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Thursday, July 25, 2013

the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, = whether certain regulations framed by the University Grants Commission had a binding effect on educational institutions being run by the different States and even under State enactments.= However, within this class of institutions there is a separate group where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision to adopt the scheme. In such cases, the consequences envisaged in the scheme itself would automatically follow. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in all these matters in the light of the various submissions made on behalf of the respective parties. The several Appeals, Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case, which involve the same questions as considered in this batch of cases, are all dismissed. However, the Appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand and Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6724, 13747 and 14676 of 2012 are allowed. As far as the Transfer Petition Nos. 1062-1068 OF 2012 are concerned, the same are allowed and the Transferred Cases are dismissed. The Contempt Petitions are disposed of by virtue of this judgment. However, persons who have continued to work on the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court or any other Court, shall not be denied the benefit of service during the said period. The Appeals and Petitions having been dismissed, both the State Authorities and the Central Authorities will be at liberty to work out their remedies in accordance with law.

                      reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40584
                                                       
      REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5527-5543 OF 2013
                      [@ SLP (C) Nos. 18766-18782/2010]



1 Jagdish Prasad Sharma etc. etc.    … Appellants



                 Vs.



           2 State of Bihar & Ors.                    … Respondents




                                    WITH


   C.A. NO.5544 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29332 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5545 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.10661 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5546 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.10783 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5547 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.11605 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5548 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16523 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5549-5551 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.12990-12992 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5552 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16845 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5553 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.21611 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5554 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.21609 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5555 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16619 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5556 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.17446 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5557 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23392 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5558 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.25446 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5559-5560 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.24037-24038 OF 2011
   WP (C) NO.348 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5561 OF 2013 @ SLP(C)NO.3679 OF 2009
   WP (C) NO.442 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5562 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.31422 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5563 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.1631 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5564-5566 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.1632-1634 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5567 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.1635 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5569-5573 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.1636-1640 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5574 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.1641 OF 2012
   C.P. (C) 425 OF 2011 IN C.A. NO.5555 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16619 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5575 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.1544 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5576 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.2645 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5577 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.3028 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5578 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.3823 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5579 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.3077 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5580 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.2785 OF 2012
   C.P. (C) 316 OF 2011 IN C.A. NO.5548 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16523 OF 2011
   C.P. (C) 57 OF 2012 IN C.A. NO.5548OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16523 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5581 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.6003 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5582 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.6430 OF 2012
   W.P. (C) NO.61 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5583 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.4020 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5584-5592 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.6915-6923 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5593 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.8153 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5594-5606 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.8887-8899 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5607 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.13359 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5608-5610 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.13271-13273 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5611-5615 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.10765-10769 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5616 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30051 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5617 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.32571 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5618 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30990 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5619 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.32596 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5620 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23275 OF 2010
   C.A. NOS.5621-5629 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.18218-18226 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5630-5653 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.9198-9221 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5654 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.14163 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5655-5658 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.14350-14353 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5659-5660 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.16300-16301 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5661 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.18157 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5662 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.411 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5663 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.21508 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5664 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.25470 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5665 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.36126 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5666 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.7392 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5667-5668 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.16107-16108 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5669 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16577 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5670 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16579 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5671 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16601 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5672 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16612 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5673 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16645 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5674 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16650 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5675 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16651 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5676 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16711 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5677 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.17296 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5678 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.17439 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5679 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16421 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5680-5682 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.22670-22672 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5683 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.26449 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5684 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.24772 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5685 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.28373 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5686 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29852 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5687 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29975 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5688 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23452 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5689-5690 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.14694-14695 OF 2011
   T.C.(C) Nos.100-106 OF 2013 @ TP (C) NOs.1062-1068 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5691 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29283 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5692 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29344 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5693 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30735 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5694 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30736 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5695 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30737 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5696 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30738 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5697 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.29807 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5698 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.35327 OF 2010
   C.A. NO.5699 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.2348 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5700 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.2349 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5701 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.26233 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5702 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.21396 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5703 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.26724 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5704 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22622 OF 2013 (CC 18057/2012)
   C.A. NO.5705 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.33411 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5706 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.30250 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5707 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22623 OF 2013 (CC 18532/2012)
   C.A. NO.5708 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22624 OF 2013 (CC 19243/2012)
   WP (C) NO.88 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5709-5773 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.32136-32200 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5774-5788 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.32748-32762 OF 2011
   C.A. NOS.5789-5790 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.32768-32769 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5791 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.36606 OF 2011
   C.A. NO.5792 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.4202 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5793 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.5262 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5794 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.12128 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5795 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.12129 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5796 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.16519 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5797 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23339 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5798 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23342 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5799 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.23338 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5800 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.20136 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5801 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.37288 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5802-5803 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.37947-37948 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5804-5805 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.37949-37950 OF 2012
   C.A. NOS.5806-5809 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NOS.8301-8304 OF 2012
   T.C.(C) NO.27 OF 2013
   C.A. NO.5810 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.6724 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5811 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.13747 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5812 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.14676 OF 2012
   W.P(C) NO.83 OF 2013
   C.A. NO.5813 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.36955 OF 2012
   C.A. NO.5814 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.28326 OF 2012
   W.P.(C) NO.53 OF 2013
   C.A. NO.5815 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.8147 OF 2013
   C.A. NO.5816 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22626 OF 2013 (CC 5514/2013)
   C.A. NO.5817 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22627 OF 2013 (CC 5518/2013
   C.A. NO.5818 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) NO.22628 OF 2013 (8248/2013)



                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.


1.    Leave granted in the Special Leave  Petitions,  which  were  taken  up
along with the Writ Petitions and Transferred Cases,  as  they  all  involve
common questions of law and fact.

2.    The common thread running through all these  various  matters  is  the
question as to
whether certain regulations framed by the  University  Grants
Commission had a binding effect on educational  institutions  being  run  by the different States and even under State enactments.

3.    The University Grants Commission Act  was  enacted  by  Parliament  in
1956 inter alia with the object of making  provision  for  the  coordination
and determination of standards in Universities  and  for  that  purpose,  to
establish a University Grants Commission, hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
“Commission”.
Under  the   University   Grants   Commission   Act,   1956,
hereinafter referred to as the “UGC Act”,
 the  Commission  is  required  to
take, in consultation with the Universities or other concerned  bodies,
 all
such steps as it may  think  fit  for  the  promotion  and  coordination  of
University education and for the determination and maintenance of  standards
of teaching, examination and research in Universities.

4.    Section 12 of the UGC  Act  inter  alia  empowers  the  Commission  to
inquire into the financial needs of the Universities, allocate and  disburse
grants to Universities established or incorporated by  or  under  a  Central
Act, out of the Funds of the Commission for the maintenance and  development
of such Universities or for any other general  or  specified  purpose.
The
Commission was also empowered to allocate and disburse, out of  such  Funds,
such grants to other Universities, as it may deem necessary  or  appropriate
for  the  development  of  such  Universities  or  for  the  maintenance  or
development or for any other general or specified purpose.
 The  Commission
was further empowered to allocate and disburse, such grants to  institutions
deemed to be Universities, as it deemed necessary, for similar purposes.

5.    Section 25 of the UGC Act empowers  the  Central  Government  to  make
Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act by notification in  the  Official
Gazette,  with  regard  to  the  formation  and  the  functioning   of   the
Commission.
Section  26  empowers  the  Commission  to  make   Regulations
consistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder,  by
notification in the Official Gazette inter alia in regard  to  defining  the
qualifications that should ordinarily  be  required  of  any  person  to  be
appointed to the teaching staff of  the  University  having  regard  to  the
branch of education in which he or she is required to give instructions  and
to define the minimum standards of instructions for the grant of any  degree
by any University.
In keeping with their  statutory  character,  the  Rules
and Regulations framed by the Central  Government  and  the  Commission  are
required to be placed before each  House  of  Parliament,  while  it  is  in
session, for a total period of 30 days.

6.    Section 20  of  the  UGC  Act,  particularly,  provides  that  in  the
discharge of its functions under the said  Act,  the  Commission  is  to  be
guided by such directions  on  questions  of  policy  relating  to  national
purposes, as may be given to it by the Central Government.

7.    On 24th December,  1998,  the  Commission  issued  a  Notification  on revision of pay scales, minimum qualification for  appointment  of  teachers in  Universities,  colleges  and  other  measures  for  the  maintenance  of standards. 
 In Clause 5 of the  Notification,  it  was  specified  that  the
Commission expected that the  entire  scheme  of  revision  of  pay  scales,
together with all conditions attached to it, would  be  implemented  by  the
State Governments, as a composite scheme without any  modifications,  except
for the date of implementation and the scales of pay, as  indicated  in  the
Government  of  India  Notifications   dated   27.7.1998,   22.9.1998,   and
6.11.1998.
Clause 16 of the Notification also indicated that  the  teachers
will retire at the age of 62 years, but it would be open to a University  or
a  college  to  re-employ  a  superannuated  teacher.  
 Subsequently,   the
Commission, in exercise of  the  powers  conferred  upon  it  under  Section
26(1)(e) and (f) of the UGC Act, framed  the  University  Grants  Commission
(Minimum Qualifications required for the appointment and career  advancement
of teachers in Universities and institutions affiliated to  it)  Regulation,
2000.  
The said Regulation  does  not,  however,  provide  for  the  age  of
superannuation.

8.    On 23rd  March,  2007,  the  Government,  in  its  Ministry  of  Human
Resource  Development,  Department  of  Higher  Education,  wrote   to   the
Secretary of the Commission on the question of enhancement  of  the  age  of
superannuation  from  62  years  to  65  years  for  teaching  positions  in
Centrally funded institutions, in higher and technical  education.
In  the
said communication, it was mentioned that
at the time  of  revision  of  pay
scales of teachers in Universities and colleges, following the revision  of pay scales of Central Government employees, on the  recommendations  of  the
Fifth Central Pay Commission,  it  had  been  provided  inter  alia  in  the
Ministry’s letter dated 27th July, 1998 that the age  of  superannuation  of
teachers in University and schools would be 62  years  and,  thereafter,  no extension in service should be given.  
However, the power to  re-employ  the
superannuated teacher up to the age of 65  years  would  remain  open  to  a University or a college, according to the  existing  guidelines,  framed  by the Commission. 
 In the letter, it was also indicated that  the  matter  had
been reviewed by the Central  Government,  in  the  light  of  the  existing
shortage in teaching  positions  in  the  Centrally-funded  institutions  in
higher and technical education under the Ministry and, in that  context,  it
had been decided that the age of superannuation  of  all  persons  who  were
holding posts as on 15.3.2007, in any of the  Centrally  funded  higher  and
technical education under the Ministry, would stand increased from 62 to  65
years.
 It was also decided  that  persons  holding  such  regular  teaching
positions, but had superannuated prior to 15.3.2007, on  attaining  the  age
of 62 years, but had not attained the age of 65 years, could be  re-employed
against vacant sanctioned teaching positions, till they attained the age  of
65 years, in accordance with the guidelines framed by  the  Commission.
It
was lastly  indicated  that  the  enhancement  of  retirement  age  and  the
provisions for  re-employment  would  only  apply  to  persons  in  teaching
positions against posts sanctioned in Centrally-funded higher and  technical
education institutions, in order to overcome the shortage of teachers.

9.    The most important development, at the  relevant  time,  however,  was
the issuance of a letter by the Central Government in its Ministry of  Human
Resource Development, Department of  Higher  Education,  to  the  Secretary,
University Grants Commission on 31st December, 2008, regarding a  scheme  of
revision of pay of teachers and other  equivalent cadres in all the  Central
universities and colleges and Deemed Universities,  following  the  revision
of pay scales of the Central Government employees on the  recommendation  of
the Sixth Central Pay Commission, subject to all  the  conditions  mentioned
in the letter and the Regulations.  The  State  Governments  were  given  an
option to adopt the scheme in its composite form.

10.   While generally dealing  with  matters  relating  to  appointment  and
promotion, it was reiterated that in order to  meet  the  situation  arising
out  of  shortage  of  teachers  in  Universities  and  in  other   teaching
institutions and the consequent vacant positions, age of  superannuation  of
teachers in Centrally-funded institutions had already been  enhanced  to  65
years.
 It  was  mentioned  in  the  said  letter  that  after  taking  into
consideration the recommendations  made  by  the  Commission  based  on  the
decisions taken at its meeting, held on  7th  and  8th  October,  2006,  the
Government of India had decided to revise the pay scales of teachers in  the
Central Universities.  It was further stipulated that the  revision  of  pay
scales of teachers would be subject to various provisions of the  Scheme  of
revision of pay scales, as contained in the said letter and  Regulations  to
be framed by the Commission in this  behalf.   Paragraph  8  of  the  Scheme
deals with other terms and conditions, apart from  those  already  mentioned
and Clause (p)(i) thereof, which deals with the applicability of the  Scheme
and relevant for our purpose is extracted hereinbelow:
           “(p)  Applicability of the Scheme:

           (i)       This Scheme shall be applicable to teachers and  other
           equivalent cadres of Library and Physical Education in  all  the
           Central  Universities   and   Colleges   there-under   and   the
           Institutions  Deemed  to  be  Universities   whose   maintenance
           expenditure is met by the UGC. The implementation of the revised
           scales shall be subject to the acceptance of all the  conditions
           mentioned in this letter as well as Regulations to be framed  by
           the UGC in this behalf. Universities  implementing  this  Scheme
           shall be advised by the UGC to amend their relevant statutes and
           ordinances in line with the UGC Regulations within three  months
           from the date of issue of this letter.”



11.   Clause (p)(v) of the said paragraph, which  is  equally  relevant,  is
also extracted hereinbelow:
           “(p)(v) This Scheme may be extended  to  universities,  Colleges
           and other  higher  educational  institutions  coming  under  the
           purview of State legislatures, provided State  Governments  wish
           to adopt and implement the Scheme subject to the following terms
           and conditions:

           (a)   Financial assistance from the Central Government to  State
           Governments opting to revise pay scales of  teachers  and  other
           equivalent cadre covered under the Scheme shall  be  limited  to
           the extent of 80% (eighty percent) of the additional expenditure
           involved in the implementation of the revision.

           (b) The State Government opting for revision of pay  shall  meet
           the remaining 20% (twenty percent) of the additional expenditure
           from its own sources.

           (c) Financial assistance referred to  in  sub-clause  (a)  above
           shall be provided for the period from 1.01.2006 to 31.03.2010.

           (d)   The entire liability on account of revision of pay  scales
           etc. of university and college teachers shall be taken  over  by
           the State Government opting for  revision  of  pay  scales  with
           effect from 1.04.2010.

           (e) Financial assistance from the Central  Government  shall  be
           restricted to revision of pay scales in respect  of  only  those
           posts which were in existence and  had  been  filled  up  as  on
           1.01.2006.

           (f) State Governments, taking  into  consideration  other  local
           conditions, may also decide in their  discretion,  to  introduce
           scales of pay higher than those mentioned in  this  Scheme,  and
           may give effect to the revised bands/ scales of pay from a  date
           on or after 1.01.2006; however, in such cases,  the  details  of
           modifications  proposed  shall  be  furnished  to  the   Central
           Government and Central assistance shall be restricted to the Pay
           Bands as approved by the  Central  Government  and  not  to  any
           higher scale of pay fixed by the State Government(s).

           (g) Payment of Central assistance for implementing  this  Scheme
           is also subject to the  condition  that  the  entire  Scheme  of
           revision of pay scales, together with all the conditions  to  be
           laid down by the UGC by way of Regulations and other  guidelines
           shall be implemented by State Governments and  Universities  and
           Colleges coming under their jurisdiction as a  composite  scheme
           without any  modification  except  in  regard  to  the  date  of
           implementation and scales of pay mentioned herein above.”


12.   Paragraph  8(f)  of  the  aforesaid  Scheme  deals  with  the  age  of
superannuation,  which  has  already  been  dealt  with  hereinbefore.    In
substance, it provides that in order to meet the situation  arising  out  of
shortage of teachers and also to attract people to the teaching  profession,
it had been decided to retain the services of teachers till the  age  of  65
years, as already intimated to all universities and colleges by  the  letter
dated 23.3.2007, issued by  the  Department  of  Higher  Education,  in  the
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India.

13.   Following the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission,  the  Bihar
Legislature  passed  the   Bihar   State   Universities   (Amendment)   Act,
substituting Section 67 of the Bihar State Universities Act,  enhancing  the
age of superannuation to 62 years.  Since the  said  Amendment  also  has  a
definite bearing in the appeals filed by Prof. (Dr.) Jagdish Prasad  Sharma,
the amended provision, namely, Section 67(a) is extracted hereinbelow:

           “(a)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in  any
           Act, Rules, Statutes,  Regulation  or  Ordinance,  the  date  of
           retirement of a teaching employee of  the  University  or  of  a
           college shall be the date on which he attains the age  of  sixty
           two years.  The date of retirement of a teaching  employee  will
           be the same which would be  decided  by  the  University  grants
           Commission.


                 The date of retirement  of  non-teaching  employee  (other
           than the inferior servants)  shall  be  the  date  on  which  he
           attains the age of sixty two years:


                 Provided that the University shall, in no case, extend the
           period of  service  of  any  of  the  teaching  or  non-teaching
           employee after he attains the age of sixty two years as the case
           may be.


                 Provided further  also  that  re-appointment  of  teachers
           after retirement may be made in appropriate cases up to the  age
           of sixty five years in the manner laid down in the Statutes made
           in  this  behalf  in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  of  the
           University Grants Commission.”

14.   Similarly, Section 64(a) of the Patna University Act was also  amended
on similar basis.
Since the decision of  the  Ministry  of  Human  Resource
Development,  as  conveyed  in  its  letter  of  23.3.2007,  was  not  being
implemented, Writ Petitions, being CWJC Nos. 4823 and  5390  of  2008,  were
filed by some teachers seeking enhancement  of  the  age  of  superannuation
from 62 to 65 years, based upon the aforesaid decision of  the  Ministry  of
Human Resource Development.
 Both the Writ Petitions were dismissed  by  the
High Court on the ground that there was no conscious decision taken  by  UGC
with regard to teachers working in State Universities since the  enhancement
was confined to Centrally-funded Universities.

15.   On 3.10.2008, the Pay  Review  Committee  set  up  by  the  Commission
submitted its Report to the Commission  relating  to  the  revision  of  pay
scales of teachers,  qualification  for  appointment,  service  and  working
conditions  and  promotional  avenues  of  teachers  in   Universities   and
colleges,  and  at  clause  5.4.2,  it   recommended   that   the   age   of
superannuation throughout the country should  be  65  years,  whether  in  a
State or Central University, as also in a college or in  a  University.   In
its 452nd meeting, the Commission took a conscious decision and  recommended
the Report of the  Pay  Review  Committee  for  acceptance  by  the  Central
Government.  Pursuant  to  the  said  decision  and  recommendation  of  the
Commission, the Ministry of Human Resource Development  published  a  Scheme
on 31.12.2008, which has already been referred to hereinbefore.

16.   As no action was taken even  thereafter,  the  Appellants  filed  Writ
Petition, being CWJC No. 2330 of 2009, before the  Patna  High  Court.   The
said matter was heard along  with  several  other  similar  Writ  Petitions,
wherein claims were made by the Petitioners under the amended provisions  of
the Patna University Act and Bihar State Universities Act.



17.   On 6.10.2009, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions  and
held that the State Government had no discretion as  they  were  statutorily
bound  by  the  decision  of  the  Commission  to   enhance   the   age   of
superannuation. Letters Patent Appeal No. 117 of 2010  and  other  connected
LPAs were filed by the State of Bihar challenging the aforesaid judgment  of
the learned Single Judge.  On 18.5.2010, a Division Bench of the Patna  High
Court allowed LPA No. 117 of 2010, filed by  the  State  of  Bihar.   It  is
against the said judgment of the Division  Bench  that  SLP(C)  Nos.  18766-
18782 were filed by the Appellants herein in June, 2010.  On 30.6.2010,  the
Commission framed the Regulations of 2010.

18.   This brings us to the substantial  challenge,  in  these  appeals  and
connected Writ Petitions and Transferred Cases,  as  has  been  set  out  in
paragraph 2 of the impugned judgment of the  Division  Bench  of  the  Patna
High Court, which is, whether in view  of  the  decision  contained  in  the
letter dated 31.12.2008  issued  by  the  Department  of  Higher  Education,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, in the  context
of Section 64(a) of the Patna University Act, 1976 and Section 67(a) of  the
Bihar State Universities Act, the age of superannuation of teachers  working
in different Universities and  colleges  of  Bihar  would  automatically  be
enhanced to 65 years.  The focus is, therefore, on whether in  view  of  the
Scheme mentioned in  the  aforesaid  letter  of  31.12.2008,  not  only  the
Central Universities and colleges, which were bound by the UGC  Regulations,
but the different States and institutions situated therein  would  be  bound
to accept the Scheme, as set out in the said letter of 31.12.2008.   As  has
been mentioned hereinbefore, the  Scheme  envisaged  in  31.12.2008,  in  no
uncertain terms, indicates that in  case  the  State  Governments  opted  to
revise the pay scales of teachers and other equivalent cadres covered  under
the Scheme, financial assistance from the Central Government to  such  State
Governments would be to the extent of  80%  of  the  additional  expenditure
involved in the implementation of the revision.  The Scheme  also  indicates
that the State Government which opted for revision of pay scales would  have
to meet the remaining  20%  of  the  additional  expenditure  from  its  own
sources.  The third consideration is that such  financial  assistance  would
be  provided  for  the  period  from  1.1.2006  to  31.3.2010,   and   that,
thereafter, the entire liability on account of revision  of  pay  scales  of
the University and college teachers would have  to  be  taken  over  by  the
State Government with  effect  from  1.4.2010.   The  fourth  and  the  most
important condition  stipulated  by  the  Commission  was  that  payment  of
Central  assistance  for  implementing  the  Scheme  was  subject   to   the
conditions that the entire Scheme of revision of pay scales,  together  with
all the conditions to be laid down by the UGC, by  way  of  Regulations  and
other guidelines, would have to be implemented by the State  Government  and
Universities and Colleges coming under their jurisdiction,  as  a  composite
scheme, emphasis supplied, without any modification except in regard to  the
date of implementation  and  scales  of  pay  mentioned  hereinabove.   This
entailed and included the enhancement of age of such teachers to  65  years.
In other words, along with the enhancement of pay, of  which  80%  would  be
borne by the Commission, the other condition of the Commission was that  the
age of the teachers would be enhanced to 65 years, and that the balance  20%
of the expenditure would have  to  be  borne  by  the  State  from  its  own
resources till 31.3.2010, and, thereafter, the entire burden of  expenditure
would have to be borne by the State.

19.   It appears that the States of West  Bengal,  Uttar  Pradesh,  Haryana,
Punjab and Madhya Pradesh implemented the Scheme  without  waiting  for  the
UGC Regulations, which were framed  only  on  30.6.2010,  whereas  the  said
Scheme was implemented by the aforesaid States long before  the  said  date.
It is when the reimbursement of 80% of the expenses was sought for from  the
Central Government, that the problems  arose,  since  in  keeping  with  the
composite  scheme,  the  concerned  States  had  not  enhanced  the  age  of
superannuation simultaneously.  The Central Government took the  stand  that
since the Scheme in its composite form had not been given effect to  by  the
States concerned, the question of reimbursement of 80% of the  expenses  did
not arise.  This is one of the core issues, which has arisen in these  cases
for decision.

20.   The ripple effect of the stand taken by  the  Central  Government  was
felt all over the  country  and,  accordingly,  matters  were  moved  before
different High Courts which have  ultimately  come  up  to  this  Court  for
hearing on such common issues.

21.   The lead case, however, is that of Prof. (Dr.) Jagdish Prasad  Sharma,
who has moved against the judgment of the Division Bench of the  Patna  High
Court on several grounds, including the grounds indicated hereinabove.   One
of the other grounds taken as far as the Patna cases are  concerned,  is  in
regard to the interpretation of Section 64(a) of the Patna  University  Act,
1976, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2006,  and  Section  67(a)  of  the
Bihar  State  Universities  Act,  1976,  introduced  by  the   Bihar   State
Universities (Amendment) Act, 2006, which has been  reproduced  hereinabove.
Learned counsel for the Appellants has claimed that although  in  the  first
part of the two amended provisions, it has been indicated that the  date  of
retirement of a teaching employee of the University or college would be  the
date on which he attains the  age  of  62  years,  the  said  condition  was
purportedly watered down by the addition of the further condition  that  the
date of retirement of a teaching employee would be the same, which would  be
decided by  the  University  Grants  Commission  in  future.   It  has  been
contended that on a construction of the aforesaid  provision,  it  is  amply
clear that though when the amendment was effected it was  the  intention  of
the Legislature that the age  of  superannuation  should  be  62  years,  no
finality was attached to  the  same,  since  the  final  decision  regarding
superannuation lay with any decision that might be taken by  the  University
Grants Commission in future.  It has been contended that  since  a  decision
had been taken by the Ministry of Human Resource Development as far back  on
23.3.2007 to enhance the age of superannuation from 62 to  65  years,  which
was also subsequently recommended by the Commission in  its  452nd  meeting,
where a conscious decision was taken to implement  the  Report  of  the  Pay
Review  Committee  recommending  the  age  of  superannuation  to  65  years
throughout the country whether in a State or central University  or  whether
in a college or in a University, it was incumbent on  the  State  Government
to implement the said recommendation of the  University  Grants  Commission,
subsequently endorsed by the Department of  Higher  Education,  Ministry  of
Human Resource Development, Government of India.

22.   Appearing for the Appellants, Mr. Ajit  Kumar  Sinha,  learned  Senior
Advocate, submitted that Section 11 of the UGC Act provides that all  orders
and decisions of the Commission are to be authenticated by the signature  of
the Chairman.  It was submitted that Section 12 of the UGC Act made  further
provision that it would be the general duty of the Commission  to  take,  in
consultation with the University or other concerned bodies, all  such  steps
as it thought necessary for the promotion  and  coordination  of  University
education  and  for  the  determination  and  maintenance  of  standards  of
teaching,  examination  and  research  in  the  Universities.    Mr.   Sinha
submitted that it would thus be apparent  that  the  Commission  could  take
decisions which were independent of its power  to  frame  Regulations  under
Section 26 or to issue Notifications under Section 3 of the Act.  Mr.  Sinha
submitted that the State of Bihar was, therefore, bound to  acknowledge  the
age of superannuation as 65  years  with  effect  from  31.12.2010  for  the
Appellants.

23.   Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, who  appeared  in  some  of
the matters, reiterated the submissions made by Mr. Sinha and  re-emphasized
the fact that  on  7.2.2011,  the  Government  of  Bihar  had  accepted  the
enhancement of age from 62 to 65 years for those  who  were  in  service  on
30.6.2010.  Mr. Ranjit Kumar submitted that the  judgment  of  the  Division
Bench impugned in these proceedings does not suffer from any infirmity  and,
therefore, did not warrant any interference.

24.   The next set of cases related to the State of  Kerala  with  Mr.  K.K.
Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the  Appellants  in  Civil
Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 12990-12992  of  2011.   Mr.  Venugopal’s
stand was different from those of  Mr.  Ajit  Kumar  Sinha  and  Mr.  Ranjit
Kumar,  learned  Senior  Advocates,  and  supported  the   action   of   the
Commission.  Mr. Venugopal submitted that the Kerala University  Act,  1974,
and the Mahatma Gandhi University Statutes, 1997, inter  alia  provided  for
the age of superannuation at 60 years.  In the affiliated colleges, the  age
of superannuation was fixed at 55 years.  Mr. Venugopal submitted  that  the
stand taken by the State of Kerala was a little  different  from  the  stand
taken by the other States, since there were a large number of qualified  and
eligible persons who were unemployed and were waiting  for  employment,  who
would ultimately fall prey to frustration if the services of those  who  had
superannuated at  the  age  of  62  years  were  to  be  continued,  thereby
depriving  eligible  candidates   waiting   to   be   employed.    In   such
circumstances, the State of Kerala was not interested in increasing the  age
of superannuation from 62 years to 65 years.  Referring  to  the  letter  of
the Ministry of Human  Resource  Development,  Government  of  India,  dated
31.12.2008,  Mr.  Venugopal   contended   that   in   all   Centrally-funded
institutions  a  general  direction  had  been  given  that   the   age   of
superannuation would be 65 years in place of 62 years.

25.    Mr.  Venugopal  further  urged  that  the  Regulations  made  by  the
Commission  were  applicable  to  Centrally-funded  institutions  and   also
included by reference the entirety of the Scheme of 31.12.2008, as  part  of
the  Regulations  and  made  it  applicable  to  State  institutions.    Mr.
Venugopal urged that the UGC Regulations  being  Central  legislation  under
Entry 66 List I of the Seventh Schedule  to  the  Constitution,  they  would
have primacy over the executive and State  laws  and  the  Government  Order
dated 10.12.2010 was liable to be struck down.

26.   While referring to the scope of  Entry  66,  List  I  of  the  Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, Mr. Venugopal  referred  to  the  decision  of
this Court in the University of Delhi Vs. Raj  Singh  [(1994)  Suppl  3  SCC
516], wherein it was held that the Regulations  of  the  Commission  in  the
said  case  would  not  be  binding  on  the  University  of   Delhi   being
recommendatory and did not impinge upon the  University’s  power  to  select
its teachers.  However, if the  University  chose  not  to  accept  the  UGC
Regulations, it would lose its grant from the UGC.

27.   During the course of his submissions, Mr. Venugopal  referred  to  the
order issued by the  Government  of  Kerala  in  the  Higher  Education  (C)
Department on 10.12.2010 for implementation of the UGC Regulations  2010  on
minimum qualifications for appointment of teachers, other academic staff  in
Universities and colleges and measures for the maintenance of  standards  in
higher education.  The Government Order further  provided  that  the  matter
had been examined in detail and the Government was,  therefore,  pleased  to
approve  and  to  implement  the  Regulations  as  such.   The  Regulations,
therefore, were to come into force from  18.9.2010  on  the  date  of  their
publication in the Government of India Gazette.  All the  Universities  were
directed  to  incorporate  the  UGC  Regulations  in  their   Statutes   and
Regulations, within one month from the date of  the  Order.   Mr.  Venugopal
joined issue with the contents of paragraph  6  of  the  said  Order,  which
provides  that  where  there  were  any  provisions   in   the   Regulations
inconsistent with the provisions in the Government Order, read as the  first
paper, the said Government  Order  would  override  the  provisions  in  the
Regulations to the extent of such inconsistency.   Mr.  Venugopal  submitted
that executive directions cannot override the statutory  provisions  and  it
was the  statutory  provisions  which  would  prevail  over  such  executive
directions.  Consequently,  the  UGC  Regulations  would,  in  these  cases,
prevail over the Orders of the Executive government.   In  this  connection,
Mr.  Venugopal  referred  to  the  decision  of   this   Court   in   Paluru
Ramkrishnaiah Vs. Union of India [(1989) 2 SCC 541], wherein relying on  two
earlier decisions of this Court  in  B.N.  Nagarajan  Vs.  State  of  Mysore
[(1966) 3 SCR 682] and Sant Ram Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan [(1968) 1  SCR
111], a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar  Vs.
State of Maharashtra [(1974) 1  SCC  317],  held  that  in  the  absence  of
legislative Rules it was competent  for  the  State  Government  to  take  a
decision in the exercise of its executive power under  Article  162  of  the
Constitution.  Therefore, an  executive  instruction  could  make  provision
only for a matter which was not covered by  the  Rules  and  such  executive
instructions could  not  override  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Rules.
Accordingly, the learned counsel submitted that the Government  Order  dated
10.12.2010 was liable to be struck down.

28.   Mr. Venugopal also referred to the decision of this Court in the  case
of the Gujarat University, Ahmedabad Vs. Krishna Ranganath  Mudholkar  [1963
Suppl 1 SCR 112], wherein it was inter alia observed as follows:
           “The State has the power to prescribe the syllabi and courses of
           study in the institutions named in Entry  66  (but  not  falling
           within entries 63 to 65) and as an incident thereof it  has  the
           power to indicate the medium  in  which  instruction  should  be
           imparted. But the Union Parliament has an overriding legislative
           power to ensure that the syllabi and courses of study prescribed
           and the medium selected do not impair standards of education  or
           render the co-ordination of such  standards  either  on  an  All
           India or other basis impossible or even difficult. Thus,  though
           the powers of the Union and of the State are  in  the  Exclusive
           Lists, a degree of overlapping is inevitable. It is not possible
           to lay down any general test which would afford a  solution  for
           every question which might arise on this head. On the' one hand,
           it is certainly within the province of the State Legislature  to
           prescribe syllabi and  courses  of  study  and,  of  course,  to
           indicate the medium or media of instruction. On the other  hand,
           it is also within the power of the Union to legislate in respect
           of media of  instruction  so  as  to  ensure  co-ordination  and
           determination of standards, that is  to  ensure  maintenance  or
           improvement of standards.  The  fact  that  the  Union  has  not
           legislated, or refrained from legislating to the full extent  of
           its powers does not invest the State with the power to legislate
           in respect of a matter  assigned  by  the  Constitution  to  the
           Union. It  does  not,  however,  follow  that  even  within  the
           permitted  relative  fields  there  might  not  be   legislative
           provisions in enactments made  each  in  pursuance  of  separate
           exclusive and distinct powers which  may  conflict.  Then  would
           arise the question of repugnancy and paramountcy which may  have
           to be resolved on the application of the "doctrine of  pith  and
           substance" of the impugned enactment. The validity of the  State
           legislation on University education and as regards the education
           in technical and  scientific  institutions  not  falling  within
           Entry 64 of List I would have to  be  judged  having  regard  to
           whether it impinges on the field reserved for  the  Union  under
           Entry 66. In other words,  the  validity  of  State  legislation
           would depend upon whether it prejudicially affects co-ordination
           and determination of standards, but not upon  the  existence  of
           some  definite  Union  legislation  directed  to  achieve   that
           purpose. If  there  be  Union  legislation  in  respect  of  co-
           ordination and  determination  of  standards,  that  would  have
           paramountcy over the State law by virtue of the  first  part  of
           Art. 254(1); even if that power be not exercised  by  the  Union
           Parliament  the  relevant  legislative  entries  being  in   the
           exclusive lists, a State law  trenching  upon  the  Union  field
           would still be invalid.”

      Mr. Venugopal, therefore, contended that  the  UGC  Regulations  would
have an overriding effect over the Government Order  dated  10.12.2010  and,
in any event, the U.G.C. could not abdicate its authority  regarding  higher
education to the States.

29.   Learned counsel appearing for the Appellants in Civil Appeals  arising
out of SLP (C) Nos. 10765-69  of  2011  and  learned  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of other Appellants, in relation  to  the  matters  relating  to  the
State of Kerala, adopted Mr. Venugopal’s submissions and it was pointed  out
by Mrs. V.P. Seemanthini that there was  a  marked  difference  between  the
2000 Regulations framed by the Commission and the subsequent Regulations  of
2010.  It was submitted by her that  while  the  2000  Regulations  did  not
provide for any age of superannuation, in the 2010 Regulations, there  is  a
mandate to the State Government to follow the same.

30.   However, appearing for the Appellants in Civil Appeal arising  out  of
SLP(C) No. 23275 of  2010,  Dr.  K.P.  Kylasanatha  Pillay,  learned  Senior
Advocate, took a different stand from that of  Mr.  Venugopal.   He  pointed
out that the Appellants were all Selection Grade Lecturers  and  Readers  of
Sree Narayana College, Kollam, an aided institution situated  in  the  State
of Kerala.  Referring to the Scheme formulated by  the  Central  Government,
which also included the question relating  to  age  of  superannuation,  Dr.
Pillay reiterated that in order to meet a situation arising out of  shortage
of teachers in Universities and other  teaching  institutions,  the  age  of
superannuation for teachers in Central educational institutions had  already
been enhanced to 65 years.  Dr.  Pillay  urged  that  the  benefits  of  the
package scheme which was implemented with effect from 1.1.2006, relating  to
enhancement of age of superannuation  to  65  years,  should  also  be  made
available to the Appellants.  Dr. Pillay  submitted  that  so  long  as  the
Appellants had been excluded from the Pay Revision of the State  Government,
as governed by the UGC Scheme, they had been  placed  in  a  disadvantageous
position.

31.   Appearing  for  the  State  of  Kerala,  Ms.  Bina  Madhavan,  learned
Advocate, contended that under Article 309 of the  Constitution,  the  State
Government is empowered to frame its own Rules and Regulations in regard  to
service conditions of its employees.  Furthermore, Section 2 of  the  Kerala
Public Service Commission Act, 1968, empowers the State Government  to  make
Rules either prospectively or retrospectively to  regulate  the  recruitment
and conditions of service for persons appointed to the Public  Services  and
posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala.   Ms.  Madhavan
submitted that under the Kerala Service Rules, 1958, enacted  by  the  State
Government under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the age  of
retirement  of  teachers  in  colleges  has  been  fixed  to  be  55  years.
Subsequently, however, by G.O.P. No.170/12/Fin. dated 22.3.2012, the age  of
compulsory  retirement  was  enhanced  to  56   years   and   the   age   of
superannuation has been enhanced to  60  years.   Ms.  Madhavan  urged  that
having regard to the UGC Regulations dated 30.6.2010, a decision  was  taken
to revise the scales of pay and other service conditions, including the  age
of superannuation in Central Universities and other institutions  maintained
and funded by the University Grants Commission, strictly in accordance  with
the decision of the Central Government.  However, the revised scales of  pay
and age of superannuation, as provided  under  paragraph  2.1.10  and  under
paragraph 2.3.1, will also be extended to Universities, colleges  and  other
higher educational institutions  coming  under  the  purview  of  the  State
legislature  and  maintained  by  the  State  Governments,  subject  to  the
implementation of the Scheme as a  composite  one  as  contemplated  in  the
Regulations.

32.   Ms. Madhavan contended that the State Governments were not  under  any
compulsion to adopt the UGC Scheme, but could do so if they wanted to.   Ms.
Madhavan  emphasized  that  neither  the  pay  scales   nor   the   age   of
superannuation  stood  revived  automatically,  without  the  Scheme   being
accepted by the State Government.  Ms. Madhavan also urged that  Section  26
of  the  University  Grants  Commission  Act,  1956,  which   empowers   the
Commission to make Regulations, does not authorize the  Commission  to  make
Regulations in regard  to  service  conditions  of  teaching  staff  in  the
Universities,  including  the  age  of  retirement.   According  to  learned
counsel, the role of the  UGC  is  only  to  prescribe  academic  standards,
qualifications required for the teaching staff,  facilities  required  in  a
higher education institutions, etc. Hence, it can  in  no  circumstances  be
contended that the rule making power  of  the  Commission  empowered  it  to
prescribe conditions of service in relation to State  Government  employees,
which is the prerogative of the State Government.

33.  Ms. Madhavan also  urged  that  in  its  affidavit  filed  in  SLP  (C)
No.10783 of 2011, the Commission had clearly stated that it  would  be  open
to the State Government or other competent authority to adopt  the  decision
or to take any decision as it  considered  appropriate  in  respect  of  the
superannuation  of  the  teachers  in   higher   and   technical   education
institutions under their purview,  with  the  approval  of  the  appropriate
competent authority.  As a result,  there  was  no  repugnancy  between  the
Regulations framed by the Commission and  the  Rules  framed  by  the  State
Government.  Referring to Section 20 of the UGC Act, Ms. Madhavan  contended
that the same provided that the Commission, in discharge  of  its  functions
under the Act, shall be guided by such directions  on  questions  of  policy
relating to national services,  as  may  be  given  to  it  by  the  Central
Government and if any dispute arose between the Central Government  and  the
Commission as to whether a question is or not a question of policy  relating
to national policy, the decision of the Central Government shall  be  final.
Ms. Madhavan also urged that the Central Government had by its letter  dated
14th August, 2012, clarified the position and had made  it  clear  that  the
question of enhancement of the age of retirement is exclusively  within  the
domain of the policy-making powers of the State  Governments  and  that  the
condition of enhancement of the  age  of  superannuation  to  65  years,  as
mentioned in the Ministry’s letter  dated  31.12.2008,  may  be  treated  as
withdrawn for the purpose of seeking reimbursement of the Central  share  of
arrears to be paid to the State University and College  teachers.  According
to Ms. Madhavan, the  Central  Government  had  itself  clarified  that  the
Scheme is not a composite one and the word ‘composite’  is  with  regard  to
financial  assistance  provided  by  the  Central  Government  and  was  not
connected with the  age  of  superannuation  which  was  incidental  to  the
Scheme.

34.   The other learned counsel appearing  for  the  different  Universities
and educational institutions generally adopted Mr. Venugopal’s  submissions,
but while doing so, added one or two points of their own.

35.   Mr.  S.R.  Singh,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  the
Appellants in Civil  Appeal  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  No.16523  of  2011,
reiterated Mr. Venugopal’s submissions relating  to  Entry  66  List  I  and
Entry 25 in List III and urged that the powers under Entry 66  List  I  were
vested in the Central Government and  could  not  be  sub-delegated  to  the
States under Entry 25 in List III, which, in any event, was not  permissible
in law.  Mr. Singh contended that the same would be evident on a reading  of
Section 12(j)  and  Section  27  of  the  UGC  Act,  1956,  which  made  the
Commission the repository of  powers  for  advancing  the  cause  of  higher
education in India.

36.    Mr. S. Chandra  Shekhar,  learned  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  the
University in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.16523 of 2011 and  other
batch matters, urged that the University Statutes provided 62 years  as  the
age of superannuation and there was no right  available  to  the  Appellants
which could be enforced by a writ of mandamus.   Mr.  Chandra  Shekhar  also
submitted  that  the  Commission  had  no  power  to  enhance  the  age   of
superannuation as a condition of service.

37.     Mr.  P.S.  Patwalia,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared   in
SLP(C)Nos.9198-9221/2011 and other matters relating to the State  of  Punjab
and the Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh,  while  adopting  Mr.  Venugopal’s
submissions regarding the binding nature  of  the  UGC  Regulations,  relied
upon the Constitution Bench decision of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Dr.
Preeti Srivastava Vs. State of M.P. [(1999)  7  SCC  120],  wherein  it  was
observed that when there was  an  existing  Central  legislation,  the  same
would be binding in the absence of any  other  legislation  by  the  States.
Mr. Patwalia also urged that the Scheme was a composite scheme and ought  to
have been accepted in its totality and  despite  the  fact  that  the  State
Government had accepted the grant of 80% of the expenses, which was part  of
the composite scheme, it ought to have also accepted the other part  of  the
Scheme relating to enhancement of the  age  of  teachers  in  the  different
Universities in Punjab, from 62 to 65 years.  By not  doing  so,  the  State
had caused severe prejudice to the teachers who would  have  otherwise  been
entitled to retire at the age of 65 years and not 62  years.   Mr.  Patwalia
submitted a copy of the Report of the Task Force  on  Faculty  Shortage  and
Design of Performance Appraisal System published by the  Ministry  of  Human
Resource Development, Government of India, in July, 2011,  and  pointed  out
that generally across the country on an average about 35% of  the  posts  of
teachers in the different  Universities  and  Colleges  were  lying  vacant,
which was  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  deterioration  of  standards  of
education  across  the  board.   Mr.  Patwalia  urged  that  the   aforesaid
vacancies would indicate that there was an urgent need  for  appointment  of
teachers  in  the  different  schools  and  colleges  across  the   country,
including the State of Punjab.

38.    The same sentiments were expressed by  Dr.  Aman  Hingorani,  learned
Advocate appearing in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)  No.7392  of  2011.
Dr. Hingorani reiterated  Mr.  Patwalia’s  submissions  that  the  composite
scheme as offered by the University Grants Commission could not be split  in
two  by  the  States,  and  independent  of  the  control  of  the   Central
Government, the College in question has to abide by the UGC  Regulations  as
the same was funded by the Commission. Dr. Hingorani  also  urged  that  the
Appellant, Susan Anand, was made to retire at the age of 60  while  the  UGC
Notification provided that the age of  superannuation  would  be  62  years.
Dr. Hingorani urged that as was held by this Court in Pavai Ammal  Vaiyapuri
Education Trust Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu [(1994) 6 SCC 259],  since  the
institution accepted the UGC Regulations,  it  came  under  its  discipline,
which fact had not been taken into consideration in  B. Bharat Kumar &  Ors.
Vs Osmania University & Ors. [(2007) 11 SCC 58].  Dr. Hingorani  also  urged
that though  the  Appellant’s  SLP  was  dismissed  and  the  Appellant  had
attained the age of superannuation, under the orders of the High Court,  she
was allowed to rejoin her duties in the college. It was submitted  that  her
case was required to be treated separately from the  others  on  account  of
the special facts involved and that having continued in  service  by  virtue
of the Court’s orders, she was entitled to the benefits of  any  order  that
may be passed in favour of enhancement of the age of superannuation from  62
to 65 years.

39.   Appearing for  the  State  of  Haryana,  Dr.  Monika  Gosain,  learned
Advocate, restated what had been stated by the other  learned  counsel  that
the State of Haryana was not bound by the UGC scheme as it had not  accepted
the  “composite  scheme”  of  the  Commission.  Supplementing  Dr.  Gosain’s
submissions, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Advocate, appearing  for  the
State of Punjab, submitted that the letter from the Government of  India  to
all the States made it clear that unless the composite scheme as offered  by
the UGC was accepted, the payment of money under the  Scheme  would  not  be
forthcoming.  It was, however, submitted that in some cases, the  Government
of Haryana had voluntarily enhanced the age of superannuation  to  65  years
and notified to the colleges recognized under Section 2(f).

40.   As far as the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No.1631  of  2012  and
four  connected  matters  are  concerned,  Mr.  C.S.N.  Mohan  Rao,  learned
Advocate, appearing for the Appellants, adopted the submissions made by  Mr.
K.K. Venugopal and reiterated the position that despite having accepted  the
composite package, the State had not accepted the enhancement  of  age  from
62 to 65 years, causing  severe  prejudice  to  the  Appellants  and  others
similarly situated.

41.   Similarly, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Advocate,  appearing  for  the
Appellants in Civil Appeals arising out of  SLP(C)  Nos.6915-6923  of  2012,
adopted Mr. Venugopal’s submissions and also relied on the decision  in  the
case of B. Bharat Kumar (supra). Ms. Bhati submitted that on behalf  of  the
State of Rajasthan a letter had been written to the  Registrar  of  all  the
Universities in the State of  Rajasthan,  indicating  that  considering  the
huge problem of unemployment of youth in the State, the  State  had  decided
not to increase the age of superannuation of teachers beyond 60 years.   Ms.
Bhati  referred  to  the  Report  of  the  Chaddha  Committee,  wherein  the
aforesaid stand had been refuted and the  said  Committee  recommended  that
the age of superannuation of teachers should be 65 years on a uniform  basis
throughout the country, whether working in a State or Central University  or
College. Learned counsel urged that the benefits which  had  been  conferred
by  the  UGC  Regulations,  could  not  be  taken  away  by   a   subsequent
legislation.  In the other cases relating to the  State  of  Rajasthan,  the
Petitioner adopted not only Mr.  Venugopal’s  submissions,  but  also  those
made by Ms. Bhati.

42.   Learned counsel appearing in  Civil  Appeals  arising  out  of  SLP(C)
Nos.18218-18226 of 2012 and 21396 of 2012  from  Odisha,  also  adopted  the
submissions made by Mr. K.K. Venugopal and submitted  that  the  UGC  scheme
having been conceived under Entry 66, List I of the Seventh Schedule to  the
Constitution, would have an overriding effect over the State legislation.

43.   Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  the
State of Uttrakhand, submitted that  the  conditions  of  service  in  State
universities could not be controlled by  the  University  Grants  Commission
and even on receipt of 80% of the expenses to be incurred  by  the  Colleges
the State’s powers under the statutes  were  not  taken  away.   Mr.  Dinesh
Dwivedi submitted in detail with regard to the  ramifications  of  Entry  66
List I as also Entry 11 of List II prior  to  the  42nd  Amendment  and  its
substitution by way of Entry 25 in List III.  The  ultimate  result  of  Mr.
Dwivedi's submission is that the statute does not use  two  different  words
to denote the same thing.  Besides the language in the Constitution  has  to
be understood in a common sense way and in common parlance, as was  observed
in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. &  Ors.
[(1990) 1 SCC 109].  Learned counsel also  submitted  that  in  the  present
case,  when  the  dominant  Legislature  has  legislated,   any   incidental
encroachment has to give way.  Moreover, no incidental or  ancillary  powers
could be read into Entry 66 as Entry 32 was  already  occupying  the  filed.
Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the 2000 Regulations framed by the UGC  were  not
applicable to  the  Pant  Nagar  University,  since  being  an  agricultural
institution, the standards and norms of the Indian Council  of  Agricultural
Research would apply.  Mr. Dwivedi lastly contended that in  regard  to  the
provisions of Secions 12, 14, 25 and 26 of the UGC Act, the said  provisions
could not be read so widely as to enable the Commission to ride  rough  shod
over the State laws.  Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the regulations, in so  far
as  they  seek  to  prescribe  conditions  of  service,  including  age   of
retirement, are illegal and beyond the legislative powers of  the  Union  or
the Commission, in the event they relate to the teachers and  staff  of  the
State university and institutions.  The 2010 Regulations as  framed  by  the
UGC could not, therefore, be enforced on unwilling States  in  view  of  the
federal structure of our Constitution.



44.   Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counselm  who  appeared  for  the
Babajan Badesab Nandyal and others, the Appellants in Civil Appeals  arising
out of SLP(C) Nos.32748-762 of 2011, submitted  that  the    impugned  order
was contrary to the law as laid down by this Court in the case of  Annamalai
University Vs. Secretary to  Govt.  Information  and  Tourism  Department  &
Ors.[(2009) 4 SCC 590] and the University  of  Delhi  Vs.  Raj  Singh  [1994
Supp. 3 SCC 516], in which this Court had held that the  provisions  of  the
UGC Act were binding on all the Universities and the Regulations  framed  by
the UGC in terms of clauses (e), (f), (g) and  (h)  of  sub-section  (1)  of
Section 26 which were of wide amplitude and were mandatory  in  nature.   He
also urged that the Division Bench of the High Court had  failed  to  notice
that the Government of India letter dated 31.12.2008 had  been  included  as
'Appendix-I' to the UGC Regulations, 2010, which made  the  Scheme  provided
therein as statutory and binding.  It was also urged  that  the  High  Court
had not really considered the provisions of Section 26(g) of the  above  Act
which empowered the Commission to regulate the maintenance of standards  and
the coordination of work or facilities  in  Universities.   Learned  counsel
submitted  that  all  factors  relevant  for  the  purpose  of   nourishing,
sustaining and enhancing the quality of human resource have been duly  taken
note of by the Commission.  Mr. Venkataramani submitted  that  the  question
of fixing the date of retirement of a teacher  were  restricted  within  the
framework of University  legislation,  since  the  age  of  retirement   was
intrinsically related to establishment and realization  of  higher  standard
and quality of imparting eduction and could not  be  confined  to  parochial
aspirations.  Mr. Venkataramani submitted that the  UGC  Regulations,  2010,
are binding on the State Governments and the  Universities  to  enhance  the
age of superannuation of teachers to 65 years.  Relying on the  decision  of
this Court in the  Annamalai  University  case  (supra),  Mr.  Venkataramani
urged that the provisions of the UGC Act were binding on  all  Universities,
whether  conventional  or  open.   It's  powers  are  very  broad  and   the
Regulations framed by it under Section 26 were of wide  amplitude  and  even
as subordinate legislation they became part  of  the  UGC  Act  having  been
validly made.  Learned counsel also referred to the decision of  this  Court
in Prem Chand Jain Vs. R.K. Chhabra [(1984) 2 SCC 302], wherein  this  Court
held that it was  well  settled  that  entries  incorporated  in  the  Lists
covered by Schedule Seven are not powers  of  legislation,  but  “field”  of
legislation.



45.   In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.36126  of  2011,  Mr.  Jagjit
Singh Chhabra, learned Advocate appearing for the State of Punjab,  referred
to the letter dated 23.3.2007 written on behalf of the Government  of  India
to the Commission regarding enhancement of the age of the teachers  from  62
to 65 years and urged that the said Scheme was voluntary and not binding  on
the State and that when a sufficient number of teachers were  available,  it
would be counterproductive to insist that the State should be  compelled  to
accept the UGC’s option in its totality when the same has been left  to  the
discretion of the State by the Regulations themselves.   Mr.  Chhabra  urged
that the conditions of service  of  teachers  in  a  State  were  completely
within the jurisdiction of the State and  such  jurisdiction  could  not  be
overridden by the UGC Regulations, without the consent of the State.



46.   In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioners and  the
Appellants in these cases, Mr.  Rakesh  Dwivedi,  learned  Senior  Advocate,
appearing for the UGC, submitted  that  after  the  letter  written  by  the
Central  Government  on  27.7.1998,  informing  the  States  regarding   the
revision of pay scales and the provision  of  financial  assistance  to  the
extent of 80% of the additional  expenditure  for  the  period  1.1.1996  to
31.3.2000, whereafter the entire liability would have to be  taken  over  by
the State Governments, it was upto the State Governments  to  take  recourse
to the scheme as framed.  By another letter dated  27.7.1998,  the  UGC  was
informed that the Central Government had revised the pay scales of  teachers
in the Central Universities on the recommendations of UGC  that  the  scheme
was of a composite nature and all the conditions of the  scheme  would  have
to be fulfilled if the States were  to  avail  of  the  offer  of  financial
assistance to the extent of  80%  of  the  additional  expenditure  for  the
period indicated hereinabove.  However, although, the State  of  Kerala  had
issued an order dated 21.12.1999,  accepting  the  revised  pay  scales,  it
continued to adopt the existing Rules of the State Government,  wherein  the
age of retirement remained 55 years. Mr. Dwivedi reiterated  that  following
the  recommendations  of  the  5th  Central  Pay  Commission,  the   Central
Government  had,  by  its  order  dated  23.3.2007,  revised  the   age   of
superannuation of teachers to 65 years and even reemployment  was  permitted
upto the age of 70 years.  The only catch was that such change  would  apply
to centrally-funded higher and  technical  educational  institutions  coming
under the purview of the Ministry of  Human  Resource  Development  and  the
Notification would be issued by the Commission.

47.   While reiterating the submissions made on behalf  of  the  Petitioners
relating to the UGC Regulations,  2010  and  Clause  2.1  of  the  Annexures
thereto, Mr. Dwivedi urged that the provisions of the UGC Act,  particularly
Section 12 thereof, are not confined to coordination  and  determination  of
standards in institutions for higher education and  research  but  that  the
powers vested in the Commission contemplated a larger role in regard to  the
promotion  of  university  education.   It  was  further  urged   that   the
Commission was empowered to give grants,  as  it  might  deem  necessary  or
appropriate, for the development of Universities and  could  also  recommend
measures necessary for their improvement.  Mr. Dwivedi  contended  that  the
UGC Act is not entirely confined to Entry  66,  List  I,  but  it  was  also
entitled to act under Entry  25  of  the  Concurrent  List  of  the  Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution.  Mr. Dwivedi urged that since  Parliament  was
competent to legislate both in terms of Entry 66, List I and Entry 25,  List
III, it could invoke both the fields of legislation.  Mr. Dwivedi  submitted
that a competent legislature could draw sustenance from more than one  entry
while legislating.  However, the aforesaid question was not required  to  be
gone into since the Commission had made an offer in the  Scheme,  which  was
left to the State to adopt or not to adopt.  Mr. Dwivedi  further  submitted
that with regard to the Concurrent field, there was no compulsion either  on
the  Parliament  or  the  authority  created  under  Central   Statutes   to
exhaustively legislate or to exercise the enabling power with regard to  the
Concurrent field. It would be open  to  the  Parliament  or  the  Commission
either to enforce a particular scheme in the State  or  leave  it  open  for
them to adopt the scheme through their laws and executive  orders.  In  such
cases, the State Governments and State Legislatures exercise plenary  powers
to decide whether the  Scheme  was  to  be  adopted  or  not.   Mr.  Dwivedi
submitted that it is also settled law that  unless  the  enabling  power  is
completely expanded, the legislative field in the  Concurrent  List  remains
available to the States.

48.   Mr. Dwivedi further urged that  different  legislations  by  different
States are inherent  in  a  federal  exercise  of  power.   The  differences
arising as a result of federal distribution of  power  by  the  Constitution
and exercise of  such  power  by  States,  cannot  be  a  ground  to  allege
discrimination.  As was held in S.R. Bommai Vs. Union  of  India  [(1994)  3
SCC 1], federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution.  In  the  present
case, the UGC Act and the Regulations of 2010 and the Scheme of the  Central
Government have been made applicable to all the States uniformly.  In  fact,
no age of retirement has also  been  fixed  by  the  Commission.   Even  for
Central Universities, the pay  scales  have  been  revised  by  the  Central
Government and the age of superannuation has been revised  to  65  years  by
the  said  Government.   The  Scheme  was  also  finalized  by  the  Central
Government and it was also the decision of the Central Government  that  the
State should take their own decisions as to whether the Scheme  prepared  by
it should be adopted.  Mr. Dwivedi reiterated that the  UGC  Regulations  of
2010 have notified the Scheme of the Central  Government  and  it  has  been
left to the discretion of the State Governments to adopt  or  not  to  adopt
the same for its Universities, colleges and other  institutions.   The  only
challenge which had occurred is the order of the  Central  Government,  vide
its letter dated 14.8.2012, in its Ministry of Human  Resource  Development,
which delinked the financial assistance from the requirement  to  adopt  the
Central Scheme.  The Central Government took a decision that the  discretion
of the State Government should not be  fettered  by  the  extension  of  the
financial incentive.  Accordingly,  any  difference  which  might  arise  on
account of any decision of the State Government would be on account  of  the
federal scheme of the Constitution  and  not  on  account  of  any  decision
either of the Central Government or the Commission.

49.   Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the cases relied upon  by  the  Petitioners
and Appellants were all based on geographical discrimination, which  had  no
bearing with the facts of these cases  and  neither  the  UGC  Act  nor  the
Regulations of 2010, nor the Scheme of the Central Government, suffers  from
any such infirmity.  In this regard, Mr. Dwivedi  also  placed  reliance  on
the decision of this Court in T.P. George Vs State of Kerala [1992 Supp  (3)
SCC 191] and in the All India  Sainik  Schools  Employees’  Association  Vs.
Defence Minister-cum-Chairman Board of Governors,  Sainik  Schools  Society,
New Delhi [1989 Supp 1 SCC 205].  Learned counsel submitted that each  State
has its own sovereign plenary power with respect to its  territory  and  the
laws of one State could not be held to be discriminatory with  reference  to
laws of another State.  In this regard, Mr. Dwivedi referred to  and  relied
upon the decision of this Court in Javed Vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 8  SCC
369], where the  said  principle  was  considered  and  the  application  of
Article 14 of the Constitution was negated.

50.   Mr. Dwivedi concluded on the note  that  the  age  of  retirement  has
varied from State  to  State  in  respect  of  public  employment  in  State
services and this Court has always upheld the power of the State to fix  the
age of superannuation in the light of conditions  prevalent  in  the  States
and the  provision  of  jobs  to  youth  has  been  upheld  to  be  a  valid
consideration, as in the State of Kerala.



51.   On behalf of Govind Ballabh  Pant  University  in  SLP(C)  No.8153  of
2012, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Advocate,  submitted  that  Section
28(r) of the UGC Act permits the University to frame Rules  with  regard  to
service conditions of its staff, including the Rules for retirement.   Apart
from the above, it was also pointed out that the grants which  are  received
by the University are not from the UGC,  but  from  the  Indian  Council  of
Agricultural Research (ICAR).



52.    Lastly, coming to the submissions made on  behalf  of  the  State  of
Rajasthan and the State of U.P., on behalf of both the States it was  sought
to be urged that the UGC Regulations could not  control  the  power  of  the
State Governments and/or the service conditions  of  its  employees  as  the
same are to be exclusively decided by the Union or the  State,  as  provided
in Article 309 of the Constitution.  It was submitted that it had also  been
held in the Osmania University case (supra) that the fixation of the age  of
superannuation by the State Government is well within its  jurisdiction  and
neither the Scheme of the Central Government nor the  UGC  Regulations  have
any binding effect.



53.   Though, at first blush, the scope of the appeals seemed to be  limited
and confined to the question as to whether the  Regulations  framed  by  the
University Grants Commission under  Section  26  of  the  University  Grants
Commission Act, 1956, were binding on the States and State-funded and  other
Universities and colleges being run  therein,  as  the  hearing  progressed,
several other ancillary issues also came to be raised.



54.   As has been indicated hereinbefore,  the  Central  Government  enacted
the UGC Act in 1956 to coordinate and determine  standards  in  universities
and towards that end,  to  establish  a  University  Grants  Commission  for
taking all steps, as  it  thought  fit,  for  the  promotion  of  university
education and for determination and maintenance  of  standards  of  teaching
and research in  universities.   On  24th  December,  1998,  the  Commission
issued a Notification relating to revision of pay scales and  other  service
conditions.   Thereafter,  after  the  expressions  of  a  series  of  views
regarding the enhancement of the age of superannuation from  60  to  62  and
from 62 to 65 years, the Central Government  in  its  Department  of  Higher
Education, wrote to the Secretary, UGC, on 31st December, 2008, with  regard
to a scheme for revision of pay-scales  of  teachers  and  other  equivalent
cadres  in  all  the  Central   universities   and   Colleges   and   Deemed
Universities,  following  the  revision  of  pay  scales  of   the   Central
Government  employees  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Sixth  Central  Pay
Commission.



55.   One of the common submissions made on behalf of  the  Respondents  was
whether the aforesaid scheme would automatically apply  to  centrally-funded
institutions, to State universities and educational  institutions  and  also
private institutions at the State level, on account of the stipulation  that
the scheme would  have  to  be  accepted  in  its  totality.   As  indicated
hereinbefore in this judgment, the purport of the scheme was to enhance  the
pay of the teachers and other connected staff in the State universities  and
educational institutions and also to increase their  age  of  superannuation
from 62 to 65 years.  The scheme provides that if it  was  accepted  by  the
concerned State, the UGC would bear 80% of the expenses on account  of  such
enhancement in the pay structure and the remaining  20%  would  have  to  be
borne by the State.  This would  be  for  the  period  commencing  from  1st
January, 2006, till 31st March, 2010, after which the  entire  liability  on
account of revision of pay-scales would have to be taken over by  the  State
Government.  Furthermore, financial assistance from the  Central  Government
would be restricted to revision of  pay-scales  in  respect  of  only  those
posts which were in existence and had been filled  up  as  on  1st  January,
2006.  While most of the States were willing to adopt the  scheme,  for  the
purpose of receiving 80% of the salary of the teachers and other staff  from
the UGC which would reduce their liability to 20% only, they were  unwilling
to accept  the  scheme  in  its  composite  form  which  not  only  entailed
acceptance of the increase in the retirement age from 62 to  65  years,  but
also shifted the total liability in regard  to  the  increase  in  the  pay-
scales to the States, after 1st April, 2010.



56.   Another anxiety which is special to certain States, such as the  State
of Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, has also come to light during the hearing.   In
both the States,  the  problem  is  one  of  surplus-age  and  providing  an
opportunity for others to enter into service.  On behalf  of  the  State  of
Kerala, it had been  urged  that  there  was  a  large  number  of  educated
unemployed youth,  who  are  waiting  to  be  appointed,  but  by  retaining
teachers  beyond  the  age  of  62  years,  they  were  being  denied   such
opportunity.  As far as the State of U.P. is concerned, it  is  one  of  job
expectancy, similar to that prevailing in Kerala.  The State Governments  of
the said two States were, therefore, opposed to  the  adoption  of  the  UGC
scheme, although, the same has not been made compulsorily applicable to  the
universities, colleges and other  institutions  under  the  control  of  the
State authorities.



57.   To some extent there is an air of redundancy in the  prayers  made  on
behalf  of  the  Respondents  in  the   submissions   made   regarding   the
applicability of the scheme to the State and its universities, colleges  and
other educational institutions.  The elaborate arguments advanced in  regard
to the powers of the UGC to frame such  Regulations  and/or  to  direct  the
increase in the age  of  teachers  from  62  to  65  years  as  a  condition
precedent for receiving aid from the UGC, appears to have  little  relevance
to the actual issue  involved  in  these  cases.   That  the  Commission  is
empowered to frame Regulations under Section 26 of the UGC  Act,  1956,  for
the  promotion  and  coordination  of  university  education  and  for   the
determination and maintenance of  standards  of  teaching,  examination  and
research, cannot  be  denied.   The  question  that  assumes  importance  is
whether in the process of framing such  Regulations,  the  Commission  could
alter the service conditions of the employees which were entirely under  the
control of the States in regard to State  institutions.   The  authority  of
the Commission to frame Regulations with regard to  the  service  conditions
of teachers in the centrally- funded  educational  institutions  is  equally
well established.  As has been very rightly done in the  instant  case,  the
acceptance of the scheme  in  its  composite  form  has  been  left  to  the
discretion of the State Governments.  The concern of the  State  Governments
and  their  authorities  that  the  UGC  has  no  authority  to  impose  any
conditions  with  regard  to  its  educational   institutions   is   clearly
unfounded.  There is no doubt that the Regulations framed by the UGC  relate
to Entry 66 List I of the  Constitution  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution, but it does not empower the Commission to  alter  any  of  the
terms and conditions of the enactments by the States under  Article  309  of
the Constitution.  Under Entry 25 of List III,  the  State  is  entitled  to
enact its own laws with regard to the service  conditions  of  the  teachers
and other staff of the universities and colleges within the  State  and  the
same will have effect unless they are repugnant to any central  legislation.




58.   However, in the  instant  case,  the  said  questions  do  not  arise,
inasmuch as, as mentioned hereinabove, the acceptance of the scheme  in  its
composite  form  was  made  discretionary  and,  therefore,  there  was   no
compulsion on the State and  its  authorities  to  adopt  the  scheme.   The
problem lies in the desire of the State and its Authorities  to  obtain  the
benefit of 80% of the salaries of the teachers and  other  staff  under  the
scheme, without increasing the age of retirement from 62  to  65  years,  or
the subsequent condition regarding the taking over of the  scheme  with  its
financial implications from 1st April, 2010.



59.   As far as the States of Kerala  and  U.P.  are  concerned,  they  have
their own problems which are localised and  stand  on  a  different  footing
from the other States, none of whom who appear to  have  the  same  problem.
Education now being a List III subject, the State Government is  at  liberty
to frame its own laws relating  to  education  in  the  State  and  is  not,
therefore, bound to accept or follow the Regulations framed by the UGC.   It
is only natural that if they wish to adopt the  Regulations  framed  by  the
Commission under Section 26 of the UGC Act, 1956, the States  will  have  to
abide by the conditions as laid down by the Commission.



60.   That leaves us with the question which is  special  to  the  State  of
Bihar, i.e., the effect of Section 67(a) introduced  into  the  Bihar  State
Universities Act, 1976, by the Bihar  State  Universities  (Amendment)  Act,
2006, and the corresponding amendments made in  the  Patna  University  Act,
1976.  Section 67(a)  has  been  extracted  hereinbefore  in  Paragraph  13.
While, on the one hand, it has been mentioned that notwithstanding  anything
to the contrary  contained  in  any  Act,  Rules,  Statutes,  Regulation  or
Ordinance, the date of retirement of a teaching employee of  the  university
or of a college shall be the date on which he attains the age of  62  years,
the confusion is created by the next sentence which  further  provides  that
the date of retirement of a teaching employee would be the same which  would
be decided by the UGC.  It has been urged that the  said  provision  clearly
contemplates that in the event of  an  alteration  resulting  in  an  upward
revision of the age of superannuation, the same  would  automatically  apply
to all such teachers and staff, without any further decision  of  the  State
and its authorities in that regard.  In other words, what  has  been  sought
to be urged  is  that  when  in  regard  to  Centrally-funded  universities,
colleges and educational institutions, the age of  superannuation  has  been
increased to 65 years by the University Grants Commission, the same  has  to
uniformly apply to all universities and  colleges  throughout  the  country,
without any discrimination.  The  same  did  not  necessitate  any  separate
decision to be  taken  by  the  State  and  its  authorities  regarding  the
applicability of the decision taken by the University Grants Commission.



61.   The said submission, in our view, is not acceptable on account of  the
fact  that  in  the  first  paragraph  of  the  said  Section  it  has  been
categorically stated that the age of superannuation would be 62 years.   The
second paragraph of the said section makes it even more  clearer,  since  it
reiterates that the date of  retirement  of  non-teaching  employees,  other
than the inferior servants, shall be the date on which he  attains  the  age
of 62 years.  The first proviso also indicates that  the  university  shall,
in no case, extend the period of service of any  of  the  teaching  or  non-
teaching employee after  he  attains  the  age  of  62  years.   The  second
proviso, however,  states  that  even  after  retirement,  teachers  may  be
reappointed in appropriate cases up to the age of 65  years  in  the  manner
laid down in the Statutes  made  in  this  behalf  in  accordance  with  the
guidelines of the Commission.



62.   As against the above, certain writ petitions have been  filed  in  the
Patna High Court  which rejected  the  contention  of  the  Petitioners  and
dismissed the writ petitions on the  ground  that  the  Commission  had  not
taken any conscious decision with regard to teachers and staff,  except  for
those which were  Centrally-funded.  Subsequently,  however,  since  in  its
452nd meeting the Commission took a conscious decision and recommended  that
the Report of the Pay Review Committee recommending the enhancement  of  age
of superannuation from 62 to 65 years  be  made  applicable  throughout  the
country,   fresh  writ  petitions  were  filed  in  the  Patna  High  Court,
including CWJC No.2330  of  2009,  filed  by  the  Appellants  herein.   The
learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions upon holding that  once  the
Commission had recommended that the age of superannuation be accepted as  65
years, the State Governments had no discretion but to  enhance  the  age  of
superannuation in line with the  recommendations  made  by  the  Commission.
The Division Bench subsequently reversed the finding of the  learned  Single
Judge, resulting in these Special Leave Petitions (now Appeals).



63.   Learned Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar, Mr. Gopal Singh,  had
in his submissions reiterated the views of the High  Court,  i.e.,  that  on
mere communication, the revision of the pay of teachers and increase in  the
age of superannuation would not automatically become effective and that,  in
any event, the right to alter the terms and conditions  of  service  of  the
State universities  and  colleges  were  within  the  domain  of  the  State
Government and till such time as it decided to  adopt  the  same,  the  same
would have no application  to  the  teachers  and  staff  of  the  different
educational institutions in the State.



64.   We are inclined to agree with such submission mainly  because  of  the
fact  that  in  the  amended  provisions  of  Section  67(a)  it  has   been
categorically  stated  that  the  age  of  superannuation  of   non-teaching
employees would be 62 years and, in no case, should the  period  of  service
of such non-teaching employees be extended beyond 62  years.
A  difference
had been made in regard to the teaching  faculty  whose  services  could  be
extended up to 65 years in the manner laid down in the University  Statutes.
 There is no ambiguity that  the  final  decision  to  enhance  the  age  of
superannuation of teachers within a particular State would be  that  of  the
State itself.
The right of the Commission to frame Regulations  having  the
force of law is admitted.  However, the State Governments are also  entitled
to legislate with matters relating to education under Entry 25 of List  III.
 So long as the State legislation did not encroach upon the jurisdiction  of
Parliament, the State legislation would  obviously  have  primacy  over  any
other law.  If there was any legislation enacted by the  Central  Government
under Entry 25 List III, both would have to be treated on a  par  with  each
other.
In the absence of any such legislation  by  the  Central  Government
under Entry  25  List  III,  the  Regulation  framed  by  way  of  delegated
legislation  has  to  yield  to  the  plenary  jurisdiction  of  the   State
Government under Entry 25 of List III.



65.   We are then faced with the situation
where  a  composite  scheme  has
been framed by the UGC, whereby the Commission agreed to  bear  80%  of  the
expenses incurred by the State if such scheme was to  be  accepted,  subject
to the condition that the remaining 20% of the expense would be met  by  the
State and that on and from 1st April, 2010, the State Government would  take
over  the  entire  burden  and  would  also  have  enhanced   the   age   of
superannuation of teachers and other staff  from  62  to  65  years.   
There
being no compulsion to accept and/or adopt the said scheme, the  States  are
free to decide as to whether the scheme would be adopted  by  them  or  not.
In our view, there can be no automatic application  of  the  recommendations
made by the Commission, without any conscious decision being  taken  by  the
State in this regard, on account of the  financial  implications  and  other
consequences attached to such a decision.  
The  case  of  those  Petitioners
who have claimed that they should be given the benefit of the scheme  dehors
the responsibility attached thereto, must, therefore, fail.



66.   However, within this class of institutions there is a  separate  group
where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision  to  adopt  the
scheme.  In such cases, the consequences  envisaged  in  the  scheme  itself
would automatically follow.



67.   We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the  impugned  judgment
and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in all  these  matters  in
the light of the various  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  respective
parties.  
The several Appeals, Writ  Petitions  and  the  Transferred  Case,
which involve the same questions as considered in this batch of  cases,  are
all dismissed.  
However, the Appeals filed by the State of  Uttarakhand  and
Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6724, 13747 and 14676 of  2012  are
allowed.  
As far as  the  Transfer  Petition  Nos.  1062-1068  OF  2012  are
concerned, the same are allowed and the  Transferred  Cases  are  dismissed.
The  Contempt  Petitions  are  disposed  of  by  virtue  of  this  judgment.
However, persons who have continued to work on  the  basis  of  the  interim
orders passed by this Court or any other Court,  shall  not  be  denied  the
benefit of service during  the  said  period.   
The  Appeals  and  Petitions
having  been  dismissed,  both  the  State  Authorities  and   the   Central
Authorities will be at liberty to work  out  their  remedies  in  accordance
with law.



68.   Having regard to the nature of  the  facts  involved  in  these  case,
parties shall bear their own costs.

                                                     ...................CJI.
                                                             (ALTAMAS KABIR)


                                                     .....................J.
                                                     (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)


                                                     .....................J.
                                                            (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated: July 17, 2013.

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

declaration of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as ultra vires the Constitution, and to strike down the provisions of Section 2(k) and (l) of the above Act, along with a prayer to bring the said Act in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and to direct the Respondent No. 1 to take steps to make changes in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, to bring it in line with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for administration of juvenile justice. = This being the understanding of the Government behind the enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the amendments effected thereto in 2006, together with the Rules framed thereunder in 2007, and the data available with regard to the commission of heinous offences by children, within the meaning of Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, we do not think that any interference is necessary with the provisions of the Statute till such time as sufficient data is available to warrant any change in the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules. On the other hand, the implementation of the various enactments relating to children, would possibly yield better results. 50. The Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case are, therefore, dismissed, with the aforesaid observations. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

                           published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40577                       
            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CIVIL/CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 10 OF 2013


1


2 SALIL BALI                                       … PETITIONER


                         VS.



           2 UNION OF INDIA & ANR.                            …
RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH
                  W.P.(C)NOS.14, 42, 85, 90 and 182 OF 2013
                                    WITH
                            W.P.(CRL)NO.6 OF 2013
                                     AND
                            T.C.(C)No. 82 OF 2013



                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.

1.    Seven Writ Petitions and one  Transferred  Case  have  been  taken  up
together for consideration in view of the commonality  of  the  grounds  and
reliefs prayed for therein.  While in Writ Petition  (C)  No.  14  of  2013,
Saurabh Prakash Vs. Union of India, and Writ Petition (C) No.  90  of  2013,
Vinay K. Sharma Vs. Union of India,  a  common  prayer  has  been  made  for
declaration of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act, 2000, as ultra vires the Constitution,
in Writ Petition (C) No. 10 of  2013,
Salil Bali Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No.  85  of  2013,  Krishna
Deo Prasad Vs. Union of India, Writ Petition  (C)  No.  42  of  2013,  Kamal
Kumar Pandey & Sukumar Vs. Union of India and Writ Petition (C) No.  182  of
2013, Hema Sahu Vs. Union of India, a common  prayer  has  inter  alia  been
made to strike down the provisions of Section 2(k)  and  (l)  of  the  above
Act, along with a prayer to bring  the  said  Act  in  conformity  with  the
provisions of the Constitution and to direct the Respondent No.  1  to  take
steps to make changes in  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000, to bring it in line with the  United  Nations  Standard
Minimum Rules for administration of juvenile justice.  In  addition  to  the
above, in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 6 of 2013, Shilpa Arora Sharma Vs.  Union
of India, a prayer has inter alia been made to appoint a panel  of  criminal
psychologists to determine through clinical methods whether the juvenile  is
involved in the Delhi gang rape on 16.12.2012.  Yet,  another  relief  which
has been prayed for in common during the oral submissions made on behalf  of
the Petitioners was that in offences like rape and murder, juveniles  should
be tried  under  the  normal  law  and  not  under  the  aforesaid  Act  and
protection granted to persons up to the age of 18 years under the  aforesaid
Act may be removed and that the investigating agency should be permitted  to
keep the record of the juvenile offenders to  take  preventive  measures  to
enable them to detect  repeat  offenders  and  to  bring  them  to  justice.
Furthermore, prayers have also been made in Writ Petition (Crl.)  No.  6  of
2013 and Writ Petition (C) No.  85  of  2013,  which  are  personal  to  the
juvenile accused in the Delhi gang rape case of 16.12.2012, not  to  release
him and to keep him in custody or any place of strict  detention,  after  he
was found to be a mentally abnormal  psychic  person  and  that  proper  and
detailed investigation be conducted by the CBI to ascertain his correct  age
by examining his school documents and other records and to  further  declare
that prohibition in Section 21 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and  Protection
of Children) Act, 2000, be declared unconstitutional.



2.    In most of the matters, the Writ Petitioners  appeared  in-person,  in
support of their individual cases.

3.    Writ Petition (C) No.10 of 2013, filed by Shri Salil Bali,  was  taken
up as the first matter in the bunch.   The  Petitioner  appearing  in-person
urged that it was necessary for the provisions of Section 2(k), 2(l) and  15
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,  to  be
reconsidered in the light of the spurt in criminal offences being  committed
by persons within the range of 16 to 18 years, such as the gang  rape  of  a
young woman inside a moving vehicle on 16th December,  2012,  wherein  along
with others, a juvenile, who had attained the age of 17½  years,  was  being
tried separately under the provisions of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

4.    Mr. Bali submitted that the age  of  responsibility,  as  accepted  in
India, is different from what has been accepted by other  countries  of  the
world.   But,  Mr.  Bali  also  pointed  out  that  even  in  the   criminal
jurisprudence  prevalent  in   India,   the   age   of   responsibility   of
understanding the consequences of one's actions had been  recognized  as  12
years in the Indian Penal Code.  Referring to Section 82 of  the  Code,  Mr.
Bali pointed out that the same provides that nothing is an offence which  is
done by a child under seven  years  of  age.   Mr.  Bali  also  referred  to
Section 83 of the Code, which provides that nothing is an offence  which  is
done by a child above seven years of age  and  under  twelve,  who  has  not
attained sufficient maturity  of  understanding  to  judge  the  nature  and
consequences of his conduct on a particular occasion.  Mr. Bali,  therefore,
urged  that  even  under  the  Indian  Criminal  Jurisprudence  the  age  of
understanding has been fixed at twelve years, which according  to  him,  was
commensurate with the thinking  of  other  countries,  such  as  the  United
States of America, Great Britain and Canada.



5.    In regard to Canada, Mr. Bali referred to the Youth  Criminal  Justice
Act, 2003, as  amended  from  time  to  time,  where  the  age  of  criminal
responsibility has been fixed at twelve years.  Referring to Section  13  of
the Criminal Code of Canada, Mr. Bali submitted that the  same  is  in  pari
materia with the provisions of Section 83 of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.   In
fact, according to the Criminal Justice Delivery System in Canada,  a  youth
between the age of 14 to 17 years may be tried and sentenced as an adult  in
certain situations.  Mr. Bali also pointed  out  that  even  in  Canada  the
Youth  Criminal  Justice  Act  governs  the  application  of  criminal   and
correctional law to those who are twelve years old  or  older,  but  younger
than 18 at the time of committing the offence, and  that,  although,  trials
were to take place in a Youth Court, for certain  offences  and  in  certain
circumstances, a youth may be awarded an adult sentence.



6.     Comparing  the  position  in  USA  and  the  Juvenile   Justice   and
Delinquency Prevention Act, 1974, he urged that while in several States,  no
set standards have been provided, reliance is placed on the common  law  age
of seven in fixing the age of criminal responsibility, the lowest being  six
years in North Carolina.  The general  practice  in  the  United  States  of
America, however, is that even for such children, the  courts  are  entitled
to impose life sentences in respect of certain types of offences,  but  such
life sentences without parole were not permitted for those under the age  of
eighteen years convicted of murder or offences involving violent crimes  and
weapons violations.



7.    In England and Wales, children accused of crimes are  generally  tried
under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, as amended by Section  16(1)
of the Children and Young Persons Act,  1963.   Under  the  said  laws,  the
minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and  Wales  is  ten  years
and those below the said age are considered to be doli  incapax  and,  thus,
incapable of having any mens rea, which is  similar  to  the  provisions  of
Sections 82 and 83 of Indian Penal Code.




8.    Mr. Bali has also referred to the legal  circumstances  prevailing  in
other parts of the world wherein the  age  of  criminal  responsibility  has
been fixed between ten to sixteen years.  Mr. Bali contended that there  was
a general worldwide concern over the rising graph of  criminal  activity  of
juveniles  below  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  which  has  been  accepted
worldwide to be the age limit under which all persons were to be treated  as
children.   Mr.  Bali  sought  to  make  a  distinction  in  regard  to  the
definition of children as such in Sections 2(k) and  2(l)  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000,  and  the  level  of
maturity of the child who is capable of understanding  the  consequences  of
his actions.  He, accordingly, urged that the provisions of Sections 15  and
16 of the  Act  needed  to  be  reconsidered  and  appropriate  orders  were
required to be passed in regard to the level of  punishment  in  respect  of
heinous offences committed by children below  the  age  of  eighteen  years,
such as murder, rape,  dacoity,  etc.   Mr.  Bali  submitted  that  allowing
perpetrators of such crimes to get off with a sentence  of  three  years  at
the maximum, was not justified and a correctional course was required to  be
undertaken in that regard.



9.    Mr. Saurabh Prakash, Petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 14  of  2013,
also appeared in-person and, while endorsing the  submissions  made  by  Mr.
Bali, went a step further in suggesting that in view of  the  provisions  of
Sections 15  and  16  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000, children, as defined in the above Act,  were  not  only
taking advantage of the same, but were also  being  used  by  criminals  for
their own ends.  The Petitioner reiterated Mr. Bali's submission that  after
being awarded a maximum sentence of three years,  a  juvenile  convicted  of
heinous offences, was almost likely to become a monster in society and  pose
a great danger to others, in view of his criminal  propensities.   Although,
in the prayers to the Writ Petition, one of the reliefs prayed for  was  for
quashing the provisions of the entire Act, Mr.  Saurabh  Prakash  ultimately
urged that some of the provisions thereof were such as could  be  segregated
and struck down so as to preserve the Act as a whole.  The Petitioner  urged
that, under Article 21 of the Constitution, every citizen has a  fundamental
right to live in dignity and peace, without being subjected to  violence  by
other members of society and that by shielding  juveniles,  who  were  fully
capable of  understanding  the  consequences  of  their  actions,  from  the
sentences, as could be awarded under  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  as  far  as
adults are concerned, the State was creating a class of  citizens  who  were
not only prone to criminal activity,  but  in  whose  cases  restoration  or
rehabilitation was not possible.  Mr. Saurabh  Prakash  submitted  that  the
provisions of  Sections  15  and  16  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000,  violated  the  rights  guaranteed  to  a
citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution  and  were,  therefore,  liable
to be struck down.

10.   Mr. Saurabh Prakash also submitted that the provisions of  Section  19
of the Act, which provided for  removal  of  disqualification  attaching  to
conviction, were also illogical and were liable to be struck down.   It  was
submitted that in order to prevent repeated offences by  an  individual,  it
was necessary to maintain the  records  of  the  inquiry  conducted  by  the
Juvenile Justice Board, in relation to juveniles so that such records  would
enable the authorities concerned to assess the  criminal  propensity  of  an
individual, which would call for a different approach to  be  taken  at  the
time of inquiry.  Mr. Saurabh Prakash urged this Court to give  a  direction
to the effect that the Juvenile  Justice  Board  or  courts  or  other  high
public authorities would have the discretion to direct that in a  particular
case, the provisions of the general law would apply to a  juvenile  and  not
those of the Act.

11.    Mr.  Vivek  Narayan  Sharma,  learned  Advocate,  appeared  for   the
petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 6 of 2013, filed by one Shilpa  Arora
Sharma, and submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board should be vested  with
the discretion to impose  punishment  beyond  three  years,  as  limited  by
Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2000, in cases where a child, having full knowledge of the  consequences  of
his/her actions, commits a  heinous  offence  punishable  either  with  life
imprisonment or death.  Mr. Sharma submitted  that  such  a  child  did  not
deserve to be treated as a child and be allowed  to  re-mingle  in  society,
particularly when the identity of the child is to be  kept  a  secret  under
Sections 19  and  21  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000.  Mr. Sharma  submitted  that  in  many  cases  children
between the  ages  of  sixteen  to  eighteen  years  were,  in  fact,  being
exploited by adults to commit heinous offences who knew full well  that  the
punishment therefor would not exceed three years.



12.   Mr.  Sharma  urged  that  without  disturbing  the  other  beneficient
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2000, some of the gray areas pointed  out  could  be  addressed  in  such  a
manner as would make the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)
Act, 2000, more effective and prevent the misuse thereof.



13.   In Writ Petition (C) No. 85 of 2013, filed by Krishna Deo Prasad,  Dr.
R.R. Kishor appeared for the Petitioner and gave a detailed account  of  the
manner  in  which  the  Juvenile  Justice  Delivery  System   had   evolved.
Referring to the doctrine of doli incapax, rebuttable presumption and  adult
responsibility,  Dr.  Kishor  contended  that  even  Article  1  of  the  UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child  defines  a  child  in  the  following
terms:

           “Article 1

           For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means  every
           human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law
           applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”




14.   Dr. Kishor contended that, as pointed  out  by  Mr.  Salil  Bali,  the
expression “child” has been defined in various ways in  different  countries
all over the world.  Accordingly, the definition of a child in Section  2(k)
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,  2000,  would
depend on the existing laws in India defining a child.  Dr. Kishor  referred
to the provisions of the Child  Labour  (Prohibition  and  Regulation)  Act,
1986, as an example, to indicate that children up to  the  age  of  fourteen
years were treated differently from children between the  ages  of  fourteen
to eighteen, for the purposes of employment in  hazardous  industries.   Dr.
Kishor re-asserted  the  submissions  made  by  Mr.  Bali  and  Mr.  Saurabh
Prakash, in regard to heinous crimes committed by children below the age  of
eighteen years, who were capable of understanding the consequences of  their
acts.

15.   Dr. Kishor also referred to the provisions of Sections 82  and  83  of
the Indian Penal Code, where the age  of  responsibility  and  comprehension
has been fixed at twelve years and below.  Learned  counsel  submitted  that
having regard to  the  above-mentioned  provisions,  it  would  have  to  be
seriously considered as  to  whether  the  definition  of  a  child  in  the
Juvenile Justice (Care and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  required
reconsideration.  He urged that because a person under the age of  18  years
was considered to be a child,  despite  his  or  her  propensity  to  commit
criminal offences, which are of a heinous and even gruesome nature, such  as
offences punishable under Sections 376, 307, 302,  392,  396,  397  and  398
IPC, the said provisions have been misused and exploited  by  criminals  and
people having their own  scores  to  settle.   Dr.  Kishor  urged  that  the
definition of a “juvenile” or a “child” or  a  “juvenile  in  conflict  with
law”,  in  Sections  2(k)  and  2(l)  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children)  Act,  2000,  was  liable  to  be  struck  down  and
replaced with  a  more  meaningful  definition,  which  would  exclude  such
juveniles.

16.    Mr.  Vikram  Mahajan,  learned  Senior  Advocate  appearing  for  the
Petitioner, Vinay K. Sharma, in Writ Petition (C)  No.  90  of  2013,  urged
that the right given  to  a  citizen  of  India  under  Article  21  of  the
Constitution is impinged upon by the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection
of Children) Act, 2000.  Mr. Mahajan urged that the Juvenile  Justice  (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, operates in violation of Articles  14
and 21 of the Constitution and that Article 13(2),  which  relates  to  post
Constitution laws, prohibits the State from making a law which either  takes
away totally or abrogates in part a fundamental  right.   Referring  to  the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination  of  Violence  against  Women,
adopted by the General Assembly on 20th December, 1993, Mr. Mahajan  pointed
out that Article 1 of the Convention describes “violence against  women”  to
mean any act of gender-based violence that  results  in,  or  is  likely  to
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm  or  suffering  to  women.
Referring to the alleged gang rape of a 23 year  old  para-medical  student,
in a moving bus, in Delhi, on 16th December,  2012,  Mr.  Mahajan  tried  to
indicate that crimes committed by juveniles had reached  large  and  serious
proportions and that there was a need to amend the law to ensure  that  such
persons were not given the benefit of lenient  punishment,  as  contemplated
under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)
Act, 2000.  From the figures cited by him,  he  urged  that  even  going  by
statistics, 1% of the total number of crimes committed in the country  would
amount to a large number and the remedy to such a problem would lie  in  the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which made the provisions of the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,  2000,  redundant  and  ultra
vires Article 21 of the Constitution.

17.   Ms. Shweta Kapoor appeared in Transferred Case  No.  82  of  2013  in-
person and  questioned  the  vires  of  Sections  16(1),  19(1),  49(2)  and
52(2)(a) of the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2000, and submitted that they were liable to be declared as ultra vires  the
Constitution.  Referring to Section 16 of  the  aforesaid  Act,  Ms.  Kapoor
submitted that even in  the  proviso  to  Sub-section  (1)  of  Section  16,
Parliament had recognized  the  distinction  between  a  juvenile,  who  had
attained the age of sixteen years, but had committed an  offence  which  was
so serious in nature that it  would  not  be  in  his  interest  or  in  the
interest of other juveniles in a special home, to send him to  such  special
home.   Considering that none of the other measures provided under  the  Act
was suitable or sufficient,  the Government had empowered the Board to  pass
an order for the juvenile to be kept in such place of  safety  and  in  such
manner as it thought fit.  Ms. Kapoor submitted that no objection  could  be
taken to the said provision except for the  fact  that  in  the  proviso  to
Section 16(2), it has been added that the period of  detention  order  would
not exceed, in any case, the maximum limit of punishment, as provided  under
Section 15, which is three years.

18.   Ms. Kapoor  contended  that  while  the  provisions  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,  2000,  are  generally  meant
for the benefit of the juvenile offenders, a serious attempt would  have  to
be  made  to  grade  the  nature  of  offences  to  suit   the   reformation
contemplated by the Act.

19.   As part of her submissions, Ms. Kapoor referred  to  the  decision  of
this Court in Avishek Goenka Vs. Union of India [(2012) 5 SCC 321],  wherein
the pasting of black films on glass panes  were  banned  by  this  Court  on
account of the fact that partially opaque glass panes on vehicles  acted  as
facilitators of crime.  Ms. Kapoor urged that in the  opening  paragraph  of
the judgment, it has been observed that “Alarming  rise  in  heinous  crimes
like kidnapping, sexual assault on women and dacoity have impinged upon  the
right to life and the right to live in a safe environment which  are  within
the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.  Ms.  Kapoor  also
referred to another decision of this Court in Abuzar Hossain  Vs.  State  of
West Bengal [(2012) 10 SCC 489],  which  dealt  with  a  different  question
regarding the provisions of Section 7A of the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and the right of an accused to raise  the
claim of juvenility at any stage of  the  proceedings  and  even  after  the
final disposal of the case.

20.   In conclusion, Ms. Kapoor reiterated her stand that in  certain  cases
the definition of a juvenile in Sections  2(k)  and  2(l)  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000,  would  have  to  be
considered differently.

21.   The next matter which engaged our attention is Writ  Petition  (Civil)
No.90 of 2013 filed by one Vinay Kumar Sharma,  praying  for  a  declaration
that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)  Act,  2000,  be
declared ultra vires the Constitution  and  that  children  should  also  be
tried along with adults under the penal laws applicable to adults.

22.   Writ Petition (Civil) No.42 of 2013 has  been  filed  by  Kamal  Kumar
Pandey and Sukumar, Advocates,  inter  alia,  for  an  appropriate  writ  or
direction declaring the provisions of  Sections  2(1),  10  and  17  of  the
Juvenile Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  to  be
irrational, arbitrary, without reasonable nexus and thereby ultra vires  and
unconstitutional, and for a Writ of  Mandamus  commanding  the  Ministry  of
Home Affairs and the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government  of  India,  to
take  steps  that  the  aforesaid  Act  operates  in  conformity  with   the
Constitution.  In addition, a prayer was made to declare the  provisions  of
Sections 15 and 19 of the above Act ultra vires the Constitution.



23.   The main thrust of the argument advanced by Mr. Pandey,  who  appeared
in person, was the inter-play between International Conventions  and  Rules,
such as the Beijing Rules, 1985, the U.N. Convention on the  Rights  of  the
Child, 1989, and the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)
Act, 2000.  While admitting the salubirous and  benevolent  and  progressive
character of the legislation in dealing with children in need  of  care  and
protection and with children in conflict  with  law,  Mr.  Pandey  contended
that a distinction was required to be made in respect  of  children  with  a
propensity to commit heinous crimes  which  were  a  threat  to  a  peaceful
social order.  Mr. Pandey reiterated the submissions made  earlier  that  it
was unconstitutional to place all juveniles, irrespective of the gravity  of
the offences,  in one bracket.  Urging that Section  2(l)  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children)  Act,  2000,  ought  not  to  have
placed all children in conflict  with  law  within  the  same  bracket,  Mr.
Pandey  submitted  that  the  same  is  ultra  vires  Article  21   of   the
Constitution.  Referring to the report of the National Crime Records  Bureau
(NCRB) for the years 2001 to 2011, Mr. Pandey submitted  that  between  2001
and 2011, the involvement of juveniles  in  cognizable  crimes  was  on  the
rise.   Mr.  Pandey  urged  that  it   was   a   well-established   medical-
psychological fact that the level of understanding of a 16 year-old  was  at
par with that of adults.



24.   Mr. Pandey's next volley  was  directed  towards  Section  19  of  the
Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  which
provides for the removal of any disqualification attached to an  offence  of
any nature.  Mr. Pandey submitted that the said provisions do not take  into
account the fact relating  to  repeated  offences  being  perpetrated  by  a
juvenile whose  records  of  previous  offences  are  removed.   Mr.  Pandey
contended that Section 19 of the Act was required to be  amended  to  enable
the concerned authorities to retain records of previous  offences  committed
by a juvenile for the purposes  of  identification  of  a  juvenile  with  a
propensity to repeatedly commit offences of a grievous or heinous nature.



25.   Mr. Pandey submitted that  Parliament  had  exceeded  its  mandate  by
blindly adopting eighteen as the upper limit in categorising a  juvenile  or
a  child,  in  accordance  with  the  Beijing  Rules,  1985,  and  the  U.N.
Convention, 1989, without taking into account  the  socio-cultural  economic
conditions and the legal system for administration of  criminal  justice  in
India.  Mr. Pandey urged that the Juvenile Justice (Care and  Protection  of
Children) Act,  2000,  was  required  to  operate  in  conformity  with  the
provisions of the Constitution of India.



26.   Ms. Hema Sahu, the petitioner in Writ  Petition  (Civil)  No.  182  of
2013, also appeared in person and restated the views expressed by the  other
petitioners  that  the  United  Nations  Standard  Minimum  Rules  for   the
Administration of Juvenile Justice, commonly known as the  “Beijing  Rules”,
recognized and noted the difference in the nature of offences  committed  by
juveniles in conflict with law.  Referring to the decision of this Court  in
the case commonly known as the “Bombay  Blasts  Case”,  Ms.  Sahu  submitted
that a juvenile who was tried and convicted  along  with  adults  under  the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), was  denied  the  protection
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  on
account of the serious nature of the offence.  Ms. Sahu ended  on  the  note
that paragraph 4 of the 1989 Convention did not make any reference to age.



27.   Appearing for the Union of India, the  Additional  Solicitor  General,
Mr. Siddharth Luthra, strongly opposed the submissions  made  on  behalf  of
the Petitioners to either declare the  entire  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as ultra vires the Constitution or  parts
thereof,  such as Sections 2(k),  2(l),  15,  16,  17,  19  and  21.   After
referring to the aforesaid provisions of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  the  learned  ASG   submitted   that
Parliament consciously fixed eighteen years  as  the  upper  age  limit  for
treating persons as juveniles and children, taking  into  consideration  the
general trend of legislation,  not  only  internationally,  but  within  the
country as well.

28.   The  learned  ASG  submitted  that  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was enacted after years  of  deliberation
and in conformity with international standards as  laid  down  in  the  U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, the Beijing  Rules,  1985,  the
Havana Rules and other  international  instruments  for  securing  the  best
interests of the child with the primary object of  social  reintegration  of
child victims and children  in  conflict  with  law,  without  resorting  to
conventional judicial proceedings which existed  for  adult  criminals.   In
the course of his submissions, the learned ASG  submitted  a  chart  of  the
various Indian statutes and the manner in which children have been  excluded
from liability under the said Acts upto the age of 18 years. In most of  the
said enactments, a juvenile/child has been  referred  to  a  person  who  is
below 18 years of age.  The learned  ASG  submitted  that  in  pursuance  of
international obligations, the Union of India  after  due  deliberation  had
taken a conscious policy decision to fix the age of a child/juvenile at  the
upper limit of 18 years.  The learned ASG urged that the fixing of  the  age
when a child ceases to be a child at 18 years is a matter  of  policy  which
could not be questioned in a court of law, unless the same  could  be  shown
to have violated any of the fundamental rights, and in  particular  Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution.  Referring to the decision of this  Court  in
BALCO Employees Union Vs. Union of India [(2002) 2  SCC  333],  the  learned
ASG submitted that at  paragraph  46  of  the  said  judgment  it  had  been
observed that it is neither within the domain of the Courts  nor  the  scope
of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry  as  to  whether  a  particular
public policy was wise or whether something better could be evolved. It  was
further observed that the Courts were reluctant to strike down a  policy  at
the behest of  a  Petitioner  merely  because  it  has  been  urged  that  a
different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or  more
logical.   The  learned  ASG  further  urged  that  Article  15(3)  of   the
Constitution empowers the State to enact special provisions  for  women  and
children, which reveals that the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of
Children)  Act,  2000,  was  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of   the
Constitution.



29.   The learned ASG submitted that in various judgments,  this  Court  and
the High Courts had recognised the fact that juveniles were required  to  be
treated differently from adults so as to give such children,  who  for  some
reason had gone astray, an opportunity to  realize  their  mistakes  and  to
rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives.  Special mention  was  made
with regard to the decision of this Court in Abuzar Hossain (supra) in  this
regard.   The learned ASG also referred to the decision  of  this  Court  in
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. K. Shyam Sunder [(2011) 8 SCC 737], wherein  it  had
been observed that merely because the  law  causes  hardships  or  sometimes
results in adverse consequences, it cannot be held to  be  ultra  vires  the
Constitution, nor can it be struck down.  The  learned  ASG  also  submitted
that it was now well-settled that reasonable classification  is  permissible
so long as such classification has a rational nexus with the  object  sought
to be achieved.  This Court has always held that the presumption  is  always
in favour of the constitutionality of an  enactment,  since  it  has  to  be
assumed that the  legislature  understands  and  correctly  appreciates  the
needs of its own people  and  its  discriminations  are  based  on  adequate
grounds.



30.   Referring to  the  Reports  of  the  National  Crime  Reports  Bureau,
learned ASG pointed out that the percentage of increase  in  the  number  of
offences committed by  juveniles  was  almost  negligible  and  the  general
public perception in such matters was  entirely  erroneous.   In  fact,  the
learned ASG pointed out that even the  Committee  appointed  to  review  the
amendments to the criminal law, headed by former CJI,  J.S.  Verma,  in  its
report submitted on 23rd January, 2013, did not recommend the  reduction  in
the age of juveniles in conflict with  law  and  has  maintained  it  at  18
years.  The learned ASG pointed out that the issue of reduction in  the  age
of juveniles from 18 to 16 years, as it was in the Juveniles Justice Act  of
1986, was also raised in the Lok Sabha  on  19th  March,  2013,  during  the
discussion on the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2013, but was  rejected  by
the House.



31.  The learned ASG submitted that the occurrence of 16th  December,  2012,
involving the alleged gang rape of  a  23  year  old  girl,  should  not  be
allowed to colour the decision taken to treat all persons below the  age  of
18 years, as children.



32.   Mr. Anant Asthana, learned Advocate appearing  for HAQ  :  Centre  for
Child Rights, submitted that the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000, as amended in 2006 and 2011, is  a  fairly  progressive
legislation, largely compliant  with  the  Constitution  of  India  and  the
minimum standards contained in the Beijing  Rules.   Mr.  Asthana  contended
that the reason for incidents such as the  16th  December,  2012,  incident,
was not on account of the provisions of the aforesaid Act,  but  on  account
of failure of the administration in implementing  its  provisions.   Learned
counsel submitted that all the Writ Petitions appeared to be  based  on  two
assumptions, namely, (i) that the age of  18  years  for  juveniles  is  set
arbitrarily; and (ii) that by reducing the age for the purpose  of  defining
a child in the aforesaid Act, criminality  amongst  children  would  reduce.
Mr. Asthana submitted that such an  approach  was  flawed  as  it  had  been
incorrectly submitted that the age of 18 years to treat persons as  children
was set arbitrarily and that it is so difficult  to  comprehend  the  causes
and the environment which brings  children  into  delinquency.  Mr.  Asthana
submitted that the answer lies in effective and  sincere  implementation  of
the different laws aimed at improving the conditions of children in need  of
care and protection and providing such protection to children at  risk.  Mr.
Asthana urged that the objective with which the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was enacted was not aimed  at  delivering
retributive justice, but to  allow  a  rehabilitative,  reformation-oriented
approach in addressing juvenile crimes. Learned counsel submitted  that  the
apathy of the administration towards juveniles and the manner in which  they
are treated would be evident from the fact that by  falsifying  the  age  of
juveniles, they were treated as adults and sent to jails, instead  of  being
produced before the  Juvenile  Justice  Board  or   even  before  the  Child
Welfare Committees to be dealt with in a manner  provided  by  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, for  the  treatment  of
juveniles.



33.   Mr. Asthana submitted that even as recently as 26th April,  2013,  the
Government of India has adopted a new National Policy  for  Children,  which
not only recognises that a child is any person below  the  age  of  eighteen
years, but also states that the policy was to guide and  inform   people  of
laws, policies, plans and programmes affecting children.  Mr. Asthana  urged
that  all  actions  and  initiatives  of  the  national,  State  and   local
Governments in all sectors  must  respect  and  uphold  the  principles  and
provisions of this policy and it would neither be appropriate  nor  possible
for the Union of India to adopt a different  approach  in  the  matter.  Mr.
Asthana, who  appears  to  have  made  an  in-depth  study  of  the  matter,
submitted that on the question of making  the  provisions  in  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,  2000,  conform  to  the
provisions of the Constitution and to allow the children of a  specific  age
group to be treated as adults, it would  be  appropriate  to  take  note  of
General Comment No.10 made by the U.N. Committee on the rights of the  child
on 25th April, 2007, which specifically dealt with the upper age  limit  for
juveniles and it was reiterated that where it was a case of  a  child  being
in need of care and protection or in conflict with law, every  person  under
the age of 18 years at the time of commission of the  alleged  offence  must
be treated in accordance with  the  Juvenile  Justice  Rules.   Mr.  Asthana
submitted that any attempt to alter the upper limit of the age  of  a  child
from 18 to 16 years would have disastrous consequences and  would  set  back
the  attempts  made  over  the  years  to  formulate   a   restorative   and
rehabilitative approach  mainly for juveniles in conflict with law.



34.   In Writ Petition (Civil) No.85 of 2013, a counter affidavit  has  been
filed on behalf of the Ministry of Women and Child  Development,  Government
of India, in which the submissions made by the ASG,  Mr.  Siddharth  Luthra,
were duly reflected.  In paragraph I of the  said  affidavit,  it  has  been
pointed out that the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)
Act, 2000, provides for a wide range of reformative measures under  Sections
15 and 16 for children in conflict with law  –  from  simple  warning  to  3
years of institutionalisation in a  Special  Home.   In  exceptional  cases,
provision has also been made for the juvenile to  be  sent  to  a  place  of
safety  where  intensive  rehabilitation  measures,  such  as   counselling,
psychiatric evaluation and treatment would be undertaken.



35.   In Writ Petition (C) No.10 of  2013  filed  by  Shri  Salil  Bali,  an
application had been made  by  the  Prayas  Juvenile  Aid  Centre  (JAC),  a
Society whose Founder and General Secretary, Shri Amod  Kanth,  was  allowed
to appear and address the Court in person.  Mr. Amod Kanth claimed  that  he
was a former member of the Indian Police  Service  and  Chairperson  of  the
Delhi Commission for the  Protection  of  Child  Rights  and  was  also  the
founder General Secretary of the aforesaid  organisation,  which  came  into
existence in 1998 as a special unit  associated  with  the  Missing  Persons
Squad of the Crime and Railway Branch of the  Delhi  Police  of  which  Shri
Amod Kanth was the in-charge Deputy Commissioner of Police.  Mr. Amod  Kanth
submitted that Prayas was created in  order  to  identify  and  support  the
missing and found  persons,  including  girls,  street  migrants,  homeless,
working and delinquent children who  did  not  have  any  support  from  any
organisation in the  Government  or  in  the  non-governmental  organisation
sector.



36.   Mr. Kanth repeated and reiterated the submissions made by the  learned
ASG and Mr. Asthana and also highlighted  the  problems  faced  by  children
both in conflict with law and in need of care  and  protection.   Mr.  Kanth
submitted that whatever was required to be done for the  rehabilitation  and
restoration of juveniles to a normal existence has, to a large extent,  been
defeated since the various provisions of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the Rules  of  2007,  were  not  being
seriously implemented.  Mr. Kanth  urged  that  after  the  ratification  by
India of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the  Child  on  11th
December, 1992, serious thought was given to the enactment of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act), 2000, which came  to  replace
the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.  Taking a leaf out of  Mr.  Asthana’s  book,
Mr. Kanth submitted that even after thirteen years  of  its  existence,  the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2000, still remained unimplemented in major areas, which made it  impossible
for the provisions of  the  Act  to  be  properly  coordinated.   Mr.  Kanth
submitted that one of the more important features of  juvenile  law  was  to
provide a child-friendly approach in the  adjudication  and  disposition  of
matters  in  the  best  interest  of  children  and   for   their   ultimate
rehabilitation through  various  institutions  established  under  the  Act.
Submitting that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)  Act,
2000, was based on the provisions of the  Indian  Constitution,  the  United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, the Beijing  Rules  and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of  the  Juveniles  Deprived  of
their Liberty, 1990, Mr. Kanth urged that the same was  in  perfect  harmony
with the provisions of the Constitution, but did not receive  the  attention
it ought to have received while dealing with a section of  the  citizens  of
India comprising 42% of the country’s population.



37.   Various measures to deal with juveniles  in  conflict  with  law  have
been suggested by Mr. Kanth, which requires serious  thought  and  avoidance
of knee-jerk reactions to situations which could set a dangerous  trend  and
affect millions of children in need  of  care  and  protection.   Mr.  Kanth
submitted that any change in the law, as it now  stands,  resulting  in  the
reduction  of  age  to  define  a  juvenile,  will  not  only  prove  to  be
regressive, but would also adversely affect India’s image as a  champion  of
human rights.



38.   Having regard to the serious nature of the issues  raised  before  us,
we have given serious thought to the submissions advanced on behalf  of  the
respective parties and  also  those  advanced  on  behalf  of  certain  Non-
Government Organizations and have  also  considered  the  relevant  extracts
from the Report of Justice  J.S.  Verma  Committee  on  “Amendments  to  the
Criminal Law”  and  are  convinced  that  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as amended  in  2006,  and  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, are  based  on  sound
principles recognized internationally and contained  in  the  provisions  of
the Indian Constitution.



39.   There is little doubt that the incident, which occurred on  the  night
of 16th December, 2012, was not only gruesome, but almost  maniacal  in  its
content, wherein one juvenile, whose role is  yet  to  be  established,  was
involved, but such an incident, in comparison to the vast number  of  crimes
occurring in India, makes it an aberration rather than the  Rule.   If  what
has come out from the reports of the Crimes Record  Bureau,  is  true,  then
the number of crimes committed  by  juveniles  comes  to  about  2%  of  the
country’s crime rate.



40.   The learned ASG along with Mr. Asthana and Mr. Kanth, took us  through
the history of the enactment of the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and  Protection
of Children) Act, 2000, and the  Rules  subsequently  framed  thereunder  in
2007.  There is a definite thought process, which went  into  the  enactment
of the aforesaid Act.  In  order  to  appreciate  the  submissions  made  on
behalf of  the  respective  parties  in  regard  to  the  enactment  of  the
aforesaid  Act  and  the  Rules,  it  may  be  appropriate  to  explore  the
background of the laws relating to child protection  in  India  and  in  the
rest of the world.



41.   It cannot be questioned that children are amongst the most  vulnerable
sections in any society.  They represent almost  one-third  of  the  world’s
population, and unless they are  provided  with  proper  opportunities,  the
opportunity of making them grow into responsible citizens of  tomorrow  will
slip out of the hands of the present  generation.   International  community
has been alive to the problem for a long time.  After the aftermath  of  the
First World War, the League of Nations issued the Geneva Declaration of  the
Rights of the Child in 1924.  Following the  gross  abuse  and  violence  of
human rights during  the  Second  World  War,  which  caused  the  death  of
millions of people, including children, the United Nations had  been  formed
in 1945 and on 10th December, 1948  adopted  and  proclaimed  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.  While Articles 1  and  7  of  the  Declaration
proclaimed that all human beings are born free  and  equal  in  dignity  and
rights and  are  equal  before  the  law,  Article  25  of  the  Declaration
specifically provides that motherhood and childhood  would  be  entitled  to
special care  and  assistance.   The  growing  consciousness  of  the  world
community was further evidenced by the Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  the
Child, which came to be proclaimed by the United Nations on  20th  November,
1959, in the best interests of the child.  This was followed by the  Beijing
Rules of 1985, the Riyadh  Guidelines  of  1990,  which  specially  provided
guidelines for the prevention of juvenile delinquency, and the Havana  Rules
of 14th December, 1990.  The said three sets of Rules intended  that  social
policies should be evolved and applied to prevent juvenile  delinquency,  to
establish a Juvenile Justice System for juveniles in conflict with  law,  to
safeguard fundamental  rights  and  to  establish  methods  for  social  re-
integration of young people who had  suffered  incarceration  in  prison  or
other corrective institutions.   One  of  the  other  principles  which  was
sought to be reiterated and adopted was that  a  juvenile  should  be  dealt
with for an offence in a manner which  is  different  from  an  adult.   The
Beijing Rules indicated that efforts should be made by member  countries  to
establish within their own national jurisdiction, a set of  laws  and  rules
specially applicable to juvenile offenders.  It was stated that the  age  of
criminal responsibility in legal systems that recognize the concept  of  the
age of criminal responsibility for juveniles should not be fixed at too  low
an age-level,  keeping  in  mind  the  emotional,  mental  and  intellectual
maturity of children.



42.   Four years after  the  adoption  of  the  Beijing  Rules,  the  United
Nations adopted  the  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child  vide  the
Resolution of the General Assembly No.  44/25  dated  20th  November,  1989,
which came into  force  on  2nd  September,  1990.   India  is  not  only  a
signatory to the said Convention, but has also ratified  the  same  on  11th
December, 1992.  The said Convention sowed the seeds  of  the  enactment  of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)  Act,  2000,  by  the
Indian Parliament.



43.   India developed its own jurisprudence relating  to  children  and  the
recognition of their rights.  With the adoption of the Constitution on  26th
November 1949, constitutional safeguards, as far as weaker sections  of  the
society, including  children,  were  provided  for.   The  Constitution  has
guaranteed several rights to children, such  as  equality  before  the  law,
free and compulsory primary education to children between the age  group  of
six to fourteen years, prohibition  of  trafficking  and  forced  labour  of
children and  prohibition  of  employment  of  children  below  the  age  of
fourteen  years  in  factories,  mines  or   hazardous   occupations.    The
Constitution enables the State Governments to make  special  provisions  for
children.  To prevent female foeticide,  the  Pre-conception  and  Pre-natal
Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex  Selection)  Act  was  enacted  in
1994.  One of the latest enactments  by  Parliament  is  the  Protection  of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.



44.   The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,  2000,  is
in  tune  with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution   and   the   various
Declarations and Conventions adopted by the world community  represented  by
the United Nations.  The basis of fixing of  the  age  till  when  a  person
could be treated as a child at eighteen years in the Juvenile Justice  (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, was Article 1 of  the  Convention  of
the Rights of the Child, as was brought to our notice  during  the  hearing.
Of course, it has been submitted by  Dr.  Kishor  that  the  description  in
Article 1 of the Convention was a contradiction in terms.   While  generally
treating eighteen to be the age till which a person could be treated  to  be
a child, it also indicates that the same was variable  where  national  laws
recognize the age of majority earlier.  In this regard,  one  of  the  other
considerations which weighed with the  legislation  in  fixing  the  age  of
understanding at eighteen years is on account of the  scientific  data  that
indicates that the brain continues to develop and  the  growth  of  a  child
continues till he reaches at least the age of eighteen years and that it  is
at that point of time  that  he  can  be  held  fully  responsible  for  his
actions.  Along with physical growth, mental growth  is  equally  important,
in assessing the maturity of a person below the age of eighteen  years.   In
this connection, reference may be made to the chart provided by  Mr.  Kanth,
wherein the various laws relating to children generally  recognize  eighteen
years to be the age for reckoning a person as a  juvenile/  child  including
criminal offences.



45.   In any event, in the absence of any proper data, it would not be  wise
on our part to deviate from the provisions of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care
and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000,  which  represent  the  collective
wisdom of Parliament.  It may not be out of place to  mention  that  in  the
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, male children above the  age  of  sixteen  years
were considered to be adults, whereas girl children were treated  as  adults
on attaining the age of eighteen years.  In the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and
Protection of Children)  Act,  2000,  a  conscious  decision  was  taken  by
Parliament to raise the age of male juveniles/children to eighteen years.



46.   In recent years, there has been a  spurt  in  criminal  activities  by
adults, but not so by juveniles, as the materials produced before  us  show.
The age limit which was  raised  from  sixteen  to  eighteen  years  in  the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, is a  decision
which was taken by the Government, which is strongly in favour of  retaining
Sections 2(k) and 2(l) in the manner in  which  it  exists  in  the  Statute
Book.



47.   One  misunderstanding  of  the  law  relating  to  the  sentencing  of
juveniles, needs to be corrected.  The general understanding of  a  sentence
that can be awarded to a juvenile under Section 15(1)(g)  of  the   Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, prior to its  amendment
in 2006, is that after attaining the age of eighteen years, a  juvenile  who
is found guilty of a  heinous  offence  is  allowed  to  go  free.   Section
15(1)(g), as it stood before  the  amendment  came  into  effect  from  22nd
August, 2006, reads as follows:

           “15(1)(g)   make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a
           special home for a period of three years:
           (i) in case of juvenile, over  seventeen  years  but  less  than
           eighteen years of age, for a period of not less than two years;


           (ii)  in case of any other juvenile  for  the  period  until  he
           ceases to be a juvenile:


                 Provided that the Board  may,  if  it  is  satisfied  that
           having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances
           of the case, it is  expedient  so  to  do,  for  reasons  to  be
           recorded, reduce the period of stay to such period as it  thinks
           fit.”




      It was generally perceived that a juvenile was free to go, even if  he
had committed a heinous crime, when he ceased to be a juvenile.



      The said understanding  needs  to  be  clarified  on  account  of  the
amendment which came into force with effect  from  22.8.2006,  as  a  result
whereof Section 15(1)(g) now reads as follows:

           “Make an order directing the juvenile to be sent  to  a  special
           home for a period of three years:


                 Provided that the Board may if it is satisfied that having
           regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the
           case, it is expedient so to  do,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded
           reduce the period of stay to such period as it thinks fit.”

      The aforesaid amendment now makes it clear that  even  if  a  juvenile
attains the age of eighteen years within a  period  of  one  year  he  would
still have to undergo a sentence of three years, which  could  spill  beyond
the period of one year when he attained majority.



48.   There is yet another consideration which appears to have weighed  with
the worldwide community, including India, to retain eighteen  as  the  upper
limit to which persons could be treated as children.
 In  the  Bill  brought
in Parliament for enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of
Children) Act of 2000, it  has  been  indicated  that  the  same  was  being
introduced to provide for the care, protection, treatment,  development  and
rehabilitation  of  neglected  or   delinquent   juveniles   and   for   the
adjudication of certain matters relating to and  disposition  of  delinquent
juveniles.
The essence of the Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of
Children)  Act,  2000,  and  the  Rules  framed  thereunder  in   2007,   is
restorative and  not  retributive,  providing  for  rehabilitation  and  re-
integration of children in conflict with law into mainstream  society.
 The
age of eighteen has been fixed on account of the  understanding  of  experts in child psychology and behavioural patterns  that  till  such  an  age  the children in conflict with law  could  still  be  redeemed  and  restored  to mainstream society,  instead  of  becoming  hardened  criminals  in  future.
There are, of course, exceptions where a child in the age group  of  sixteen
to eighteen may have developed criminal propensities, which  would  make  it
virtually  impossible  for  him/her  to  be  re-integrated  into  mainstream
society, 
but such examples are not of such proportions  as  to  warrant  any
change in thinking, since it is probably  better  to  try  and  re-integrate
children with criminal propensities into mainstream society, rather than  to
allow them to develop into hardened criminals, which  does  not  augur  well
for the future.



49.   This being the understanding of the Government  behind  the  enactment
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000,  and
the amendments effected thereto in 2006,  together  with  the  Rules  framed
thereunder in 2007, and the data available with regard to the commission  of
heinous offences by children, within the meaning of Sections 2(k)  and  2(l)
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,  we  do
not think that any interference is necessary  with  the  provisions  of  the
Statute till such time as  sufficient  data  is  available  to  warrant  any
change in the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules.  On  the  other
hand, the implementation of the various  enactments  relating  to  children,
would possibly yield better results.



50.    The  Writ  Petitions  and  the  Transferred  Case   are,   therefore,
dismissed, with the aforesaid observations.  There  shall,  however,  be  no
order as to costs.


                                                     …………………………………………………CJI.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                    (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (J. CHELAMESWAR)


New Delhi
Dated:July 17, 2013.