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Sunday, September 22, 2013

Himachala Pradesh state amendment is with the view to provide impediment free reservation in promotion to the Scheduled-Castes and Scheduled-Tribes and to bring certainty and clarity in the matter. Furthermore, the aforesaid proposed amendment is to be introduced with retrospective effect from 17th June, 1995. = “‘Due Consideration’ is totally different from collecting quantifiable data. This exercise has to be conducted and no reservation in promotion can be made without conducting such an exercise. Therefore, the State cannot be permitted to make reservations till such exercise is carried out and clear-cut quantifiable data is collected on the lines indicated in M.Nagaraj’s case. We may also point out that other than making vague reference to “due consideration” having been done, till date the State has not produced before us any clear-cut quantifiable data which could establish the need for reservation. Merely because the amended provision of the Constitution enable the State to make reservation is no ground not to collect data. Therefore, the instructions have to be struck down as being violate of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj’s case by the Apex Court.”= We, therefore, allow this Interlocutory Application and direct the State of Himachal Pradesh to take a final decision on the issue either on the basis of the data already submitted to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on 25th April, 2011 or on the basis of the data reflecting the position as on 30th June, 2011, within a period of three months from today. Till a final decision is taken, the direction restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh from making any promotion shall continue H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees Federation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors. …Respondents.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40773
REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                   INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.6 OF 2012


                                     IN


                SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) No. 30143 OF 2009


           H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees
           Federation & Anr.                                …
           Appellants
                                   Versus


           Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors.         …Respondents
                                    With
                    CONTEMPT PETITION (C.) NO. 91 OF 2013
                                     IN


                SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) No. 30143 OF 2009


                               J U D G M E N T
           SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
        1.  This  Interlocutory  Application   No.6   was   filed   on
             16th  March,  2012,  by  the  appellants  herein  in  the
                           S.L.P. (Civil) No. 30143 of  2009,  seeking
           direction to the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  to  take  a
           decision on the issue of reservation in promotions on basis
           of data already  collected  or  submitted  to  Cabinet  Sub
           Committee on 25th April, 2011 within a period of one month.
           For the purpose of adjudicating the present I.A., it  would
           be pertinent to make a reference to facts concerning S.L.P.
           (Civil) No. 30143 of 2009 that  was  disposed  of  by  this
           Court on 26th April, 2010.


        2. SLP (Civil) No. 30143 of 2009 was  filed  against  judgment
           and order dated 18th September, 2009  passed  by  the  High
           Court of Himachal Pradesh.
By the said judgment/order,  the
           High Court allowed the CWP-T No. 2628 of 2008  and  thereby
           quashed the instructions dated 7th September,  2007  issued
           by the State of Himachal  Pradesh.  
The  said  instructions
           made  provision  for   reservation   in   promotions   with
           consequential seniority in favour of Scheduled  Castes  and
           Scheduled Tribes in all classes of posts in services  under
           the State.


        3. The aforesaid S.L.P. was disposed of on 26th April, 2010 by
           passing the following order:-
                 “The State of Himachal Pradesh has  issued  a  Circular  on
                 07.09.2007 as regards the promotion of SCs/STs in the State
                 service.   The  said  circular  was   challenged   by   the
                 respondent no.1 and the circular was quashed  by  the  High
                 Court by the impugned judgment.  
Learned counsel  appearing
                 for  the  State  submits  that  the  circular   issued   on
                 07.09.2007 has since been withdrawn as the State intends to
                 collect more  details  with  regard  to  representation  of
                 SCs/STs and to pass appropriate  orders  within  reasonable
                 time  i.e.  approximately   within   three   months   after
                 collecting   necessary details and datas.   
The  petitioner
                 would be at liberty  to  take  appropriate  steps,  if  any
                 adverse order is passed. 
This Special  Leave  Petition  and
                 the Contempt Petition are thus disposed of finally.”


        4. Although the present I.A.No.6 is filed in the  disposed  of
           SLP, it would be appropriate to notice the manner, in which
           the order dated 16th April, 2010 came to be passed.


        5.  On  27th  November,  1972,  Government  of  India   issued
           instructions vide  letter  No.  27-2/71-Estt(SCT),  whereby provision was made for providing reservation  in  promotion for the members of Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled  Tribes.
           On 24th April,  1973,  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  issued
           instructions vide Letter No.  2-11/72-DP  (Appt.),  whereby
           reservation was provided for  promotion  of  employees.  On
           9th/13th August, 1973, State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  issued
           instructions vide Letter       No 2-11/72-DP (Apptt.),  and
           thereby, followed  the  Reservation  policy  of  the  Union
           Government  relating  to  promotion  for  the  members   of
           Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It may be  mentioned
           here that the Reservation Policy of  the  Union  Government
           was set out in Letter/Order dated  2nd  March,  1972,  24th
           March, 1972 and 11th August, 1972, 28th October 1972,  30th
           January, 1973 and 12th March, 1973.


        6. Meanwhile on 31st October, 1988, this Court in the case  of
           Karam Chand Vs. Haryana State Electricity Board &  Ors.[1],
           approved the grant of consequential seniority in promotions
           given to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.  The  State
           of  Himachal   Pradesh,   by   instructions   vide   letter
           No. PER  (AP-II)  F  (1)-1/87  dated  31st  January,  1989,
           introduced Reservation Roster in  both  direct  recruitment
           and promotions.


        7. Later, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indra  Sawhney
           & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.[2]
held  that  reservation
           in promotion is not  permissible  under  Article  16(4)  of
           Constitution and directed to discontinue such  reservations
           after 5 years.
Thereafter, in R.K.  Sabharwal  &  Ors.  Vs.
           State of  Punjab  &  Ors.,[3]  this  court  
held  that  the
           operation of roster must stop running when  the  prescribed
           quota of posts have been occupied by the reserved category.
           
It was in  this  backdrop  that  the  Parliament  of  India
           enacted     Constitution  (77th
           Amendment) Act, 1995, thereby adding Article  16(4A)  which
           permits the State to  provide  reservation  in  matters  of
           promotion to Scheduled  castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes.  
In 2001, Parliament  approved  Constitution  (85th  Amendment)Act, permitting promotions with consequential seniority  to government service.


        8. On 7th September, 2007, with a view to give effect  to  the
           85th Amendment to the Constitution, the State  of  Himachal
           Pradesh issued instructions vide letter  No.  PER  (AP)-C-F
           (1)-1/2005,  and  thereby  provided   for   assignment   of
           consequential seniority to the members of Scheduled  Castes
           and Scheduled Tribes in service under the State. 
The policy
           was to take effect from 17th June, 1995. 
 The  instructions
           further provided, as under:-
                 “Thus as a result of this decision of State  Government  to
                 implement  the  aforesaid  amendment   with   effect   from
                 17.6.1995,  State   Government   employees   belonging   to
                 Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  shall  also   be
                 entitled to consequential seniority on promotion by  virtue
                 of rule of reservation.  
However,  controlling  factors  or
                 compelling reasons, namely, backwardness and inadequacy  of
                 representation  which  enable  the  State  to  provide  for
                 reservation keeping in mind  the  over  all  efficiency  of
                 State administration under Article  335  will  continue  to
                 apply   with   mandatory   compliance   of   Constitutional
                 requirement  of   Ceiling   limit   of   50%   quantitative
                 limitation.  
Moreover it is made clear that in the State of
                 Himachal Pradesh the  State  Government  has  already  made
                 provision  for   reservation   in   promotion   after   due
                 consideration prior to 19.10.2006, thus, collection of data
                 as mandated by para 124 of the judgment in  M.Nagaraj  case
                 (AIR 2007 Sc.71) is not required.”


        9. The instructions were challenged by respondent No.1  herein
           by filing Original Application No. 19 of  2008  before  the
           Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Shimla. 
Since the
           Administrative Tribunal was thereafter abolished, the  O.A.
           was transferred to be heard and  adjudicated  by  the  High
           Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla and was  renumbered  as
                                  Civil Writ Petition –T No.  2628  of
           2008. 
By the impugned order dated 18th September, 2009, the
           High Court allowed  the  writ  petition,  and  quashed  the
           instructions dated 7th September, 2007.




       10. In its judgment, the High Court inter alia relied upon  the
           law laid down in M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs.  Union  of  India  &
           Ors.[4]
The High Court noticed that the State was bound  to
           collect data to show that the so  called  backward  classes
           are actually backward and they are inadequately represented
           in the service under the State.
It was also held  that  the
           State has to provide for reservations in such a manner that
           the efficiency of administration is not adversely affected.
         
The High Court then proceeded  to  determine  that
whether
           such an exercise was undertaken by the State while  issuing
           instructions dated 7th September, 2007.  The  High
           Court came to the conclusion that the State admittedly  has
           not carried out any such exercise to collect such data. The
           reason provided by the State for not carrying out  such  an
           exercise was that since there  was  already  a  policy  for
           providing reservation in promotion in the  State  prior  to
           the judgment in Indra Sawhney’s case (supra), collection of
           data as mandated  in  M.  Nagaraj’s  case  (supra)  is  not
           required.
It was also urged on behalf of the State that the
           decision for providing reservations in promotions was taken
           after “due consideration”.
These reasons were  rejected  by
           the High Court, and it was held that:
                 “‘Due Consideration’ is totally different  from  collecting
                 quantifiable data.  This exercise has to be  conducted  and
                 no reservation in promotion can be made without  conducting
                 such an exercise.  Therefore, the State cannot be permitted
                 to make reservations till such exercise is carried out  and
                 clear-cut quantifiable  data  is  collected  on  the  lines
                 indicated in M.Nagaraj’s case.  We may also point out  that
                 other than making vague reference  to  “due  consideration”
                 having been done, till date  the  State  has  not  produced
                 before us  any  clear-cut  quantifiable  data  which  could
                 establish the need for reservation.


                 Merely because the amended provision  of  the  Constitution
                 enable the State to make reservation is no  ground  not  to
                 collect data.   Therefore,  the  instructions  have  to  be
                 struck down as being violate of the law  laid  down  in  M.
                 Nagaraj’s case by the Apex Court.”




       11. In compliance with the aforesaid directions, the  State  of
           Himachal Pradesh, vide letter No. PER  (AP)-C-F  (1)01/2009
                        dated  16th  November,  2009,  rescinded   the
           instructions dated   7th September,  2007.  In  the  letter
           (dated 16th November, 2009), the State of Himachal  Pradesh
           also directed that all the promotions made on or after  7th
           September, 2007 may be regulated  in  accordance  with  the
           procedure applicable prior to the  said  date.  The  letter
           also  made  it  clear  that  promotion  policy  has  to  be
           interpreted in the manner “as if the instructions dated 7th
           September, 2007 and  subsequent  instructions  thereof  had
           never been issued.”


       12. The judgment of the High Court dated 18th  September,  2009
           was  challenged  in  the  Civil  Appeal   @   SLP   (Civil)
           No. 30143 of 2009,  filed  by  Himachal  Pradesh  Schedules
           Tribes Employees Federation,  and  Himachal  Pradesh  SC/ST
           Government Employees Welfare Association.  This  Court,  by
           order dated 4th December, 2009 issued  notice  and  granted
           interim stay on the operation  of  the  impugned  judgment.
           Meanwhile, the State Government withdrew  the  instructions
           dated 16th November, 2009  and  issued  fresh  instructions
           vide letter dated 20th January, 2010,  which  were  further
           amended by letter dated 16th March, 2010. By the  aforesaid
           two letters, the Government Departments were refrained from
           making further promotions where consequential seniority  is
           involved.


       13. By order dated 26th April, 2010, this Court disposed of the
           S.L.P. (Civil) No. 30143 of 2009 and the contempt  petition
                       No. 27 of 2010 on the undertaking given by  the
           State. In the said order, this court inter alia observed as
           under:
                 “Learned counsel appearing for the State submits  that  the
                 circular issued on 07.09.2007 has since been  withdrawn  as
                 the State intends to collect more details  with  regard  to
                 representation of SCs/STs and to  pass  appropriate  orders
                 within reasonable  time  i.e.  approximately  within  three
                 months   after    collecting    necessary    details    and
                 datas (sic).  The petitioner would be at  liberty  to  take
                 appropriate steps, if any adverse  order  is  passed.  This
                 Special Leave Petition and the Contempt Petition  are  thus
                 disposed of finally.”


       14.  This Court, by order dated 7th July, 2010, dismissed  I.A.
           No.     5     in     the     aforesaid     SLP      seeking
           modification/clarification of the aforesaid order.


       15. It appears that the State of Himachal Pradesh collected the
           necessary data as on 31st December, 2011. This  is  evident
           from the   answers   given   to   the   Assembly   Question
           Unstarred No.196, to which  the  reply  was  given  on  4th
           April, 2012.  The    question was specific in the following
           terms:
                 “(a)  How much is the present SC/ST backlog in the State;
                       and
                  (b)  What steps  the  Government  is  taking  to  fill-up
                       the backlog of these categories?”


           The answer to the aforesaid question (a) and (b) was that
                 "The necessary information is at Annexure - "A"."
       16. A perusal of the  Annexure-A  shows  that  the  details  of
           backlog position of Scheduled  Castes/Scheduled  Tribes  in
           direct recruitment and promotion in  the  services  of  the
           State    and Boards/Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings
           etc. as on  31st December, 2011, is clearly indicated.


       17. It was in  this  backdrop  that  I.A.  No.  6  came  to  be
           preferred by the petitioner herein  on  16th  March,  2012,
           seeking a direction to the State to take a decision on  the
           issue of reservation on the basis of data already collected
           or submitted to Cabinet Sub Committee on 25th  April,  2011
           within a period of one month. The  petitioner  also  prayed
           for stay on all the promotions, pending the decision  taken
           in this case. This Court, by  order  dated  6th  September,
           2012, directed inter alia as under:
                 “In our opinion, in the facts and   circumstances  of  this
                 case, it is necessary for the State  of  Himachal   Pradesh
                 to take the necessary  policy  decision  on  the   question
                 of  providing  reservation  to  the  members  of  Scheduled
                 Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of  promotion  in
                 the services within the State  of  Himachal Pradesh, within
                 a period eight weeks from the date  of  receipt  of  a copy
                 of this order.”


                 The State of Himachal  Pradesh  is  directed  to  place  on
                 record the  compliance  report  before  the  next  date  of
                 hearing.”




                 This direction was given upon  consideration  of  the
           submission of the State in its reply to this I.A. dated 4th
           July,   2012,   that   the   petitioners   themselves   had
           reservations with regard to  the  data  placed  before  the
           Cabinet Sub-Committee on 25th  April,  2011.   Accordingly,
           the Government decided to collect afresh data and  material
           showing position as                  on  30th  June,  2011.
           According to the  respondent  State,  the  policy  decision
           would have to relate to the data showing the position as on
           30th June, 2011, which would be available shortly.




       18. On 2nd November, 2012, an I.A. was filed by  the  State  of
           Himachal Pradesh in the Civil Appeal, seeking extension  of
           time for complying with the order of this Court until  31st
           January, 2013. By order dated 7th January, 2013, this Court
           granted extension to  the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  as
           sought and further directed it not to make  any  promotions
           in the meantime.  On  11th  January,  2013,  the  State  of
           Himachal Pradesh issued instructions to all the departments
           to stop granting promotions. On  31st  January,  2013,  the
           State of Himachal Pradesh in Letter  No.  PER  (AP)-C-F(1)-
           2/2011  noticed  that   since   the   Constitution   (117th
           Amendment) Bill,  2012  is  pending  consideration  in  the
           Parliament,  the   matter   regarding   implementation   of
           Constitution (85th Amendment) Act, 2001 in the state may be
           deferred.         It was also decided that the instructions
           dated 11th January, 2013 issued pursuant to  interim  order
           dated 7th January, 2013 in  I.A.  No.  6  of  2012  in  SLP
           (Civil) No. 30143 of 2009 will continue in operation in the
           meantime. On 4th February,  2013,  the  State  of  Himachal
           Pradesh sought modification of the  restriction  placed  by
           this Court by order dated 7th January,  2013,  whereby  the
           State was directed not to make any  promotions.  The  stand
           taken in the said affidavit was that since the Constitution
           (117th Amendment) Bill, 2012 is  pending  consideration  in
           the Parliament,  the  matter  regarding  implementation  of
           Constitution (85th Amendment) Act, 2001 in the state may be
           deferred.  The  State  Government  also  prayed  that   the
           existing reservation system in promotions be continued till
           the finalization of matter  relating  to  the  Constitution
               (117th Amendment) Bill, 2012.


           Submissions:
       19. Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appeared for the
           appellants. Whereas,  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhawan,  learned  senior
           counsel appeared for the respondent no.1, State of Himachal
           Pradesh.


       20. Mr.  Hansaria  submitted  that  the  State  Government  has
           already  taken  a  decision  to  provide   reservation   in
           promotion. In its order dated 31st January, 2013, the State
           Government mentions that the existing system for  providing
           reservation, prior to order dated 7th September, 2007  will
           continue. Therefore, mandamus  is  to  be  issued  not  for
           providing reservations but to direct the State to implement
           its own policy decision.

       21. Mr. Hansaria further submitted that the data  collected  by
           the State reveals that there is backlog in  the  government
           services. Further, it was submitted that data was available
           to the State Government on 31st  October,  2009,  but  this
           fact was suppressed from this Court.  It  was  also  argued
           that the defence put by the State that  they  deferred  the
           matter concerning implementation of 85th Amendment  on  the
           ground                       of  117th  Amendment  Bill  is
           without any basis since it already has the data. Thus, they
           must  take  a  decision  thereon.                   Learned
           senior counsel relied upon Salauddin Ahmed & Anr. Vs. Samta
           Andolan[5], to submit that this Court had earlier  directed
           the  State  to  comply  with  the   directions   given   in
                 M. Nagaraj (supra) and Suraj Bhan Meena (supra).


       22. Dr. Dhawan, learned senior counsel, firstly, reiterated the
           well known principles concerning the concept of reservation
           laid down by this  Court  in  the  following  cases:  Indra
           Sawhney (supra), R.K.Sabharwal (supra), Union  of  India  &
           Ors. Vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan & Ors.[6],  Ajit Singh Januja
           & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.[7], Chander  Pal  &  Ors.
           Vs. State of Haryana[8],  Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs.  State  of
           Haryana & Ors.[9],  Ajit Singh & Ors.  (II)  Vs.  State  of
           Punjab & Ors.[10]                       Dr.  Dhawan  relied
           upon M. Nagaraj’s case (supra),  and  submitted  that  this
           Court has laid down certain conditions which  are  required
           to  be  complied  with  by  the  State   before   providing
           Reservation under Article 16(4). The learned senior counsel
           relied on the following observations of this Court:
                 “As stated above, the boundaries of the width of the power,
                 namely, the ceiling-limit of 50% (the numerical benchmark),
                 the principle of  creamy  layer,  the  compelling  reasons,
                 namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and  the
                 overall administrative efficiency are  not  obliterated  by
                 the impugned amendments. At the appropriate time,  we  have
                 to consider the law as enacted by various States  providing
                 for reservation if challenged. At that time we have to  see
                 whether limitations on the exercise of power are  violated.
                 The State is free to exercise its discretion  of  providing
                 for reservation subject to limitation, namely,  that  there
                 must exist compelling reasons of  backwardness,  inadequacy
                 of representation in a class of post(s) keeping in mind the
                 overall administrative efficiency. It is  made  clear  that
                 even if the State  has  reasons  to  make  reservation,  as
                 stated above, if the impugned law violates any of the above
                 substantive limits on the width of the power the same would
                 be liable to be set aside.”


                 Further,  Dr.  Dhawan  submitted  that  this   Court,
           applying the aforesaid ratio in M.  Nagaraj’s  case(supra),
           quashed the reservation policy of the respective states  in
           Suraj Bhan Meena & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan  &  Ors.[11]
           and Uttar Pradesh  Power  Corporation  Limited  Vs.  Rajesh
           Kumar & Ors.[12]


       23. Dr. Dhawan further submitted that no mandamus would lie  to
           order    reservations    or     de-reservations     because
              Article 16(4), (4A)  &  (4B)  are  enabling  provisions.
           Learned senior counsel relied upon C.A. Rajendran Vs. Union
           of India (UOI) & Ors.[13] Union of India Vs. R. Rajeshwaran
           & Anr.[14] and Ajit Singh (II)’s case (supra).


       24. We have very carefully considered the submissions  made  by
           the learned counsel for the parties.


       25. Undoubtedly, in the case of C.A.  Rajendran  (supra),  this
           Court has held as follows:-
                 “Our conclusion therefore is that Article  16(4)  does  not
                 confer  any  right  on  the  petitioner  and  there  is  no
                 constitutional duty imposed on the  Government  to  make  a
                 reservation for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes,
                 either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the  stage
                 of promotion. In other words, Article 16(4) is an  enabling
                 provision and confers a discretionary power on the State to
                 make a reservation of appointments in  favour  of  backward
                 class of citizens which, in its opinion, is not  adequately
                 represented  in  the  Services  of  the   State.   We   are
                 accordingly of the opinion that the petitioner is unable to
                 make good his submission on this aspect of the case.”


       26. Similarly, in R.Rajeshwaran (supra), this Court observed as
           follows:-
                 “9. In Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab this  Court  held
                 that Article 16(4) of the Constitution confers a discretion
                 and does not create any constitutional duty and obligation.
                 Language of Article 15(4) is  identical  and  the  view  in
                 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian  Prakash  v.
                 K.S. Jagannathan and Superintending Engineer, Public Health
                 v. Kuldeep Singh that a mandamus can be  issued  either  to
                 provide for reservation or for relaxation  is  not  correct
                 and runs  counter  to  judgments  of  earlier  Constitution
                 Benches and, therefore, these two judgments cannot be  held
                 to be laying down the correct law. In these  circumstances,
                 neither the respondent  in  the  present  case  could  have
                 sought for a  direction  nor  the  High  Court  could  have
                 granted the same.”


       27. The aforesaid dicta reiterated the earlier pronouncement of
           this Court in Ajit Singh (II)’s case (supra), wherein  this
           Court observed as follows:-
                 28. We next come to the question whether Article 16(4)  and
                 Article  16(4-A)  guaranteed  any  fundamental   right   to
                 reservation. It should be noted that  both  these  articles
                 open with a non obstante clause — “Nothing in this  Article
                 shall prevent the  State  from  making  any  provision  for
                 reservation….”  (emphasis  supplied)  There  is  a   marked
                 difference in the language employed in Article 16(1) on the
                 one hand and Article  16(4)  and  Article  16(4-A)  on  the
                 other. There is no directive or command in Article 16(4) or
                 Article 16(4-A) as in Article 16(1). On the face of it, the
                 above language in each of Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A) is  in
                 the nature of an enabling provision and it has been so held
                 in judgments rendered by Constitution Benches and in  other
                 cases right from 1963.




       28. In our  opinion,  the  reliance  placed  on  the  aforesaid
           observations by Dr. Dhwan is misplaced. Controversy  herein
           is not about  whether  the  court  can  issue  mandamus  to
           introduce the policy of reservation. The issue relates only
           to ensuring that the respondent-State  implements  its  own
           decisions. 
The only excuse  given  by  the  State  for  not
           implementing its decision dated 31st January, 2013  is  the
           pendency  of    the  117th Amendment Bill.
As noticed earlier, the State had  admitted
           in answer to the unstarred Assembly question that necessary
           data had been collected.  Furthermore, in the  reply  dated
           4th July, 2012 to this application the State  has  admitted
           the existence of the  data  which  was  placed  before  the
           Cabinet Sub-Committee on 25th April, 2011,  which  has  the
           base as on 31st October, 2009.   The  State  also  affirmed
           that fresh data showing the position as on 30th June, 2011,
           would be available  shortly.   Therefore,  it  is  patently
           apparent that there is no impediment  in  the  way  of  the
           respondent State to take the necessary policy  decision  on
           the basis of the available  data.  
Non-compliance  of  the
           direction in M. Nagaraj was the sole reason for  which  the
           High  Court  had  quashed  the   instructions   dated   7th
           September, 2007.  With  the  collection  of  the  necessary
           data, there exists no justifiable reason not  to  take  the
           required decision.


       29. The State has very skilfully avoided a decision  on  merits
           in SLP (C) No.30143 of 2009. Thereafter, it is a series  of
           false starts to  avoid  the  implementation  of  their  own
           decision and the directions issued by this  Court.  In  our
           opinion, that this cat and mouse game has gone far  enough.
           Therefore,  we  will  not  content   ourselves   with   the
           justification that the State has to await  the  outcome  of
           the 117th Amendment. We see no relevance of  the  amendment
           to the implementation by the State of its earlier  decision
           making reservation in promotions.  It has  taken  a  policy
           decision          for           implementation           of
                 the 85th  Constitution  Amendment  Act.  Instructions
                             dated 7th September, 2007 had been issued
           for  implementation  of  the  policy  decision.  In   these
           instructions,  H.P.  Government  had   decided   to   grant
           seniority to SC/ST employees. But this circular  dated  7th
           September, 2007 was withdrawn in  compliance  of  the  High
           Court judgment by issuing Circular            No.  PER(AP)-
           CF(1)-1/2009  dated   16th   November,   2009.    But   the
           implementation of this Circular was stayed by this Court in
           SLP (C) No.30143 of 2009 on 4th December, 2009.  The  State
           then  issued  another  Circular  No.  PER(AP)-C-F(1)-1/2009
           dated 20th January, 2010 withdrawing  circular  dated  16th
           November, 2009. Thus, the situation prevalent prior to  the
           Circular dated  7th September, 2007 was again operative for
           making promotions. Thereafter another Circular  was  issued
                          on 23rd January, 2010 amending the  circular
                                   dated  16th   November,   2009   by
           substituting words “wherever reservation is available” with
           the words “wherever consequential seniority  by  virtue  of
           reservation will be applicable.” The issuance  of  so  many
           circulars is indication of the intention of the  State  not
           to comply with the earlier decision to implement the policy
           of reservation in promotions and the grant of consequential
           seniority. Therefore, a clever statement  was  made  before
           this Court on 26th April, 2010 on the basis  of  which  the
           SLP was disposed  of.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the
           statement was only to  avoid  a  decision  on  merits  with
           regard to the correctness of the impugned judgment  of  the
           High Court.


       30. When a statement is made before this  Court  it  is,  as  a
           matter of course, assumed that it is made sincerely and  is
           not an effort to over-reach  the  court.  Numerous  matters
           even involving momentous questions of law  are  very  often
           disposed of by this Court on the  basis  of  the  statement
           made by the learned counsel for the parties. The  statement
           is accepted as it is assumed without doubt, to  be  honest,
           sincere, truthful, solemn and in the interest  of  justice.
           The  statement  by  the  counsel  is  not  expected  to  be
           flippant, mischievous, misleading and certainly not  false.
           This confidence in statements made by the  learned  counsel
           is founded on the assumption that the counsel is aware that
           he is an officer of the Court. Here we would like to allude
           to the words of Lord Denning, in the  case  of  Rendel  vs.
           Worsley[15] about the conduct expected of an Advocate.  “As
           an advocate, he is a minister of justice equally  with  the
           Judge…………………I say “all he honourably can” because his  duty
           is not only to his client. He has a duty to the Court which
           is paramount. It is a mistake to suppose  that  he  is  the
           mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his  tool
           to do what he directs. He is none of these things. He  owes
           allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of truth  and
           justice. He must not consciously mis-state  the  facts.  He
           must not knowingly conceal the truth. He must not  unjustly
           make a charge  of  fraud,  that  is,  without  evidence  to
           support it. He must produce all the  relevant  authorities,
           even those that are against  him.  He  must  see  that  his
           client discloses, if ordered, the relevant documents,  even
           those that are fatal to his case.  He  must  disregard  the
           most specific instructions of his client, if they conflicts
           with his duty to the  court.  The  code  which  requires  a
           Barrister to do all this is not a code of law.  It  is  the
           code of honour.” In our opinion,  the  aforesaid  dicta  of
           Lord Denning is an apt exposition of the very high standard
           of moral, ethical and professional conduct expected  to  be
           maintained by members of the legal profession.   We  expect
           no less of an Advocate/Counsel in this  country.  Here,  in
           this case,                on 26th April, 2010  a  statement
           was made on behalf of the State of  H.P.  that  “the  state
           intends  to   collect   more   details   with   regard   to
           representation of  the  SCs/STs  and  to  pass  appropriate
           orders within a reasonable time, i.e., approximately within
           three months after collecting  the  necessary  details  and
           datas.” Having very deftly avoided a decision on merits  in
           the SLP (C) No.30143 of 2009, the State has totally  failed
           to live up to the solemn statement made to this  Court.  It
           has hedged and hemmed and  prevaricated  from  26th  April,
           2010  till  date.  Inspite  of  the  requisite  data  being
           available, the policy of reservation already adopted by the
           State has not been implemented. We, therefore, do not agree
           with Dr. Dhawan that the applicants are seeking a  mandamus
           to adopt a policy in reservation. From the above narration,
           it is  evident  that  the  applicants  want  the  State  to
           implement its own decisions.


       31. The prayer is :
                 “Direct the Respondent/State Government to decide the  case
                 in  time  bound  manner  on  the  basis  of  data   already
                 available/submitted to Cabinet Sub Committee  on  25.4.2011
                 within a period of one month and ;


                 Further direct stay  on  all  promotions  pending  decision
                 taken in this Case.”




       32. The final excuse offered by the State for not granting  the
           aforesaid  relief  is  that  the  State  now   awaits   the
           finalisation  of  the  117th  Constitution  Amendment.   We
           decline to accept the reasons put forward for not honouring
           the statement solemnly made to this Court  on  26th  April,
           2010. This Court has been  more  than  considerate  to  the
           requests made by the State for extension of time. This last
           excuse about awaiting  the  finalisation  of  the  proposed
           117th Constitutional Amendment is the proverbial last straw
           on the camel’s back.  As stated earlier, the proposed 117th
           Constitutional Amendment would  not  adversely  affect  the
           merits of the clam of the petitioner for grant of promotion
           with consequential seniority.  By  the  aforesaid  proposed
           amendment, the existing Article 16 clause  (4A)  is  to  be
           substituted by the following clause 4A:-
                 “(4A) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere  in  the
                 Constitution, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
                 notified under article 341 and article  342,  respectively,
                 shall be deemed to be backward and nothing in this  article
                 or in article 335 shall prevent the State from  making  any
                 provision for reservation in matters  of  promotions,  with
                 consequential seniority, to any class or classes  of  posts
                 in the services under the State in favour of the  Scheduled
                 Castes and the  Scheduled  Tribes  to  the  extent  of  the
                 percentage of reservation provided to the Scheduled  Castes
                 and the Scheduled Tribes in the services of the State.”




       33. A bare perusal of the aforesaid would show that the purpose
           of amendment is to remove any impediment in  the  grant  of
           consequential seniority upon  promotion  on  the  basis  of
           reservation.
The aforesaid conclusion is stated explicitly
           in the Statement of Objects and Reasons  for  the  proposed
                            117th   Constitutional   amendment.    For
           facility of reference, the Statement of Objects and Reasons
           is reproduced hereunder:-
                      “Statement of Objects and Reasons
                 The Scheduled Castes and the  Scheduled  Tribes  have  been
                 provided reservation in promotions  since  1955.  This  was
                 discontinued following the judgment in the  case  of  Indra
                 Sawhney Vs. Union of India, wherein it was held that it  is
                 beyond the mandate of Article 16(4) of the Constitution  of
                 India. Subsequently, the Constitution was  amended  by  the
                 Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act,  1995  and  a
                 new clause (4A) was inserted in article 16  to  enable  the
                 Government to provide reservation in promotion in favour of
                 the   Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled    Tribes.
                 Subsequently, clause (4A) of article 16 was modified by the
                 Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 to  provide
                 consequential seniority to the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the
                 Scheduled Tribes candidates promoted by giving reservation.


                 The  validity  of   the   constitutional   amendments   was
                 challenged before the  Supreme  Court.  The  Supreme  Court
                 while  deliberating   on   the   issue   of   validity   of
                 Constitutional amendments in the case of M. Nagaraj Vs. UOI
                 & Ors., observed that the concerned State will have to show
                 in each case  the  existence  of  the  compelling  reasons,
                 namely,  backwardness,  inadequacy  of  representation  and
                 overall administrative efficiency before  making  provision
                 for reservation in promotion.


                 Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.  Nagaraj
                 case, the High Court of Rajasthan and  the  High  Court  of
                 Allahabad have struck down the provisions  for  reservation
                 in promotion in the services of the State of Rajasthan  and
                 the State of Uttar Pradesh, respectively. Subsequently, the
                 Supreme Court has upheld the decisions of these High Courts
                 striking down  provisions  for  reservation  in  respective
                 States.


                 It has been observed that there is difficulty in collection
                 of quantifiable data showing backwardness of the class  and
                 inadequacy  of  representation  of  that  class  in  public
                 employment.  Moreover,  there   is   uncertainty   on   the
                 methodology of this exercise.


                 Thus, in the wake of the judgment of the Supreme  Court  in
                 M.  Nagaraj  case,  the  prospects  of  promotion  of   the
                 employees  belonging  to  the  Scheduled  Castes  and   the
                 Scheduled Tribes are being adversely affected.


                 Demands  for  carrying  out  further   amendment   in   the
                 Constitution were raised by various quarters. A  discussion
                 on the issue  of  reservation  in  promotion  was  held  in
                 Parliament  on  3-5-2012.  Demand  for  amendment  of   the
                 Constitution  in  order  to  provide  reservation  for  the
                 Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in promotion  has
                 been voiced by the  Members  of  Parliament.  An  All-Party
                 Meeting to discuss the issue was held on 21-08-2012.  There
                 was a general consensus  to  carry  out  amendment  in  the
                 Constitution, so as to enable the  State  to  continue  the
                 scheme of reservation in promotion for the Scheduled Castes
                 and the Scheduled Tribes as it existed since 1995.


                 In view of the  above,  the  Government  has  reviewed  the
                 position  and  has  decided  to  move  the   constitutional
                 amendment to substitute clause (4A) of article 16,  with  a
                 view to provide impediment-free reservation in promotion to
                 the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and to  bring
                 certainty and clarity in the matter.
It is  also  necessary
                 to give retrospective effect to the proposed clause (4A) of
                 article 16 with effect from the date of coming  into  force
                 of that clause as originally introduced, that is, from  the
                 17th day of June, 1995.”


       34. The aforesaid leaves no manner of doubt that the  amendment
           is with the view to provide impediment free reservation  in
           promotion to the Scheduled-Castes and Scheduled-Tribes  and
           to bring certainty and clarity in the matter.  
Furthermore,
           the aforesaid proposed amendment is to be  introduced  with
           retrospective effect from 17th June, 1995. 
 In view of  the
           above, there can be no impediment in the way of  the  State
           Government to implement the  policy  of  reservation  which
           existed till the issuance of the various instructions prior
           to the making of the Statement before this  Court  on  26th
           April, 2010.  
It is time to put an  end  to  this  charade;
           this never ending process of extensions and hold the  State
           to honour its statements.


       35. We, therefore, allow  this  Interlocutory  Application  and
           direct the State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  to  take  a  final
           decision on the issue either  on  the  basis  of  the  data
           already submitted to  the  Cabinet  Sub-Committee  on  25th
           April, 2011 or on the basis  of  the  data  reflecting  the
           position as on 30th June, 2011, within a  period  of  three
           months from today. Till a  final  decision  is  taken,  the
           direction restraining the State of  Himachal  Pradesh  from
           making any promotion shall continue.




                                                             ….….…………………..J.
                                                     [Surinder Singh Nijjar]






                                                              ….…………………,……J.
                                                      [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]
           New Delhi;
           September 13, 2013.




































































           -----------------------
[1] (1989) Supp 1 SCC 342
[2] 1992 (Supp) 3 SCC 217
[3] 1995 (2) SCC 745
[4] (2006) 8 SCC 212
[5] (2012) 10 SCC 235
[6] (1995) 6 SCC 684
[7] (1996) 2 SCC 715
[8] (1997) 10 SCC 474
[9] (1997) 6 SCC 538
[10] (1999) 7 SCC 209
[11] (2011) 1 SCC 467
[12] (2012) 7 SCC 1
[13] 1968 (1) SCR 721
[14] (2003) 9 SCC 294
[15] [1967] 1 QB 443

Section 78(5) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act').=The Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi had levied penalty in exercise of his powers under Section 78(5) of the Act against the owner of the vehicle who was carrying certain goods of the assessee.- “If one reads sub-section (5) of Section 78 in its entirety with Rule 53 of the 1995 Rules, it is clear that penalty was liable to be imposed for importation of any taxable goods for sale without furnishing a declaration in Form ST 18A completely filled in all respects. The duty to fill and furnish the said Form is imposed on the purchasing dealer. Therefore, Section 78(5) as it stood prior to 22.3.02 imposed penalty if possession or movement of goods took place inter alia in breach of Section 78(2)(a) on "the person in-charge", which included the owner. In this connection it may be noted that sub- section (5) comes after sub-section 4(c) which talks about release of the goods to "the owner of the goods" on his giving of adequate security. It is the owner (importer) who has to fill in the Form ST 18A. It is the owner who is entitled to seek release under Section 78(4) on giving security. It is the owner who is entitled to hearing under Section 78(5) and, therefore, the expression "person in-charge of the goods" under Section 78(5) would include the owner. Moreover, under Section 78(2) the words used are "person in-charge of a vehicle or carrier of goods in movement" whereas the words in Section 78(5) which comes after sub-section (4) refers to "person in-charge of the goods". The words "in movement" do not find place in Section 78(5) and therefore the expression "person in charge of goods" under Section 78(5) was wider than the expression "person in charge of goods in movement" under Section 78(2)(a). Consequently, the expression "person in-charge of the goods" under Section 78(5) who is given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry would include the "owner of the goods".= "person in-charge of the goods" under the old Section 78(5) is substituted by the words "the owner of the goods or a person authorized in writing by such owner or person in-charge of the goods".- Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER Vs. M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES .

         published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40817
               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.8216        OF 2013
               (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.4194 OF 2010)


ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER                APPELLANT(S)

                                   VERSUS

M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES                            RESPONDENT(S)

                                  O R D E R



1.          Leave granted.


2.          This appeal is directed against the judgment and  order  passed
by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in S.B.  Sales  Tax
Revision Petition  No.110  of  2009,  dated  01.07.2009.  By  the  impugned
judgment and order, the High Court has set aside the penalty levied by  the
Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi (Revenue) in exercise of  their
powers under Section 78(5) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for  short
'the Act').

3.          The Assistant Commercial  Taxes  Officer,  Bhiwadi  had  levied penalty in exercise of his powers under Section 78(5) of  the  Act  against the owner of the vehicle who was carrying certain goods  of  the  assessee.
Being aggrieved by the said order, the assessee had carried the  matter  in
further appeal before the various authorities and the same  had  culminated
into a final order passed by the High Court.  The High Court has taken  the
view that the Revenue could not have directed the owner of the  vehicle  to
pay the penalty imposed under Section 78(5) of the Act.

4.          Being aggrieved by the aforesaid  finding  and  the  conclusion
reached by the High Court, the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer,  Bhiwadi
is before us in this appeal.
The issue raised in this appeal  is  no  more
res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of  Assistant
Commercial Taxes Officers Vs. Bajaj Electricals Limited, reported in (2009)
1 SCC 308.
In the said decision, this Court has observed:
      “If one reads sub-section (5) of Section 78 in its entirety with  Rule
      53 of the 1995 Rules, it is  clear  that  penalty  was  liable  to  be
      imposed  for  importation  of  any  taxable  goods  for  sale  without
      furnishing a declaration in Form  ST  18A  completely  filled  in  all
      respects.   The duty to fill and furnish the said Form is  imposed  on
      the purchasing dealer. Therefore, Section 78(5) as it stood  prior  to
      22.3.02 imposed penalty if possession or movement of goods took  place
      inter alia in breach of Section 78(2)(a) on  "the  person  in-charge",
      which included the owner. In this connection it may be noted that sub-
      section (5) comes after sub-section 4(c) which talks about release  of
      the goods to "the owner of  the  goods"  on  his  giving  of  adequate
      security. It is the owner (importer) who has to fill in  the  Form  ST
      18A. It is the owner who is entitled to  seek  release  under  Section
      78(4) on giving security. It is the owner who is entitled  to  hearing
      under Section 78(5) and, therefore, the expression  "person  in-charge
      of the goods" under Section 78(5) would include the  owner.  Moreover,
      under Section 78(2) the words used are "person in-charge of a  vehicle
      or carrier of goods in movement" whereas the words  in  Section  78(5)
      which comes after sub-section (4) refers to "person in-charge  of  the
      goods". The words "in movement" do not find place in Section 78(5) and
      therefore the expression "person in charge  of  goods"  under  Section
      78(5) was wider than the expression "person  in  charge  of  goods  in
      movement" under Section 78(2)(a). Consequently, the expression "person
      in-charge  of  the  goods"  under  Section  78(5)  who  is  given   an
      opportunity of being heard in the enquiry would include the "owner  of
      the goods".


                 Therefore, in our view, the judgment of this Court  in  the
      case of    M/s.Guljag Industries (supra) would squarely apply  to  the
      facts of the present case. 
In fact, our  view  in  the  case  of  M/s.
      Guljag Industries (supra) finds support from  the  amendment  made  in
      Section 78(5) vide Act No.7 of 2002  w.e.f.  22.3.2002  by  which  the
      expression
"person in-charge of the goods" under the old Section 78(5)
  is substituted by the words "the  owner  of  the  goods  or  a  person authorized in writing by such owner or person in-charge of the goods".
      It is once again emphasized that Act No.7 of 2002 is  an  exercise  in
      substitution.    Therefore,  the  Legislature  seeks  to  clarify  the
      expression "person in-charge of the goods" occurring in Section  78(5)
      as it stood earlier by Act No.7 of 2002. In fact, it is interesting to
      note that even under Section 22A(3)  of  the  1954  Act,  penalty  was
      leviable on the "owner of the  goods"  for  possession  of  goods  not
      covered by the  Goods  Vehicle  Record  [including  Declaration  under
      Section 22A(3)].”



5.          In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court,  the  judgment
and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and deserves  to  be
set aside.

6.          Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed  by
the High Court and restore the order passed  by  the  Assistant  Commercial
Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi.

            Ordered accordingly.



                                                   .......................J.
                                                               (H. L. DATTU)




                                                   .......................J.
                                                               (M. Y. EQBAL)

NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 13, 2013

Saturday, September 21, 2013

adverse possession can be used as a shield/defence but not as a weapon = Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.- As the appellant is in possession of the suit property since 13.4.1952 and has been granted the decree of injunction, it obviously means that the possession of the appellant cannot be disturbed except by due process of law. We make it clear that though the suit of the appellant seeking relief of declaration has been dismissed, in case respondents file suit for possession and/or ejectment of the appellant, it would be open to the appellant to plead in defence that the appellant had become the owner of property by adverse possession. Needless to mention at this stage, the appellant shall also be at liberty to plead that findings of issue No.1 to the effect that the appellant is in possession of adverse possession since 13.4.1952 operates as res- judicata. Subject to this clarification, the appeal is dismissed.

         published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40774       
                                          NON-REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8244/2013
              (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 23728 of 2012)

Gurudwara Sahib                                    …Appellant



                 Vs.

Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr.
…Respondents



                             J U D G M E N T



A.K.SIKRI,J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant herein is the original plaintiff  which  had  filed  the
suit for decree of declaration to the effect that it  had  become  owner  of
the suit property by adverse possession.  Declaration  was  also  sought  to
the effect that the Revenue record  showing  ownership  of  respondent  No.1
herein i.e.  Gram  Panchayat  (defendant  in  the  suit)  is  liable  to  be
corrected in the name of the appellant and the auction already held  by  the
Gram Panchayat of the land in  dispute  is  null  and  void.   Consequential
relief   of   permanent   injunction   restraining   Gram   Panchayat   from
dispossessing the appellant from the disputed  land  was  also  prayed  for.
This suit  was  partly  decreed  by  the  trial  court  granting  relief  of
injunction.  First Appeal against that part of the judgment  whereby  relief
of declaration was denied was dismissed by the learned  Additional  District
Judge and the Second  Appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant  has  also  been
dismissed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana vide judgment  dated  22nd
September 2011.   Undeterred  by  successive  failures,  the  appellant  has
knocked at the door of this Court with the plea that its suit be decreed  in
entirety.

3.    The appellant claims ownership by adverse  possession  on  the  ground
that it is in possession of  the  land  in  dispute  for  sufficiently  long
period which fact has been established and, therefore, his  suit  could  not
be dismissed.  We, however, find that this relief of  declaration  has  been
denied on the ground that suit  for  such  a  prayer  was  not  maintainable
inasmuch as declaration to this effect on the basis  of  adverse  possession
cannot be sought and the plea of adverse possession is available only  as  a
defence to the defendant.

4.    On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the trial court  had  framed
the following issues:

      1. Whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession  of  the  suit  land
since 13.4.1952 as alleged? (OPP)

      2. If  issue  No.1  is  proved,  whether  adverse  possession  of  the
plaintiff has matured into ownership? (OPP)

      3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to declaration as prayed for? (OPP)

       4.  Whether  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  injunction  as  prayed
for?(OPP)

      5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?(OPP)

      6. Relief.

5.    In so far as first issue is concerned, it was  decided  in  favour  of
the plaintiff returning the findings  that  the  appellant  was  in  adverse
possession of the suit property  since  13.4.1952  as  this  fact  had  been
proved by plethora  of  documentary  evidence  produced  by  the  appellant.
However,  while  deciding  the  second  issue,  the  court  opined  that  no
declaration can be sought on the basis of  adverse  possession  inasmuch  as
adverse possession can be used as a shield and not as a sword.  The  learned
Civil Judge relied upon the judgment of the Punjab and  Haryana  High  Court
in Gurudwara  Sahib Sannuali vs. State of Punjab  PLR  page  756  and  thus,
decided the issue against the plaintiff.  Issue No.3 was also, in  the  same
vein, decided against the appellant.    In so far as issue  no.4  pertaining
to relief of injunction is concerned, the learned Civil Judge held  that  as
long  uninterrupted  possession  of  the  appellant  was  established,   the
appellant was entitled to the decree of injunction and the respondents  were
restraining from dispossessing the appellant  forcibly  and  illegally  from
the suit land and also restrained from damaging the  building  of  Gurudwara
Sahib.  Issue No.5 was decided against the respondent on the ground that  no
evidence was led to show how the suit was not maintainable  in  the  present
form.   While granting relief, the learned Civil Judge  partly  decreed  the
suit holding as under:

                 “It is held that plaintiff is in adverse  possession  over
           the suit property since 13.4.1952 and defendants are  restrained
           from dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly and illegally from the
           suit property and further restrained  from damaging the building
           of Gurudwara Sahib except according to due process of  law.   As
           discussed above, the remaining relief as sought by the plaintiff
           is dismissed.  Decree sheet be prepared. File  be  consigned  to
           the record room.”



6.    It is pertinent to note that the  respondents  accepted  the  judgment
and decree pertaining to prohibiting injunction.   It is the  appellant  who
filed the First Appeal. Obviously, the confines of the said appeals  related
to the issue pertaining to declaration of ownership of  adverse  possession.
The First Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal observed as under:

                  “The respondents have  not  challenged  the  judgment  and
          decree dated 6.1.2009 passed by the ld. Civil  Judge  (Jr.  Div.),
          Khanna, which means that they have accepted that the appellant was
          in adverse possession of the suit land since 13.4.1952. The  issue
          whether adverse possession of the appellant/plaintiff had  matured
          into his ownership is purely a question of law and it is a settled
          that no declaration of title can be sought on the basis of adverse
          possession.  Ld. Trial court has  rightly  relied  upon  the  case
          titled Gurudwara Sahib Sannauli       vs. State of Punjab PLR  756
          wherein  it is held that no  declaration  can  be  sought  by  the
          plaintiff with regard to adverse possession because such a plea is
          available only to the defendant. Since the appellant was  not  the
          lawful owner of the property  in  dispute,  therefore,  respondent
          No.1 was within its rights to auction  a  part  of  the  same,  on
          19.12.2003 in favour  of  respondent  No.2.  Respondent  No.1  has
          proved that land measuring 13B-12B was auctioned on 19.12.2003  in
          the presence of BDPO Doraha and Ranjit Singh was declared  as  the
          last  bidder  and  the  auction  was  struck  in  his  name  of  a
          consideration of Rs.1,11,000/- and the land measuring 6B on  which
          the building of Gurudwara Sahib  had  been  constructed,  was  not
          auctioned.

                  In view  of  my  above  discussion,  I  find  no  material
          illegality or  irregularity  in  the  judgment  and  decree  dated
          6.11.2009 passed by ld. Trial court and therefore  the  appeal  is
          dismissed and the findings of the ld. trial  court  are  affirmed.
          Decree  sheet  be  prepared.  File  of  lower  court  be  returned
          forthwith. File be consigned to the record room.”




7.    In the Second Appeal, the relief of ownership  by  adverse  possession
is again denied holding that such a suit is not maintainable.  There  cannot
be any quarrel to this extent the judgments of the courts below are  correct
and without any blemish.
Even if the plaintiff is found to  be  in  adverse
possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the  effect  that  such  adverse possession has matured into ownership. 
Only  if  proceedings  filed  against
the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that  it  can  use  this adverse possession as a shield/defence.

8.    However, we also find from the reading of the  judgment  of  the  High
Court that the High Court has refused  the  injunction  observing  that  the
appellant was not entitled to the same as it is the Gram Panchayat which  is
the owner of the property in dispute and as the appellant is  in  possession
without any right, it has no right  to  seek  injunction  against  the  Gram
Panchayat.  This finding is totally perverse and, in fact, unnecessary.   In
the first instance, there was no occasion  or  reason  for  the  appellant’s
counsel to seek this prayer in the Second Appeal.   As  pointed  out  above,
the relief of injunction had already been granted by  the  Civil  Court  and
this portion of the decree had  not  been  challenged  by  the  respondents.
Decree to this extent in favour of  the  appellant  had  attained  finality.
The First Appellate Court also specifically recorded this fact and  observed
that by not challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned  Civil
Judge,  the  respondents  accepted  that  the  appellant  was   in   adverse
possession  of  the  land  since  13.4.1952.    We,   thus,   clarify   that
observations of the High  Court  that  the  appellant  is  not  entitled  to
injunction, were unnecessary and beyond the scope of the appeal .

9.    As  the  appellant  is  in  possession  of  the  suit  property  since 13.4.1952 and has been granted the decree of injunction, it obviously  means that the possession of the appellant  cannot  be  disturbed  except  by  due process of law.  
We make it clear that though  the  suit  of  the  appellant
seeking relief of declaration has been dismissed, in case  respondents  file suit for possession and/or ejectment of the appellant, it would be  open  to the appellant to plead in defence that the appellant had  become  the  owner of property by adverse possession.  
Needless to mention at this  stage,  the
appellant shall also be at liberty to plead that findings of issue  No.1  to the effect that the appellant is in possession of adverse  possession  since 13.4.1952 operates as res- judicata.  
Subject  to  this  clarification,  the appeal is dismissed.



                                             ………………………….J.
                                             (K.S.RADHAKRISHNAN)



                                             ………………………….J.
                                             (A.K.SIKRI)
New Delhi,
September 16,  2013