  by
the Borrower.
   4. As the Borrower could not pay its dues to the Bank in spite of several
      notices, the Bank was constrained to file Original Suit No. 83 of 2002
      in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) at Gulbarga.  
In  the  said
      Suit, the Board was joined as defendant no. 3 as the Board  had  given
      an assurance that the interest would be paid by the Board to the  Bank
      , if the Borrower was paying  its  dues  regularly  i.e.  without  any
      default.
   5. Upon perusal of the evidence and after hearing the learned  advocates,
      the suit was decreed.
All the defendants, namely  the  Borrower,  the
      Secretary of the Borrower, who was defendant No. 2 and the Board  were
      made liable to pay a sum of Rs.1,60,827.68/- with interest at the rate
      of 12% p.a. to the Bank.  
However, from the said amount, defendant no.
      3 was made liable to pay only Rs.75,213/- alongwith other  defendants,
      namely the Borrower and the Secretary of  the  Borrower  as  the  said
      amount was towards interest.
   6. Being aggrieved by the aforestated judgment delivered in the suit, the
      Board had filed Regular First Appeal No. 164 of 2004, which  has  been
      dismissed by the High Court and being aggrieved by the said  judgment,
      the Board has filed the present Appeal.
   7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties  and  have
      also perused the impugned judgment and the judgment delivered  in  the
      Suit and the relevant documents.
Upon hearing the  concerned  counsel
      and looking at the contents of a letter dated  23rd  March,  1988,  we
      find that the Board has been wrongly saddled  with  the  liability  of
      paying Rs.75,213/-.
   8.  It is an admitted fact that the Borrower had  borrowed  Rs.1,00,000/-
      from the Bank and the said amount, along with interest  thereon  could
      not be repaid by the Borrower to the Bank.
The question only is  with
      regard to the liability of the Board.  
The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. 
 In pursuance of policy of State  of  Karnataka,  the
      Board was to give subsidy to the  Borrower.   The  letter  dated  23rd
      March, 1988, which had been written by the Chief Executive Officer  of
      the Board to the Manager of the Bank reads as under:
      “The above mentioned Sri Shiva Shakti Gramodyoga Sangha, Gulbarga  has
      applied to Gulbarga (sic) for a loan  of  Rs.1,00,000-00  for  working
      capital for P.C.P.I. Industry.
           The above loan upto Rs. 1,00,000 ( Rupees One Lakh Only) will be
      eligible for the interest subsidy payable by the Commission  in  terms
      of Government of India, Ministry of Industry (Department of Industrial
      Department) letter No. 4(47) 75 –KVI (1) dated the 17th May 77.
           The Commission agrees to surrender its  first  charge  over  the
      assets (moveable and immoveable) the above instruction  in  favour  of
      the Bank (sic).
           The final decision to accept or reject any loan application from
      eligible borrowers will vest with the Bank. 
 However, in case the Bank
      reject the application they may indicate to the Commission / the State
      Board the reasons for rejecting the Loan Application.
           The  Commission  and  the  Karnataka  State  Khadi  and  Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect  of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or  revised  rate  of interest to be borne by  the  borrowers  for  which  interest  subsidy eligibility certificate  has  been  issued  by  the  Commission.   Its  liability shall be  restricted  only  to  the  extent  of  payment  of  interest subsidy as per scheme.
           The Commission would be liable to pay interest  subsidy  as  per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by  the  Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the  defaulted  period 87-88.”


   9. Upon perusal of the said letter, it is clear that the Board had agreed
      to pay interest on behalf of the  Borrower  and  the  Board  had  also
      agreed that whatever charge had been created on the Borrower’s  assets
      in favour of the Board would  be  released  in  favour  of  the  Bank.
      Moreover, the interest payable by the Borrower was to be paid  by  the Board by way of subsidy, provided the borrower  does  not  commit  any default in the payment.
 It is an admitted fact that the Borrower  had
      committed default by not paying its dues to the Bank regularly. In the
      aforestated circumstances, the Board cannot  be  held  liable  to  pay
      interest on behalf of the Borrower.
The liability,  which  the  board
      had, was only with regard to surrendering its first  charge  over  the
      assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as one can see  from  the
      third para of the letter dated 23rd March, 1988.
In other words, upon
      default committed by the Borrower,  the  Board  was  absolved  of  its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and  its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable  assets  of  the  borrower  in   favour of the Bank.
  10. In spite of the  aforestated  facts,  the  trial  court  came  to  the
      conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and
      payable by the Borrower.  
In our opinion,  the  said  finding  of  the
      trial court is not correct.  
Even the High Court’s view of  confirming
      the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set  aside
      the judgment of the appellate court as well as the  decree  passed  by
      the trial court so far as  it  makes  the  Board  liable  to  pay  the
      interest on behalf of the Borrower. 
 In view of the  contents  of  the
      aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board  shall  surrender
      its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable  assets  of  the
      Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible.
  11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no  order
      as to costs.



                                       .....................................
                                       ...J.
                                                         (ANIL R. DAVE)



                            .......................................J
                                         (DIPAK MISRA)



New Delhi
September 13, 2013

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6