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Thursday, September 12, 2013

A street vendor / hawker is a person who offers goods for sale to the public at large without having a permanent structure / place for his activities. Some street vendors / hawkers are stationary in the sense that they occupy space on the pavements or other public / private places while others are mobile in the sense that they move from place to place carrying their wares on push carts or in baskets on their heads.= For facilitating implementation of the 2009 Policy, we issue the following directions: i) Within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order, the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments and Administrators of the Union Territories shall issue necessary instructions/directions to the concerned department(s) to ensure that the Town Vending Committee is constituted at city / town level in accordance with the provisions contained in the 2009 Policy. For the cities and towns having large municipal areas, more than one Town Vending Committee may be constituted. (ii) Each Town Vending Committee shall consist of representatives of various organizations and street vendors / hawkers. 30% of the representatives from the category of street vendors / hawkers shall be women. iii) The representatives of various organizations and street vendors / hawkers shall be chosen by the Town Vending Committee by adopting a fair and transparent mechanism. iv) The task of constituting the Town Vending Committees shall be completed within two months of the issue of instructions by the Chief Secretaries of the State and the Administrators of the Union Territories. v) The Town Vending Committees shall function strictly in accordance with the 2009 Policy and the decisions taken by it shall be notified in the print and electronic media within next one week. vi) The Town Vending Committees shall be free to divide the municipal areas in vending / hawking zones and sub-zones and for this purpose they may take assistance of experts in the field. While undertaking this exercise, the Town Vending Committees constituted for the cities of Delhi and Mumbai shall take into consideration the work already undertaken by the municipal authorities in furtherance of the directions given by this Court. The municipal authorities shall also take action in terms of Paragraph 4.2(b) and (c). vii) All street vendors / hawkers shall be registered in accordance with paragraph 4.5.4 of the 2009 Policy. Once registered, the street vendor / hawker, shall be entitled to operate in the area specified by the Town Vending Committee. viii) The process of registration must be completed by the municipal authorities across the country within four months of the receipt of the direction by the Chief Secretaries of the States and Administrators of the Union Territories. ix) The State Governments / Administration of the Union Territories and municipal and local authorities shall take all the steps necessary for achieving the objectives set out in the 2009 Policy. x) The Town Vending Committee shall meet every month and ensure implementation of the relevant provisions of the 2009 Policy and, in particular, paragraph 4.5.1 (b) and (c). xi) Physically challenged who were allowed to operate PCO’s in terms of the judgment reported in (2009) 17 SCC 231 shall be allowed to continue to run their stalls and sell other goods because running of PCOs. is no longer viable. Those who were allowed to run Aarey/Sarita shall be allowed to continue to operate their stalls. xii) The State Governments, the Administration of the Union Territories and municipal authorities shall be free to amend the legislative provisions and/or delegated legislation to bring them in tune with the 2009 Policy. If there remains any conflict between the 2009 Policy and the municipal laws, insofar as they relate to street vendors/hawkers, then the 2009 Policy shall prevail. xiii) Henceforth, the parties shall be free to approach the jurisdictional High Courts for redressal of their grievance and the direction, if any, given by this Court in the earlier judgments / orders shall not impede disposal of the cases which may be filed by the aggrieved parties. xiv) The Chief Justices of the High Courts are requested to nominate a Bench to deal with the cases filed for implementation of the 2009 Policy and disputes arising out of its implementation. The concerned Bench shall regularly monitor implementation of the 2009 Policy and the law which may be enacted by the Parliament. xv) All the existing street vendors / hawkers operating across the country shall be allowed to operate till the exercise of registration and creation of vending / hawking zones is completed in terms of the 2009 Policy. Once that exercise is completed, they shall be entitled to operate only in accordance with the orders/directions of the concerned Town Vending Committee. xvi) The provisions of the 2009 Policy and the directions contained hereinabove shall apply to all the municipal areas in the country. 17. The aforesaid directions shall remain operative till an appropriate legislation is enacted by Parliament or any other competent legislature and is brought into force. 18. The parties, whose applications have remained pending before this Court, shall be free to institute appropriate proceedings in the jurisdictional High Court. If so advised, the aggrieved person shall be free to file petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. All the appeals and I.As are disposed of in the manner indicated above. 20. The Registry is directed to send copies of this order to the Chief Secretaries of all the States, Administrators of the Union Territories and Registrar Generals / Registrars (Judicial) of all the High Courts, who shall place the order before the Chief Justice for consideration and necessary directions.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40757
                                                                      1
                           REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPRME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     Civil Appeal Nos.4156-4157 of 2002
                                    WITH
                     Civil Appeal Nos. 4161-4162 of 2002
                                     AND
                     Civil Appeal Nos. 4175-4176 of 2002
                                     AND
        I.A.Nos.266-285, 288-289, 294-299, 304-309, 312-321 & 324-335
                                     IN
                     Civil Appeal Nos.4156-4157 of 2002
                                     AND
             I.A.Nos.7-8 in Civil Appeal Nos. 4161-4162 of 2002
                                     AND
            I.A.Nos.16-17 in Civil Appeal Nos. 4175-4176 of 2002


Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union and another               ... Appellants

                                   Versus

Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai and others         ... Respondents

                                  O R D E R


G.S. SINGHVI, J.



1.    A street vendor / hawker is a person who offers goods for sale to  the
public at large without  having  a  permanent  structure  /  place  for  his
activities. Some street vendors / hawkers are stationary in the  sense  that
they occupy space on the pavements or other public /  private  places  while
others are mobile in the sense that they move from place to  place  carrying
their wares on push carts or in baskets on their heads.





2.    In last four decades, there has been manifold increase in  the  number
of street vendors / hawkers in all major cities in the country.  One of  the
many  factors  responsible  for  this  phenomena  is  unabated   growth   of
population without corresponding increase in employment opportunities.   The
other factor is the migration of rural population to  the  urban  areas.   A
large section of the  rural  population  has  been  forced  to  leave  their
habitat because of massive acquisition of land and substantial reduction  in
the number of cottage industries, which  offered  source  of  livelihood  to
many people in the rural areas and even those living in the  peripheries  of
the urban areas.  In recent past, many lakh youngsters have moved  from  the
rural areas to the cities with the  hope  of  getting  permanent  source  of
livelihood but a substantial number of them have  become  street  vendors  /
hawkers because their expectations have been belied.  One reason  which  has
contributed to this scenario is that unlike  other  sections  of  the  urban
population, they neither have the capacity and strength to demand  that  the
Government should create jobs for  them  nor  do  they  engage  in  begging,
stealing or extortion.  They try to live with dignity  and  self-respect  by
doing the work as street vendors / hawkers.

3.    The importance of street vendors and hawkers can be measured from  the
fact that millions of urban poor across  the  country  procure  their  basic
necessities mainly from street vendors / hawkers because  the  goods,  viz.,
cloths, hosiery items, plastic wares, household  items,  food  items,  etc.,
sold on pavements or through push carts, etc., are cheap.  The lower  income
groups also spend a large proportion of their  income  in  purchasing  goods
from street vendors / hawkers.

4.     Unfortunately,  the  street  vendors  /  hawkers  have  received  raw
treatment from the State apparatus before and even after  the  independence.
They are a harassed lot and are constantly victimized by  the  officials  of
the local authorities, the police,  etc.,  who  regularly  target  them  for
extra  income  and  treat  them  with  extreme  contempt.   The  goods   and
belongings of the street vendors / hawkers are  thrown  to  the  ground  and
destroyed at regular intervals if they are not able to meet the  demands  of
the officials.   Perhaps  these  minions  in  the  administration  have  not
understood meaning of the term “dignity” enshrined in the  preamble  of  the
Constitution.

5.    The constant threat faced by the street vendors /  hawkers  of  losing
their source of livelihood has forced  them  to  seek  intervention  of  the
Courts across the country from time to time.  In last 28 years,  this  Court
has struggled to find a workable solution of the problems of street  vendors
/ hawkers on the one hand and other sections of society including  residents
of the localities / places  where  street  vendors  /  hawkers  operate  and
delivered several judgments  including  Bombay  Hawkers’  Union  vs.  Bombay
Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 528, Sodan Singh vs. New Delhi  Municipal
Committee (1989) 4 SCC 155, Maharashtra Ekta  Hawkers  Union  vs.  Municipal
Corporation, Greater Mumbai (2004)  1  SCC  625,  Maharashtra  Ekta  Hawkers
Union  vs.  Municipal  Corporation,  Greater  Mumbai  (2009)  17  SCC   151,
Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union vs.  Municipal  Corporation,  Greater  Mumbai
(2009) 17 SCC 231 (this order was passed on 30.07.2004 but  was  printed  in
the journal only in 2009) and Gainda Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of  Delhi
(2010) 10 SCC 715, but the situation has not changed in last  four  decades.
Rather, the problem has aggravated because of lackadaisical attitude of  the
administration at various levels and the legislative instruments  made  many
decades ago have become totally ineffective.

6.    In Sodan Singh vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee (supra),  L.M.Sharma,
J., who authored the main judgment,  referred  to  a  number  of  precedents
including Saghir Ahmad vs. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 728 and observed.
      “17. So far as right of a hawker to transact business while going from
      place to place is concerned, it has been admittedly recognised  for  a
      long period. Of course, that also is subject to proper  regulation  in
      the interest of general convenience of the public including health and
      security considerations. What about the right to squat on the roadside
      for engaging in trading business? As  was  stated  by  this  Court  in
      Bombay Hawkers’ Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 528
      the public streets by their nomenclature and definition are meant  for
      the use of the general public: they are not  laid  to  facilitate  the
      carrying on of private business. If hawkers were to  be  conceded  the
      right claimed by them, they  could  hold  the  society  to  ransom  by
      squatting on the busy  thoroughfares,  thereby  paralysing  all  civic
      life. This is one side of the picture. On the other hand, if  properly
      regulated according to the exigency of the  circumstances,  the  small
      traders on the sidewalks can  considerably  add  to  the  comfort  and
      convenience of general public, by making available  ordinary  articles
      of everyday use for a comparatively lesser price. An ordinary  person,
      not very affluent, while hurrying towards his home  after  day’s  work
      can pick up these articles without going out of  his  way  to  find  a
      regular market. If the  circumstances  are  appropriate  and  a  small
      trader can do some business for personal gain on the pavement  to  the
      advantage  of  the  general  public  and  without  any  discomfort  or
      annoyance to the others, we do not see any objection to  his  carrying
      on the business.  Appreciating  this  analogy  the  municipalities  of
      different cities and towns in the  country  have  been  allowing  such
      traders. The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in  Article
      19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  on  street  pavements,  if  properly
      regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the  streets  are  meant
      exclusively for passing or re-passing and for  no  other  use.  Proper
      regulation is, however, a necessary condition as  otherwise  the  very
      object of laying out roads — to facilitate traffic — may be  defeated.
      Allowing the right to trade without appropriate control is  likely  to
      lead  to  unhealthy  competition  and  quarrel  between  traders   and
      travelling  public  and  sometimes  amongst  the  traders   themselves
      resulting in chaos. The right is subject  to  reasonable  restrictions
      under clause (6) or Article 19. If the matter is examined in its light
      it will appear that the principle stated in Saghir Ahmad case (1955) 1
      SCR 707:AIR 1954 SC 728 in connection with transport business  applies
      to the hawkers’ case also. The proposition that all public streets and
      roads in India vest in the State but that  the  State  holds  them  as
      trustee on behalf of the public, and the members  of  the  public  are
      entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter of right,  and  that
      this right is limited only by the similar rights  possessed  by  every
      other citizen to use the pathways,  and  further  that  the  State  as
      trustee is  entitled  to  impose  all  necessary  limitations  on  the
      character and extent of the user, should be treated  as  of  universal
      application.”

                                                         (Emphasis supplied)



      In his  concurring  opinion,  Kuldip  Singh,  J.  made  the  following
observations:

      “33. In India there are large number of people who are engaged in  the
      business of “street  trading”.  There  is  hardly  a  household  where
      hawkers do not reach. The housewives wait for a vegetable vendor or  a
      fruit  seller  who  conveniently  delivers  the  daily  needs  at  the
      doorstep. The petitioners before us are street traders  of  Delhi  and
      New Delhi areas. Some of them have licences/Tehbazari  from  Municipal
      Corporation of Delhi/New Delhi Municipal Committee but  most  of  them
      are squatters. There is practically no law regulating  street  trading
      in Delhi/New Delhi. The skeletal provisions  in  the  Delhi  Municipal
      Corporation Act, 1957 and the Punjab Municipal Act,  1911  can  hardly
      provide any  regulatory  measures  to  the  enormous  and  complicated
      problem of street trading in these areas.


      35. Street trading being a fundamental right has to be made  available
      to the citizens subject to Article 19(6) of the  Constitution.  It  is
      within the domain of the State to make any  law  imposing  reasonable,
      restrictions in the interest of general public. This can be done by an
      enactment on the same  lines  as  in  England  or  by  any  other  law
      permissible under Article 19(6)  of  the  Constitution.  In  spite  of
      repeated suggestions by this Court  nothing  has  been  done  in  this
      respect. Since a citizen has no right to choose a particular place  in
      any street for trading, it is for the State to designate  the  streets
      and earmark the places from where street trading can be done. Inaction
      on the part of the State would  result  in  negating  the  fundamental
      right of the citizens. It is expected  that  the  State  will  do  the
      needful in this respect within a  reasonable  time  failing  which  it
      would be left to the courts to protect the rights of the citizens.”




7.    In Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union vs. Municipal  Corporation,  Greater
Mumbai (supra), which was decided on 9.12.2003, a two Judge  Bench  referred
to the judgments in Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal  Corporation  (1985)  3
SCC 545,  Sodan  Singh  vs.  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee  (supra),  the
recommendations made by the Committee constituted  pursuant  to  an  earlier
judgment and observed:

      “10. The above authorities make it clear that the hawkers have a right
      under Article 19(1)(g) of  the  Constitution  of  India.  This  right,
      however, is subject to reasonable restrictions  under  Article  19(6).
      Thus hawking may not be permitted where, e.g.  due  to  narrowness  of
      road, free flow of traffic or movement of pedestrians is  hindered  or
      where for security reasons an area is required to be kept free or near
      hospitals, places of worship etc. There is no fundamental right  under
      Article 21 to carry on any hawking business. There is also no right to
      do hawking at any particular place. The authorities also recognize the
      fact that if properly regulated, the small  traders  can  considerably
      add to the convenience and comfort of the general  public,  by  making
      available ordinary articles of everyday use for a comparatively lesser
      price. The scheme must keep in mind the above principles.  So  far  as
      Mumbai is concerned, the scheme must comply with the  conditions  laid
      down in Bombay Hawkers’ Union case (1985) 3 SCC 528. Those  conditions
      have  become  final  and  there  is  no  changed  circumstance   which
      necessitates any alteration.”



The Court then enumerated the following restrictions and conditions  subject
to which the hawkers could do business in Mumbai:

      “(1) An area of 1 m × 1 m on one side of the  footpath  wherever  they
      exist or on an extreme side of the carriageway, in such a manner  that
      the vehicular and pedestrian traffic is not obstructed and  access  to
      shops and residences is not blocked.  We  further  clarify  that  even
      where hawking is permitted, it can only be on one side of the footpath
      or road and under no circumstances on both sides of the  footpaths  or
      roads. We, however, clarify that  aarey/sarita  stalls  and  sugarcane
      vendors would require and may be permitted an area of more than 1 m  ×
      1 m but not more than 2 m × 1 m.

      (2) Hawkers must not put up stalls or place any tables, stand or  such
      other thing or erect any type of structure. They should also  not  use
      handcarts. However, they may protect their goods from the sun, rain or
      wind. Obviously,  this  condition  would  not  apply  to  aarey/sarita
      stalls.

      (3) There should be no hawking within 100 metres  from  any  place  of
      worship, holy shrine, educational institutions and hospitals or within
      150 metres from any municipal or other markets  or  from  any  railway
      station. There should be no hawking on  footbridges  and  overbridges.
      Further, certain areas may be required to be kept free of hawkers  for
      security reasons. However, outside places of worship  hawkers  can  be
      permitted to sell items required by the devotees for offering  to  the
      deity or for placing in the place of worship e.g. flowers, sandalwood,
      candles, agarbattis, coconuts etc.

      (4) The hawkers must not create any noise or play  any  instrument  or
      music for attracting the public or the customers.

      (5) They can only sell cooked foods, cut fruits, juices and the  like.
      We are  unable  to  accept  the  submission  that  cooking  should  be
      permitted. We direct that no cooking of any nature whatsoever shall be
      permitted. Even where cooked food or cut fruits or the like are  sold,
      the  food  must  not  be  adulterated  or  unhygienic.  All  Municipal
      Licensing Regulations and the provisions of  the  Prevention  of  Food
      Adulteration Act must be complied with.

      (6) Hawking must be only between 7.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m.

      (7) Hawking will be on the basis of payment of a prescribed fee to  be
      fixed by BMC. However, the payment of  prescribed  fee  shall  not  be
      deemed  to  authorize  the  hawker  to  do  his  business  beyond  the
      prescribed hours and would not confer on the hawker the  right  to  do
      business at any particular place.

      (8)  The  hawkers  must  extend  full  cooperation  to  the  municipal
      conservancy staff for cleaning the streets and footpaths and  also  to
      the other municipal staff for carrying on  any  municipal  work.  They
      must also cooperate with the other government and public agencies such
      as BEST Undertaking, Bombay Telephones, BSES Ltd. etc. if they require
      to lay any cable or any development work.

      (9) No hawking would be permitted on any street which is less  than  8
      metres in width. Further, the hawkers also have  to  comply  with  the
      Development Control Rules, thus, there can  be  no  hawking  in  areas
      which are exclusively residential and  where  trading  and  commercial
      activity is prohibited. Thus hawking cannot be permitted on roads  and
      pavements which do not have a shopping line.

      (10) BMC shall grant licences which will have photos of the hawkers on
      them. The licence must be displayed, at all times, by the  hawkers  on
      their person by clipping it on to their shirt or coat.

      (11) Not more than one member of a family must be given a  licence  to
      hawk. For this purpose BMC will have to computerize its records.

      (12) Vending of costly items e.g.  electrical  appliances,  video  and
      audio tapes and cassettes, cameras, phones etc. is to  be  prohibited.
      In the event of any hawker found to be selling such items his  licence
      must be cancelled forthwith.

      (13) In areas other than  the  non-hawking  zones,  licences  must  be
      granted to the  hawkers  to  do  their  business  on  payment  of  the
      prescribed fee. The licences must be for a period of 1 year. That will
      be without prejudice to the right  of  the  Committee  to  extend  the
      limits of the non-hawking zones in the  interests  of  public  health,
      sanitation, safety, public convenience and the like. Hawking  licences
      should not be refused in the hawking zones except  for  good  reasons.
      The discretion not to grant a hawking  licence  in  the  hawking  zone
      should be exercised reasonably and in public interest.

      (14) In future, before  making  any  alteration  in  the  scheme,  the
      Commissioner should place the matter before the  Committee  who  shall
      take a decision after considering views of all concerned including the
      hawkers, the Commissioner of Police and members of the  public  or  an
      association representing the public.

       (15) It is expected that citizens and shopkeepers  shall  participate
      in keeping non-hawking zones/areas free from hawkers. They shall do so
      by bringing to the notice of the ward officer concerned  the  presence
      of a hawker in a non-hawking zone/area.  The  ward  officer  concerned
      shall take immediate steps to remove such a hawker. In case  the  ward
      officer takes no action, a written  complaint  may  be  filed  by  the
      citizen/shopkeeper to the Committee. The Committee shall look into the
      complaint and if found correct, the Committee will with  the  help  of
      police remove the hawker. The officer in charge of the police  station
      concerned is directed to give prompt and immediate assistance  to  the
      Committee. In the event of the Committee finding the complaint  to  be
      correct it shall so record. On the Committee so recording  an  adverse
      remark re  failure  to  perform  his  duty  will  be  entered  in  the
      confidential record of the ward officer concerned. If more than  three
      such entries are found in the record of  an  officer  it  would  be  a
      ground for withholding promotion. If more than six  such  entries  are
      found in  the  records  of  an  officer  it  shall  be  a  ground  for
      termination of service. For the work of attending to  such  complaints
      BMC shall pay to the Chairman a fixed honorarium of Rs 10,000 p.m.

      (16) The scheme framed by  us  will  have  a  binding  effect  on  all
      concerned. Thus, apart from those to whom licences will now be issued,
      no other person/body will have any right to  squat  or  carry  on  any
      hawking or other business on the roads/streets.  We  direct  that  BMC
      shall bring this judgment to the notice of all courts in which matters
      are now pending. We are quite sure that the court(s)  concerned  shall
      then suitably vacate/modify its injunction/stay order.”



8.    By an order dated 30.07.2004, which is reported in (2009) 17  SCC  231
(Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union vs. Municipal Corporation, Greater  Mumbai),
the Court modified order dated 09.12.2003 and permitted handicapped  persons
who were granted licence for running PCOs/Aarey/Sarita  stalls  to  continue
to run those stalls even  in  non-hawking  zones  with  the  rider  that  no
further or new licences be granted to any other person.

9.    The matter did not stop there.  The issue was again  examined  in  the
judgment reported in (2009) 17 SCC 151 (Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers  Union  vs.
Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai). In that  case,  a  two  Judge  Bench
took cognizance of  National  Policy  on  Urban  Street  Vendors,  2004  and
observed:
      “41. After noticing the contents of the statements in the counter,  we
      are happy to note that the State Government is  initiating  a  process
      for implementation of National  Policy  on  Urban  Street  Vendors  by
      framing regulations as envisaged  in  Section  10.1  of  the  National
      Policy. We hope and trust that the State Government  will  pursue  the
      matter with right earnest and bring it to  logical  conclusion  within
      the time stipulated.


      42. We clarify that the regulations so framed by the State would be in
      consonance with the aims and objects of the National Policy to  render
      some sort of succour to the urban street vendors to eke out  a  living
      through hawking.


      43. We also clarify that the State Government shall frame  regulations
      in order to solve the problem of hawkers independently  without  being
      influenced by any scheme framed by us or any direction issued by  this
      Court in the interregnum. We further  clarify  that  the  schemes  and
      directions issued by this Court are purely  temporary  in  nature  and
      subject to regulations framed by the  State  Government  in  terms  of
      Section 10.1 of the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors. In  other
      words, the schemes and directions issued by this Court shall be  valid
      only till the regulations are framed and implemented.”



The two Judge Bench also restrained all other Courts from  interpreting  its
order or passing any order touching upon the subject matter  dealt  with  by
this Court. Simultaneously, hearing of the  writ  petitions  pending  before
all  the  High  Courts  was  stayed  and  it  was  ordained  that   if   any
clarification / modification is required then  the  same  must  be  obtained
from this Court.

10.   In Gainda Ram vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (2010)  10  SCC  715,
the  problem  was  considered  in  the  context  of  Delhi.   After   taking
cognizance  of  the  fact  that  various  committees  were  set  up  by  the
administration to solve the problem of street vendors / hawkers,  the  Bench
referred to the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors,  2009  (for  short,
‘the 2009 Policy’), the  Master  Plan  of  Delhi,  2012,  the  Model  Street
Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of  Street  Vending)  Bill,
2009 prepared by the Government of India,  Ministry  of  Housing  and  Urban
Poverty Alleviation and observed:
      “67. In the background of the provisions in  the  Bill  and  the  2009
      Policy,  it  is  clear  that  an  attempt  is  made  to  regulate  the
      fundamental right of street hawking and street vending by  law,  since
      it has been declared by this Court that  the  right  to  hawk  on  the
      streets or right to carry on street vending  is  part  of  fundamental
      right under Article 19(1)(g).  However,  till  the  law  is  made  the
      attempt made by NDMC and MCD to regulate this right by framing schemes
      which  are  not  statutory  in  nature  is  not  exactly  within   the
      contemplation of constitutional provisions discussed  above.  However,
      such schemes have been regulated from time to time by this  Court  for
      several years as pointed out above. Even, orders passed by this Court,
      in trying to regulate such hawking and  street  vending,  is  not  law
      either. At the same time, there is no denying the  fact  that  hawking
      and street  vending  should  be  regulated  by  law.  Such  a  law  is
      imminently necessary in public interest.”




The Court also referred  to  the  mechanism  established  by  the  Municipal
Corporation  of  Delhi  for  redressing  the   grievance   of   the   street
vendors/hawkers and issued the following directions:

      “77. In view of such schemes, the hawkers, squatters and vendors  must
      abide by the dispute redressal mechanism mentioned above. There should
      not be any direct approach to this Court by way of fresh petitions  or
      IAs,  bypassing  the  dispute  redressal  mechanism  provided  in  the
      schemes.


      78. However, before 30-6-2011, the appropriate Government is to  enact
      a law on the basis of the Bill mentioned above or on the basis of  any
      amendment thereof so that the hawkers may precisely know the  contours
      of their rights. This Court is giving this direction  in  exercise  of
      its jurisdiction to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens.


      79. The hawkers’ and squatters’ or vendors’ right to carry on  hawking
      has been recognised as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g).  At
      the same time the right of the commuters to move freely  and  use  the
      roads without any impediment is also a fundamental right under Article
      19(1)(d). These two apparently conflicting rights must  be  harmonised
      and regulated by subjecting them to reasonable restrictions only under
      a law. The question is, therefore, vitally important to a  very  large
      section of people, mostly ordinary men and women. Such an issue cannot
      be left to be decided by schemes and which are monitored by this Court
      from time to time.”



11.   When these appeals and applications were taken up  for  hearing,  Shri
Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel representing some of the street vendors  /
hawkers produced Twenty Third Report of  the  Standing  Committee  on  Urban
Development (2012-2013) prepared  in  the  context  of  the  Street  Vendors
(Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Bill,  2012  and
submitted  that  till  Parliament   enacts   appropriate   legislation   for
protecting the rights of the urban street vendors / hawkers, the  Court  may
ordain implementation of the 2009 Policy with  liberty  to  the  parties  to
approach appropriate judicial forums for redressal of their grievance.  They
and  learned  counsel  representing  the  municipal  bodies  /  authorities,
residents and others lamented that due to the restrictions imposed  by  this
Court, no other Court is entertaining  the  grievance  made  by  the  street
vendors / hawkers on the one hand and the residents of various colonies  and
other people on the other  hand  and  this  is  the  reason  why  dozens  of
interlocutory applications are being filed in this Court every year  in  the
decided matters. They suggested that the embargo placed  by  this  Court  on
the entertaining of writ petitions, etc.,  by  the  High  Courts  should  be
lifted and a direction be given  that  till  the  enactment  of  appropriate
legislation by Parliament or  any  other  competent  legislature,  the  2009
Policy should be implemented throughout  the  country.   Shri  Shyam  Divan,
learned senior counsel, extensively referred to some of the  precedents  and
submitted that the Bombay High Court  should  be  directed  to  specifically
deal with the issue related to  establishment  of  hawking  and  non-hawking
zones so that the residents  may  not  be  adversely  affected  due  to  un-
regulated street vending and hawking activities in different  parts  of  the
city of Mumbai.

12.   Shri Pallav  Shishodia,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai argued that  the  street  vendors  /
hawkers cannot be allowed to occupy public spaces at each  and  every  place
and the scheme framed by the Corporation in  compliance  of  the  directions
given by this Court does not require any modification. Shri Vijay  Hansaria,
Shri Anand Grover, learned Senior Advocates and Shri Sushil Kumar  Jain  and
other  learned  counsel  emphasized  that  this  Court  should  direct   the
municipal authorities to accommodate all the street vendors  /  hawkers  and
stop  their  harassment,  exploitation  and  victimization  by   the   State
agencies. Shri Prashant  Bhushan  emphasized  that  despite  the  directions
given by this Court from time to time, including the  interim  order  passed
in relation to  the  street  vendors  /  hawkers  in  Delhi,  the  concerned
authorities are not allowing them to conduct their  activities.  He  further
argued that the street vendors / hawkers should be  allowed  to  operate  in
accordance with the provisions of 2009 Policy and the concerned  authorities
should ensure that everybody is given licence for carrying  out  his  /  her
activity.  Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  also  suggested   that   the
decision(s) of the Town Vending Committees should be  published  on  regular
intervals in print and electronic  media  and  the  internet  and  the  High
Courts should be asked to monitor implementation of  various  provisions  of
the 2009 Policy.

13.   At the conclusion of hearing, the Court had given time to the  parties
to file written  submissions  /  suggestions.  On  7th  August,  2013,  Shri
Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the applicants in IA Nos.  322-323  of
2013 and 324-325 of 2013 filed written suggestions. On 8th August,  2013,  a
written note was filed on behalf of Citizen Forum for Protection  of  Public
Spaces (CitiSpace), which was allowed to act as intervenor  in  the  special
leave petitions filed by Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union.

14.   We have considered the respective arguments  /  submissions.   Learned
counsel for the parties are ad–idem that the orders  passed  by  this  Court
from time to time have not solved the  problems  of  the  street  vendors  /
hawkers and the residents of the cities  of  Delhi  and  Mumbai  and  almost
every year they have been seeking  intervention  of  this  Court  by  filing
interlocutory applications.  The experience has, however, shown that  it  is
virtually impossible for this Court to monitor day to day implementation  of
the provisions of different enactments and the directions contained  in  the
judgments noted hereinabove.  Therefore, it will be appropriate to lift  the
embargo placed on the entertaining of matters by  the  High  Courts  and  we
order accordingly.   Paragraph 45 of the judgment reported in (2009) 17  SCC
151 shall stand modified and the street vendors /  hawkers,   the  residents
and others adversely affected by street vending / hawking  shall  henceforth
be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of  the  concerned  High  Courts  for
redressal of their grievance.

15.   In Gainda Ram’s case (paragraph 78),  this  Court  had  directed  that
appropriate Government should enact a law on  or  before  30th  June,  2011.
Once the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation  of  Street
Vending) Bill, 2012 becomes law, the livelihood of millions would  be  saved
and they will get protection against constant harassment  and  victimization
which has so far been an order of the day.  However,  till  the  needful  is
done, it will be apposite for the Court to step in and direct that the  2009
Policy, of which the salient  provisions  are  extracted  below,  should  be
implemented throughout the country:

      “1.8  A centre piece of this  Policy  is  the  role  of  Town  Vending
      Committee (henceforth  referred  to  as  TVC)  to  be  constituted  at
      City/Town level. A TVC shall be coordinated by a convener  who  should
      be nominated by the urban local body concerned. The  Chairman  of  TVC
      will be the Commissioner/Chief  Executive  Officer  of  the  concerned
      urban local body. The TVC will  adopt  a  participatory  approach  and
      supervise the entire process of planning, organisation and  regulation
      of street vending activities, thereby facilitating the  implementation
      of this Policy. Further, it will provide  an  institutional  mechanism
      for due appreciation of the ground realities and harnessing  of  local
      knowledge for arriving at a consensus on critical issues of management
      of street vending activities. The TVC may constitute, in collaboration
      with the local authority, Ward Vending  Committee  to  assist  in  the
      discharge of its functions.


      1.9   This Policy adopts the considered opinion that there should  not
      be any cut off date or limit imposed on  the  number  of  vendors  who
      should be permitted to vend in any city/town, subject to  registration
      of such vendors and regulation through the TVC. At any time, an  urban
      poor person can decide that he or she would like to go to a  wholesale
      market, purchase some items and sell these  in  vending  zones  during
      permitted hours to make an  honest  living.  The  vendor  may  not  be
      subject to undue restrictions if he/she wishes to change the trade. In
      order to make this conceptual right a practically feasible right,  the
      following would be necessary:


      i)    Vendor markets/outlets should be developed in which space  could
      be made available to hawkers/vendors on a time-sharing  model  on  the
      basis of a roster. Let us say that there are 500 such  vending  places
      in about  a  100  new  vendors’  markets/push  cart  markets/motorized
      vending outlets. Let us also assume that there are 5,000  vendors  who
      want to apply for a vending site on a time-sharing basis.  Then  by  a
      simple process of mathematical analysis, a certain number of  days  or
      hours on particular days could be fixed for each vendor in  a  vending
      place on a roster basis through the concerned TVC.


      ii)   In addition to vendors’ markets/outlets, it would  be  desirable
      to promote week-end markets in public maidans, parade grounds or areas
      meant for religious festivals. The week-end markets can be  run  on  a
      first-come-first-serve basis depending on the number of vending  sites
      that can be accommodated in the designated  area  and  the  number  of
      vendors seeking vending places. However, in order to be equitable,  in
      case there is a heavy demand from vendors the number  of  week-ends  a
      given vendor can be allocated a  site  on  the  first-come-first-serve
      basis can be restricted to one or two in a month depending on demand.


      iii)  A registered vendor can  be  permitted  to  vend  in  designated
      vending zones without restrictions, especially during non-rush  hours.
      Again in places like verandahs  or  parking  lots  in  areas  such  as
      central  business  districts,  e.g.  Connaught  Place  in  New  Delhi,
      vendors’ markets can be organized after the  closing  of  the  regular
      markets. Such markets, for example, can be run from 7.30 PM  to  10.30
      PM as night bazaars on a  roster  basis  or  a  first-come-first-serve
      basis, with suitable restrictions determined by the concerned TVC  and
      authorities.


      iv)   It is desirable that all City/Town Master  Plans  make  specific
      provisions  for  creating  new  vending  markets  at   the   time   of
      finalization/revision of Master Plans,  Zonal  Plans  and  Local  Area
      Plans. The space reserved in such plans should  be  commensurate  with
      the current number of vendors and their rate of growth on  perspective
      basis (say 10-20 years) based on rate of growth over  a  preceding  5-
      year period.


      This Policy attempts to address some of the  above  concerns,  keeping
      the interests of street vendors in view vis-à-vis  conflicting  public
      interests.


      3. Objectives


      3.1 Overarching Objective
      The overarching objective to be achieved through this Policy is:
      To provide for and promote a supportive environment for the vast  mass
      of urban street vendors to carry out their vocation while at the  same
      time  ensuring  that  their  vending  activities  do   not   lead   to
      overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in public spaces and streets.


      3.2 Specific Objectives
      This Policy aims to develop a legal framework through a model  law  on
      street vending which can be adopted by States/Union  Territories  with
      suitable modifications to take into account  their  geographical/local
      conditions. The specific objectives of this Policy are  elaborated  as
      follows:


      a) Legal Status:
      To give street vendors a legal status by  formulating  an  appropriate
      law and thereby providing  for  legitimate  vending/hawking  zones  in
      city/town master or  development  plans  including  zonal,  local  and
      layout plans and ensuring their enforcement;


      b) Civic Facilities:
      To provide civic facilities for appropriate use of  identified  spaces
      as  vending/hawking  zones,  vendors’  markets  or  vending  areas  in
      accordance with city/town master  plans  including  zonal,  local  and
      layout plans;


      c) Transparent Regulation:
      To eschew imposing numerical limits on  access  to  public  spaces  by
      discretionary  licenses,  and  instead  moving  to  nominal  fee-based
      regulation of access, where previous occupancy of space by the  street
      vendors determines the allocation of space or  creating  new  informal
      sector markets where space  access  is  on  a  temporary  turn-by-turn
      basis. All allotments of space, whether permanent or temporary  should
      be based on payment of a prescribed fee fixed by the  local  authority
      on the recommendations of the Town Vending Committee to be constituted
      under this Policy;


      d) Organization of Vendors:
      To promote, where necessary,  organizations  of  street  vendors  e.g.
      unions / co-operatives / associations and other forms of organizations
      to facilitate their collective empowerment;


      e) Participative Processes:
      To  set  up  participatory  processes  that  involve  firstly,   local
      authority, planning authority and police;  secondly,  associations  of
      street vendors; thirdly, resident welfare associations  and  fourthly,
      other civil society organizations such  as  NGOs,  representatives  of
      professional  groups  (such  as  lawyers,  doctors,   town   planners,
      architects   etc.),   representatives   of   trade    and    commerce,
      representatives of scheduled banks and eminent citizens;


      f) Self-Regulation:
      To promote norms of civic discipline by institutionalizing  mechanisms
      of self-management and self-regulation in matters relating to hygiene,
      including waste disposal etc.  amongst  street  vendors  both  in  the
      individually allotted areas as well  as  vending  zones/clusters  with
      collective responsibility for the entire vending zone/cluster; and


      g) Promotional Measures:
      To promote access of street vendors to such services as credit,  skill
      development, housing, social security and capacity building. For  such
      promotion, the services  of  Self  Help  Groups  (SHGs)/Co-operatives/
      Federations/Micro Finance  Institutions  (MFIs),  Training  Institutes
      etc. should be encouraged.


      4.2 Demarcation of Vending Zones
      The  demarcation  of  ‘Restriction-free  Vending  Zones’,  ‘Restricted
      Vending Zones’ and ‘No-vending Zones’ should be city/town specific. In
      order to ensure that the city/town master/ development  plans  provide
      for adequate space for street vendors to  run  their  activities,  the
      following guidelines would need to be adhered to:


      a) Spatial planning should take into account the natural propensity of
      street vendors to  locate  in  certain  places  at  certain  times  in
      response to the patterns of demand for their goods/services. For  this
      purpose, photographic digitalized surveys of street vendors and  their
      locations   should   be   conducted    by    competent    professional
      institutions/agencies. This  is  to  be  sponsored  by  the  concerned
      Department  of  State  Government/Urban  Development   Authority/Local
      Authority.


      b) Municipal Authorities should frame necessary rules  for  regulating
      entry of street vendors on a time sharing basis in designated  vending
      zones keeping in view three broad categories - registered vendors  who
      have secured a license for a specified site/stall;  registered  street
      vendors in a zone on a  time  sharing  basis;  and  registered  mobile
      street vendors visiting one or the other vending zone;


      c)  Municipal  Authorities  should  allocate  sufficient   space   for
      temporary ‘Vendors’ Markets’ (e.g. Weekly Haats, Rehri Markets,  Night
      Bazaars, Festival Bazaars, Food Streets/Street Food Marts etc.)  whose
      use at other times may be  different  (e.g.  public  park,  exhibition
      ground, parking lot etc.). These ‘Vendors Markets’ may be  established
      at suitable locations keeping in view demand for the wares/services of
      street vendors. Timing restrictions on vending should be in accordance
      with the need for ensuring non-congestion of public spaces/maintaining
      public hygiene without being  ad  hoc,  arbitrary  or  discriminatory.
      Rationing of space should be resorted  to  if  the  number  of  street
      vendors exceeds the number of spaces available. Attempts  should  also
      be made to provide ample parking areas for mobile vendors for security
      of their vehicles and wares at night on payment of suitable fees.


      d) Mobile vending should be permitted in all areas  even  outside  the
      'Vendors Markets', unless  designated  as  ‘No-vending  Zone’  in  the
      zonal, local area or layout plans under the master/development plan of
      each city/town. ‘Restricted Vending’ and ‘No  Vending  Zones’  may  be
      determined in a participatory manner. ‘Restricted Vending  Zones’  may
      be notified in  terms  of  both  location  and  time.  Accordingly,  a
      particular location may be  notified  as  'No-vending  Zone'  only  at
      particular times of the day or days of the week. Locations should  not
      be designated as ‘No-vending Zones' without  full  justification;  the
      public benefits of declaring an area/spot as 'No-vending Zone'  should
      clearly  outweigh  the  potential  loss  of   livelihoods   and   non-
      availability of 'affordable' and ‘convenient’ access  of  the  general
      public to street vendors.


      e) With the growth of cities/towns in response  to  urbanization,  the
      statutory plans of every new area should have adequate  provision  for
      ‘Vending/hawking Zones’ and 'Vendors Markets.'


      4.5.1 Town Vending Committee
      a) Designation or demarcation  of  'Restriction-free  Vending  Zones'/
      'Restricted Vending  Zones'/No-vending  Zones'  and  Vendors’  Markets
      should be carried out in a participatory manner by  the  Town  Vending
      Committee, to be established at town/city level.  A TVC should consist
      of the Municipal Commissioner/ Chief Executive Officer  of  the  urban
      local body as Chairperson  and  such  number  of  members  as  may  be
      prescribed by the appropriate Government, representing firstly,  local
      authority; planning authority and police and such other  interests  as
      it deems proper; secondly, associations of  street  vendors;  thirdly,
      resident  welfare  associations  and  Community  Based   Organisations
      (CBOs); and fourthly, other civil society organizations such as  NGOs,
      representatives of professional groups (such as lawyers, doctors, town
      planners, architects etc.), representatives  of  trade  and  commerce,
      representatives of scheduled banks and eminent citizens.  This  Policy
      suggests that the representatives of street vendors’ associations  may
      constitute forty per cent of the number of the members of the TVC  and
      the other three categories may be represented in equal  proportion  of
      twenty per cent each. At least one third  of  the  representatives  of
      categories of street vendors, resident welfare associations and  other
      civil society organizations should be women to provide a gender  focus
      in the TVC. Adequate/reasonable representation should also be provided
      to the physically challenged in the TVC. The process for selection  of
      street vendors’ representatives  should  be  based  on  the  following
      criteria:


      • Participation in membership-based organisations; and
      • Demonstration of financial accountability and civic discipline.


      b) The TVC should ensure that the  provision  of  space  for  vendors’
      markets are pragmatic, consistent with formation of  natural  markets,
      sufficient for existing demand  for  the  street  vendors’  goods  and
      services as well as likely increase  in  accordance  with  anticipated
      population growth.


      c) The TVC should monitor the provision of civic facilities and  their
      functioning  in  Vending  Zones  and  Vendors’   Markets   and   bring
      shortcomings, if any to the notice of the concerned authorities of the
      urban local body. The TVC should  also  promote  the  organisation  of
      weekly markets, festival bazaars, night bazaars, vending festivals  on
      important holidays etc. as well as take up  necessary  improvement  of
      infrastructure facilities and municipal services with the urban  local
      body concerned.


      4.5.2 The TVC shall perform the following functions:

      a) Undertake periodic survey/census to assess the increase or decrease
      in the number of street vendors in the city/town/wards/localities;


      b) Register the street vendors and ensure  the  issuance  of  Identity
      Cards to the street vendors after their preparation by  the  Municipal
      Authority;


      c) Monitor the civic facilities to be provided to the  street  vendors
      in vending zones/vendors’ markets by the Municipal Authority;


      d) Assess and determine maximum holding capacity of each vending zone;


      e) Work out a non-discretionary system and based on the same, identify
      areas for hawking with no restriction,  areas  with  restriction  with
      regard to the dates, days and time, and, areas which would  be  marked
      as 'No Vending Zones';


      f) Set the terms and conditions for hawking and take corrective action
      against defaulters;


      g) Collect fees or other charges as authorized by the competent  civic
      authority;


      h) Monitor to ensure that  those  allotted  stalls/vending  spots  are
      actually using them and take necessary action to ensure that these are
      not rented out or sold to others;


      i) Facilitate the organization of weekly  markets,  festival  bazaars,
      night bazaars, vending festivals such as food festivals  to  celebrate
      important occasions/holidays including city/town formation  days  etc;
      and


      j) Ensure that the quality of products and services  provided  to  the
      public is as per standards of public health, hygiene and  safety  laid
      down by the local authority.


      4.5.4 Registration System for Street Vending
      A system of  registration  of  vendors/hawkers  and  non-discretionary
      regulation of their access to public spaces  in  accordance  with  the
      standards of planning  and  the  nature  of  trade/service  should  be
      adopted. This system is described in greater detail below.


      a) Photo Census of Vendors:
      The Municipal Authority, in consultation with the TVC should undertake
      a comprehensive, digitalized photo census / survey /  GIS  Mapping  of
      the existing stationary vendors with the  assistance  of  professional
      organisations/experts for the purpose of granting them lease  to  vend
      from specific places within the holding capacity of the vending  zones
      concerned.


      b) Registration of Vendors:
      The power to register vendors would be vested with the TVC. Only those
      who give an undertaking that they  will  personally  run  the  vending
      stall/spot and have no other means of livelihood will be entitled  for
      registration. A person will be  entitled  to  receive  a  registration
      document for only one vending spot for him/her  (and  family).  He/she
      will not have the right to either rent or lease out or sell that  spot
      to another person.


      c) New Entrants:
      Those left out in the photo census or wishes to take up street vending
      for the first time will also have a right to apply for registration as
      vendors provided they give a statement on oath that they do  not  have
      any other means of livelihood and will be  personally  operating  from
      the vending spot, with help from family members.


      d) Identity Cards:
      Upon registration, the concerned Municipal Authority  would  issue  an
      Identity Card with Vendor Code Number, Vendor Name, Category of Vendor
      etc. in writing to  the  street  vendor,  through  the  TVC  concerned
      containing the following information:


      (i) Vendor Code No.
      (ii) Name, Address and photograph of the Vendor;
      (iii) Name of any one Nominee from the family/and/or a family helper;
      (iv) Nature of Business;
      (v) Category (Stationary /Mobile); and
      (vi) If Stationary, the Vending Location.
      Children below 14 years would not be included in the Identity Card for
      conduct of business.


      e) Registration Fee:
      All vendors in each city/town should be registered at a nominal fee to
      be decided by the Municipal Authority concerned  based  on  the  photo
      census or any other reliable means of identification such as  the  use
      of biometric techniques.


      f) Registration Process:
      i) The registration  process  must  be  simple  and  expeditious.  All
      declarations, oath, etc. may be on the basis of self-declaration.


      ii) There should preferably be no numerical restriction or quotas  for
      registration, or prior residential status requirements of any kind.


      iii) Registration should be renewed after every three years.  However,
      a vendor who has rented out or sold his spot to  another  person  will
      not be entitled to seek re-registration.


      iv) There may be a "on the spot"  temporary  registration  process  on
      renewable basis, in order to allow the street vendors  to  immediately
      start their earnings as the registration process and issue  of  I-card
      etc. may take time.


      5.1 If authorities come to the conclusion in any given  instance  that
      genuine public obstruction of a street, side walk etc. is being caused
      by street vending, there should be a mechanism of due  notice  to  the
      street vendors. The vendors should be informed/warned by way of notice
      as the first step  before  starting  the  clearing  up  or  relocation
      process. In the second step, if the space is not  cleared  within  the
      notified time, a fine should be imposed. If the space is  not  cleared
      even after the notice and imposition of fine, physical eviction may be
      resorted to. In the case of vending in a 'No-vending Zone',  a  notice
      of at least a few hours should be given to a street vendor in order to
      enable him or her clear the space occupied.  In  case  of  relocation,
      adequate compensation or reservation in allotment of new vending  site
      should be provided to the registered vendors.


      5.2 With regard to confiscation of goods (which should happen only  as
      a last resort rather than routinely),  the  street  vendors  shall  be
      entitled to get their goods back within a reasonable time  on  payment
      of prescribed fee, determined by TVC.


      6.6 Allotment of Space/Stationary Stalls
      Stationary vendors should be allowed  space/stalls,  whether  open  or
      covered, on license basis after photo census/ survey and  due  enquiry
      in this regard, initially for a period of 10 years with the  provision
      that only one extension of ten years  shall  be  provided  thereafter.
      After 20 years, the vendor will be required  to  exit  the  stationary
      stall (whether open or covered) as it is reasonably expected that  the
      licensee would have suitably enhanced his/her income,  thereby  making
      the said stall available for being licensed to a person  belonging  to
      the weaker sections of society. Wherever vending  stall/vending  space
      is provided to a vendor on a lease  basis  for  a  certain  number  of
      years, care should be taken that adequate reservation is made for  the
      SCs/STs in accordance with their share in the total population of  the
      city.   Similarly,   priority   should   be   given   to    physically
      challenged/disabled   persons   in   the   allocation    of    vending
      stalls/vending spaces as vending space can  be  a  useful  medium  for
      rehabilitating  physically  challenged/disabled  persons.  Further,  a
      suitable monitoring system should be put in place by the TVC to ensure
      that the licensees of the stationary stalls do not sell/ let out their
      stalls.


      6.7 Rehabilitation of Child Vendors
      To prevent vending by children and seek their rehabilitation  wherever
      such practice exists, in conformity with the Child Labour (Prohibition
      & Regulation) Act,1986, the State Government and Municipal Authorities
      should undertake measures such as sending the children to  regular  or
      bridge schools, imparting them skills training etc.


      6.8 Promoting Vendors’ Organisations
      To enable street vendors to access the  benefits  of  social  security
      schemes and other promotional measures in an effective manner,  it  is
      essential that the street vendors  are  assisted  to  form  their  own
      organizations. The TVC should take steps to facilitate  the  formation
      and smooth functioning of such organizations of street vendors.  Trade
      Unions and other Voluntary Organisations should play  an  active  role
      and help the  street  vendors  to  organise  themselves  by  providing
      counseling and guidance services wherever required.”



16.   For facilitating implementation of  the  2009  Policy,  we  issue  the
following directions:

      i)    Within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order,
           the   Chief   Secretaries   of   the   State   Governments   and
           Administrators of the Union Territories  shall  issue  necessary
           instructions/directions to the concerned department(s) to ensure
           that the Town Vending Committee is constituted at  city  /  town
           level in accordance with the provisions contained  in  the  2009
           Policy.  For the cities and towns having large municipal  areas,
           more than one Town Vending Committee may be constituted.

      (ii)  Each Town Vending Committee shall consist of representatives  of
           various organizations and street vendors / hawkers. 30%  of  the
           representatives from the category of street  vendors  /  hawkers
           shall be women.

      iii) The representatives of various organizations and street  vendors
           / hawkers shall be chosen  by  the  Town  Vending  Committee  by
           adopting a fair and transparent mechanism.

       iv) The task of constituting the Town Vending  Committees  shall  be
           completed within two months of the issue of instructions by  the
           Chief Secretaries of the State and  the  Administrators  of  the
           Union Territories.

        v)  The  Town  Vending  Committees  shall  function   strictly   in
           accordance with the 2009 Policy and the decisions  taken  by  it
           shall be notified in the print and electronic media within  next
           one week.

       vi) The  Town  Vending  Committees  shall  be  free  to  divide  the
           municipal areas in vending / hawking zones and sub-zones and for
           this purpose they may take assistance of experts in  the  field.
           While undertaking this exercise,  the  Town  Vending  Committees
           constituted for the cities of Delhi and Mumbai shall  take  into
           consideration the  work  already  undertaken  by  the  municipal
           authorities in furtherance  of  the  directions  given  by  this
           Court.   The municipal authorities shall  also  take  action  in
           terms of Paragraph 4.2(b) and (c).

      vii) All street vendors / hawkers shall be registered  in  accordance
           with paragraph 4.5.4 of the 2009 Policy.  Once  registered,  the
           street vendor / hawker, shall be entitled to operate in the area
           specified by the Town Vending Committee.

     viii) The process of registration must be completed by  the  municipal
           authorities across the country within four months of the receipt
           of the direction by the Chief  Secretaries  of  the  States  and
           Administrators of the Union Territories.

       ix) The State Governments / Administration of the Union  Territories
           and municipal and local authorities shall  take  all  the  steps
           necessary for achieving the  objectives  set  out  in  the  2009
           Policy.

        x) The Town Vending Committee shall meet  every  month  and  ensure
           implementation of the relevant provisions  of  the  2009  Policy
           and, in particular, paragraph 4.5.1 (b) and (c).

       xi) Physically challenged who were allowed to operate PCO’s in terms
           of the judgment reported in (2009) 17 SCC 231 shall  be  allowed
           to continue to run their stalls and  sell  other  goods  because
           running of PCOs. is no longer viable.  Those who were allowed to
           run Aarey/Sarita shall be allowed to continue to  operate  their
           stalls.

      xii)  The  State  Governments,  the  Administration  of   the   Union
           Territories and municipal authorities shall be free to amend the
           legislative provisions and/or  delegated  legislation  to  bring
           them in tune  with  the  2009  Policy.   If  there  remains  any
           conflict between the 2009 Policy and the municipal laws, insofar
           as they relate to street vendors/hawkers, then the  2009  Policy
           shall prevail.

     xiii)  Henceforth,  the  parties  shall  be  free  to   approach   the
           jurisdictional High Courts for redressal of their grievance  and
           the direction, if any,  given  by  this  Court  in  the  earlier
           judgments / orders shall not impede disposal of the cases  which
           may be filed by the aggrieved parties.

      xiv) The Chief Justices of the High Courts are requested to  nominate
           a Bench to deal with the cases filed for implementation  of  the
           2009 Policy and disputes arising out of its implementation.  The
           concerned Bench shall regularly monitor  implementation  of  the
           2009 Policy and the law which may be enacted by the Parliament.

       xv) All the existing street vendors / hawkers operating  across  the
           country shall  be  allowed  to  operate  till  the  exercise  of
           registration  and  creation  of  vending  /  hawking  zones   is
           completed in terms of the 2009 Policy.  Once  that  exercise  is
           completed, they shall be entitled to operate only in  accordance
           with  the  orders/directions  of  the  concerned  Town   Vending
           Committee.

      xvi) The provisions of the 2009 Policy and the  directions  contained
           hereinabove shall apply  to  all  the  municipal  areas  in  the
           country.

17.   The aforesaid directions shall remain operative  till  an  appropriate
legislation is enacted by Parliament or any other competent legislature  and
is brought into force.

18.   The parties, whose applications  have  remained  pending  before  this
Court,  shall  be  free  to  institute  appropriate   proceedings   in   the
jurisdictional High Court.  If so advised, the  aggrieved  person  shall  be
free to file petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

19.   All the appeals and I.As are  disposed  of  in  the  manner  indicated
above.

20.   The Registry is directed to send copies of this  order  to  the  Chief
Secretaries of all the States, Administrators of the Union  Territories  and
Registrar Generals / Registrars (Judicial)  of  all  the  High  Courts,  who
shall place the  order  before  the  Chief  Justice  for  consideration  and
necessary directions.


                                                  …………………………..J.
                                              (G.S. SINGHVI)





                                              ………………………….J.
                                                   (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
September 9, 2013.







                           -----------------------
27


Wednesday, September 11, 2013

'Invitation to Tender' = Appellant-company had failed to comprehensively correspond to the essential terms of the tender and, therefore, its offer contained in the said tender was ineligible for consideration.= “(i) A declaration in the form of Affidavit in a non judicial stamp paper should be submitted stating clearly that the applicant is not barred/delisted/blacklisted by any Government Department/ Government Undertaking/ Statutory Body/ Municipality and of the like Government Bodies in DI Pipe-supply tender during last five years and if any such incident is found at any point of time, the tender will be cancelled summarily without assigning any reason whatsoever. (j) Valid PAN No., VAT No., Copy of acknowledgement of latest Income Tax Return and Professional Tax Return.”= “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) (at p.18): “Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow order.” 13. So far as clause (j) of the detailed notice inviting E-tender No.01/KMDA/MAT/CE/2013-2014 dated 10.5.2013 emanating from the office of the Chief Engineer is concerned, it seems to us that contrary to the conclusion in the impugned judgment, the clause is not an essential element or ingredient or concomitant of the subject NIT. In the course of hearing, the Income Tax Return has been filed by the Appellant-company and scrutinized by us. For the Assessment Year 2011-2012, the gross income of the Appellant- company was Rs.15,34,05,627, although, for the succeeding Assessment Year 2012-2013, the income tax was NIL, but substantial tax had been deposited. We think that the Income Tax Return would have assumed the character of an essential term if one of the qualifications was either the gross income or the net income on which tax was attracted. In many cases this is a salutary stipulation, since it is indicative of the commercial standing and reliability of the tendering entity. This feature being absent, we think that the filing of the latest Income Tax Return was a collateral term, and accordingly the Tendering Authority ought to have brought this discrepancy to the notice of the Appellant- company and if even thereafter no rectification had been carried out, the position may have been appreciably different. It has been asserted on behalf of the Appellant-company, and not denied by the learned counsel for the Respondent-Authority, that the financial bid of the Appellant-company is substantially lower than that of the others, and, therefore, pecuniarily preferable. 14. In this analysis, we find that the Appeal is well founded and is allowed. The impugned judgment is accordingly set aside. The disqualification of the Appellant-company on the ground of it having failed to submit its latest Income Tax Return along with its bid is not sufficient reason for disregarding its offer/bid. The Respondents are directed, therefore, to proceed further in the matter on this predication. The parties shall bear their respective costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6772 OF 2013




      Rashmi Metaliks Ltd. & Anr.                       …..Appellants


            Versus


      Kolkata Metropolitan Development
      Authority & Ors.                                  …..Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T




      VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.


     1. We are called upon  to  decide  the  correctness  of  the  impugned
        decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta  which
        in turn has upheld the appreciation of the law as also the facts of
        the case by a learned Single Judge  of  that  Court.  
Thus,  these
        courts have concurrently concluded that the  Appellant-company  had
        failed to comprehensively correspond to the essential terms of  the
        tender and, therefore, its offer contained in the said  tender  was
        ineligible for consideration.
     2. The two terms of the  subject  'Invitation  to  Tender'  which  are
        germane to the case in hand are clauses (i) and (j) thereof,  which
        read thus –
           “(i) A declaration in the form of Affidavit in  a  non  judicial
           stamp  paper  should  be  submitted  stating  clearly  that  the
           applicant is not barred/delisted/blacklisted by  any  Government
           Department/ Government Undertaking/ Statutory Body/ Municipality
           and of the like  Government  Bodies  in  DI  Pipe-supply  tender
           during last five years and if any such incident is found at  any
           point of time, the tender will be  cancelled  summarily  without
           assigning any reason whatsoever.


           (j) Valid PAN No., VAT No., Copy of  acknowledgement  of  latest
           Income Tax Return and Professional Tax Return.”


     3. It must immediately be clarified that  so  far  as  clause  (i)  is
        concerned, the learned Single Judge had thought it  unnecessary  to
        analyse  its  applicability  and  relevance,  having  come  to  the
        conclusion that a violation of clause (j) had been committed by the
        Appellant-company inasmuch as it had  failed  to  file  its  latest
        Income Tax Return along with its bid.  
This position has  continued
        to obtain even before the Division Bench as will be palpably  clear
        from a perusal of  the  impugned  judgment.   
The  Division  Bench,
        despite noting clause (j), has concerned itself only with the legal
        implications flowing from the alleged non-compliance of clause (i).
       
The Division Bench has  predicated  its  decision  on  W.B.  State
        Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. (2001)  2  SCC  451
        and has extracted, as we shall also do,  the  following  paragraphs
        therefrom –
           “23.   The  mistakes/errors  in  question,  it  is  stated,  are
           unintentional and occurred due to the fault of  computer  termed
           as a “repetitive systematic computer typographical  transmission
           failure”.  It is difficult to accept this contention.  A mistake
           may be unilateral or mutual but it is always unintentional.   If
           it is intentional it ceases to be a mistake.  Here the  mistakes
           may be unintentional but  it  was  not  beyond  the  control  of
           Respondents 1 to 4 to correct the same before submission of  the
           bid.  Had they been  vigilant  in  checking  the  bid  documents
           before their submission, the mistakes would have  been  avoided.
           Further, correction of such mistakes after one-and-a-half months
           of opening of the bids will also be violative of  clauses  24.1,
           24.3 and 29.1 of the ITB.


           24.   The controversy in this case has arisen at the  threshold.
           It cannot be disputed that this is an international  competitive
           bidding which postulates keen competition and  high  efficiency.
           The bidders have or should have assistance of technical experts.
            The degree of care required in such a bidding is  greater  than
           in ordinary local bids for small  works.   It  is  essential  to
           maintain the sanctity and integrity of process of tender/bid and
           also award of a contract.  The appellant, Respondents 1 to 4 and
           Respondents 10 and 11 are all bound by the ITB which  should  be
           complied with scrupulously.  
 In  a  work  of  this  nature  and
           magnitude where bidders who fulfil  prequalification  alone  are
           invited to bid, adherence to the instructions cannot be given  a
           go-by by branding it as a pedantic approach, otherwise  it  will
           encourage and provide scope  for  discrimination,  arbitrariness
           and favouritism which are totally opposed to the rule of law and
           our  constitutional  values.   The  very  purpose   of   issuing
           rules/instructions is to ensure their enforcement lest the  rule
           of law should be a casualty.  Relaxation or waiver of a rule  or
           condition, unless so provided under the ITB, by the State or its
           agencies (the appellant) in favour of one  bidder  would  create
           justifiable doubts in the minds of other bidders,  would  impair
           the rule of transparency  and  fairness  and  provide  room  for
           manipulation to suit the whims of the State agencies in  picking
           and choosing a bidder for awarding contracts as in the  case  of
           distributing bounty or  charity.   
In  our  view  such  approach
           should always be avoided.  Where power to relax or waive a  rule
           or a condition exists  under  the  rules,  it  has  to  be  done
           strictly in compliance with the rules.  We have,  therefore,  no
           hesitation in concluding that adherence to the ITB or  rules  is
           the best principle to be followed, which is  also  in  the  best
           public interest.”


     4. The impugned judgment states that clause (j) cannot be viewed as  a
        non-essential term  and,  therefore,  should  have  been  corrected
        before the submission of the  tender.   This  seems  to  us  to  be
        chronologically or  sequentially  impossible;  what  was  obviously
        meant was that failure to adhere to this term would render the  bid
        non-compliant and, therefore, beyond the pale of  consideration  in
        toto.  The Division Bench also opined  that  the  Appellant-company
        could not be granted the indulgence to correct this error, as ‘such
        facility was not available to other bidders.’  In  saying  so,  the
        Division Bench, it appears to us, has diluted its view that  clause
        (j) is altogether inviolable.
     5. The Respondents have endeavoured to raise the alleged violation  of
        clause (i) before us, but we are in no manner of  doubt  that  this
        effort should be roundly rejected.  This is despite the  fact  that
        an explanation even in this context has been offered  by  Mr.  K.V.
        Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel appearing for the  Appellants.
        We shall desist from making any  observations  in  regard  to  this
        clause (j) since it does not feature in the analysis  of  both  the
        courts below.  Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned  senior  counsel  for  the
        Respondents has cited the following cases  before  us  :  (i)  W.B.
        State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. (2001) 2  SCC
        451 Para 23; (ii) Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal v. Union of India  (2002)  6
        SCC 315 Paras 5 and 6;  (iii)  Puravankara Projects Ltd.  v.  Hotel
        Venus International  (2007)  10  SCC  33  Paras  28  to  30;   (iv)
        Sorath Builders v. Shreejikrupa Buildcon Ltd. (2009) 11 SCC 9 Paras
        17 and 28; and (v) Glodyne Technoserve  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Madhya
        Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 103 Para 47.  Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior
        counsel  for  the  Appellants  sought  to  rely  on  Poddar   Steel
        Corporation v. Ganesh  Engineering  Works  (1991)  3  SCC  273  and
        Kanhaiya Lal.
      6. This Court, and even  more  so  the  High  Court  as  well  as  the
         subordinate courts have to face  lengthy  arguments  in  each  case
         because of the  practice  of  citing  innumerable  decisions  on  a
         particular point of law.  The  correct  approach  is  to  predicate
         arguments on the decision which  holds  the  field,  which  in  the
         present case is Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994)  6  SCC  651
         rendered by a three-Judge Bench.  The rule of precedence, which  is
         an  integral  part  of  our  jurisprudence,  mandates   that   this
         exposition of law must be followed and applied even by  co-ordinate
         or co-equal Benches  and  certainly  by  all  smaller  Benches  and
         subordinate Courts.  We hasten to clarify  that  if  a  co-ordinate
         Bench considers the ratio decidendi of the previous Bench to be  of
         doubtful efficacy, it must comply with the discipline of requesting
         Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  to   constitute   a   larger   Bench.
         Furthermore there are some instances of decisions even of a  Single
         Judge,  which  having  withstood  the  onslaughts  of   time   have
         metamorphosed into high authority demanding reverence and adherence
         because of its vintage and following in  contradistinction  of  the
         strength of the Bench.  This is a significant characteristic of the
         doctrine of stare decisis.  Tata Cellular has been so  ubiquitously
         followed, over decades, in almost every case concerning  Government
         tenders and contracts that it has attained heights  which  dissuade
         digression by even a larger Bench.  The law of  precedence  and  of
         stare  decisis  is  predicated  on  the  wisdom  and  salubrity  of
         providing a firmly  founded  law,  without  which  uncertainty  and
         ambiguity would cause consternation in society.  It  garners  legal
         predictability, which simply stated, is an essential.  Our research
         has revealed the existence of  only  one  other  three-Judge  Bench
         decision which has dealt with  this  aspect  of  the  law,  namely,
         Siemens Public Communication Networks Private Limited v.  Union  of
         India (2008) 16 SCC 215, which is in actuality an anthology of  all
         previous decisions including Tata Cellular.  The sheer plethora  of
         precedents makes it essential that this Court  should  abjure  from
         discussing each and every decision which has dealt with  a  similar
         question of law.  Failure to follow  this  discipline  and  regimen
         inexorably leads to prolixity in judgments which  invariably  is  a
         consequence of lengthy arguments.
      7. It is a capital exhaustion of Court time, lack of which has  become
         critical.    We  shall,  therefore,  confine  ourselves   to   Tata
         Cellular.  We are mindful of the  fact  that  it  is  a  legitimate
         exercise, perfectly permissible for  Benches  to  advance  the  law
         provided this exercise does not  lead  to  a  conclusion  which  is
         irreconcilable with a binding precedent.   We  also  would  clarify
         that the manner in which a Bench  appreciates  the  factual  matrix
         before it can obviously be of  value  only  if  a  subsequent  case
         presents identical facts, which remains a rarity.
     8. Tata Cellular states thus :
            “77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question
           of legality.  Its concern should be :


           1. whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?
           2. committed an error of law,
           3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,
           4.  reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunals would  have
              reached or,
           5. abused its powers.


           Therefore, it is not  for  the  Court  to  determine  whether  a
           particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment
           of that policy is fair.  It is only concerned with the manner in
           which those decisions have been taken.  The extent of  the  duty
           to act fairly will vary from case to  case.   Shortly  put,  the
           grounds upon  which  an  administrative  action  is  subject  to
           control by judicial review can be classified as under :


           i) Illegality: This means  the  decision-maker  must  understand
              correctly the law that regulates  his  decision-making  power
              and must give effect to it.
          ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
         iii) Procedural impropriety.


           The above are only the broad grounds but it does  not  rule  out
           addition of further grounds in course of time.  As a  matter  of
           fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the  Home  Department,  ex
           parte Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696, Lord Diplock  refers  specifically
           to one development  namely,  the  possible  recognition  of  the
           principle of proportionality.  In all these cases the test to be
           adopted is that the Court should,  'consider  whether  something
           has gone wrong of  a,  nature  and  degree  which  requires  its
           intervention.”


     9. Since we have been deluged with decisions,  we  must  now  consider
        whether there have been any material additions to the law which per
        force are compatible with Tata Cellular.   W.B.  State  Electricity
        Board reiterated the exposition of law contained in Tata  Cellular,
        as it had to do.   On facts it opined that ‘once the unit rate  and
        line item total are filled in by the bidder, they  are  unalterable
        though arithmetical errors can be rectified’.  So far as the law is
        concerned the position remains the same significantly, as  it  must
        do; the facts bear no semblance to those in hand.  The  Court  held
        that  the  private  parties  could  not  bind  the  Government   by
        implication.  Although Sorath Builders makes no reference  to  Tata
        Cellular but nevertheless is not incongruous to  it;  otherwise  it
        would have been rendered per incuriam.  It merely  reiterates  that
        while reasonableness in the Wednesbury mould is an integral part of
        administrative law it has no relevance in contractual law; on facts
        this Court held that since documents had  not  been  despatched  in
        accordance with the specified time  schedule,  the  bid  which  had
        already been received on-line could correctly  not  be  considered.
        Glodyne Technoserve also applies Tata Cellular; but on the  factual
        matrix sounds a discordant note so far as the Respondents who  rely
        on it are concerned, inasmuch as it recognises that it fell  within
        the discretionary domain of the concerned Authority whether or  not
        to consider the documents (in that case an ISO Certification) which
        had not been submitted as per tender stipulations.   Kanhaiya  Lal,
        relied upon by Shri Vishwanathan, talks in the same timbre in  that
        it distinguishes between essential and collateral terms of a tender
        and  in  the  latter  case  allows  elbow  room  for  exercise   of
        discretion.  Although it may be  seen  as  a  facet  of  Wednesbury
        reasonableness, this decision can be seen as adding another  factor
        to Tata Cellular viz., the Court is empowered to separate the wheat
        from the chaff.  In this  exercise  the  Court  can  segregate  the
        essential terms forming the bulwark  of  the  compact,  and  whilst
        ensuring their strict adherence, can  allow  leniency  towards  the
        compliance of collateral clauses.  This analysis of the cited case-
        law shows that there is little or no advantage to  be  gained  from
        the manner in which the Court has responded to the  factual  matrix
        as other  Courts  may  legitimately  place  emphasis  on  seemingly
        similar facts to arrive at a different conclusion.  But  the  ratio
        decidendi has to be adhered to.   Counsel  must  therefore  exhibit
        circumspection in the number of cases they cite.   The  three-Judge
        Bench in Tata Cellular is more than sufficient to adumbrate the law
        pertaining to tenders; the later decision of the co-ordinate  Bench
        in Siemens is in the nature of annals of previous decisions on  the
        point.
    10. With this brief analysis of the decisions  cited  at  the  Bar,  we
        shall now return to the essential factors that shall determine  our
        decision.  The two clauses that have been debated  before  us  have
        already been reproduced by us above.  The learned Single Judge  had
        returned the finding that the Appellant-company’s  tender  did  not
        correspond to the essential term of the ‘Invitation to  Tender’  in
        two respects :
           a)  The  alleged  blacklisting  of   the   Appellant-company   as
              postulated in clause (i); and
           b) The Appellant-company’s failure to furnish/forward the  latest
              Income Tax Return, as envisaged in clause (j).


    11. The letter rejecting the Appellant-company’s offer reads thus :
           “Subject: KMDA: Disqualify for Tender No.:01/ KMDA / MAT
                           / CE/2013-2014


           Date : Mon, 22 Jul 2013 18:13:22 +0530 (IST)
           From: tender tender@eternderwizard.com
            To: sales.marketingdomestic@rashmigroup.com


           Dear RASHI METALIKS LIMITED,


           Important Notice:


           This is to inform that your bid has been  disqualified  for  the
           tender invited by KMDA


           Tender No.: 01 / KMDA / MAT / CE / 2013-2014
           Line No.: 01


           Name of Work : SUPPLY and DELIVERY  OF  DIFFERENT  DIAMETERS  OF
           DISS K 7 and K 9 PIPES  AT  DIFFERENT  LOCATION  WITHIN  KOLKATA
           METROPOLITAN AREA


           Reason for Disqualification : company not having  submitted  its
           latest income tax return along with its Bid.


           With regards
           Tendering Authority”

    12. So far as the first point is concerned, it needs to be  dealt  with
        short shrift for the reason that the Courts below have not  thought
        it relevant for discussion, having, in their wisdom, considered  it
        sufficient to non-suit the Appellant-company for its failure on the
        second count.  It has, however, been explained by Mr. Vishwanathan,
        learned Senior  Counsel  for  the  Appellant-company  that  at  the
        material time  there  was  no  blacklisting  or  delisting  of  the
        Appellant-company and  that  in  those  circumstances  it  was  not
        relevant to make any disclosure in this regard.  The very fact that
        the Tendering Authority, in terms of its communication  dated  22nd
        July 2013 had not adverted to this ground at all, lends credence to
        the contention that a valid argument had been  proffered  had  this
        ground been raised.     Regardless  of  the  weight,  pithiness  or
        sufficiency of the explanation given by  the  Appellant-company  in
        this regard, this issue in its entirety has become  irrelevant  for
        our cogitation for the reason that it does not feature as a  reason
        for  the  impugned  rejection.   This  ground  should   have   been
        articulated at the  very  inception  itself,  and  now  it  is  not
        forensically fair or permissible for the Authority or  any  of  the
        Respondents to adopt this ground for the first time in this  second
        salvo of litigation by way of a side wind.  The  impugned  Judgment
        is indubitably a cryptic one and does not contain  the  reasons  on
        which the decision is predicated.  Since reasons are not  contained
        in the impugned Judgment itself, it must be set aside on the  short
        ground that a party cannot be permitted to travel beyond the  stand
        adopted and expressed by it in its earlier decision.  The following
        observations found in the celebrated  decision  in  Mohinder  Singh
        Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi,  AIR  1978  SC
        851 are relevant to this question :
           “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a  statutory
           functionary  makes  an  order  based  on  certain  grounds,  its
           validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned  and  cannot
           be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape  of  affidavit  or
           otherwise.  Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
           time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get  validated
           by additional grounds later  brought  out.   We  may  here  draw
           attention to the observations of Bose J.  in  Gordhandas  Bhanji
           (AIR 1952 SC 16) (at p.18):
               “Public orders publicly made, in  exercise  of  a  statutory
               authority cannot be construed in the light  of  explanations
               subsequently given by the officer making the order  of  what
               he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to
               do.  Public orders made by public authorities are  meant  to
               have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and
               conduct of those to whom they  are  addressed  and  must  be
               construed objectively with reference to the language used in
               the order itself.
               Orders are not like old wine becoming better  as  they  grow
               order.”


    13. So far as clause (j)  of  the  detailed  notice  inviting  E-tender
        No.01/KMDA/MAT/CE/2013-2014  dated  10.5.2013  emanating  from  the
        office of the Chief Engineer is concerned,  it  seems  to  us  that
        contrary to the conclusion in the impugned judgment, the clause  is
        not an essential  element  or  ingredient  or  concomitant  of  the
        subject NIT.  
In the course of hearing, the Income Tax  Return  has
        been filed by the Appellant-company and scrutinized by us.  For the
        Assessment Year 2011-2012,  the  gross  income  of  the  Appellant-
        company  was  Rs.15,34,05,627,   although,   for   the   succeeding
        Assessment Year 2012-2013, the income tax was NIL, but  substantial
        tax had been deposited.  We think that the Income Tax Return  would
        have assumed the character of an  essential  term  if  one  of  the
        qualifications was either the gross income or  the  net  income  on
        which tax  was  attracted.   In  many  cases  this  is  a  salutary
        stipulation, since it is indicative of the commercial standing  and
        reliability of the tendering entity.  This feature being absent, we
        think that the filing  of  the  latest  Income  Tax  Return  was  a
        collateral term, and accordingly the Tendering Authority  ought  to
        have brought this discrepancy  to  the  notice  of  the  Appellant-
        company and if even thereafter no rectification  had  been  carried
        out, the position may have been appreciably different.  It has been
        asserted on behalf of the Appellant-company, and not denied by  the
        learned counsel for the Respondent-Authority,  that  the  financial
        bid of the Appellant-company is substantially lower  than  that  of
        the others, and, therefore, pecuniarily preferable.
    14. In this analysis, we find that the Appeal is well  founded  and  is
        allowed.  The impugned judgment  is  accordingly  set  aside.   The
        disqualification of the  Appellant-company  on  the  ground  of  it
        having failed to submit its latest Income Tax Return along with its
        bid is not sufficient reason for disregarding its  offer/bid.   The
        Respondents are directed, therefore,  to  proceed  further  in  the
        matter  on  this  predication.   The  parties  shall   bear   their
        respective costs.



      .............................................J.
                                             [T.S. THAKUR]




      New                                                              Delhi
      .............................................J.
      September 11, 2013.                    [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
-----------------------
15


Whether the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 302 IPC = the manner in which the deceased was assaulted and the brutality of the assault shows that the accused formed an unlawful assembly with the object of killing the deceased. The blow landed on the deceased by Perumal had brought the deceased to the ground whereupon the accused continued brutalising the deceased with the help of stones, in the process crushing his head and squeezing his testicles. We have no manner of doubt that the nature of injuries caused to the deceased were clearly indicative of the accused having had the intention of killing him. The use of the words “with that he must go” by appellant No.2 is only a manifestation of that intention. 18. There is, therefore, no room for altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II, IPC as argued by the learned counsel. 19. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

                       published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40749                       
  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1623 OF 2009


Shanmugam and Anr.                           …Appellants

      Versus

State Rep. by Inspector of Police, T. Nadu   …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    This appeal arises out of a judgment  and  order  dated  24th  August,
2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Madras  at  Madurai,  whereby
Criminal Appeal No.857 of 2004  filed  by  the  appellants  and  two  others
against their conviction for murder and sentence of  life  imprisonment  has
been dismissed.

2.    On 5th January, 1999 at about 3.00 p.m. the deceased  Asokan  was  one
amongst 200 other mourners who had assembled to attend the  cremation  of  a
near relative who  had  passed  away  and  was  being  cremated  at  village
Veerappanayakan Patti.  Adikesavan (PW-1), Rajendran (PW-4), Vellingiri (PW-
5) and Paneer (PW-10)  were  also  among  those  present  at  the  cremation
ground. The prosecution case is that, that on account of strained  relations
between the accused and the deceased arising out of rivalry in  relation  to
smuggling of sandalwood by the two groups, there was, a few days earlier  to
the date of occurrence, a quarrel between them which had  turned  ugly  with
the two groups assaulting each other. The accused were,  therefore,  looking
for an opportunity to get even with deceased which  opportunity  came  their
way when the deceased who was a  resident  of  another  village  joined  the
funeral and the cremation ceremony.  It so happened that no sooner were  the
mortal remains of the departed soul consigned to flames, Perumal one of  the
accused (since deceased) saw Asokan standing near  a  coconut  tree  in  the
former’s land, and started  moving  towards  him  with  the  remaining  four
accused including the appellants in this appeal. Perumal who had  picked  up
a stick gave a blow to the  deceased  on  the  head  because  of  which  the
deceased collapsed to the ground. Shanmugam (A-1), appellant in the  present
appeal, in the meantime picked up a stone and hit the deceased on  his  face
repeatedly while Mahendran (A-2)  caught  hold  of  his  legs.  Raghu  (A-3)
squeezed the testicles of Asokan while Ramajayam (A-4),  appellant  No.2  in
this appeal,  assaulted  the  deceased  with  a  heavy  stone  on  his  head
exclaiming “with that  he  must  go”.  The  injuries  so  inflicted  crushed
Asokan’s head and killed him on the spot. Adikesavan (PW-1), Rajendran  (PW-
4) and Vellingiri (PW-5) tried to  intervene  but  were  threatened  by  the
accused persons that they  would  also  meet  the  same  fate.  Scared,  the
witnesses ran for safety while the accused made  their  escape  good.  Those
attending the cremation also ran away in panic. Adikesavan  (PW-1)  returned
to the crime scene and found his younger brother lying dead  with  his  head
shattered. He informed Sudha (PW-3) about the incident and rushed  to  Harur
to meet his younger brother Ramalingam (PW-2) who accompanied  him  back  to
the crime scene in a car. The incident was then  reported  at  Harur  Police
Station in writing by Adikesavan  (PW-1).  The  police  swung  into  action,
conducted an inquest and seized the stick and stones  used  by  the  accused
persons for the assault and the blood stained clothes  of  the  deceased.  A
chargesheet was eventually filed by the Investigating Officer  that  led  to
their trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Dharamapuri  who  recorded
the statements of as  many  as  11  witnesses  produced  on  behalf  of  the
prosecution. The defence did not choose to lead any oral evidence.

3.     The  Trial  Court  eventually  came  to  the  conclusion   that   the
prosecution  had  brought  home  the  guilt  to  the  accused  persons   and
accordingly convicted them for murder  punishable  under  Section  302  read
with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to  undergo  imprisonment  for  life.
Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  the
appellants and two other surviving accused  persons  filed  Criminal  Appeal
No.857 of 2004 before the High Court of Judicature  of  Madras  at  Madurai,
Perumal the fifth accused  having  passed  away  in  the  meantime.  By  its
judgment and order impugned in this appeal  the  High  Court  has  concurred
with the view taken  by  the  Trial  Court  and  found  the  conviction  and
sentence to be perfectly  justified  upon  a  reappraisal  of  the  evidence
adduced before the Trial Court. The present appeal filed by two out  of  the
four accused persons calls in question the correctness of the said  judgment
and order of the High Court.

4.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties at  considerable  length
who have taken us through the evidence on record. The Trial  Court  as  also
the High Court have both placed reliance upon the deposition  of  Adikesavan
(PW-1) who was an eye witness to the occurrence. The Courts below have  also
noted  that  while  Rajendran  (PW-4)  and  Vellingiri  (PW-5)  have  turned
hostile, they have nevertheless supported the prosecution case in the  past.
The Courts also found that enmity  between  the  deceased  and  the  accused
persons on account of  smuggling  of  sandalwood  was  the  motive  for  the
commission of the crime which motive was satisfactorily established  on  the
evidence adduced at the trial.

5.    Appearing for the appellants Mr. Srilok  N.  Rath  made  a  three-fold
submission before us. Firstly, it was contended that there was  un-explained
delay not only in the lodging of the first information report  but  also  in
dispatching a copy of the same to  the  jurisdictional  Magistrate.  In  the
absence  of  any  cogent  and  acceptable  explanation  for  the  delay  the
prosecution case was rendered doubtful. Secondly, it was contended that  the
prosecution case rests entirely on the deposition of Adikesavan  (PW-1)  who
was closely related to  the  deceased  and  could  not  be  said  to  be  an
independent witness. Relying upon the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Mahtab
Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. (2009) 13  SCC  670,  it  was  contended  that
although  the  deposition  of  an  interested  witness  was  not  by  itself
inadmissible  in  evidence,  prudence  demanded  that   his   testimony   be
scrutinized  more  closely  and  carefully.  A  careful  evaluation  of  the
evidence of Adikesavan (PW-1) did not, according  to  the  learned  counsel,
inspire confidence which was  full  of  embellishments  and  improbabilities
sufficient to demolish his credibility.

6.    Thirdly, it was contended  that  even  if  the  prosecution  case  was
accepted in toto the offence could not go beyond Section 304 Part II of  the
IPC. Reliance was  in  support  placed  by  the  learned  counsel  upon  the
decision of this Court in Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa (2000) 9 SCC 1.

7.    The incident in the case at hand took place at  around  3.00  p.m.  on
the 5th of January, 1999 in a village.  The first information  report  about
the same was lodged by Adikesavan (PW-1) at 10.00 p.m. on the same day.  The
contention urged on behalf of the appellant was  that  the  delay  of  seven
hours in the lodging of the report by Adikesavan (PW-1)  was  inordinate  in
the facts and circumstances of the case and ought to render the  prosecution
version suspect on that count itself.  We do not think  so.   Delay  in  the
lodging of the FIR is not by itself fatal to the  case  of  the  prosecution
nor can delay itself create any suspicion  about  the  truthfulness  of  the
version given by the informant just as a prompt lodging of  the  report  may
be no guarantee about its being wholly truthful. So long as there is  cogent
and acceptable explanation offered for the delay it loses its  significance.
Whether or not the explanation is acceptable will depend upon the  facts  of
each case. There is no cut and dried formula  for  determining  whether  the
explanation is or is not acceptable.  Having said that, Courts need to  bear
in mind that delay in lodging of the FIR  deprives  it  of  spontaneity  and
brings in chances of embellishments like exaggerations  and  distortions  in
the story which if narrated at the earliest  point  of  time  may  have  had
different contours than what is eventually  recorded  in  a  delayed  report
about the occurrence. On the flipside a prompt lodging  of  the  report  may
not carry a  presumption  of  truth  with  it.  Human  minds  are  much  too
versatile  and  innovative  to  be  subject  to   any   such   strait-jacket
inferences. Embellishments, distortions, and false implication of  innocence
may come not only out of deliberation which the victim party may hold  among
themselves or with their well-wishers and supporters, but  also  on  account
of quick thinking especially when all that it takes to do so is to name  all
those whom the informant or his advisors perceive to be guilty  or  inimical
towards them.  Decisions of this Court as  to  the  advantage  of  a  report
lodged promptly and possibility of embellishment in cases where  the  report
is delayed, as also the approach which  the  Courts  ought  to  adopt  while
considering the effect of such delay in a given case are a  legion  and  the
principles of law much too well settled to require any  elaboration  or  re-
statement.  Reference can all the same be made to Meharaj Singh v. State  of
U.P (1994) 5 SCC 188, Thulia Kali v.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  (1972)  Crl.LJ
1296, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC  71,  Ramdas  and
Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC  170,  Kilakkatha  Parambath  Sasi
and Ors. v. State of Kerala AIR 2011 SC 1064 and Harivandan  Babubhai  Patel
v. State of Gujarat (2013) 7 SCC 45.

8.    There is, in the case before us, delay of hardly  a  few  hours  which
the prosecution has explained to the satisfaction of  the  Trial  Court  and
the High Court both.  Adikesavan (PW-1), it appears, returned to  the  place
of occurrence after the accused persons had left only to  find  his  brother
dead with his face and head severely injured.  According to the witness,  he
travelled to Harur to inform his brother- Ramalingam (PW-2) who  accompanied
him to the place of occurrence in a car  and  then  to  the  police  station
where Adikesavan (PW-1) lodged the first information report. Some  time  was
obviously wasted in this  process  of  travel  to  and  from  the  place  of
occurrence and to the police station for lodging  the  report.   The  report
gave a detailed account of the incident.  No  deficiency  in  terms  of  the
omission of the names or the role played by the accused was pointed  out  to
us by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.  The  version  given
by Adikesavan (PW-1) has remained consistent with the version given  in  the
first information report. There is, in  that  view,  no  reason  for  us  to
disbelieve the prosecution case only because the  first  information  report
was  delayed  by  a  few  hours  especially  when   the   delay   has   been
satisfactorily explained.  The  first  limb  of  the  argument  advanced  by
counsel for the appellants has, therefore, failed and is hereby rejected.

9.    That brings us to  the  question  whether  Adikesavan   (PW-1)  was  a
reliable witness. The  contention,  as  seen  earlier,  is  that  since  the
witness happened to be the brother of the deceased, he must be  taken  as  a
partisan witness on account of his  close  relation  with  the  victim.  The
difference between a partisan witness on one hand and an interested  witness
who is unrelated to the victim but  has  some  beneficial  interest  in  the
outcome of a litigation on the other, remains obscure.  This Court  in  Raju
@ Balachandran and Ors. v. State  of  Tamil  Nadu  AIR  2013  SC  983,  very
recently attempted a possible categorization  of  witnesses  and  identified
broadly four such categories in the following words:

           “33. For the time being, we are concerned with  four  categories
           of witnesses - a third party disinterested and unrelated witness
           (such as a bystander or passer-by);  a  third  party  interested
           witness (such as a trap witness); a  related  and  therefore  an
           interested witness (such as the wife of the  victim)  having  an
           interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a  related  and
           therefore an interested witness (such as the wife or brother  of
           the victim) having an interest in seeing  the  accused  punished
           and also having some enmity with the accused. But, more than the
           categorization  of  a  witness,  the  issue  really  is  one  of
           appreciation of the  evidence  of  a  witness.  A  court  should
           examine the evidence of a related and interested witness  having
           an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having  some
           enmity with the accused with greater care and caution  than  the
           evidence of a third party disinterested and  unrelated  witness.
           This is all that is expected and required.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)




10.   As observed by this Court far more important  than  categorization  of
witnesses is the question of appreciation of their  evidence.   The  essence
of any such appreciation is to  determine  whether  the  deposition  of  the
witness on to the incident is truthful hence  acceptable.  While  doing  so,
the Court can assume that a related witness would not ordinarily shield  the
real offender to falsely implicate an innocent person.  In cases  where  the
witness was inimically disposed towards the  accused,  the  Courts  have  no
doubt at times noticed a tendency to implicate an innocent person also,  but
before the Court can reject the deposition of such  a  witness  the  accused
must lay a foundation for the argument that his  false  implication  springs
from such enmity.  The mere  fact  that  the  witness  was  related  to  the
accused does not provide that foundation.  It  may  on  the  contrary  be  a
circumstance for the Court to believe that the version  of  the  witness  is
truthful on the simple logic that such a witness would not screen  the  real
culprit to falsely implicate an  innocent.   Suffice  it  to  say  that  the
process of evaluation of evidence of witnesses whether they are partisan  or
interested (assuming there is  a  difference  between  the  two)  is  to  be
undertaken in the facts  of  each  case  having  regard  to  ordinary  human
conduct prejudices and predilections.

11.   The approach which the Court ought to adopt in such matters  has  been
examined by this Court in several cases, reference to which  is  unnecessary
except a few that should suffice.  In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab  (1954)
1 SCR 145 this Court observed:

           “26. A witness is normally to be considered  independent  unless
           he or she springs from sources which are likely  to  be  tainted
           and that usually means unless the witness  has  cause,  such  as
           enmity against the accused, to wish to  implicate  him  falsely.
           Ordinarily, a close relative would be the  last  to  screen  the
           real culprit and falsely implicate an  innocent  person.  It  is
           true, when feelings run high and there  is  personal  cause  for
           enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an  innocent  person
           against whom a witness has a grudge along with the  guilty,  but
           foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the  mere  fact
           of relationship far from being a  foundation  is  often  a  sure
           guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any  sweeping
           generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own  facts.  Our
           observations are only made  to  combat  what  is  so  often  put
           forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence.  There
           is no such general rule. Each case must be  limited  to  and  be
           governed by its own facts.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)



12.   The above was followed by this Court  in  Masalti  v.  State  of  U.P.
(1964) 8 SCR 133 where this Court observed:

           “But it  would,  we  think,  be  unreasonable  to  contend  that
           evidence given by witnesses should  be  discarded  only  on  the
           ground  that  it  is  evidence   of   partisan   or   interested
           witnesses.....The mechanical rejection of such evidence  on  the
           sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure
           of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid  down  as  to  how
           much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be
           cautions in dealing with such evidence; but the plea  that  such
           evidence should be rejected because it  is  partisan  cannot  be
           accepted as correct.”



13.   We may also refer to the decision of this  Court  in  Darya  Singh  v.
State of Punjab (1964) 3 SCR 397 and a more recent  reminder  of  the  legal
principles in Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat  and  Anr.  (2011)
10 SCC 158 where this Court observed:

           “(i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering  him
           as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that  the
           term 'interested' postulates that the  witness  must  have  some
           direct interest in having  the  accused  somehow  or  the  other
           convicted for some other reason. (Vide: Kartik Malhar  v.  State
           of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614; and  Rakesh  and  Anr.  v.  State  of
           Madhya Pradesh JT 2011 (10) SC 525).

           (ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the
           Court can and may act on  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness
           provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment  in
           convicting a person on the sole testimony of a  single  witness.
           That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872.  But
           if there are doubts about the testimony, the court  will  insist
           on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number,  the  quantity,
           but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is
           that evidence has to be weighed and not  counted.  The  test  is
           whether the evidence has a ring of truth,  is  cogent,  credible
           and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis
           on  value,  weight  and  quality  of  evidence  rather  than  on
           quantity,  multiplicity  or  plurality  of  witnesses.  It   is,
           therefore, open to a competent court  to  fully  and  completely
           rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it
           may  acquit  the  accused  in  spite  of  testimony  of  several
           witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of  evidence.
           (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras AIR  1957  SC  614;
           Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2003)  11  SCC  367;
           Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007)  14  SCC  150;  and  Bipin
           Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal AIR 2010 SC 3638).”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)




14.   To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in  Amit  v.  State
of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 107, Bur Singh and Anr.  v.  State  of  Punjab
AIR 2009 SC 157, and Sate of H.P. v. Kishanpal  and  Ors.  2008  (11)  SCALE
233.

15.   In the case at  hand the   deposition of Adikesavan  (PW-1)  has  been
found to be reliable by the Trial Court as also the High  Court,  no  matter
he was related closely to the deceased.  There  is  nothing  in  the  cross-
examination of the witness that could be said  to  have  adversely  affected
the credibility of this witness nor is there anything to suggest that  apart
from his being a relative of  the  deceased  he  had  any  other  reason  to
falsely implicate the accused persons or  any  one  of  them.   The  version
given by the witness as to the manner in which  the  deceased  was  done  to
death by the accused persons gets support from the medical evidence  led  in
the case. The doctor conducting the post-mortem examination found the  death
to be homicidal caused by the  following  injuries  on  the  person  of  the
deceased :

           “External Injuries: Face – Mouth  lacerated.  Lower  lip,  lower
           jaw, nose – lacerated.  Blood stained liquid  oozing   from  the
           mouth.  Mandible and all the teeth i the lower jaw  broken  into
           pieces.  Neck – A skin colour contusion over the  neck  present.
           Limbs – contusion over right shoulder. Abdomen –  Left  testicle
           crusted and exposed of the skin.

                 Internal Examination: Skull – Base of  skull  fracture  in
           the post cranial fossa crossing the midline.  Bain  –  Congested
           and contained about 100 ml of clotted blood.  Neck – Hyoid  bone
           intact.  Thorax – Sternum intact.  No  rib  fracture.   Lungs  –
           Congested. Right – 450 gms. Left – 420 gms. Heart  –  Congested.
           Empty 150 gms. Liver – Congested. Intact – 1100  gms.  Kidney  –
           Congested – intact – 120 gms. Each. Bladder – Empty.  Stomach  –
           contains about 50 gms. Of undigested food. Spleen – Congested  –
           90 gms.”



16.   It is noteworthy that the other two witnesses namely Rajendran  (PW-4)
and Vellingiri (PW-5) also supported the prosecution case,  no  matter  only
in part.  The fact that the deceased was present  at  the  cremation  ground
where the occurrence took place is proved from their  depositions  as  well.
It is equally important to note that one of  the  accused  persons,  namely,
Perumal (since deceased) had according to these two  witnesses  also  picked
up a stick and assaulted the deceased on his head as a result of  which  the
deceased had collapsed to the ground. The rest of the prosecution  case,  on
the role played  by  the  other  accused  persons  in  the  killing  of  the
deceased, has not been supported by these two witnesses  who  were  declared
hostile and cross-examined by the  prosecution.  Even  so,  the  prosecution
case as to the manner in which assaults started and the place of  occurrence
was proved by the deposition of Adikesavan (PW-1) whom we find no reason  to
disbelieve.

17.   That brings us to the contention urged on  behalf  of  the  appellants
that even if the prosecution version is accepted in  toto,  the  case  falls
under Section 304 Part II  IPC  and  not  Section  302  IPC  for  which  the
appellants have been convicted.
There is, in our view,  no  merit  in  that
contention either. We say so because of
the manner  in  which  the  deceased
was assaulted and the brutality  of  the  assault  shows  that  the  accused
formed an unlawful assembly with the object of  killing  the  deceased.  
The
blow landed on the deceased by Perumal  had  brought  the  deceased  to  the
ground whereupon the accused continued brutalising  the  deceased  with  the
help of  stones,  in  the  process  crushing  his  head  and  squeezing  his
testicles.  
We have no manner of doubt that the nature  of  injuries  caused
to the deceased were clearly  indicative  of  the  accused  having  had  the
intention of killing him. The use of the words “with that  he  must  go”  by
appellant No.2 is only a manifestation of that intention.

18.   There is, therefore, no room for altering the conviction from  Section
302 to Section 304 Part II, IPC as argued by the learned counsel.

19.   In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.



                                                    ………………………………….……….…..…J.
                           (T.S. THAKUR)


                                                  ………………………..…………………..…..…J.
New Delhi                        (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
September 11, 2013