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Wednesday, July 24, 2013

Or. 40, rule 1 CPC - Appointment of interim receiver is not maintainable as the petitioner received the amount from the respondent to put a stop to the litigation and on the other hand the respondent is in possession of property = during the pendency of these proceedings, the second respondent sold the property in favour of respondent nos. 4 and 5 by sale deed dated 11.07.2006. It appears that the Sub-Registrar on inspection of the disputed plot found that there were two constructed duplex and two more near completion as on the date of inspection i.e. on 13.03.2007 of which one was occupied by respondent no.4.= It must be remembered that the instant proceedings arise out of the interlocutory proceedings seeking appointment of the receiver at the instance of the petitioner herein. Having regard to the fact that respondent no.4 was in possession of the property in dispute at least since 13.03.2007 admittedly and also having regard to the fact that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- we do not see any justification for the appointment of the receiver. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petition.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40573

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(C) NO. 13255 OF 2012


Satya Pal Anand                              …Petitioner
                       Versus
Punjabi Housing Co-operative Society
& Others                                           …Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T




Chelameswar, J.


1.    This petition arises  out  of  the  final  judgment  and  order  dated
03.08.2011 passed in Writ Petition No.14548 of 2008 by  the  High  Court  of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.


2.    It is rather difficult to cull out the  facts  accurately  because  of
the inadequacy of the record.  Be that as it may, the broad  and  undisputed
facts are as under:


3.    The petitioner’s mother was  allotted  a  plot  of  land  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the property in dispute’) by  the  first  respondent  –  the
Punjabi Housing Co-operative Society Ltd.  
Pursuant to  such  an  allotment,
the  sale-deed  dated  22.03.1962  came  to  be  executed,  which  deed  was
registered on 30.03.1962 before the Sub-Registrar, Bhopal.
It appears  that
the petitioner’s mother died on 12.06.1988.  The  petitioner  claims  to  be
the sole successor-in-interest though we find  from  the  record  (from  the
alleged compromise deed dated 06.07.2004 executed by the petitioner  herein)
that he has a sister.


4.    It appears that after lapse of about 40 years,  the  first  respondent
purported to have cancelled the sale made  in  favour  of  the  petitioner’s
deceased mother.
On 09.08.2001, a deed styled as Extinguishment  Deed  came
to be executed by the first respondent before the  Sub-Registrar,  Bhopal  -
the legality of which deed is required to be examined separately.  
However,
we do not propose to say anything at this stage.


5.    Subsequently, the first respondent executed  another  sale  deed  with
respect to the property in dispute in favour of  the  second  respondent  on
21.04.2004.


6.    A document styled as Compromise  Deed  dated  06.07.2004  came  to  be executed by the petitioner herein,  the  substance  of  which  is  that  the petitioner agreed to receive a sum of Rs.6,50,000/-  only and put an end  to all the disputes in respect of the disputed property.  
It appears  from  the
recital of the document that out of the  above mentioned  amount,  a  sum  of
Rs.4.50,000/- was paid by draft issued by the State Bank of  Indore,  Bhopal
Branch and the balance by a post dated cheque.
We may state here  that  the
petitioner does not dispute  either  the  execution  of  the  abovementioned
document or the receipt of the abovementioned amounts.
As it  can  be  seen
from the synopsis filed in  this  appeal  at  page  ‘J’,  it  is  stated  as
follows:
       “Amount was not returned as the petitioner had been advised  by  the
       learned advocates having expertise in civil litigation  and  of  the
       Indian  Contract  Act,  1872  that  the   agreement   secured   upon
       misrepresentation & upon the facts in his case on 06.07.2004 was  in
       law null and void & amount had been paid for unlawful purposes &  in
       violation of the provisions of  the  Indian  Contract  Act  and  the
       return of the amount paid there under could not be  claimed  in  law
       and the suit if filed shall meet its dismissal.”

However, the petitioner now maintains that the said compromise was  obtained
under duress.
Subsequently, the petitioner raised a dispute by  approaching
the Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies.

7.    It appears from the record that  subsequently  the  petitioner  herein
raised a  dispute  before  the  Registrar  under  Section  64  of  the  M.P.
Cooperative Societies Act questioning the legality of the execution  of  the
abovementioned unilateral Extinguishment Deed and allotment of the  property
in dispute in favour of the second respondent.  Vide order  dated  1.2.2006,
the Deputy Registrar passed an order injuncting the defendants from  raising
any construction or transferring by way of sale  etc.  of  the  property  in
dispute.

8.    However, the said interim injunction appears to have been  vacated  by
an order dated 12.4.2006.  Aggrieved by the same, the  petitioner  preferred
an appeal before the Registrar, Cooperative Society.  It  appears  that  the
Registrar vide order dated 29.08.2006 set aside the order dated  12.04.2006.
 Unfortunately, the order  dated  29.08.2006  is  not  available  on  record
completely, only part of the order is annexed to the paper book.

9.    On 02.02.2008, the petitioner herein filed an application under  Order
40 Rule 1 CPC before the Deputy Registrar for  appointment  of  receiver  in
respect of the property  in  dispute.  
On  04.02.2008,  an  ex-parte  order
appointing receiver was passed which was modified on 18.2.2008  and  it  was
further directed  to  the  receiver  to  take  physical  possession  of  the
property in dispute.
It appears that by another order dated  25.03.2008  the
Deputy Registrar directed the receiver to take symbolic possession,  instead
of physical possession, of the property in dispute.  (Copy of this order  is
not available on record).
Aggrieved by the same,  the  petitioner  filed  a
revision before the Joint Registrar.  Simultaneously, the second  respondent
also filed two revisions  challenging  the  orders  of  appointment  of  the
receiver dated 04.02.2008 and 18.02.2008 whereby the receiver  was  directed
to take physical possession of the property in dispute.

10.   By order dated 08.11.2008, the Joint Registrar allowed  the  revisions
of the second respondent and remitted the case back to the Deputy  Registrar
to decide the matter afresh.
Aggrieved by the said  order,  the  petitioner
herein preferred a second  appeal  before  the  Cooperative  Tribunal  which
appeal was treated as revision  filed  under  Section  77  of  the  Act  but
dismissed vide order dated  22.11.2008.   (Neither  of  the  two  orders  is
available on record).

11.   Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the  petitioner  approached
the High Court by way of a writ  petition  from  which  the  present  appeal
arises.

12.   By the impugned judgment, the writ petition was dismissed.


13.   We must  also  mention  herein  that
during  the  pendency  of  these
proceedings,  the  second  respondent  sold  the  property  in   favour   of
respondent nos. 4 and 5 by sale deed dated 11.07.2006.  
It appears that  the
Sub-Registrar on inspection of the disputed plot found that there  were  two
constructed  duplex  and  two  more  near  completion  as  on  the  date  of
inspection i.e. on 13.03.2007 of which one was occupied by respondent no.4.


14.   It must be remembered that the instant proceedings arise  out  of  the
interlocutory  proceedings  seeking  appointment  of  the  receiver  at  the
instance  of  the  petitioner  herein.   
Having  regard  to  the  fact  that
respondent no.4 was in possession of the property in dispute at least  since
13.03.2007  admittedly  and  also  having  regard  to  the  fact  that   the
petitioner  received  an  amount  of  Rs.6,50,000/-  
we  do  not   see   any
justification for the appointment of the receiver.   
We  see  no  reason  to
interfere with the  judgment  under  appeal.   We  accordingly  dismiss  the
special leave petition.

                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)




                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                 (J. CHELAMESWAR )

New Delhi;
July 17, 2013.

-----------------------
7


Acquittal =Death was caused by head injuries - as per doctor head injuries may be caused by iron pipe - No oral evidence that any one of the accused caused 1 - 4 heard injuries with iron pipe = medical evidence did not support the version of the prosecution = as per the prosecution case, A-1 and A-2 were armed with knives, A-4 was armed with iron rod and A-3 was holding only stick, in the absence of specific assertion by PWs 1 & 3 about the specific role of the appellant (A-3) and no medical evidence from the Doctor in the post mortem certificate, we are of the view that the conviction and the ultimate sentence in respect of the appellant (A-3) cannot be sustained. We are satisfied that both the courts below failed to take note of the fact that the medical evidence has not supported the version of the prosecution in respect of the appellant (A-3) and in fact contrary to the evidence of PWs 1 & 3, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is liable to be set aside. The conclusion of the High Court that the appellant along with others attacked the deceased with intention to cause injuries is without any basis and not supported by acceptable evidence. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC insofar as the appellant is concerned is liable to be set aside.= In the light of the above discussion, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

        published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40572
REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1533 OF 2009



Nagappan                                                 .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu         .... Respondent(s)







                               J U D G M E N T



P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    This appeal has been  filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
12.04.2006 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at  Madras  in  Criminal
Appeal No. 1861 of 2002 whereby the High Court dismissed  the  appeal  filed
by the  appellants  therein  and  confirmed  the  order  of  conviction  and
sentence dated 20.12.2002 passed by the Court  of  Additional  District  and
Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Cuddalore  in  Sessions  Case
No. 230 of 2000.

2)    Brief facts
(a)   The case relates to the death of a person by name Pasupathy,  resident
of Periya Irusampalayam village, committed by Sivaraman (A-1),  Mano  (A-2),
Nagappan (A-3) and Tamil@Tamilvanan (A-4) on account of enmity  between  the
deceased-Pasupathy and Sivaraman (A-1).
At one point of time, there  was  a
quarrel  between  Sivaraman  (A-1)  and  one  Srinivasan  (DW-1)  which  was
pacified by Pasupathy and thereby A-1 had an impression  that  Pasupathy  is
in support of Srinivasan (DW-1).
 Due  to  this  kind  of  impression,
A-1
planned to eliminate Pasupathy.
(b)     In order to materialize the same, on 08.05.2000, at 08:30 p.m.,
A-1 to A-4,  assembled  near  the  road  leading  to  the  graveyard  of  Periya
Irusampalayam village with an ulterior motive of killing Pasupathy.
At  the
relevant time, Sivaraj (PW-1) and Ganapathy (PW-3),  who  are  brothers  and
relatives of Pasupathy, along with  Vijayan,  Murugan,  Babu  and  Veerappan
were having conversation near the electric post on the way to graveyard  and
Pasupathy was coming towards the same direction.
On seeing  Pasupathy,  the
accused persons, in order to grab the opportunity of killing  him,  attacked
him using knives, stick and iron pipe.
A-1 and A-2  inflicted  injuries  on
the deceased using knives 
from behind on the head and neck respectively.  
A-3 attacked Pasupathy with a stick 
whereas A-4 attacked him using  iron  pipe
over the rear portion of his neck.
When PW-1  and  others  came  to  rescue
Pasupathy, the accused persons ran away from the  spot  leaving  behind  the
weapons used in the  incident.   
Pasupathy  was  immediately  taken  to  the
hospital but he died on the way.
(c)   On the very next day, i.e., on 09.05.2000, at 05:00 a.m., PW-1  lodged
a complaint at Reddichavadi Police Station which came to  be  registered  as
Crime No. 132 of 2000 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,  1860  (in
short ‘the IPC’).
(d)    After  investigation,  the  case  was  committed  to  the  Court   of
Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge-cum-Chief  Judicial   Magistrate,
Cuddalore under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC which  was  numbered
as Sessions Case No. 230 of 2000.
The  Additional  District  and  Sessions
Judge, by order dated 20.12.2002, convicted  A-1  to  A-4  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced  them
to undergo imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 4,000/-  each,  in
default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for 1 (one) year.
(e)   Aggrieved by the said order, A-1 to A-3 preferred Criminal Appeal  No.
1861 of 2002 before the High Court.  
The Division Bench of the  High  Court,
by  order  dated  12.04.2006,  dismissed  their  appeal  by  confirming  the
conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court.
(f)   Against the  said  order,  Nagappan  (the  appellant  herein  and  A-3
therein) has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

3)    Heard Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel  for  the  appellant-accused  and
Mr. M. Yogesh Khanna, learned counsel for the respondent-State.

Contentions:

4)    Mr. K.K. Mani, learned counsel for the  appellant,  at  the  foremost,
submitted that the conviction solely based on the evidence of  Sivaraj  (PW-
1) and Ganapathy  (PW-3),  who  are  brothers  and  interested/related  eye-
witnesses, cannot be sustained in the absence of  corroboration  from  other
witnesses.  
He further submitted  that  both  the  courts  below  failed  to
notice the fact that the medical evidence did not  support  the  version  of
the prosecution in respect of the appellant (A-3) and in  fact  contrary  to
the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 and, therefore, the  conviction  and  sentence
of the appellant is liable to be set aside.

5)    On the other hand, Mr. M.  Yogesh  Khanna,  learned  counsel  for  the
State submitted that merely because the eye-witnesses in the case  on  hand,
namely, PW-1 and PW-3, are brothers/related to the deceased, their  evidence
cannot be eschewed.   According  to  him,  the  role  of  the  Court  is  to
scrutinize the evidence carefully.  He also pointed out that in addition  to
the evidence of said eye-witnesses, medical evidence through Doctor  (PW-10)
also supports the prosecution case, and hence, there is no valid ground  for
interference.

6)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the relevant materials.

Discussion:

7)    As regards  the  first  contention  about  the  admissibility  of  the
evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 being  closely  related  to  each  other  and  the
deceased, first of all, there is no  bar  in  considering  the  evidence  of
relatives.  It is true that in the case  on  hand,  other  witnesses  turned
hostile and not supported the case  of  the  prosecution.  
The  prosecution
heavily relied on the evidence of PW-1, PW-3 and  PW-10.   The  trial  Court
and the High Court, in view of their relationship,  closely  analysed  their
statements and ultimately found that their evidence  is  clear,  cogent  and
without considerable  contradiction  as  claimed  by  their  counsel.  
This
Court, in  series  of  decisions,  has  held  that  where  the  evidence  of
“interested witnesses”  is  consistent  and  duly  corroborated  by  medical
evidence, it is not possible to discard the same merely on the  ground  that
they were interested witnesses.
In  other  words,  relationship  is  not  a factor to affect credibility of a witness.
[ vide Dalip  Singh  &  Ors.  vs.
State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364, Guli Chand & Ors. vs. State of  Rajasthan,
(1974) 3 SCC 698, Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC  614,
Masalti & Ors. vs. The State of U.P.,  AIR 1965 SC 202, The State of  Punjab
vs. Jagir Singh & Ors. (1974) 3 SCC 277 = AIR 1973 SC 2407, Lehna vs.  State
of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 76, Sucha Singh & Anr. vs. State of Punjab,  (2003)
7 SCC 643 = 2003(6) JT SC 348, Israr vs. State of U.P., (2005)  9  SCC  616,
S. Sudershan Reddy & Ors. vs. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 163  =  AIR  2006
SC 2716 and   Abdul  Rashid  Abdul  Rahiman  Patel  &  Ors.   vs.  State  of
Maharashtra JT 2007 (9) SC 194, Waman and Others vs. State  of  Maharashtra,
(2011) 7 SCC 295, State of Haryana vs. Shakuntla and Others,  (2012)  5  SCC
171, Raju @ Balachandran & Ors. vs. State of Tamil  Nadu,  2012  (11)  Scale
357, Subal Ghorai & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 607].

8)     In  the  light  of  the  above  principles,  let  us   consider   the
acceptability or otherwise of the evidence of Sivaraj (PW-1)  and  Ganapathy
(PW-3).
 In view of the stand taken by the appellant,
we have  analysed  the
evidence of PWs 1 & 3.  As rightly  observed  by  the  courts  below,  their
evidence is clear, cogent and without much  contradiction.
In  categorical
terms, PWs 1 & 3 asserted before the Court that Sivaraman (A-1) and Mano (A-
2) caused cut injuries to Pasupathy (deceased) using knives (M.Os  9  &  10)
and Nagappan – the appellant herein    (A-3), attacked the deceased  with  a
stick and caused extensive injuries upon the head,  neck  and  other  places
resulting into his death on the way to hospital.
No doubt,  they  mentioned
that the appellant (A-3) attacked  Pasupathy  with  a  stick,  however,  our
analysis shows that the evidence of PW-1 and  PW-3  clearly  implicated  A-1
and A-2 and  the  courts  below  have  rightly  accepted  the  case  of  the
prosecution.
Insofar as the role of the appellant (A-3) is concerned,  even
according to the eye witnesses, viz., PWs 1 & 3,
he  attacked  the  deceased with a stick.  
There is no specific assertion about the exact  blow  on  the
head by use of stick by the appellant (A-3).
They merely  stated  that  A-3
used the stick and hit on the back.
There is not even a  whisper  that  the
stick used by the appellant (A-3) hit on the neck or head of  the deceased.
We are satisfied that the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are  not  sufficient  to convict the appellant (A-3) under Section 302.

9)    Now let  us  consider  the  medical  evidence.  
Doctor  (PW-10),  who
conducted the post mortem on the dead body,  in  his  evidence,  has  stated
that he conducted the post mortem at 12.30 p.m. on 09.05.2000 and
found  the
following injuries on the dead body:

      “1.   Bluish discolouration and swelling present over right upper  eye
      lid.

      2.    Lacerated injury of 4 cm x 1 cm  bone  deep  present  over  left
      Parietal region of head with fracture of underlying bone.

      3.    Lacerated injury of 5 cm x 1 cm bone deep  over  left  occipital
      region of head.

      4.    Lacerated injury of 4cm x 1  cm  bone  deep  present  over  left
      occipital region of head.

      5.    Obliquely placed incised wound 10 x 1.5 bone deep with  fracture
      of underlying bone present over back of neck behind left ear.”

PW-10 further stated that the deceased appeared to have died of  the  wounds
on the head 6 to 24 hours before  the  post  mortem.   
In  other  words,  he
asserted that the deceased died due to head  injuries.  
He  explained  that
the deceased had 4 injuries on the head and one  swelling  injury  over  the
right eye.
He further explained that out of 4 injuries  on  the  head,  two
were on the rear left side, one injury was found on the  rear  of  the  head
and one injury was found near the left ear. 
According to him,  injury  Nos. 2 to 5 were at bone depth.  
He also stated  that  the  5th  injury  was  cut injury.  
Injury Nos. 2 to 4 were lacerated injuries.  Exh. P-10 is the  post
mortem certificate issued by him.  
Admittedly, the  stick  alleged  to  have
been used by the appellant (A-3) was not shown to the  Doctor  (PW-10).  
In
his cross examination, he admitted that he did not remember that the  police
had enquired by showing the weapons to him.  
He  also  stated  that  Injury
Nos. 1-4 may be possible by attack with iron pipe.
He  also  admitted  that
there was no injury on the back of the deceased person.  
He  concluded  that
there was no other injury other than what he had stated in the  examination-
in-chief as well as noted in the post mortem certificate (Ex.P-10).

10)   In the earlier paragraph of our discussion, we mentioned  the  minimal
role alleged to have been played by the appellant (A-3).
Even  PWs  1  &  3
have not  specifically  stated,  namely,
whether  the  stick  used  by  the
appellant (A-3) struck on the head or neck.
 In the post  mortem  report  as
well as in the evidence of the  Doctor  (PW-10),  absolutely,  there  is  no
reference of any injury on the back of  the  deceased  person.
 Considering
the fact that even as per the prosecution case, A-1 and A-2 were armed  with knives, A-4 was armed with iron rod and A-3 was holding only stick,  in  the absence of specific assertion by PWs 1 & 3 about the specific  role  of  the appellant (A-3) and no medical evidence from the Doctor in the  post  mortem
certificate, we are of  the  view  that  the  conviction  and  the ultimate sentence in respect of the appellant (A-3)  cannot  be  sustained.   
We  are
satisfied that both the courts below failed to take note of the   fact  that
the medical evidence has not supported the version  of  the  prosecution  in
respect of the appellant (A-3) and in fact contrary to the evidence  of  PWs
1 & 3, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is liable  to
be set aside.  
The conclusion of the High Court  that  the  appellant  along
with others attacked the  deceased  with  intention  to  cause  injuries  is
without any basis and not supported by acceptable evidence.  Therefore,  the
conviction under Section 302  read  with  Section  34  IPC  insofar  as  the
appellant is concerned is liable to be set aside.

11)   In the light of the above discussion, the conviction and  sentence  of
the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is set aside.   The
appeal is allowed.  The appellant is directed to be released  forthwith,  if
not required in any other case.



                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)



































                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (J. CHELAMESWAR)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 17, 2013.




Acquittal of murder case= It is a well settled principle of law that when the genesis and the manner of the incident is doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Inasmuch as the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant was alleged to have fired at the deceased, the entire story has to be rejected. 19) In the light of the above discussion, though we are unable to accept the contention relating to the right of private defence as pleaded by learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the entire prosecution case, coupled with the reasoning of the High Court accepting the claim of the other accused, i.e., A-2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case is to be rejected as unbelievable. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt, accordingly, we set aside his conviction and sentence.

            published in          http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40570           
    REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 2009



Arshad Hussain
                                                                   ....
Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Rajasthan                                     ... Respondent(s)

                                      2





                               J U D G M E N T



P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    This appeal has been  filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
30.04.2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur
in Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2004 whereby the Division Bench  of  the  High
Court dismissed the  appeal  with  regard  to  the  appellant  herein  while
setting aside the conviction and sentence  imposed  upon  rest  of  the  two
appellants therein by the Court  of  Sessions,  Udaipur,  vide  order  dated
18.05.2004 in Session Case No. 96 of 2001 for the offence  punishable  under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,  1860  (in  short
’the IPC’).
2)    Brief facts
(a)   As per the prosecution case, on  18.12.2000,  at  around  10:30  p.m.,
Nizam (the complainant), Iqbal,  Jamil  and  Moin  were  returning  back  to
Khanji Peer, Udaipur on two scooters after  having  meals  at  Mulla  Talai,
Udaipur, in-laws’ house of Iqbal.  At that  time,  when  all  four  of  them
reached near the house of Ashfaq, all of a  sudden,  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar,
sons of Ashfaq, came in front of their scooters and stopped them. On  seeing
them, Iqbal got down from the scooter and asked as to what  is  the  matter?
Immediately, Shahjad and Mujaffar shouted ‘Arshad  fire’.   On  hearing  the
same, Arshad, who was standing in the verandah of  his  house  with  a  gun,
fired three shots which hit on the chest and shoulder of Iqbal, as a  result
of which, he fell down.  Nizam, Jamil  and  Moin,  who  were  also  standing
closer to Iqbal, ran away from the spot.
(b)   Thereafter, Nizam (the complainant), Jamil and Moin took Iqbal to  the
hospital in the car of Raja@Siraj (PW-7)  and  submitted  a  written  report
(Exh. P-1) to Nazir Khan, Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-19),  posted  at  P.S.
Surajpol, Udaipur, on the basis of which, a First Information  Report  (FIR)
being No. 523 of 2000 (Exh. P-52) was registered against Arshad Hussain  (A-
1), Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3)  under  Sections  341,  302  read  with
Section 34 of IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. It was  also  stated
in the written complaint that there was old enmity between Ashfaq and  Iqbal
and the said incident was a pre-determined plan in order  to  kill  him  and
also that he had seen the gun in the hands of Arshad while running away.
(c)   After filing of the chargesheet, the case was committed to  the  Court
of Sessions, Udaipur which was numbered as Session Case No. 96 of 2001.
(d)   The Sessions Judge, vide  order  dated  18.05.2004,  convicted  Arshad
Hussain (A-1), Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3) under Section 302 read  with
Section 34 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous  imprisonment  (RI)
for life along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-  each,  in  default,  to  further
undergo RI for one year.

(e)   Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence, the  appellant
herein (A-1) and other convicted accused  (A-2  and  A-3)  filed  an  appeal
being Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2004 before the High  Court.   By  judgment
dated 30.04.2008, the  High  Court,  while  acquitting  Mujaffar  (A-2)  and
Shahjad (A-3) of all the charges, confirmed the conviction and  sentence  of
Arshad Hussain (A-1).

(f)   Against the said order, the appellant-accused has  filed  this  appeal
by way of special leave before this Court.

3)    Heard Mr. Sushil  Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-
accused and Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General for  the
respondent-State.

4)    Mr. Sushil Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-accused
mainly  contended  that  the  deceased  was  a  history-sheeter,  hard  core
criminal, was involved in more than 17  criminal  cases  in  the  States  of
Rajasthan and Gujarat and was detained under Section 3(2)  of  the  National
Security Act, 1980 (Act  No.  65  of  Central  Act  of  1980).   He  further
submitted that the deceased and his gang wanted to extract  money  from  the
appellant by demanding Rs. 50 lakhs and when the appellant did not agree  to
the same, the deceased and his gang attacked his brother and 4-5 years’  old
daughter.  He further pointed out that in view  of  the  background  of  the
said enmity between his gang  and  the  appellant  as  well  as  his  family
members, even if the  prosecution  case  is  acceptable,  the  appellant  is
entitled to avail the right of private  defence.   He  also  submitted  that
inasmuch as the other co-accused, namely, Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad  (A-3),
have been acquitted by the High Court believing their alibi that  they  were
not present at the place of incident, the entire prosecution story is to  be
disbelieved.  According to him, in view of the acquittal of  those  persons,
viz., Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3), the genesis of the prosecution  case
is completely falsified.

5)    On the other hand, Dr. Manish  Singhvi,  learned  Additional  Advocate
General for the respondent-State submitted that though  the  State  has  not
preferred any appeal against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3, in the  light  of
overwhelming evidence adduced by  the  prosecution  with  reference  to  the
specific role of the appellant, the High Court is  justified  in  confirming
his conviction, hence, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

6)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the relevant materials.

Discussion:

7)    In order to understand the rival submissions, it is  useful  to  refer
the First Information Report (FIR) made by PW-4 which reads as under:

      “Sir,

            Submitted that today on 18.12.2000 at 10.30 p.m. night, I  Iqbal
      Bhai, Jameel Bhai and Moin Bhai were returning to Khanji Peer  on  two
      scooters, after taking meals, from SASURAL of Iqbal Bhai at the  house
      of Babu Bhai which is at Mulla Talai.  That at about 10.45  p.m.,  all
      the four of us reached near the house of  Ashfaw  in  Kishanpol  where
      there is a Ghati.  My scooter was ahead which I  was  driving.   Iqbal
      Bhai was sitting behind me and another scooter which Moin was  driving
      and Jameel was sitting behind him.  We were going side by side.  Since
      there is ghati near the house of Ashfaw, scooters were at  slow  speed
      just then Shahjad and his brother Muzaffar came against my scooter all
      of a sudden and stopped us and just then Iqbal Bhai got down and asked
      what is the matter, by then Shahjad and Muzaffar both  shouted  Arshad
      fire, just then Arshad, who was already standing near the wall of  the
      Verandah having a gun in hand fired three shots of gun.  I feared  and
      sat down and the bullet hit in the chest and side of Iqbal Bhai and he
      fell down there itself.  At  that  time  Jameel  and  Moin  were  also
      standing close by and all the three of them fled from the  scene.   At
      the time of this incident all the street lights of the  road  and  the
      light in the verandah of the house of Ashfaq were also lit.  There was
      old enmity between Ashfaq and Iqbal Bhai and they have committed  this
      murder with pre-planning.  While running, I saw gun in  the  hands  of
      Arshad.  Please take action.  Thereafter I, Jameel, Moin put Iqbal  in
      the car of my friend Raja alias Siraj  and  brought  to  the  hospital
      where he died.”




8)    If we carefully scrutinize the contents of the FIR given by Nizam (PW-
4), it is clear that the occurrence took place at 10:30 p.m.  on  18.12.2000
when Iqbal (since deceased), Nizam (PW-4), Jamil (PW-6) and  Moinuddin  (PW-
5) were returning to Khanji Peer on two scooters. When all the four  reached
near the house of Ashfaq, Shahjad (A-3) and his brother Muzaffar (A-2)  came
towards their scooters and stopped them.  On seeing  this,  Iqbal  got  down
and asked about the matter,  by  then  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar  both  shouted
“Arshad fire”.  On hearing the same, Arshad  (A-1),  the  appellant  herein,
who was standing in the verandah of his house with a gun  opened  fire  upon
them.  It is further stated that the appellant, who was having  gun  in  his
hand, fired three shots and in order to escape, Nizam (PW-4)  sat  down  and
the bullet hit in the chest and the shoulder of Iqbal as a result  of  which
he fell down immediately.  Afterwards, PWs 5 and 6 ran away from the  scene.
 It is also stated that at that time, the streetlights as well as the  light
of the verandah of the house of Ashfaq were on.  It is also seen that  there
was old enmity between Ashfaq and  Iqbal.   It  is  further  clear  that  on
seeing the deceased and the prosecution party and also on the  shoutings  of
A-3 and A-4, the appellant herein (A-1), who was standing in  the  verandah,
fired three shots which hit the deceased due to  which  he  sustained  fatal
injuries.

9)    It is not  in  dispute  that  the  High  Court,  after  analyzing  the
evidence of prosecution witnesses, particularly PWs 4, 5, 6, 7  and  19  and
the defence pleaded  by  A-2  and  A-3,  accepted  the  plea  of  alibi  and
categorically concluded that both of them were not present at the  scene  of
occurrence.  We have already stated that the State has  not  challenged  the
said order of acquittal by filing  appeal  before  this  Court  and  it  has
become final.  It is clear that with the acquittal of said persons, viz., A-
2 and A-3, the genesis of the  prosecution  case  is  completely  falsified.
Let us analyse this aspect in detail hereunder.

10)   Though Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain has mainly submitted  that  the  deceased
was a history-sheeter and he threatened the family members of the  appellant
on several occasions and also in view of the  criminal  antecedents  of  the
deceased, there is no acceptable evidence for availing the right of  private
defence as claimed by  him.   Likewise,  though  this  Court  on  29.09.2008
issued notice qua nature of offence only considering  the  materials  placed
by both the sides, we have gone into the matter in  depth  in  order  to  do
complete justice to the parties.

11)   We have already noted the contents of the FIR and  the  conclusion  of
the High Court ordering the acquittal of A-2 and  A-3.   The  first  witness
relied on by the prosecution is Nizam (PW-4) – the complainant.   A  perusal
of the evidence of PW-4 shows that  the  same  is  in  conformity  with  the
contents of the FIR.  In other words, he reiterated what he  has  stated  in
the FIR.  The important statement made by him as stated in  the  FIR  is  as
under:

       “Iqbal Bhai asked the accused as to  what  is  the  matter,  by  then
      Arshad fired.  Arshad, who was already standing with  gun  inside  the
      boundary wall of his house shot three fires on Iqbal.  One shot hit on
      the right shoulder and right arm pit.”

It is clear from the above  that  only  on  the  direction  of  Shahjad  and
Mujaffar, Arshad (the appellant herein) fired at Iqbal.

12)   The other witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution  were  PWs
5, 6 & 7.  All of them made similar statements as that of  PW-4.   In  other
words, all the three witnesses once again reiterated similar assertion  made
in the FIR including the presence  of  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar,  stopping  of
scooters and shouting Arshad to fire on Iqbal.

13)   The High Court has found that Mujaffar and Shahjad  were  not  present
at the place of incident.  The basis for such conclusion  was  that  at  the
relevant time Mujaffar (A-2) was  admitted  in  a  Hospital  at  Bombay  and
Shahjad, his brother, was attending him at the said place.  In  the  absence
of challenge as to the same by the State, it is  clear  that  both  the  co-
accused were not present at the place  of  incident  and,  therefore,  three
important aspects  of  the  prosecution  case  have  not  been  established,
namely, (a) the party of the deceased was stopped by Shahjad  and  Muzaffar;
(b) the deceased and his associates were stopped  by  Shahjad  and  Muzaffar
near the gate of their house; and (c) Shahjad and Muzaffar had asked  Arshad
to open fire upon the deceased.

14)   A perusal of the contents of the FIR,  the  statements  of  the  above
mentioned prosecution witnesses as well as the reasoning of the  High  Court
clearly show that the incident  had  not  taken  place  as  alleged  by  the
prosecution.  We are satisfied that the prosecution had  suppressed  genesis
and the manner in which the incident took place.

15)   In other words, in such circumstances,  in  the  absence  of  specific
assertion by PWs 4, 5, 6 & 7, the role of the  appellant  and  also  in  the
light of the conclusion by the High Court accepting the alibi pleaded by  A-
2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case could not be believed.

16)   Another aspect to be noticed is the use of automatic 12  bore  gun  in
the manner alleged by the prosecution.  According to the  prosecution,  each
of the cartridges used in the 12 bore gun has 180 pellets.  With  regard  to
the above, Nizam (PW-4), who is alleged to have driven the scooter on  which
Iqbal was sitting, has stated as under:

      ”The scooter which was being driven by Moin stopped on the right  side
      just ahead to my scooter.   Muzaffar  and  Shahjad  only  stopped  our
      scooter nobody stopped the other scooter.  Iqbal got  down  from  left
      side of the scooter.  We, the six persons, who were  standing  on  the
      spot were within the radius of about seven feet.”

Again it is stated that: –

      “This is true that except Iqbal none of us were hit by the pellet.”

Moinuddin (PW-5), in his evidence has stated as under:

      “This is true that the pellets of cartridge did not hit any one of  us
      except Iqbal Bhai and not hit on our scooter.”



In view of the above, it is seen that after  firing  540  pellets,  i.e.,  3
rounds, how it is possible that none of the witnesses  or  the  brothers  of
the appellant did not receive a single pellet  though  they  were  within  7
feet radius.  This aspect has not been clarified by the prosecution.

17)   In addition to the above infirmities, no scooter  was  recovered  from
the place of incident.  Likewise, the story  relating  to  recovery  of  gun
from the custody of the appellant-accused is also  doubtful.   There  is  no
evidence as to how and when the gun was kept by the appellant under the  bed
and thereafter got recovered from his own house.  The story of  recovery  of
the gun at the information of  the  appellant  is  ex  facie  concocted  and
unbelievable.

18)   It is a well settled principle of law that when the  genesis  and  the
manner of the incident is doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted for  the
offence punishable under Section  302  IPC.   Inasmuch  as  the  prosecution
failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant was alleged  to
have fired at the deceased, the entire story has to be rejected.

19)   In the light of the above discussion, though we are unable  to  accept
the contention relating to the  right  of  private  defence  as  pleaded  by
learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the  entire  prosecution
case, coupled with the reasoning of the High Court accepting  the  claim  of
the other accused, i.e., A-2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case is  to  be
rejected as unbelievable.  In such circumstances, the appellant is  entitled
to the benefit of doubt,  accordingly,  we  set  aside  his  conviction  and
sentence.



20)   The appeal is allowed.  The  appellant  is  directed  to  be  released
forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.


                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)


















                                     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 2009



Arshad Hussain
                                                                   ....
Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Rajasthan                                     ... Respondent(s)

                                      2





                               J U D G M E N T



P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    This appeal has been  filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
30.04.2008 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan  at  Jodhpur
in Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2004 whereby the Division Bench  of  the  High
Court dismissed the  appeal  with  regard  to  the  appellant  herein  while
setting aside the conviction and sentence  imposed  upon  rest  of  the  two
appellants therein by the Court  of  Sessions,  Udaipur,  vide  order  dated
18.05.2004 in Session Case No. 96 of 2001 for the offence  punishable  under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,  1860  (in  short
’the IPC’).
2)    Brief facts
(a)   As per the prosecution case, on  18.12.2000,  at  around  10:30  p.m.,
Nizam (the complainant), Iqbal,  Jamil  and  Moin  were  returning  back  to
Khanji Peer, Udaipur on two scooters after  having  meals  at  Mulla  Talai,
Udaipur, in-laws’ house of Iqbal.  At that  time,  when  all  four  of  them
reached near the house of Ashfaq, all of a  sudden,  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar,
sons of Ashfaq, came in front of their scooters and stopped them. On  seeing
them, Iqbal got down from the scooter and asked as to what  is  the  matter?
Immediately, Shahjad and Mujaffar shouted ‘Arshad  fire’.   On  hearing  the
same, Arshad, who was standing in the verandah of  his  house  with  a  gun,
fired three shots which hit on the chest and shoulder of Iqbal, as a  result
of which, he fell down.  Nizam, Jamil  and  Moin,  who  were  also  standing
closer to Iqbal, ran away from the spot.
(b)   Thereafter, Nizam (the complainant), Jamil and Moin took Iqbal to  the
hospital in the car of Raja@Siraj (PW-7)  and  submitted  a  written  report
(Exh. P-1) to Nazir Khan, Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-19),  posted  at  P.S.
Surajpol, Udaipur, on the basis of which, a First Information  Report  (FIR)
being No. 523 of 2000 (Exh. P-52) was registered against Arshad Hussain  (A-
1), Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3)  under  Sections  341,  302  read  with
Section 34 of IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. It was  also  stated
in the written complaint that there was old enmity between Ashfaq and  Iqbal
and the said incident was a pre-determined plan in order  to  kill  him  and
also that he had seen the gun in the hands of Arshad while running away.
(c)   After filing of the chargesheet, the case was committed to  the  Court
of Sessions, Udaipur which was numbered as Session Case No. 96 of 2001.
(d)   The Sessions Judge, vide  order  dated  18.05.2004,  convicted  Arshad
Hussain (A-1), Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3) under Section 302 read  with
Section 34 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous  imprisonment  (RI)
for life along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-  each,  in  default,  to  further
undergo RI for one year.

(e)   Aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence, the  appellant
herein (A-1) and other convicted accused  (A-2  and  A-3)  filed  an  appeal
being Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2004 before the High  Court.   By  judgment
dated 30.04.2008, the  High  Court,  while  acquitting  Mujaffar  (A-2)  and
Shahjad (A-3) of all the charges, confirmed the conviction and  sentence  of
Arshad Hussain (A-1).

(f)   Against the said order, the appellant-accused has  filed  this  appeal
by way of special leave before this Court.

3)    Heard Mr. Sushil  Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-
accused and Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General for  the
respondent-State.

4)    Mr. Sushil Kumar  Jain,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-accused
mainly  contended  that  the  deceased  was  a  history-sheeter,  hard  core
criminal, was involved in more than 17  criminal  cases  in  the  States  of
Rajasthan and Gujarat and was detained under Section 3(2)  of  the  National
Security Act, 1980 (Act  No.  65  of  Central  Act  of  1980).   He  further
submitted that the deceased and his gang wanted to extract  money  from  the
appellant by demanding Rs. 50 lakhs and when the appellant did not agree  to
the same, the deceased and his gang attacked his brother and 4-5 years’  old
daughter.  He further pointed out that in view  of  the  background  of  the
said enmity between his gang  and  the  appellant  as  well  as  his  family
members, even if the  prosecution  case  is  acceptable,  the  appellant  is
entitled to avail the right of private  defence.   He  also  submitted  that
inasmuch as the other co-accused, namely, Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad  (A-3),
have been acquitted by the High Court believing their alibi that  they  were
not present at the place of incident, the entire prosecution story is to  be
disbelieved.  According to him, in view of the acquittal of  those  persons,
viz., Mujaffar (A-2) and Shahjad (A-3), the genesis of the prosecution  case
is completely falsified.

5)    On the other hand, Dr. Manish  Singhvi,  learned  Additional  Advocate
General for the respondent-State submitted that though  the  State  has  not
preferred any appeal against the acquittal of A-2 and A-3, in the  light  of
overwhelming evidence adduced by  the  prosecution  with  reference  to  the
specific role of the appellant, the High Court is  justified  in  confirming
his conviction, hence, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

6)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the relevant materials.

Discussion:

7)    In order to understand the rival submissions, it is  useful  to  refer
the First Information Report (FIR) made by PW-4 which reads as under:

      “Sir,

            Submitted that today on 18.12.2000 at 10.30 p.m. night, I  Iqbal
      Bhai, Jameel Bhai and Moin Bhai were returning to Khanji Peer  on  two
      scooters, after taking meals, from SASURAL of Iqbal Bhai at the  house
      of Babu Bhai which is at Mulla Talai.  That at about 10.45  p.m.,  all
      the four of us reached near the house of  Ashfaw  in  Kishanpol  where
      there is a Ghati.  My scooter was ahead which I  was  driving.   Iqbal
      Bhai was sitting behind me and another scooter which Moin was  driving
      and Jameel was sitting behind him.  We were going side by side.  Since
      there is ghati near the house of Ashfaw, scooters were at  slow  speed
      just then Shahjad and his brother Muzaffar came against my scooter all
      of a sudden and stopped us and just then Iqbal Bhai got down and asked
      what is the matter, by then Shahjad and Muzaffar both  shouted  Arshad
      fire, just then Arshad, who was already standing near the wall of  the
      Verandah having a gun in hand fired three shots of gun.  I feared  and
      sat down and the bullet hit in the chest and side of Iqbal Bhai and he
      fell down there itself.  At  that  time  Jameel  and  Moin  were  also
      standing close by and all the three of them fled from the  scene.   At
      the time of this incident all the street lights of the  road  and  the
      light in the verandah of the house of Ashfaq were also lit.  There was
      old enmity between Ashfaq and Iqbal Bhai and they have committed  this
      murder with pre-planning.  While running, I saw gun in  the  hands  of
      Arshad.  Please take action.  Thereafter I, Jameel, Moin put Iqbal  in
      the car of my friend Raja alias Siraj  and  brought  to  the  hospital
      where he died.”




8)    If we carefully scrutinize the contents of the FIR given by Nizam (PW-
4), it is clear that the occurrence took place at 10:30 p.m.  on  18.12.2000
when Iqbal (since deceased), Nizam (PW-4), Jamil (PW-6) and  Moinuddin  (PW-
5) were returning to Khanji Peer on two scooters. When all the four  reached
near the house of Ashfaq, Shahjad (A-3) and his brother Muzaffar (A-2)  came
towards their scooters and stopped them.  On seeing  this,  Iqbal  got  down
and asked about the matter,  by  then  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar  both  shouted
“Arshad fire”.  On hearing the same, Arshad  (A-1),  the  appellant  herein,
who was standing in the verandah of his house with a gun  opened  fire  upon
them.  It is further stated that the appellant, who was having  gun  in  his
hand, fired three shots and in order to escape, Nizam (PW-4)  sat  down  and
the bullet hit in the chest and the shoulder of Iqbal as a result  of  which
he fell down immediately.  Afterwards, PWs 5 and 6 ran away from the  scene.
 It is also stated that at that time, the streetlights as well as the  light
of the verandah of the house of Ashfaq were on.  It is also seen that  there
was old enmity between Ashfaq and  Iqbal.   It  is  further  clear  that  on
seeing the deceased and the prosecution party and also on the  shoutings  of
A-3 and A-4, the appellant herein (A-1), who was standing in  the  verandah,
fired three shots which hit the deceased due to  which  he  sustained  fatal
injuries.

9)    It is not  in  dispute  that  the  High  Court,  after  analyzing  the
evidence of prosecution witnesses, particularly PWs 4, 5, 6, 7  and  19  and
the defence pleaded  by  A-2  and  A-3,  accepted  the  plea  of  alibi  and
categorically concluded that both of them were not present at the  scene  of
occurrence.  We have already stated that the State has  not  challenged  the
said order of acquittal by filing  appeal  before  this  Court  and  it  has
become final.  It is clear that with the acquittal of said persons, viz., A-
2 and A-3, the genesis of the  prosecution  case  is  completely  falsified.
Let us analyse this aspect in detail hereunder.

10)   Though Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain has mainly submitted  that  the  deceased
was a history-sheeter and he threatened the family members of the  appellant
on several occasions and also in view of the  criminal  antecedents  of  the
deceased, there is no acceptable evidence for availing the right of  private
defence as claimed by  him.   Likewise,  though  this  Court  on  29.09.2008
issued notice qua nature of offence only considering  the  materials  placed
by both the sides, we have gone into the matter in  depth  in  order  to  do
complete justice to the parties.

11)   We have already noted the contents of the FIR and  the  conclusion  of
the High Court ordering the acquittal of A-2 and  A-3.   The  first  witness
relied on by the prosecution is Nizam (PW-4) – the complainant.   A  perusal
of the evidence of PW-4 shows that  the  same  is  in  conformity  with  the
contents of the FIR.  In other words, he reiterated what he  has  stated  in
the FIR.  The important statement made by him as stated in  the  FIR  is  as
under:

       “Iqbal Bhai asked the accused as to  what  is  the  matter,  by  then
      Arshad fired.  Arshad, who was already standing with  gun  inside  the
      boundary wall of his house shot three fires on Iqbal.  One shot hit on
      the right shoulder and right arm pit.”

It is clear from the above  that  only  on  the  direction  of  Shahjad  and
Mujaffar, Arshad (the appellant herein) fired at Iqbal.

12)   The other witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution  were  PWs
5, 6 & 7.  All of them made similar statements as that of  PW-4.   In  other
words, all the three witnesses once again reiterated similar assertion  made
in the FIR including the presence  of  Shahjad  and  Mujaffar,  stopping  of
scooters and shouting Arshad to fire on Iqbal.

13)   The High Court has found that Mujaffar and Shahjad  were  not  present
at the place of incident.  The basis for such conclusion  was  that  at  the
relevant time Mujaffar (A-2) was  admitted  in  a  Hospital  at  Bombay  and
Shahjad, his brother, was attending him at the said place.  In  the  absence
of challenge as to the same by the State, it is  clear  that  both  the  co-
accused were not present at the place  of  incident  and,  therefore,  three
important aspects  of  the  prosecution  case  have  not  been  established,
namely, (a) the party of the deceased was stopped by Shahjad  and  Muzaffar;
(b) the deceased and his associates were stopped  by  Shahjad  and  Muzaffar
near the gate of their house; and (c) Shahjad and Muzaffar had asked  Arshad
to open fire upon the deceased.

14)   A perusal of the contents of the FIR,  the  statements  of  the  above
mentioned prosecution witnesses as well as the reasoning of the  High  Court
clearly show that the incident  had  not  taken  place  as  alleged  by  the
prosecution.  We are satisfied that the prosecution had  suppressed  genesis
and the manner in which the incident took place.

15)   In other words, in such circumstances,  in  the  absence  of  specific
assertion by PWs 4, 5, 6 & 7, the role of the  appellant  and  also  in  the
light of the conclusion by the High Court accepting the alibi pleaded by  A-
2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case could not be believed.

16)   Another aspect to be noticed is the use of automatic 12  bore  gun  in
the manner alleged by the prosecution.  According to the  prosecution,  each
of the cartridges used in the 12 bore gun has 180 pellets.  With  regard  to
the above, Nizam (PW-4), who is alleged to have driven the scooter on  which
Iqbal was sitting, has stated as under:

      ”The scooter which was being driven by Moin stopped on the right  side
      just ahead to my scooter.   Muzaffar  and  Shahjad  only  stopped  our
      scooter nobody stopped the other scooter.  Iqbal got  down  from  left
      side of the scooter.  We, the six persons, who were  standing  on  the
      spot were within the radius of about seven feet.”

Again it is stated that: –

      “This is true that except Iqbal none of us were hit by the pellet.”

Moinuddin (PW-5), in his evidence has stated as under:

      “This is true that the pellets of cartridge did not hit any one of  us
      except Iqbal Bhai and not hit on our scooter.”



In view of the above, it is seen that after  firing  540  pellets,  i.e.,  3
rounds, how it is possible that none of the witnesses  or  the  brothers  of
the appellant did not receive a single pellet  though  they  were  within  7
feet radius.  This aspect has not been clarified by the prosecution.

17)   In addition to the above infirmities, no scooter  was  recovered  from
the place of incident.
 Likewise, the story  relating  to  recovery  of  gun
from the custody of the appellant-accused is also  doubtful.
There  is  no
evidence as to how and when the gun was kept by the appellant under the  bed
and thereafter got recovered from his own house.  
The story of  recovery  of
the gun at the information of  the  appellant  is  ex  facie  concocted  and unbelievable.

18)   It is a well settled principle of law that 
when the  genesis  and  the
manner of the incident is doubtful, 
the accused cannot be convicted for  the
offence punishable under Section  302  IPC.   
Inasmuch  as  the  prosecution
failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant was alleged  to have fired at the deceased, the entire story has to be rejected.

19)   In the light of the above discussion, 
though we are unable  to  accept
the contention relating to the  right  of  private  defence  as  pleaded  by learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the  entire  prosecution case, coupled with the reasoning of the High Court accepting  the  claim  of the other accused, i.e., A-2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case is  to  be rejected as unbelievable.  
In such circumstances, the appellant is  entitled
to the benefit of doubt,  accordingly,  we  set  aside  his  conviction  and sentence.



20)   The appeal is allowed.  The  appellant  is  directed  to  be  released
forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.


                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)






































                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (J. CHELAMESWAR)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 17, 2013.


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10





















                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (J. CHELAMESWAR)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 17, 2013.


-----------------------
10


driver of the said taxi involved in the offence undergone seven years and six months in jail, reduced from 10 years to served setence = even if the prosecution case is accepted that the appellant had facilitated in the commission of crime, considering the fact that he did not enter the jewellery shop and was not armed with any weapon, the maximum sentence of 10 years is excessive. On going through all the aspects, particularly, the entire evidence of the owner of the taxi PW-12, we inclined to accept the claim of Mr. Ghosh. - It is relevant to point out that PW-12, nowhere in his statement has described about any illegal activity on the part of the appellant who was his taxi driver. Inasmuch as no adverse statement has been made by him and also of the fact that till date, he had already undergone seven years and six months in jail, while confirming his conviction, we feel that ends of justice would be met by altering his sentence to the period already undergone. 11) In view of our conclusion on the sentence, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.

                           published in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40568
     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1109 OF 2009



Rajendra Sharma                                 .... Appellant(s)

      Versus

State of West Bengal                               .... Respondent(s)

                                      2





                               J U D G M E N T



P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    This appeal is filed  against  the  final  judgment  and  order  dated
09.04.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the High  Court  at  Calcutta  in
C.R.A. No. 81 of 2006 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal  preferred
by the appellant herein by confirming his conviction and sentence passed  by
the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Alipore dated  19/20.12.2005  in
Sessions Trial No. 1(2) of 2000 for the offence  punishable  under  Sections
395/397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short  ‘IPC’),  Section  25  (1a)
(b) of the Arms Act, 1959 and Sections 3 and 5 of the  Explosive  Substances
Act, 1908.
2)    Brief facts:
(a)   As per the prosecution case, on 07.12.1998, at about 13:15 hours,  the
accused persons, viz., Rajendra Sharma, Sk. Muktar  @  Dabbu,  Sarban  Singh
and 2/3  others,  armed  with  revolvers,  khojali,  bombs  etc.,  committed
dacoity in gold jewellery workshops at  Gopal  Bose  Lane  and  looted  gold
ornaments weighing about 1820 grams approx. and fled away in two taxis.
(b)   With regard to the above incident, a written FIR being No.  234  dated
07.12.1998 was registered by Arun  Hazra  (PW-3)  at  P.S.  Cossipore  under
Sections 395/397 IPC and Sections 25/27 of the  Arms  Act,  1959  read  with
Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
(c)   After investigation, the case  was  committed  to  the  Court  of  1st
Additional Sessions Judge, Alipore and was numbered as  Sessions  Trial  No.
1(2) of 2000.
(d)   The trial Court, by order dated 19/20.12.2005 convicted the  appellant
along with other co-accused under Sections 395/397 IPC and directed  him  to
suffer rigorous imprisonment  (RI)  for  10  years  along  with  a  fine  of
Rs.5,000/-, in default, to further undergo RI  for  a  period  of  2  years.

(e)   Being aggrieved of  the  above  said  order,  the  appellants  therein
preferred separate appeals before the High Court at Calcutta.
(f)   The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 09.04.2008,  dismissed  the
appeal  of  the  appellant  (A-1)  and  one  Sarban  Singh  affirming  their
conviction and sentence and set aside the order of conviction  and  sentence
of other co-accused - Ranjit Kumar.
(g)   Being aggrieved, the appellant (A-1) alone  has  preferred  the  above
appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
3)    Heard Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant-
accused and Mr. Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, learned counsel for the  respondent-
State.
4)    Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned senior  counsel  for  the  appellant,  after
taking us through the entire materials submitted that in the absence of  any
individual  overt  act  committed  by  him,  particularly,  even  when   the
prosecution witnesses  identified  the  appellant  as  the  person  who  was
sitting inside the taxi in which the other dacoits got up  after  committing
dacoity, awarding maximum punishment of 10 years is not warranted.  He  also
submitted that even if the conviction is sustainable,  taking  note  of  his
limited role, namely, keeping taxi near the spot and of the  fact  that  out
of 10 years of sentence, so far he had served seven years and six months  in
jail, the  same  may  be  considered  sufficient  and  he  may  be  released
forthwith.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Ganguli,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent-State submitted that  the  prosecution  witnesses,  particularly,
PWs 3, 4 and 5 and the owner of the taxi, viz., Kartik Santra (PW-12)  amply
prove  the  involvement  of  the  appellant.   He  also  pointed  out   that
considering the seriousness of the offence, the  sentence  awarded,  namely,
10 years cannot be construed as excessive or unreasonable.
5)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the relevant materials.


Discussion:
6)    Among the witnesses, the evidence of  Arun  Hazra  (PW-3)  is  heavily
relied on by the prosecution and accepted by  both  the  courts  who  was  a
goldsmith in the shop of Uttam Majhi at 2F Gopal Bose Lane.  It was  he  who
made a complaint under Exh. 3-3/3.  In his evidence,  he  asserted  that  on
07.12.1998, at about 1.30 p.m., while he was working in the  shop  of  Uttam
Majhi along with others, suddenly a man of 25-30 years  entered  into  their
shop through their collapsible gate with a pistol. 4-5 persons also  entered
into their shop following him.  They all were  armed  with  pistols,  knives
and curbed knives.  They were running here and there and they picked up  the
manufactured gold ornaments from their workers and kept the same in  a  jute
bag.  Some persons  also  entered  into  the  gold  shops  of  Prosanta  and
Nasiruddin.  When people assembled in  front  of  their  shops  and  shouted
‘dacoits dacoits’, the said persons, on hearing the  same,  fled  away.   He
also stated that when he came out while following them, he noticed that  the
engines of two taxis, viz.,  yellow  and  black  yellow  were  on  with  the
drivers standing outside the taxis.  He noted down the registration  numbers
of the taxis.  He identified the appellant as one  of  the  person  standing
with the taxi on.
7)    The next witness examined on the side of the prosecution was Asim  Das
(PW-4).  He also worked as a goldsmith  in  a  jewellery  factory  of  Uttam
Majhi at 2F Gopal Base Lane, Kolkata.  He narrated the incident  similar  to
one as mentioned by PW-3.  PW-4 also came to the road  and  shouted  ‘dacoit
dacoit’ and noted that two hired taxis were standing on the road with  start
condition and drivers were standing besides them.  He  also  identified  the
appellant who, according to him, standing near the taxi in start  condition.
 In the same effect, PW-5 also deposed before the Court.
8)    Apart from the evidence of PWs 3, 4 and 5, the  prosecution  has  also
examined one Kartik Santra as PW-12 who is the owner of a  yellow  taxi  No.
WB/237672.  He admitted that the appellant Rajendra  Sharma  (A-1)  was  the
driver of the said taxi.  He identified him in the  dock.   He  also  stated
that Rajendra Sharma took the vehicle on 07.12.1998 at about 7.00  a.m.  and
returned the same at 3.00 p.m.  on  that  day.  On  08.12.1998,  the  police
informed him that there was a dacoity in which his taxi  was  involved.   On
inquiry by  the  police,  he  took  them  to  his  driver’s  residence  and,
thereafter, the police arrested him from his house and the taxi  was  seized
on the very same day.  He also produced the Garage  Register  maintained  by
him which has been marked as Exh.-10.
9)    A conjoint reading of the evidence of PWs 3, 4 and 5 and the owner  of
the taxi, namely, PW-12 clearly establish the involvement of  the  appellant
in the commission of the offence.  There is no reason  to  disbelieve  their
versions and we are satisfied that both the courts  below  rightly  accepted
their statements.
10)   Relating  to  sentence,  Mr.  Ghosh  pointed  out  that
even  if  the
prosecution case is accepted that  the  appellant  had  facilitated  in  the
commission of crime,  considering  the  fact  that  he  did  not  enter  the
jewellery shop and was not armed with any weapon, the  maximum  sentence  of
10 years is excessive.  
On going through all the aspects, particularly,  the
entire evidence of the owner of the taxi PW-12, we inclined  to  accept  the
claim of Mr. Ghosh.  
It is relevant to point out that PW-12, nowhere in  his
statement has described about any  illegal  activity  on  the  part  of  the
appellant who was his taxi driver.  
Inasmuch as  no  adverse  statement  has
been made by him and also of  the  fact  that  till  date,  he  had  already
undergone  seven  years  and  six  months  in  jail,  while  confirming  his
conviction, we feel that ends of  justice  would  be  met  by  altering  his
sentence to the period already undergone.
11)   In view of  our  conclusion  on  the  sentence,  we  direct  that  the
appellant be released forthwith, if he is not required in  any  other  case.
The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.





                                  ………….…………………………J.


                                       (P. SATHASIVAM)




























                                    ………….…………………………J.


                                      (J. CHELAMESWAR)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 17, 2013.
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