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Friday, September 20, 2013

Curable mental disorder -No ground for divorce = whether the marriage between the parties can be dissolved by granting a decree of divorce on the basis of one spouse's mental illness which includes schizophrenia under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act. In the English case of Whysall v. Whysall[4], it was held that a spouse is ‘incurably of unsound mind’ if he or she is of such mental incapacity as to make normal married life impossible and there is no prospect of any improvement in mental health, which would make this possible in future. The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, in Pramatha Kumar Maity v Ashima Maity[5] has held that mental disorder of the wife, even if proved, cannot, by itself, warrant a decree of divorce and it must be further proved that it is of such a nature as the husband could not be expected to live with the wife. The Allahabad High Court, in Mt. Tilti Vs. Alfred Rebert Jones[6] has held that where it has come on record that the wife has improved her educational qualifications and has been looking after her children, the apprehension of the husband that there is danger to his life or to his children is not borne out is the finding recorded in the said case. Inability to manage his or her affairs is an essential attribute of an “incurably unsound mind”. The facts pleaded and the evidence placed on record produced by the appellant in this case does not establish such inability as a ground on which dissolution of marriage was sought for by him before the trial court.= It is thus clear that the respondent, even if she did suffer from schizophrenia, is in a much better health condition at present. Therefore, this Court cannot grant the dissolution of marriage on the basis of one spouse's illness. The appellant has not proved the fact of mental disorder of the respondent with reference to the allegation made against her that she has been suffering from schizophrenia by producing positive and substantive evidence on record and on the other hand, it has been proved that the respondent is in much better health condition and does not show signs of schizophrenia as per the most recent medical report from NIMHANS, as deposed by PW-4 in his evidence before the trial court.- Under Hindu law, marriage is an institution, a meeting of two hearts and minds and is something that cannot be taken lightly. In the Vedic period, the sacredness of the marriage tie was repeatedly declared; the family ideal was decidedly high and it was often realised[7]. In Vedic Index I it is stated that “The high value placed on the marriage is shown by the long and striking hymn”. In Rig Veda, X, 85; “Be, thou, mother of heroic children, devoted to the Gods, Be, thou, Queen in thy father-in- law’s household. May all the Gods unite the hearts of us “two into one” as stated in Justice Ranganath Misra’s ‘Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage’[8]. Marriage is highly revered in India and we are a Nation that prides itself on the strong foundation of our marriages, come hell or high water, rain or sunshine. Life is made up of good times and bad, and the bad times can bring with it terrible illnesses and extreme hardships. The partners in a marriage must weather these storms and embrace the sunshine with equanimity. Any person may have bad health, this is not their fault and most times, it is not within their control, as in the present case, the respondent was unwell and was taking treatment for the same. The illness had its fair share of problems. Can this be a reason for the appellant to abandon her and seek dissolution of marriage after the child is born out of their union? Since the child is now a grown up girl, her welfare must be the prime consideration for both the parties. In view of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the two parties in this case must reconcile and if the appellant so feels that the respondent is still suffering, then she must be given the right treatment. The respondent must stick to her treatment plan and make the best attempts to get better. It is not in the best interest of either the respondent or her daughter who is said to be of adolescent age for grant of a decree of dissolution of marriage as prayed for by the appellant. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the High Court in not granting a decree of divorce and allowing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Therefore, we grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act in favour of the respondent.

       published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40785           
                               REPORTABLE




                 IN      THE      SUPREME       COURT       OF       INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8264 OF 2013

                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3544 of 2007)




          KOLLAM CHANDRA SEKHAR                       ... APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

           KOLLAM PADMA LATHA                        ... RESPONDENT



                               J U D G M E N T

V. Gopala Gowda, J.



       Leave granted.

2.     This appeal is directed against the common judgment and  order  dated
28.09.2006 passed in CMA No. 2858 of 2002 and CMA No. 2859 of  2002  of  the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh as it has set aside the judgment and decree  of
divorce granted in favour of the appellant-husband dissolving  the  marriage
between the appellant and respondent by  dismissing  the  Original  Petition
No. 203 of 2000 filed by the appellant for  dissolution  of  their  marriage
under Section 13 (1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act,  1955  (in  short  ‘the
Act’) and allowing the Original  Petition  No.  1  of  1999  filed  by   the
respondent-wife against the appellant by granting  restitution  of  conjugal
rights urging various facts and legal contentions.

3.  The factual and rival legal contentions urged on behalf of  the  parties
are adverted to in this judgment with a view to examine  the  tenability  of
the appellant's submissions.  The relevant facts are stated as hereunder:

      The marriage between the appellant and the respondent  was  solemnized
on 31.05.1995 at Kakinada (Andhra Pradesh) as per Hindu  rites  and  customs
and their marriage was consummated.  It is the case of  the  appellant  that
at the time of marriage, he was working as Senior Resident at the All  India
Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi. After marriage, the  respondent-
wife joined the appellant at New Delhi and secured employment  in  the  said
Institute.

4.   It is the case of both the parties that when they were living  at  New
Delhi, the brother of the appellant died in an accident.  At that point  of
time, the appellant herein came  to  Yanam  (Andhra  Pradesh)  leaving  the
respondent at Delhi, who gave birth to a female child on 07.07.1997.

      It is contended by the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant,
Mr.Jaideep Gupta, in the pleadings that dispute arose between the  appellant
and his parents on the one hand and the in-laws of the deceased  brother  of
the appellant on the other.  There  were  threats  to  kill  the  appellant.
During that period,  respondent’s  father  stayed  in  the  company  of  the
appellant and his parents at Yanam.   At that time, both the  appellant  and
the respondent suffered tensions and they were restless on  account  of  the
situation created by the in-laws of the appellant’s deceased brother.   Both
of  them  received  medical  treatment  and  due  to  depression,  appellant
submitted his resignation and the respondent also resigned from her  job  at
AIIMS.  The appellant then joined as Assistant Professor in Gandhi  Hospital
at Secunderabad. The respondent and the child also joined him at  Hyderabad.
 It is their further case that while they were in Hyderabad,  the  appellant
used to receive threatening calls from the in-laws of his  deceased  brother
which used to create tension in their family.  The  respondent  was  treated
for hypothyroidism problem.

5.   In the counter statement filed by the respondent, she  contended  that
after one year of their marriage, the appellant  and  his  parents  started
harassing her by demanding colour television,  refrigerator  etc.   In  May
1998, after the death of the father of the respondent, the  appellant  went
on insisting that the respondent gets the  house  situated  at  Rajahmundry
registered in his name and when she refused, he  started  to  torture  her.
The respondent applied for post-graduate entrance  examination,  which  was
scheduled  to  be  held  on  13.08.1998,  and  the  appellant  was   making
arrangements to  go  to  Madras  on  12.08.1998  in  connection  with  FRCS
admission. On 11.08.1998, the  appellant  picked  up  a  quarrel  with  the
respondent insisting that she must get the house at Rajahmundry  registered
in his name to which she did not agree. The respondent also  requested  him
not to go to Madras as she has to appear  for  the  Post-Graduate  entrance
examination on  13.08.1998  for  which  the  respondent  alleged  that  the
appellant badly tortured her both physically and mentally. A  telegram  was
sent to her mother with false allegations of her mental illness with a view
to create evidence as he could have as well conveyed  the  message  through
telephone as there was telephone facility at the house of her  parents.  As
the appellant was preparing to appear for FRCS examination and would  spend
most of his time in the libraries and the respondent and their child  would
be left alone without help, he suggested that the appellant  should  go  to
Rajahmundry and stay with her parents to  which  she  agreed  and  went  to
Rajahmundry and joined Chaitanya Nursing Home and Bhavani Nursing  Home  to
work as a doctor.  In the second week of November, 1998, the appellant came
to Rajahmundry and asked the respondent to go to Yanam and  stay  with  his
parents saying that she can have the company of his  parents  and  she  can
carry on the medical profession along with his father who was also a doctor
to which she agreed. Thereafter, the appellant got issued  a  notice  dated
25.11.1998 to the respondent making certain false allegations  saying  that
she was suffering from schizophrenia and she had suicidal tendencies  etc.,
with the object of marrying again for fat dowry.  The respondent has denied
that she suffered from schizophrenia or  suicidal  tendencies  and  further
stated that during her delivery days and subsequently  on  account  of  the
threats received from in-laws of the appellant’s  deceased  brother,  there
was some depression for which the respondent was treated and the  appellant
never allowed her to go through  the  prescriptions  of  her  treatment  at
anytime and she was also not allowed to see the medicines given to  her  as
part of treatment for her depression.    It  is  stated  by  her  that  she
believes that as part of the ill motive of the  appellant,  he  might  have
administered some medicines to build up a false case  against  her  with  a
view to file petition for  dissolution  of  marriage.  The  respondent  got
issued a reply notice to the lawyer of the appellant mentioning  the  above
facts on 18.12.1998.

6.   It is  further  contended  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
respondent, Mr. Pallav Sisodia, that the appellant never cared for her  and
encouraged his parents to dislodge her from the family  house.   She  filed
O.S. No.53 of 1998 on the  file  of  District  Munsif’s  Court,  Yanam  for
permanent injunction  against  the  parents  of  the  appellant  and  filed
Interlocutory Application No. 237 of 1998 for temporary injunction  against
them not to evict her from the residential house where she was staying.  It
is further stated that the appellant has no  right  to  withdraw  from  her
society and demand for divorce and that she is entitled for restitution  of
conjugal rights. It is  contended  by  the  respondent  that  the  impugned
judgment is a well-considered judgment both on facts and  in  law  and  the
Division Bench of the High Court rightly allowed the appeals filed  by  the
respondent refusing to grant a decree of divorce in favour of the appellant
and granting a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favour  of  the
respondent.  Therefore, the respondent has  prayed  for  dismissal  of  the
petition filed by the appellant praying for grant of  decree  of    divorce
against her.

7.  The  appellant  filed  the  counter  statement  to  the   petition   for
   restitution of conjugal  rights  denying  the  allegations  made  in  the
   petition. He contended that the behaviour of  the  respondent  even  when
   they were staying at New Delhi was marked by emotional  disturbances  and
   she also received treatment from a psychiatrist there.   He  has  further
   stated  that  he  underwent  severe  mental  stress  due  to   irrational
   behavioural pattern of the respondent.   Her  erratic  behaviour  started
   increasing as  time  passed  by.  She  started  manifesting  symptoms  of
   schizophrenia like violent or aggressive behaviour and a tendency  to  be
   harsh and hostile towards other members of the family without any  reason
   whatsoever which were not visible earlier. For that reason, she was  kept
   with her parents’ family so that she can  develop  a  sense  of  security
   which is required for  patients  suffering  from  schizophrenia.  He  has
   further stated that she also started developing the symptoms like  sudden
   withdrawal and being silent for long periods without any communication.

8. Further, he has stated that after the death of his brother,  he  brought
his wife and child to Hyderabad where he had secured  a  job  as  Assistant
Professor of Orthopaedics in Gandhi Medical College.  He further  contended
that on account of the death of  his  brother,  tension  developed  in  his
family and that neither he nor his family members harassed  the  respondent
demanding goods etc.  He also stated that at the time of  marriage,  mental
status of the respondent was not known to  him.   Further,  the  respondent
tried to evict his parents from their house at Yanam and when she failed in
her attempt, she filed O.S. No. 53 of  1998  at  District  Munsif’s  Court,
Yanam  which  shows  her  erratic  attitude  towards  the  parents  of  the
appellant.

9.  The respondent fell seriously ill due to which the  appellant  sent  her
mother a telegram to come and take care of her.  She went to live  with  her
mother at Rajahmundry as she consulted some psychiatrists  who  advised  her
to live with her mother.  The appellant visited  her  after  two  weeks  and
found that her mental condition had aggravated  to  such  a  point  that  it
would be impossible for him to live with her as her husband.   He  contended
that she was showing all the classical symptoms of  schizophrenia  including
violence, psychotic behaviour, suicidal tendencies, withdrawal symptoms  and
abnormal and irrational behaviour including in the matter of her speech  and
her conversation.   She also used to say  that  she  would  like  to  commit
suicide and he was, thus, worried about her and the  child.  The  respondent
was continuously on psychiatric treatment.  The above  facts  were  narrated
by the appellant in his divorce petition filed before the trial  court.   He
has further contended that under the circumstances narrated  above,  it  was
impossible for him to resume cohabitation with  the  respondent  as  he  was
afraid of danger to his life and that of  his  daughter  and  therefore,  he
requested the  Court  for  grant  of  a  decree  of  divorce  and  that  the
respondent’s petition for restitution of conjugal  rights  be  dismissed  as
she is not entitled to the relief prayed for by her.

10. The learned trial Judge in his judgment  held  that  the  appellant  is
   entitled to a decree of divorce if not annulment  of  marriage  and  that
   since the disease of the respondent was not disclosed  to  the  appellant
   before marriage, she is not  entitled  to  a  decree  of  restitution  of
   conjugal rights.   As a result, O.P. 1/99 filed  by  the  respondent  for
   restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed and  O.P.203/2000  filed  by
   the appellant for grant of divorce was allowed by dissolving the marriage
   between the appellant and  the  respondent  and  decree  of  divorce  was
   granted.

11. The trial court relied on the certified copy of report  from  Institute
of Mental Health, Government  Hospital  for  Mental  Care,  Sanjeeva  Reddy
Nagar, Hyderabad, bearing No. A and D/402/99  submitted  to  the  Registrar
(Judicial) High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, marked  as  Exh.  B-10,
given as per procedure and by conducting chemical examination  etc.  It  is
stated that the report clearly showed that the respondent is suffering from
schizophrenia. The trial court relied on the case of  Tarlochan  Singh  Vs.
Jit Kaur,[1] where it was held that since the fact  of  the  wife  being  a
patient of schizophrenia was not disclosed to the husband before  marriage,
it would amount to matrimonial fraud and therefore it was held the  husband
was entitled to decree of divorce if not annulment of marriage.

12.  Being aggrieved by the common judgment and decree of the  trial  court
passed in O.P. Nos. 1/99 and 203/2000 the respondent filed  appeals  before
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the correctness  of  the  same
urging various grounds.  The High Court on re-appreciation of pleadings and
evidence held  that  there  is  no  positive  evidence  to  show  that  the
respondent has suffered  schizophrenia  and  even  in  the  case  that  she
suffered from schizophrenia, it cannot be said that she was suffering  from
such a serious form of the disease that it would attract  the  requirements
of Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act for grant of decree for  dissolution  of
marriage between the parties.

13. On perusal of the facts and legal evidence on record and  hearing  rival
legal contentions urged by both the parties, the  points  that  would  arise
for consideration of this Court are:

        1) Whether the  respondent  is  suffering  from  a  serious  mental
           disorder i.e. schizophrenia or incurable  unsoundness  of  mind,
           and can this be considered as a ground for divorce under Section
           13 (1) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

        2) Whether the High Court has correctly  re-appreciated  the  facts
           pleaded and evidence on  record  while  dismissing  the  divorce
           petition  of  the  appellant  and  allowing  the  petition   for
           restitution of conjugal rights of the respondent?

        3) Whether the appeal filed by the appellant has to be allowed  and
           we must restore the judgment  and  decree  of  trial  court  and
           dismiss  the  petition  for  conjugal  rights   filed   by   the
           respondent?

        4) What order?

14.  Answer to point nos.1 to 3:

These points are answered together as  they  are  interrelated.  On  careful
scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence on record and the  decision  of  this
Court referred to above, the provision of Section 13(1) (iii) of the Act  is
interpreted and the meanings of 'unsound  mind'  and  'mental  disorder'  as
occurring in the above provisions of the Act are examined  and  referred  to
in the impugned judgment. The High Court, while  examining  the  correctness
of the findings recorded in the common judgment  of  the  trial  court,  has
placed reliance on Ram Narain Gupta vs. Rameshwari  Gupta[2],  wherein  this
Court has interpreted the provision of Section 13(1)(iii)  of  the  Act  and
laid down the law regarding mental disorder or  unsound  mind  as  a  ground
available to a party to  get  dissolution  of  the  marriage.  The  relevant
portions with regard to ‘unsoundness of mind’  and  ‘mental  disorder’  from
the case referred to supra are extracted hereunder:

          “20.The context in which the ideas of unsoundness  of  “mind”  and
      “mental disorder” occur in the Section as grounds for dissolution of a
      marriage,  require  the  assessment  of  the  degree  of  the  “mental
      disorder”. Its degree must be such  that  the  spouse  seeking  relief
      cannot reasonably be expected to  live  with  the  other.  All  mental
      abnormalities are not recognised as grounds for grant  of  decree.  If
      the mere existence of any degree of mental abnormality  could  justify
      dissolution of a marriage few marriages would, indeed, survive in law.




        21. The answer to the apparently simple — and perhaps misleading  —
      question as to “who is normal?”  runs  inevitably  into  philosophical
      thickets of the concept of mental normalcy and as involved therein, of
      the ‘mind’ itself. These concepts of “mind”, “mental phenomena”  etc.,
      are more  known  than  understood  and  the  theories  of  “mind”  and
      “mentation” do  not  indicate  any  internal  consistency,  let  alone
      validity, of their basic ideas. Theories of “mind” with cognate  ideas
      of  “perception”  and  “consciousness”  encompass  a  wide  range   of
      thoughts, more ontolopical than enistemological.  Theories  of  mental
      phenomena are diverse and include the  dualist  concept  —  shared  by
      Descartes and Sigmund Freud — of the separateness of the existence  of
      the physical or the material world  as  distinguished  from  the  non-
      material mental world  with  its  existence  only  spatially  and  not
      temporally.  There  is,  again,  the   theory   which   stresses   the
      neurological  basis  of  the  “mental  phenomenon”  by  asserting  the
      functional correlation of the neuronal arrangements of the brain  with
      mental phenomena. The “behaviourist” tradition,  on  the  other  hand,
      interprets all reference to mind as  “constructs”  out  of  behaviour.
      “Functionalism”, however, seems to assert that mind is the logical  or
      functional state  of  physical  systems.  But  all  theories  seem  to
      recognise, in varying degrees, that the psychometric control over  the
      mind operates at a level not yet  fully  taught  to  science.  When  a
      person is oppressed by intense and seemingly insoluble moral dilemmas,
      or when grief of loss of dear ones etch away all the bright colours of
      life, or where a broken marriage brings with it the loss of  emotional
      security, what standards of normalcy of behaviour could be  formulated
      and applied?  The  arcane  infallibility  of  science  has  not  fully
      pervaded the study of the non-material dimensions of “being”.


        22. Speaking of the indisposition of science towards this study,  a
      learned Author says:
      “...we have inherited cultural resistance to  treating  the  conscious
      mind as a biological phenomenon like any  other.  This  goes  back  to
      Descartes in the seventeenth century. Descartes divided the world into
      two kinds of substances: mental substances  and  physical  substances.
      Physical substances were the  proper  domain  of  science  and  mental
      substances were the property of religion. Something of  an  acceptance
      of this division exists even to the  present  day.  So,  for  example,
      consciousness and subjectivity are often regarded as unsuitable topics
      for science. And  this  reluctance  to  deal  with  consciousness  and
      subjectivity is part of a  persistent  objectifying  tendency.  People
      think science must  be  about  objectively  observable  phenomena.  On
      occasions  when  I  have  lectured  to  audiences  of  biologists  and
      neurophysiologists, I have found many of them very reluctant to  treat
      the mind in general and consciousness in particular as a proper domain
      of scientific investigation.
      ...the use of the noun “mind” is dangerously inhabited by  the  ghosts
      of old philosophical theories. It is very difficult to resist the idea
      that the mind is a kind of a thing, or at least an arena, or at  least
      some kind of black box in which all of these mental processes occur.


        23. Lord Wilberforce,  referring  to  the  psychological  basis  of
      physical illness said that the area  of  ignorance  of  the  body-mind
      relation seems to expand with that of knowledge. In McLoughlin  v.  O’
      Brian, the learned Lord said, though in a different context:  (All  ER
      p. 301)


      “Whatever is unknown about the mind-body relationship (and the area of
      ignorance seems to expand with that of knowledge), it is now  accepted
      by medical science that recognisable and severe physical damage to the
      human body and system may be caused by the impact, through the senses,
      of external events on the mind. There may thus be produced what is  as
      identifiable an illness as any that may be caused by  direct  physical
      impact. It is safe to say that this, in general terms,  is  understood
      by the ordinary man or woman who is hypothesised by the courts...”


        24.  But  the  illnesses  that  are  called   “mental”   are   kept
      distinguished from those that ail the “body” in a fundamental way.  In
      “Philosophy and Medicine”, Vol. 5 at page X the learned Editor  refers
      to what distinguishes the two qualitatively:
      “Undoubtedly, mental illness is so disvalued because it strikes at the
      very roots of our personhood. It visits us with uncontrollable  fears,
      obsessions, compulsions, and anxieties....
      . . . This is captured in part by the language we  use  in  describing
      the mentally ill. One is an hysteric, is a neurotic, is an  obsessive,
      is a schizophrenic, is a manic-depressive. On the other hand, one  has
      heart disease, has cancer, has the flu, has malaria, has smallpox...”


The principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case with  all  fours
is applicable to the fact situation on hand wherein this Court  has  rightly
referred to Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act  and  explanation  to  the  said
clause and made certain pertinent observations regarding “unsound  mind”  or
“mental  disorder”  and  the  application  of  the  same  as   grounds   for
dissolution of marriage. This Court cautioned that Section 13 (1)  (iii)  of
the Act does not make a mere existence of a mental disorder  of  any  degree
sufficient in law to justify the dissolution of marriage. The High Court  in
the present case stated that  a  husband  cannot  simply  abandon  his  wife
because she is suffering from sickness and relied on the evidence  of  RW-2,
Dr. Krishna Murthy, Superintendent, Institute of Mental  Health,  Hyderabad,
wherein it is stated by him that  schizophrenia  can  be  put  on  par  with
diseases like hypertension and diabetes  on  the  question  of  treatability
meaning that constant medication is required  in  which  event  the  disease
would be under control. The High Court also relied on the evidence of  PW-4,
Dr. Ravi S. Pandey, Professor  and  Head  of  Department  of  Psychiatry  at
NIMHANS, Bangalore, who had examined the  respondent  and  stated  that  the
team could not find any evidence suggesting  that  she  has  been  suffering
from schizophrenia at the time of examining  her  and  also  stated  in  his
cross-examination that no treatment including drugs were  given  to  her  at
NIMHANS as they did not find any abnormality in  her  behaviour.    He  also
stated that it is true that psychiatrically there  is  no  contra-indication
in leading a normal conjugal life.   Thus,  they  gave  her  a  certificate,
which is marked as Exh. B-11, based  on  clinical  examination  and  in  the
absence of any abnormal behaviour  including  psychiatric  features  in  the
past history of respondent. The High Court has not accepted the  finding  of
fact recorded by the trial  court  on  the  contentious  issue  and  further
stated that “schizophrenia” does not appear to be such a  dangerous  disease
and it can be controlled by drugs and in the present case, this  finding  is
supported by evidence of RW-2, who has stated  in  his  examination-in-chief
that the appellant herein has not made any reference to any of the  acts  of
the respondent that can constitute “schizophrenia” ailment.  It  is  further
held by the High Court that there is no positive evidence to show  that  the
respondent has suffered from schizophrenia and even  in  the  case  she  has
suffered from some form of schizophrenia, it cannot be  said  that  she  was
suffering from such a serious form of the disease  that  would  attract  the
requirement as provided under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act  and  that  it
is of such a nature that it would make life of the  appellant  so  miserable
that he cannot lead a marital life with her.

15.   We are of the opinion that the High Court has  rightly  examined  the
entire evidence on record and correctly found fault with  the  findings  of
fact recorded by the trial court with regard to the ailment  attributed  to
the respondent for seeking dissolution of  marriage  under  the  ground  of
'unsound mind' which is a non-existent fact. In the case of  Vinita  Saxena
v. Pankaj Pandit[3], this  Court  has  examined  in  detail  the  issue  of
schizophrenia wherein the facts are different and the facts and evidence on
record are not similar to the case on  hand.  Therefore,  the  observations
made in the judgment for grant of decree for dissolution of marriage  under
Section 13 (1) (ia) and Section 13(1) (iii) of the Act cannot be applied to
the fact situation of the case on hand. But, we would like to examine  what
was said in that case on the issue of this disease, schizophrenia -:

      “What is the disease and what one should know?


      *A psychotic lacks insight, has the whole of his personality distorted
      by illness, and constructs a false environment out of  his  subjective
      experiences.
      *It is customary to define ‘delusion’ more or less  in  the  following
      way. A delusion is a false unshakeable belief, which is out of keeping
      with  the   patient’s   social   and   cultural   background.   German
      psychiatrists tend to stress the morbid origin of  the  delusion,  and
      quite rightly so.  A  delusion  is  the  product  of  internal  morbid
      processes and this is what makes it unamenable to external influences.
      *Apophanous experiences which occur in acute  schizophrenia  and  form
      the basis of delusions of persecution, but these  delusions  are  also
      the result  of  auditory  hallucinations,  bodily  hallucinations  and
      experiences of passivity.  Delusions  of  persecution  can  take  many
      forms. In delusions of reference, the patient feels  that  people  are
      talking about him,  slandering  him  or  spying  on  him.  It  may  be
      difficult to be certain if the patient has delusions of self-reference
      or if he  has  self-reference  hallucinosis.  Ideas  of  delusions  or
      reference  are  not  confined  to  schizophrenia,  but  can  occur  in
      depressive illness and psychogenic reactions.
      Causes
      The causes  of  schizophrenia  are  still  under  debate.  A  chemical
      imbalance in the brain seems to play a role, but the  reason  for  the
      imbalance remains  unclear.  One  is  a  bit  more  likely  to  become
      schizophrenic if he has a family member with the illness. Stress  does
      not cause schizophrenia, but can make the symptoms worse.
      Risks
        Without medication and therapy, most  paranoid  schizophrenics  are
      unable to function in the real world. If they fall  victim  to  severe
      hallucinations and delusions, they can be a danger to  themselves  and
      those around them.


      What is schizophrenia?
      Schizophrenia is a chronic, disabling mental illness characterised by:
           *Psychotic symptoms
           *Disordered thinking
           *Emotional blunting


      How does schizophrenia develop?
      Schizophrenia  generally  develops  in  late  adolescence   or   early
      adulthood, most often:
           *In the late teens or early twenties in men
           *In the twenties to early thirties in women


      What are the symptoms of schizophrenia?
      Although schizophrenia is  chronic,  symptoms  may  improve  at  times
      (periods of remission) and worsen at other times (acute  episodes,  or
      period of relapse).
      Initial symptoms appear gradually and can include:
           *Feeling tense
           *Difficulty in concentrating
           *Difficulty in sleeping
           *Social withdrawal

      What are psychotic symptoms?
      *Psychotic symptoms include:
      *Hallucinations: hearing voices or seeing things.
      *Delusions: bizarre beliefs with no  basis  in  reality  (for  example
      delusions of persecution or delusions of grandeur).

These symptoms occur during acute or psychotic phases of  the  illness,  but
may improve during periods of remission.

A patient may experience:
      *A single psychotic episode during the course of the illness
      *Multiple psychotic episodes over a lifetime…”




16.   As per evidence of RW-2,  schizophrenia  is  a  treatable,  manageable
disease, which can be put on par with hypertension and  diabetes.  So  also,
PW-4, who had examined the respondent at NIMHANS, Bangalore stated that  the
team could not find any evidence suggesting schizophrenia  at  the  time  of
their examining the respondent and he had stated  in  his  cross-examination
that no treatment including drugs was given to her at NIMHANS  as  they  did
not find any abnormality in her. They thus gave her a certificate of  normal
mental status, based on the absence of any abnormal findings in her  medical
report including  psychiatric  features  in  the  past  history  and  normal
psychological test. We have carefully perused the Report marked as  Exh.  B-
10 dated 24.4.1999 given by the  Doctors  of  Institute  of  Mental  Health,
Hyderabad before the trial court.  The learned trial Judge has  misread  the
contents of the said report  and  also  wrongly  interpreted  the  same  and
recorded the finding that the respondent is suffering from  the  ailment  of
‘schizophrenia’ and therefore he has accepted the case of the appellant  who
has made out a ground under Section 13(1) (iii) of the  Act  wherein  it  is
stated that a spouse suffering from schizophrenia or incurably unsound  mind
is a ground for dissolution of the marriage between the parties.

17. The High Court has thus rightly set aside the decree of  dissolution  of
marriage granted in favour of the appellant and dismissed his  petition  and
granted a decree  of  restitution  of  conjugal  rights  in  favour  of  the
respondent by allowing  her  petition.  The  High  Court  has  recorded  the
finding of fact on re-appreciation of material evidence on  record  and  has
rightly held that the trial court has erroneously  come  to  the  conclusion
that the respondent was suffering  from  schizophrenia  by  relying  on  the
evidence of PW-1, who is the appellant herein and as per the  opinion  given
by the Committee of Doctors in Ex.B-10. In the deposition by  witness  RW-2,
Dr. K.Krishna  Murthy,  he  has  stated  in  his  examination-in-chief  that
Schizophrenia has become eminently treatable with the  advent  of  many  new
psychiatric drugs. He further stated that many patients  with  schizophrenia
are able to lead a near normal life with medication.  The  trial  court  has
erroneously relied on certain cases referred to and  applied  the  principle
laid down in those cases to the facts of this case even though they are  not
applicable to the case on hand either on facts or in law  as  the  appellant
has not proved the allegations made in the petition against  the  respondent
by adducing positive and substantive evidence on record to substantiate  the
same and that the alleged ailment of the respondent would  fall  within  the
provision of Section 13(1)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, he has not  made  out
a case for grant of decree for dissolution of marriage.  We  have  carefully
examined Ex. Nos. X-6 to X-11,  which  are  the  prescriptions  of  medicine
prescribed to her by Dr. Mallikarjuna Rao, Dr. Pramod Kumar and  Dr.M.Kumari
Devi. The above prescriptions mention the symptoms of  the  ailment  of  the
respondent, which were in the nature of delusions, suspicious  apprehensions
and fears,  altered  behaviours,  suicidal  tendency  and  past  history  of
depression. Reliance is placed by PW 1 on the above documentary evidence  to
prove that  the  respondent  was  suffering  from  the  mental  disorder  of
schizophrenia and therefore  it  squarely  falls  within  the  provision  of
Section 13(1)(iii) of  the  Act  for  grant  of  decree  of  dissolution  of
marriage in his favour. The High Court  has  rightly  held  that  the  trial
court has erroneously accepted the same and recorded its finding of fact  on
the  contentious  issues  to  pass  decree  of  divorce  in  favour  of  the
appellant, which is contrary to the decision of this Court in  the  case  of
Ram Narain Gupta vs. Rameshwari Gupta supra.  The  same  decision  has  been
relied upon by the respondent  before  the  High  Court,  wherein  the  said
decision was correctly accepted by it to set aside the erroneous finding  of
fact recorded by the trial court on the contentious issue.

18.   The legal question that arises for our consideration is  
whether  the
marriage between the parties can be  dissolved  by  granting  a  decree  of
divorce on  the  basis  of  one  spouse's  mental  illness  which  includes
schizophrenia under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act. 
In the English case of
Whysall v. Whysall[4], it was held that a spouse is ‘incurably  of  unsound
mind’ if he or she is of such mental incapacity as to make  normal  married
life impossible and there is no  prospect  of  any  improvement  in  mental
health, which would make  this  possible  in  future.  
The  High  Court  of
Judicature at Calcutta, in Pramatha Kumar Maity v Ashima Maity[5]  has held
that mental disorder of the  wife,  even  if  proved,  cannot,  by  itself,
warrant a decree of divorce and it must be further proved  that  it  is  of
such a nature as the husband could not be expected to live with  the  wife.
The Allahabad High Court, in Mt. Tilti Vs. Alfred Rebert Jones[6] has  held
that where it has come on record that the wife has improved her educational
qualifications and has been looking after her children, the apprehension of
the husband that there is danger to his life or  to  his  children  is  not
borne out is the finding recorded in the said case.   
Inability  to  manage
his or her affairs is an  essential  attribute  of  an  “incurably  unsound
mind”. The facts pleaded and the evidence placed on record produced by  the
appellant in this case does not establish such inability  as  a  ground  on
which dissolution of marriage was sought for by him before the trial court.

19.   The High Court has rightly set aside the said finding and allowed the
appeal  of  the  respondent  after  careful  scrutiny  of   Exh.B-10.   The
correctness of the finding of the High Court in the  impugned  judgment  is
seriously challenged by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the
appellant in this appeal.
We have examined this contention,  after  careful
perusal of the contents of Exh.B-10. In our considered view,  the  contents
of the report as stated by the team of doctors do not support the  case  of
the appellant that the respondent is  suffering  from  a  serious  case  of
schizophrenia, in order to grant the decree of divorce under Section  13(1)
(iii) of the Act. 
The report states that the respondent, although suffering
from ‘illness of schizophrenic type’, does not show symptoms  of  psychotic
illness at present and has responded well to the treatment from  the  acute
phases and her symptoms are fairly under control with the medication  which
had been administered to her.  
It was further stated that if there is  good
compliance with treatment coupled with good social and  family  support,  a
schizophrenic patient can continue their marital relationship.  In view  of
the aforesaid findings and reasons recorded,  we  have  to  hold  that  the
patient is not suffering from the symptoms  of  schizophrenia  as  detailed
above.

20. We are of the view that the High Court in  exercise  of  its  appellate
jurisdiction has rightly come to a different conclusion that the respondent
is not suffering from the ailment of schizophrenia or incurable unsoundness
of mind.  Further, the High Court has rightly rejected the finding  of  the
trial court which is based on  exh.B-10  and  other  documentary  and  oral
evidence by applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the case  of  Ram
Narain Gupta vs. Rameshwari Gupta referred to supra.  A pertinent point  to
be taken into consideration is that the respondent had not  only  completed
MBBS but also did a post graduate diploma in Medicine and was  continuously
working as a Government Medical Officer and had she been suffering from any
serious kind of mental disorder, particularly, acute type of schizophrenia,
it would have been impossible for  her  to  work  in  the  said  post.  The
appellant-husband cannot simply abandon his wife because she  is  suffering
from sickness.
Therefore,  the  High  Court  allowed  both  the  CMAs  and
dismissed O.P. No. 203/2000 filed by the appellant for divorce and  allowed
O.P. No.1/99 filed by the respondent for  restitution  of  conjugal  rights
wherein the High Court granted decree of restitution of conjugal rights  in
favour of the respondent.

21. It is thus clear that the respondent,  even  if  she  did  suffer  from
schizophrenia, is in a much better health condition at present.  Therefore,
this Court cannot grant the dissolution of marriage on  the  basis  of  one
spouse's illness. 
The appellant has not proved the fact of mental  disorder
of the respondent with reference to the allegation made  against  her  that
she has  been  suffering  from  schizophrenia  by  producing  positive  and
substantive evidence on record and on the other hand, it  has  been  proved
that the respondent is in much better health condition and  does  not  show
signs of schizophrenia as per the most recent medical report from  NIMHANS,
as deposed by PW-4 in his evidence before the trial court.

22. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the firm  view  that  the  findings
and reasons recorded in setting aside the judgment and decree of  the  trial
court is neither erroneous nor does  it  suffer  from  error  in  law  which
warrants our interference and calls for setting aside the impugned  judgment
and decree of the first  appellate  court.  
Therefore,  this  Court  cannot
interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court as the same is  well-
reasoned and based on cogent reasoning of facts and evidence on  record  and
accordingly, we answer point no.4 in favour of the respondent.

23. Under Hindu law, marriage is an institution, a meeting  of  two  hearts
and minds and is something that cannot  be  taken  lightly.  In  the  Vedic
period, the sacredness of the marriage tie  was  repeatedly  declared;  the
family ideal was decidedly high and it  was  often  realised[7]. 
 In  Vedic
Index I it is stated that “The high value placed on the marriage  is  shown
by the long and striking hymn”. 
In Rig Veda, X, 85; “Be,  thou,  mother  of
heroic children, devoted to the Gods, Be, thou,  Queen  in  thy  father-in-
law’s household. 
May all the Gods unite the hearts of us “two into one”  as
stated in Justice Ranganath Misra’s ‘Mayne’s  Treatise  on  Hindu  Law  and
Usage’[8]. 
Marriage is highly revered in India and we  are  a  Nation  that
prides itself on the strong foundation of our marriages, come hell or  high
water, rain or sunshine. 
Life is made up of good times and bad, and the bad
times can bring with it  terrible  illnesses  and  extreme  hardships.  The
partners in a marriage must weather these storms and embrace  the  sunshine
with equanimity. 
Any person may have bad health, this is  not  their  fault
and most times, it is not within their control,  as in  the  present  case,
the respondent was unwell and  was  taking  treatment  for  the  same.  
The
illness had its fair share of problems.  Can  this  be  a  reason  for  the
appellant to abandon her and seek dissolution of marriage after  the  child
is born out of their union? Since the child is now a  grown  up  girl,  her
welfare must be the prime consideration for both the parties.   In view  of
the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the two parties  in  this
case must reconcile and if the appellant so feels that  the  respondent  is
still suffering, then she must be given the right treatment. 
The respondent
must stick to her treatment plan and make the best attempts to get  better.
It is not in the best interest of either the respondent or her daughter who
is said to be of adolescent age for grant of a  decree  of  dissolution  of
marriage as prayed for by the appellant.  Hence, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed.



24.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the High
Court in not granting a decree of divorce and  allowing  the  petition  for
restitution  of  conjugal  rights.  Therefore,  we  grant  a   decree   for
restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act in favour of  the
respondent.





                                       …………………………………………………………J.       [G.S.
                                       SINGHVI]







                                       …………………………………………………………J.         [V.
                              GOPALA GOWDA]



New Delhi,                                                   September  17,
2013





-----------------------
[1]    AIR 1986 P & H 379

[2]   (1988) 5 SCC 247

[3]    (2006)3 SCC 778

[4]   (1959) 3 All ER 389

[5]    AIR 1991 Cal 123

[6]    AIR 1934 All 273

[7]    Vedic Index, I, 484,485; CHI,I,89 as in Ranganath Misra J.  Revised.,
Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,  Fifteenth  Edition,  2003,  Bharat
Law House at p.97

[8]    Fifteenth Edition, 2003, Bharat Law House at p.97





-----------------------
41





cut off date for starting the professional courses,= it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioner to change the time-schedule when the last date for admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long ago. If the Central Government forwards the application to the DCI at this juncture, DCI shall hardly have any time to look into the feasibility of the scheme as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. We have to keep in mind that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations 2006, six to eight months time is given to the DCI for this purpose. We are, thus, of the view that the High Court did not commit any error in holding that in the given circumstances mandamus could not be issued to the Central Government to exercise its discretionary powers in a particular manner to modify the time-schedule. Sanctity to the time-schedule has to be attached. It is too late in the day, in so far as present academic session is concerned, to give any direction.- This Court has highlighted the importance of cut off date for starting the professional courses, particularly medical courses, and repeatedly impressed upon that such deadline should be tinkered with. (See: Priya Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya vs. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 617. 10. We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This petition is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

                published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40787
                                             [REPORTABLE]

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Civil) No. 22910 OF 2013

Educare Charitable Trust                                      ……Petitioner

                 Vs.

Union of India & Anr.
       ….Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T



A.K.SIKRI,J.



1.    In this petition, invoking  the  provisions  of  Article  136  of  the
Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks  leave  to  appeal  against  the
judgment dated 2nd July 2013 passed by  the  High  Court  of  Kerala.   Writ
Petition of the petitioner has been dismissed  by  the  aforesaid  judgment.


2.    The petitioner, which is a Charitable Trust working in  the  field  of
education, has established a Dental College which was established few  years
ago.  During the  Academic  Year  2007-08,  course  in  Bachelor  of  Dental
Surgery (BDS) was started by it with an annual intake of 50 students.   This
was done after taking due -permission  from  the  Central  Government  under
Section 10-A of the Dentists Act,  1948  on  the  recommendation  of  Dental
Council of India (DCI).
 The  Government  of  Kerala  has  issued  requisite
Essentiality Certificate.  The college run by the petitioner  is  affiliated
with University of Calicut as that University had granted necessary  Consent
of Affiliation.
The Dental College also stands  affiliated  to  the  Kerala
University of Health Sciences,  established  by  the  Kerala  University  of
Health Science Act, 2010.

3.    In the year 2012, the petitioner wanted to expand  the  size  of  BDS,
being desirous of increasing the capacity from 50 to 100 seats.  
 Intention
was to do so with effect from  current  Academic  Year  i.e.  2013-14.  
The
scheme was rejected by the Government vide order  dated  31.12.2012  on  the
ground that  it  did  not  fulfil  the  eligibility  criteria  for  such  an
increase.
Against this order of refusal  of  the  Central  Government,  the
petitioner had approached the High Court of Kerala seeking quashing  of  the
said order and for issuance of  Writ  of  Mandamus  commanding  the  Central
Government to forward the  application  of  the  petitioner  for  intake  of
students,  to the DCI for technical scrutiny and further to direct  the  DCI
to make appropriate recommendation to the Central  Government  for  issuance
of letter of  permission  during  the  Academic  Year  2013-14  itself.   As
pointed out in the beginning of this order, the said Writ Petition has  been
dismissed by the High Court.

-

4.    In order to appreciate  the  controversy  and  the  grievance  of  the
petitioner, it would be necessary to traverse few facts.

5.    On 8th August 2012, the petitioner had submitted  the  scheme  to  the
Government of India for increasing the admission capacity.
This request  of
the petitioner was considered      but  the  Central  Government  could  not
process the same as at the  time  of  submission  of  the  application,  the
petitioner had yet to get the recognition of the BDC course  with  50  seats
i.e. the existing capacity, which is  a  pre-condition  for  forwarding  the
application.
The Central Government had issued  various  letters,  last  of
which was dated 19th December 2012, asking  the  petitioner  to  obtain  the
recognition.
Last date  for  forwarding  the  application  by  the  Central
Government to DCI for approval of such scheme  was  31.12.2012.  
Since  the
petitioner could not bring the said  “Essential  Documents”  even  upto  the
last date i.e. 31-12-2012, the Central Government returned  the  application
with liberty to the petitioner to apply afresh in  the  next  Academic  Year
i.e. 2014-15.

6.    As per the petitioner, its college fulfilled all  the  norms  required
for increase of intake of students from 50 to  100  seats.   In  so  far  as
matter of recognition is concerned, the petitioner squarely blames  the  DCI
for dragging its feet and, therefore, it  is  pleaded  that  the  petitioner
could not be made to suffer for no fault on its part.  In  this  behalf,  it
was pointed out that the Executive Committee of the DCI in its meeting  held
on 26.11.12 had duly recommended to accord recognition.  -Recommendation  of
the Executive Committee was considered by the General  Council  of  the  DCI
which met on  27/28.11.2012.   This  Governing  Council  also  approved  the
proposal.  Nothing further was to be done by the DCI but to send  letter  of
recommendation to the Central Government.  Had it been done  immediately  or
within few days thereafter, the petitioner could have  got  the  recognition
of the BDS course much before 31st December 2012, which was the  last  date.
The grudge of the petitioner is tht the DCI slept over the matter  and  sent
the communication regarding recognition of the petitioner  –college  to  the
Central Government only on 7th January 2013 thereby causing  the  last  date
to expire.  The Central Government had  notified  the  recognition  on  23rd
January 2013 but with effect from July 2012.  In  this  conspectus,  it  was
the submission of the petitioner that the right of the  petitioner  to  seek
enhancement  of  seats  from  50  to  100  could  not  be  defeated  by  the
respondents when the delay was at their end.  It was  pleaded  that  thought
as per the time frame set out in the Schedule, last date for forwarding  the
application was 31st December, 2012, Note  (2)  appended  beneath  the  said
Schedule enables the Central Government to modify the  same  in  respect  of
any class or category of applicants.  In the present case, there  was  valid
reason to exercise such discretion but it was not done.   For  this  reason,
another prayer was made in the Writ Petition to the effect that the  Central
Government be directed to -modify the time schedule for  the  petitioner  by
invoking the power under Note (2) to the Regulations.

7.    The aforesaid plea of the petitioner did not  cut  any  ice  with  the
High Court.  It held that as per Regulation 18 of the DCI (Establishment  of
New Dental Colleges, Opening of New Higher Course of Study or  Training  and
Increase of Admission Capacity in Dental Colleges)  Regulations,  2006,  the
applicant has to submit application in Form 3 when it wants to  increase  of
seats.  Qualifying criteria is laid down in Regulation 19 and as per  Clause
(a) thereof, it is  mandatory  that  the  college  is  recognized  with  the
existing admission capacity.   This  condition  was  not  fulfilled  by  the
petitioner and it was not possible for the  Central  Government  to  forward
the application to the DCI for technical scrutiny.  In these  circumstances,
if the Central Government did not exercise  its  discretion  to  modify  the
time schedule, in terms of Note (2) of the Regulations, direction could  not
be issued to the Central Government to exercise that power in  a  particular
manner as it was purely within the discretion of the Central Government  and
Central Government refused to exercise the discretion for valid reason.

8.    Before us as well, the case was argued on the  same  lines  which  was
taken before the High Court.  It was submitted by Mr. Patwalia, the  learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioner  that  in  the  absence  of  any
fault of the petitioner and when the petitioner has  taken  all  steps  well
within time, it was a fit case for -exercising  discretion  by  the  Central
Government and non-exercise of such  a  discretion  was  clearly  arbitrary.
Mr. Patwalia  emphasized and reemphasized, with lots of vehemence that  when
the  Governing  Council  had  approved  the  case  of  recognition  of   the
petitioner-college in respect of existing  seats  on  27/28  November  2012,
there was no reason for it to delay  forwarding  of  this  proposal  to  the
Central Government.  Had it been done immediately  thereafter,  the  Central
Government would have granted the recognition  much  before  31st  December,
2012 thereby removing the only handicap which was coming in the way  of  the
petitioner and its scheme containing proposal of increase of seats  from  5o
to 100 could have been forwarded to the DCI well in time.  He, thus, made  a
passionate plea that it was a fit case for exercise of power to  extend  the
time   Schedule   under    Note    (2)    of    the    Regulations,    2006.


9.     We  are  not  persuaded  by  these  submissions  of  the  petitioner.
Regulations, 2006 are framed by the DCI, with the previous approval  of  the
Central Government, in exercise of powers  conferred  by  Section  10A  read
with Section 20 of the Dentists Act, 1948.  These  Regulations,  thus,  have
statutory force.  These Regulations deal with the  procedure  for  obtaining
permission of the Central Government to establish new  Dental  College,  for
starting new or higher courses or training in a Dental College  as  well  as
for increase in admission capacity  in  a  Dental  College.   Regulation  18
deals with “Permission of the  Central  Government  -to  increase  admission
capacity in the dental college” which is the subject matter of  the  present
proceedings.  Under Regulation 18, the applicant, a Dental College  desirous
to increase the admission capacity has  to  make  requisite  application  in
Form 3.  Regulation 19 lays down the qualifying criteria and the  conditions
which are to be necessarily fulfilled to enable that college to apply  under
Regulation 18.  As per Regulation 20, application  is  to  be  submitted  in
Form 3 and the application fee with the particulars mentioned  in  the  said
Regulation. Relevant portions of Regulations 18,19 and  20,  with  which  we
are concerned, are reproduced herein below:

      “18.   Application for increasing the admission capacity:-

            For increasing the admission capacity (number of seats)  at  the
      under-graduate or post-graduate level (degree or  diploma),  a  dental
      college shall,  subject  to  regulation  19,  submit  to  the  Central
      Government the scheme in this  regard  in  Form  3,  as  annexed,  for
      obtaining its permission.




      19.   Qualifying Criteria:-

      A dental college shall qualify to apply under regulation  18,  if  the
      following conditions are fulfilled:

            (a) the dental qualification granted  to  the  students  of  the
      college and in respect of which the capacity is sought to be increased
      is recognized with the existing admission capacity;

            (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

-           (c) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

            (d)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

            (e)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

      20.   Submission of the application in  Form  3  and  the  application
fee:-

            (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

           (2) Incomplete application or scheme will not  be  accepted  and
           will be returned by the  Central  Government  to  the  applicant
           along with enclosures and processing fee.

            (3)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”



7.    It is clear from the above that  Regulation  18  is  made  subject  to
Regulation 19.   Regulation 19 states, in no uncertain terms, that a  dental
college “shall qualify to apply  under  regulation  18”  if  the  conditions
stipulated in Regulation 19  are  fulfilled.   It  clearly  follows  that  a
dental  college  which  does  not  satisfy  the  conditions  laid  down   in
Regulation 19 is not qualified to make an application under  Regulation  18.
Clause (a) of Regulation 19 lays down a specific condition, namely  existing
admission capacity should be recognized

8.    Admittedly, as on the date of  application,  the  petitioner  did  not
have this  recognition  and  thus,  it  did  not  fulfill  the  stipulations
contained in Clause (a) of Regulation 19.   In the absence thereof,  it  was
not qualified to make the -application.  It, thus, clearly  follow  that  on
the  date  of  application  i.e.  8th  August  2012,  the  application   was
incomplete. As per regulation 20(2) incomplete application or scheme can  be
returned by the Central Government to the applicant,

9.     No  doubt,  instead  of  returning  the  application,   the   Central
Government gave chances to the petitioner to  obtain  the  recognition  from
DCI and furnish the same to it.   Mr.  Patwalia  may  be  correct,  to  some
extent, that had such a recommendation been  forwarded  by  the  DCI  before
December 2012, probably Central Government would have acted  thereupon.   It
is also correct that the Governing Council in  its  meeting  held  on  27/28
November 2012 approved the case of the petitioner and sent the same  to  the
Central Government only on 7.1.2013.  However, merely from these facts,  the
blame cannot be foisted upon the DCI.  It has been  duly  explained  by  the
DCI that there  are  about  40  Members  of  the  Governing  Council  spread
throughout the country.  The Governing Council meets twice  a  year  and  in
every meeting the business transacted by  the  Governing  Council  is  huge.
After the meeting, minutes are to be prepared in respect of  all  the  items
in the agenda.  By the time minutes are prepared, the  Members  go  back  to
their respective places of residence.  Getting signatures of the Members  of
the Council is, therefore, a time consuming  process.  It  was  pointed  out
also by the learned counsel for the DCI, which could not be disputed by  the
petitioner, that 40 days time is earmarked for  sending  the  recommendation
to the Central -Government, after it is approved by the  Governing  Council.
In  the  instant  case,  the  Governing  Council  did  its  job  within  the
stipulated time.  Therefore, there is no delay in sending  its  approval  to
the Central Government on 7th January 2013.

10.   As per Regulation 4 of Regulations, 2006, the scheme or  proposal  has
to be submitted within the time frame as appended in  the  Schedule  annexed
to the said Regulations.  The Schedule gives the following time frame:

                            SCHEDULE

                       (See Regulation 4(2))

      Schedule for receipt of Applications for Establishment of  New  Dental
Colleges, Opening  of  Higher  Course  of  Study  &  Increase  of  admission
capacity  in  the  recognized  Dental  Colleges  and   processing   of   the
applications by the Central Government and the Dental Council of India.

S.No.         Stage   of   Processing                 Time   Schedule    for
Time Schedule
                                       BDS                               for
MDS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------
1                2                           3                     4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------
1.    Receipt of applications by  From 1st August to 30th          From  1st
May
      the Central Govt.                 Sep.(both  days  inclusive)       to
30th June
                                   of  any  year.                      (both
days
                                                           inclusive)of
                                                                   any year




2.    Forwarding of applications   Upto  31st  October            Upto  31st
July
      by the Central Government
      to the Dental Council of India
      for technical scrutiny.
3.    Recommendations of DCI      Upto 15th June        Upto 28th February

      to the Central Govt.
4.    Issue of Letter of Permission    Upto 15th July        Upto 31st
March
      by Central Government

Note (1)If any clarification is sought by  the  Central  Government  on  the
recommendation of the Council, the same will be  furnished  by  the  Council
forthwith, if necessary after conducting inspection.
      (2) The time-schedule indicated above may be modified by  the  Central
Government, for reason to be recorded in writing, in respect  of  any  class
or category of applications.”


8.    As per the aforesaid time-schedule, the applicant-college desirous  of
increasing the admission capacity is to  submit  the  application  from  1st
August to 30th September.  This was done by the petitioner.   However,  what
was found that the petitioner was not meeting the qualifying criteria as  on
that date because with respect to existing admission capacity,  it  had  not
been recognized so far.   The  applications  are  to  be  forwarded  by  the
Central Government, once they are found to  be  in  order  and  meeting  the
qualifying criteria laid down in Regulation 19, by 31st October  in  respect
of BDS course.  This time was extended upto  31st  December  in  this  year.
After an application is forwarded to the DCI, DCI is  supposed  to  evaluate
the scheme for increasing admission capacity as per the procedure laid  down
in Regulation 21 which lays down that the DCI is required to  ascertain  the
desirability and  prima  facie  feasibility  for  increasing  the  admission
capacity at the Dental College.  It  is  also  required  to  satisfy  itself
about the capability of the Dental College to  provide  necessary  resources
and infrastructure  for  the  scheme.   DCI  is  even  required  to  conduct
physical inspection of the college before forming an opinion as  to  whether
the applicant satisfies the condition  of  -feasibility  of  increasing  the
admission capacity.  This process, naturally, is  time  consuming.   As  per
the time-schedule referred to above, time upto 15th June is  given  for  the
DCI to make  recommendation  to  the  Central  Government.   Such  a  report
containing its recommendation is to be given  in  terms  of  Regulation  22.
Thereafter,  Central  Government  is  required   to   go   into   the   said
recommendation and if  it  is  found  that  applicant-college  deserves  the
permission to increase the admission capacity, Letter of  Permission  is  to
be issued by 15th July.  This time frame  is to ensure timely admissions  of
students.
9.    Having regard to the above,
  it  is  not  possible  to  accede  to  the
request of the petitioner to change the time-schedule  when  the  last  date
for admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long  ago. 
  If
the  Central  Government  forwards  the  application  to  the  DCI  at  this
juncture, DCI shall hardly have any time to look  into  the  feasibility  of
the scheme as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. 
 We  have  to
keep in mind that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations  2006,  six  to
eight months time is given to the DCI for this purpose.  
We  are,  thus,  of
the view that the High Court did not commit any error  in  holding  that  in
the given  circumstances  mandamus  could  not  be  issued  to  the  Central
Government to exercise its discretionary powers in a  particular  manner  to
modify  the  time-schedule.   
Sanctity  to  the  time-schedule  has  to   be
attached.  It is too late  in  the  day,  in  so  far  as  present  academic
session is concerned, to give any direction.-  
This  Court  has  highlighted
the importance of cut  off  date  for  starting  the  professional  courses,
particularly medical  courses,  and  repeatedly  impressed  upon  that  such
deadline  should  be  tinkered  with.  (See:  Priya  Gupta  vs.   State   of
Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya  vs.
State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 617.

10.   We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of  the  High
Court.  This petition is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

                                       ……………………………….J.
                                       (K.S.Radhakrishnan)



                                       ……………………………….J.
                                       (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
September 17, 2013

LAND REFORMS ACT- The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in Sy. Nos. 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 53 situated in village Halligeri, Dharward Taluk, Karnataka, having purchased the same in the year 1956. According to the appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then. 3. The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since deceased) filed an application before the Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, Dharwad, contending therein that he had sent an application on 23rd June, 1975 in Form No.7 for registering him as an occupant of the lands belonging to the appellants.- whether in fact the 2nd respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was found that he had made such an application, then to consider it on merits in accordance with law. = the Tribunal admitted Form No.7 produced by the 2nd respondent and on an enquiry gave definite finding that the applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation of the suit land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto. In view of such finding of the Tribunal it was not open for the learned Single Judge to remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7 is on record or Form No.7 was produced by the 2nd respondent which in fact rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Tribunal ineffective for no reason. The Division Bench of the High Court also failed to notice the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3836/2005(LR) and order dated 3rd June, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40793
                                                          REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8289  OF 2013
                   (arising out of SLP(C)No.14496 of 2006)

CHANNABASAPPA(DEAD) BY LR & ANR.        … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.                    … RESPONDENTS

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

     Leave granted.

1.    This appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the  judgment
and order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A. No.3836/2005(LR).  By  the  impugned
judgment  the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal  preferred   by   the
appellants herein and affirmed  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single
Judge, whereby the learned  Single  Judge  directed  the  Land  Tribunal  to
verify the aspect of filing of Form No.7 by the tenant.

2.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in  Sy.  Nos.  33,  37,
38, 39, 40, 41  and  53  situated  in  village  Halligeri,  Dharward  Taluk,
Karnataka, having purchased the same in the  year  1956.  
According  to  the
appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then.
3.    The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since  deceased)  filed  an  application
before the Special Tahasildar, Land  Reforms,  Dharwad,  contending  therein
that he had sent an  application  on  23rd  June,  1975  in  Form  No.7  for
registering him as an occupant of the lands  belonging  to  the  appellants.
The Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, on 31st  October,  1987  replied  that
there was no record of having received such  an  application  from  the  2nd
respondent in respect of the lands in question and no entry was made in  the
Register of Form No.7 maintained by the Land Tribunal.
4.    The 2nd respondent filed Writ Petition No.4165/1988 in the High  Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore with the prayer for a direction  to  the  Tribunal
to conduct enquiry under Section 48-A of the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act,
1974 (hereinafter referred to as the “Land Reforms Act”) and  to  grant  him
occupancy rights. In support of his claim for having sent  the  application,
the 2nd respondent had produced  a  xerox  copy  of  a  postal  receipt  and
acknowledgment. The High Court by its order dated 5th August, 1991  remanded
the matter to the  Land  Tribunal  to  consider  whether  in  fact  the  2nd
respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was  found  that
he had  made  such  an  application,  then  to  consider  it  on  merits  in
accordance with law. The said  order  was  challenged  before  the  Division
Bench of the High Court as well as by way of Special Leave  Petition  before
this Court unsuccessfully.
5.    After a detailed enquiry, by the order dated 2nd June, 1997, the  Land
Tribunal found, on evidence produced before it, that the 2nd respondent  had
not proved that he had in fact sent an application to the Land  Tribunal  in
Form No.7.
      Before the Land Tribunal, the 2nd respondent produced  xerox  copy  of
the Form No.7 on 27th November, 1993, claiming to be the one sent by him  by
post.
      Although, the Land Tribunal came to the  conclusion that there was  no
proof of filing of Form No.7 by the 2nd respondent, unanimously  it  decided
to admit the copy produced by the 2nd respondent on 27th November, 1993  for
enquiry under Section 48-A of the Land Reforms Act and, upon evidence,  held
that the lands were in  self-cultivation  of  the  appellants  and  the  2nd
respondent was not a tenant of the lands in question as on 1st  March,  1974
or immediately prior  thereto  and  as  such  rejected  his  application  on
merits.
6.    The 2nd respondent being aggrieved filed a writ  petition  being  W.P.
No.15722/1987  challenging  the  correctness  of  the  order  of  the   Land
Tribunal. Though the learned Single Judge noticed  that  the  Land  Tribunal
had admitted the xerox copy of the Form No.7 produced by the 2nd  respondent
on 27th November, 1993 and had conducted an enquiry  thereon  under  Section
48-A of the Land Reforms Act, learned Single Judge, by  the  judgment  dated
3rd June, 2005 remitted the matter to the Tribunal to find out  whether  the
application existed in the records and whether in fact  the  2nd  respondent
had filed an application in Form No.7.
7.    The appellants thereafter filed a review petition before  the  learned
Single Judge bringing to the notice of the learned  Single  Judge  that  the
copy of the application found in  records  was  the  one  which  the  second
respondent had filed  on  27th  November,  1993  and  that  the  remand  was
unnecessary as the  application  was  admitted  and  enquiry  was  conducted
thereon. However, learned Single Judge did not appreciate  the  grounds  for
the review and dismissed the review petition on 1st July, 2005.
8.    The appellants being not happy preferred the writ appeal  in  question
before the Division Bench which dismissed the same by the impugned  judgment
on 2nd June, 2006.
9.    Notices were issued to respondents. The legal representatives  of  the
2nd respondent who are party respondents appeared.
10.   Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that  the  Land  Tribunal
having accepted the filing of the Form No.7 by the 2nd respondent, there  is
no question of remitting the matter  again  to  the  Tribunal  to  find  out
whether the Form No.7 is available on records and whether the Form No.7  was
filed by the 2nd respondent.
11.   Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the 2nd  respondent
had produced the copy of the Form No.7 and made it available on  records  to
the Land Tribunal and the case was  rightly  remanded  to  make  a  detailed
enquiry  under  Section  48-A  of  the  Land  Reforms  Act.  However,   such
submission cannot be accepted in view of the  finding  already  recorded  by
the Land Tribunal.
12.   On perusal of order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land  Tribunal,
we find that the Land Tribunal  admitted  Form  No.7  produced  by  the  2nd
respondent in view of the High Court’s  direction  dated  5th  August,  1991
passed in W.P.No.4165/1988 and on  enquiry made under Section 48-A, held  as
follows:


      “……In spite of this, in view of the directions dated 5-8-91  in  W.P.
      No.4165, the Form No.7 produced by  the  applicant  is  admitted  and
      enquiry upon the same is taken up by unanimous opinion  of  the  Land
      Tribunal.


      Applicant has not produced any document  to  prove  that  he  was  in
      possession  and  cultivation  of  the  suit  lands  on  1-3-1974   or
      immediately prior thereto. Except his own  statement,  the  applicant
      has not produced any evidence to establish that he held the lands  on
      crop share basis. In this respect, he has not produced any acceptable
      evidence. But on the other hand, the opponents have  produced  pahani
      records for the years prior to 1974 as well as for subsequent  years,
      in which nowhere the name  of  the  applicant  is  appearing  in  the
      cultivator’s column. It is apparent that all the lands were  in  self
      cultivation.


      Apart from this, the opponents have produced  tax  paid  receipts  in
      respect  of  the  suit  lands.  The  opponents  have  also  given   a
      declaration regarding their holding under Section 86 of the Karnataka
      Land Reforms Act, claiming it to be under self cultivation  and  vide
      order NO.KLR:D:SR:752 dated 25-3-82, this Land Tribunal has  accepted
      the declaration holding that he is not in possession of excess lands.
      In the said order there is no mention  about  the  said  lands  being
      subject to tenancy.  For all these reasons, the  following  order  is
      passed by unanimous opinion of this Land Tribunal.










                                    ORDER


      It is decided unanimously that the applicant was  not  in  occupation
      and cultivation of  the  suit  lands  as  a  tenant  on  1-3-1974  or
      immediately prior thereto.
      This order is pronounced and read out in open Court on 2-6-97.


                                                                        Sd/-
                                                      Land Tribunal, Dharwad
      Members:
   1. Sd/-
   2. Sd/-
   3. Sd/-.”




13.   Thus, it is clear that
the Tribunal admitted  Form  No.7  produced  by
the 2nd respondent  and  on  an  enquiry  gave  definite  finding  that  the
applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation  of  the  suit
land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto.  
In  view  of  such
finding of the Tribunal it was not open for  the  learned  Single  Judge  to
remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7  is  on
record or Form No.7 was  produced  by  the  2nd  respondent  which  in  fact
rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the  Tribunal  ineffective
for no reason. 
The Division Bench of the High Court also  failed  to  notice
the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed  by  the
learned Single Judge.
14.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order  dated  2nd
June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in  W.A.No.3836/2005(LR)  and  order
dated  3rd  June,  2005  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge   in   W.P.
No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June,  1997  passed  by  the  Land  Tribunal,
Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no  order  as  to
costs.




                                                      ………………………………………………….J.
                             (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)




                                                       ……………………………………………….J.
                                      (RANJAN GOGOI)




NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 17, 2013.





the Electricity Act, 2003= whether the CERC and the Tribunal have correctly interpreted Regulation 2.5 of the said regulations while permitting capitalisation of the additional expenditure for purposes of determining the tariff. = the respondent-Corporation sought additional capitalisation of the expenditure on the project in question relevant to the period 2001-2004. The Central Commission determined the additional capitalisation and allowed the same to the respondent, which determination was upheld by the Tribunal with the modification to which we have adverted in the beginning of this order. 22. There is no gainsaying that the prayer for additional capitalisation was made by the respondent-Corporation and considered by CERC after the Electricity Act 2003 had come into force, repealing the earlier enactments. The new legislation did not set out any role for the CEA, in the matter of approval of the schemes for the generating companies or the capital expenditure for the completion of such projects. The entire exercise touching the regulation of the tariff of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government, like the respondent was entrusted to the Central Commission. The role of the Central Electricity Authority established under Section 7 of the 2003 Act, was limited to matters enumerated under Section 73 of the Act, approval of the scheme for generating companies or the capital expenditure for the completion of such projects or capitalisation of the additional expenditure not being one such function. The CERC was, therefore, right when it said that the Central Electricity Authority had no part to play in the matter of approval for purposes of capitalisation of the extra expenditure incurred on a project. That was so notwithstanding the continuance of Regulation 2.5 of the regulations framed by the CERC providing for such an approval by the CEA. The far reaching changes that came about in the legal framework with the enactment of the 2003 Act, made Regulation 2.5 redundant in so far as the same envisaged a reference to the CEA or an Independent Agency for approval of the additional capitalisation. Insistence on a reference, to the CEA for such approval, despite the sea change in the legal framework would have been both unnecessary as well as opposed to the spirit of new law that reduced the role of CEA to what was specified in Section 73 of the Act. The CERC and the Tribunal were in that view justified in holding that a reference to the CEA was not indicated nor did the absence of such a reference denude the CERC of its authority to fix the tariff after the 2003 Act had come into force. That was so notwithstanding the fact that proviso to Section 61 of the Electricity Act, 2003 continued the terms and conditions for determination of tariff under the enactments mentioned therein and those specified in the Schedule for a period of one year or till such terms were specified under that section whichever was earlier. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.50,000/- Civil Appeal Nos.5361-5362 of 2007 23. In these appeals the order impugned by the appellant places reliance upon the order passed by the Tribunal, in Appeal No.36 of 2006 against which order we have in the foregoing part of this judgment dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. On a parity of reasoning these appeals are also destined to be dismissed and are, accordingly, dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.50,000/-.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40786

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.4117 OF 2006


U.P. Power Corporation Ltd.                             …Appellant

      Versus

N.T.P.C. Ltd. & Ors.                               …Respondents


WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5361-5362 OF 2007







                               J U D G M E N T



T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    This appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act,  2003  calls  in
question the correctness of a  Judgment  and  Order  dated  7th  July,  2006
passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity whereby  the  Tribunal  has
while partially modifying  the  Order  passed  by  the  Central  Electricity
Regulatory Commission (‘CERC’ for short)  dismissed  Appeal  No.36  of  2006
filed by the appellant.

2.    The CERC had  by  the  Order  impugned  before  the  Tribunal  allowed
Petition No.139 of 2004 filed by the  respondent-Corporation  and  permitted
capitalisation of Rs.4.521 crores over the approved cost for the  completion
of Feroz Gandhi Unchahar Thermal Power Station Stage-I for  the  period  1st
April, 2001 to 31st March, 2004.  While doing so the CERC had in Para 37  of
its Order held respondent No.1 entitled to return on equity and interest  on
loan on the said amount payable along with the tariff for the  period  2004-
2009.  What is significant is that both the CERC and the Appellate  Tribunal
rejected the contention urged on behalf of  the  appellant-Corporation  that
the additional capital expenditure incurred  by  the  respondent-Corporation
could not be taken into consideration for tariff fixation without  the  same
having been approved by the Central Electricity Authority (“CEA” for  short)
as required under Regulation 2.5 of  the  CERC  (Terms  and  Conditions  for
Determination of  Tariff)  Regulations,  2001.  The  primary  question  that
therefore falls for consideration in this appeal is  whether  the  CERC  and
the  Tribunal  have  correctly  interpreted  Regulation  2.5  of  the   said
regulations while permitting capitalisation of  the  additional  expenditure
for purposes of  determining  the  tariff.   That  question  arises  in  the
following factual backdrop:

3.    Feroz Gandhi Unchahar Thermal Power Station Stage-I was taken over  by
the respondent-National Thermal Power Corporation from  the  erstwhile  U.P.
State Electricity Board on 13th February, 1992.
The Central  Government  had
approved the takeover cost of Rs.925 crores  in  terms  of  a  communication
dated 2nd May, 1993 issued by  the  Ministry  of  Power.  
By  a  subsequent
letter dated 5th August, 1996 the CEA accorded approval  for  an  additional
Rs.2.85 crores for R&M under Environment Action  Plan,  thereby  taking  the
total approved project cost to Rs.927.85 crores.

4.     The  CERC  (Terms  &  Conditions   for   Determination   of   Tariff)
Regulations, 2001 for the period 1st April, 2001 to 31st  March,  2004  came
to be notified  on  26th  March,  2001,  pursuant  whereto  the  respondent-
Corporation filed Petition No.41 of 2001 for  approval  of  tariff  for  the
relevant tariff period in respect of the generating plant  in  question.  By
an Order dated 24th October, 2003, the CERC approved the tariff taking  into
consideration the capital cost at Rs.940.70 crores as  on  1st  April,  2001
but  did  not  consider  the  additional  capitalisation  claimed   by   the
respondent  since  the  latter  was  based  only  on  an  estimated  capital
expenditure and was unsupported by  an  auditor’s  certificate.  Respondent-
Corporation then moved petition No.139  of  2004  before  the  CERC  on  5th
October, 2004 seeking approval of the revised fixed charges  in  respect  of
the generating plant for the relevant tariff period taking into account  the
additional capital expenditure incurred during the  said  period  which  was
estimated at Rs.6.101 crores.  By an order dated 31st March, 2005, the  CERC
disposed of the  said  petition  approving  an  amount  of  Rs.4.521  crores
towards capital expenditure while disallowing the rest.

5.    The CERC held that the respondent would  not  be  entitled  to  tariff
revision during the relevant period in the light of Regulation 1.10  of  the
CERC  Regulations  which  prohibited  allowance  of  an  additional  capital
expenditure, if such expenditure happened to be less than  20  per  cent  of
the approved project cost.  It all the same held in Para  37  of  its  Order
that the respondent was entitled to relief in the form of return  on  equity
at the rate of 16% and interest on loan on the approved  additional  capital
expenditure for the period 2004-2009.  The CERC observed :

           “37.  As there is nothing in the notification dated 26.3.2001 to
           deny the petitioner the reasonable return to service the capital
           expenditure incurred by the petitioner and found to be justified
           by us, we direct that the petitioner shall earn return on equity
           @ 16% on the equity portion  of  the  additional  capitalization
           approved  by  us.   Similarly,  the  petitioner  shall  also  be
           entitled to the  interest  on  loan  as  applicable  during  the
           relevant period.  Return on equity and interest shall be  worked
           out on the additional capitalization of Rs.4.521 crore  approved
           by us from  1st  April  of  the  financial  year  following  the
           financial year to which additional capital  expenditure  relates
           up to 31.3.2004.  The lump sum of the amount of return on equity
           and interest on loan so arrived  at  shall  be  payable  by  the
           respondents along with the tariff for the period 2004-09  to  be
           approved by  the  Commission.   The  exact  entitlement  of  the
           petitioner on this account shall be considered by the Commission
           while approving tariff for the period 2004-09.”




6.    Aggrieved by the order passed by the  CERC  the  appellant-Corporation
approached the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity in Appeal No.36  of  2006.
The appellant  thereby  questioned  the  CERC’s  authority  to  approve  the
additional capital expenditure of Rs.4.521  crores  as  also  the  power  to
award relief in the nature specified in para 37 supra. It was  contended  on
behalf  of  the  Corporation  that  in  the  absence  of  approval  of   the
expenditure  by  CEA  as  required  under  Regulation  2.5   of   the   CERC
Regulations, the CERC had no authority to hold that the respondent-NTPC  was
entitled  to  additional  capitalisation.   The   Appellate   Tribunal   for
Electricity, however, repelled that  contention  and  dismissed  the  appeal
filed by the appellant on the ground  that  CERC’s  approval  of  additional
capitalisation to  the  tune  of  Rs.4.521  crores  did  not  call  for  any
interference and  that  the  respondent-Corporation  had  placed  sufficient
material before the CERC to substantiate its claim.  The  Tribunal  declared
that the CERC was  empowered  to  undertake  a  prudent  check  and  approve
additional capitalisation after the  deletion  of  Section  43-A(2)  of  the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 because of which deletion CEA ceased to  have
any role in such matters.  The Tribunal further held that  the  project  had
been originally approved by CEA as far back as on 5th August, 1986  and  was
taken over while still  incomplete  by  the  respondent-NTPC  in  1992.  The
incomplete items were then  completed  by  the  respondent  NTPC  after  the
takeover which required investment  of  additional  capital.   The  Tribunal
was, therefore, of the view that the additional capital was well within  the
approved cost of the project  which  remained  unexecuted  on  the  date  of
vesting.   The  Appellate  Tribunal,  however,  accepted   the   appellant’s
contention that the relief regarding the return on equity  and  interest  on
loan could not be granted until the next tariff  period.   Consequently  the
Tribunal directed deletion of Para 37 of the CERC’s order giving liberty  to
the CERC to take the said relief into consideration  while  determining  the
tariff for the next period. The present appeal assails  the  correctness  of
the view taken by the CERC and the Appellate Tribunal.

7.    When this appeal came up for admission on 29th September,  2006,  this
Court admitted the same only to examine the following two questions:

           “a. What is the true scope and ambit of Regulation 2.5  of  CERC
           (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Tariff)  Regulations,
           2001?

           b. xxxxxxx

           c. xxxxxxx

           d.  Whether  the  CERC  could  have   allowed   the   additional
              capitalization  which  was  not  approved  by  the  concerned
              authority i.e. Central Electricity Authority?


           e. xxxxxxx”



8.    Appearing for the appellant Mr. Pradeep  Misra  strenuously  contended
that the CERC and so also the Appellate Tribunal  had  failed  to  correctly
interpret Regulation 2.5 of the Regulations in question.  He submitted  that
Regulation 2.5 of the Regulations  was  much  too  clear  to  admit  of  any
equivocation. A plain reading of the Regulation, argued Mr. Misra,  left  no
manner of doubt that any additional  capital  expenditure  incurred  on  the
completion of the project could be taken into consideration for fixation  of
tariff only if such  excess  was  allowed  by  the  CEA  or  an  appropriate
independent agency constituted under the said Regulations. So  long  as  the
capital expenditure incurred in excess of the approved expenditure  did  not
have the sanction of the CEA or the  independent  agency  nominated  by  the
CERC, the same could not, according to the  learned  Counsel,  constitute  a
valid input for fixing the tariff.  No such approval having been  sought  or
granted either by the CEA or any independent agency in this case,  the  CERC
could not have taken the additional capital expenditure  into  consideration
for purposes of fixing the tariff.  It was also contended that the  CERC  as
also the Appellate Tribunal had fallen in error in holding that deletion  of
Section 43A(2) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948  made  a  reference  to
the CEA in terms of Regulation  2.5  of  the  Regulations  unnecessary.  The
deletion of Section 43A(2) notwithstanding, the CEA  continued  to  exercise
powers in terms of Sections 28 to 32 of the Act. The  statutory  requirement
of an approval from the CEA of the additional cost had not, therefore,  been
rendered a surplusage by reason of the removal of Section  43A(2)  from  the
statute book.

9.    On behalf of the respondent it was contended by Mr. Ramachandran  that
the CERC as also the  Tribunal  were  perfectly  justified  in  taking  into
consideration the additional expenditure incurred on the completion  of  the
project, not only because there was no dispute that such an expenditure  had
in fact been incurred but also because the said expenditure was found to  be
capital in nature.  The  question  of  an  approval  from  the  CEA  or  the
independent agency was,  therefore,  rendered  academic  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case.

10.   It was further argued that since the  appellant  itself  accepted  the
expenditure to have been incurred and the nature of the  expenditure  having
been found to be capital in character, the CEA  or  the  independent  agency
could not have, even if a reference  was  made,  declined  approval  to  the
same.  It was also argued  that  the  deletion  of  Section  43A(2)  of  the
Electricity (Supply) Act,  1948  from  the  statute  book  made  a  material
difference and that the CERC and the Tribunal  had  correctly  held  that  a
reference to the CEA or independent agency was on that count unnecessary.

11.   Regulation 2.5 of the Regulations reads as under:

           “2.5 Capital Expenditure

           The capital expenditure of the project shall be financed as  per
           the approved financial package set out  in  the  techno-economic
           clearance of the Authority or  as  approved  by  an  appropriate
           independent agency as the case may be.  The project  cost  shall
           include reasonable amount of capitalized initial spares.

           The actual capital expenditure incurred  on  completion  of  the
           project shall form the basis for fixation of tariff.  Where  the
           actual expenditure exceeds the approved project cost, the excess
           expenditure as  allowed  by  the  Authority  or  an  appropriate
           independent agency  shall  be  considered  for  the  purpose  of
           fixation of tariff.

           Provided that such excess expenditure is not attributable to the
           Generating Company or its suppliers or contractors;

           Provided further that where a Power Purchase  Agreement  entered
           into between the Generating Company and the beneficiary provides
           a ceiling on capital expenditure, the capital expenditure  shall
           not exceed such ceiling for computation of tariff.”




12.   The term “independent agency” referred to in the above  Regulation  is
defined in regulation 1.9 as under:

           “1.9  ‘Independent agency’ means  the  agency  approved  by  the
           Commission by a separate notification.”



13.   A plain reading of the above makes it  manifest  that  the  basis  for
fixation has  to  be  the  “actual  capital  expenditure”  incurred  on  the
completion of the project.  But where the  actual  expenditure  exceeds  the
approved expenditure the excess so incurred can be taken into  consideration
to the extent the same is allowed by the Central  Electricity  Authority  or
an appropriate independent agency nominated for the purpose.   This  implies
that the excess expenditure must go through a process of scrutiny either  by
the CEA or the independent agency before it  can  constitute  an  input  for
determination  of  the  tariff.   Scrutiny  of  the  excess  would  in  turn
primarily involve examination of two distinct aspects viz.
       (a) Whether the excess expenditure has been actually    incurred  or
           is a make believe or an exaggeration by the generating  company;
           and


       (b) Whether the expenditure was capital in nature.


14.   In  cases  where  the  answers  to  these  two  questions  is  in  the
affirmative, the CEA or the Independent  Agency  would  have  no  reason  to
disallow such expenditure, nor would its consideration for  tariff  fixation
present any difficulty.  In case a lesser amount is allowed by  the  CEA  or
the Independent Agency  either  because  the  generating  company  fails  to
substantiate its claim of having incurred  the  expenditure  as  claimed  or
even if the amount is incurred, only a part of the same was  in  the  nature
of capital expenditure, the lesser amount alone  will  constitute  an  input
for tariff determination.  To that extent, there is no  difficulty  nor  was
Mr. Misra, Counsel for the appellant, able to suggest  any  other  dimension
which the CEA or the Independent Agency would be entitled to consider  while
examining the question of allowing or  disallowing  the  excess  expenditure
incurred by the generating unit.  If that be  so,  absence  of  a  reference
under Regulation 2.5 (supra) to the CEA or  Independent  Agency  would  make
little or no difference having regard to the facts of the case at hand.   We
say so because although the respondent-Corporation  had  claimed  an  excess
expenditure of Rs.6.101 crores the amount actually taken into  consideration
for fixation of the tariff was Rs.4.521 crores only.   The  CERC  had  on  a
prudent check disallowed a substantial part of the excess that  was  claimed
by the respondent-Corporation.  What is significant is that  the  appellant-
Corporation had fairly conceded  that  an  amount  of  Rs.4.521  crores  was
indeed spent by the respondent for the completion of the project.   That  is
evident  from  the  following  observation  of  the  Electricity   Appellate
Tribunal, where Mr. Misra learned counsel for the appellant  made  a  candid
admission as to the extent of the expenditure incurred over  and  above  the
approved Project cost:
           “Mr. Pradeep Misra, learned counsel  for  the  appellant,  while
           relying on Regulation 1.10 which provides that there shall be no
           tariff revision if the capital expenditure is less than  20%  of
           the approved cost of the project contended that there  could  be
           no tariff revision at all much less the appellant shall be  made
           liable to pay 16% ROE as well as interest as directed in Para 37
           of the Impugned Order under challenge.  Mr. Pradeep  Misra  also
           contended that the claim of this additional  expenditure,  under
           five Heads, are not  disputed  but  they  are  only  maintenance
           expenditure.  It was also contended by the learned counsel  that
           in the absence of approval of expenditure by CEA and there being
           no proof of such approval, CERC has no authority  to  hold  that
           NTPC had incurred additional capital expenditure and entitled to
           additional capitalisation.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)
15.   From the above, we have no difficulty in holding  that  the  first  of
the two aspects that may have engaged  the  attention  of  the  CEA  or  the
Independent Agency was concluded by the admission of  the  appellant,  which
was the best evidence, in the matter apart from the  fact  that  the  figure
arrived at by the Commission was based on a fair and prudent  check  of  the
extent of admissible expenditure said to have been incurred.
16.   That  leaves  us  with  the  second  aspect  which,  any  scrutiny  or
examination by the CEA may have involved viz. whether  the  expenditure  was
capital or revenue in nature.  The CERC has  found  the  expenditure  to  be
capital  in  nature  which  finding  has  been  affirmed  by  the  Appellate
Tribunal.  There is nothing perverse about that finding in our  opinion  nor
has this appeal been admitted on the question whether  the  expenditure  was
capital or revenue.  In the absence of any question relating to  the  nature
of the expenditure, we find it difficult to appreciate how the absence of  a
reference to CEA has caused any miscarriage of justice for the appellant  or
vitiated the tariff fixation  by  the  CERC.  It  follows  that  even  if  a
reference to CEA was in the facts of the  case  required  to  be  made,  the
absence of any failure of justice or prejudice would render  it  unnecessary
for us to interfere with the orders passed by the  CERC  and  the  Appellate
Tribunal.
17.   Since the question whether or not a reference  to  CEA  was  necessary
under Regulation 2.5 was argued before us at some  length  we  may  as  well
deal with the same before parting.  A reference to  the  backdrop  in  which
the question arises becomes necessary and may be summarised as under:
18.    The  Electricity  (Supply)  Act,  1948  inter  alia  dealt  with  the
generation and supply of electricity by  generating  companies.   Chapter  V
comprising Sections 28 to 58 of the said Act dealt with the  preparation  of
schemes by generating companies and concurrence of the CEA for such  schemes
including the capital cost to be incurred  by  these  generating  companies.
Section 43A of the Act dealt with sale  of  electricity  by  the  generating
companies and provided norms and parameters to be determined by the CEA  and
notified by the Government of India. Since much of the  debate  at  the  Bar
was around the said provision and the effect of deletion of sub-section  (2)
thereof, it would be useful to reproduce the same at this stage.


           “43A. Terms, conditions and tariff for sale  of  electricity  by
           Generating Company.- (1) A Generating Company may enter  into  a
           contract for the sale of electricity generated by it-

                 (a) with the Board constituted for the State or any of  the
                 States in which a generating station owned or  operated  by
                 the company is located;

                 (b) with the Board constituted for any other State in which
                 it is carrying on  its  activities  in  pursuance  of  sub-
                 section (3) of section 15A; and

                 (c) with any other person with  consent  of  the  competent
                 government or governments.

           (2) The tariff for the  sale  of  electricity  by  a  Generating
           Company to the Board shall be determined in accordance with  the
           norms regarding operation and the Plant Load Factor  as  may  be
           laid down by the Authority and in accordance with the  rates  of
           depreciation and reasonable return and such other factors as may
           be determined, from time to time, by the Central Government,  by
           notification in the Official Gazette:

                 Provided that the terms, conditions  and  tariff  for  such
           sale shall, in respect of a Generating Company wholly or  partly
           owned by the Central Government, be such as may be determined by
           the Central Government and in respect of  a  Generating  Company
           wholly or partly owned by one or more State Governments be  such
           as may be determined, from time to time, by  the  government  or
           governments concerned.”




19.   In the year 1998, came the  Electricity  Regulatory  Commissions  Act,
1998,  which  established  the  Central  Electricity  Regulatory  Commission
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Central  Commission”).   The   Central
Commission was inter alia charged with the function of  determining  tariffs
of Central Units such as those  owned  and  controlled  by  the  respondent-
Corporation.  Significantly enough Section 51  of  this  Act  empowered  the
Central Government to delete sub-section (2)  of  Section  43A  with  effect
from  such  date  as  the  Central  Government  may  decide.   The   Central
Government, invoked that power and by a notification dated  11th  September,
2000, directed the deletion of Section 43A (2)  of  the  Electricity  Supply
Act, 1948 in respect  of  generating  companies  regulated  by  the  Central
Commission retrospectively w.e.f. 24th July, 1998.  Shortly  thereafter  the
Central  Commission  issued  an  order  in  regard  to   operational   norms
applicable to generating stations owned  among  others  by  respondent-NTPC.
The order was to the following effect:
           “As regards capital costs, the situation is somewhat  difficult.
           As the law  stands  today  in  respect  to  PSUs,  the  required
           approvals from the Government and clearance from CEA have to  be
           obtained before the commencement  of  the  project,  subject  to
           certain limits for which no clearance is  required.   After  the
           completion of the project, if  the  actual  expenditure  or  the
           scope of the  project  vary  beyond  certain  limits,  they  are
           required to be further approved. This  process  of  approval  is
           time consuming, resulting in a provisional clearance,  making  a
           subsequent  retrospective  revision  inevitable.    Changes   in
           legislation are being contemplated by which the  clearance  from
           CEA for projects might be done away with. However,  as  the  law
           stands today, approvals are inevitable. Still it is possible  to
           bring about stability in tariff  in  case  a  time  schedule  is
           worked out by which utilities may submit data of CEA at least  6
           months prior to the completion of a project, so  that  clearance
           could be obtained sufficiently in time before the tariff for the
           station/lines is determined.  It is hoped that any variations on
           actual finalization of accounts thereafter should  be  minor  in
           nature  which  could  be  absorbed  by  the   utility   and   if
           substantial, can be taken care of in the next revision.  In view
           of the above, all utilities seeking determination of  tariff  in
           respect of new projects, shall submit their applications  to  us
           at least  3  months  in  advance  of  the  anticipated  date  of
           completion, along with the  project  cost  as  approved  by  the
           appropriate independent authorities, other  than  the  Board  of
           Directors of the Company. This project cost will constitute  the
           basis for tariff fixation, and no revision would be  entertained
           till the next tariff period.  This  direction  presupposes  that
           CEA  may  hereafter,  unlike  the  past,  clear   capital   cost
           escalations on factors other than the change in scope  as  well.
           We would urge upon CEA to consider and deal with the approval of
           additional capital costs other than those due to change  in  the
           scope of the project as well, in the interest  of  avoidance  of
           tariff shocks down stream. In case the  projects  exempted  from
           CEA clearance, the Commission would  consider  accepting  a  due
           diligence clearance from any recognised agency.”




20.   The above was  followed  by  the  Central  Commission  framing  Tariff
Regulations 2001, in which  Regulation  2.5  extracted  earlier  dealt  with
capital expenditure.  It was  in  the  above  background  that  the  Central
Commission determined the Tariff for the generating  unit  in  question  for
the period 1st April, 1997 to 31st  March,  2001  by  an  order  dated  30th
October,  2002.  Shortly  after  that  order  the  Parliament  enacted   the
Electricity Act, 2003 which came into force w.e.f. 10th June, 2003. The  new
legislation repealed the Electricity (Supply)  Act,  1948.   The  effect  of
this repeal was  that  all  provisions  of  the  1948  Act  including  those
requiring approval by the CEA of the scheme of the generating  stations  and
capital cost which the repealed Act provided  for  became  inapplicable  and
irrelevant under the new Act. The new law aimed at deregulating  electricity
generation.  In the case of Thermal Power Stations the capital cost was  not
required to be approved by the CEA, as was the position  under  the  earlier
law.
21.    In  Petition  No.139  of  2004,
the  respondent-Corporation   sought
additional capitalisation of the expenditure  on  the  project  in  question
relevant to the period 2001-2004.  
The  Central  Commission  determined  the
additional capitalisation and allowed the  same  to  the  respondent,  which
determination was upheld by the Tribunal with the modification to  which  we
have adverted in the beginning of this order.
22.   There is no gainsaying that the prayer for  additional  capitalisation
was made by the respondent-Corporation and  considered  by  CERC  after  the
Electricity Act 2003 had come into force, repealing the earlier  enactments.
The new legislation did not set out any role for the CEA, in the  matter  of
approval of  the  schemes  for  the  generating  companies  or  the  capital
expenditure for the  completion  of  such  projects.   
The  entire  exercise
touching the regulation of the  tariff  of  generating  companies  owned  or
controlled by the Central Government, like the respondent was  entrusted  to
the Central Commission.  
The  role  of  the  Central  Electricity  Authority
established under Section  7  of  the  2003  Act,  was  limited  to  matters
enumerated under  Section  73  of  the  Act,  approval  of  the  scheme  for
generating companies or the capital expenditure for the completion  of  such
projects or capitalisation of the additional expenditure not being one  such
function.  
The CERC was, therefore, right when  it  said  that  the  Central
Electricity Authority had no part to play in  the  matter  of  approval  for
purposes of capitalisation of the extra expenditure incurred on  a  project.
That was so  notwithstanding  the  continuance  of  Regulation  2.5  of  the
regulations framed by the CERC providing for such an approval  by  the  CEA.
The far reaching changes that came about in the  legal  framework  with  the
enactment of the 2003 Act, made Regulation 2.5 redundant in so  far  as  the
same envisaged a reference to the CEA or an Independent Agency for  approval
of the additional capitalisation. 
 Insistence on a  reference,  to  the  CEA
for such approval, despite the sea change in the legal framework would  have
been both unnecessary as well as opposed to  the  spirit  of  new  law  that
reduced the role of CEA to what was specified in  Section  73  of  the  Act.
The CERC and the Tribunal were in that view  justified  in  holding  that  a
reference to the CEA was not  indicated  nor  did  the  absence  of  such  a
reference denude the CERC of its authority to fix the tariff after the  2003
Act had come into force.  
That was so notwithstanding the fact that  proviso
to Section  61  of  the  Electricity  Act,  2003  continued  the  terms  and
conditions for  determination  of  tariff  under  the  enactments  mentioned
therein and those specified in the Schedule for a  period  of  one  year  or
till such terms were specified under that section whichever was earlier.  In
the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs assessed  at
Rs.50,000/-


Civil Appeal Nos.5361-5362 of 2007

23.   In these appeals the order impugned by the appellant  places  reliance
upon the order passed by the Tribunal,  in  Appeal  No.36  of  2006  against
which order we have in the foregoing part of  this  judgment  dismissed  the
appeal preferred by the appellant. On a parity of  reasoning  these  appeals
are also destined to be  dismissed  and  are,  accordingly,  dismissed  with
costs assessed at Rs.50,000/-.



                                                          ………………….……….…..…J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)






                                                        .……..…………………..…..…J.
                                                            (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
September 18, 2013