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Monday, July 22, 2013

Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar =Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a public interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent, the State of Gujarat and its functionaries to allocate more water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch. By the impugned order the prayer made by the appellants has been rejected and against the dismissal of the writ petition they are before us with the leave of the Court.= “We are of the opinion that the prayer for allocation of adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be a matter of judicial review. It is for the executive authorities to look into this matter= The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence to the mandate of Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The State, in our opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does not mean that for achieving that the State Government has to apply it on the basis of the number of people residing in different parts only. Other factors just cannot be forgotten. We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning given by the High Court and we reiterate that there being no judicially manageable standards for allocation of water, any interference by this Court would mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the State Government. In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

                  published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40555             
                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2957 OF 2013


KACHCHH JAL SANKAT NIVARAN SAMITI & ORS.     ..APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.                          …RESPONDENTS



                                  JUDGMENT



CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.


      Appellant no. 1, Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti, claims to be
a non-
political organization established with the object amongst  others  to  work
to alleviate the District of Kutch of its perennial water  scarcity  and  to
mitigate the resultant problems faced by the inhabitants and the  residents.
 Other appellants have also interest in the cause espoused by appellant  no.
1.  Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar  Project
to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a  public
interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the  nature
of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing  the
respondent, the State of Gujarat and  its  functionaries  to  allocate  more
water from Sardar  Sarovar  Project  to  the  District  of  Kutch.   By  the
impugned order the prayer made by  the  appellants  has  been  rejected  and
against the dismissal of the writ petition  they  are  before  us  with  the
leave of the Court.

      Water is essential for survival of universe.  It is not available  for
human use in plenty and hence disputes existed between  various  States  for
its sharing.
In the year 1969, the Government of India in exercise  of  its
power  under  Section  4  of  the  Inter-State  Water  Disputes  Act,   1956
constituted Narmada Water Disputes  Tribunal  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
“the Tribunal”), to decide the Inter-State dispute of sharing  of  water  of
river Narmada.  
The Tribunal handed over its award on 16th of August,  1978.
 As provided under Section 5(3)  of  the  Inter-State  Water  Disputes  Act,
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the Union of India  and  the  States
of Gujarat, Madhya  Pradesh,  Maharashtra  and  Rajasthan  made  references.
Those references were heard by the Tribunal which gave its  final  award  on
7th of December, 1979.
It was published on 12th of December,  1979  in  the
Extraordinary Gazette of the Government of India.
While giving  the  award,
the Tribunal considered the issue pertaining to allocation of water,  height
of the dam, hydrology and other related issues.
As  regards  the  issue  of
allocation of Narmada  water  at  Sardar  Sarovar  Dam  site,  the  Tribunal
allocated 9.00 Million Acre Feet (for short “MAF”) to the State  of  Gujarat
whereas 18.25 MAF, 0.50 MAF and 0.25 MAF were allocated  to  the  States  of
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and  Maharashtra  respectively.  
It  is  relevant
here to state that the State of Gujarat laid claim for 20.73  MAF  of  water
out of the total demand of 22.02 MAF of water  before  the  Tribunal,  which
included 6.57 MAF water for reclaiming and/or irrigating  12.17  lakh  acres
of land of  the  District  of  Kutch  under  Zone  XI-C,  Banni  and  Ranns.
However, the claim of the State of Gujarat was turned down by  the  Tribunal on its finding that these areas are  barren  and  sparsely  populated.  Its soil  is  highly  saline  having  very   low   permeability   and   vertical permeability of nearly nil.  
It has high ground water table  and  impervious
layer near the ground water surface, high evaporation and low rainfall.  
 In this way the Tribunal rejected the claim of State of Gujarat for  irrigating 11 lakh acres of land in Banni and Ranns  areas  and  as  stated,  allocated 9.00 MAF of water.  
How the water allocated to each of the States  shall  be
utilised was left to the choice of the State Government.  As it  was  not  a case of plenty, 
the State Government of  Gujarat  out  of  9.00  MAF  water,
allocated 7.94 MAF water for irrigation and 1.06 MAF water for domestic  and industrial  use  and  because  of  the   limited   water   allocation,   the proportionate water requirement for Kutch region  was  worked  out  as  0.15 MAF.

      The appellants are aggrieved by aforesaid meager allocation  of  water
and, according to them, the State Government has not distributed  the  water
keeping in mind the Directive Principles of the State  Policy  as  enshrined
under Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India which  inter  alia  obliges
the State to make the policy in such a way that the  material  resources  of
the community are so distributed  as  best  to  subserve  the  common  good.
Appellant further contended that by meager allocation of  water,  the  State
Government also did not carry out its obligation as mandated
under  Article
38(2) of the Constitution which casts a duty on it  to  strive  to  minimise the inequalities in income and make an endeavour to  eliminate  inequalities in the status, facilities and opportunity amongst individuals and groups  of people residing in different areas of the State.   
The  plea  of  the  State
Government is that  out  of  the  limited  water  allocated  to  it  by  the
Tribunal, it had made the best use of that.  It has also  been  pointed  out
that the allocation complained of is not static and shall vary from time  to
time and the quantity of water allocated for Kutch  District  may  increase.
It has also been averred that while making  allocation  to  Kutch  District,
the State Government has kept in view the  interest  of  all  concerned  and
also the factors relevant for the purpose.  
According  to  the  respondent-
State Government, it laid a claim for 20.73 MAF of water out  of  the  total demand of 22.02 MAF water before the Tribunal which included  6.57  MAF  for Kutch, but only 9.00 MAF water was allocated and the award of  the  Tribunal having been approved by the Supreme  Court,  the  State  Government  has  to
distribute the limited water allocated to it.  It has also been pointed  out that the allocation made for the District of Kutch  has  been  increased  in later years.


      The High Court has analysed in detail the pleas raised by the  parties
and declined to interfere with the same, inter alia,  on  the  grounds  that
the decision involved balance of competing claims of the  natural  resources
and  there  is  no  judicially  manageable  standard  for  adjudication  for
allocation of water in favour of any region within the State.   While  doing
so, the High Court observed as follows:


           “In  our  opinion,  the  above  observations  would  answer  the
           submissions advanced by the learned counsel of the  petitioners.
           We are not here to weigh the pros and  cons  of  the  policy  or
           scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable
           disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying  or  annulling
           it, unless it is arbitrary or violative of  any  constitutional,
           statutory or any other provision of law.  
Needless to  say  that
           the petitioners have  not  challenged  these  decisions  on  the
           ground that as they are arbitrary nor have they pointed out that
           they are unconstitutional or violative of statutory or any other
           provisions of law.  
The Government, in the instant case, decided
           to accept the award of the NWDT which is  based  on  the  expert
           opinion and now we are asked to  test  the  utility,  beneficial
           effect etc. of the policy on the basis of  the  affidavit  filed
           before us……”




      The High  Court  further  observed  that  the  issue  raised  requires
determination of the choice of priorities and it is not subject to  judicial
review.  The High Court, in this connection, observed as follows:


              “29. Apart from that, determining the  choice  of  priorities
              and formulating perspective thereof is a matter of policy and
              it is not within  our  domain  to  interfere  with  the  sole
              question of efficacy or otherwise of such policy  unless  the
              same is “vitiated” of in violation of any provisions  or  the
              statute or Constitution of India.”






      Mr. Altaf Ahmed, Senior Counsel appears on behalf  of  the  appellants
and takes  a  stand  that  the  appellants  do  not  seek  determination  of
appropriate quantity of water for the District of  Kutch  but  the  plea  is
that the policy of distribution is based on  irrelevant  consideration  and,
therefore,  subject  to  judicial  review.   According  to  him,  it   lacks
transparency and  exhibits  extreme  prejudice  and  discrimination  against
Kutch District.  According to him, while making  the  policy,  the  relevant
factors were ignored and irrelevant and extraneous factors have  been  taken
into account.  He points out that the State of Gujarat while claiming  large
share of water from river Narmada before the Tribunal  relied  heavily  upon
the need of Kutch District to get more water but after the  award,  did  not
stick to its stand after the allocation was made by the  Tribunal.   He  has
brought to our notice the comparative data regarding allocation of water  to
the various districts and points out that the same indicates  discriminatory
allocation of water to the Kutch area.  Mr. Ahmed  draws  our  attention  to
Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India and submits that the State  while
dealing with the distribution of water did not  respect  the  constitutional
philosophy that the State shall distribute the material  resources  as  best
to subserve “common good”.
 It has also  been  contended  that  the  natural
resources are held by the Government as  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  the
citizens and, therefore, the State Government  is  required  to  manage  and
utilize  them  in  the  best  interest  of  the   society.    While   making
distribution, according to Mr. Ahmed,  the  State  Government  totally  lost
sight of Article 38(2) of the Constitution which stipulates that  the  State
shall endeavor to minimize inequalities in the facilities and  opportunities
amongst people.


      On account of all these infirmities, the impugned policy  deserves  to
be looked into by this Court in exercise of its power  of  judicial  review,
contends Mr.Ahmed. Reliance has been placed  in  support  of  aforementioned
contention to a decision of this Court in the  case  of  Tata  Cellular  vs.
Union of India (1994)6  SCC  651.  Our  attention  has  been  drawn  to  the
following passage from the     said judgment:




              “70. It cannot be denied  that  the  principles  of  judicial
              review would apply to the exercise of contractual  powers  by
              Government  bodies  in  order  to  prevent  arbitrariness  or
              favouritism.  However, it must be clearly stated  that  there
              are  inherent  limitations  in  exercise  of  that  power  of
              judicial review.  Government is the guardian of the  finances
              of the State.   It  is  expected  to  protect  the  financial
              interest of the State.  The right to refuse the lowest or any
              other tender is always available to the Government.  But, the
              principles laid down in Article 14 of the  Constitution  have
              to be kept in view while  accepting  or  refusing  a  tender.
              There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the
              Government  tries  to  get  the  best  person  or  the   best
              quotation.  The right to choose cannot be considered to be an
              arbitrary power.  Of course, if the said power  is  exercised
              for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be
              struck down”






        Mr. Shyam Diwan, Senior Counsel representing the State  of  Gujarat
states that the issue regarding allocation of  water  to  the  districts  of
Gujarat is a matter of policy and the  scope  of  judicial  review  in  this
regard is narrow.  According to  him,  the  policy  has  been  framed  after
consulting technical experts  in  the  best  interest  of  the  people  and,
therefore, does not call for any interference by this Court in  exercise  of
its power of judicial review.


        We  have  given  our  most  anxious  consideration  to  the   rival
submissions and we find substance in the submission of  Mr.  Diwan.  We  are
conscious of the fact that there is wide separation of  powers  between  the
different limbs of the State and, therefore, it is expected  of  this  Court
to exercise judicial restraint  and  not  encroach  upon  the  executive  or
legislative domain. What the appellants in substance are asking  this  Court
to do is to conduct  a  comparative  study  and  hold  that  the  policy  of
distribution of water is bad.  We are afraid, we do not have  the  expertise
or wisdom to analyse the same. It entails  intricate  economic  choices  and
though this Court tends to believe that it is expert  of  experts  but  this
principle has inherent limitation. True it is that the court is entitled  to
analyse the legal validity of the different means  of  distribution  but  it
cannot and will not term a particular policy as fairer than the other.    We
are of the opinion that the  matters  affecting  the  policy  and  requiring
technical expertise be  better  left  to  the  decision  of  those  who  are
entrusted and qualified to address the same.  This Court shall step in  only
when it finds that the policy is inconsistent with the  Constitutional  laws
or arbitrary or irrational.


        Candidly speaking, we do not have the expertise to lay down  policy
for distribution of water  within  the  State.  It  involves  collection  of
various data which is variable and many a times policy formulated will  have
political overtones. It may require a  political  decision  with  which  the
Court has no concern so long it is within the  Constitutional  limits.  Even
if we assume that this Court has the expertise, it will  not  encroach  upon
the field earmarked for the executive. If the policy of the  Government,  in
the opinion of the sovereign, is unreasonable, the remedy is  to  disapprove
the same during election. In respect of policy, the Court has  very  limited
jurisdiction. A dispute, in  our  opinion,  shall  not  be  appropriate  for
adjudication  by  this  Court  when  it  involves  multiple   variable   and
interlocking factors, decision on each  of  which  has  bearing  on  others.
While disposing of an interlocutory  application  in  this  very  appeal  by
order dated 22nd of July, 2011, this Court observed as follows:


              “We are of the opinion that  the  prayer  for  allocation  of
              adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be  a
              matter  of  judicial  review.   It  is  for   the   executive
              authorities to look into this matter.
As held by this  Court
              in Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club & Anr.  vs.  Chander
              Hass &  Anr.  (2008)  1  SCC  683,  there  must  be  judicial
              restraint in such matters.”






       We are in respectful agreement with the view aforesaid.


       The State of Gujarat emphasized the  need  of  more  water  for  the
 District of Kutch before the Tribunal and projected all those pleas  which
 have been projected before us by the appellants but the same did not  find
 favour with the Tribunal and the Tribunal allocated 9.00 MAF water instead
 of 22.02 MAF water claimed before the Tribunal.  Therefore, they were left
 with little amount of water. In the face of it, less amount of water  than
 what has been claimed by the appellants was allocated for the District  of
 Kutch.  The allocation of water is a matter of policy and how  much  water
 is to be released from the canal and for that matter a particular area  or
 how much water is to be left with  other  regions,  in  our  opinion,  are
 matters which require delicate  balancing  and  consideration  of  complex
 social and economic consideration.  In our view, there being no judicially
 manageable standards, it shall be appropriate to leave it to be decided by
 the experts of  the  irrigation  management  system  and  water  resources
 management.






       The plea of the appellants that those factors which  were  projected
 by the State Government itself before the Tribunal are not  being  adhered
 to and its action  is  arbitrary,  does  not  appeal  to  us.  
The  State
 Government also projected the need of Kutch area before the  Tribunal  but
 the same did not appeal to it.
In fact, the award of the Tribunal has got
 the seal of approval  of  this  Court  and  the  State  Government  having
 accepted the decision of the Tribunal, its  action  cannot  be  termed  as
 arbitrary only on the ground that all those factors  were  not  considered
 while making allocation to the district.
As regards the complaint of  the
 appellants that while making distribution, the State  Government  did  not
 take into account the policy underlying Article 39(b) of the Constitution,
 we must observe that the distribution  of  material  resources  is  to  be
 effected in the manner to subserve the “common good” and  this  expression
 is not to be confined for the Kutch District only but to the other regions
 of the State also.


      The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence  to  the  mandate  of
Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The  State,  in  our
opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income  and  endeavour
to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities  not  only
amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing  in  different
parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does  not  mean  that  for
achieving that the State Government has to apply it  on  the  basis  of  the
number of people residing  in  different  parts  only.  Other  factors  just
cannot be forgotten.




      We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning  given  by
the High Court and we reiterate that there being  no  judicially  manageable
standards for allocation of water, any  interference  by  this  Court  would
mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the  State  Government.
In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path.


        In the result, we do not find any merit  in  this  appeal  which  is
dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.


                                  ………………………………………………………………J
                                                             (CHANDRAMAULI
                                  KR. PRASAD)






                                                    ………..……….………………………………..J
                                       (V.GOPALA GOWDA)


NEW DELHI,
JULY 15, 2013.

-----------------------
20


As per Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act sec.6 - the property lies in the hands of father fell on him during family partition among his brothers, becomes as a joint family property after the birth of the plaintiff and as such, the father has no absolute right and title to dispose the entire property with out consent of plaintiff - so the documents not valid and not binding on the plaintiff = the property received by his father is ancestral property and, therefore, alienation of the same by him is null and void.= Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for declaration to the effect that impugned release deed dt.28.5.2004 and mutation no.3365 entered and attested in lieu of impugned release deed and further two sale deeds dt.19.5.2000 bearing no.272/1 and 273/1 and mutation no.3110 and 3106 entered and attested on the basis of impugned two sale deeds and further revenue entries are wrong, illegal and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff and defendants no. 6 & 7?”= It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.”= A person, who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener as in the present case Gulab Singh was, before the birth of the plaintiff, was entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property. Gulab Singh, till the birth of plaintiff Rohit Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgage and deal with the property as his property in the manner he liked. Had he done so before the birth of plaintiff, Rohit Chauhan, he was not competent to object to the alienation made by his father before he was born or begotten. But, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the property which defendant no. 2 got on partition was an ancestral property and till the birth of the plaintiff he was sole surviving coparcener but the moment plaintiff was born, he got a share in the father’s property and became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in view of the settled legal position, the property in the hands of defendant no. 2 allotted to him in partition was a separate property till the birth of the plaintiff and, therefore, after his birth defendant no. 2 could have alienated the property only as Karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s case that defendant no. 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as Karta for any legal necessity. Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire coparcenary property are illegal, null and void. However, in respect of the property which would have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale- deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their remedies in appropriate proceeding.- In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court with the liberty aforementioned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

               published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40554

                                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5475 OF 2013
                        (@ SLP (C) No. 22388 of 2011)

ROHIT CHAUHAN                                     …APPELLANT
                                   VERSUS

SURINDER SINGH & ORS.                            …RESPONDENTS


                                  JUDGMENT


CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J.

      Sole  plaintiff  Rohit  Chauhan  is  the  appellant  before  us.  
His
grandfather Budhu had three sons, namely, Gulab Singh, Zile  Singh  and  one
Ram Kumar.
Gulab Singh, father  of  the  plaintiff,  has  been  arrayed  as
defendant no. 2, whereas son of Zile Singh i.e. Surinder  Singh  figures  as
defendant no. 1 in the suit. In partition between Budhu and his three  sons,
defendant no. 2 got 1/4  share  i.e.,  72  Kanals  of  land.
 In  the  said
partition Budhu also got 72 Kanals of land and  he  bequeathed  1/4  of  his
share i.e., 18 Kanals to each of his three sons and  kept  with  himself  18
Kanals.
After the death of Budhu,  defendant  no.  2  inherited  1/3  share
i.e., 6 Kanals and in this way plaintiff’s  father  Gulab  Singh,  defendant
no. 2,got 96 Kanals  of  land.  Defendant  No.2  during  his  lifetime  also
acquired 8 Kanals of land from the income of the properties which he got  in
partition amongst his  father  and  brothers.  
At  the  time  of  partition
defendant no. 2 was unmarried.  But later on, Gulab  Singh  was  married  to
defendant no. 7, Rajesh Rani and from the  wedlock  the  plaintiff  as  also
defendant no. 6 were born. Plaintiff  was  born  on  25th  of  March,  1982.
Plaintiff alleged that his father defendant  no.  2  executed  two  separate
sale deeds on 19th of May, 2000 selling  8  Kanals  of  land  acquired  from
joint family funds to defendant nos. 3 to 5.
It is  further  allegation  of
the plaintiff that his father illegally gifted 96 Kanals of land  in  favour
of defendant no. 1 Surinder Singh, the son of his real  brother  Zile  Singh
by way of release deed dated 28th  of  May,  2004.   On  the  basis  of  the
release deed and the sale deeds, the defendants  claiming  interest  therein
got their names mutated and attested in the revenue records.
It is the  case
of the plaintiff that the property  received  by  his  father  is  ancestral
property and, therefore, alienation of the same by him  is  null  and  void.
On  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  pleadings,  the  plaintiff  prayed   for
declaration that the release deed, sale deeds and the mutation entries  made
on that basis are illegal, null and void and  not  binding  on  him,  Varsha
(defendant no. 6) and Rajesh Rani (defendant no. 7).


      Defendant no.  1  contested  the  suit  and,  according  to  him,  the
plaintiff, his mother Rajesh  Rani  and  minor  sister  Varsha  were  living
separately from defendant No. 2 and  there  was  no  good  relation  between
them.  They were not even on talking terms.  According to defendant  no.  1,
he and his family members  were  rendering  service  and  giving  honour  to
defendant no. 2 and he was  residing  with  them  as  their  family  member.
Defendant no. 1 further averred that out  of  love,  affection  and  service
rendered by him, defendant no. 2 was pleased and, as  such,  he  executed  a
release deed in his favour and on that basis  mutation  entries  were  made.
It is the plea of defendant no.1 that the land in question became  the  self
acquired property of defendant no. 2 after partition and, therefore, he  was
competent to transfer the property in the manner he desired.  Defendant  no.
1 further alleged that the sale deed executed by defendant no. 2  in  favour
of defendant nos. 3 to 5 is legal and valid.  Defendant no. 2 supported  the
case of defendant no. 1 and adopted the  written  statement  filed  by  him.
Defendant nos. 3 to 5 filed their separate written statements and  supported
the plea of defendant no. 1 and averred that the sale deeds and the  release
deed were validly executed.  On the basis of the aforesaid pleading  of  the
parties various issues have been framed including the following issues:


             “1.Whether  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to   a   decree   for
declaration  to  the  effect  that  impugned  release   deed dt.28.5.2004 and mutation no.3365 entered  and  attested  in
  lieu of impugned release deed and  further  two  sale  deeds
  dt.19.5.2000 bearing no.272/1 and 273/1 and mutation no.3110
  and 3106 entered and attested on the basis of  impugned  two
  sale deeds and further revenue entries  are  wrong,  illegal
  and  not  binding  on  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff   and
  defendants no. 6     & 7?”





      The trial court, on analysis of the materials placed on record and the
legal position, came to the conclusion that  the  property  which  defendant
no. 2 got by virtue of the partition decree amongst his father and  brothers
was although separate property qua  other  relations  but  it  attained  the
characteristics of coparcenary property after the  plaintiff  Rohit  Chauhan
was born.  The finding recorded by the trial court in this regard  reads  as
follows:


           “21. No doubt Gulab Singh got some of his share in the  property
           described in para no. 1(a) of  the  plaint  through  his  father
           Budhu vide mutation no. 3089 in which the father Budhu  suffered
           a decree in favour of defendant no. 1 along with Zile Singh  and
           Ram Kumar of 3/4th share but in the  year  1969  when  the  said
           decree was passed Gulab Singh  was  unmarried  and  he  had  got
           alienated the land which  had  come  to  his  share  when  Rohit
           Chauhan,  Plaintiff  came  into  existence  i.e.  on  25.3.1982.
           Meaning thereby that the property which Gulab Singh had  got  by
           the decree was although his separate property qua other relation
           but became JHF property immediately when Rohit Chauhan was  born
           thereby getting characteristic of coparcenary property.”




      Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit.


      Defendant no. 1, aggrieved by the same, preferred appeal  and  it  was
his plea that the property received by defendant 2 on partition will  become
his separate property and requires  to  be  treated  as  his  self  acquired
property and, therefore, defendant no. 2 was free to deal with the  property
in the manner he liked.  In other  words,  according  to  defendant  no.  1,
after partition the property falling in the share of defendant  no.  2  lost
its character as a coparcenary property  and  assumed  the  status  of  self
acquired  property.   The  aforesaid  plea  found  favour  with  the   lower
appellate court and it held that the property which defendant no. 2  got  on
partition “lost the character of coparcenary property and  became  the  self
acquired property of Gulab Singh”.  The lower appellate court  further  held
that once the property is held to be self acquired property of Gulab  Singh,
he had every right to deal with the same in any manner he  liked.   Relevant
portion of  the  judgment  of  the  lower  appellate  court  reads        as
follows:


           “13. In the light of above said precedents  it  can  be  readily
           concluded that only when the property which  is  received  by  a
           person from his ancestors by survivorship  can  be  held  to  be
           ancestral/coparcenary property  and  any  other  property  which
           although, might have been received from the ancestors  by  means
           of will or consent decree or a father partitioned the  property,
           will loose its character as that  of  coparcenary  property  and
           will become self  acquired  property  in  the  hands  of  person
           receiving it.  Applying these precedents to  the  facts  of  the
           present case, this Court will  conclude  that  approximately  96
           Kanals of land was received by Gulab Singh from his father Budhu
           on the basis of consent decree or on the basis of will  and  not
           by  survivorship  and  this  property  lost  the  character   of
           coparcenary property and was self  acquired  property  of  Gulab
           Singh.  The version of plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in the present
           case is that rest of the property was acquired  by  Gulab  Singh
           with the funds originated from joint Hindu family  property  and
           the said property also assumed  the  character  of  joint  Hindu
           family property, also cannot  be  sustained  because  the  major
           chunk of land in the hands of Gulab Singh has been  held  to  be
           non-ancestral property and  rather  self  acquired  property  of
           Gulab Singh.


           14. Once the property involved in the suit has been held  to  be
           self acquired property of  Gulab  Singh  then  Gulab  Singh  was
           having every right to deal with the same in any manner he  liked
           and no embargo can be put on the rights of Gulab Singh  as  well
           as his rights to alienate the suit property  are  concerned  and
           thus neither release deed nor sale deeds executed by Gulab Singh
           can be questioned by anyone much less by son of Gulab Singh…………”




      Accordingly, the lower appellate court  allowed  the  appeal  and  set
aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.




      Plaintiff, aggrieved by the same, preferred second appeal and the High
Court dismissed the second appeal in limine and, while  doing  so,  observed
as follows:


           “………Finding of the lower appellate court that the suit  land  is
           not proved to be ancestral  or  coparcenary  property  is  fully
           justified by the documentary evidence and admitted facts…….”


      This is how the plaintiff is before us.


      Leave granted.


      Mr. L.Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff-appellant submits that at the time  when  the  plaintiff’s  father
Gulab Singh got the property in partition, it was his separate property vis-
à-vis his relations but after the birth of the plaintiff on 25th  of  March,
1982, plaintiff acquired interest in the  property  as  a  coparcener.   Mr.
Satinder S. Gulati, learned Counsel appearing on behalf  of  the  defendant-
respondents, however, submits that once the property fell into the share  of
the plaintiff’s father Gulab Singh, it lost the character of  a  coparcenary
property and the said status will not change on the birth of the  plaintiff.
 He points out that even if plaintiff Rohit Chauhan was born at the time  of
partition between defendant no. 2, his father and brothers, plaintiff  would
not have got any share under Section 8 of  the  Hindu  Succession  Act.   In
support of the submission he has placed  reliance  on  a  judgment  of  this
Court in the case of Bhanwar Singh  v.  Puran,  (2008)  3  SCC  87  and  our
attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said judgment:


           “13. Section 6 of the Act, as it stood  at  the  relevant  time,
           provided for devolution of interest in the coparcenary property.
            Section 8 lays down the general rules of  succession  that  the
           property of a male dying intestate  devolves  according  to  the
           provisions of the Chapter as specified  in  Clause  (1)  of  the
           Schedule.  In the Schedule appended to the Act, natural sons and
           daughters are placed as Class I heirs but a grandson, so long as
           father is alive, has not been included. Section 19  of  the  Act
           provides that in the event of succession by two or  more  heirs,
           they will take the property per capita and not per  stripes,  as
           also tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.”






      We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submission and we find
substance in the submission of Mr. Rao. In our opinion coparcenary  property
means the property which consists of ancestral  property  and  a  coparcener
would mean a person who shares equally with others  in  inheritance  in  the
estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower  body  than  the  Joint
Hindu family and before commencement of Hindu  Succession  (Amendment)  Act,
2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth  an  interest
in the coparcenary property.  A coparcener has  no  definite  share  in  the
coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one  has  to
bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and  diminishes  by  births  in  the
family.  It is not static. We are further of the opinion that  so  long,  on
partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single  person,  it
has to be treated as  a  separate  property  and  such  a  person  shall  be
entitled to dispose of the  coparcenary  property  treating  it  to  be  his
separate property but if a son is subsequently  born,  the  alienation  made
before the birth cannot be questioned.  But, the moment a son is  born,  the
property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would  acquire  interest
in that and become a  coparcener.   The  view  which  we  have  taken  finds
support from a judgment of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  M.  Yogendra  v.
Leelamma N., (2009) 15 SCC 184, in which it has been held as follows:


           “29. It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this
           Court that 
the property  in  the  hands  of  a  sole  coparcener
allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property  for
 the same 
shall revive only when a son is born to him. 
It is  one thing to say that the property remains  a  coparcenary  property but it is another thing to say that it revives. 
The  distinction
 between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. 
In the case
of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole
 survivor coparcener shall be valid 
whereas  in  the  case  of  a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.


      Now referring to the decision of this Court in  the  case  of  Bhanwar
Singh  (supra),  relied   on   by   respondents,   the   same   is   clearly
distinguishable.  In the said case the issue was in relation  to  succession
whereas in the present  case  we  are  concerned  with  the  status  of  the
plaintiff vis-à-vis  his  father  who  got  property  on  partition  of  the
ancestral property.


      A person, 
who for the time being is the sole surviving  coparcener  as
in the present case Gulab Singh was, 
before the birth of the plaintiff,  was
entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were  his  separate property.  
Gulab Singh, till the  birth  of  plaintiff  Rohit  Chauhan,  was
competent to sell, mortgage and deal with the property as  his  property  in the manner he liked.  
Had he done so before the birth  of  plaintiff,  
Rohit Chauhan, he was not competent to  object  to  the  alienation  made  by  his father before he was born or begotten.  
But, in the present case, 
it  is  an
admitted position that the property which defendant no. 2 got  on  partition was an ancestral property and till the birth of the plaintiff  he  was  sole surviving coparcener but the moment plaintiff was born, he got  a  share  in the father’s property and became a coparcener. 
As observed earlier, in  view
of the settled legal position, the property in the hands of defendant no.  2 allotted to him in partition was a separate property till the birth  of  the plaintiff and, therefore,  after  his  birth  defendant  no.  2  could  have alienated the property only as Karta for legal necessity.  
 It  is  nobody’s
case that defendant no. 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as  Karta for any legal necessity.   
Hence,  the  sale  deeds  and  the  release  deed
executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of  entire  coparcenary  property  are illegal, null and void.  
However, in respect of  the  property  which  would
have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of  execution  of  sale-deeds and  release  deed,  the  parties  can  work  out  their  remedies  in appropriate proceeding.






      In view of what we have observed above, the view taken  by  the  lower
appellate court as affirmed by the High Court is erroneous in law.


      In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree
of the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court and restore  that
of the trial court with  the  liberty  aforementioned.   In  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.




                                  ………………………………………………………………J
                                                             (CHANDRAMAULI
                                  KR. PRASAD)




                                                    ………..……….………………………………..J
                                       (V.GOPALA GOWDA)


NEW DELHI,
JULY 15, 2013.

-----------------------
17


Retd. Employee can not file a complaint before the consumer forum for his retirement benefits as he is not a consumer nor the dispute is consumer disputes comes under the jurisdiction of consumer forum = though the complaint was not maintainable as the District Forum did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the appellant as he was not a “consumer” and the dispute between the parties could not be redressed by the said Forum, but in view of the fact that the opposite party (State) neither raised the issue of jurisdiction before the District Forum nor preferred any appeal, order of the District Forum on the jurisdictional issue attained finality= 2(d) ‘consumer’ means any person who- (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or (ii) [hires or avails of] any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who [hires or avails of] the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payments, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first-mentioned person; [but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose;= by no stretch of imagination a government servant can raise any dispute regarding his service conditions or for payment of gratuity or GPF or any of his retiral benefits before any of the Forum under the Act. The government servant does not fall under the definition of a “consumer” as defined under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act. Such government servant is entitled to claim his retiral benefits strictly in accordance with his service conditions and regulations or statutory rules framed for that purpose. The appropriate forum, for redressal of any his grievance, may be the State Administrative Tribunal, if any, or Civil Court but certainly not a Forum under the Act. 17. In view of the above, we hold that the government servant cannot approach any of the Forum under the Act for any of the retiral benefits. 18. Mr. Hooda has made a statement that all the dues for which the appellant had been entitled to had already been paid and the penal rent has also been dispensed with and the State is not going to charge any penal rent. If the State has already charged the penal rent, it will be refunded to the appellant within a period of two months. In view thereof, we do not want to pass any further order. In view of the above, the appeal stands disposed of. Before parting with the case, we record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Shri Prateesh Kapur, learned Amicus Curiae. He is entitled for full fees as per the Rules.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40564
                                 REPORTABLE


                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF  INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5476 OF 2013
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 11381 of 2012)




      Dr.                Jagmittar                Sain                Bhagat
      ...Appellant




                                   Versus




      Dir.       Health        Services,        Haryana        &        Ors.
      ...Respondent








                                  O R D E R

      1.    Leave granted.


      2.    This appeal has been preferred against the  judgment  and  order
      dated 26.11.2009 passed by the National  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal
      Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as  the   ‘Commission’)
      constituted under  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘Act’), in Revision Petition No. 1156 of 2007,  MA.
      No. 291 of 2008; and MA. No.  450  of  2008,  by  way  of  which,  the
      Commission has dismissed the claim of the appellant  as  well  as  the
      review petition seeking certain reliefs.
      3.    The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
      A.    The  appellant  joined  Health  Department,  of  the  respondent
      State, as Medical Officer on 5.6.1953 and took voluntary retirement on
      28.10.1985.  During the period of service,  he  stood  transferred  to
      another district but he retained the  government  accommodation,  i.e.
      Bungalow No. B-8 from 11.5.1980 to 8.7.1981. Appellant claimed that he
      had not been paid all his retiral benefits, and  penal  rent  for  the
      said period had also been deducted from his dues of  retiral  benefits
      without giving any show cause notice to him.


      B.    Appellant made various  representations,  however,  he  was  not
      granted any relief by the State authorities.


      C.    Aggrieved,  the  appellant  preferred  a  complaint  before  the
      District Consumer Disputes  Redressal  Forum,  Faridabad  (hereinafter
      referred to as the `District Forum’) on 5.1.1995 and  the  said  Forum
      vide  order  dated  24.3.2000  dismissed  the  complaint   on   merits
      observing  that  his  outstanding  dues  i.e.  pension,  gratuity  and
      provident fund etc. had correctly been  calculated  and  paid  to  the
      appellant by the State authorities.


      D.    The appellant approached  the  appellate  authority,  i.e.,  the
      State Commission. The State Commission dismissed the appeal vide order
      dated  31.1.2007  observing  that  though  the   complaint   was   not
      maintainable as the  District  Forum  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to
      entertain the complaint of the appellant as he was  not  a  “consumer”
      and the dispute between the parties could not be redressed by the said
      Forum, but in view of the fact that the opposite party (State) neither
      raised the  issue  of  jurisdiction  before  the  District  Forum  nor
      preferred  any  appeal,  order  of   the   District   Forum   on   the
      jurisdictional issue  attained finality. However, there was  no  merit
      in the appeal.


      E.    Aggrieved, the appellant filed Revision  Petition  No.  1156  of
      2007 before the Commission.  The said revision  stood  dismissed  vide
      order dated 1.4.2008 and the review filed by the  appellant  has  also
      been dismissed vide order dated 26.11.2009.
            Hence, this appeal.


      4.    Shri Narendra Hooda, learned Senior  AAG,  Haryana,  has  raised
      preliminary issue of the  jurisdiction  submitting  that  the  service
      matter of a government servant cannot be dealt  with  by  any  of  the
      Forum in any hierarchy under the Act.  Therefore,  the  matter  should
      not be considered on merit at all.  More so, all the outstanding  dues
      of the appellant had been paid, and none of  the  issues  survive  any
      more.


      5.    Shri Prateesh Kapur, learned Amicus Curiae, has raised  a  large
      number of grievances, inter-alia,  that till today the  appellant  has
      not been paid all his retiral benefits as some of his outstanding dues
      have been withheld by the authorities, thus, he is entitled to recover
      the same with interest; whether the Forum was competent  to  entertain
      the complaint ought to have been decided by the District  Forum  first
      as a preliminary issue. It is difficult for a litigant to go  back  to
      any other appropriate Forum after such a long  time.  In  the  instant
      case, the appellant approached the District Forum in 1995, the  matter
      could not be finalised till date, and at such  a  belated  stage,  the
      appellant if asked to approach the other forum, a great hardship would
      be caused to him.


      6.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the records.

      7.    Indisputably, it is a  settled legal proposition that conferment
      of jurisdiction is a  legislative  function  and  it  can  neither  be
      conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior Court, and
      if the Court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over  the  matter,
      it would amount to nullity as the matter goes  to  the  roots  of  the
      cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage  of  the  proceedings.
      The  finding  of  a  Court  or   Tribunal   becomes   irrelevant   and
      unenforceable/ inexecutable  once  the  forum  is  found  to  have  no
      jurisdiction.  Similarly,  if  a   Court/Tribunal   inherently   lacks
      jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to
      perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the  legislative  animation.  The
      Court cannot derive jurisdiction  apart  from  the  Statute.  In  such
      eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide:  United
      Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230; Smt. Nai  Bahu
      v. Lal Ramnarayan & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 22; Natraj Studios (P)  Ltd.  v.
      Navrang Studios & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 537; and Kondiba Dagadu  Kadam  v.
      Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2213).


      8.    In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind  Ram  Bohra  (Dead)  Thr.  Lrs.,
      (1990) 1 SCC 193, this Court, after placing reliance on  large  number
      of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles  Ltd.  v.
      K.S. Wadke & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 496; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR
      1954 SC 340;  and Chandrika Misir & Anr. v.  Bhaiyalal,  AIR  1973  SC
      2391 held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity.  It  is  a
      coram non judice; when a  special  statute  gives  a  right  and  also
      provides for a forum for adjudication of  rights,  remedy  has  to  be
      sought only under the provisions of that Act and the Common Law  Court
      has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation  and  enforces
      the performance in specified manner, “performance cannot be forced  in
      any other manner.”

      9.    Law does not permit any court/tribunal/authority/forum to  usurp
      jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such a authority  does
      not have jurisdiction on the subject matter.  For the reason  that  it
      is not an objection as to the place of suing;,  “it  is  an  objection
      going  to  the  nullity  of  the  order  on  the  ground  of  want  of
      jurisdiction”. Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a  court  or  a
      tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a  condition  precedent.
      But once such jurisdictional fact is found  to  exist,  the  court  or
      tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory  facts  or  facts  in
      issue.  (Vide: Setrucharlu Ramabhadra  Raju  Bahadur  v.  Maharaja  of
      Jeypore, AIR 1919 PC 150; State of Gujarat v. Rajesh  Kumar  Chimanlal
      Barot & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2664; Harshad  Chiman  Lal  Modi  v.  D.L.F.
      Universal Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2005 SC  4446;  and  Carona  Ltd.  v.  M/s.
      Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, AIR 2008 SC 187).


      10.   The Act was enacted to provide  for  the  better  protection  of
      interest of consumers, such as  the  right  to  be  protected  against
      marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property; the right
      to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity,  standard
      and price of goods, to  protect  the  consumer  against  unfair  trade
      practices;  and  right  to  seek  redressal  against  an  unscrupulous
      exploitation of consumers, and further to provide  right  to  consumer
      education etc. as is evident from the statement of objects and reasons
      of the Act.


      11.   Section 2 of the Act which is a definition  clause  defines  the
      following as under:
           “2(b) ‘Complainant’ means-
           (i) a consumer; or
           (ii) any voluntary consumer  association  registered  under  the
           Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or under any other law for  the
           time being in force; or
           (iii) the Central Government or any State Government;
           (iv) one or more consumers, where there are  numerous  consumers
           having the same interest;
           (v)  in  case  of  death  of  a  consumer,  his  legal  heir  or
           representative; who or which makes a complaint;


           2(c) ‘complaint’ means any  allegation  in  writing  made  by  a
           complainant that-
           (i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has
           been adopted by any trader or service provider;
           (ii) the goods bought by him or  agreed  to  be  bought  by  him
           suffer from one or more defects;
           (iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired  or
           availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect;


                       xx         xx         xx


           2(d) ‘consumer’  means any person who-
           (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has  been  paid  or
           promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system
           of deferred payment and includes any user of  such  goods  other
           than the person who buys such goods for  consideration  paid  or
           promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any  system
           of deferred payment when such use is made with the  approval  of
           such person, but does not include  a  person  who  obtains  such
           goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
           (ii) [hires or avails of] any services for a consideration which
           has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or
           under  any  system  of  deferred  payment   and   includes   any
           beneficiary of such services other than the person who [hires or
           avails of] the services for consideration paid or  promised,  or
           partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
           payments, when such services are availed of with the approval of
           the first-mentioned person; [but does not include a  person  who
           avails of such services for any commercial purpose;


                       xx         xx         xx


           2(g) ‘deficiency’ means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming  or
           inadequacy in the quality,  nature  and  manner  of  performance
           which is required to be maintained by or under any law  for  the
           time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by  a
           person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise  in  relation  to
           any service;


            2(o) ‘service’ means service of any description which  is  made
           available to potential users and includes, but not  limited  to,
           the  provision  of  facilities  in  connection   with   banking,
           financing,   insurance,   transport,   processing,   supply   of
           electrical or other energy, board or lodging or  both,  [housing
           construction], entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news
           or other information, but does not include the rendering of  any
           service free of charge or under a contract of personal service.”




           Section 11 of  the  Act  deals  with  the  jurisdiction  of  the
      District Forum as:
            “(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the  District
           Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where  the
           value of the goods or services and  the  compensation,  if  any,
           claimed [does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs.”


            The aforesaid statutory provisions make it  crystal  clear  that
      the Act is made to deal with the rights of consumers wherein marketing
      of goods, or “services” as defined under the Act have  been  provided.
      Therefore, the question does arise as to whether the Forum  under  the
      Act  can deal with the service matters of government servants.


      12.   In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC  225,
      this Court examined the issue as to whether a prospective buyer can be
      “consumer” under the Act, and  held:
            “The consumer as the term implies is one who consumes.  As  per
           the definition, consumer is the  one  who  purchases  goods  for
           private use or consumption. The meaning of the  word  ‘consumer’
           is broadly stated in the  above  definition  so  as  to  include
           anyone who consumes goods or services at the end of the chain of
           production. The comprehensive definition aims at covering  every
           man who pays money as the price or cost of goods  and  services.
           The consumer deserves to get what he pays for in  real  quantity
           and true quality. In every society, consumer remains the  centre
           of gravity of all business and  industrial  activity.  He  needs
           protection from the manufacturer, producer, supplier, wholesaler
           and retailer.


                       xx         xx         xx


               Therefore, it is after allotment, rights may  arise  as  per
           the contract (Article of Association of Company). But  certainly
           not before allotment. At that stage, he is  only  a  prospective
           investor (sic in) future goods……There is no  purchase  of  goods
           for a consideration nor again could he be called  the  hirer  of
           the services of the company for a  consideration.  In  order  to
           satisfy the requirement of above definition of consumer,  it  is
           clear that there must be  a  transaction  of  buying  goods  for
           consideration under Section 2(1)(d)(i)  of  the  said  Act.  The
           definition  contemplates  the  pre-existence  of   a   completed
           transaction of a sale and purchase. If  regard  is  had  to  the
           definition of complaint under the Act, it will be clear that  no
           prospective investor could fall under the Act”.




      13.     In Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Orissa  v. Santosh
      Kumar Sahoo & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 3553, this Court  resolved  the  issue
      as to whether the Forum under the Act had  jurisdiction  to  entertain
      and allow a complaint filed by a person for correction of his date  of
      birth recorded in the matriculation certificate,  observing  that  the
      impugned order was liable to be set aside  because  all  the  consumer
      forums  failed  to  consider  the  issue  of  maintainability  of  the
      complaint in a correct perspective. Before the District Forum could go
      into the issue of correctness of the date of  birth  recorded  in  the
      matriculation certificate of Respondent 1, it ought to have considered
      whether the so-called failure of the appellant to make  correction  in
      terms of the prayer made by Respondent 1  amounted  to  deficiency  of
      service.
            The court remitted the matter to the District  Forum  to  decide
      the issue of maintainability of the complaint.
      14.    This Court in Bihar School Examination Board v.  Suresh  Prasad
      Sinha, AIR 2010 SC  93,  considered  the  question  as  to  whether  a
      candidate can file a complaint before the District Forum under the Act
      raising any grievance regarding  his  examinations  conducted  by  the
      Bihar School Examinations Board constituted  under  the  Bihar  School
      Examinations Board Act, 1952 and answered it in negative observing  as
      under:
            “The object of the Act is to cover in its net, services offered
           or rendered for a consideration.  Any  service  rendered  for  a
           consideration is presumed to be a  commercial  activity  in  its
           broadest  sense  (including  professional  activity  or   quasi-
           commercial activity). But the  Act  does  not  intend  to  cover
           discharge  of  a  statutory  function  of  examining  whether  a
           candidate is fit to be declared as having successfully completed
           a course by passing the examination. The fact that in the course
           of conduct of the examination, or evaluation of answer  scripts,
           or furnishing of marksheets or certificates, there may  be  some
           negligence, omission or deficiency, does not convert  the  Board
           into a service provider for a  consideration,  nor  convert  the
           examinee into a consumer who can make a complaint under the Act.
           We are clearly of the view that the  Board  is  not  a  ‘service
           provider’ and a student  who  takes  an  examination  is  not  a
           ‘consumer’ and consequently, complaint under the Act will not be
           maintainable against the Board.”


      (See also: Maharshi Dayanand University v. Surjeet Kaur, (2010) 11 SCC
      159).


    15.       In Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Bhavani, AIR  2008
        SC 2957,
this Court dealt with the issue as to whether Dr.  Padia's
        submissions regarding the non-applicability of the Act to the  case
        of  the  Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner   -   the   person
        responsible for the working of a  Pension Scheme, could  be held to
        be a 'service giver' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o)  of  the
        Act, as it was neither a case of  rendering  of  free  service  nor
        rendering of service under a contract of personal service so as  to
        bring the relationship between the parties within  the  concept  of
        'master and servant'. The court held:
           “In  our  view,  the  respondent  comes  squarely   within   the
           definition  of  'consumer'  within  the   meaning   of   Section
           2(1)(d)(ii), inasmuch as, by becoming a member of the Employees'
           Family Pension Scheme, 1971, and contributing to the  same,  she
           was availing of the  services  rendered  by  the  appellant  for
           implementation of the Scheme. The same is the case in the  other
           appeals as well.”




      16.   In view of the above, it  is  evident  that
by  no  stretch  of
      imagination a government servant can raise any dispute  regarding  his
      service conditions or for payment of gratuity or GPF  or  any  of  his
      retiral benefits  before  any  of  the  Forum  under  the  Act.    The
      government servant does not fall under the definition of a  “consumer”
      as defined under Section  2(1)(d)(ii)  of  the  Act.  Such  government
      servant  is  entitled  to  claim  his  retiral  benefits  strictly  in
      accordance with his service conditions and  regulations  or  statutory
      rules framed for that purpose.  The appropriate forum,  for  redressal
      of any his grievance, may be the  State  Administrative  Tribunal,  if
      any, or Civil Court but certainly not a Forum under the Act.

      17.   In view of the above, we hold that the government servant cannot
      approach any of the Forum  under  the  Act  for  any  of  the  retiral
      benefits.


      18.   Mr. Hooda  has made a statement that all the dues for which  the
      appellant had been entitled to had already been  paid  and  the  penal
      rent has also been dispensed with and the State is not going to charge
      any penal rent. If the State has already charged the  penal  rent,  it
      will be refunded to the appellant within a period of  two  months.  In
      view thereof, we do not want to pass any further order.


            In view of the above, the  appeal  stands  disposed  of.  Before
      parting with the case, we record our appreciation for  the  assistance
      rendered by Shri Prateesh Kapur, learned Amicus Curiae. He is entitled
      for full fees as per the Rules.




                  ……………………….........J.
                                                                  ( Dr. B.S.
      CHAUHAN )





      ……………………….........J.
                                                                    (   S.A.
      BOBDE )
      New Delhi,
      July 11, 2013
-----------------------
11


Right to Vote & Right to Contest When arise = “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law takes it away. Persons convicted of crime are kept away from elections to the Legislature, whether to State Legislature or Parliament, and all other public elections. The Court has no hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws framed under it, read together, that persons in the lawful custody of the Police also will not be voters, in which case, they will neither be electors. The Law temporarily takes away the power of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene. To vote is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote, which privilege may be taken away. In that case, the elector would not be qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls. The name is not struck off, but the qualification to be an elector and the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of the police is taken away.” - a person who has no right to vote by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act is not an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.

                         published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40561
              REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3040-3041 OF 2004

The Chief Election Commissioner Etc.              … Petitioners

           Versus


Jan Chaukidar (Peoples Watch) & Ors.        … Respondents


                                    ORDER


   These are appeals by way of  Special  Leave  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution against the common order dated 30.04.2004  of  the  Patna  High
Court in C.W.J.C. No.4880 of 2004 and C.W.J.C. No.4988 of 2004.

2.    The facts very briefly  are  that  Article  326  of  the  Constitution
provides that  the  elections  to  the  House  of  the  People  and  to  the
Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult  suffrage
and every person who is a  citizen  of  India  and  who  is  not  less  than
eighteen years of age on such date as may be fixed  in  that  behalf  by  or
under any law made by the  appropriate  Legislature  and  is  not  otherwise
disqualified under the Constitution or  any  law  made  by  the  appropriate
Legislature on the grounds of non-residence, unsoundness of mind,  crime  or
corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as  a  voter
for any such election.  In accordance with Article 326 of the  Constitution,
Parliament has enacted the Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1950  (for
short ‘the 1950 Act’) for registration of voters at such  elections  to  the
House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State  and  has
also enacted the Representation of the People  Act,  1951  (for  short  ‘the
1951 Act’) for the conduct of elections to the Houses of Parliament  and  to
the Houses of Legislature of each State.

3.    The word “elector” is defined in the  1951  Act  in  relation  to  the
constituency to mean a person whose name is entered in  electoral  rolls  of
the constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject  to  any
of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the 1950  Act.   Section
16(1)(c) of the 1950 Act provides that a person shall  be  disqualified  for
registration in an electoral roll if he is for the time  being  disqualified
from voting under the provisions of any law relating  to  corrupt  practices
and other offences in connection with elections.

4.    Section 4 of the 1951 Act lays down the qualifications for  membership
of the House of the People and one of the qualifications laid down  is  that
he must be an  “elector”  for  any  Parliamentary  constituency.  Similarly,
Section 5 of the 1951 Act lays down the qualifications for membership  of  a
Legislative Assembly of a State and one of the qualifications laid  down  is
that he must be an “elector” for any Assembly constituency  in  that  State.
Section 62 of the 1951 Act is titled “Right to vote” and it provides in sub-
section (5) that no person shall vote at any election if he is  confined  in
a prison, whether under a sentence  of  imprisonment  or  transportation  or
otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police.  The proviso  to  sub-
section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act, however,  states  that  the  sub-
section will not apply to a person subjected to preventive  detention  under
any law for the time being in force.


5.    Writ petitions C.W.J.C. No.4880 of 2004 and C.W.J.C. No.4988  of  2004
were filed in the  Patna  High  Court  contending  that  a  person,  who  is
confined  in  prison,  whether  under  a   sentence   of   imprisonment   or
transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of  the  police  is
not entitled to vote by virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the  1951
Act and accordingly is not an “elector” and is, therefore, not qualified  to
contest elections to the House of People or the Legislative  Assembly  of  a
State because of the provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of  the  1951  Act.   By
the impugned common order, the High Court accepted this  contention  in  the
writ petitions and held:

           “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law
           takes it away.  Persons convicted of crime are  kept  away  from
           elections to the Legislature, whether to  State  Legislature  or
           Parliament, and all other public elections.  The  Court  has  no
           hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws  framed
           under it, read together, that persons in the lawful  custody  of
           the Police also will not be voters, in  which  case,  they  will
           neither be electors.  The Law temporarily takes away  the  power
           of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene.  To vote
           is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote,  which  privilege
           may be taken away.  In that  case,  the  elector  would  not  be
           qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls.  The name
           is not struck off, but the qualification to be  an  elector  and
           the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of  the  police
           is taken away.”



6.    Aggrieved, by the findings of the  High  Court,  the  appellants  have
filed these appeals.  We have heard learned counsel for the parties  and  we
do not find any infirmity in the findings of the High Court in the  impugned
common order that
a person who has  no  right  to  vote  by  virtue  of  the
provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62  of  the  1951  Act  is  not  an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the  House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.

7.    These civil appeals are accordingly dismissed.  No costs.

                                                       ..……………..……………………….J.
                                        (A. K. Patnaik)






                                 ...…………..………………………..J.
                                     (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

New Delhi,
July 10, 2013.