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Saturday, July 20, 2013

Price fixation Notifications dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th November, 2009 whereby the Government had fixed the prices of “Doxofylline formulations” in exercise of power conferred under paras 9 and 11 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘DPCO, 1995’ for short).= Bench affirmed the order dated 19th May, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C)No.10277 with W.P. (C)No.12958 of 2009 and dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellants. Learned Single Judge set aside the Notifications aforesaid and held that ‘Doxofylline’ is not a bulk drug within the meaning ascribed to it under para 2(a) of the DPCO, 1995. The Technical Committee decided to seek the experts opinion of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore (IISc for short) on whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a derivative of ‘scheduled bulk drug’ Theophylline. The IISc, Bangalore, vide their letter dated 23rd January, 2009, informed the appellants that ‘Doxofylline’, is in fact, a derivative of scheduled bulk drug - Theophylline. = In this view of the matter and having regard to the facts that we have held that Doxofylline is derivative of Theophylline, a bulk drug, and Doxofylline in any formulation comes within the definition of scheduled formulation, we hold that it is well within the jurisdiction of the Government to fix the ceiling price of Doxofylline formulation under para 9 or para 11 of DPCO, 1995. Therefore, interference with Notification (s) both dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th November, 2009 is uncalled for. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the judgments and orders dated 19th May, 2010 and 15th March, 2011 passed respectively by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court are set aside. The writ petitions preferred by the respondents in the High Court are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own cost.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40521
Page 1
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5117 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.11107 OF 2012)
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS
VERUS
M/S. SWISS GARNIER LIFE SCIENCES & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5118 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.11108 OF 2012)
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS
VERUS
M/S. MARS THERAPEUTICS AND
CHEMICALS LIMITED … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
Leave granted. These appeals are preferred by the Union of India
and others against the common judgment dated 15th March, 2011
passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in LPA No. 634 of
2010 with LPA No.790 of 2010.
 By the impugned judgment the DivisionPage 2
2
Bench affirmed the order dated 19th May, 2010 passed by the learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C)No.10277 with W.P.
(C)No.12958 of 2009 and dismissed the appeals preferred by the
appellants. 
2. The respondents filed the aforesaid 
two writ petitions challenging
the price fixation Notifications dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th
November, 2009 whereby the Government had fixed the prices of
“Doxofylline formulations” in exercise of power conferred under paras 9 and 11 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘DPCO, 1995’ for short).
Learned Single Judge set aside the
Notifications aforesaid and held that ‘Doxofylline’ is not a bulk drug within the meaning ascribed to it under para 2(a) of the DPCO, 1995.
3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
On 14th May, 2008 an article appeared in the Newspaper ‘THE
HINDU’, regarding the sale of ‘Doxofylline formulations’ as a part of tactics to replace less profitable price controlled products i.e. ‘Theophylline’ with huge profitable alternatives of the same class. 
The article captioned – ‘Drug companies chasing profits, cheating patients;
Costlier asthma drugs duck curb, hit market’ wherein the Editor of the Medical Journal, Monthly Index of Medical Specialties, Dr. C.M. Gulati, while giving various reasons for the real reason for ‘Doxofylline’ entry
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into the country, stated that ‘Doxofylline’ was being offered as a more profitable alternative to Theophylline. 
Further, by successive orders in
2006, all loopholes to sell Theophylline products at high profit margins have been closed by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), the body that monitors medicine prices in India. 
Therefore,
nearly all companies selling Theophylline formulations have been scouting for similar molecules outside the price control system irrespective of whether they are similar, better or even worse than their current brands. It was alleged that the core issue is profits, not patients.
4. In the light of aforesaid newspaper report and complex of
consideration implied in the DPCO, 1995, on 22nd July, 2008, the
appellants wrote to all the Doxofylline formulation manufactures asking
them to provide reasons as to why ‘Doxofylline’ should not be classified
as derivative of Theophylline.
Since the requisite information was not
furnished by the manufacturers /formulators, including the respondents
herein, and Industry Associations even after a lapse of substantial
time, and the matter being significant, they were once again reminded
by the appellants vide letter dated 16th September, 2008 to furnish the
reply latest by 30th September, 2008.
5. The matter was then considered by Technical Committee of the
NPPA(2nd appellant). 
The Technical Committee decided to seek the
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experts opinion of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore (IISc for
short) on whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a derivative of ‘scheduled bulk drug’ Theophylline. 
The IISc, Bangalore, vide their letter dated 23rd January,
2009, informed the appellants that ‘Doxofylline’, is in fact, a derivative of scheduled bulk drug - Theophylline. 
6. On the advice of the IISc, Bangalore, it was decided by the 2nd
appellant to fix the price of ‘Doxofylline formulations’. A letter dated
17th February, 2009 was addressed by 2nd appellant to all known
manufacturers of the Doxyfylline formulations seeking details of the
purchase price of the bulk drug ‘Doxofylline’ necessitated for fixation of
price of the ‘Doxofylline formulation’. 
As per provisions and paras 4 and 5 of the DPCO, 1995, all the
manufacturers of the bulk drugs are required to furnish details of manufacture, sales and cost of different bulk drugs including nonscheduled bulk drugs to the NPPA. 
However, none of the manufacturers
of the bulk drug ‘Doxofylline’ complied with the mandatory
requirement of DPCO provisions. 
In absence of the required information
from the manufacturers of bulk drug ‘Doxofylline’, 
2nd appellant
considered the price of the ‘Doxofylline’, based on best available
information in terms of para 11 of the DPCO, 1995.
Accordingly, the
prices of the ‘Doxofylline formulations’ were fixed by 2nd appellant vide Notification Nos.S.O.1124(E) and S.O.1084(E), both dated 30th April, 2009, as per the provisions of paras 9 and 11 of the DPCO, 1995.
7. The 2nd Appellant, vide their letter dated 14th May, 2009
requested the IISc, Bangalore for specific views of IISc on the issue as
to whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a salt or ester or stereo-isomer or derivative of the bulk drug Theophylline. 
8. In the meantime, the respondents, who are manufacturers of
‘scheduled formulations’ of ‘Doxofylline’, filed applications for review,
both dated 19th May, 2009 under para 22 of DPCO, 1995 against the
notifications aforesaid. 
Therefore, the appellants, vide their letter dated
25th May, 2009 addressed to the Director, National Institute of
Pharmaceutical Education and Research (NIPER), SAS Nagar, Punjab,
requested them to give expert advice as to 
whether the drug ‘Doxofylline’ was a new chemical entity/new drug or a derivative of Theophylline. 
The respondents were also given opportunity of hearing
on 9th June, 2009 to discuss the said review applications.
9. During the pendency of the review applications aforesaid, by
letter dated 28th May, 2009,
  the IISc clearly opined that ‘Doxofylline’ is
a ‘derivative’ of Theophylline. 
The Director, NIPER, Professor P. Rama Rao, vide his letter dated
1st June, 2009 also opined that:
“1. Drug Doxofylline is a new chemical entity/new drug.
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2. Drug Doxofylline is a derivative of Theophylline.”
Going through the review applications filed by the respondentscompanies and after giving them hearing, 1st appellant passed an order on 2nd July, 2009 directing 2nd appellant to consider the cost of raw material Doxofylline used in the formulations whose prices have been fixed by Notifications dated 30th April, 2009 in respect of the Doxofylline formulations either by obtaining the cost of Doxofylline from the respondents or by fixing the cost of Doxofylline by the authority.
10. Aggrieved by the review order dated 2nd July, 2009 passed in
review applications, the respondents approached the Delhi High Court
by filing writ petitions.
During the pendency of the writ petitions, 2nd
appellant requested the Pharma Industry Associations, i.e., Indian Drug Manufacturers’ Association (IDMA), Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) and the Indian Pharmaceutical Association and 8 known bulk drug manufacturers to send the cost details of Doxofylline bulk drug, within a stipulated period. 
A reminder was also issued on 31st August, 2009.
Twelve known manufacturers including
M/s Lupin Ltd. were requested on 11th August, 2009 to furnish the data
I Form-III for the fixation of price of Doxofylline.
Appellant No.2 also
requested the manufacturers on 9th October, 2009 to furnish the
detailed information in Form-III of the DPCO, 1995 in respect of the
revision in the price fixation of the Doxofylline based formulation.
11. In line with the review order of the Department of
Pharmaceuticals and in view of the fact that the prices of Doxofylline formulation were very high in the market, 2nd appellant decided that the prices of bulk drug Doxofylline may be fixed on the basis of available information under para 3 and para 11 of DPCO, 1995 to bring down the prevailing market price of Doxofylline based products for consumers/patients and also to provide a reasonable incentive to the manufacturers by giving a better price than that of Theophylline.
Vide Notification dated 17th November, 2009 upward price revision had been carried out, based on maximum sale price of Rs.1487/kg for the Doxofylline bulk drug (as against the earlier adopted price of Rs.512/kg based on notified price of bulk drug Theophylline) in respect of Doxofylline formulations including those which were fixed/notified on 30th April, 2009.
12. Subsequent notification was also challenged by the respondents
before the High Court and the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 19th May, 2010 allowed the writ petitions with cost of Rs.5,000/- in favour of the respondents which has been affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. 
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13. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing
for the appellants submitted as follows:
(a) Doxofylline is a bulk drug within the
meaning of para 2(a) of DPCO, 1995, therefore,
maximum sale price of such bulk drug can be notified
under para 3 and sale price of formulations based on
such bulk drug can be notified under para 9 of DPCO,
1995.
(b) Doxofylline is a derivative of Theophylline, it
comes within the meaning of bulk drug. The salts,
esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives of any bulk
drug also come within the meaning of para 2(a) of
DPCO, 1995.
(c) If the pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or
plant product conforms the requirement of Second
Schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, it also
applies to every salts, esters, stereo-isomers and
derivatives of pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or
plant product. But salts, esters, stereo-isomers and
derivatives of bulk drug need not require to be listed
separately in First Schedule of DPCO, 1995, if the
pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant product
is listed in the First Schedule. 
14. On behalf of the respondents the following broad contentions
were advanced:
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(1) Doxofylline is a new drug, and has been
considered as a new drug by the authority under Rule
122B of the D & C Rules. Doxofylline was previously a
patented drug (for which patent has now expired), and
therefore clearly meets the test of novelty etc. It
cannot, therefore, be considered a derivative of
Theophylline;
(2) Even if Doxofylline is considered to be a
derivative, it is not a bulk drug as it is not mentioned
in any official Pharmacopoeia. Under para 2(a) of
DPCO, even salts, esters, stereo-isomers and
derivatives must conform to the standards laid down
in Second Schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
(i.e., being listed in pharmacopoeia);
(3) Even if Doxofylline is considered as a bulk drug it
is not a ‘scheduled bulk drug’ within the meaning of
para 2(u) as it is not specified in the First Schedule of
DPCO. As such it is not amenable to price control; and 
(4) Doxofylline can only be tamenable to price
control if it meets the price criteria set out in para
22.7-2. “Span of Control” in the New Drug Policy of
1994. 
15. The contentions which found favour with the High Court are: 
(i) Doxofylline does not conform the pharmacopoeial or other
standards specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940. Therefore, Doxofylline could not be regarded as a ‘bulk drug’ on the dates on which the impugned judgment/notifications were issued.
(ii) The definition of ‘scheduled formulation’ [para 2(v) of the DPCO,1995] indicates that the expression - ‘scheduled formation’ refers to a formulation containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule either individually or in combination with other drugs etc. As Doxofylline is not specified in the First Schedule of DPCO, 1995, the Doxofylline formulation cannot be regarded as scheduled formulation and consequently would not be covered under para 9 of the DPCO,1995 for fixing the ceiling price for such formulation. 
(iii) Theophylline is not contained in the Doxofylline formulation either independently or in combination with other drugs. Therefore,
Doxofylline formulation contains Doxofylline and not Theophylline and for that Doxofylline formulations are not covered under the expression scheduled formulation appearing in para 2(v) of DPCO, 1995.
16. The High Court did not feel it necessary to go into the issue
whether the impugned Notifications were issued after satisfaction of the criteria specified in para 22.7-2 of the New Drug Policy.
17. The questions involved in these cases are:
(a)Whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a bulk drug within the meaning of
para 2(a) of DPCO, 1995; 
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(b)Whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a ‘schedule bulk drug’ within the
meaning of para 2(u) of DPCO, 1995 ; and
(c)Whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a “scheduled formulation” within
the meaning of para 2(v) of DPCO, 1995; and
(d)Whether the appellant has power to fix the ceiling price
or revise the price of Doxofylline under paras 9 and 10 of
DPCO, 1995 ? 
18. For determination of the above stated issues it is necessary at
this stage to notice the broad features of the DPCO, 1995, 
as discussed below: 
In exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government made order, namely, the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995. 
It repealed the earlier the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1987.
 It was so issued to control the prices of the essential drugs including life saving drugs. 
Para 2 is the definition clause. 
Bulk drug is defined in para 2(a) as under:
“2(a). ‘bulk drug’ means 
any pharmaceutical, chemical,
biological or plant product including its salts, esters, stereoisomers and derivatives, conforming to pharmacopoeial or
other standards specified in the Second Schedule to the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), and which is

used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation;”

Whereas para 2(f) defines “drug”, 
In this case, we are concerned
with para 2(f)(iii) which indicates “drug” includes “bulk drugs and formulations”. 
The same is quoted hereunder: 
2(f)(iii). “bulk drugs and formulations”
Then comes to what is defined as “formulation” in para 2(h) and
reads as follows:
“2(h).’formulation’ means a medicine processed out of, or
containing one or more bulk drug or drugs with or without
the use of any pharmaceutical aids, for internal or external
use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or
prevention of disease in human beings or animals, but shall
not include- 
(i) any medicine included in any bona fide
Ayurvedic (including Sidha) or Unani (Tibb)
systems of medicines;
(ii) any medicine included in the
Homoeopathic system of medicine; and
(iii) any substance to which the provisions of
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of
1940) do not apply;”
Para 2(u) defines ‘scheduled bulk drug” in the following manner:
“2(u) ‘scheduled bulk drug’ means a bulk
drug specified in the First Schedule;”
Whereas “scheduled formation” is defined in para 2(v) as follows:
“2(v) ‘scheduled formulation’ means a
formulation containing any bulk drug
specified in the First Schedule either
individually or in combination with other
drugs, including one or more than one
drug or drugs not specified in the First
Schedule except single ingredient
formulation based on bulk drugs specified
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in the First Schedule and sold under the
generic name;”
19. From the aforesaid definitions, 
we find that for the purpose of
coming within the meaning of bulk drug, pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant product including its salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives should conform to pharmacopoeial or other standards specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, 
while for the purpose of coming within the purview of “scheduled
bulk drug” within the meaning of para 2(u) or “scheduled formulation” within the meaning of para 2(v), 
it is not necessary to refer to the
Second Schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, 
the bulk drug is specified in the First Schedule of DPCO, 1995.
20. We will now move into para 3 which relates to power to fix the
maximum sale prices of bulk drugs specified in the First Schedule,
which reads as follows:
“3. Power to fix the maximum sale prices of
bulk drugs specified in the First Schedule.-
(1)The Government may, with a view to regulate the
equitable distribution and increasing supplies of a
bulk drug specified in the First Schedule and making
it available at a fair price, from different
manufacturers, after making such inquiry as it
deems fit, fix from time to time, by notification in the
Official Gazette, a maximum sale price at which such
bulk drug shall be sold: 
Provided that for the purpose of enquiry, in
addition to the information required to be furnished
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by the manufacturers under this Order, the
manufacturers shall provide any such additional
information as may be required by the Government,
and shall allow for inspection of their manufacturing
premises for verification through on the spot study of
manufacturing processes and faculties and records
thereof, by the Government.
(2)While fixing the maximum sale price of a bulk
drug under sub-paragraph (3), the Government shall
take into consideration a post-tax return of fourteen
per cent on net worth or a return of twenty-two
percent on capital employed or in respect, of a new
plant an internal rate of return of twelve per cent
based on long term marginal costing depending upon
the option for any of the specified rates of return that
may be exercised by the manufacturer of a bulk drug: 
Provided that where the production is from basic
stage, the Government shall take into consideration a
post-tax return of eighteen percent on net worth or a
return of twenty-six percent on capital employed : 
Provided further that the option with regard to the
rate of return once exercised by a manufacturer shall
be final and no change of rates shall be made without
the prior approval of the Government.
(3)No person shall sell a bulk drug at a price
exceeding the maximum sale price fixed under subparagraph (1) plus local taxes, if any: 
Provided that until the price of a bulk drug is fixed,
by the Government under sub-paragraph (1), the price
of such bulk drug shall be the price which prevailed
immediately before the commencement of this Order
and the manufacturer of such bulk drug shall not sell
the bulk drug at a price exceeding the price prevailing
immediately before the commencement of this Order.
(4)Where, after the commencement of this Order,
any manufacturer commences Production of any bulk
drug specified in the First Schedule, he shall within
fifteen days of the commencement of production of
such bulk drug, furnish the details to the Government
in Form I, and any such additional information as may
be required by the Government and the Government
may after receipt of the information and after making
such inquiry as it may deem fit, may fix the maximum

sale price of bulk drug by notification in the Official
15
Gazette.
(5)Any manufacturer, who desires revision of the
maximum sale price of a bulk drug fixed under subparagraph (1) or (4) or as permissible under subparagraph (3), as the case may be, shall make an
application to the Government in Form 1, and the
Government shall after making such inquiry, as it
deems fit within a period of four months from the date
of receipt of the complete information, fix a revised
price for such bulk drug or reject the application for
revision for reasons to be recorded in writing.”
In the present case, it is not necessary for us to go into the
details of para 4 and para 5 except to state that the manufacturers
producing “scheduled bulk drugs” are required to furnish details under
para 4 as per the said order to the Central Government. Similarly,
manufacturers of “non-scheduled bulk drugs” are also required to
furnish details as per para 5 to the Central Government.
We will now deal with the special provisions relating to “fixation
of price” as provided under para 9 and 11, which read as follows:
9. Power to fix ceiling price of Scheduled
formulations.- (1)Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Order, the Government may, from
time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette,
fix the ceiling price of a Scheduled formulation in
accordance with the formula laid down in paragraph
7, keeping in view the cost or efficiency, or both, of
major manufacturers of such formulation and such
price shall operate as the ceiling sale price for all
such packs including those sold under generic name
and for every manufacturer of such formulations.
(2)The Government may, either on its own
motion or on application made to it in this behalf by
a manufacturer in Form III or Form IV, as the case
may be, after calling for such information as it may
consider necessary, by notification in the Official
Gazette, fix a revised ceiling price for a Scheduled
formulation.
(3)With a view to enabling the manufacturers
of similar formulations to sell those formulations in
pack size different to the pack size for which ceiling
price has been notified under the sub-paragraphs (1)
and (2), manufacturers shall work out the price for
their respective formulation packs in accordance
with such norms, as may be notified by the
Government, from time to time, and he shall
intimate the price of formulation pack, so worked
out, to the Government and such formulation packs
shall be released for sale only after the expiry of
sixty days after such intimation.
Provided that the Government may, if it
considers necessary, by order revise the price so
intimated by the manufacturer and upon such
revision, the manufacturer shall not sell such
formulation at a price exceeding the price so revised.
Explanation - For the purpose of this
paragraph the "Scheduled formulation" includes
single ingredient formulation based on bulk drugs
specified in the First Schedule and sold under the
generic name.”
11. Fixation of price under certain
circumstances. - Where any manufacturer or
importer of bulk drug or formulation fails to submit
the application for price fixation or revision, as the
case may be, or to furnish information as required
under this Order, within the time specified therein,
the Government may, on the basis of such
information as may be available with it, by order fix a
price in respect of such bulk drug or formulation as
the case may be.”
21. First Schedule of the DPCO, 1995 indicates the ‘bulk drugs’
recognised by the Government. 
There are 75 Bulk Drugs shown therein.
At Serial No.34 “Theophylline” has been shown as one of the
bulk drugs for the purpose of para 2 and 3.
Doxofylline’ as such has
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not been shown as one of the bulk drugs in the First Schedule of the DPCO, 1995.
22. The Second Schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
provides “Standards to be complied with by imported drugs and
by drugs manufactured for sale, stocked or exhibited for sale
or distributed”. The class of drugs and the standards to be complied
with has been shown therein. For the purpose of the present case, we
would refer Item Nos.1 and 5 of the class of drug and standards to be
complied with, which read as under:

“THE SECOND SCHEDULE
(See sections 8 and 16)
STANDARDS TO BE COMPLIED WITH BY IMPORTED DRUGS AND BY
DRUGS MANUFACTURED FOR SALE, STOCKED OR EXHIBITED FOR
SALE OR DISTRIBUTED
Class of drug
Standard to be complied with
1. Patent or proprietary medicines
[other than Homoeopathic
medicines]
5. Other drugs-
(a) Drugs included in the
Indian Pharmacopoeia
The formula of list of ingredients
displayed in the prescribed manner
on the label or container and such
other standards as may be
prescribed.
Standards of identity, purity and
strength specified in the edition of
the Indian Pharmacopoeia for the
time being in force and such other
standards as may be prescribed.
In case the standards of identity,
purity and strength for drugs are not
specified in the edition of the Indian
Pharmacopoeia for the time being in
force but are specified in the editionPage 18
18
(b) Drugs not included in
the Indian
Pharmacopoeia but which
are included in the
official Pharmacopoeia
of any other country.
of the Indian Pharmacopoeia
immediately preceding the
standards of identity, purity and
strength shall be those occurring in
such immediately preceding edition
of the Indian Pharmacopoeia and
such other standards as may be
prescribed.
Standards of identity, purity and
strength specified for drugs in the
edition of such official Pharmacopoeia
of any other country for the time
being in force and such other
standards as may be prescribed. In
case the standards of identity, purity
and strength for drugs are not
specified in the edition of such official
Pharmacopoeia for the time being in
force, but are specified in the edition
immediately preceding the standards
of identity, purity and strength shall
be those occurring in such
immediately preceding edition of such
official Pharmacopoeia and such other
standards as may be prescribed.

23. According to the respondents ‘Doxofylline’ is a new drug; it is not
a ‘bulk drug’ as ‘Doxofylline’ is not mentioned in the official
pharmacopeia. Even salts, ester, stereo-isomers and derivatives of
Doxofylline do not conform to the standards laid down in the Second
Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. ‘Doxofylline’ cannot
be considered as a derivative of ‘Theophylline’.
24. In answer to this, the stand of the appellants is that ‘Doxofylline’
is derivative of Theophylline, therefore, by virtue of being a derivative,
ipso facto, is itself a bulk drug. Page 19
19
25. In view of such stand taken by the parties, it is necessary to
decide on the question whether the ‘Doxofylline’ is a derivative of
‘Theophylline’.
In reply to a letter written by the Department of Chemical and
Petro-Chemicals, Ministry of Chemical and Fertilizer, New Delhi dated
5
th December, 2008 in connection with Doxofylline as a derivative of
Theophylline, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore vide letter dated
23rd January, 2009 informed that Doxofylline, was in fact, a derivative
of scheduled drug Theophylline. The said letter is quoted herein:
“Dear Mr. Jagdish Kumar
Thank you for your letter of December 5, 2008 in
connection of Doxophylline as a derivative of
Theophylline a scheduled bulk drug under DPCO
1995.
I have gone through the structures of both the
compounds and the methods of preparation of
Doxophylline from Theophylline. My
recommendation is as follows.
While Doxophylline is a new compound it is prepared
by N-alkylation of Theophylline by treatment with 2-
boromethy -13- dioxalane. Instead of replacement of
hydrogen with methyl or ethyl or propyl group it is
being replaced by 1.3 dixalan 2-yl methyl group.
Therefore it should be considered as an N-alkyl
derivative of Theophylline.
My recommendation is that Doxophylline is a
derivative of scheduled drug Theophylline. If you
need any others clarification feel free to in tough
with me.
With kind regards (SD)
S. Chandrasekartan.”

26. The National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research
(NIPER) by its letter dated 1st June, 2009 informed as follows:
“After going through your letter and the
information as provided by Prof. A.K. Chakraborti, I
am of the opinion that:
1.Drug Doxofylline is a new chemical entity/new
drug.
2.Drug Doxofylline is a derivative of
Theophylline.”
27. The aforesaid opinions of the experts of Indian Institute of
Science (IISc), Bangalore, and Director, National Institute of
Pharmaceutical Education and Research (NIPER) have not been
disputed by the respondents.
28. In the present case, what we find is that the present stand taken
by the respondents is contrary to their stand taken before the
authorities while they applied for grant of registration of Doxofylline
400 mg. tablets. The record as enclosed by the respondent-Mars
Therapeutics Ltd. reveals the following facts:
(i) Application for grant of registration of Doxofylline 400 mg.
tabs. formulation was filed on 3rd October, 2003. Therein the
respondents enclosed a number of documents including reports
in its support. Item No.3 is “a copy of the letter from M/s. Suven
Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Hyderabad relating to supply of ‘Bulk
Drug Doxofylline’. This shows that the respondents had
knowledge that Doxofylline is a bulk drug.Page 21
21
(ii) In Form-44 the composition of the formulation of
Doxofylline 400 mg. as shown at Serial No.8 the active
ingredients and inactive ingredients as Annexure I and II and
which is specification and standard test procedures over ‘active
and inactive ingredients’. The analytical control schedule shows
that Doxofylline is the ingredient of Theophyllin and the relevant
portion of the same is extracted below:
“7-Theophyllin acetaldehyde <0.2%
Theophylline 2.91- 0.5%
Theophyllinemethyl – 1.3-dioxolane”
(iii) Under the heading denomination while common
denomination has been shown “Doxofylline” , which has been
mentioned as follows:
“Denomination
Common denomination Doxofylline
Systematic demonation : 2-7’ – Theophyllinemethyl-1,3-
dioxolane”
(iv) In Annexure II attached with Form 44 Chemical
Pharmaceutical information has been supplied therein. Chemical
information has been shown as follows:
“Name of the material/Code:Doxofylline Category:Finished
Formulation
Chemical Information
General Name Doxofylline
Chemical Name (s) 2-7’ –Theophyllinemethyl-1.3- dioxolane”
(v) On the Toxicological and Pharmacological (Pre-Clinical)
documentation of ‘Doxofylline’ has been shown in the expertPage 22
22
report enclosed with Form 44, relevant portion of which reads as
follows:
“1. INTRODUCTION
Doxofylline or 2(7’-theophyllinmethyl)-1.3”dioxolane is a
theophylline derivative with the following structural formula:
Doxofylline was synthesized with the aim of reducing the typical
theophylline side effects, without affecting antibronchospastic
and bronchodilator effects that are the main pharmacological
activities of methylxanthines useful for the therapy of asthma.”
From the expert opinion of IISc and NIPER which has been
submitted by the appellants, details enclosed by the respondent- Mars
Therapeutics Ltd. with their Form 44, and the stand taken in their

application for registration, we find and hold that Doxofylline is a
derivative of Theophylline.
29. The difference between ‘bulk drug’ [para 2(a) ], ‘scheduled bulk
drug’ [para 2(u)] and ‘scheduled formulation’ [para 2(v)] has already
been noticed in the preceding paragraphs. As per definition the bulk
drug should conform to the pharmacopoeial or other standards
specified in Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
On the other hand, to find out whether a drug is a ‘scheduled bulk
drug’ within the meaning of para 2(u) or ‘scheduled formulation’
within the meaning of para 2(v), one has to find out whether the bulk
drug is specified in the First Schedule of DPCO, 1995, individually or in
combination with other drugs.
30. Theophylline is a ‘bulk drug’ shown at Serial No.34 of the First
Schedule of DPCO, 1995. It is also not in dispute that Theophylline is
shown in the Indian pharmacopeia and conforms to the standard as
per Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
Therefore, Theophylline comes within the meaning of bulk drug as
defined in para 2(a) and also comes within meaning of ‘scheduled bulk
drug’ [para 2(u)] and ‘scheduled formulation’ [para 2(v)].
31. From the experts opinion of IISc, Bangalore and NIPER, Punjab
and opinion enclosed with the Form 44 submitted by the respondentMars Therapeutics Ltd., we have noticed and held that Doxofylline is a
derivative of Theophylline. In the preceding paragraph we have noticed
that Theophyline is a bulk drug, therefore, and by virtue of being
derivative of Theophylline, Doxofylline, ipso facto, is itself a bulk drug.
Where a certain “pharmaceutical, chemical, biological or plant
product”, i.e. the “base drug” satisfies the test laid down under para
2(a), its “salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives” are also
automatically included and to be treated as bulk drug in terms of para
2(a). Therefore, if the “base drug” conforms the requirement of Second
Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, it automatically
applies to every salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives of such
“base drug”.
32. As per Para 2(a) ‘bulk drug’ means any pharmaceutical, chemical,
biological or plant product including its salts, esters, stereo-isomers
and derivatives, conforming to pharmacopoeial or other standards
specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
, and which is used as such or as an ingredient in any formulation. The
words “includes also” in the context of definition of lease was
considered by this Court in State of Uttarakhand and others vs.
Harpal Singh Rawat, (2011) 4 SCC 575. If the ratio of the said case
is followed, we find and hold that the definition of “bulk drug”
contained in para 2(a) consists of two parts. The first part is applicable
to “base drug” i.e. any pharmaceutical, chemicals, biological or plant
product. The second part, which is inclusive, applies to salts, esters,
stereo-isomers and derivatives
of such “base drugs”. The use of the word “includes” implies that the
definition of bulk drug contained in para 2(a) is very wide and it not
only applies to the base drug but also ipso facto applies to its salts,
esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives. Page 25
25
33. In view of the definition of ‘bulk drug’ [para 2(a)] and our finding
as recorded above, we hold that if any pharmaceutical, chemical,
biological or plant product conforms to pharmacopeial or other
standards accepted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and
thus comes within the meaning of bulk drug, as defined in para 2(a), all
salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives of such bulk drug are, ipso
facto, deemed to be conforming to the pharmacopoeial or other
standards accepted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and are
deemed to be bulk drug within the meaning of para 2(a) of DPCO,
1995.
34. We have already held that Doxofylline is a derivative of
Theophylline and admittedly, Theophylline is a bulk drug shown in First
Schedule (Item No.34) of DPCO, 1995 and is conforming to
pharmacopoeial and other standards specified in the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act. We hold that Doxofylline is deemed to be a bulk drug
within the meaning of para 2(a) conforming to pharmacopoeial and
other standards specified in the Second Schedule to the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act. Further, in view of the definition of bulk drug [para
2(a)], Theophylline if used as such (i.e. Theophylline) or as an
ingredient (i.e. Doxofylline) in any formulation, it will deem to be a bulk
drug within the meaning under para 2(a).Page 26
26
35. ‘Scheduled bulk drug’ means a bulk drug specified in the First
Schedule of DPCO, 1995 [Para 2(u)]. Theophylline has been shown as
one of the scheduled drug at Serial No.34 of the First Schedule. In view
of our finding that Doxofylline is a derivative of Theophylline, we hold
that Doxofylline comes within the meaning of bulk drug as defined in
para 2(a) and also within the meaning of ‘scheduled bulk drug’ as
defined in para 2(u).
36. ‘Scheduled formulation’ is defined in para 2(v), means a
formulation containing any bulk drug specified in the First Schedule,
either individually or in combination with other drugs, including one or
more than one drug or drugs not specified in the First Schedule. In view
of the finding recorded above, Doxofylline being the derivative of
Theophylline, a bulk drug, and Doxofylline in any formulation having
held to be a bulk drug within the meaning of para 2(a), we hold that
Doxofylline also comes within the definition of scheduled formulation
under para 2(v).
37. Under sub-para (1) of para 9, notwithstanding anything contained
in DPCO, 1995, the Government is empowered to fix the ceiling price of
a scheduled formulation. In view of our finding that Doxofylline
formulation is a scheduled formulation as defined under para 2(v), we
hold that the Government was very well within its jurisdiction to fix the
ceiling price of Doxofylline formulation.
It is not the case of the respondents that ceiling price has not
been fixed as per formula laid down in para 7 keeping in view the cost
or efficiency or both of the major manufacturers of such formulation as
laid down in sub-para (1) of para 9. For the reason aforesaid, there was
no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the impugned
Notification Nos.S.O.1124(E) and S.O.1084(E), both dated 30th April,
2009 or Notification dated 17th November, 2009.
38. In the present case we have noticed that though the appellants
called for details from manufacturers of Doxofylline formulations by
letters dated 22nd July, 2008, 16th September, 2008, they failed to
furnish information as required under DPCO, 1995, within the time
specified therein. In view of such refusal to furnish the detailed
information, it was well within the jurisdiction of the Government to fix
price under para 11 on the basis of information as available with it, by
order fixing a price in respect of Doxofylline or its formulation.
39. In this case, we have noticed the news appeared in the
newspaper insinuating that drug companies were cheating patients, by
following a strategy by way of which, they would stop selling less
profitable, price controlled products and replacing them with highlyPage 28
28
profitable alternatives of the same class.
The article captioned – ‘Drug
companies chasing profits, cheating patients; Costlier asthma drugs duck curb, hit market’. 
Dr. C.M. Gulati have given various reasons for
Doxofylline entry into the country, stated that “ ‘Doxofylline’ has been offered as a more profitable alternative to Theophylline. Further, by successive orders in 2006, all loopholes to sell Theophylline products at high profit margins have been closed by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), the body that monitors medicine prices in India. 
Therefore, nearly all companies selling Theophylline formulations have been scouting for similar molecules outside the price control system irrespective of whether they are similar, better or even worse than their current brands” adds Dr. Gulati. On the basis of such report, the Government suo moto took the matter under para 11 of theDPCO, 1995, called for reports and opinion of experts and then fixed the price. 
40. In this view of the matter and having regard to the facts that we have held that Doxofylline is derivative of Theophylline, a bulk drug, and Doxofylline in any formulation comes within the definition of scheduled formulation, we hold that it is well within the jurisdiction of the Government to fix the ceiling price of Doxofylline formulation under para 9 or para 11 of DPCO, 1995. Therefore, interference with Notification (s) both dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th November, 2009 is uncalled for.
41. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the judgments and orders
dated 19th May, 2010 and 15th March, 2011 passed respectively by the
Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court are set
aside. The writ petitions preferred by the respondents in the High
Court are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own cost. 
………..………………………………………..J.
 (G.S. SINGHVI)
………………………………………………….J.
 (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 4, 2013

Friday, July 19, 2013

Therefore, a reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and Section 138 Evidence Act, insofar as it comes to the question of a criminal trial, the order of re-examination at the desire of any person under Section 138, will have to necessarily be in consonance with the prescription contained in Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, imperative that the invocation of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and its application in a particular case can be ordered by the Court, only by bearing in mind the object and purport of the said provision, namely, for achieving a just decision of the case as noted by us earlier. Therefore, the paramount requirement is just decision and for that purpose the essentiality of a person to be recalled and re-examined has to be ascertained. To put it differently, while such a widest power is invested with the Court, it is needless to state that exercise of such power should be made judicially and also with extreme care and caution.= We do not find any bonafides in the application of the second respondent, while seeking the permission of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for his re-examination by merely alleging that on the earlier occasion he turned hostile under coercion and threat meted out to him at the instance of the appellant and other accused. It was quite apparent that the complaint, which emanated at the instance of the appellant based on the subsequent incident, which took place on 30.5.2007, which resulted in the registration of the FIR in Khizersarai Police Station in case No.78/2007, seem to have weighed with the second respondent to come forward with the present application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., by way of an afterthought. If really there was a threat to his life at the instance of the appellant and the other accused, as rightly noted by the Court below, it was not known as to why there was no immediate reference to such coercion and undue influence meted out against him at the instance of the appellant, when he had every opportunity to mention the same to the learned trial Judge or to the police officers or to any prosecution agency. Such an indifferent stance and silence maintained by the second respondent herein and the categorical statement made before the Court below in his evidence as appreciated by the Court below was in the proper perspective, while rejecting the application of the respondents filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. In our considered opinion, the trial Court, had the opportunity to observe the demeanour of the second respondent, while tendering evidence which persuaded the trial Court to reach the said conclusion and that deserves more credence while examining the correctness of the said order passed by the trial Court. In the light of the above conclusion, applying the various principles set out above, we are convinced that the order of the trial Court impugned before the High Court did not call for any interference in any event behind the back of the appellant herein. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order impugned dated 9.12.2010, passed in Crl. M.P. 12454/2010 of the High Court is set aside. The order of the trial Court stands restored. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial. The stay granted by this Court in the order dated 7.3.2011, stands vacated. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage it was left and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40520
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013
(@ SLP (CRL.) No.2400 of 2011)
Rajaram Prasad Yadav ….Appellant
VERSUS
State of Bihar & Anr. ….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna, in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.
12454 of 2010, dated 9.12.2010.
3. By a short order dated 18.11.09, passed in Sessions Trial
No. 425 of 2009,
the trial Court disallowed the applications of the
Respondents filed under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.), to re-examine PW-9, the informant.
 The High
Court directed the trial Court to allow the 2nd Respondent to
examine himself as a witness on a specified date by its order
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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dated 9.12.2010.
4. To narrate the brief facts, the 2nd Respondent (PW-9), herein
filed a written complaint, alleging that on 07.07.1999, at about 5
p.m. in the evening, as regards the construction of a latrine in his
land in front of his house, a dispute arose as between him and his
brother Bindeshwar Yadav and that at the instance of his brother
Bindeshwar Yadav, his son Rajaram Yadav, brought a country
made pistol and fired at the 2nd respondent (PW-9) on the left side
of the back, whereafter he was taken to the hospital for
treatment.
5. At the instance of the second respondent, based on a
complaint dated 8.7.1999, a case in Crime No. 71 of 1999 was
registered in Khizersarai Police Station for the offences
punishable under Sections 324, 307 read with Section 34 Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and also under Section 27 of the Arms Act,
1959. Investigation was held and an injury report was brought on
record, in which the doctor opined that the injury was caused by
a hard blunt substance and was single in nature. It was stated
that the second Respondent (PW-9) was able to secure another
report later on.
6. The appellant was enlarged on bail on 13.10.1999. A charge
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sheet bearing No. 127 of 1999, dated 31.10.1999 was filed
against the appellant and the other accused for the offences
under Sections 324, 307 read with 34 of IPC.
Significantly, there
was no charge framed under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
Cognizance was taken and the case was committed and after
framing of the charges, the trial commenced. After the
examination of the other witnesses, the 2nd Respondent was
examined as PW-9 on 16.3.2007.
7. In his evidence, the 2nd Respondent (PW9), categorically
stated that he never gave any statement to the police; that
nobody beat him on the date of occurrence and that he was not
hit by any bullet. He further stated in his evidence that he
accidently fell into the hole of the latrine, while looking into it and that some instrument, which was lying inside the hole, caused the injury on his body.
As far as the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5,
namely, his sons, Babloo and Munna Kumar was concerned, the
2nd Respondent (PW9) stated that they were not present at the
place of occurrence, since Babloo was staying in a hospital at
Hulasganj and Munna Kumar was at Ranchi.
The evidence of the
prosecution was closed on 4.4.2007 and thereafter, the evidence
of the defense side stated to have commenced.
8. In the meantime, it is stated that yet another altercation
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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took place as between, the 2nd Respondent (PW9), his son Babloo
on the one side and the appellant and his father on the other
side, regarding the flowing of water from the latrine, constructed
by the 2nd Respondent into the field of the father of the appellant.
9. Pursuant to the said issue, it is stated that the father of the
appellant was beaten with bamboo sticks, injuring him seriously.
In connection with the said incident, Bindeshwar Yadav filed a
complaint before the police on 7.6.2007, leading to the
registration of the FIR on the same date in Khizersarai Police
Station in case No.78 of 2007. 
Subsequently, the second
respondent came forward with a petition dated 24.8.2007, 
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and sought for permission for his reexamination. 
For the same purpose, the Additional Public
Prosecutor also filed a petition on 5.12.2007, in the above
applications. 
The trial Court passed a common order on
18.11.2009, dismissing both the applications and posted the case
for evidence of investigation officers and the doctors on
18.12.2009.
The second respondent approached the High Court
by filing the present Criminal Misc. Case No.12454/2010, in which
the impugned order was passed by the High Court on 9.12.2010.
10. We heard Mr. Mohit Kumar Shah, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the first
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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respondent and Mr. Amlan Kumar Ghosh, learned counsel for the
second respondent. We also perused the order impugned, as
well as the order of the trial Court and other material papers
placed on record.
11. Mr. Mohit Kumar Shah, learned counsel for the appellant in
his submission contended that while the trial Court passed a
reasoned order after hearing both parties extensively, the
Hon’ble High Court passed the impugned order in the absence of
the appellant.
According to the learned counsel, the second
respondent even without impleading the appellant, persuaded
the High Court to pass the impugned order, which according to
the learned counsel is on the face of it, not sustainable under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. 
Learned counsel further contended that by
permitting the second respondent to get himself re-examined,
every attempt has been made to fill up the lacunae in the case of
the prosecution, which the High Court ought not to have
permitted.
According to the learned counsel, when the trial Court
had examined the pros and cons, while dealing with the prayer of
the second respondent, as well as the first respondent for reexamination of the second respondent and gave well-founded reasons for rejecting the applications, the High Court ought not to
have interfered with the same by passing a cryptic order.
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Learned counsel further contended that
 the application, which
came to be allowed by the High Court was vexatious and would
only encourage the malicious designs of the second respondent
to get over his own earlier version deposed before the Court,
which fully supported the case of the appellant. 
12. As against the above submissions, learned counsel for the
respondents contended that
as enormous powers are vested in
the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C., in the matter of examination
or re-examination of a witness in order to arrive at a just
conclusion and the High Court having exercised its powers in
pursuance of the said power, the order of the High Court does not
call for interference. 
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
and having bestowed our serious consideration to the issue
involved, we find force in the submission of the counsel for the
appellant, as the same merits acceptance.
In order to appreciate
the stand of the appellant it will be worthwhile to refer to Section
311 Cr.P.C., as well as Section 138 of the Evidence Act.
The
same are extracted hereunder:
Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure 
311. Power to summon material witness, or
examine person present:
Any Court may, at any
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under
this Code, summon any person as a witness, or
examine any person in attendance, though not
summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any
person already examined; and the Court shall
summon and examine or recall and re-examine any
such person if his evidence appears to it to be
essential to the just decision of the case.
Section 138, Evidence Act
138. Order of examinations- 
witnesses shall be first
examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so
desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him
so desires) re-examined.
The examination and cross-examination must
relate to relevant facts,
but the cross-examination
need not be confined to the facts to which the witness
testified on his examination-in-chief.
Direction of re-examination- 
The re-examination
shall be directed to the explanation of matters
referred to in cross-examination; and, 
if new matter is,
by permission of the Court, introduced in reexamination, 
the adverse party may further cross examine upon that matter.”
14. A conspicuous reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. would show
that widest of the powers have been invested with the Courts
when it comes to the question of summoning a witness or to
recall or re-examine any witness already examined.
A reading of
the provision shows that the expression “any” has been used as a
pre-fix to “court”, “inquiry”, “trial”, “other proceeding”, “person
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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as a witness”, “person in attendance though not summoned as a
witness”, and “person already examined”.
By using the said
expression “any” as a pre-fix to the various expressions
mentioned above, it is ultimately stated that all that was required
to be satisfied by the Court was only in relation to such evidence
that appears to the Court to be essential for the just decision of
the case.
Section 138 of the Evidence Act, prescribed the order
of examination of a witness in the Court.
Order of re-examination
is also prescribed calling for such a witness so desired for such
re-examination.
Therefore, a reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and
Section 138 Evidence Act, insofar as it comes to the question of a
criminal trial, the order of re-examination at the desire of any
person under Section 138, will have to necessarily be in
consonance with the prescription contained in Section 311 Cr.P.C.

It is, therefore, imperative that the invocation of Section 311
Cr.P.C. and its application in a particular case can be ordered by
the Court, only by bearing in mind the object and purport of the
said provision, namely, for achieving a just decision of the case
as noted by us earlier. 
The power vested under the said
provision is made available to any Court at any stage in any
inquiry or trial or other proceeding initiated under the Code for
the purpose of summoning any person as a witness or for
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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examining any person in attendance, even though not summoned
as witness or to recall or re-examine any person already
examined. Insofar as recalling and re-examination of any person
already examined, the Court must necessarily consider and
ensure that such recall and re-examination of any person,
appears in the view of the Court to be essential for the just
decision of the case.
Therefore, the paramount requirement is
just decision and for that purpose the essentiality of a person to
be recalled and re-examined has to be ascertained. 
To put it
differently, while such a widest power is invested with the Court,
it is needless to state that exercise of such power should be
made judicially and also with extreme care and caution.
15. In this context, we also wish to make a reference to certain
decisions rendered by this Court on the interpretation of Section
311 Cr.P.C. where, this Court highlighted as to the basic
principles which are to be borne in mind, while dealing with an
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. In the decision reported in
Jamatraj Kewalji Govani vs. State of Maharashtra - AIR 1968
SC 178, this Court held as under in paragraph 14:-
“14. It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction,
statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be
exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a
witness or examine one present in court or to recall a
witness already examined, and makes this the duty
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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and obligation of the Court provided the just
decision of the case demands it. In other words,
where the court exercises the power under the second
part, the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has
brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but
whether the court is right in thinking that the new
evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the
case. If the court has acted without the
requirements of a just decision, the action is
open to criticism but if the court's action is
supportable as being in aid of a just decision
the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the
jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis added)
16. In the decision reported in Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs.
Union of India and another - 1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 271, this
Court again highlighted the importance of the power to be
exercised under Section 311 Cr.P.C. as under in paragraph 10:-
“10….In order to enable the court to find out the truth
and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of
Section 540 of the Code (Section 311 of the new
Code) are enacted whereunder any court by
exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of
enquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any
person as a witness or examine any person in
attendance though not summoned as a witness or
recall or re-examine any person in attendance though
not summoned as a witness or recall and re-examine
any person already examined who are expected to be
able to throw light upon the matter in dispute;
because if judgments happen to be rendered on
inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of
facts, the ends of justice would be defeated.”
17. In the decision in Raj Deo Sharma (II) vs. State of Bihar
- 1999 (7) SCC 604, the proposition has been reiterated as under
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in paragraph 9:-
“9. We may observe that the power of the court as
envisaged in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure has not been curtailed by this Court.
Neither in the decision of the five-Judge Bench in A.R.
Antulay case nor in Kartar Singh case such power has
been restricted for achieving speedy trial. In other
words, even if the prosecution evidence is closed in
compliance with the directions contained in the main
judgment it is still open to the prosecution to invoke
the powers of the court under Section 311 of the
Code. We make it clear that if evidence of any
witness appears to the court to be essential to
the just decision of the case it is the duty of the
court to summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person.”
(Emphasis added)
18. In U.T. of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Anr. vs.
Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan - 2006 (7) SCC 529, the
decision has been further elucidated as under in paragraph 15:-
“15. A conspectus of authorities referred to above
would show that the principle is well settled that
the exercise of power under Section 311 CrPC
should be resorted to only with the object of
finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof
of such facts which lead to a just and correct
decision of the case, this being the primary duty of
a criminal court. Calling a witness or re-examining a
witness already examined for the purpose of finding
out the truth in order to enable the court to
arrive at a just decision of the case cannot be
dubbed as “filling in a lacuna in the prosecution
case” unless the facts and circumstances of the case
make it apparent that the exercise of power by the
court would result in causing serious prejudice to the
accused resulting in miscarriage of justice.”
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19. In Iddar & Ors. vs. Aabida & Anr. - AIR 2007 SC 3029, the
object underlying under Section 311 Cr.P.C., has been stated as
under in paragraph 11:-
“11. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is
that there may not be failure of justice on account of
mistake of either party in bringing the valuable
evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the
statements of the witnesses examined from either
side. The determinative factor is whether it is
essential to the just decision of the case. The
section is not limited only for the benefit of the
accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the
powers of the court to summon a witness under the
section merely because the evidence supports the
case for the prosecution and not that of the accused.
The section is a general section which applies to all
proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and
empowers Magistrate to issue summons to any
witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or
enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that
occurs is ‘at any stage of inquiry or trial or other
proceeding under this Code’. It is, however, to be
borne in mind that whereas the section confers
a very wide power on the court on summoning
witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be
exercised judiciously, as the wider the power
the greater is the necessity for application of
judicial mind.”
(Emphasis added)
20. In P. Sanjeeva Rao vs. State of A.P.- AIR 2012 SC 2242,
the scope of Section 311 Cr.P.C. has been highlighted by making
reference to an earlier decision of this Court and also with
particular reference to the case, which was dealt with in that
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decision in paragraphs 13 and 16, which are as under:-
“13. Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to
prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial,
observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector
of Customs, Amritsar (2000) 10 SCC 430. The
following passage is in this regard apposite:
“In such circumstances, if the new counsel thought to
have the material witnesses further examined, the
Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in
the interest of justice, particularly when the
court has unbridled powers in the matter as
enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all
the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts
should afford the opportunity to them in the
fairest manner possible.”
16. We are conscious of the fact that recall of the
witnesses is being directed nearly four years after
they were examined-in-chief about an incident that is
nearly seven years old. Delay takes a heavy toll on the
human memory apart from breeding cynicism about
the efficacy of the judicial system to decide cases
within a reasonably foreseeable time period. To that
extent the apprehension expressed by Mr. Rawal, that
the prosecution may suffer prejudice on account of a
belated recall, may not be wholly without any basis.
Having said that, we are of the opinion that on a parity
of reasoning and looking to the consequences of
denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses,
we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant
getting an opportunity rather than protecting the
prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost.
Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct
in our judicial system and no price is too heavy
to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to
prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one
that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to
the accused to defend himself.”
(Emphasis added)
21. In a recent decision of this Court in Sheikh Jumman vs.
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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State of Maharashtra - (2012) 9 SCALE 80, the above referred
to decisions were followed.
22. Again in an unreported decision rendered by this Court
dated 08.05.2013 in Natasha Singh vs. CBI (State) – Criminal
Appeal No.709 of 2013, where one of us was a party, various
other decisions of this Court were referred to and the position has
been stated as under in paragraphs 14 and 15:
“14. The scope and object of the provision is to
enable the Court to determine the truth and to render
a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and
obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just
decision of the case. Power must be exercised
judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any
improper or capricious exercise of such power may
lead to undesirable results. An application under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. must not be allowed only to fill up
a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the
defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to
cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused,
or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party.
Further the additional evidence must not be received
as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the
case against either of the parties. Such a power must
be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely
to be tendered by a witness, is germane to the issue
involved. An opportunity of rebuttal, however, must
be given to the other party.
The power conferred under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
must, therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order
to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid
reasons, and the same must be exercised with great
caution and circumspection.
The very use of words such as ‘any Court’, ‘at
any stage’, or ‘or any enquiry’, trial or other
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’
clearly spells out that the provisions of this section
have been expressed in the widest possible terms,
and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way.
There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be
obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.
The determinative factor should, therefore, be
whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness
is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case.
15. Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure,
and it is the duty of the court to ensure that such
fairness is not hampered or threatened in any manner.
Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the
victim and of the society, and therefore, fair trial
includes the grant of fair and proper opportunities to
the person concerned, and the same must be ensured
as this is a constitutional, as well as a human right.
Thus, under no circumstances can a person’s right to
fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support
of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of such right
would amount to the denial of a fair trial. Thus, it is
essential that the rules of procedure that have been
designed to ensure justice are scrupulously followed,
and the court must be zealous in ensuring that there
is no breach of the same. (Vide Talab Haji Hussain v.
Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar & Anr., AIR 1958 SC
376; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh & Anr. v. State of
Gujarat & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3114; Zahira Habibullah
Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 2006 SC
1367; Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) v. M.S. Sampoornam
(Mrs.) (2007) 2 SCC 258; Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P.
& Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 136; and Sudevanand v. State
through C.B.I. (2012) 3 SCC 387.)”
23. From a conspectus consideration of the above decisions,
while dealing with an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. read
along with Section 138 of the Evidence Act, we feel the following
principles will have to be borne in mind by the Courts:
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a) Whether the Court is right in thinking that the
new evidence is needed by it? Whether the
evidence sought to be led in under Section 311 is
noted by the Court for a just decision of a case?
b) The exercise of the widest discretionary power
under Section 311 Cr.P.C. should ensure that the
judgment should not be rendered on inchoate,
inconclusive speculative presentation of facts, as
thereby the ends of justice would be defeated.
c) If evidence of any witness appears to the Court
to be essential to the just decision of the case, it
is the power of the Court to summon and
examine or recall and re-examine any such
person.
d) The exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
should be resorted to only with the object of
finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof for
such facts, which will lead to a just and correct
decision of the case.
e) The exercise of the said power cannot be dubbed
as filling in a lacuna in a prosecution case, unless
the facts and circumstances of the case make it
apparent that the exercise of power by the Court
would result in causing serious prejudice to the
accused, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
f) The wide discretionary power should be
exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily.
g) The Court must satisfy itself that it was in every
respect essential to examine such a witness or to
recall him for further examination in order to
arrive at a just decision of the case.
h) The object of Section 311 Cr.P.C. simultaneously
imposes a duty on the Court to determine the
truth and to render a just decision.
i) The Court arrives at the conclusion that
additional evidence is necessary, not because it
would be impossible to pronounce the judgment
without it, but because there would be a failure
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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of justice without such evidence being
considered.
j) Exigency of the situation, fair play and good
sense should be the safe guard, while exercising
the discretion. The Court should bear in mind
that no party in a trial can be foreclosed from
correcting errors and that if proper evidence was
not adduced or a relevant material was not
brought on record due to any inadvertence, the
Court should be magnanimous in permitting such
mistakes to be rectified.
k) The Court should be conscious of the position
that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners
and the Court should afford an opportunity to
them in the fairest manner possible. In that
parity of reasoning, it would be safe to err in
favour of the accused getting an opportunity
rather than protecting the prosecution against
possible prejudice at the cost of the accused. The
Court should bear in mind that improper or
capricious exercise of such a discretionary
power, may lead to undesirable results.
l) The additional evidence must not be received as
a disguise or to change the nature of the case
against any of the party.
m) The power must be exercised keeping in mind
that the evidence that is likely to be tendered,
would be germane to the issue involved and also
ensure that an opportunity of rebuttal is given to
the other party.
n) The power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must
therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order
to meet the ends of justice for strong and valid
reasons and the same must be exercised with
care, caution and circumspection. The Court
should bear in mind that fair trial entails the
interest of the accused, the victim and the
society and, therefore, the grant of fair and
proper opportunities to the persons concerned,
must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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well as a human right.
24. Keeping the above principles in mind, when we examine the
case on hand, at the very outset, it will have to be stated that the
High Court, while passing the impugned order has completely
ignored the principal objectives with which the provision under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. has been brought into the statute book. As
rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, at the
foremost when the trial was very much in the grip of the trial
Court, which had every opportunity to hear the appellant, the
State, as well as the second respondent, had not even bothered
to verify whether the appellant, who was facing criminal trial was
impleaded as a party to the proceedings in the High Court. A
perusal of the order discloses that the High Court appears to
have passed orders on the very first hearing date, unmindful of
the consequences involved. The order does not reflect any of the
issues dealt with by the Learned Sessions Judge, while rejecting
the application of the respondents in seeking to re-examine PW-
9, the second respondent herein. Though orders could have been
passed in this appeal by remitting the matter back to the High
Court, having regard to the time factor and since the entire
material for passing final orders, are available on record and
since all parties were before us, the correctness of the order of
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the Sessions Judge dated 18.11.2009, can be examined and final
orders can be passed one way or the other in the present criminal
appeal itself.
25. With that view, when we examine the basic facts, we find
them as noted by the learned trial Judge being indisputably
contrary to the complaint preferred by the second respondent on
8.7.1999, in the police station in case No. 71/1999, wherein
offences under Section 324/307/34 IPC were reported alongwith
Section 27 of the Arms Act. Based on the report of the doctor, the
chargesheet came to be filed bearing No.127/99, dated
31.10.1999, under Sections 324/307/34 IPC and no charge under
Section 27 of the Arms Ac was laid. The said case was put to trial
and parties were participating. In the course of the trial, the turn
of examination of PW-9, the second respondent came on
16.3.2007, nearly after eight years from the date of occurrence.
Second respondent made a categorical statement in his evidence
that he never made any statement to the police nor was he
beaten on the date of occurrence, nor was he hit by any bullet
shot. Further he made a clear statement that the injury
sustained by him was due to the fall into the hole dug for
constructing a latrine, where some instruments caused the injury
sustained by him. He also made a categorical statement that his
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sons PWs-4 and 5, Babloo and Munna Kumar, were not present at
the place of occurrence since one was staying in a hostel in
Hulasganj and the other was at Ranchi on the date and time of
occurrence, namely, on 07.07.1999, at about 5 p.m. While the
said version of the second respondent was stated to have been
recorded by the Court below on 16.3.2007, and the evidence of
the prosecution was stated to have been closed on 4.4.2007, the
defence evidence seem to have also commenced.
26. In that scenario, the second respondent filed the present
application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on 24.8.2007, i.e., nearly
after five months after his examination by the trial Court. While
filing the said application, the second respondent claimed that his
evidence tendered on 16.3.2007, was not out of his own free will
and volition, but due to threat and coercion at the instance of the
accused persons, including the appellant. It was contended on
behalf of the second respondent that the accused persons posed
a threat by going to the extent of eliminating him and that such
threat was meted out to him on 15.3.2007, when he was
kidnapped from his wheat field by the accused, along with two
unknown persons.
27. The trial Court having examined all the above factors in its
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order dated 18.11.2009, has held as under:
“….Either at the time of his evidence in Court or
subsequent to his evidence he never made any
complaint to the court or any other officer viz. the
C.J.M. or any police officer that accused persons had
yielded any pressure upon him to turn hostile to the
prosecution and to give a go by to the prosecution
case. He has also argued that he did not also file any
affidavit or case in this regard. Rather when on the
basis of the information dated 30.5.2007 given by the
accused Bindeshwar Yadav Khizersarai Police Station
case No.78/2007 dated 7.6.2008 was registered by
the police the informant Suresh Prasad has filed this
petition and has also got the similar petition filed
through the Additional Public Prosecutor which has got
no legs to stand and the same is fit to be rejected. He
also filed a photocopy of the FIR to Khizersarai Police
Station case No.78/2007 in support of his argument.”
28. After noting the above submissions made on behalf of the
accused, the trial Court held as under:
“….After the evidence of the informant, Suresh Prasad
(PW-9) on 16.03.2007 the Court of Addl. Sessions
Judge, F.T.C.-5 closed the evidence of prosecution on
04.04.2007 after giving opportunity to the learned
Addl. P.P. to produce the remaining witness on
26.03.2007 and 04.04.2007 which he could not do on
the ground that the time limited by the Hon’ble Court
has expired. The Lordships of Supreme Court have
held in Dohiyabhai Vs. State, AIR 1964 SC 1563 that
“Right to re-examine a witness arises only after the
conclusion of cross examination and S.C. 138 says it
shall be directed to the explanation of any part of his
evidence given during cross examination which is
capable of being construed unfavourably too his own
side. The object is to give an opportunity to reconcile
the discrepancies if any between the statements in
examination in chief and cross examination or to
explain any statement inadvertently made in cross
examination or to remove any ambiguity in the
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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deposition or suspicion cast on the evidence by cross
examination. Where there is no ambiguity or where
there is nothing to explain, question put in reexamination with the sole object of giving a change to
the witness to unto the effect of the previous
statement should not be asked during re-examination
(S.142). Section 154 is wide in its scope and court can
permit a person calling a witness to but question in
the nature of cross examination at the stage of reexamination provided it take care to give opportunity
to the adverse party to cross examine the witness in
the such case”.
It is clear from the afore quoted
principles decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court and from
the evidence of PW-9 as well as from the instant two
aforesaid petitions filed on behalf of the PW-9 and the
Additional P.P. that the cross examination of PW-9
does not contain any evidence against his evidence in
chief which could be explained or made clear by reexamination of PW-9 through his re-examination vide
Section 138 Evidence Act or Section 311 of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
It is also clear that PW-9 had
filed petition after filing of the case against him by the
accused. As such the two instant petitions are not
maintainable.
However, whether the hostility of PW-9
would have been tested on the touch stone of Section
145 Evidence Act by examining the I.O. as some other
prosecution witness have supported the prosecution
case.
The evidence of the I.O. of the case is taken
would have sufficed the end of justice.”
29. We find that the factors noted by the trial Court and the
conclusion arrived at by it were all appropriate and just, while
deciding the application filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
We do
not find any bonafides in the application of the second
respondent, while seeking the permission of the Court under
Section 311 Cr.P.C. for his re-examination by merely alleging that on the earlier occasion he turned hostile under coercion and
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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threat meted out to him at the instance of the appellant and
other accused. 
It was quite apparent that the complaint, which
emanated at the instance of the appellant based on the
subsequent incident, which took place on 30.5.2007, which
resulted in the registration of the FIR in Khizersarai Police Station in case No.78/2007, seem to have weighed with the second respondent to come forward with the present application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., by way of an afterthought.
 If really there
was a threat to his life at the instance of the appellant and the
other accused, as rightly noted by the Court below, it was not
known as to why there was no immediate reference to such
coercion and undue influence meted out against him at the
instance of the appellant, when he had every opportunity to
mention the same to the learned trial Judge or to the police
officers or to any prosecution agency. 
Such an indifferent stance
and silence maintained by the second respondent herein and the
categorical statement made before the Court below in his
evidence as appreciated by the Court below was in the proper
perspective, while rejecting the application of the respondents
filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. 
In our considered opinion, the
trial Court, had the opportunity to observe the demeanour of the
second respondent, while tendering evidence which persuaded
Criminal Appeal No. of 2013
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the trial Court to reach the said conclusion and that deserves
more credence while examining the correctness of the said order
passed by the trial Court. 
30. In the light of the above conclusion, applying the various
principles set out above, we are convinced that the order of the
trial Court impugned before the High Court did not call for any
interference in any event behind the back of the appellant herein.
The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order impugned dated
9.12.2010, passed in Crl. M.P. 12454/2010 of the High Court is set
aside. The order of the trial Court stands restored. The trial
Court shall proceed with the trial. The stay granted by this Court
in the order dated 7.3.2011, stands vacated. The trial Court shall
proceed with the trial from the stage it was left and conclude the
same expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date
of receipt of the copy of this order.
……...............................................J.
[T.S. Thakur]
…………….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
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July 04, 2013

3 contradictory Dying declarations not proved free and fair , not proved the contents were read over and explained , not proved who recorded the translated version from Telugu to Kannada =- ends in acquittal =. Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration. But before it can be acted upon, the same must be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully. Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be accepted on their face value. Caution, in this behalf, is required to be applied.” In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12), she (deceased) stated that her husband instigated her to pour kerosene on her body, therefore, she poured the kerosene on her body and her husband further poured kerosene on her and put on fire using a match box. In the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22), she (deceased) stated that her husband along with Laxmi poured kerosene on her body and put on fire by using match stick. In the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29), she (deceased) stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the match stick and thrown upon her body. Apart from the contradictions, the credibility of three dying declarations (Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29) is to be doubted. In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12) dated 14th January, 2000 the thumb impression of victim has been shown. Whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22) taken on the same day, i.e, 14th January, 2000 and the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29) given on the next day, i.e., 15th January, 2000, the victim had stated that she had not given her signatures since her hand was completely burnt. Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), who signed the Ex.P.22, in his cross-examination stated that he was not aware whether Neelamma (deceased) was talking in Telugu. Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who signed Ex.P.12, in his cross-examination specifically stated that he can understand Kannada but does not know Telugu language and that Neelamma was talking in Telugu language. Padmavathi (PW-8), mother of the deceased, in her crossexamination stated that Neelamma (deceased) was not knowing the correct writing the Telugu. But she was writing some Telugu. The prosecution has failed to state as to why three dying declarations were recorded in Kannada, if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu. It has also not made clear as to who amongst the Tehisldar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has signed in Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out. On careful perusal of the materials on record, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the prosecution in this case has established its case beyond reasonable doubt to base a conviction on the appellant. Hence, we are of the opinion that both the courts below have erred in coming to the contra conclusion. 28. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and conviction recorded by the courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant, who is in jail, is directed to be released forthwith.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40519
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 175 OF 2007
KASHI VISHWANATH … APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
The appellant, who is accused No.1, by this appeal has challenged the
judgment dated 27th July, 2004 in Criminal Appeal No.347 of 2001 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High
Court affirmed the conviction and sentenced imposed by the trial court under
Section 498-A and 302 read with 34 IPC. So far as accused No.2 is concerned, the
High Court acquitted her of all the charges levelled against her.
2. The appellant along with other accused faced charges punishable under
Section 498-A and 302 read with 34 IPC. The First Additional Sessions judge,
Dharwad, sitting at Hubli by his judgment dated 1st February, 2001 in Sessions
Case No.119 of 2000, acquitted accused No.2 under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. of thePage 2
2
offences under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC but convicted accused Nos.1 and 3
under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. for the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 read
with Section 34 IPC. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
one year by each and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- by each, in default to undergo
further rigorous imprisonment for one month, for offence under Section 498-A
IPC. They were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay find of
Rs.2,000/- by each, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months
by each for the offence under Section 302 IPC.
In appeal, the High Court by its judgment dated 27th July, 2004 allowed the
appeal in part. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions
Judge as against accused No.1 (first appellant before the High Court) for the
offence under Section 498-A and 302 read with 34 IPC was confirmed giving rise
to this appeal and as against accused No.2 (second appellant before the High
Court), she was acquitted of all the charges levelled against her.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, as unfurled before the trial court is as
follows:
The deceased, Neelamma (alias Leelamma) got married to the appellant
herein 13 years prior to the incident. The date of the incident is 14th January, 2000.
Out of the wedlock, they have two sons and a daughter and they were all living at
Mantur Road, Ambedkar Colony, Hubli. According to the prosecution, thePage 3
3
relationship between the husband and wife was cordial till two years prior to the
incident. The disruptions started in the family on account of the appellant
developing intimacy with one Lakshmi, who was accused No.3 and was the second
appellant before the High Court. In this regard, in spite of intervention of the
family members of the parental house of the deceased and persistent resistance of
the deceased, the said affair of intimacy continued. There used to be bickering and
quarrels between the husband and wife in this regard. Though accused No.2, the
mother of the appellant was living with them, she never tried to patch up the
differences between the husband and wife. Ultimately, on 14th January, 2000, at
about 10.00 a.m. in the matrimonial home of the deceased, accused Nos.1 and 3
doused deceased Neelamma and set her ablaze while accused No.2 was watching
outside. On the same day in the afternoon, she was shifted to K.M.C. Hospital,
Hubli and on admission, the Hospital authorities intimated the police who came
into picture at about 9.30-10.00 p.m. in the night. Prior to that, the Taluka
Executive Magistrate, PW-10, recorded her statement as per Ex.P.12. One more
statement, Ex.P.22 – dying declaration, came to be recorded by Rayappa, Police
Sub Inspector (PW-23), in the form of complaint in the presence of Dr. Bhimappa
(PW-22) and during the course of treatment, deceased Neelamma succumbed to
burns on 18th January, 2000 at about 6.15 p.m. On 15th January, 2000, at about 5.30
p.m., Ashok (PW-24), the Investigation Officer recorded the dying declaration
Ex.P.29 in the presence of Dr. Komal Prasad (PW-25). On the basis of Ex.P.22,Page 4
4
investigation of the case commenced as against accused No.1 to 3. The kith and kin
of the deceased are examined as Pullayya (PW.5) - maternal uncle; Eliya (PW-6) –
father; Grasamma (PW-7) – maternal aunt; Padmavathi (PW-8) – mother and
Prabhudas (PW-9) – uncle of the deceased. The purpose of examining these
witnesses was to establish harassment, motive and oral dying declaration
implicating accused Nos.1 to 3. The independent witnesses, who were the
neighbours of the appellant i.e. Mansuresh (PW-11), Savakka (PW-13),
Kanechanamma(PW-14), (M. Saloman)PW-15 and Perumal (PW-16) were also
examined. Unfortunately, none of them have supported the case of the prosecution.
4. Ex.P.1, is the spot mahazar drawn in the kitchen of the matrimonial home of
the deceased where burnt clothes, burnt gunny bag, match box, match stick, a
kerosene stove, kerosene can were found. PW-2 and PW-3 were examined to
support the contents of Ex.P.2 to Ex.P.6 – mahazars seizing caste certificate and
marriage certificate revealing the relationship and the case of the deceased and
accused Nos.1 and 2. Ex.P.3 is the recovery of bed sheet alleged to have been used
by accused No.2 to extinguish the fire. Letters i.e. Ex.P8 & Ex.P9 alleged to have
been written by the appellant to the wife and parents in law, Ex.P.5 is the seizure
mahazar of letters (Exs.P.10 to P.11) alleged to have been written by the deceased
to her parents aunt and uncle and lastly Ex.P.6 is mahazar seizure of photographs
of the deceased revealing the burns. Peshalal (PW.4) was examined to speak thePage 5
5
inquest over the dead body as per Ex.P.7 but turned hostile. Prabhakar (PW.21) was
also turned hostile. Dr. Radha (PW.17) was the Doctor at the casualty ward in
K.M.C. Hospital who entered the details in M.L.C. register and the relevant
document is at Ex.P.18. Dr. Jagadish (PW-18), conducted autopsy on the dead body
and issued Ex.P.19, the postmortem report opining that the death of the deceased
Neelamma was due to septicemia as a result of burns. Ex.P.20 is the sketch drawn
by PW-19. Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22) is the Head of Department of the Burns Ward in
whose presence Rayappa (PW-23), PSI, Bendigeri P.S., Hubli recorded the
complaint as per Ex.P.22 on 14th January, 2000 and sent FIR to the Court.
5. As noticed above, the learned Sessions Court based on the oral and
documentary evidence held accused No.1 and 3 guilty of the offence punishable
under Section 498-A and 302 read with 34 IPC. Accused No.2 mother-in-law of the
deceased was acquitted of all the charges levelled against her.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution absolutely
failed to establish any of the charges, much less, the charge under Section 302 IPC
in view of four dying declarations brought on record which are contrary to each
other. It was further contended that the oral declarations made before the kith and
kin of the deceased are not at all important or relevant in the light of the four dying
declarations. According to the learned counsel, the contents of Ex.P.18, Ex.P.12,
Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29, if looked into carefully, would indicate the purpose of soPage 6
6
many dying declarations coming into existence i.e. only to ensure that all the
accused are somehow roped in. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance
on the decisions of this Court in Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf vs. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 112, etc. which will be referred to in this judgment at
the appropriate stage.
7. In reply, learned counsel for the State submitted that Ex.P.18 was not a dying
declaration but the entries in the M.L.C. Register made immediately on the
admission of the patient to the Hospital. Ex.P.12 was the actual dying declaration
recorded by the Taluka Executive Magistrate (PW-10). Ex.P.22 was a complaint
recorded by Rayappa, PSI (PW-23), in the presence of Dr. Bhimappa (PW.22) and
further investigation was taken up. Therefore, the contents of Ex.P.12, according to
the counsel for the State have to be taken into consideration which is the earliest
dying declaration. He further contended that Ex.P.29 is more reliable because after
treatment for almost a day, when the patient was physically and mentally fit, the
same came to be recorded.
8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant also raised doubt
relating to contents of Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29, the three dying declarations
which were originally recorded in Kannada. According to the learned counsel for
the appellant, the deceased had no knowledge of Kannada language and could
speak only Telugu. Page 7
7
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through
the entire material placed before us.
10. The kith and kin of the deceased who examined are: as Pullayya (PW.5) -
maternal uncle, Eliya (PW-6) – father, Gracemma (PW-7) – maternal aunt,
Padmavathi (PW-8) – mother and Prabhudas (PW-9) – uncle of the deceased. Their
deposition corroborates the case of the prosecution that one or two years prior to
the death of the deceased, everything seemed to be cordial between the husband
and wife (deceased). After the appellant joined the Railway services on
compassionate ground after the death of his father, the bickering and quarrel
commenced because of developing intimacy with a co-worker by name Lakshmi
who was the third accused. Ex.P.8 to P.11 are inland letters produced by the uncle
and father of the deceased, PW-5 and PW-6 and the letters pertaining to the year
1995 written by the deceased which say that except some harassment and illtreatment, there was no serious harassment to the deceased at the hands of her
husband and mother-in-law of the deceased. The letter written in the year 1999
only would indicate that on account of the appellant developing intimacy with
Lakshmi, he ill-treated and harassed her to the maximum extent possible. Accused
No.2, mother-in-law was only a spectator. This was her complaint or depression
recorded in her letters written to the kith and kin.
11. When we look into the statement of independent witnesses produced by the
prosecution, who are neighbours of the appellant i.e. Mansuresh (PW-11), Savakka
(PW-13), Kanechanamma(PW-14), (M. Saloman)PW-15 and Perumal (PW-16), we
find that none of them have supported the case of the prosecution.
12. In this case, we have noted that there is no eye-witness to the incident in
question. The prosecution primary relies on three dying declarations Ex.P.12,
Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29. In support of those Exhibits the prosecution relied on the
statements of Tahsildar, Hubli (PW-10), Dhanjaya Kumar, PG student (PW-20)
present at the time of arrival of Maharudrappa, Tahasildar (PW-10) to the Burns
Ward. Dr. Radha (PW-17) who examined the deceased, Dr. Jagdish (PW-18), who
was working as Medical Officer on 14th January, 2000 and conducted the
postmortem, Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), in whose presence Ex.P.22 was recorded,
Rayappa (PW-23), PSI, Bendigeri Police Station, Crime Branch, Hubli who
recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P.22) and registered the case, Dr. Komal Prasad
(PW-25), in whose presence Ex.P.29 was recorded, etc.
In Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC
112, having noticed multiple dying declarations this Court held:
“7. Conviction can indisputably be based
on a dying declaration. But before it can
be acted upon, the same must be held to
have   been   rendered   voluntarily   and
truthfully.   Consistency   in   the   dying
Page 9
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declaration   is   the   relevant   factor   for
placing full reliance thereupon. In this
case,   the   deceased   herself   had   taken
contradictory   and   inconsistent   stand   in
different   dying   declarations.   They,
therefore,   should   not   be   accepted   on
their   face   value.   Caution,   in   this
behalf, is required to be applied.”
13. We will now examine the contents of three different dying declarations i.e.
Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 and the related prosecution witnesses who deposed in
support of such dying declarations.
Maharudrappa (PW-10), Tahasildar, Hubli recorded dying declaration
Ex.P.12, at 8.30 p.m. on 14th January, 2000 in Ward No.202, The deceased stated
that she was conscious to give answer the questions. She got married with the
appellant at the age of 26 years, about 13 years back. She had two sons and one
daughter. She was a housewife and her husband was working in Railways and used
to come home once in a week. She was staying at Mantur Road, Ganesh Pet, Hubli.
She stated that she had been brought at KMC Hospital, Hubli by her mother-inlaw, Smt. Polamma by auto rickshaw, after she being sustained burn injuries at
about 8.30 a.m. in her residence. At about 12 p.m. she had been admitted there for
treatment by her mother-in-law. Her husband had not come to see her after the
incident. Her mother-in-law was accompanying her in the Hospital. She further
stated that her husband (appellant herein) had illicit relations with one Lakshmi.
Every week he used to come home and for one or the other reason, used to fight
and beat her ruthlessly. Her mother-in-law used to keep quiet without objecting for
such acts of her son. It is stated in Ex.P.12 on the said date (14th January, 2000) at
about 8.30 a.m., when her children had gone out of the residence, her husband
had a fight with her and instigated her to pour kerosene upon her body. She
poured the kerosene on her body and her husband further poured kerosene
upon her and put on fire with match box. At that time her mother-in-law was
out of the residence. When the flame was catching her sari and burning her body,
her husband has not tried to douse the fire. Neighbouring people rushed to her
residence on hearing her screams and doused the fire by pouring water. Thereafter,
her mother-in-law had brought her to the Hospital by auto and admitted for
treatment. Both her husband and Lakshmi are responsible for her condition. In the
bottom of the Ex.P.12 where thumb impression of the victim is taken it is written
“read over and accepted to be correct".
14. The Tahasildar (PW-10) in his statement stated that while he was working as
Tahasildar in Hubli, on 14th January, 2000 at 7.25 p.m., he received a requisition
from Town Police Station, Hubli, to record dying declaration of Neelamma wife of
Kashi Vishwanath Murari. He had recorded the dying declaration of the said
Neelamma on 14th January, 2000 from 8.30 p.m. to 9.00 p.m. Doctor opined that
she was in condition to give dying declaration. He put the questions to NeelammaPage 11
11
and she answered. After recording it, it was read over to her. Admitting its
contentions she put her thumb impression on it and Doctor also singed. Dying
declaration is marked at Ex.P.12, and the signatures of witness is marked at
Ex.P.12(a).
15. Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who was working as P.G. student in K.M.C.
Hubli stated that on 14th January, 2000 at about 8.30 p.m. Tahasildar, Hubli came to
K.M.C. Ward No.202. He was on duty there. The Tahasildar asked him about the
patient’s condition. He examined the patient and she was fit to give statement. The
Tahasildar recorded the statement of the injured and he examined again and found
her alright. He was present when Tahasildar recorded the statement of the injured.
He had also signed on that statement. The signatures of the witness are marked at
Ex.P.12(b) and the certificate of the witness is marked at Ex.P.12(c). In the crossexamination he stated that Dr. A.S. Bekanalkar, Unit Chief did not give anything in
writing asking him to be present and examine the injured lady. The Tahasildar,
Hubli did not give requisition in writing with a request to be present there and
examine that injured lady. He has not given in writing separately about the fitness
condition of injured Neelamma. From 8.00 a.m. he was on duty in Ward No.202 of
K.M.C. on 14th January, 2000. He had not given treatment to Neelamma but his
colleague had given treatment. On Ex.P.12, it is not specifically written that
Neelamma was examined twice. He specifically, stated that he can understand
Kannada language. He does not know Telugu language. Neelamma was
talking in Telugu language. He further stated that it is incorrect to suggest that at
that time Neelamma was not in fit condition.
16. The second dying declaration is Ex.P.22 recorded by the PSI, Bendigeri P.S.,
Hubli at 9.45 p.m. on 14th January, 2000. In the said dying declaration, the
deceased disclosed her name and address as Neelamma @ Lilamma w/o Kashi
Vishwanath of Mantoor Road, Ambedkar Colony, Hubli. She along with her
husband-Kashi Vishwanath, mother-in-law-Polamma, and her children-Sandya,
Prasanna and Naveen were staying at home. Her husband had illicit and immoral
relation with one Laxmi, who has been working as sweeper in Railways. Her
husband and mother-in-law used to quarrel with her and on 14th January, 2000 at
about 10.00 a.m. her husband started quarreling with her at the behest of
Laxmi and along with Laxmi poured Kerosene on her body and put on fire by
using match stick. She further stated that she could not put her signatures since
her hand was completely burnt. In the bottom of it, it was mentioned that dying
declaration was “read over and accepted to be correct”
17. Rayappa, PW.23, PSI, Bendigeri, P.S. Hubli who recorded dying declaration
Ex.P.22 stated that while he was working as PSI, Bendigeri Crime Branch on 14th
January, 2000 as the Police Inspector gave an order and directed me to go to
K.M.C. and record statement of Neelamma. He went to KMC Hubli at 9.45 p.m.Page 13
13
and gave the order to the Doctor. Doctor opined that she was in condition to give
statement. He recorded the statement of Neelamma in the presence of Doctor. The
statement is Ex.P.22. He has signed on it and Doctor has also signed on Ex.P.22.
18. Dr. Bhimappa (PW.22), Medical Officer, District Hospital Bagalkot stated
that on 14th January, 2000 he was Medical Officer in K.M.C., Hubli. On 14th
January, 2000 he was on duty in K.M.C. Bendigeri Police recorded the statement
of injured. The statement is marked at Ex.P.22. It bears his signatures at Ex.22(a).
The injured was in a position to give statement. Ex.P.22 was recorded in his
presence. In cross-examination he accepted that the Police Officer of Bendigeri
P.S. had not given any requisition in writing requesting him to be present while
recording such statements. He further accepted that on Ex.P.22 he had not endorsed
that Neelamma was in fit condition to give statement. He further stated that he
was not aware whether Neelamma was talking in Telugu.
19. Padmavathi (PW-8), coolie by occupation, is the mother of Neelamma. She
stated that after marriage of the appellant and her daughter, Neelamma, their
relationship was good, later appellant used to complain that Neelamma had not
brought any dowry. Neelamma was complaining that she was ill treated and
harassed by the appellant and he was intending to marry another woman. They
convened a Panchayat and advised the appellant. Even after advice harassment was
continued. Her daughter was beaten 2-3 times, and she left her matrimonial homePage 14
14
and resided with her mother. The appellant took her back to his house. The
appellant was suspecting her daughter. She stated that Pullayya had phoned her
about the incident. She along with her husband, son-in-law came to Hubli. When
they went to K.M.C. Neelamma was talking properly, when they asked Neelamma
she told that accused No.1(appellant) to 3 closed the door of the house, accused
No.3 poured kerosene and accused No.1 set her on fire. Accused No.2, mother-inlaw was outside the house, closing the door. During her cross-examination, PW-8,
specifically stated that Neelamma did not know correct writing in Telugu but
she used to write some Telugu. She had some written letters which have been
given to the police. She does not know that those letters were written by
Neelamma or not.
20. The contents of the third dying declaration – Ex.P.29 was recorded by the
Bendigeri Police on 15th January, 2000 in the presence of Dr. Komal Prasad (PW-
25), a P.G. student in KMC, Hubli. In the said dying declaration (Ex.P.29),
deceased Neelamma stated that she had been residing at the above-mentioned
address, i.e., Mantur Road, Ambedkar Colony, Hubli along with her husband,
mother-in-law, Polamma, and three children. She was a house wife. Her husband
Vishwanath was working in SNI Division, Railways at present employed at Karat.
Often he visited the house. Two days prior i.e. Thursday, 13th January, 2000, she
was confronted and slapped on the right cheek by one Laxmi of Mantur Road,
Hanchandra Colony, who had illicit relation with her husband. She returned to her
house having decided to inform about the incident to her husband. She had
informed her husband about the incident when he came to house at 7.30 p.m. on
the same day. Then he had scolded, thrashed her by saying that why you had
spoken to Laxmi. She kept quiet. Next morning i.e. Friday, 14th January, 2000
while she was cleaning the utensils, her husband came along with Laxmi, and
thrashed her by saying that what can she do if he kept Laxmi in the said
house. Then he dragged her inside the house and closed the door. Her motherin-law also supported her husband and went outside. At that time Laxmi was
inside the house. Her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the
match stick and thrown on her body, due to the flames, fire spread all over her
body, she rushed outside the house screaming for help. Then neighbours and
workers who were at site came and doused the fire by wrapping her body with
blanket. After being scolded by the neighbours her mother-in-law had taken
her to KMC Hospital by auto. The incident took place at around 10.00 a.m.
She further stated that she had been harassed and tormented quite often by
her husband and mother-in-law since one year and Laxmi was responsible for
the said incident. She further stated that she could not put her signatures since
her hand was burnt. Her children had been to school at the time of the
incident. Below the dying declaration it was written that the same was “read
over & accepted to be correct”.
Page 15
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Hanchandra Colony, who had illicit relation with her husband. She returned to her
house having decided to inform about the incident to her husband. She had
informed her husband about the incident when he came to house at 7.30 p.m. on
the same day. Then he had scolded, thrashed her by saying that why you had
spoken to Laxmi. She kept quiet. Next morning i.e. Friday, 14th January, 2000
while she was cleaning the utensils, her husband came along with Laxmi, and
thrashed her by saying that what can she do if he kept Laxmi in the said
house. Then he dragged her inside the house and closed the door. Her motherin-law also supported her husband and went outside. At that time Laxmi was
inside the house. Her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the
match stick and thrown on her body, due to the flames, fire spread all over her
body, she rushed outside the house screaming for help. Then neighbours and
workers who were at site came and doused the fire by wrapping her body with
blanket. After being scolded by the neighbours her mother-in-law had taken
her to KMC Hospital by auto. The incident took place at around 10.00 a.m.
She further stated that she had been harassed and tormented quite often by
her husband and mother-in-law since one year and Laxmi was responsible for
the said incident. She further stated that she could not put her signatures since
her hand was burnt. Her children had been to school at the time of the
incident. Below the dying declaration it was written that the same was “read
over & accepted to be correct”.
21. Dr. Komal Prasad (PW-25), in his statement stated that on 15th January, 2000
he was on duty in K.M.C. Hubli. Bendigeri Police Officer had come to KMC on
15th January, 2000 and asked his opinion about the fit condition of one Neelamma
injured to give statement. He examined her, and stated that she was in fit condition
to give statement. Police Officer recorded her statement in his presence and he had
also signed on that statement. The statement is Ex.P.29. The signature of witness is
marked at Ex.P.29(a). The statement was recorded at 5.25 p.m. In his crossexamination, he stated that Neelamma had sustained burn injuries nearly 90 to 95
per cent. She was admitted on previous day and it was 1 ½ day when he gave his
opinion. She was given with sedative injunction.
22. Dr. Radha (PW.17), Assistant Surgeon, KMC, Hubli, in her deposition stated
that she was working as Medical Officer in KMC, Hubli. On 14th January, 2000 at
11.45 a.m., she examined one Neelamma wife of Kashi Vishwanath Murari,
who had sustained burn injuries.
The history is self afflicted burns due to a
quarrel at home at 11 a.m. with her husband. 
Patient was conscious. 
On
examination she noticed superficial deep burns over the lower part of face, lower
half of chest and abdomen.
Both the upper limbs and both the lower limbs were
also burnt, sparing the face, neck, upper part of chest, parts of back in patches,
groin and soles of the feet. She had sustained burn injuries from 70 to 75 per cent.
Eye brows and hair of Neelamma were singed.
She was admitted to female surgical
ward. The patient was brought by her mother-in-law namely Polamma Venkatayya.
In her cross-examination, she stated that such burn injuries are possible if fire catches to the lower end of saree of a woman. 
23. We have noticed the three dying declarations (Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29).
A comparison of the three dying declarations, in our opinion, shows certain glaring
contradictions.
In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12), we have noticed that
deceased, Neelamma stated that she sustained burn injuries in the early morning at
8.30 a.m., when her children had gone out of the residence, her husband had a fight
with her and instigated her to pour kerosene upon her body. She poured the
kerosene on her body and her husband had also further poured kerosene upon her
and put on fire match box.
While in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22),
Neelamma (deceased) stated that her husband and mother-in-law used to quarrel
with her and on 14th January, 2000 at about 10.00 a.m. her husband had started
fight with her at the behest of Laxmi and along with Laxmi poured kerosene on her
body and put on fire by using match stick.
In the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29),
Neelamma (deceased) stated that next morning i.e. Friday, 14th January, 2000 while
she was cleaning the utensils, her husband came along with Laxmi, and thrashed
her by saying that what can you do if he kept Laxmi in the said house.
Then he
dragged her inside the house and closed the door, her mother-in-law also supported
her husband went outside.
At that time Laxmi was inside the house.
Her husband
Page 18
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poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the match stick and thrown upon her body,
due to the flames, fire spread all over her body, she rushed outside the house screaming for help.
24. In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12), 
she (deceased) stated that her
husband instigated her to pour kerosene on her body, therefore, she poured the kerosene on her body and her husband further poured kerosene on her and put on fire using a match box. 

In the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22), she (deceased)
stated that her husband along with Laxmi poured kerosene on her body and put on
fire by using match stick. 
In the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29), she (deceased)
stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the match stick and thrown upon her body. 
25. Apart from the contradictions, the credibility of three dying declarations
(Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29) is to be doubted.
 In the first dying declaration
(Ex.P.12) dated 14th January, 2000 the thumb impression of victim has been shown.
Whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22) taken on the same day, i.e, 14th
January, 2000 and 
the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29) given on the next day, i.e.,
15th January, 2000, 
the victim had stated that she had not given her signatures since
her hand was completely burnt. 
Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), who signed the Ex.P.22,
in his cross-examination stated that he was not aware 
whether Neelamma
(deceased) was talking in Telugu. 
Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who signed
Ex.P.12, in his cross-examination specifically stated that he can understand Kannada but does not know Telugu language and that Neelamma was talking in Telugu language. 
Padmavathi (PW-8), mother of the deceased, in her crossexamination stated that Neelamma (deceased) was not knowing the correct writing the Telugu. 
But she was writing some Telugu. 
26. The prosecution has failed to state 
as to why three dying declarations were
recorded in Kannada, 
if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu
It has also
not made clear as to who amongst the Tehisldar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has
signed in Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the
bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. 
The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the
truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out. 
27. On careful perusal of the materials on record, we are unable to come to the
conclusion that the prosecution in this case has established its case beyond
reasonable doubt to base a conviction on the appellant. Hence, we are of the
opinion that both the courts below have erred in coming to the contra conclusion.
28. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and
conviction recorded by the courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The
appellant, who is in jail, is directed to be released forthwith.
……………………………………………….J.
 ( A.K. PATNAIK )
……………………………………………….J.
 ( SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 3, 2013