Applicability of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1956, vis-à-vis, Article 2262 of the French Code Civil, said to be the governing law of limitation in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, erstwhile French Establishment.= whether, by virtue of the Limitation Act, 1963, the French Law of Limitation which had been in force till 1.1.1964, was in any manner repealed or modified by the Limitation Act, 1963. We can draw considerable sustenance from the ratio laid down by this Court in Syndicate Bank (supra), wherein, we have already indicated, this Court considered the interaction between the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 vis-à-vis Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code. In that case, this Court held as follows: “20. ……………….. In any event, as noticed above, the Portuguese Civil Code, in our view, could not be read to be providing a distinct and separate period of limitation for a cause of action arising under the Indian Contract Act or under the Negotiable Instruments Act since the Civil Code ought to be read as one instrument and cause of action arising therefrom ought only to be governed thereunder and not otherwise. The entire Civil Code ought to be treated as a local law or special law including the provisions pertaining to the question of limitation for enforcement of the right arising under that particular Civil Code and not dehors the same and in this respect the observations of the High Court in Cadar Constructions that the Portuguese Civil Code could not provide for a period of limitation for a cause of action which arose outside the provisions of that Code, stands approved. A contra approach to the issue will not only yield to an absurdity but render the law of the land wholly inappropriate. There would also be repugnancy insofar as application of the Limitation Act in various States of the country is concerned: Whereas in Goa, Daman and Diu, the period of limitation will be for a much larger period than the State of Maharashtra — the situation even conceptually cannot be sustained having due regard to the rule of law and the jurisprudential aspect of the Limitation Act.” 12. This Court also held that it cannot but hold that in the wake of the factum of the Limitation Act coming into existence from 1.1.1964, Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code cannot but be termed to be impliedly repealed and it is on this score that the decision of this Court in Justiniano Augusto De. Piedade Barreto v. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca (1979) 3 SCC 47, stood overruled. This Court also held that there is one general law of limitation for the entire country, being the Act of 1963, and the Portuguese Civil law cannot be termed to be a local law or a special law applicable to the State of Goa, Daman and Diu, prescribing a different period of limitation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the question of saving of local law under the Limitation Act, 1963 does not and cannot arise.- Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act, 1968, as amended, has adopted several such legislations in the State of Pondicherry, but the Act which governs limitation is the general law of the land that is the Indian Limitation Act. Consequently, it is not Article 2262 of the French Code Civil that applies to the suit in question, but Section 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Under such circumstances, as rightly held by the High Court, the suit filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is clearly barred. Since the suit itself is barred by the law of limitation, the other questions of law framed by the High Court were rightly not answered. The appeal, therefore, lacks in merits and accordingly dismissed.

        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40788
                                                          REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8308 OF 2013
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4836 of 2012]


      Gothamchand Jain                        .. Appellant
                                   Versus
      Arumugam @ Tamilarasan            .. Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T




      K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.




      1.    Leave granted.


      2.    We are, in this appeal, concerned with the
applicability of  the
      provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1956, vis-à-vis, Article 2262
      of the French Code Civil, said to be the governing law  of  limitation
      in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, erstwhile French Establishment.




      3.    Appellant herein preferred a suit, being  OS  No.  295  of  1991
      before the Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry.   The  suit  was
      resisted,  inter  alia,  on  the  ground  of  limitation,  which   was
      ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiff.  However, on  the  plea
      of limitation, the trial Court held as follows:
           “12.  On Issue No. 3: - Article 2262 of French Code Civil  shows
           that the limitation for original cause of action is thirty years
           and it is  a  well  settled  law  that  the  said  provision  is
           applicable to the Union Territory – Pondicherry.    Accordingly,
           suit claim is not time barred.  Hence this issue is answered  in
           the negative and in favour of the plaintiff.”




      4.     Defendant  took  up  the  matter  in  appeal  before  the  IInd
      Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, but the judgment/decree of the
      trial Court dated 25.11.1994 was confirmed.  The matter was carried in
      appeal to the High Court by filing Second  Appeal  No.  383  of  2010.
      Following substantial questions of law were framed by the High Court:
           “1.    Whether the lower appellate Court has committed  an  error
           in  law  in  pronouncing  a  Judgment  without  considering   and
           answering the question regarding readiness and willingness on the
           part of the respondent/plaintiff  to  perform  his  part  of  the
           contract?


           2.     Whether the lower appellate Court has committed  an  error
           in not adverting to the issue regarding limitation when the  same
           has been specifically raised in the trial Court and also  in  the
           grounds of appeal?


           3.     Whether the Courts below have erroneously  held  that  the
           Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the case?”


      5.    The question of limitation  was  the  primary  issue  which  was
      raised before the High Court.  It was submitted that provisions of the
      Indian Limitation Act govern the law of  limitation,  so  far  as  the
      Union Territory of Pondicherry is concerned and not  Article  2262  of
      the French Code Civil.  Placing reliance on the judgment of this Court
      in Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik and  Another  (2001)  4  SCC  713,
      which dealt with the applicability of the  provisions  of  the  Indian
      Limitation Act, 1963, vis-à-vis, Article 535 of the  Portuguese  Civil
      Code in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, the High Court took
      the view that it is Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 that
      would apply in the matter of filing of the suit in Pondicherry and not
      Article 2262 of the French Code Civil.   Consequently,  it  was  found
      that the suit filed for specific performance of the contract, was  not
      saved by Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act which  provided  that
      the suit be filed within three years of the date  of  agreement.   The
      appeal was accordingly allowed and the  judgment  and  decree  of  the
      trial Court was reversed by the High Court.  Hence the present appeal.




      6.    Shri R. Nedumaran, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant,
      submitted that the High Court  was  not  justified  in  reversing  the
      concurrent finding arrived at by the trial Court without examining the
      other two substantial questions of  law  framed  by  the  High  Court.
      Learned counsel also submitted that the concurrent  finding  of  facts
      ought not have been reversed by the High Court,  placing  reliance  on
      the judgment of this Court in Syndicate Bank (supra).  That was a case
      where this Court was examining the scope of the Limitation Act, vis-à-
      vis, the Portuguese Civil Code and not the provisions  of  the  French
      Code Civil, which is one applicable to the present case.


      7.    Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,
      on the other hand,  contended  that  the  ratio  of  the  decision  in
      Syndicate Bank (supra) would  squarely  apply  to  the  facts  of  the
      present case and the provisions are pari materia and  the  High  Court
      has rightly held that the law that is  applicable  is  the  Limitation
      Act, 1963 and, if that be so, the suit was hopelessly  barred.   Under
      such circumstances, learned counsel further submitted that  there  was
      no reason for considering the other two substantial questions of  law,
      since the suit was rightly dismissed on the ground of limitation.


      Discussion




      8.    We may notice that  de  jure  merger  of  the  erstwhile  French
      Territory of Pondicherry took place on 16.8.1962 following the  Treaty
      of  Cession  concluded  between  France   and   India   on   28.5.1956
      establishing the cession of the French  Establishments  by  France  to
      India in full sovereignty.   The Parliament  enacted  the  Pondicherry
      (Administration) Act, 1962  (Act  49  of  1962)  to  provide  for  the
      administration of Pondicherry and for matters connected therewith. The
      said Act came into force on 15.12.1962.  Section 4 of the  Pondicherry
      (Administration) Act, 1962 deals with continuance of existing laws and
      their adaptation, which reads as under:
           “4.Continuance of existing laws and their  adaptation.-  (1)  All
           laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the  former
           French Establishments or any part thereof shall continue to be in
           force in Pondicherry until amended or  repealed  by  a  competent
           Legislature or other competent authority:
           
                Provided that references in any such law to the   President
           or Government of  the  French  Republic  shall  be  construed  as
           references to the Central Government, references to the  Governor
           of the French Establishments in India, to the Commissioner of the
           Republic for the French Establishments in  India,  to  the  Chief
           Commissioner  for  the  French  Establishments,  to   the   Chief
           Commissioner  of  the  State  of  Pondicherry  or  to  the  Chief
           Commissioner, Pondicherry shall be construed as references to the
           Administrator of Pondicherry  and  references  to  the  State  of
           Pondicherry shall be construed as references to Pondicherry.
           
                (2) For the purpose of facilitating the application of  any
           such law in relation to the administration of Pondicherry and for
           the purpose of bringing the  provisions  of  any  such  law  into
           accord with the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  the  Central
           Government may, within three years  from the  appointed  day,  by
           order, make such adaptations and modifications, whether by way of
           repeal or  amendment,  as  may  be  necessary  or  expedient  and
           thereupon every  such  law  shall  have  effect  subject  to  the
           adaptations and modifications so made.”




      9.    By the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which came into
      force on 20.12.1962, in the First Schedule to the  Constitution  under
      the heading “II. The Union Territories”, after entry 8, the  following
      entry was inserted, namely:
           “9. Pondicherry : The territories which immediately  before  the
           sixteenth day of August,  ‘96,  were  comprised  in  the  French
           Establishments in India known as Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and
           Yanam.”


            Later, by  the  Pondicherry  (Alteration  of  Name)  Act,  2006,
      instead of “Pondicherry”, the  word  “Puducherry”  was  inserted  with
      effect from 1.10.2006.


      10.   The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (Act 20  of  1963)
      was enacted to provide for Legislative Assemblies and  Ministries  for
      the Union Territories.  It received the assent  of  the  President  on
      10.5.1963.   The Limitation Act, 1963 was passed by the Parliament  on
      5.10.1963.   By that time, the  Union  Territory  of  Pondicherry  had
      become part of India.  Clause 2 of Section 1 of  the  Limitation  Act,
      1963 says that it extends to the whole of India except  the  State  of
      Jammu and Kashmir.   Since the Union Territory of  Pondicherry  having
      become part of India, the Limitation Act automatically extended to the
      then Pondicherry.   The Limitation Act, 1963, consequently, came  into
      force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry on 1.1.1964.


      11.   The question that we have to consider is
whether, by  virtue  of
      the Limitation Act, 1963, the French Law of Limitation which had  been
      in force till 1.1.1964, was in any manner repealed or modified by  the
      Limitation Act, 1963.  
We can draw considerable  sustenance  from  the
      ratio laid down by this Court in Syndicate Bank (supra),  wherein,  we
      have already indicated, this Court considered the interaction  between
      the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act,  1963  vis-à-vis  Article
      535 of the Portuguese Civil Code.   
In that case, this Court  held  as
      follows:
           “20.  ……………….. In any event, as noticed  above,  the  Portuguese
           Civil Code, in our view, could not be read  to  be  providing  a
           distinct and separate period of limitation for a cause of action
           arising under the Indian Contract Act or  under  the  Negotiable
           Instruments Act since the Civil Code ought to  be  read  as  one
           instrument and cause of action arising therefrom ought  only  to
           be governed thereunder and not otherwise. The entire Civil  Code
           ought to be treated as a local law or special law including  the
           provisions  pertaining  to  the  question  of   limitation   for
           enforcement of the right arising  under  that  particular  Civil
           Code  and  not  dehors  the  same  and  in  this   respect   the
           observations of the High Court in Cadar Constructions  that  the
           Portuguese  Civil  Code  could  not  provide  for  a  period  of
           limitation for  a  cause  of  action  which  arose  outside  the
           provisions of that Code, stands approved. A contra  approach  to
           the issue will not only yield to an absurdity but render the law
           of the land wholly inappropriate. There would also be repugnancy
           insofar as application of the Limitation Act in  various  States
           of the country is concerned: Whereas in Goa, Daman and Diu,  the
           period of limitation will be for a much larger period  than  the
           State of Maharashtra — the situation even conceptually cannot be
           sustained  having  due  regard  to  the  rule  of  law  and  the
           jurisprudential aspect of the Limitation Act.”




      12.   This Court also held that it cannot but hold that in the wake of
      the factum of the Limitation Act coming into existence from  1.1.1964,
      Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code cannot but be  termed  to  be
      impliedly repealed and it is on this score that the decision  of  this
      Court in Justiniano Augusto De. Piedade Barreto v. Antonio Vicente  Da
      Fonseca (1979) 3 SCC 47, stood overruled.  This Court also  held  that
      there is one general law of limitation for the entire  country,  being
      the Act of 1963, and the Portuguese Civil law cannot be termed to be a
      local law or a special law applicable to the State of Goa,  Daman  and
      Diu, prescribing a different period of limitation within  the  meaning
      of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the question of  saving  of
      local law under the Limitation Act, 1963 does not and cannot arise.


      13.    We  may,  in  this  case,  refer  to  the  Pondicherry   (laws)
      Regulation, 1963 (No. 7 of 1963) which deals with  the  regulation  to
      extend certain laws to the Union Territory of Pondicherry.   
Reference
      may also be made to the Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act, 1968.  By
      virtue of those legislations,  the  Indian  Contract  Act,  1872,  the
      Transfer of Property Act,  1882  and  various  other  enactments  were
      brought into force in Pondicherry. 
It is, therefore, to be seen as  to
      whether specific legislations containing the subjects under which  the
      cause of action had arisen, would govern the field or  the  procedural
      law assuming it would have its due application in replacement  of  the
      governing statute.   
This question was also  pointedly  considered  by
      this Court in Syndicate Bank (supra) and the Court took the view  that
      the cause of action of the suit, namely, money lent  and  advanced  in
      terms of the agreement stands squarely governed by  the  Contract  Act
      read with the Negotiable Instruments Act by  reason  of  the  admitted
      execution of the promissory note and, as such, cannot be  said  to  be
      governed by the Portuguese  Civil  Code.   
The  Court  held  that  the
      Portuguese Civil Code cannot be read  to  be  providing  distinct  and
      separate period of limitation for cause of action  arising  under  the
      Indian Contract Act and other related laws.


      14.   Pondicherry (Extension of  Laws)  Act,  1968,  as  amended,  has
      adopted several such legislations in the State of Pondicherry, but the
      Act which governs limitation is the general law of the  land  that  is the Indian Limitation Act.  
Consequently, it is not  Article  2262  of
      the French Code Civil that  applies  to  the  suit  in  question,  but
      Section  54  of  the  Indian  Limitation  Act,   1963.    
Under   such
      circumstances, as rightly held by  the  High  Court,  the  suit  filed
      beyond the period of limitation prescribed under  Article  54  of  the
      Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is clearly barred.  
Since the suit  itself
      is barred by the law of limitation, the other questions of law  framed
      by the High Court were rightly not answered.  The  appeal,  therefore,
      lacks in merits and accordingly dismissed.






                                                                ……………………….…J
                                            (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                                                ………………………….J
                                            (A.K. Sikri)
      New Delhi,
      September 18, 2013

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. = The certificate reveals the date of birth of the accused as 10.05.1991. The school leaving certificate was proved by examining the head mistress of the school. She has recognized the signatures of the principal who issued the school leaving certificate. The evidence adduced by the head mistress was not challenged. Consequently, there is no reason to discard that document. Further, we notice that there was some confusion as to whether the appellant, whose name is Ranjeet Goswami is the same person Rajiv Ranjan Goswami. The investigating officer’s report indicates that they are different persons. Consequently we have to take it that the school leaving certificate produced was in respect of the appellant which has been proved.- We, therefore, find no reason to reject the school leaving certificate. If that be so, as per the ratio laid down in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) there is no question of subjecting the accused to a medical examination by a medical board. Going by the school leaving certificate since the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence, he can be tried only by the JJ Board. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Sessions Judge, Dumka is restored. The appeal is allowed, as stated above.

               published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40789
                                                   REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1465 OF 2013
           (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.10661 of 2010)




      Ranjeet Goswami                              ….. Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of Jharkhand & Anr.                  ….. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T






      K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.






      1.    Leave granted.


      2.    We notice with concern the commission of large number of  crimes
      by the juveniles at a time when there is a hue and cry  to  lower  the
      age limit of juvenile in conflict  with  law  within  the  meaning  of
      clause (l) of Section 2 of the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection
      of  Children)  Act,  2000.   Claiming  juvenility  large   number   of
      applications are also being filed before the criminal courts  and  age
      determination enquiry orders passed by the Board themselves result  in
      several litigations right up to this Court.
This  case  is  also  one
      among them in spite  of the various directions given by this Court  as
      to how to determine the age of a juvenile  in  conflict  with  law  in
      Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P. (2012) 9 SCC 750.


      3.    The appellant herein was charge-sheeted for the  offences  under
      Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, along  with  three
      others.   The  appellant,  after  submission  of   the   charge-sheet,
      surrendered before the court on 13.06.2008 and  filed  an  application
      before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dumka on 17.06.2008 stating that
      on the date of occurrence i.e. 12/13.04.2008 he was a  juvenile  since
      his date of birth was 10.05.1991, as  per  the  records  kept  in  the
      Primary School, Benagadia.


      4.    The CJM, Dumka forwarded the said application to  the  Principal
      Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Dumka (for short “the  JJ  Board”)
      to conduct an  appropriate  enquiry  and  to  submit  a  report.   The
      application was registered as GR Case No.577 of 2008.   The  appellant
      preferred a petition on 18.06.2008 before the  Board  to  examine  the
      Principal of Primary  School,  Benagadiya  along  with  the  admission
      register and also to examine the person in-charge of the Head  Master,
      as well as the head mistress of Akmit School, Benagadia to  prove  his
      date of birth.  Application was allowed on 23.06.2008, but on the same
      date, a fresh petition was filed on  behalf  of  the  respondent  duly
      endorsed by the APP stating that the appellant had produced  a  forged
      copy of the admission register.  Appellant  examined  Neela  Hembrahm,
      who was the Head Mistress of the School since 17.8.2006, to prove  the
      School Leaving Certificate issued on 10.4.2004, by the then  Principal
      of  the  School,  whose  signature  was  identified  and   recognized.
      Applications dated 26.6.2008 and 31.7.2008  were  also  filed  by  the
      appellant for medical examination.


      5.    The JJ Board then sought the opinion of the  Medical  Board  and
      the Board opined that the appellant was about 20 years of age  on  the
      date of the incident.  There was some confusion whether the  appellant
      and one Rajiv Ranjan Goswami was the same person,  but  it  was  found
      otherwise,  and  the  School  Leaving  Certificate  produced  was  not
      accepted.  The JJ Board, however, accepted the report of  the  Medical
      Board and passed an order  on  27.3.2009,  rejecting  the  application
      holding that  the  appellant  was  not  a  juvenile  on  the  date  of
      occurrence.  JJ Board then forwarded the report to the  CJM.   Learned
      CJM, on accepting the report, committed the case to the Sessions Court
      and it was registered as Case No.132 of 2009. Accused  then  preferred
      Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No.71 of 2009 before the Sessions Judge,
      Dumka.  Learned Sessions Judge took the view that the JJ Board had not
      assigned any  cogent  reasons  for  discarding  the  School  Admission
      Register and then to accept the medical report.   Learned  Judge  also
      took the view that there was conflicting evidence as to the age of the
      accused, hence the benefit of doubt should go  to  the  accused.   The
      appeal was accordingly allowed and the order passed by the court below
      was set aside and a direction was given to recall the  case  from  the
      Sessions Court to be tried by the JJ Board.


      6.    The respondent aggrieved by the order, approached  the  Division
      Bench of the High Court by way of Criminal Revision  No.504  of  2009.
      The Criminal Revision was allowed and the order passed by the JJ Board
      was restored, setting aside the order dated 30.05.2009, passed by  the
      Sessions Judge, Dumka.


      7.    Shri  Shankar  Narayanan,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
      appellant submitted that the High Court  has  committed  an  error  in
      reversing the judgment of the Sessions  Judge  without  examining  the
      correctness or otherwise on the school admission register, which  will
      indicate that his date of birth is 10.05.1991 and hence a juvenile  on
      the date of  occurrence  i.e.  12/13-04-2008.   Learned  counsel  also
      submitted that the admission register was properly proved through  the
      head mistress of the school and there is  no  reason  to  discard  the
      same.  Learned counsel submitted that the question  of  accepting  the
      report of  the  medical  board  arises  only  if  the  school  leaving
      certificate is discarded by stating cogent reasons.


      8.    Shri Barun  Kumar  Sinha,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
      respondent, on the other hand,  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has
      rightly accepted the report of the medical board which indicated  that
      the accused was not a juvenile on the  date  of  occurrence.   Learned
      counsel pointed out that the medical board has assessed the age of the
      accused as 20 years on the  date  of  occurrence  i.e.  12/13-04-2008.
      Learned counsel also submitted that  there  was  some  confusion  with
      regard to the documents produced, one document showed that the date of
      birth of one Rajiv Ranjan Goswami as 10.04.1990 though the appellant’s
      date of birth was shown as 10.05.1991.  It is due  to  that  confusion
      the matter was referred to the medical board  and  medical  board,  in
      turn, opined that the age of the accused was 20 years on the  date  of
      occurrence.


      9.    We are of the view that no cogent reasons have  been  stated  by
      the High court to discard the school  leaving  certificate  which  was
      issued on 10.04.2004  by  the  then  Principal  of  the  school.  
The
      certificate reveals the date of birth of the  accused  as  10.05.1991.
      The school leaving  certificate  was  proved  by  examining  the  head
      mistress of the school.  
She has  recognized  the  signatures  of  the
      principal who issued the school  leaving  certificate.   The  evidence
      adduced by the head mistress was not challenged.  
Consequently,  there
      is no reason to discard that document.  
Further, we notice that  there
      was some confusion as to whether the appellant, whose name is  Ranjeet
      Goswami is the same person Rajiv Ranjan  Goswami.   
The  investigating
      officer’s  report  indicates  that   they   are   different   persons.
      Consequently we have to take it that the  school  leaving  certificate
      produced was in respect of the appellant which has been proved.


      10.   We, therefore, find no  reason  to  reject  the  school  leaving
      certificate.  
If that be so, as per the ratio  laid  down  in  Ashwani
      Kumar Saxena (supra) there is no question of subjecting the accused to
      a medical examination by a medical board.  
Going by the school leaving
certificate since  the  appellant  was  a  juvenile  on  the  date  of occurrence, he can be tried only by the JJ Board.   
Consequently,  the
      order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of  the  Sessions
      Judge, Dumka is restored.  The appeal is allowed, as stated above.




                                              …….……………………….J.
                                              (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                              ……………………………J.
                                              (A.K. Sikri)
      New Delhi,
      September 18, 2013

“Enhancement of Annual Intake Capacity in Undergraduate Courses in Medical College for the Academic Session 2013-14 only Regulations 2013”= Writ of Certiorari to quash the Corrigendum Notification No. 37(1)2013/One Time Permission/Med./19355, in so far as it confines the benefits of - the “Enhancement of Annual Intake Capacity in Undergraduate Courses in Medical College for the Academic Session 2013-14 only Regulations 2013” (in short “Regulations 2013”), issued vide notification dated 8.7.2013, to the Government Medical Colleges only, as unconstitutional, being ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.= Central Government is also empowered under Section 3(c) of Indian Medical Council Act, as amended in 2010, to issue various directions to the Board of Governor of the the MCI, which reads as follows :- “3C. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the Board of Governors or the Council after its reconstitution shall, in exercise of its powers and in the performance of its functions under this Act, be bound by such directions on questions of policy, other - than those relating to technical and administrative matters, as the Central Government may give in writing to it from time to time; Provided that the Board of Governors or the Council after its reconstitution shall, as far as practicable, be given an opportunity to express its views before any direction is given under this subsection. (2) The decision of the Central Government whether a question is a matter of policy or not shall be final.” Board of Governors of the MCI is, therefore, bound by the Corrigendum issued by the Central Government. We notice that the above corrigendum extending the last date was made applicable only to the Government medical colleges recording the reason that the time would be very short so as to process the applications by the MCI received from the non-government medical colleges. We cannot say that the decision taken by the Central Government is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, so as to strike down the corrigendum issued under the extra- ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. - 22. The petitions, therefore, lack in merits and are accordingly dismissed.

  published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40790                                                           
  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 580 OF 2013

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Medical College & Ors.            .. Petitioners

                                   Versus

Union of India & Another                            .. Respondents

                                    WITH
                        SLP (CIVIL) NO. 24693 OF 2013

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1.    Petitioners have approached  this  Court  invoking  the  extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of  India
seeking a
Writ of Certiorari  to  quash  the  Corrigendum  Notification  No.
37(1)2013/One Time Permission/Med./19355, in  so  far  as  it  confines  the
benefits of -
the “Enhancement of Annual  Intake  Capacity  in  Undergraduate  Courses  in
Medical College for the Academic Session 2013-14 only Regulations 2013”  (in
short “Regulations 2013”), issued vide notification dated 8.7.2013,  to  the
Government Medical Colleges only, as unconstitutional, being ultra vires  of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

2.    Petitioners in all these petitions  submit  that  they  are  all  well
established private unaided medical institutions in the country running  for
more than 10 years with an annual intake of  100  MBBS  students,  over  and
above,  they  are  conducting  PG  Degree  and  Diploma  courses  as   well.
Regulations 2013 was issued on 8.7.2013 by  the  Medical  Council  of  India
(for short “MCI”) with the intention of granting one-time permission to  all
Government  and  Non-Government  Medical  Colleges  with  the  objective  of
enhancing the intake capacity of all the medical colleges  in  the  country,
which was framed with the  intention  to  augment  the  human  resources  in
medicine for  attaining  optimum  Doctor-Population  ratio  in  the  nation,
without  compromising  on  the  prescribed  minimum  standards  of   medical
education.

-
3.    Petitioners have satisfied all the eligibility criteria laid  down  in
the above  mentioned  Regulations  2013,  and  after  having  satisfied  the
eligibility criteria laid down, few of them submitted an application to  the
MCI for enhancement of annual intake of students, reference was made to  one
of such  applications  dated  15.7.2013.   While  so,  they  came  across  a
Corrigendum issued by the Board of Governors of the MCI,  on  the  direction
given by the Central Government, stating  that  Regulations  2013  would  be
confined only to Government medical colleges for the academic year  2013-14.


4.    Learned senior counsel appearing for the  writ  petitioners  submitted
that such corrigendum  cannot  override  the  statutory   Regulations  2013.
Learned senior counsel submitted that the object of  the  Regulations  would
be achieved only if the same is made applicable uniformly to the  Government
as  well  as  Non-Government  medical  colleges  in  the  country  and  that
confining the  Regulations  only  to  the  Government  medical  colleges  is
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of  the  Constitution  of  India.
In support of this contention, reference was made to the judgments  of  this
Court in Suraj Mall Mohta and Co. v. A. V. -
Vishvanath Sastri (1955) 1 SCR 448 and State of West  Bengal  v.  Anwar  Ali
Sarkar 1952 SCR 284.

5.    Shri Amit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for MCI defended the  issue
of corrigendum stating that the same was issued in public interest and  also
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case since  the  time
limit fixed in the  Schedule  to  2013  Regulations  got  expired.   Learned
counsel also submitted that  corrigendum  was  issued  by  the  MCI  on  the
direction given by the Central Government under Section 3(c) of  the  Indian
Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 2010, which enables the Central  Government
to give proper directions to the MCI and the MCI is bound to give effect  to
those directions.   Learned counsel also explained the  circumstances  which
led the Central Government in issuing the  letter  dated  18.7.2013  to  the
MCI.   Learned counsel also submitted that, due to the extreme necessity  of
completing the admission process, the Board of Governors of  the  MCI  could
not have  received  applications  from  the  private  medical  colleges  for
enhancing the intake capacity during the academic year 2013-14. It is  under
such circumstances, the Central Government had directed  the  MCI  to  apply
the modified time schedule for the receipt of application -
and grant permission  only  to  the  Government  medical  colleges  for  the
academic year 2013-14.  Learned counsel also pointed out that  MCI  and  the
Central Government have to comply with  the  time  schedule  fixed  by  this
Court in various judgments for admission of  students  as  well.   Reference
was made to the judgments of this Court in Mridul Dhar (Minor)  and  Another
v. Union of India and Others (2005) 2 SCC 65 and Priya  Gupta  v.  State  of
Chhattisgarh and Others (2012) 7 SCC 433.

6.    Shri  Sidharth  Luthra,  Additional  Solicitor  General  appearing  on
behalf of the Union of India, made available the original files  leading  to
the issue of the letter dated 18.7.2013 by the  Central  Government  to  the
MCI and explaining the circumstances under which it was decided  to  confine
the Regulations 2013 only to the  Government  medical  colleges,  that  too,
taking into consideration the larger public  interest.    Shri  Luthra  also
submitted that the direction given by the  Central  Government  vide  letter
dated 18.7.2013  is  in  consonance  with  the  Regulations  and  issued  in
exercise of the powers conferred on it under  Section  3(c)  of  the  Indian
Medical Council Act, 1956.

-
7.    We have heard learned senior counsel on either  side  at  length.   We
need not reiterate the imperative need to follow the  time  limit  fixed  by
this Court in the matter of admission to MBBS/BDS  courses  in  Mridul  Dhar
case (supra) which was done in the  interest  of  students’  community,  for
admission to the  Post  Graduate  and  Super  Speciality  courses.    Timely
admission of the students to these courses is of utmost importance  so  that
the students would get quality and timely education.  In  Mridul  Dhar  case
(supra),  this  Court  clearly  indicated  that  the   time   schedule   for
establishment of new college or  to  increase  intake  in  existing  college
shall be adhered to strictly by  all  concerned,  failing  which  defaulting
party would be liable to be personally proceeded with.

8.    In Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others  (2012) 7 SCC  433,
this Court has reiterated the necessity to follow the time  limit  fixed  by
this Court. This Court went even to the extent of  indicating  that  failure
to conform with the time limit fixed by  this  Court  shall  be  liable  for
action under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971  read  with
Article 129 of the Constitution of India.

-
9.    In the  light  of  the  above  mentioned  judgments  and  the  various
directions issued by this Court, we  have  to  judge  whether  the  decision
taken  by  the  Central  Government  as  well  as  the  MCI  confining   the
Regulations 2013 only to  the  Government  medical  colleges  is  arbitrary,
illegal or discriminatory  in  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  this  case.
Regulations 2013 was issued by the MCI in exercise of its  powers  conferred
under Section 33(fa) of the  Indian  Medical  Council  Act,  1956  with  the
previous  sanction  of  the  Central  Government.    The   object   of   the
notification was to enhance the intake  capacity  in  the  existing  medical
colleges so as to augment human resources in medicine for attaining  optimum
Doctor-Population ratio in the Nation, without compromising  the  prescribed
minimum standards  of  medical  education.   Regulation  3  deals  with  the
eligibility to make an application, which reads as under:
      “3.  Eligibility  to  make  application.-  (1)  The  application   for
      enhancement of annual intake capacity in the existing Medical Colleges
      may be made by the organizations that  have  established  the  Medical
      College to the Board of  Governors  in  Supersession  of  the  Medical
      Council of India. The format of application for  Government  and  non-
      governmental  owned  Medical  College  is  prescribed  in  Schedule  I
      appended to these Regulations.


      (2) Only such existing Medical Colleges shall  be  eligible  to  apply
      under these Regulations that enjoy minimum -
      ten years of standing from the date of  grant  of  initial  letter  of
      permission by  the  Central  Government  and  the  MBBS  qualification
      awarded by them stands included in the First Schedule  of  the  Indian
      Medical Council Act, 1956 [Act No. 102 of 1956].


      (3) The Medical Colleges with an annual intake of 50 or more but below
      100 MBBS seats shall be eligible to apply for enhancement  for  annual
      intake capacity to 100, as one-time measure.


      (4) The Medical Colleges with an annual intake  of  100  or  more  but
      below 150 MBBS seats shall be eligible to apply  for  enhancement  for
      annual intake capacity to 150, as one-time measure.


      (5) Such Medical  Colleges  that  have  not  been  granted  letter  of
      permission by the Board of Governors in Super-session of  the  Medical
      Council  of  India  in  accordance  with  clause  8(1)(3)(d)  of   the
      Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999  [notified  in  the
      Official Gazette on 16.04.2010] and/or the person who has  established
      the Medical College  has  been  convicted  by  a  Court  of  Competent
      jurisdiction in a criminal  investigation  initiated  by  the  Central
      Bureau of Investigation or Police.”

10.   Regulation 4 deals with the procedure to make application.  The  time-
schedule for  receipt  of  application  for  enhancement  of  annual  intake
capacity in under-graduate courses, is provided in Schedule II  appended  to
the Regulations, which reads as follows:






                                      -
                                “SCHEDULE II
     TIME-SCHEDULE FOR RECEIPT OF APPLICATION FOR ENHANCEMENT OF ANNUAL
                  INTAKE CAPACITY IN UNDERGRADUATE COURSES


      |S. No. |Stage of Processing                   |Last date      |
|1.     |Receipt of applications by the Board  |15.07.2013     |
|       |of Governors in Super-session of the  |               |
|       |Medical Council of India              |               |
|2.     |Return of Incomplete application      |20.07.2013     |
|3.     |Grant of Letter of Permission by the  |31.07.2013     |
|       |Board of Governors in Supersession of |               |
|       |the Medical Council of India          |               |




11.   Schedule I of Regulations 2013 deals with the  format  of  application
for  Government  and  Non-government  medical   colleges   for   making   an
application for enhancement of annual intake capacity.  Para 4 of  the  Form
(Schedule I) as well as the note  attached  to  the  said  format  also  has
relevance and the same is as follows:
                                 “SCHEDULE I
                                    FORM
                      (Suggested format for Applicants)


      PROPOSED FORMAT OF UNDERTAKING TO BE OBTAINED FROM THE  APPLICANT  FOR
      ENHANCEMENT OF MBBS  SEATS  FROM  ________  (Please  specify  existing
      intake capacity} to ________ (Please specify enhanced intake capacity)


      -
      xxx        xxx         xxx
      xxx        xxx         xxx
      4. The applicant assures that the compliance with the relevant Minimum
      Standard Requirement Regulations is mandatory for continuation of  the
      batch of students and is in the interest of students. In case  of  any
      failure to meet  the  requirements  of  the  Regulations  the  Central
      Government / Board  of  Governors  in  super-session  of  the  Medical
      Council of India would be entitled in  law  to  withdraw/revoke/cancel
      such permission.




                                                           Yours faithfully,
                                                                 [Applicant]
      Note :


Kindly enclose :



           (a) duly attested copy of initial Letter of  Permission  and  of
           subsequent renewals granted by the Central Government u/s 10A of
           the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; and


           (b) duly attested copy of the Gazette notification/Order of  the
           Central Government including the MBBS qualification  awarded  by
           the applicant’s Medical College in the  First  Schedule  of  the
           Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.


The Undertaking in case of Government of State/Union Territory should be
signed by the Chief Secretary.



 The Undertaking in case of non-Governmental application should be on non-
judicial stamp paper of Rs. 100 and should be made by President / Chairman
/Vice Chancellor/ Managing Trustee of the Society/Trust and Managing
Director of the Company. The Undertaking should inter alia state that:



           -
           (a) the College has not been subject to clause 8 (3) (1) (d)  of
           the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999; and


           (b) the person establishing the Medical  College  has  not  been
           convicted by a Court of competent  jurisdiction  in  a  criminal
           investigation initiated by the Central Bureau  of  Investigation
           or Police. The Undertaking should be duly attested  by  a  First
           Class Magistrate.”


12.   MCI, in their counter  affidavit,  stated  that  the  above  mentioned
notification dated 8.7.2013 was received  by  the  Council  Office  only  on
16.7.2013.  By that time, the last date fixed for receipt of application  by
the Board of Governors  was  over,  which  was  on  15.7.2013.   Under  such
circumstances, the MCI wrote a letter dated 17.7.2013 to the  Government  of
India, stating as follows:
      “        xxx           xxx        xxx


            In light of Gazette notification received on 16.07.2013 the time
      of receipt of application  has  already  lapsed.   Therefore,  as  per
      provisions  as  under  [in  the  Establishment  of   Medical   College
      Regulations, 1999]:


            “The time schedule  indicated  above  may  be  modified  by  the
      Central Government, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in  respect
      of any class or category of applications.


            Keeping in light the above  statutory  provisions,  whereby  the
      Central Government is empowered to modify the  time  schedule,  it  is
      proposed in order to -
      achieve the objective of enhancing the  intake  capacity  in  existing
      Medical Colleges, so as to augment the human resources in medicine for
      attaining optimum Doctor-population ratio in  the  nation,  the  above
      schedule may be modified to the following:




      |S. No. |Stage of Processing      |Last Date    |Modified Dates|
|1.     |Receipt of applications  |15.07.2013   |24.07.2013    |
|       |by the Board of Governors|             |              |
|       |in Super-session of the  |             |              |
|       |Medical Council of India |             |              |
|2.     |Return of Incomplete     |20.07.2013   |31.07.2013    |
|       |application              |             |              |
|3.     |Grant of Letter of       |31.07.2013   |31.07.2013    |
|       |Permission by the Board  |             |              |
|       |of Governors in          |             |              |
|       |Supersession of the      |             |              |
|       |Medical Council of India |             |              |


            It is requested that permission of Central Government to  modify
      the Schedule as proposed above be granted, so as to enable the Council
      to further expedite the process.  This modification, with the approval
      of Central Government can be carried out by public notice and need not
      be notified in the Official Gazette.


            It is also brought to your kind  attention  that  as  the  time-
      schedule for grant of letter of permission for  establishment  of  new
      Medical Colleges and renewal of permission for increase  of  seats  in
      existing Medical Colleges was extended to 15 July 2013, by the Hon’ble
      Supreme Court for he academic year 2013-14 pursuant to an  application
      moved by the Council in Priya Gupta’s case, an appropriate application
      is also required to be filed by the Council seeking permission -
      of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.  Necessary steps are being taken by  the
      Council in this regard.


            Kindly grant permission at the earliest which  will  enable  the
      Council to do the needful at the earliest.”

13.   The MCI, therefore, requested the Government of India  to  modify  the
time schedule and  extend  the  last  date  of  receipt  of  application  to
24.7.2013, since they could not receive  the  applications  by  the  various
medical colleges prior to 15.7.2013, as  the  very  Regulations  2013  dated
8.7.2013 was received by the MCI only on 16.7.2013.

14.   The Central Government considered the request and pointed out that  it
would not be possible for the Board of Governors of MCI to process  all  the
applications preferred by the Non-government  medical  colleges  within  the
time fixed, therefore, it decided to issued  a  corrigendum  which  modified
that the date of 24.7.2013 would apply only to Government medical colleges.

15.   We find no serious error in the view taken by the  Central  Government
confining Regulations 2013 to Government medical colleges alone in  view  of
strict time limit fixed in the Schedule for  receipt  of  applications  i.e.
15.7.2013 and the preremptory directions given by this Court   in  judgments
referred to above.  -
We may make it clear that the  time  limit  fixed  for  starting  a  medical
college as well as for additional intake are of extreme importance, or  else
it may collide with the time limit fixed for starting the academic  session.
 If the time limit fixed in  the  notification  dated  8.7.2013  was  to  be
adhered to strictly, the majority of  the  Non-government  medical  colleges
could not have applied, since the Regulations 2013 was received by  the  MCI
only on 16.7.2013 beyond the last date fixed for the receipt of  application
by the Board of Governors of MCI.

16.   We indicate that the  main  argument  raised  by  the  learned  senior
counsel appearing for the Petitioners was that 2013 Regulations should  have
been made applicable equally to the Government Medical Colleges as  well  as
non-Government Medical Colleges  and  there  cannot  be  any  discrimination
between them, otherwise the object sought to be achieved by the  Regulations
would have been defeated.  In our view, in a  given  case  power  is  vested
with the Central Government to modify the time schedule, in  respect  of  at
least one class or category of applicants.  We may in this connection  refer
to Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999, which was  issued  in
exercise of powers conferred under Section 10A read with Section  3  of  the
Indian -
Medial Council Act, which has recognised five  categories  of  organisations
which are eligible to apply for  starting  a  Medical  College  as  well  as
eligible  to  apply  for  further  intake  of  seats.   Following  are   the
categories :-
   1. A State Government/Union Territory;
   2. A University;
   3. An autonomous body promoted by Central  and  State  Government  by  or
      under a Statute for the purpose of medical education;


   4. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of
      1860) or corresponding Acts in States; or


   5. A public religious or charitable trust registered under the Trust Act,
      1882 (2 of 1882) or the Wakfs Act, 1954 (29 of 1954).



 17.   State Government/Union Territory can also set up  a  Medical  College and take additional intake  of  seats,  apart  from  the  other  categories mentioned above.  
In a given case, the Central Government, for  reasons  to
 be recorded in writing, can modify the time  schedule  in  respect  of  any class or category of applicants mentioned hereinbefore.  Such a  power  has been conferred on Central Government by virtue of Establishment of  Medical College Regulations (Amendment), 2012.


 -
 18.  The Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999, as amended  by
 Establishment of Medical College Regulations  (Amendment),  2012,  provides
 for time schedule for grant of letter of permission by the Medical  Council
 of India for establishment of a Medical College  as  well  as  increase  in
 admission capacity  in  MBBS  course.   
Schedule  to  the  above  mentioned
 Regulations reads as follows :-
                                  SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE FOR RECEIPT  OF  APPLICATIONS  FOR  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  NEW  MEDICAL
COLLEGES AND PROCESSING OF  THE  APPLICATIONS  BY  THE  MEDICAL  COUNCIL  OF
INDIA.

|S.No. |Stage of processing                    |  |Last Date           |
|1.    |Receipt of applications by the Council |  |From 1st August to  |
|      |                                       |  |30th September (both|
|      |                                       |  |days inclusive) of  |
|      |                                       |  |the year.           |
|2.    |Issue of Letter of Intent by the       |  |Upto 30th April     |
|      |Council                                |  |                    |
|3.    |Receipt of reply from the applicant by |  |Upto 31st May       |
|      |the Council for consideration for issue|  |                    |
|      |of Letter of Permission                |  |                    |
|4.    |Issue of Letter of Permission by the   |  |15th June           |
|      |Council                                |  |                    |

Note :  The time schedule indicated above may be  modified  by  the  Central
        Government, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in respect of any
        class or category of applications.


-
19.   The note specifically  indicates  that the  time  schedule  could  be
modified by Central Government for reasons to  be  recorded  in  writing  in
respect of any category, class of applicants which, in our view, could  also
be invoked in the case of increase of annual intake as  well.
 Resultantly,
the Central Government has the power to modify the date  from  15.7.2013  to
24.7.2013 in respect of any class or category of applications.  
So  far  as
the present case is concerned, it is in exercise of  that  statutory  power,
the Corrigendum has been issued by  the  Central  Government  modifying  the
time schedule to the Government  Medical  College  alone  out  of  the  five
categories mentioned hereinbefore.
We are not  prepared  to  say  favouring
the Government Medical College alone in such circumstances is  violative  of
Article 14 of the Constitution.

20.   Central Government is also 
empowered  under  Section  3(c)  of  Indian
Medical Council Act, as amended in 2010, to issue various directions to  the
Board of Governor of the the MCI, which reads as follows :-
      “3C.  (1)   Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the Board
      of Governors  or  the  Council  after  its  reconstitution  shall,  in
      exercise of its powers and in the performance of its  functions  under
      this Act, be bound by such directions on questions of policy, other -
      than those relating to technical and administrative  matters,  as  the
      Central Government may give in writing to it from time to time;


            Provided that the Board of Governors or the  Council  after  its
      reconstitution shall, as far as practicable, be given  an  opportunity
      to express  its  views  before  any  direction  is  given  under  this
      subsection.


            (2) The decision of the Central Government whether a question is
      a matter of policy or not shall be final.”


      Board of Governors of the MCI is, therefore, bound by the  Corrigendum
issued by the Central Government.

21.   We notice that 
the above corrigendum extending the last date was  made
applicable only to the Government  medical  colleges  recording  the  reason
that the time would be very short so as to process the applications  by  the
MCI received from the non-government medical colleges.  
We cannot  say  that
the decision taken by the  Central  Government  is  perverse,  arbitrary  or
unreasonable, so as to strike down the corrigendum issued under  the  extra-
ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution  of
India.


-
22.    The  petitions,  therefore,  lack  in  merits  and  are   accordingly
dismissed.

                                           ………………………….…J.
                                            (K. S. Radhakrishnan)






                                           …………………………….J.
                                             A. K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
September 18, 2013

Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 = since on the date of his conviction the Petitioner was over 21 years old, and therefore, was not a juvenile under the erstwhile or current statutory dispensation as per the wisdom of the Legislature, there was no impediment or legal impropriety in his having to undergo his sentence in an ordinary jail; on the contrary being an adult it would not have been advisable for him to be detained in a Borstal School as he may detrimentally influence younger persons. The position would have been totally different had he, on the date of his conviction, been between ages of 16 and 21 years as he would then have required to be placed in a Borstal School. Even if this infraction had occurred, the Petitioner would not be entitled to bail today solely on that score. In any event, the entire argument is totally academic since on the present date the Petitioner is over 30 years of age and on the date of his conviction for the commission of the offence, the Petitioner was over 21 years of age. The Borstal Schools Act merely concerns detention of a convict, whereas the Juvenile Justice Act deals with detention as also the punishment or sentence that can be imposed. 6. Accordingly the Application for bail, on the grounds pressed before us, is devoid of merit and is dismissed.

 punishable   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40792                                                             
 REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                           CRL.M.P. NO.853 OF 2013
                                     IN
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.811 OF 2011




      Nagoor Pichai @ Badusha                           …..Petitioner


            Versus


      State Tr. Sub-Inspector of Police                       …..Respondent










                               J U D G M E N T




      VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.


      1.    The only question agitated before us by learned  Senior  Counsel
      for the Petitioner is  that  the  provisions  of  Tamil  Nadu  Borstal
      Schools Act,  1925  (hereinafter  ‘Borstal  Schools  Act’)  have  been
      ignored by the Courts below.  It is evident  from  a  perusal  of  the
      impugned judgment that the applicability of the said statute  has  not
      been raised in either  of  the  Courts  below.   Briefly  stated,  the
      Petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment under  Section  302
      of the Indian Penal Code for the  murder  of  his  paternal  uncle  on
      12.8.1999.  It is not disputed before us that the Petitioner’s date of
      birth is 29.11.1979 thereby making him 19 years 8 months of age on the
      date of the commission of the  murder.   The  Petitioner  having  been
      found guilty has been sentenced to life imprisonment vide judgment  of
      the Trial Court pronounced on 6.9.2002, on which date  the  Petitioner
      was 22 years 9 months old.  It  is  contended  before  us  by  learned
      Senior Counsel that the  Courts  below  erred  in  not  directing  the
      detention of the Petitioner in a Borstal School.
      2.       The  Borstal  Schools  Act  does  not  contemplate  the  term
      ‘juvenile’ at all.  However, the definition of  ‘adolescent  offender’
      is contained in Section 2(1) of the said Act and reads thus :
           “ ‘Adolescent offender’ means any person who has been  convicted
           of any offence punishable with imprisonment or who  having  been
           ordered to give security  under  section  118  of  the  Code  of
           Criminal Procedure has failed to do so and who at  the  time  of
           such conviction or failure to give security is not less than  16
           in the case of a boy and not less than 18 in the case of a girl,
           but not more than 21 years of age in either case.”


      We should clarify that Section 118 corresponds to Section 110  of  the
      current 1973 Cr.P.C.  The age of a juvenile prior to the  present  Act
      was 16 years and a legal  anachronism  palpably  exists  requiring  an
      amendment to the Borstal Schools Act substituting the age of 16  years
      by 18 years for a boy.  ‘Adolescent’ is seldom considered in any legal
      dictionary, whereas juvenile/minor/child is ubiquitously  dealt  with.
      Adolescence is the penumbral period (presently between 18 years and 23
      years) when, for good reason, a person is not perceived and treated as
      an adult for the purposes of incarceration.  The Borstal School  is  a
      halfway house intended to prepare  a  person  for  imprisonment  in  a
      regular/ordinary  jail.   Section  8  of  the  Borstal   Schools   Act
      stipulates that a convict cannot remain in a Borstal School  beyond  a
      period of five years or his attaining the age of 23 years.  We  should
      immediately note the distinction, as  the  relevant  statutes  ordain,
      between  an  ‘adolescent’  and  a  ‘juvenile’.   ‘Juvenile’  and   its
      statutory synonym ‘child’ (and now even ‘minor’) has been  defined  in
      the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000  [for
      short, ‘Juvenile  Justice  Act’]  simply  as  a  person  who  has  not
      completed eighteen years of age.  The repealed  Juvenile  Justice  Act
      treated any person below the age of sixteen years as a juvenile and it
      is this age which is contemplated in  the  Borstal  Schools  Act.   By
      virtue, therefore, of Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice  Act,  Special
      Homes have to be established for the ‘reception and rehabilitation  of
      a juvenile in conflict with law’.  Again, it is this Act in  terms  of
      Section 16, that places an embargo on the imposition of  any  sentence
      of death or imprisonment for life.
      3.   In the context  of  the  arguments  addressed  before  us  it  is
      important to emphasise that it is the date of conviction that  assumes
      singular significance.  By  virtue  of  the  statutory  definition  of
      ‘adolescent offender’, on the date of the conviction  he  should  have
      been not less than 16 years  but  not  more  than  21  years  of  age.
      Although this question does not arise directly before us, the date  of
      juvenility was less than 16 years of age and,  therefore,  a  plea  on
      this ground had not been raised since the Petitioner was over 19 years
      on the date of occurrence of the unfortunate event or the  conviction.
      Even in the postulation of the Juvenile  Justice  Act,  no  relief  is
      available even retrospectively to the Petitioner.  Under Section 8  of
      the Borstal Schools Act, the Court is empowered to pass a sentence  of
      detention in the Borstal School when it appears  to  it  expedient  to
      pass such a sentence for a term which shall not be less than two years
      but  shall  not  exceed  five  years.   The  rationale  behind   these
      provisions is obviously to insulate a young person  or  adolescent  in
      contradistinction to a  juvenile,  during  his  waning  impressionable
      years, from the pernicious influence of hardened  criminals;  and,  on
      the other hand, to  similarly  insulate  other  persons  sentenced  to
      detention in Borstal Schools from the influence of convicts  who  have
      attained the age of 23 years or who have been detained  in  a  Borstal
      School for five years.
      4.    Learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to Yaduraj  Singh
      v. State of U.P. (1976) 4 SCC 310 and C. Elumalai v.  State  of  Tamil
      Nadu (1984) 4 SCC 539 both of which have no  relevance  to  the  issue
      raised before us,  that too for the first time.  In Yaduraj Singh this
      Court had emphasised that the plea under the  Probation  of  Offenders
      Act had not been raised in any of the Courts below and whilst it could
      nevertheless  be  pressed,   such   a   course   invariably   presents
      difficulties in comprehensively considering the plea  because  of  the
      absence of any credible evidence to determine the  juvenility  of  the
      person concerned.  We hasten to clarify that we have not  declined  to
      entertain the plea on the ground that it has not been raised in any of
      the Courts below, therefore rendering Yaduraj Singh of  no  assistance
      to the Petitioner.  The ratio of Elumalai follows upon a bare  reading
      of Sections 8 and 10  of  the  Borstal  Schools  Act  which  we  shall
      reproduce so as to make our judgment holistic and self contained :
                 “8. Power of Court to pass sentence of detention in Borstal
           School. (1) Where it appears  to  a  Court  having  jurisdiction
           under this Act that an adolescent offender should, by reason  of
           his criminal habits  or  tendencies,  or  association  with  the
           persons of bad character, be subject to detention for such  term
           and under  such  instruction  and  discipline  as  appears  most
           conducive to his reformation and the  repression  of  crime,  it
           shall be lawful for the Court, in lieu of passing a sentence  of
           imprisonment, to pass a  sentence  of  detention  in  a  Borstal
           school for a term which shall not be less  than  two  years  and
           shall not exceed five years but in no case extending beyond  the
           date on which the adolescent offender will, in  the  opinion  of
           the Court, attain the age of twenty-three years.
                 (2) Before passing a sentence of  detention  in  a  Borstal
           School under sub-section (1), the Court
                 (a) shall call for a report from the Probation  Officer  of
           the area in which the offender permanently resided at  the  time
           when he committed the offence and shall consider such report,
                 (b) shall consider any other report or representation which
           may be made to it, and
                 (c) may make such further inquiry as it may think fit,
           as to suitability of the case for treatment in a Borstal  school
           and shall be satisfied that the character, state of  health  and
           mental condition of the offender and the other circumstances  of
           the case are such that the offender is likely to profit by  such
           instruction and discipline as aforesaid.
                 (3) The report of a Probation Officer referred to  in  sub-
           section (2) shall be treated as confidential.
                 Provided  that  the  Court  may,  if  it  so  thinks  fit,
           communicate the substance thereof to the offender and  may  give
           him an opportunity of producing such evidence as may be relevant
           to the matter stated in the report.
                 10. Power of Inspector-General  to  transfer  prisoners  to
           Borstal Schools.-The Inspector General  may,  subject  to  rules
           made by the State Government, if satisfied that  any  adolescent
           offender undergoing imprisonment in consequence  of  a  sentence
           passed either before or after the passing of this Act might with
           advantage be detained in a Borstal school, there  to  serve  the
           whole or any part of the unexpired residue of his sentence.  The
           provisions of this Act shall thereupon apply to such  person  as
           if he had been originally sentenced to detention  in  a  Borstal
           school.”
      5.    So far as the facts in the present Appeal are  concerned,
since
      on the date of his conviction the Petitioner was over  21  years  old,
      and therefore, was not a  juvenile  under  the  erstwhile  or  current
      statutory dispensation as per the wisdom of the Legislature, there was
      no impediment or legal  impropriety  in  his  having  to  undergo  his
      sentence in an ordinary jail; 
on the contrary being an adult it  would
      not have been advisable for him to be detained in a Borstal School  as
      he may detrimentally influence younger persons.   
The  position  would
      have been totally different had he, on the  date  of  his  conviction,
      been between ages of 16 and 21 years as he would then have required to
      be placed in a Borstal School.  
Even if this infraction had  occurred,
      the Petitioner would not be entitled to  bail  today  solely  on  that
      score.  
In any event, the entire argument is totally academic since on
      the present date the Petitioner is over 30 years of  age  and  on  the
      date of  his  conviction  for  the  commission  of  the  offence,  the
      Petitioner was over 21 years of age.  
The Borstal Schools  Act  merely
      concerns detention of a convict,  whereas  the  Juvenile  Justice  Act
      deals with detention as also the punishment or sentence  that  can  be
      imposed.
      6.    Accordingly the Application for bail,  on  the  grounds  pressed
      before us, is devoid of merit and is dismissed.



      .............................................J.
                                             [T.S. THAKUR]





      .............................................J.
                                             [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
      New Delhi
      September 19, 2013.