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Saturday, July 20, 2013

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short ‘the Act’),= occupation of government accommodation by members of all the three branches of the State, viz., the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary beyond the period for which the same were allotted. The occupation of such government houses/quarters beyond the period prescribed causes difficulty in accommodating other persons waiting for allotment and, therefore, the Government is at a loss on the one hand in not being able to accommodate those persons who are in need and on the other is unable to effectively deal with the persons who continue to occupy unauthorisedly beyond the period prescribed.= The following suggestions would precisely address the grievances of the Centre and the State governments in regard to the unauthorized occupants: Suggestions: (i) As a precautionary measure, a notice should be sent to the allottee/officer/employee concerned under Section 4 of the PP Act three months prior to the date of his/her retirement giving advance intimation to vacate the premises. (ii) The Department concerned from where the government servant is going to retire must be made liable for fulfilling the above-mentioned formalities as well as follow up actions so that rest of the provisions of the Act can be effectively utilized. (iii) The principles of natural justice have to be followed while serving the notice. (iv) After following the procedure as mentioned in SR 317-B-11(2) and 317- B-22 proviso 1 and 2, within 7 working days, send a show cause notice to the person concerned in view of the advance intimation sent three months before the retirement. (v) Date of appearance before the Estate Officer or for personal hearing as mentioned in the Act after show cause notice should not be more than 7 working days. (vi) Order of eviction should be passed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 15 days. (vii) If, as per the Estate Officer, the occupant’s case is genuine in terms of Section 5 of the Act then, in the first instance, an extension of not more than 30 days should be granted. (viii) The responsibility for issuance of the genuineness certificate should be on the Department concerned from where the government servant has retired for the occupation of the premises for next 15 days and further. Giving additional responsibility to the department concerned will help in speedy vacation of such premises. Baseless or frivolous applications for extensions have to be rejected within seven days. (ix) If as per the Estate Officer the occupant’s case is not genuine, not more than 15 days’ time should be granted and thereafter, reasonable force as per Section 5(2) of the Act may be used. (x) There must be a time frame within how much time the Estate Officer has to decide about the quantum of rent to be paid. (xi) The same procedure must be followed for damages. (xii) The arrears/damages should be collected as arrears of land revenue as mentioned in Section 14 of the Act. (xiii) There must be a provision for compound interest, instead of simple interest as per Section 7. (xiv) To make it more stringent, there must be some provision for stoppage or reduction in the monthly pension till the date of vacation of the premises. (xv) Under Section 9 (2), an appeal shall lie from an order of eviction and of rent/damages within 12 days from the day of publication or on which the order is communicated respectively. (xvi) Under Section 9(4), disposal of the appeals must be preferably within a period of 30 days in order to eliminate unnecessary delay in disposal of such cases. (xvii) The liberty of the appellate officer to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 9 of the Act should be exercised very reluctantly and it should be an exceptional practice and not a general rule. (xviii) Since allotment of government accommodation is a privilege given to the Ministers and Members of Parliament, the matter of unauthorized retention should be intimated to the Speaker/Chairman of the House and action should be initiated by the House Committee for the breach of the privileges which a Member/Minister enjoys and the appropriate Committee should recommend to the Speaker/Chairman for taking appropriate action/eviction within a time bound period. (xix) Judges of any forum shall vacate the official residence within a period of one month from the date of superannuation/retirement. However, after recording sufficient reason(s), the time may be extended by another one month. (xx) Henceforth, no memorials should be allowed in future in any Government houses earmarked for residential accommodation. It is unfortunate that the employees, officers, representatives of people and other high dignitaries continue to stay in the residential accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no longer entitled to such accommodation. Many of such persons continue to occupy residential accommodation commensurate with the office(s) held by them earlier and which are beyond their present entitlement. The unauthorized occupants must recollect that rights and duties are correlative as the rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the duty of one person entails the rights of another person. Observing this, the unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in the premise directly infringes the right of another. No law or directions can entirely control this act of disobedience but for the self realization among the unauthorized occupants. The matter is disposed of with the above terms and no order is required in I.As for impleadment and intervention.

              published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40526

                       REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4064 OF 2004




S.D. Bandi                                        .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

Divisional Traffic Officer, KSRTC & Ors.          .... Respondent(s)



                                      2



                               J U D G M E N T


P.Sathasivam, J.

1)     The  instant  case  relates   to   the  
occupation   of   government
accommodation by members of all the three branches of the State,  viz.,  the
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary beyond  the  period  for  which
the same were allotted.  The occupation of such  government  houses/quarters
beyond the  period  prescribed  causes  difficulty  in  accommodating  other
persons waiting for allotment and, therefore, the Government is  at  a  loss
on the one hand in not being able to accommodate those persons  who  are  in
need and on the other is unable to effectively deal  with  the  persons  who
continue to occupy unauthorisedly beyond the period prescribed.
2)    Despite the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Act,
1971 (in short ‘the Act’), it is seen that it has not been effective  enough
in dealing with the eviction inasmuch  as  the  competent  Authority,  i.e.,
Estate Officer has to first  initiate  proceedings  and  pass  orders  after
hearing the parties  and  thereafter,  one  statutory  appeal  lies  to  the
District Judge under Section 9 of the Act.  After disposal  of  the  appeal,
people resort to writ proceedings thereby  enjoying  the  scarce  government
accommodation. There are cases where the  occupants  are  so  affluent  that
they are willing to  pay  the  penal/market  rent  and  continue  to  occupy
government quarters especially in metropolitan cities where such  government
quarters are a luxury situated in several acres of land within the heart  of
the city.
3)    Before proceeding further, it is useful to find out the  circumstances
and basis on which the matter was agitated.
       One Shri S.D. Bandi filed the present appeal against the order  dated
25.03.2004 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore  in  W.A.  No.
324 of 2002 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court while disposing  of
the appeal filed by the respondents herein granted  time  to  the  appellant
herein to vacate the government quarter by 30.04.2004.   The  appellant  was
working as a Driver in the Karnataka State Road Transport  Corporation  (for
short “the  Corporation”),  Mysore  Division  at  Mysore.   By  order  dated
31.05.1992, he was transferred to the Mangalore  Division  and  for  joining
the place of duty, he was relieved from  the  duty  of  Mysore  Division  on
12.06.1997.  Challenging the order of transfer, the appellant  herein  filed
Reference No.21 of 1997 before the  Industrial  Tribunal,  Mysore.   At  the
same time, he did join the place of posting at Mangalore but did not  vacate
the quarter.  On 19.07.1999,  the  competent  officer  under  the  Karnataka
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Act,  1974  passed  an
order of eviction against the appellant in KPP No.3 of  1998.   Against  the
said order, the appellant preferred an appeal  before  the  District  Judge,
which was  dismissed  and  the  order  of  eviction  was  confirmed.   Being
aggrieved, the appellant preferred a writ petition being W.P. No.  41762  of
2001 before the High Court of Karnataka which  was  allowed  on  10.12.2001.
In the meantime, on 03.07.2000, the Industrial Tribunal set aside the  order
of transfer and ordered the appellant to be restored to his  original  place
of work at  Mysore.   Against  the  said  order,  the  Corporation  filed  a
petition being Writ Petition No. 3249 of 2001 in which rule nisi was  issued
and the award of  the  Industrial  Tribunal  was  stayed.   Thereafter,  the
Corporation preferred Writ Appeal being No. 324 of 2002  against  the  order
dated 10.12.2001 in W.P. No. 41762 of 2001 which  was  allowed  by  impugned
order dated 25.03.2004 and the appellant herein was also directed to  vacate
the quarter by 30.04.2004.  Challenging the said order, the  present  appeal
has been preferred before this Court by way of special leave.
4)    By order dated 13.07.2004, after hearing all the parties,  this  Court
dismissed the appeal and directed the competent officer of the  Corporation,
Mysore Division to at once evict the appellant from the quarter.
5)    Pursuant to the said order, this Court, taking note of the  fact  that
in government quarters, unauthorisedly,  people  are  continuing  for  years
together to the detriment of the persons who  are  entitled  to  occupy  the
same and also that the same is the position in most of  the  State  capitals
and Head quarters of the Union Territories, issued notices to the  Union  of
India, all the States and the Union Territories with a direction to  furnish
the list of such unauthorized occupants of government quarters in the  State
capitals and Head quarters of Union Territories belonging to all  the  three
limbs of the State, viz., the Legislature, the Executive and the  Judiciary.
 This Court further directed to furnish all the details including  names  of
such persons, details of quarters, period of unauthorized  occupancy,  steps
taken for vacation and its result etc., and also that in case no steps  have
been taken, reasons for such inaction.
6)    Pursuant to the above directions, the Union of India, all  the  States
and Union Territories were  represented  by  their  counsel.   In  order  to
eliminate the problem and frame  workable  guidelines  in  addition  to  the
existing statutory  provisions,  this  Court  appointed  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,
learned senior counsel and Ms. Anjani Aiyyagari, learned counsel  as  amicus
curiae to assist the Court.
7)    Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned amicus curiae,  after  highlighting  various
aspects,  particularly,  the  persons  in  all  the  three  wings  occupying
official premises/quarters/bungalows even after expiry of their  term/period
submitted that in addition to the statutory provisions, this  Court  has  to
frame certain workable guidelines.  He took us  through  various  provisions
of the Act, Fundamental Rules (FRs) applicable to the persons working  under
Central Government, various State enactments similar  to  the  Central  Act,
some of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short  “the  IPC”)
and earlier decisions, particularly, Shiv Sagar Tiwari vs.  Union  of  India
and others (1997) 1 SCC 444 which dealt with the similar  problem  confining
to National Capital Territory of Delhi.
8)    We propose to deal with all these aspects in detail hereinafter.
9)    Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court, Union of India  and  some
of the States submitted  their  views  and  suggestions  and  others  though
represented by counsel, did not convey their views by  filing  affidavit  or
report which we are going to discuss after quoting  the  report  of  learned
amicus curiae.
10)   Learned amicus curiae in his report submitted as under:-
      “II(a) Menace of unauthorized occupation is required to be dealt  with
      firmly and the charging of penal rent/market rent is not a  sufficient
      alternative.  In this connection, it  may  be  stated  here  that  the
      States of Orissa and Uttar Pradesh have amended  Section  441  of  the
      Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’)  in  its  application  to
      their States by providing as under:-


           ….. or having lawfully  entered  into  or  upon  such  property,
           remains  there  with  the  intention  of   taking   unauthorized
           possession or making unauthorized use of such property and fails
           to withdraw such property or its possession or use, when  called
           upon to do so by that another person by notice in writing,  duly
           served on him, is said to have  committed  “criminal  trespass”.
           (Orissa)


           ….. or having entered into or upon such property, whether before
           or after the  coming  into  force  of  the  Criminal  Law  (U.P.
           Amendment) Act, 1961, with the intention of taking  unauthorized
           use of such property fails to withdraw from such property or its
           possession or use, when called upon to do  so  by  that  another
           person by notice in writing, duly served upon him, by  the  date
           specified in the notice, is said to commit “criminal tresspass”.
           (Uttar Pradesh)


      Thus, in these two States, the Governments are in a position  to  file
      criminal proceedings for the offence of criminal trespass in the  case
      of unauthorized occupation of Government accommodation.  This acts  as
      a deterrent for any officer to live beyond the period prescribed.


      (b)   Though this Court in one of its Orders in these proceedings  had
      sought the opinion of the other States as to whether they  would  like
      to make amendments on similar lines vide Orders dated  24.07.2007  and
      19.09.2007,  The response of the various States was as under:-
      a)    Union of India said ‘No’
      b)    The Government of Bihar said ‘No’
      c)    The Government of Haryana said they would follow if the Union of
           India amends.
      d)     The  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  said  the  matter  was   under
           consideration.
      e)    The State of Madhya Pradesh said that it  will  do  so  if  need
           arises.
      f)    The State of Karnataka said that it was drafting rules for  this
           purpose.
      g)     The  State  of  Maharashtra  said  that  it  has  approved  the
           amendment.
      h)    The State of Uttarakhand said that  the  proposal  is  sent  for
           amendment.
      i)    The State of Nagaland said that  it  will  take  steps  for  the
           amendment.
      j)    The State of Sikkim said ‘No’
      k)    The State of Mizoram said that it will bring about the amendment
           if the Supreme Court directs.
      l)    The State of Manipur said that it had amended and sent it to the
           Union of India for approval.
      m)    The Union Territory of Chandigarh welcomed the amendment but was
           bound to follow the Union of India.
           The remaining other States did not respond before this Court.


      III)  Though the Act  provides  under  Section  11  for  offences  and
      penalty for unlawful occupation and makes the offence cognizable under
      Section 11A, it has been found as a matter of practice that the Estate
      Officers do not ordinarily take any  action  under  the  said  Section
      because of the proviso to Section 11(1) which reads as under:-


           “Provided that a person who, having been lawfully in  occupation
           of any public premises by virtue of any  authority  (whether  by
           way of  grant,  allotment  or  by  any  other  mode  whatsoever)
           continues to be  in  occupation  of  such  premises  after  such
           authority has ceased to be valid, shall not be  guilty  of  such
           offence.”

      This proviso gives the window for not prosecuting  a  person  who  had
      been allotted a premise but  continues  to  occupy  so  unauthorisedly
      after the authority to occupy the premises ceases to be valid.   Thus,
      the  unauthorized  occupant  continues  to   unlawfully   occupy   the
      government accommodation without fear of any prosecution.
      IV    It  has  also  been  seen  that  even  where  outstanding  rents
      including penal/market rent are there, there are persons continuing in
      occupation who do not pay the  amounts  and  there  is  difficulty  in
      recovering the same.  In this regard, apart from the provisions  under
      the Act, there are provisions under the Public Demand Recovery Act and
      Revenue Recovery Act which can be applied  for  the  recovery  of  the
      arrears as arrears of land revenue, because if  the  totality  of  the
      government houses in all the States of India are taken  into  account,
      the amount due works out to several crores.


      V.(a)  Fundamental   Rule   45-A   prescribes   for   the   Government
      accommodation  to  be  occupied  and  details  the  licence  fee  etc.
      including the continued occupation/retention  beyond  the  permissible
      period  and  guidelines  have  also  been  framed  for  that  purpose.
      However, these rules and guidelines do not state  anything  about  the
      eviction possibly on the premise that Public Premises  Act  will  take
      care of it.


      (b)   The Supplementary Rules in Chapter VIII Division 26  made  under
      Fundamental Rule 45 provide for rules for allotment of residences vide
      SR 311 to  316.   Similarly,  under  Chapter  26B,  the  Allotment  of
      Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963 are provided
      in SR 317.


           What is of significance is that while providing these rules, the
      government while allowing persons to continue to retain the Government
      accommodation does not provide for their  eviction,  again  presumably
      because of the provisions of the Public  Premises  Act.   However,  as
      explained hereinabove on account of the proviso to Section 11(1),  the
      Estate Officer cannot take any penal action against such  unauthorized
      occupants except for going through the process of eviction.


           It would have been useful if the Government  while  promulgating
      such  rules/orders/notifications  had  also   provided   for   certain
      undertakings to be taken from the  Government  officer  prior  to  his
      allotment to make sure that a person does vacate the quarters as  soon
      as his period prescribed for its retention gets over.”

11)   After furnishing all  these  materials,  he  suggested  the  following
guidelines to be issued by this Court which are as under:-
(i)   At the time of allotment of the Government accommodation to the  three
wings of the Government,  viz.,  the  Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the
Judiciary, an undertaking should be  taken  from  the  allotee  that  he/she
shall vacate the premises within  the  prescribed  period  under  the  rules
failing which he/she will be liable to disciplinary action  apart  from  any
other liability that he/she may incur.
(ii)  All arrears of rent including penal/market rent shall be recovered  as
arrears of land revenue.
(iii) The proviso to Section 11(1) of  the  Act  should  be  declared  ultra
vires as it is in  conflict  with  the  main  provisions  of  providing  for
offences and penalty for the unauthorized occupation of government houses.
(iv)  Any person who is in service and continues  to  unauthorisedly  occupy
the government accommodation  beyond  the  period  of  retention  should  be
suspended immediately, pending disciplinary action as  per  the  undertaking
given at the time of taking the Government quarter.
(v)   Since allotment of Government accommodation is a  privilege  given  to
the  Ministers  and  Members  of  Paliament,  the  matter  of   unauthorized
retention should be intimated to  the  Speaker/Chairman  of  the  House  and
action should be initiated by the House Committee  for  the  breach  of  the
privileges which a Member/Minister  enjoys  and  the  appropriate  Committee
should recommend the same  to  the  Speaker/Chairman  for  taking  deterrent
action.
(vi)  In view of paucity of Government accommodation, all the allotments  to
persons  belonging  to  categories  other  than  the  three  wings  of   the
Government should be henceforth immediately cancelled  and  discontinued  as
such allotments are made on discretion which is mostly abused.
(vii) All government houses which have been turned into memorials should  be
retrieved, memorials in Government houses should  be  removed  and  no  more
memorials should be allowed in future.
12)   Before considering the response of the Union of India, States and  the
Union Territories as to the suggestions of learned  amicus  curiae,  let  us
consider the relevant provisions of the Act applicable  to  the  persons  in
service.  The Act was  enacted  to  provide  for  eviction  of  unauthorized
occupants from public premises.  Section 2(e) of  the  Act  defines  `public
premises’ as under:
      “e) "public premises" means-
     
      (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned  by,
      or on behalf  of,  the  Central  Government,  and  includes  any  such
      premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before  or
      after  the  commencement  of  the   Public   Premises   (Eviction   of
      Unauthorised Occupants) Amendments Act, 1980, under the control of the
      Secretariat of either House of Parliament  for  providing  residential
      accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat;
     
      (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of,-
     
      (i) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in
      which not less than fifty-one per cent, of the paid up  share  capital
      is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary
      (within the meaning of that Act ) of the first-mentioned company.”
     
Section 2(g) defines “unauthorized occupation” as under:
      “(g) "unauthorised occupation", in relation to  any  public  premises,
      means the occupation by any person  of  the  public  premises  without
      authority  for  such  occupation,  and  includes  the  continuance  in
      occupation by any person of the public premises  after  the  authority
      (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he
      was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been  determined
      for any reason whatsoever.”

Section 4 of the Act speaks about issue of show cause notice before  passing
an order of eviction and Section  5  deals  with  eviction  of  unauthorized
occupants.  Section 7 relates to direction for payment of  rent  or  damages
in respect of public premises.  Section 9 speaks about  appeal  against  the
order of the Estate Officer.  In terms of Section 10, the  order  passed  by
the Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be called  in  question
in any original suit, application or execution proceedings  whereas  Section
11 speaks about offences and penalty.
13)   Apart from the above provisions of the Act, for  the  benefit  of  the
persons working in Central service, the Central  Government  framed  certain
rules which are called “Fundamental Rules”.  Among other rules, FR  45,  45A
and 45B are relevant which are as under:-
      “F.R.45 The Central Government may make rules or issue  orders  laying
      down the principles governing the allotment to officers serving  under
      its administrative control, for use by them  as  residences,  of  such
      buildings owned or leased by it, or  such  portions  thereof,  as  the
      Central Government may make available for the purpose.  Such rules  or
      orders may lay down different principles for observance  in  different
      localities or in respect of different classes of residences,  and  may
      prescribe  the  circumstances  in  which  such  an  officer  shall  be
      considered to be in occupation of a residence.”


      “F.R. 45-A  I. Deleted
       II. For the purpose of the assessment of licence  fee,  the  capital
           cost of a residence owned by Government shall include  the  cost
           or value of sanitary, water supply  and  electric  installations
           and fittings; and shall be either -
           a) the cost of acquiring or constructing the residence including
              the  cost  of  site  and  its  preparation  and  any  capital
              expenditure incurred after acquisition  or  construction;  or
              when this is not known;
           b) the present value of the residence, including  the  value  of
              the site.”
      “F.R. 45-B. I. This rule applies to  Government  servants  other  than
      those to whom Rule 45-A applies  or  than  those  occupying  residence
      belonging to the Indian Railway or  rented  at  the  cost  of  railway
      revenues.


       II. For the purpose of sub-clause(b) Clause III, the capital cost of
           a residence owned by Government shall not include  the  cost  or
           value of such  special  services  and  installations  (including
           furniture, tennis courts and sanitary, water supply or  electric
           installations and fittings_ as it  may  contain;  and  shall  be
           either :–
           a)  the  cost  of  acquiring  or  constructing  the   residence,
              including the cost  of  site  and  its  preparation  and  any
              capital   expenditure   incurred   after    acquisition    or
              construction; or, when this is not known.
           b) The present value of the residence  including  the  value  of
              site.”




14)   This Court had an occasion to consider the  similar  grievance/problem
viz., availability of  government  accommodation  in  Delhi  in  Shiv  Sagar
Tiwari (supra).   In this case, taking note of the  fact  that  Delhi  being
the capital of the country and is also the seat of  the  Central  Government
and that the issue  applies  to  a  large  number  of  persons,  this  Court
analysed the entire issue relating to government accommodation  and  various
rules applicable.  Even in  that  matter,  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  the  present
amicus curiae assisted this Court.  Though the said order  was  confined  to
the National Capital Territory of Delhi, this Court has categorized  various
groups, viz., ‘vacated list’,  ‘arrears  list’,  ‘change  from  same  type’,
‘change to  higher  type’,  ‘medical  cases  within  the  existing  policy’,
‘medical  cases  outside  the   existing   policy’,   ‘5   year   category’,
‘infructuous cases’,  ‘out  of  turn  and  above  entitlement’,  ‘functional
grounds’, ‘eviction cases’, ‘procedure for eviction’ etc.   After  analyzing
all these categories with facts  and  figures  as  well  as  the  provisions
applicable, this Court summed up various principles  and  issued  directions
for the authorities concerned.  Since we  are  considering  the  problem  of
such government accommodation/residential  quarters/bungalows  etc.  at  the
national level, the guidelines and  the  ultimate  decision  in  Shiv  Sagar
Tiwari (supra) framed  for  National  Capital  Territory  of  Delhi  may  be
immensely helpful.
15)   We have already referred to the suggestions  made  by  learned  amicus
curiae; now let us consider the response of Union of India, States and  some
of the Union Territories.  On behalf of the  Union  of  India,  Shri  Manish
Kumar Garg, Director of Estates, Ministry of Urban  Development,  Government
of India, Nirman Bhavan, New Delhi has filed  an  affidavit  on  16.11.2011.
Mr. P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor  General,  took  us  through
the stand taken by the Ministry of Urban Development.  Since the  department
concerned has expressed its views about suggestions put forward  by  learned
amicus, we intend to incorporate the same which are as under:-
      “1. It is submitted that the allotment  of  government  house  to  the
      employees/officers  of  the  three  wings  of  the   government,   the
      Legislature, the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary  is  made  under  the
      provisions of allotment of  Government  Residences  (General  Pool  in
      Delhi) Rules, 1963 as amended from time to time.  These rules  provide
      for allotment, cancellation, retention, penalties for non-vacation  of
      quarters within the permissible retention  period.   It  is  submitted
      that the applicant has to be  given  an  undertaking  in  “Application
      Form”  itself  that  he/she  agrees  to  abide  by  the  Allotment  of
      Government Residences (General Pool in Delhi) Rules, 1963 also in  the
      Acceptance Form, the allottee undertakes to vacate  the  accommodation
      allotted to him/her within the stipulated period.  However, because of
      certain unavoidable circumstances which may be beyond the  control  of
      allottee, the allottee sometimes retains the  house  for  a  few  days
      beyond the permissible retention period  for  which  damages  rate  is
      charged vis-à-vis action for eviction under Public Premises  (Eviction
      of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.   Therefore,  the  provision  of
      disciplinary  may  not  be  desirable.   In   case   of   unauthorized
      occupation, in the case of subletting,  apart  from  charging  damages
      (penal rent)  and  action  is  initiated  for  eviction,  disciplinary
      proceedings are initiated against the unauthorized occupant.  In  view
      of these provisions already existing in the rules further  undertaking
      may not be necessary.


      2. As per the existing provisions penal/market rent is recovered  from
      the unauthorized occupant by raising bills on the employee or  his/her
      department.  In  case  of  retiring  employees,  10%  of  gratuity  is
      withheld for adjustment of outstanding dues on account of licence  fee
      and damages.  The withheld amount  of  gratuity  is  released  by  the
      employer  only  after  the  retired  employee  obtains  a  “No  Demand
      Certificate” from the Directorate of Estates after making payment  for
      all the dues and submits the same to his/her employer.  In  case  some
      retired employees do not turn up for “No Demand Certificate”, and dues
      on account  of  licence  fee/damages  remain  unrecovered,  action  is
      initiated for recovery of dues as arrears of land  revenue  under  the
      provisions of the Act.


      3.    It is submitted that Section 11(1) of the Act deals  with  three
      categories of unauthorized occupation – (i) A  person  who  unlawfully
      occupies a public premises (ii)   A person who having been lawfully in
      occupation of a public premises by virtue of authority etc., continues
      to be in occupation of such premises after such authority  has  ceased
      to be valid and (iii) A person who has been evicted  from  the  public
      premises under  the  Act  again  occupies  the  premises  without  any
      authority.  While Section 11(1) of the Act provides for punishment  to
      unlawful occupants, the proviso of the section deals with unauthorized
      occupants due to expiry of licence  or  allotment  period.   Both  the
      categories i.e., (i) and (ii)  are  not  comparable.   Therefore,  the
      provisions meet  the  requirements  to  deal  with  various  types  of
      unauthorized occupants and hence cannot be declared ultra vires.


      4.    A person who is in Government service  is  liable  to  surrender
      Government accommodation in case of his/her transfer to an  ineligible
      office at the same station or outside.  However, with a view to enable
      the government servant to make arrangements for settling  his  family,
      retention is permitted upto 8 months i.e. 2 months under SR-317-B  and
      6 months under SR-317-B-22.  In the case of retention of accommodation
      beyond the permissible retention period, the employee/family is liable
      to be evicted from the house under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and
      damages are charged from the concerned employee.


            However, there may be a few cases where the allottee or  his/her
      family retains the accommodation beyond the permissible period due  to
      unavoidable circumstances, say, in the  case  of  regularization,  re-
      posting or severe illness  for  which  damages  is  charged  vis-à-vis
      action under the provisions of the  Act.   However,  in  the  case  of
      unauthorized occupation on account of subletting, the  Directorate  of
      Estates cancels the allotment and initiates eviction  proceedings  and
      the controlling department of the unauthorized allottee  proceeds  for
      disciplinary  action  including  placing  him/her  under   suspension.
      Therefore, the suggestion to put all  serving  unauthorized  occupants
      under suspension will be too harsh and does not fall within the  ambit
      of provisions of the Act.  Moreover, suspension is resorted  to  under
      certain specific circumstances as a matter  of  administrative  action
      under CCS (CCA) Rules.


      5.    Allotment to a Union Minister is  made  by  the  Directorate  of
      Estates, Ministry of Urban Development as per provisions of Ministers’
      Residences Rules, 1962.  The Ministers, on ceasing to be  a  Minister,
      are required to vacate the official accommodation  within  one  month.
      Alternate accommodation,  if  necessary,  is  allotted  as  per  their
      entitlement by  the  House  Committee  concerned.   The  allotment  to
      Members of Parliament is made  by  the  respective  House  Committees,
      viz.,  Lok  Sabha  House  Committee,  Rajya  Sabha  House   Committee.
      However, in the event of unauthorized occupation, the respective House
      Committees refer the case to the Directorate of Estates for initiating
      eviction proceedings under the provisions of the  Act.   Allotment  to
      Members of Parliament is also made by the Directorate of Estates  from
      the General Pool as per laid down guidelines.  Hence,  such  a  matter
      does not fall within the purview of breach of privilege.


      6.    Allotment of government accommodation to  persons  belonging  to
      categories other  than  the  three  wings  of  the  Government,  viz.,
      Journalists, eminent Artists, freedom fighters, social workers etc. is
      made as per provisions in the guidelines framed as  per  direction  of
      the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 585/1984 titled Shiv  Sagar
      Tiwari vs. Union of India.  These allotments are made out  of  the  5%
      discretionary quota allowed by the Supreme Court.  In  view  of  this,
      cancellation of such allotments already made  and  discontinuation  of
      such further allotment may not be desirable.


      7.    The government houses which have been turned into memorial  were
      allotted on  lease  to  respective  Trusts/Societies  by  the  Cabinet
      Committee on Accommodation in accordance with  the  guidelines  framed
      for the purpose as per direction of the Supreme Court in C.P. (W)  No.
      585/1994 titled Shiv Sagar Tiwari  vs.  Union  of  India.   The  lease
      agreement has been executed between the Government of  India  and  the
      respective Trusts etc. for specified period.  It would, therefore,  be
      violation of the agreement if such houses  are  retrieved  before  the
      lease period is over.  The guidelines formulated in November 2000  put
      complete ban on the conversion of Government bungalows into  memorials
      of the departed leaders.  As such, the suggestion given by the  amicus
      curiae has already been taken care of.  The present guidelines provide
      for allotment of accommodation to non-Government  organizations  which
      are  working  for  national  interest  or  for  meeting  international
      obligations.”


16)   It is clear from the response  submitted  by  the  Ministry  of  Urban
Development that in view of various provisions in the Act for taking  action
against unauthorized occupants, existing provisions would  suffice.   It  is
also clear that in respect of retiring employees, without  clearing  arrears
of rent/penal/ market rent and No Due Certificate from  the  Directorate  of
Estates, the retirement  benefits  will  not  be  settled  and  as  per  the
provisions, 10% of  the  gratuity  is  to  be  withheld  for  adjustment  of
outstanding dues.
17)   The Department also highlighted  that  for  allotment  to  Members  of
Parliament, it is the “House of Committee”  which  controls  such  allotment
and no further guidelines are required for the same.
18)   It was also pointed out that for the persons from special  categories,
viz., journalists, eminent artists, freedom fighters, social  workers  etc.,
guidelines framed by this Court earlier, govern the  issue  and  no  further
direction is required.
19)   On behalf of the State of Sikkim, the Principal Resident  Commissioner
has filed an affidavit highlighting the position and the procedure  that  is
in vogue in the State.  He  emphasized  that  the  Government  never  allows
anyone  to  overstay  including   unauthorized   retention   of   government
accommodation by the Ministers and Members of Parliament.
20)   On behalf of the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Directorate of  Estates
has filed an affidavit  wherein  it  is  highlighted  that  so  far  as  the
employees of the State Government, executive and  judiciary  are  concerned,
there is no objection in taking an undertaking as suggested by  this  Court.
However, according to the government, the houses allotted to the members  of
the  legislative  assembly,  members  of  parliament   and   ministers   are
concerned, the matter needs  to  be  examined  after  taking  views  of  the
Secretary, Vidhan Sabha.  It is also pointed  out  that  the  Government  of
Madhya Pradesh has issued separate rules called  Madhya  Pradesh  Government
Quarters Allotment  Rules,  2000  which  provides  effective  mechanism  for
eviction of unauthorized persons and recovery of rent, if any.
21)   On behalf of the State  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  Principal  Secretary  to
Government, General Administration (Accomm.) Department has  filed  a  reply
affidavit furnishing information as to the position in  the  State  and  the
steps that are being taken by them.
22)   On  behalf  of  the  State  of  Jammu  &  Kashmir,  Director,  Estates
Department has filed an affidavit informing about various steps being  taken
by them.  He also submitted that the government  is  ready  to  comply  with
further/additional directions being issued by this Court.
23)    Union  Territory  of  Puducherry  through  its  Secretary   (Housing)
highlighted the availability of government quarters, number of  unauthorized
occupants and the procedure being followed for eviction  of  those  persons.
He also informed this Court that all the directions and instructions of  the
Government  of  India  are  being  followed  in  the  Union   Territory   of
Puducherry.
24)   On behalf of the  State  of  Maharashtra,  Deputy  Secretary,  General
Administration  Department   filed   an   affidavit   highlighting   various
instructions issued to the competent  authority  dealing  with  unauthorized
occupants.  He  also  furnished  a  statement  showing  the  eviction  cases
pending with the competent authority  and  also  the  cases  in  which  rent
recovery is going on.
25)   On behalf of the State  of  Haryana,  Special  Secretary  Coordination
from  the  office  of  Chief  Secretary  to  Government,  Haryana  filed  an
affidavit conveying their comments  on  the  propositions  made  by  learned
amicus curiae.
26)   On behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh,  Assistant  Estates  Officer,
Government of U.P. submitted his response  as  to  the  suggestions  of  the
learned amicus  curiae.   He  also  highlighted  that  necessary  amendments
should be made in their allotment rules.  According to him,  in  respect  of
arrears of rent and damages, the rules enable them to recover  the  same  as
arrears of land revenue.  The State  has  also  highlighted  that  stringent
provision, viz., Section  11  of  the  U.P.  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 is in force.  As per the  said  provision,
if any person who has been evicted from any public premises  again  occupies
the same without authority for such occupation, he shall be punishable  with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or fine which may  extend
to Rs. 1,000/- or with both.  He also highlighted  the  allotment  procedure
in respect of journalists, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary  as
well as memorials available in their State.
27)   As per the details furnished by  learned  amicus  curiae  and  various
comments made by Union of India as well as some of the States and the  Union
Territories, it cannot be said that at present  there  is  no  machinery  to
check eviction of unauthorized occupants as well as recovery of  arrears  of
rent including penal charges.  However, it is not in dispute that  in  spite
of existing provisions/rules, directions etc., the  fact  remains  same  and
the persons from all the three branches either  by  their  influence  or  by
lengthy  procedure  as  provided  in  the  Act,  continue  to  stay  in  the
government accommodation by paying paltry amount either by way  of  rent  or
penalty.  In these circumstances, we are of the view  that  in  addition  to
the statutory provisions, there is need to frame guidelines for the  benefit
of both Union of India/States and Union Territories for  better  utilization
of their premises.
28)   The following suggestions would precisely address  the  grievances  of the  Centre  and  the  State  governments  in  regard  to  the  unauthorized occupants:
Suggestions:

  (i)   As  a  precautionary  measure,  a  notice  should  be  sent  to  the allottee /officer/employee concerned under Section  4  of  the  PP  Act  three months prior to the date of his/her  retirement  giving  advance   intimation to vacate the premises.
(ii)  The Department concerned from where the government  servant  is  going to retire must be  made  liable  for  fulfilling  the  above-mentioned  formalities as  well  as  follow  up  actions  so  that  rest  of  the   provisions of the Act can be effectively utilized.
(iii) The principles of natural justice have to be  followed  while  serving  the notice.
(iv)  After following the procedure as mentioned in SR 317-B-11(2) and  317-   B-22 proviso 1 and 2, within 7 working days, send a show cause  notice  to the person concerned in view of the advance intimation  sent  three  months before the retirement.
(v)   Date of appearance before the Estate Officer or for  personal  hearing    as mentioned in the Act after show cause notice  should  not  be  more   than 7 working days.
(vi)  Order of eviction  should  be  passed  as  expeditiously  as  possible   preferably within a period of 15 days.
(vii) If, as per the Estate Officer,  the  occupant’s  case  is  genuine  in  terms of Section 5  of  the  Act  then,  in  the  first  instance,  an  extension of not more than 30 days should be granted.
(viii)      The responsibility for issuance of the  genuineness  certificate  should be on  the  Department  concerned  from  where  the  government  servant has retired for the occupation of the  premises  for  next  15  days and further.  Giving additional responsibility to the  department concerned will help in speedy vacation of such premises.  Baseless  or   frivolous applications for extensions have to be rejected within seven  days.
(ix)  If as per the Estate Officer the occupant’s case is not  genuine,  not  more than 15 days’ time should be granted and  thereafter,  reasonable   force as per Section 5(2) of the Act may be used.
(x)   There must be a time frame within how much  time  the  Estate  Officer  has to decide about the quantum of rent to be paid.
(xi)  The same procedure must be followed for damages.
(xii) The arrears/damages should be collected as arrears of land revenue  as  mentioned in Section 14 of the Act.
(xiii)      There must be a provision  for  compound  interest,  instead  of    simple interest as per Section 7.
(xiv) To make it more stringent, there must be some provision  for  stoppage   or reduction in the monthly pension till the date of vacation  of  the  premises.
(xv)  Under Section 9 (2), an appeal shall lie from  an  order  of  eviction   and of rent/damages within 12 days from the day of publication  or  on  which the order is communicated respectively.
(xvi) Under Section 9(4), disposal of the appeals must be preferably  within  a period of 30  days  in  order  to  eliminate  unnecessary  delay  in   disposal of such cases.
(xvii) The liberty of the appellate officer to condone the delay  in  filing  the appeal under Section  9  of  the  Act  should  be  exercised  very  reluctantly and it should be an exceptional practice and not a general  rule.
(xviii) Since allotment of government accommodation is a privilege given  to  the Ministers and Members of Parliament, the  matter  of  unauthorized  retention should be intimated to the Speaker/Chairman of the House and  action should be initiated by the House Committee for  the  breach  of   the privileges which a  Member/Minister  enjoys  and  the  appropriate
    Committee  should  recommend  to  the  Speaker/Chairman   for   taking appropriate action/eviction within a time bound period.
(xix) Judges of any forum shall  vacate  the  official  residence  within  a period of  one  month  from  the  date  of  superannuation/retirement.
      However,  after  recording  sufficient  reason(s),  the  time  may  be  extended by another one month.
(xx)   Henceforth,  no  memorials  should  be  allowed  in  future  in   any  Government houses earmarked for residential accommodation.
29)   It is unfortunate that the  employees,  officers,  representatives  of
people and other high  dignitaries  continue  to  stay  in  the  residential
accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no  longer
entitled to such accommodation.  
Many of such  persons  continue  to  occupy
residential accommodation commensurate  with  the  office(s)  held  by  them
earlier and which are beyond their present  entitlement.   
The  unauthorized
occupants must recollect that rights  and  duties  are  correlative  as  the
rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the  duty
of one person entails the rights of another  person.   
Observing  this,  the
unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in  the
premise directly infringes the right of another.  
No law or  directions  can
entirely control this act of  disobedience  but  for  the  self  realization
among the unauthorized occupants.  
The matter is disposed of with the  above
terms and no order is required in I.As for impleadment and intervention.

                            ...…………….………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)










                            .…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


NEW DELHI;
JULY 05, 2013.
-----------------------
29


Service matter = in case the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, he must record reasons for the dis-agreement and communicate the same to the delinquent seeking his explanation and after considering the same, the punishment could be passed. = in Kunj Behari Misra (supra), observing that it was a case where the disciplinary authority differed from the view of the Inquiry Officer. “In that context, it was held that denial of opportunity of hearing was per se violative of the principles of natural justice.” 11. In fact, not furnishing the copy of the recorded reasons for disagreement from the enquiry report itself causes the prejudice to the delinquent and therefore, it has to be understood in an entirely different context than that of the issue involved in ECIL (supra).= The learned Single Judge has concluded the case observing as under: “The whole process that resulted in dismissal of the petitioner is flawed from his inception and the order of dismissal cannot be sustained. I am examining this case after nearly 23 years after its institution and the petitioner has also attained the age of superannuation. The issue of reinstatement or giving him the benefit of his wages for during the time when he did not serve will not be appropriate. The impugned orders of dismissal are set aside and the petitioner shall be taken to have retired on the date when he would have superannuated and all the terminal benefits shall be worked out and paid to him in 12 weeks on such basis. There shall be, however, no direction for payment of any salary for the period when he did not work.”= As the case is squarely covered by the judgment of this court in Kunj Behari Misra (supra), we do not see any reason to approve the impugned judgment rendered by the Division Bench. Thus, in view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. No costs.

           published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40533                                                   

REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                                  CIVIL
                           APPELALTE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5128  OF 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 39105 of 2012)




      S.P. Malhotra                                               …Appellant

                                   Versus

      Punjab National Bank & Ors.                        …Respondents




                             O R D E R

      1.    Leave granted.




      2.    This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and
      order dated 25.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab  and  Haryana
      at Chandigarh in L.P.A.No. 2028 of  2011,  by  way  of  which  it  has
      reversed the judgment and order of  the  learned  Single  Judge  dated
      20.5.2011 passed in Writ Petition No.  1201  of  1988,  by  which  and
      whereunder the learned Single Judge had  awarded  the  relief  to  the
      appellant herein on the ground that
in case the Disciplinary Authority
does not agree with the findings recorded by the  Enquiry  Officer  in disciplinary  proceedings,  
the  Disciplinary  Authority  must  record reasons for disagreement and communicate the same  to  the  delinquent
and seek his response and only after considering the  same,  he  could pass the order of punishment.

      3.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

      A.    The appellant was appointed as Clerk/Cashier in  the  respondent
      Bank in the year 1969 and was promoted as Accountant in the year 1977,
      and further promoted as  Assistant  Manager  in  the  year  1981.  
The
      Disciplinary Authority put him under suspension in November, 1982  for
      certain delinquencies and in respect of the same, a chargesheet  dated
      7.2.1983 was served upon him containing four charges namely:

      (i)   Tampering with official record to the detriment of the    Bank’s
           interest;

      (ii)   Indulging in un-authorized business  against  the  interest  of
           the Bank;

      (iii)   Mis-utilising  official  position  to  benefit  relatives  and
           friends against the interest of the Bank; and

       iv) Concealment of facts from the authorities.

      B.    The appellant submitted his reply to the said charges  in  July,
      1983 denying all the allegations and further submitting  that  it  was
      the Branch Manager who had sanctioned all the loans and  advances  and all the entries had been made at  his  behest.  
As  the  Disciplinary
      Authority was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the appellant,
      an Enquiry Officer was appointed to examine the charges.

      C.    After conducting and concluding the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 27.2.1985 exonerating the appellant on all  the charges and in support of the findings  sufficient  reasons  had  been  given on each charge.

      D.    The Disciplinary Authority partly agreed with  the  findings  on
      charge Nos. (ii) and (iii), but disagreed with the findings qua charge
      Nos. (i)  and  (iv),  and  vide  order  dated  27.4.1985  imposed  the
      punishment of dismissal from service.

      E.    Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the appeal against  the  said
      order   under   Regulation   17   of   the   Punjab   National    Bank
      Officers/Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)    Regulation    1977
      (hereinafter referred to as the  ‘Regulations),  and  the  appeal  was
      dismissed vide order dated 14.8.1985 by the Appellate Authority.  
 The
      Appellate Authority also concurred with the findings  on  two  charges
      recorded by the Enquiry Officer.

      F.    Being aggrieved of the order of  the  Appellate  Authority,  the
      appellant filed review petition under Regulation 18 of the Regulations
      and the said review petition  was  also  dismissed  vide  order  dated
      19.8.1987.

      G.    The appellant challenged the said orders of punishment by filing
      a Writ Petition No. 1201 of 1988 before the High Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana at Chandigarh. The said writ petition  was  contested  by  the   respondent Bank. The  learned  Single  Judge  allowed  the  said  writ   petition vide judgment and order dated 20.5.2011, holding that in case  the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the   Enquiry Officer, he must record  reasons  for  the  dis-agreement  and   communicate the same to the delinquent  seeking  his  explanation  and after considering the same, the punishment could be  passed.   In  the
 instant case,  as  such  a  course  had  not  been  resorted  to,  the  punishment order stood vitiated.

      H.    Aggrieved, the respondent Bank preferred LPA before the Division
      Bench which has been allowed taking a view that as the punishment  had
      been imposed prior to the date of judgment in Managing Director, ECIL,
      Hyderabad, etc.etc. v. B. Karunakar etc.etc., AIR 1994 SC  1074,  i.e.
      20.11.1990, and as there was no requirement of issuing a  second  show
      cause notice before  the  punishment  was  imposed,  the  question  of
      serving the copy of the reasons  recorded  for  dis-agreement  to  the
      delinquent would not arise.

            Hence, this appeal.

      4.    Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
      appellant has submitted that the Division Bench has not  examined  the
      case in correct perspective and failed to appreciate that the judgment
      in ECIL (supra) had no application in the instant case. The matter was
      squarely covered by the judgment of this court in Punjab National Bank
      & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra, AIR 1998 SC 2713, and the  ratio  thereof
      had correctly been applied by the  learned  Single  Judge.  Thus,  the
      appeal deserves to be allowed.

      5.    Per contra, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for  the
      respondent Bank has  defended  the  judgment  of  the  Division  Bench
      contending that there was  no  requirement  of  serving  the  recorded
      reasons  for  dis-agreement  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  to  the
      delinquent if such a decision was taken prior to the date of  decision
      of ECIL (supra) i.e. 20.11.1990, and  therefore,  no  interference  is
      required in the appeal.

      6.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the record.

      7.    In view of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for
      the parties, two separate issues are involved  in  the  instant  case,
      namely, (a) requirement of issuing a second show cause notice  by  the
      Disciplinary  Authority  to  the  delinquent   before   imposing   the
      punishment; and (b) serving the copy of the reasons  recorded  by  the
      Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the findings recorded  by  the
      Enquiry Officer.

            In the case of ECIL (supra), only the first issue  was  involved
      and in the facts of this case, only second  issue  was  involved.  The
      second issue was examined and decided by a three-Judge Bench  of  this
      Court in Kunj Behari Misra  (supra),  wherein  the  judgment  of  ECIL
      (supra) has not only been referred to, but extensively quoted, and  it
      has clearly been stipulated that wherein the second issue is involved,
      the order of punishment would stand vitiated in case  the  reasons  so
      recorded by the Disciplinary  Authority  for  dis-agreement  with  the
      Enquiry Officer  had not been  supplied  to  the  delinquent  and  his
      explanation had not been sought.  While deciding the  said  case,  the
      court relied upon the earlier judgment of this court in  Institute  of
      Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, AIR 1987 SC 71.

      8.    Kunj  Behari  Misra  (supra)  itself  was  the  case  where  the
      Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the  findings  recorded  by  the
      Enquiry Officer on 12.12.1983  and  passed  the  order  on  15.12.1983
      imposing the punishment, and immediately  thereafter,  the  delinquent
      officers therein stood superannuated on  31.12.1983.  In  Kunj  Behari
      Misra (supra), this court held as under:

           “19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would  be  that  the
           principles of natural justice have to be  read  into  Regulation
           7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the  disciplinary  authority
           disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article  of  charge,
           then before it records its own findings on such charge, it  must
           record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and  give  to
           the delinquent officer an opportunity  to  represent  before  it
           records  its  findings.  The  report  of  the  enquiry   officer
           containing its  findings  will  have  to  be  conveyed  and  the
           delinquent officer will have  an  opportunity  to  persuade  the
           disciplinary authority to accept the  favourable  conclusion  of
           the enquiry officer. The principles of natural  justice,  as  we
           have already observed, require the authority which has to take a
           final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an  opportunity
           to the officer charged of misconduct to  file  a  representation
           before the disciplinary authority records its  findings  on  the
           charges framed against the officer.”                   (Emphasis
           added)


      The Court further held as under:


           “21. Both the respondents superannuated  on  31-12-1983.  During
           the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on  6-1-1995  and  his
           legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years
           have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It
           will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at  this
           stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority
           for the start of another innings.”




      9.    The  view  taken  by  this  Court  in  the  aforesaid  case  has
      consistently been  approved  and  followed  as  is  evident  from  the
      judgments in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of  Maharashtra  &  Anr.,  AIR
      1999 SC 3734; State Bank of India & Ors. v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty,  AIR
      2003 SC 1100; J.A. Naiksatam v. Prothonotary and Senior  Master,  High
      Court of Bombay & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1218; P.D. Agrawal v.  State  Bank
      of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2064; and Ranjit Singh v. Union of  India
      & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3685.


      10.   In Canara Bank & Ors. v. Shri Debasis Das & Ors.,  AIR  2003  SC
      2041, 
this Court explained the ratio of the judgment  in  Kunj  Behari
      Misra (supra), observing that it was a  case  
where  the  disciplinary
      authority differed from the view of  the  Inquiry  Officer.  
“In  that
      context, it was held that denial of opportunity of hearing was per  se  violative of the principles of natural justice.”
      11.   In fact, not furnishing the copy of  the  recorded  reasons  for
      disagreement from the enquiry report itself causes  the  prejudice  to
      the delinquent and therefore, it has to be understood in  an  entirely
      different context than that of the issue involved in ECIL (supra).


      12.   The learned Single Judge has concluded  the  case  observing  as
      under:
           “The whole process that resulted in dismissal of the  petitioner
           is flawed from his inception and 
the order of  dismissal  cannot be sustained.  
I am examining this case after  nearly  23  years after its institution and the petitioner has also  attained  the age of superannuation. 
The issue of reinstatement or giving  him the benefit of his wages for during the time  when  he  did  not serve will not be appropriate.  
The impugned orders of dismissal
           are set aside and the petitioner shall be taken to have  retired on the date  when  he  would  have  superannuated  and  all  the terminal benefits shall be worked out and  paid  to  him  in  12 weeks on such basis. 
There shall be, however, no  direction  for
 payment of any salary for the period when he did not work.”




      13.   As the case is squarely covered by the judgment of this court in Kunj Behari Misra (supra), we do not see any  reason  to  approve  the  impugned judgment rendered by the Division Bench.
           Thus, in view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The  judgment and order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of  the  learned Single Judge is restored. No costs.


                                                              …….………………….…J.
                                                (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)



                                                               ………………………….J.
                                              (S.A. Bobde)

      New Delhi,

      July 4, 2013

?









-----------------------
8





Rape by Police in Custody - absence of medical examination about the Rape is not fatal to the prosecution as they made efforts to get medically examined through petition, through complaint but the Doctors refused =the complainant and one Kamaljit Kaur, who were working as ‘dai’ and nurse respectively, and brought them to the Police Station. On the intervention of Maha Singh, President of the Para Medical Union, Kamaljit Kaur, was released, but the complainant was not released.- in the night of 09.02.1989, the appellants tortured her with patta, made her senseless and had intercourse with her and released her on the morning of 10.02.1989 on the intervention of the Panchayats of Villages Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour. when she was released on 10.02.1989, she was in a bad shape and she told them about the torture and sexual intercourse that was forced upon her by the appellants on the night of 09.02.1989. - The appellants in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. before the trial court, on the other hand, took the defence that the complainant (PW-3) along with Kamaljit Kaur were actually released on 09.02.1989 at 6.00 p.m. = the trial court and the High Court have recorded the findings of rape committed by the appellants on PW-3 because of her consistent version in her petition dated 13.02.1989 (Ext.P3/A) to the Governor made within a few days of her release from Police Station on 09.02.1989, her complaint dated 25.07.1989 and her evidence in Court. PW- 1, PW-2 and PW-3 have deposed that an attempt was made for a medical examination in the Civil Hospital, Balachaur, and the hospital at Saroa but the doctors refused to conduct the medical examination on account of the pressure from the appellant-Radha Krishan, but DW-11 and DW-12, the doctors in the hospital, have denied that they had refused to conduct the medical examination. The result is that there is no medical evidence to support the allegation of rape made by PW-3 against the appellants. The High Court, however, has held that as PW-3 was not a young woman, medical examination was not significant and absence of medical examination may not be sufficient to disbelieve PW-3 if her story stands on its own. The High Court has found that she has consistently stated in her petition dated 13.02.1989 to the Governor of Punjab, in her complaint dated 25.07.1989 before the Magistrate and in her deposition in Court that she was detained in the night and raped by the appellants and both the trial court and the High Court have found that soon after she was released from the Police Station on 10.02.1989, she stated before her husband (PW-1) and the neighbour (PW-2) that she had been raped by the appellants and that she was bleeding profusely. The trial court and the High Court, therefore, have come to the finding of guilt of rape against the appellants relying on the evidence of PW-3 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act.= Thus, the trial court and the High Court have recorded concurrent findings of facts holding the appellants guilty of the offences under Sections 323/34, 504/34, 376(2)(a) and 376(2)(g) IPC and the appellant- Radha Krishan guilty of the offence under Section 342 IPC also. = It has been repeatedly held by this Court that even though the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide, in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts, save in exceptional circumstances where there has been grave miscarriage of justice

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40523
Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 232 of 2007


Charanjit & Ors.                                               ……
Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Punjab & Anr.                                   ….. Respondents







                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

      This is an appeal by way of special leave under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution against the judgment of the Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  in
Criminal Appeal Nos. 768-SB of 1997 &  769-SB  of  1997  arising  out  of  a
complaint case.


Facts of the case:

2.    The facts very briefly are that  on  09.02.1989  at  about  5.00  a.m.
Shankar Dass, who was the  Principal  of  D.A.V.  Higher  Secondary  School,
Balachaur, was shot  dead  by  terrorists  and  Ramesh  Kumar,  son  of  the
deceased Shankar Dass lodged FIR No. 13 on  09.02.1989  in  Police  Station,
Balachaur.
Thirty two persons of village Paili filed a petition before  the
SHO, Police Station, Balachaur, alleging that terrorists frequent the  house of the complainant in Village Paili.  
The  appellants  who  were  posted  in
Police Station, Balachaur went to the house of the  complainant  and  picked up the complainant and one Kamaljit Kaur, who  were  working  as  ‘dai’  and nurse respectively, and brought them to the Police Station.  
On  13.02.1989,
the complainant sent a petition to the Governor of Punjab  by  a  registered
letter alleging that she along with Kamaljit Kaur were taken to  the  Police
Station on 09.02.1989 at 7.00 a.m. and were  asked  whether  the  extremists
were frequenting their house and when they  replied  in  the  negative  they
were tortured at the Police Station.
On the  intervention  of  Maha  Singh,
President of the Para Medical Union, Kamaljit Kaur, was  released,  but  the complainant was not  released.   
The  complainant  further  alleged  in  her
petition to the Governor of Punjab that in  the  night  of  09.02.1989,  the appellants tortured her with patta, made her senseless and  had  intercourse with her and released her on the morning of 10.02.1989 on  the  intervention of the Panchayats of Villages Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour.
Soon  after
the release, the complainant disclosed to the members of Panchayat what  had happened to her in the  night  of  09.02.1989.  
 In  this  petition  to  the Governor of Punjab, the complainant made a request for an enquiry.

3.    When no action was  taken  against  the  appellants,  the  complainant
filed a criminal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Hoshiarpur
on  25.07.1989  making  substantially  the  same  allegations  against   the
appellants.  
The  Magistrate  recorded  the  preliminary  evidence  of  the
complainant and took cognizance of the offences under Sections 323  and  504
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’)  and  issued
summons to the appellants.
The  complainant  then  filed  a  petition  under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”)  contending
that the appellants should be summoned for standing trial for  the  offences
under Sections 366/342/376/506 read with Section  34  IPC.  
The  appellants
also filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing  the  complaint
as well as the order of  the  Magistrate  summoning  the  appellants.  
Both
these petitions  were  disposed  of  by  order  dated  29.07.1991  with  the
direction to the Magistrate to hold an enquiry in respect  of  the  offences
described in the complaint.
The complaint  was  thereafter  transferred  to
the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, by the  High  Court.
Thereafter, the  Magistrate  took  cognizance  of  offences  under  Sections 323/342/366/506 read with Section 34 IPC and  summoned  the  appellants  and Hussan  Lal.   
The  case  was  committed  to  the  Sessions  Court  and  the
Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, was entrusted  with  the  case.  
The
Additional  Sessions  Judge  initially   framed   charges   under   Sections
366/504/342 and 323 IPC to which the  appellants  pleaded  not  guilty,  but
thereafter by order dated 16.02.1995 the High Court directed the  Additional
Sessions Judge to reconsider the framing of charges against  the  appellants
in the light of the allegations made in the complaint  and  the  preliminary
evidence recorded in respect  of  the  complaint.  
The  learned  Additional
Sessions Judge reframed the charges under Section 376 (2) (g) IPC  to  which the appellants pleaded not guilty and the appellants were tried.

4.    At the trial, the complainant was examined as PW-3 and she  reiterated
in the witness box her  version  in  the  complaint.   The  husband  of  the
complainant, Gurmail Singh, was examined  as  PW-1  and,  the  neighbour  of
Gurmail Singh, Harbans Singh was examined as PW-2 and  both  PW-1  and  PW-2
stated before the trial court that the complainant (PW-3) was  not  released
on the evening  of  09.02.1989  and  was  released  only  at  4.30  p.m.  on
10.02.1989 and
when she was released on 10.02.1989, she was in a  bad  shape
and she told them about the torture and sexual intercourse that  was  forced upon her by the appellants on the night of 09.02.1989.  
The  appellants  in
their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. before the trial  court,  on  the other hand,  took  the  defence  that  the  complainant  (PW-3)  along  with Kamaljit Kaur were actually released on 09.02.1989 at  6.00  p.m.  and  they were handed over to the people of Panchayat to ensure that  the  complainant
would not do anything wrong in future and they  denied  that  they  had  any sexual intercourse with the complainant and also stated  that  she  was  not detained in the evening or the night of 09.02.1989 at the Police Station  as alleged by her. 
 In  support  of  their  defence,  the  appellants  examined
witnesses and produced two documents Ex. DW-1A and Ex. DW-1B.

5.    The trial court, however, rejected the defence of the  appellants  and
instead held that the testimony of PW-3 as corroborated by the  evidence  of
PW-1 and PW-2 who were  present  at  the  gathering  immediately  after  the
release of PW-3 clearly establishes that PW-3  was  released  on  10.02.1989
and at the time of her release she was in a bad shape and  in  torn  clothes
and was bleeding and that she had told her tale of  sufferings  before  PW-1
and PW-2 by giving details of the incident of  rape  at  the  hands  of  the
appellants.  The trial court  accordingly  convicted  the  appellants  under
Sections 323/34, 504/34, 376(2)(a) and 376(2)(g) IPC and sentenced  them  to
rigorous imprisonment for various periods which were  to  run  concurrently,
the maximum being 10 years for the offences  under  Sections  376(2)(a)  and
376(2)(g) IPC.  Aggrieved, the appellants, Charanjit and Kashmiri Lal  filed
Criminal Appeal No. 768-SB of 1997 and Radha Krishan filed  Criminal  Appeal
No. 769-SB of 1997, but by the impugned common judgment, the High Court  has
dismissed their appeals.
Contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties:

6.    Mr. P. H. Parekh, learned counsel for the appellants,  submitted  that
the finding of the trial court as well as the High Court that PW-3  was  not
released on 09.02.1989 at 6 p.m. and was detained in the Police  Station  on
the night of 09.02.1989 and raped by the police is not at all  correct.   He
submitted that this finding is based on the evidence of PW-3 but PW-3  ought
not to have been believed because she had close links  with  the  terrorists
who had pressurized her to implicate the appellants falsely in the case  and
therefore it was unsafe to rely on her evidence.   In  this  connection,  he
submitted that one of the terrorists Hazura Singh was  a  relative  of  PW-3
and PW-3 used to give shelter to him  and  this  would  be  clear  from  the
letter dated 09.02.1989 of the villagers marked as Ex.DW1/B.   He  submitted
that PW-3 had herself given an earlier statement in an enquiry conducted  by
the Superintendent of Police Mr. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa  that  she  had  made
the complaint against the appellants on someone’s instigation and  she  does
not want any action to be taken on her complaint.

7.    Mr. Parekh next submitted that the trial  court  and  the  High  Court
have held that the evidence of PW-3 has been corroborated  by  the  evidence
of PW-1 and PW-2  who  claimed  to  have  gone  to  the  Police  Station  on
10.02.1989 at 5.30 p.m. when PW-3 was released but  in  her  petition  dated
13.02.1989 to the Governor (Ex.PW-3/A) she has not mentioned that  PW-1  and
PW-2 were  present  when  she  was  released  at  the  intervention  of  the
Panchayat of village Paili, Otal Majarh and  Unaramour  on  10.02.1989.   He
submitted that the trial court and the High  Court,  therefore,  should  not
have relied on the corroboration of PW-1 and PW-2.

8.    Mr. Parekh next submitted that the trial  court  and  the  High  Court
ought to have considered the evidence led on  behalf  of  the  defence.   He
referred to the evidence of DW-2 as well as Ex.DW1/A  to  submit  that  PW-3
was released on 09.02.1989 itself.  He also referred to the evidence of  DW-
10, who has stated that PW-3 had returned home on 09.02.1989 at  about  9.00
p.m.  He submitted that the case of the prosecution is  that  PW-3  went  to
the civil hospital at Balachaur for her medical examination  and  thereafter
to the hospital at Saroa but the  doctors  of  the  two  hospitals  did  not
conduct the medical examination to avoid a conflict  with  the  police,  and
therefore the appellants examined the doctors of  the  two  hospitals  DW-11
and DW-12, and both DW-11 and DW-12 have denied that  PW-3  approached  them
for her medical examination.  Mr. Parekh vehemently submitted that there  is
thus no medical evidence to support the allegation of  rape  and  the  trial
court and the High Court could not have held the appellants  guilty  of  the
offence of rape.

9.    Mr. Parekh submitted that the main reason why the trial court and  the
High Court disbelieved the defence version  was  that  the  records  of  the
Police Station relating to the arrest of  PW-3  were  not  produced  by  the
appellants before the Court.  He submitted that in the  present  case  there
was no arrest of PW-3 at all and she was picked up  only  for  interrogation
and for this reason no records were maintained by the  Police  Station.   He
vehemently argued that the prosecution has not been able  to  establish  the
guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and hence they are  entitled
to acquittal.

10.   Learned counsel for the State Mr. Kuldip Singh submitted  that  it  is
not believable that PW-1, husband of PW-3 did not  accompany  the  Panchayat
to the Police Station for release of PW-3 on 10.02.1989.  He submitted  that
Ex. DW-1/A dated 09.02.1989 on which the  appellants  relied  on  for  their
case that PW-3 was released on 09.02.1989 itself has not been signed by  PW-
1, the husband of PW-3.  He referred to the evidence of  PW-3  to  show  how
she was tortured and raped  by  the  appellants  one  after  the  other  and
submitted that the evidence of PW-3 is believable.  He submitted that  PW-1,
the husband of PW-3  as  well  as  PW-2,  the  neighbour  of  PW-1  who  had
accompanied PW-1 to the Police Station  on  10.02.1989,  have  also  deposed
that soon after PW-3 was released from the Police Station she told them  how
she was humiliated and raped by the appellants  against  her  consent  after
taking liquor.  He submitted that the evidence of PW-3  as  corroborated  by
the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 was sufficient for the  trial  court  and  the
High Court to hold the appellants guilty  of  the  offences  under  Sections
323/34, 504/34 and 376 2(a) and 2(g), IPC and to hold  the  appellant  Radha
Krishan guilty also of the offence under Section 342, IPC.


Findings of the Court
11.   We have considered the contention of  Mr.  Parekh  on  behalf  of  the
appellants that PW-3 has sought  to  falsely  implicate  the  appellants  on
account of her close links  with  the  terrorists  and  on  account  of  the
pressure from the terrorists, but no  evidence  as  such  has  been  led  on
behalf of the defence to show that PW-3 has implicated the appellants  under
the influence of the terrorists.  Mr.  Parekh  relied  on  Ext.DW-1/B  dated
09.02.1989 said to have been signed by 32 villagers in which  it  is  stated
that the villagers believe that terrorists were frequenting the house of PW-
3 and staying in her house and  taking  their  meals  and,  therefore,  PW-3
should be brought and interrogated about those  terrorists,  but  Ext.DW-1/B
is no proof of the fact that PW-3 has made the allegations of  rape  against
the appellants on the pressure of the terrorists.  We have  also  considered
the submission of Mr. Parekh that PW-3 had herself given a statement in  the
inquiry conducted by the  Superintendent  of  Police,  Mr.  Harbhajan  Singh
Bajwa, that she had made the complaint against the appellants  at  someone’s
instigation and she does not want any action to be taken on  her  complaint.
 This statement of PW-3 is not substantive evidence before the Court and  at
best can be treated as a previous statement to  contradict  the  substantive
evidence of PW-3 given in Court.  Section 145 of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act
states that a witness may be cross-examined as to previous  statements  made
by him in writing or  reduced  into  writing,  and  if  it  is  intended  to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before  the  writing  can
be proved, be called to those parts of it which  are  to  be  used  for  the
purpose of contradicting him.  In the cross-examination of PW-3, a  question
was put whether S.P. Mr. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa  conducted  the  inquiry  and
recorded her statement and she has stated that he  did  conduct  an  inquiry
but she does not know what he had recorded.  She  has  further  stated  that
her signatures were obtained on the statement  but  she  knew  only  how  to
write her name and  cannot  read  or  write  Punjabi  except  appending  her
signatures.  In view of the aforesaid statement made by PW-3 in  her  cross-
examination, her statement recorded in the inquiry  conducted  by  S.P.  Mr.
Harbhajan Singh Bajwa cannot be used to  contradict  the  evidence  of  PW-3
given in Court.

12.   We have also considered the submission  of  Mr.  Parekh  that  in  the
petition  dated  13.02.1989  to  the  Governor  (Ex.PW-3/A),  PW-3  had  not
mentioned that PW-1 and PW-2 were present  when  she  was  released  at  the
intervention of the Panchayat of village Paili, Otal  Majarh  and  Unaramour
on 10.02.1989.  This statement of PW-3 in the petition dated  13.02.1989  is
not substantive evidence before the Court and  can  only  be  treated  as  a
previous statement to contradict the substantive evidence of PW-3  given  in
Court by putting a question to  PW-3  in  course  of  her  cross-examination
under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.  If such a  question  was  put
in the cross-examination, PW-3 would have got an opportunity to explain  why
she had not specifically stated in the  petition  dated  13.02.1989  to  the
Governor (Ex.PW-3/A) that her husband (PW-1) and the neighbour  (PW-2)  were
also present when she was released at the intervention of the  Panchayat  of
village Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour on 10.02.1989.  In absence  of  any
such question put to PW-3 in her  cross-examination,  the  omission  of  the
names of PW-1 and PW-2 in the petition  dated  13.02.1989  to  the  Governor
(Ex.PW-3/A) cannot be taken  as  contradictory  to  the  evidence  of  PW-3.
Hence, the evidence of PW-3 as well  as  that  of  PW-1  and  PW-2  that  on
10.02.1982, PW-1 and PW-2 were present when PW-3 was released at  4.30  p.m.
could not have been disbelieved by the Court.

13.    We have perused the depositions of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3  and  we  find
that the depositions of these three witnesses support the  findings  of  the
trial court and the High Court that PW-3 was not released at  6.00  p.m.  on
09.02.1989 but 4.30 p.m. on 10.02.1989.  As against the  evidence  of  PW-1,
PW-2 and PW-3, the appellants  examined    DW-1,  the  Head  Constable,  who
produced the record of Police  Station,  Balachaur  relating  to  FIR  No.13
dated 09.02.1989 and he has stated that the investigation of  the  case  was
conducted by the appellant-Radha Krishan, the then SHO  of  Police  Station,
Balachaur, and PW-3 was interrogated by him and  PW-3  was  handed  over  to
Shanker Singh, Maha Singh, Dhanpat, Sarpanch of village  Pillai  and  others
as per the document Ext.DW1/A dated 09.02.1989, but he has admitted  in  his
cross-examination that he has no personal  knowledge  of  the  investigation
and he did not know PW-3 and had just produced the record.   The  appellants
have also examined DW-2 and he has stated in his  examination-in-chief  that
he along with others who had  been  to  the  Police  Station  requested  the
appellant-Radha Krishan to release the two  ladies  in  case  they  were  no
longer required for interrogation and the  two  ladies,  PW-3  and  Kamaljit
Kaur, were released at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989 after getting a writing  from
them (Ext.DW1/A) to the effect  that  they  will  produce  them  before  the
police if need be at a future date.   In  cross-examination,  however,  DW-2
admitted that he did not know whether any entry was recorded at  the  Police
Station for calling the two ladies to  the  Police  Station,  Balachaur  and
whether any entry was recorded regarding their release and he was  also  not
aware whether Ext.DW1/A was recorded in the  Daily  Diary  Register  of  the
Police Station, Balachaur.    Additional M.H.C. Harminder  Singh  of  Police
Station, Balachaur was examined as DW-4 and he  produced  the  FIR  Register
containing the FIR No.13  dated  09.02.1989  of  Police  Station,  Balachaur
under Section 302/34, IPC and others and has  admitted  that  there  was  no
jimni specifically incorporating the facts of execution of Ext.DW1/A.    The
Head Constable Gurdev Dass of Police Station, Balachaur was examined as  DW-
9 and he has stated that he was posted in  Police  Station,  Balachaur  from
20.11.1988 to April, 1991 and his duty hours on  09.02.1989  and  10.02.1989
were from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. and  no  lady  by  the  name  of  PW-3  was
confined in the police lock up, but he has stated that he  has  not  brought
any record of Police Station, Balachaur and he has made the  statement  from
his memory only.  He has, however, admitted that entries were to be made  in
Daily Diary Register kept in the Police  Station  as  and  when  any  police
official leaves the Police Station or returns  to  the  Police  Station  and
similarly, if anybody other than police officials  enters  or  departs  from
the Police Station.  Thus,  except  the  document  Ext.DW1/A,  the  relevant
records of Police Station, Balachaur such as the Daily Diary  Register  were
not produced to support the  defence  case  that  PW-3  was  picked  up  for
interrogation on the morning of 09.02.1989 and was released at 6.00 p.m.  on
09.02.1989 and for this reason both the  trial  court  and  the  High  Court
rejected the defence case and instead believed the evidence  of  PW-1,  PW-2
and PW-3 that PW-3 was not released at 6.00  p.m.  on  09.02.1989,  but  was
detained during the night of 09.02.1989 and was released only  on  the  next
day in the evening on 10.02.1989.

14.   The aforesaid discussion  would  show  that  the  prosecution  adduced
evidence through PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 that PW-3 was  not  released  from  the
Police Station on 09.02.1989 at 6.00 p.m.,  but  was  actually  released  on
10.02.1989 at 4.30 p.m.  This evidence could be discarded by the Court  only
if reliable evidence was produced by the defence to establish that PW-3  was
actually released from the Police Station at 6.00 p.m. on  09.02.1989.   The
most relevant evidence to establish this defence  of  the  appellants  would
have been the records of the  Police  Station.   As  has  been  provided  in
Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, an  entry  in  any  public  or  other
official book, register or record or an electronic record,  stating  a  fact
in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge  of
his official duty, is itself a  relevant  fact.   The  Punjab  Police  Rules
provides that Register No. II shall be maintained in the Police Station  and
Rule 22.49 in Chapter 22 enumerates the matters to be  entered  in  Register
No. II. These include the following matters in clauses (c) and (h)  of  Rule
22.49, which are extracted hereinbelow:

           “(c) The hour of arrival and departure on  duty  at  or  from  a
           police station of all enrolled police officers of whatever rank,
           whether posted at  the  police  station  or  elsewhere,  with  a
           statement of the nature of their duty. This entry shall be  made
           immediately on arrival or prior to the departure of the  officer
           concerned and shall be attested  by  the  latter  personally  by
           signature or seal.


           Note. - The term Police Station will include all places such  as
           Police  Lines  and  Police  Posts  where  Register  No.  II   is
           maintained.”




           “(h) All arrivals at, and dispatches from, the police station of
           persons in custody, and all admissions to,  and  removals  from,
           the police station lock-ups, whether temporary or otherwise, the
           exact hour being given in every case.”


That the aforesaid matters are required to be maintained in the Daily  Diary
Register kept in the Police  Station  has  been  admitted  by  DW-9  in  his
evidence.  Thus, even if PW-3 was not arrested as contended by  Mr.  Parekh,
records were required to be maintained in  Police  Station,  Balachaur  with
regard to both the arrivals of the appellants and PW-3 and  their  departure
giving the exact hour of arrival and departure.  Moreover, if  Ex.DW1/A  was
to be treated as a genuine document, records of Police  Station,  Balachaur,
containing relevant entries ought to have been produced  by  the  appellants
to show that Ex.DW1/A was contemporaneously created  on  09.02.1989.   Since
the appellants did not produce the aforesaid records in their  defence,  the
trial court and the High Court acted  within  their  powers  to  reject  the
defence of the appellants and instead believe the  evidence  of  PW-1,  PW-2
and PW-3 that PW-3 was released only on 10.02.1989 at 4.30 p.m.

15.   We further find that the trial court and the High Court have  recorded the findings of rape committed by the appellants  on  PW-3  because  of  her consistent version in  her  petition  dated  13.02.1989  (Ext.P3/A)  to  the Governor made within a few days  of  her  release  from  Police  Station  on 09.02.1989, her complaint dated 25.07.1989 and her evidence in  Court.   

PW- 1, PW-2 and PW-3 have deposed  that  an  attempt  was  made  for  a  medical examination in the Civil Hospital, Balachaur, and the hospital at Saroa  
but the doctors refused to conduct the medical examination  on  account  of  the pressure from the appellant-Radha Krishan, 
but DW-11 and DW-12, the  doctors in the hospital, have denied that they had refused to  conduct  the  medical examination.  
The result is that there is no  medical  evidence  to  support the allegation of rape made  by  PW-3  against  the  appellants.   
The  High
Court, however, has held that  as  PW-3  was  not  a  young  woman,  medical examination was not significant and absence of medical examination  may  not be sufficient to disbelieve PW-3 if her story stands on its own.   
The  High
Court has found that she has  consistently  stated  in  her  petition  dated 13.02.1989 to the Governor of Punjab,  in  her  complaint  dated  25.07.1989 before the Magistrate and in her deposition in Court that she  was  detained in the night and raped by the appellants and 
both the trial  court  and  the
High Court have found that soon after  she  was  released  from  the  Police Station on  10.02.1989,  she  stated  before  her  husband  (PW-1)  and  the neighbour   (PW-2) that she had been raped by the appellants  and  that  she was bleeding profusely.  
The trial court  and  the  High  Court,  therefore,
have come to the finding of guilt of rape against the appellants relying  on the evidence of PW-3 as corroborated by the evidence  of  PW-1,  PW-2  under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act.

16.   Thus, the trial court and the  High  Court  have  recorded  concurrent findings of facts holding  the  appellants  guilty  of  the  offences  under Sections 323/34, 504/34, 376(2)(a) and  376(2)(g)  IPC  and  the  appellant- Radha Krishan guilty of the offence under Section  342  IPC  also.   
It  has
been repeatedly held by this Court that  even  though  the  powers  of  this Court under Article 136 of the  Constitution  are  very  wide,  in  criminal appeals this Court does  not  interfere  with  the  concurrent  findings  of facts,  save  in  exceptional  circumstances  where  there  has  been  grave miscarriage of justice
(Sri  Sambhu  Das  and  Another  v.  State  of  Assam [(2010) 10 SCC 374].
As we have  found  that  the  concurrent  findings  of
facts recorded by the trial court and the High Court in this case are  based
on legal evidence and there is no miscarriage of justice as such by the  two
courts while arriving at said findings, we are not inclined to  disturb  the
impugned judgment of the High Court in  exercise  of  our  discretion  under
Article 136 of the Constitution and we accordingly dismiss the appeal.


                                                               .……………………….J.
                                                               (A. K.
Patnaik)



                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                               (Gyan Sudha
Misra)
New Delhi,
July 04, 2013.


MERE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL INJURIES ON BODY OF VICTIM - IT CAN NOT BE SAID AS CONSENT PARTY TO SEX = In the absence of pleading in defence , no court can presume the same wrongly = We are of the considered opinion that as the appellant had not taken any defence of consent of PW-5, the trial court was not correct in recording the finding that there was consent of PW-5 to the sexual intercourse committed by the appellant ;When benifit of doubt arose = The settled position of law is that the prosecution is required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Hence, if the prosecution in a given case adduces evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court cannot acquit the accused on the ground that there are some defects in the investigation, but if the defects in the investigation are such as to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, then of course the accused is entitled to acquittal because of such doubt. In the present case, as we have seen, the evidence of PW-5 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and the FIR establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed rape on PW-5 and thus the appellant is not entitled to acquittal. 16. In the result, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the guilt recorded by the High Court against the appellant as well as the minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC imposed by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40522
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1118 of 2004
Ganga Singh …… Appellant
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh …..
Respondent
J U D G M E N T
A. K. PATNAIK, J.
This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article
136 of the Constitution against the judgment dated
26.06.2003 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior
Bench, in Criminal Appeal No.92 of 1990.
2. The facts very briefly are that the informant lodged
an oral complaint on 22.12.1987 at 6.00 P.M. at Mangraoul
Police Station, alleging that on 21.12.1987 at 6.30 P.M. in the
evening when she had gone to the field of Tilak Singh at
Page 2
Naya Kunwa to answer her natural call and was coming out
from the field, the appellant came and caught hold of her
and fell her down, gagged her mouth, lifted her petticoat and
committed rape.
She returned home and told her mother-inlaw about the incident and
on 22.12.1987 when her
husband, who works on a truck, returned home, she has
come to lodge the report in the police station. The police
registered the complaint as an FIR, got the informant
medically examined at 7.15 P.M. on the same day.
Dr. (Mrs.)
Kusumlata of Government Hospital, Seondha, opined that as
the informant is a married lady and was habitual to
intercourse, no definite opinion could be given on whether
she was subjected to any sexual intercourse. 
The petticoat
and vaginal smear slides (which were prepared and sealed)
were sent for further examination.
The police then
undertook the investigation, went to the place of occurrence
on 23.12.1987 and seized a blouse and a dhoti and got
prepared the map of the site of occurrence and after
recording statements of witnesses and completing the
investigation, submitted a charge-sheet against the
2
appellant under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code (for short
‘IPC’).
3. The appellant denied the charge and Session Trial
No.9/1988 was conducted by the Sessions Judge, Datia. At
the trial, the informant was examined as PW-5, who stood by
her story in her complaint, the seizure witness was examined
as PW-1, the mother-in-law was examined as PW-2, Dr.
Kusumlata was examined as PW-9 and the Investigating
Officer was examined as PW-10.
The Sessions Judge, after
considering the evidence on record held that 
as PW-5 did not obstruct or resist the appellant from doing the indecent act and no injury was caused on her person, PW-5 appears to have given her consent for the sexual intercourse and
acquitted the appellant of the offence under Section 376,
IPC, by judgment dated 30.11.1988.
4. The judgment of the Sessions Judge was challenged
before the High Court by the State of Madhya Pradesh in
Criminal Appeal No.92 of 1990. The High Court held in the
impugned judgment that PW-5 has categorically deposed
3Page 4
that the appellant had committed rape against her consent
and she had also deposed that she had informed her
mother-in-law after returning home and this fact has been
corroborated by her mother-in-law (PW-2) and, therefore,
there was no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW-5.
The High Court further held that merely because there were
some discrepancies in the deposition of PW-5, her testimony
cannot be treated as doubtful. 
The High Court concluded
that the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court was
totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on record and
set aside the judgment of acquittal and convicted the
appellant under Section 376, IPC, and sentenced him to
seven years rigorous imprisonment, which was the minimum
sentence for the offence of rape under Section 376, IPC.
5. At the hearing, Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned
Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant, submitted that
this Court has held
in Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of
Delhi) [(2012) 7 SCC 171]
that the prosecution has to prove
its own case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take
support from the weakness of the case of defence and hence
4Page 5
there must be proper legal evidence to record the conviction
of the accused. 
He also cited Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v.
State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 8 SCC 21] 
in which the qualities
of a ‘sterling witness’ have been described and it has been
held that the evidence of only a ‘sterling witness’ can be
accepted by the Court without any corroboration. He
submitted that in this case this Court further held that the
version of such a ‘sterling witness’ on the core spectrum of
the crime should remain intact in order to enable the Court
trying the offence to rely on such core version.
6. Mr. Mehrotra submitted that PW-5 was not such a
‘sterling witness’ and her version that the appellant
committed rape on her cannot be believed. He submitted
that PW-5 has falsely implicated the appellant in the offence
of rape on account of enmity between the appellant and the
husband of PW-5.
He contended that the Doctor (PW-9) in
her evidence as well as the medical examination report
(Ext.P-8) are clear that there were no external injuries on the
person of PW-5.
He submitted that PW-1, the seizure
witness, has clearly proved the seizure of bangles, dhoti and

a blouse from the field of Tilak Singh where the occurrence
was alleged to have been taken place and these articles
were seized in presence of PW-5 and yet PW-5 has omitted
to mention about the seizure of these articles from the place
of occurrence in her evidence. 
He finally submitted that the
FIR (Ext.P-9) was scribed by V.S. Rathod of the Police Chowki
and not by PW-10, the Investigating Officer. He argued that
in fact PW-10 went on leave from 23.12.1987 and made a
shoddy and defective investigation and hastily submitted a
charge-sheet against the appellant. He submitted that there
was, therefore, reasonable doubt in the prosecution case
and the appellant was entitled to be acquitted because of
such doubt.
7. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel appearing for
the State of Madhya Pradesh, submitted that the testimony
of PW-5 that the appellant forcibly committed rape on her by
felling her on the ground is corroborated by PW-2 before
whom she made a statement soon after the incident as well
as by the FIR (Ext. P-9) lodged by her to PW-10 one day after
the incident. This is, therefore, not a case where the finding
6Page 7
of guilt against the appellant recorded by the High Court is
on the sole testimony of PW-5 as argued by Mr. Mehrotra.
He cited Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. [(1995) 5 SCC 518] for
the proposition that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot
be put on par with an accomplice whose evidence needs to
be corroborated in material particulars.
He submitted that
the nature of evidence of the prosecutrix is such that no
corroboration is necessary and if the testimony of the
prosecutrix is trustworthy and totality of the circumstances
appearing on the record of the case disclose that the
prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely
implicate the person charged, the Court should ordinarily
have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. He submitted
that applying the aforesaid test to the evidence of PW-5 and
considering all other circumstances in this case, the High
Court was right in recording the conviction against the
appellant.
8. In reply to the submission of Mr. Mehrotra that the
medical evidence of PW-9 as well as the medical
examination report (Ext.P-8) did not disclose any injuries on
7Page 8
the person of PW-5, Mr. Dave cited the decision of this Court
in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 9]
in which even though there was no medical evidence to
corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix, this Court held
that such corroboration was not necessary where the
evidence of the prosecutrix was otherwise consistent and
stood corroborated by other circumstances and the FIR. In
reply to the contention of Mr. Mehrotra that the appellant
has been falsely implicated on account of enmity between
the husband of PW-5 and the appellant, he submitted that
PW-2 has very fairly stated in her evidence that there was
enmity between the two and yet has stated that the
complaint against the appellant has not been falsely made.
He submitted that a very strong circumstance against the
appellant is that after the incident on 21.12.1987 the
appellant absconded and he was arrested by the police after
ten days on 31.12.1987.
9. Mr. Dave submitted that the trial court has not
appreciated the meaning of the word ‘consent’ used in the
definition of ‘rape’ in Section 375, IPC. He cited State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Chhotey Lal [(2011) 2 SCC 550] for the
proposition that consent for the purpose of Section 375, IPC,
requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of
intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and
moral quality of the act as also after full exercise of the
choice between resistance and assent. He submitted that
the evidence of PW-5 clearly establishes that there was no
voluntary participation in the sexual intercourse by PW-5,
and on the contrary, PW-5 could not physically resist the
sexual intercourse forced on her by the appellant. He
submitted that the High Court therefore rightly held the
appellant guilty of the offence of rape and the finding of guilt
recorded by the High Court against the appellant should not
be disturbed by this Court in this appeal.
Findings of the Court
10. Mr. Mehrotra is right in his submission that burden is on
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant is guilty of the offence under Section 376, IPC and
this burden has to be discharged by adducing reliable
9Page 10
evidence in proof of the guilt of the appellant. In the present
case, the prosecution seeks to establish the guilt of the
appellant through the evidence of PW-5, the prosecutrix.
Law is well-settled that the prosecutrix is a victim of, and not
an accomplice in, a sex offence and there is no provision in
the Indian Evidence Act requiring corroboration in material
particulars of the evidence of the prosecutrix as is in the
case of evidence of accomplice. He submitted that the
prosecutrix is thus a competent witness under Section 118 of
the Indian Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the
same weight as is attached to an injured witness in cases of
physical violence 
[see State of Maharashtra vs.
Chandrapraksh Kewalchand Jain (1990) 1 SCC 550]. Keeping
this principle in mind, when we look at the evidence of PW-5,
we find that she has categorically stated that the appellant
fell her down, covered her mouth with one hand and
restricted her hands with other hand and lifted her petticoat
and committed rape on her. It is true that on her medical
examination the next day, PW-9 did not find any injury on
the person of PW-5, but PW-5 has explained that she fell on
10Page 11
her back in the agricultural field which had a smooth surface
and there were wheat and mustard crops in the field and this
could be reason for her not suffering injury.
11. According to Mr. Mehrotra, however, PW-5 is not a
reliable witness as she has made a significant omission in
her evidence by not stating anything about the seizure of the
blouse, dhoti and broken bangles which were made in her
presence. But we find that no question has been put to PW-
5 in cross-examination with regard to seizure of the blouse,
dhoti and broken bangles in her presence. If the appellant’s
case was that PW-5 cannot be believed because she made
this significant omission in her evidence, a question in this
regard should have been put to her during her crossexamination.
To quote Lord Herschell, LC in Browne vs.
Dunn [(1894) 6 R 67]:
“……it seems to me to be absolutely
essential to the proper conduct of a
cause, where it is intended to suggest
that a witness is not speaking the truth
on a particular point, to direct his
attention to the fact by some questions
put in cross examination showing that
the imputation is intended to be made,
and not to take his evidence and pass it
by as a matter altogether unchallenged,
and then, when it is impossible for him
to explain, as perhaps he might have
been able to do if such questions had
been put to him, the circumstances
which it is suggested indicate that the
story he tells ought not to be believed,
to argue that he is a witness unworthy
of credit.”
Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act also provides that
when a witness is cross-examined, he may be asked any
question which tend to test his veracity. Yet no question was
put to PW-5 in cross-examination on the articles seized in
her presence. In the absence of any question with regard to
the seizure of the blouse, dhoti and broken bangles in
presence of PW-5, omission of this fact from her evidence is
no ground to doubt the veracity of her evidence.
12. The evidence of PW-5, in this case, is also corroborated
by other evidence. Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act
provides that in order to corroborate the testimony of a
witness, any former statement made by such witness
relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact
took place, or before any authority legally competent to
12Page 13
investigate the fact may be proved. The evidence of PW-5 is
corroborated by the evidence of her mother-in-law (PW-2)
before whom she stated about the commission of the rape
by the appellant soon after the incident the very same
evening. The evidence of PW-5 is also corroborated by the
FIR (Ex.9) before the Investigating Officer, PW-10, before
whom she lodged the complaint one day after the incident.
13. Further, though the medical evidence of PW-9 and the
medical examination report Ex. P-8 do not give any definite
opinion on whether or not PW-5 suffered any sexual
intercourse, soon after the medical examination on
22.12.1987, the petticoat and vaginal smear slides (which
were prepared and sealed) were sent for further examination
and the report of State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. P-
15) confirms spots of semen and spermatozoa. This
evidence confirms that PW-5 had been subjected to sexual
intercourse some time before she lodged the complaint in
the police station on 22.12.1987. Hence, the forensic
evidence is not entirely in conflict with the evidence of PW-5
so as to belie her story that she was raped by the appellant.
13Page 14
14. We further find that the appellant has not taken a
defence in his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal
Procedure Code that the sexual intercourse was with the
consent of PW-5. Instead, he has denied having had any
sexual intercourse with PW-5 and has taken a stand that he
has been falsely implicated on account of a quarrel between
him and the husband of PW-5.
Yet, the trial court held that
there was proof of sexual intercourse between the appellant
and PW-5, but the sexual intercourse was with the consent of
PW-5. 
We are of the considered opinion that as the
appellant had not taken any defence of consent of PW-5, the
trial court was not correct in recording the finding that there
was consent of PW-5 to the sexual intercourse committed by
the appellant and
should have instead considered the
defence of the appellant that he had been falsely implicated
because of a quarrel between him and the husband of PW-5.
We have, however, considered this defence of the appellant
but find that except making a suggestion to PW-2, the
appellant has not produced any evidence in support of this
defence.
As PW-2 has denied the suggestion, we cannot
14Page 15
accept the defence of the appellant that he was falsely
implicated on account of a quarrel between the appellant
and the husband of PW-5.
15. We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr.
Mehrotra that the investigation by the police is shoddy and
hasty and there are defects in the investigation and
therefore benefit of doubt should be given to the appellant
and he should be acquitted of the charge of rape.
The
settled position of law is that the prosecution is required to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
by adducing evidence. 
Hence, if the prosecution in a given
case adduces evidence to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the court cannot acquit the
accused on the ground that there are some defects in the
investigation, but if the defects in the investigation are such
as to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, then
of course the accused is entitled to acquittal because of such
doubt. 
In the present case, as we have seen, the evidence
of PW-5 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and the FIR
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has

committed rape on PW-5 and thus the appellant is not
entitled to acquittal. 
16. In the result, we are not inclined to interfere with the
finding of the guilt recorded by the High Court against the
appellant as well as the minimum sentence of 7 years
imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC imposed
by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 
.……………………….J.
(A. K. Patnaik)
………………………..J.
(Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi,
July 04, 2013.