whether a pronouncement as to the vires of Section 364A will have any impact on the sentence awarded to the petitioners would arise only if Section 364A is held to be constitutionally invalid. = Death penalty under two counts one under sec. 320 and another under sec. 364 A kidnap for ransom - after attaining finality - filed the writ petition to declare that the sec.364 A is un-constitutionality with a hope that if that section declared as he desired, a fresh out look of consideration was arise for granting death sentence under sec.302 I.P.C as per the guidelines - referred to three bench judges = The petitioners have been, as noticed earlier, convicted both under Sections 302 and 364A of the IPC and sentenced to death for each one of the two offences. We, therefore, asked Mr. Garg whether any juristic exercise aimed at determining the constitutional validity of Section 364A will be of any assistance to the petitioners who may despite an acquittal under Section 364A remain condemned to death for the capital offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. Mr. Garg, however, argued that if Section 364A, of the Indian Penal Code were to be declared ultra vires of the Constitution, the sentence awarded to the petitioners under Section 302 may call for a fresh look, having regard to the fact that the Courts had while awarding death sentence to the petitioners had taken them to be guilty under both the provisions, which would no longer hold good, if Section 364A were to be held ultra vires. 13. We do not wish to express any final opinion on this aspect at this stage. The question whether a pronouncement as to the vires of Section 364A will have any impact on the sentence awarded to the petitioners would arise only if Section 364A is held to be constitutionally invalid. It is only then that the Court may go into the question of the impact of such a pronouncement. For the present, what we have before us is a last ditch attempt by the petitioners to avoid the extreme penalty that the law provides for even the most heinous crime punishable under the code. The plea may indeed be in complete desperation but one can well understand such desperation among those who are waiting at the gallows for the hangman to put the noose around their neck. Dismissal of this appeal is bound to take them a step closer to the end. That apart the questions raised may require an authoritative answer, by a Bench of three Judges having regard to the fact that the death sentence awarded to the petitioners has been affirmed by a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The peculiar fact situation in which the case arises and the grounds on which the provisions of Section 364A are assailed persuade us to the view that this case ought to go before a larger Bench of three Judges for hearing and disposal. We, accordingly, refer this matter to a Bench of three Judges for hearing and disposal. The appellants shall, furnish additional set of papers within four weeks, failing which the Registry shall take steps to have additional copies prepared for the Court. Since it is a death sentence case, we permit learned counsel for the parties to mention the matter before the larger Bench for an early hearing.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 824 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.8149 of 2012)
Vikram Singh @ Vicky & Anr. …Appellants
Versus
Union of India & Ors. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. For a person found guilty of a capital offence and
sentenced to death even by the highest Court of the land the
options for reprieve are very limited.
Once the conviction of
the accused and the sentence awarded to him attains finality
the prospects of judicial intervention recede further.
Undeterred by these limitations the appellants who have
Page 2
2
been sentenced to death by hanging both under Section 302
and 364A of the Indian Penal Code have taken a chance with
a petition seeking review of their conviction not because
anything grossly erroneous is pointed out about the
conclusions arrived at by the Courts that dealt with their
cases but on the ground that Section 364A of the IPC which
makes kidnapping for ransom an offence is itself
unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. 
Writ Petition (Crl.) D No. 15177 of 2012 was
first filed in this Court by the petitioner, Vikram Singh @
Vicky for a declaration that Section 364A inserted in the
Indian Penal Code by Act 42 of 1993 w.e.f. 22nd May 1993 is
ultra vires the Constitution to the extent the same prescribes
death sentence for any one proved guilty. 
The petitioner
prayed for a further writ quashing the death sentence
awarded to him by the trial Court, upheld by the High Court
and finally affirmed by this Court in Criminal Appeals
No.1396-97 of 2008. 
A mandamus directing commutation of
the sentence awarded to the petitioners to imprisonment for
life was also prayed for. 
Page 3
3
3. The writ petition aforementioned was eventually
withdrawn with liberty to the petitioners to file a writ petition
before the jurisdictional High Court.
The Petitioners
accordingly filed CWP No.18956 of 2012 before the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh once again
praying for striking down Section 364A of IPC and for an
order restraining the execution of the death warrant against
them. 
Re-opening of the case of the petitioners and
commutation of the death sentence to imprisonment for life
were also prayed for in the said petition. 
A Division Bench of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has, upon
consideration, dismissed the petition by its judgment and
order dated 3rd October 2012 which is impugned in these
appeals.
4. The High Court has taken the view that the question
whether Section 364A of IPC was attracted and whether a
person found guilty of an offence punishable under that
provision could be sentenced to death without applying the
test of ‘rarest of rare cases’ was not only available to the
petitioners as an argument before this Court in the appeal
Page 4
4
filed by them but that such a plea had been raised but lost
by them. 
The High Court while saying so relied upon the
following passage from the judgment of this Court in the
appeal filed by the appellants against their conviction:
“… A plain reading of the Objects and Reasons
which led to the amendment shows the concern of
Parliament in dealing with kidnapping for ransom a
crime which called for a deterrent punishment, even
in a case where the kidnapping had not resulted in
the death of the victim. 
The statistics further reveal
that kidnapping for ransom had become a lucrative
and thriving industry all over the country which
must be dealt with, in the harshest possible manner
and an obligation rests on Courts as well. 
Courts to
lend a helping hand in that direction. 
In the case
before us, we find that not only was Abhi Verma
kidnapped for ransom which act would by itself
attract the death penalty but he was murdered in
the process.
 It is relevant that even before the
aforesaid amendments, this Court in Henry’s case
(supra) observed that death sentence could be
awarded even in a case of kidnapping and murder
based on circumstantial evidence..” 
 (emphasis supplied)
5. The High Court also held that the question of quantum
of sentence awarded to the petitioners had also been
examined by this Court in the following paragraph of the
judgment delivered in the criminal appeal:
“24. Some of the judgments aforesaid refer to the
ongoing debate as to the validity and propriety of
the death sentence in a modern society. 
There are
the moralists who say that as God has given life, he
alone has the right to take it away and this
Page 5
5
privilege cannot be usurped by any human being.
There are others who believe that the death
sentence cannot be taken as a retributive or
deterrent factor as the statistics show that the
possibility of a death sentence has never acted as a
deterrent to serious crime. 
The theory which is
widely accepted in India, however, is that as the
death penalty is on the statute book it has to be
awarded provided the circumstances justify it.
 The
broad principle has been laid in Bachan Singh’s
case (supra) as the “rarest of the rare cases”.
Bachan Singh case has been followed by a series of
judgments of this Court delineating and setting out
as to the kind of matters that would fall within this
category. In Machhi Singh & Ors. Vs. State of
Punjab 1983 (3) SCC 470 this Court gave an
indication as to what could constitute this
category…”
6. The High Court on the above reasoning concluded that
this Court had considered the nature of the offence and its
gravity and come to the conclusion that the same deserved
the maximum punishment prescribed for both the offences
proved against them. 
The High Court held that the plea now
sought to be raised by the petitioners in the writ petition to
the effect that Section 364A of IPC was attracted only when
the offence is committed against Government or a foreign
country etc. or that no such offence was made out in case of
the petitioners, had not found favour with this Court. 
Page 6
6
7. Having said that, the High court proceeded to examine
the plea raised by the petitioners on its merit, referred to the
historical background in which the provisions of Section 364A
were added to the statute book and held that Section 364A
of IPC even in the form in which it was initially introduced
made kidnapping by any person in the circumstances
indicated in the said provision an offence no matter at the
time of initial insertion of Section 364A, India was not
committed to the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, 1979 to which it became a party only on
7
th September 1994.
 It was only then that Section 364A was
amended to incorporate the expression
“...any foreign State
or international inter-governmental organisation or any
other person...” to honour the commitment made in terms of
the said Convention. The High Court accordingly repelled the
argument that Section 364A was intended only to take care
of situations where kidnapping was meant to coerce the
Government or any international organisation to do or not to
do a particular act including the demand for payment of
ransom. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that
there was no substance in the contentions urged in support
Page 7
7
thereof even on merits. 
The present appeals by special
leave assail the correctness of the view taken by the High
Court.
8. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. D.K. Garg strenuously
argued that the High Court had fallen in error in holding the
provisions of Section 364A to be constitutionally valid and
also that the question whether the petitioners could be found
guilty under Section 364A and sentenced to death has been
examined by this Court in the appeals filed by the appellants
against their conviction and sentence.
 Elaborating the
submissions, Mr. Garg argued that the provisions of Article
21 of the Constitution guaranteed to the petitioners a
fundamental right to life and liberty and protected them
against deprivation of those rights otherwise than in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
He urged
that in order to satisfy the requirement of Article 21 of the
Constitution it was necessary not only that the deprivation
was in accordance with a validly enacted law but also that
such law was just and fair.
Deprivation of life and liberty on
the basis of a law that was either unjust or unfair would,
Page 8
8
according to Mr. Garg, offend the constitutional guarantee
contained in Article 21.
He contended that inasmuch as
Section 364A of IPC made even a first offender liable to be
punished with death, it was much too harsh to be considered
fair and reasonable.
9. It was further argued that the provisions of Section
364A are ultra vires also because a simple kidnapping for
ransom in which the victim is released without any harm to
him/her with or without payment of the ransom demanded
for his/her release, is also on a plain reading of Section
364A, punishable with death without there being any
guidelines in Section 364A for the Courts to follow while
determining the quantum of punishment to be awarded in a
given case.
10. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned ASG, appearing for the
respondents per contra argued that Section 364A of IPC was
a validly enacted piece of legislation. In the absence of any
challenge to the legislative competence of the Parliament to
enact the said provision, Section 364A of the Code could not
be assailed for want of legislative competence. As regards
Page 9
9
the question of fairness of the law, the argument that
Section 364A was unfair and hence violative of Article 21 of
the Constitution, it was contended that it was within the
legislative competence of the Parliament to provide
remedies and prescribe punishment for different offences
depending upon the nature and gravity of such offences and
the societal expectation for weeding out ills that afflict or
jeopardise the lives of the citizens and the security and
safety of the vulnerable sections of the society especially
children who are prone to kidnapping for ransom and being
brutally done to death if their parents are unable to pay the
ransom amount. Mr. Luthra referred to 42nd Law Commission
Report, The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 1992 introduced
in the Rajya Sabha as also the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Bill for introduction of Section 364A and
contended that kidnapping innocent persons for ransom had
become rampant and called for strong legislative measures
to root out the malady by providing heavy penalties for those
indulging in such nefarious and barbaric acts. He also
referred to the International Convention and the Report of
the Committee of Home Affairs in support of his submission
Page 10
10
that Section 364A was amended in the year 1995 to fulfil
India’s commitment towards the international convention
signed by it in the year 1994 by providing for severe penalty
for those engaged in acts of violence and terrorism against
the State, any foreign country or any international
organisation.
The provisions of Section 364A were, therefore,
not only intended to deal with simple cases of kidnapping for
ransom but also cases in which terrorists and other extremist
organisations resort to kidnapping for ransom or to such
other acts only to coerce the Government to do or not to do
something. Judged in the historical perspective in which the
Law Commission had recommended enactment of the law,
and the salutary purpose which it is aimed at achieving the
provisions of Section 364A were neither unfair nor
unreasonable, argued Mr. Luthra.
11. Constitutional validity of any Parliamentary or State
legislation is judged on the twin tests of legislative
competence of the legislature that enacts the law or on the
ground that the legislative enactment violates a fundamental
right guaranteed to the citizen. There is no other ground on
Page 11
11
which the constitutional validity of an enactment may be
determined by a Court of law competent to do so.
Mr. Luthra
rightly argued that the challenge to the provisions of Section
364A of the IPC is not founded on the plea that the
Parliament was not competent to enact such a law.
Mr. Garg
also fairly conceded that the petitioners have not challenged
the provisions on the ground that the Parliament was not
competent to enact the same.
His challenge to the
constitutional validity rests entirely on the ground that in as
much as the same prescribes death sentence for a case of
kidnapping for ransom the same is so harsh as to make it
unreasonable and unfair hence violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
12. The petitioners have been, as noticed earlier, convicted
both under Sections 302 and 364A of the IPC and sentenced
to death for each one of the two offences.
We, therefore,
asked Mr. Garg whether any juristic exercise aimed at
determining the constitutional validity of Section 364A will be
of any assistance to the petitioners who may despite an
acquittal under Section 364A remain condemned to death for
Page 12
12
the capital offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. 
Mr.
Garg, however, argued that if Section 364A, of the Indian
Penal Code were to be declared ultra vires of the
Constitution, the sentence awarded to the petitioners under
Section 302 may call for a fresh look, having regard to the
fact that the Courts had while awarding death sentence to
the petitioners had taken them to be guilty under both the
provisions, which would no longer hold good, if Section 364A
were to be held ultra vires.
13. We do not wish to express any final opinion on this
aspect at this stage.
The question
whether a pronouncement
as to the vires of Section 364A will have any impact on the
sentence awarded to the petitioners would arise only if
Section 364A is held to be constitutionally invalid. 
It is only
then that the Court may go into the question of the impact of
such a pronouncement. For the present, what we have
before us is a last ditch attempt by the petitioners to avoid
the extreme penalty that the law provides for even the most
heinous crime punishable under the code. 
The plea may
indeed be in complete desperation but one can well
Page 13
13
understand such desperation among those who are waiting
at the gallows for the hangman to put the noose around their
neck. 
Dismissal of this appeal is bound to take them a step
closer to the end. 
That apart the questions raised may
require an authoritative answer, by a Bench of three Judges
having regard to the fact that the death sentence awarded to
the petitioners has been affirmed by a Bench of co-ordinate
jurisdiction. 
The peculiar fact situation in which the case
arises and the grounds on which the provisions of Section
364A are assailed persuade us to the view that this case
ought to go before a larger Bench of three Judges for hearing
and disposal.
14. We, accordingly, refer this matter to a Bench of three
Judges for hearing and disposal. The appellants shall, furnish
additional set of papers within four weeks, failing which the
Registry shall take steps to have additional copies prepared
for the Court. Since it is a death sentence case, we permit
learned counsel for the parties to mention the matter before
the larger Bench for an early hearing. Page 14
14
.................…......………………....………..……J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
 ..................…......
………………....………..……J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
New Delhi
July 2, 2013

Confirmation of conviction with out assigning valid reasons - not valid and as such remanded to consider afresh =The High Court’s cryptic reasoning is contained in two short paragraphs. We find such disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court particularly in a case involving charge under Section 302 of the IPC where the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment unsatisfactory. It was necessary for the High Court to consider whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the conviction. The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record. The High Court’s concurrence with the trial court’s view would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence and important submissions which go to the root of the matter. Since this exercise is not conducted by the High Court, the appeal deserves to be remanded for a fresh hearing after setting aside the impugned order.

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1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 818 OF 2013
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 1300 OF 2013]
Majjal … APPELLANT
Versus
State of Haryana … RESPONDENT
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed
against the judgment and order dated 14/2/2012 passed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
dismissing Criminal Appeal No.920-DB of 2009 filed by the
appellant. Page 2
3. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that the
complainant – Ramjani (PW-4) made a complaint with
police station Punhana against the appellant and others. It
was alleged in the complaint that during the night
intervening 30/10/1995 and 31/10/1995 the appellant along
with his sons namely Harun, Rajak, Khurshid and Bhati and
other persons arrived at the house of Deen Dar with
common object to kidnap Farida daughter of Deen Dar. The
appellant and his associates were armed with guns and
country made pistols. They tried to take away Farida on
which she raised cries. Consequently Abdul Karim son of
Deen Dar, Lal Khan(PW-3) and Khurshid sons of Rojdar,
Deen Dar son of Chand Khan and Roshni arrived at the
house of Deen Dar along with the complainant and tried to
rescue Farida. At that time the appellant fired a shot at Lal
Khan, Harun fired a shot at Abdul Karim and Khurshid fired
a shot at Deen Dar. Injuries were caused to Roshni with
lathis. Thereafter Mehboob son of Rojdar came. He was
abducted by the appellant and his son Khurshid. Abdul
2Page 3
Karim expired at the spot due to firearm injury. Deen Dar
also got injured. Thereafter, the assailants fled away from
the scene of occurrence.
3. On the basis of the information given by PW-4, FIR
No.277 was registered under Sections 148, 149, 302, 307,
364, 323, 120B of IPC and Section 25 of Arms Act against
the appellant and investigation commenced. On completion
of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the
appellant. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges
and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, in support of its
case, examined as many as 16 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-16).
The prosecution exhibited 29 documents (Exhibits P1 to P29)
in evidence. No defence evidence was adduced.
4. Upon perusal of the evidence, the trial court convicted
the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the
IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 3 months. The appellant was
3Page 4
directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as compensation to injured Lal
Khan. As already stated, the appeal preferred by the
appellant was dismissed by the High Court. Hence, this
appeal by special leave.
5. We have heard Shri Dushyant Parashar, learned
counsel for the appellant as well as Shri Narender Hooda,
Sr. Assistant Advocate General for the State.
6. In this case what strikes us is the cryptic nature of the
High Court’s observations on the merits of the case. The
High Court has set out the facts in detail. It has mentioned
the names and numbers of the prosecution witnesses.
Particulars of all documents produced in the court along with
their exhibit numbers have been mentioned. Gist of the trial
court’s observations and findings are set out in a long
paragraph. Then there is a reference to the arguments
advanced by the counsel.
Thereafter, without any proper
analysis of the evidence almost in a summary way the High
Court has dismissed the appeal.
The High Court’s cryptic
4Page 5
reasoning is contained in two short paragraphs. 
We find
such disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court
particularly in a case involving charge under Section 302 of
the IPC where the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment
unsatisfactory.
It was necessary for the High Court to
consider whether the trial court’s assessment of the
evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be
convicted deserve to be confirmed. 
This exercise is
necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is
curtailed because of the conviction. 
The High Court must
state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record.
The High Court’s concurrence with the trial court’s view
would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. 
In
such appeals it is a court of first appeal. 
Reasons cannot be cryptic. 
By this, we do not mean that the High Court is
expected to write an unduly long treatise. 
The judgment
may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to
vital evidence and important submissions which go to the
root of the matter. 
Since this exercise is not conducted by
5Page 6
the High Court, the appeal deserves to be remanded for a
fresh hearing after setting aside the impugned order. 
7. Hence, we set aside the impugned judgment and order
dated 14/2/2012 and remand the appeal to the High Court.
We request the High Court to hear the appeal afresh and
deliver judgment in light of our above observations as
expeditiously as possible as the appellant is in jail and he is
stated to be 84 years of age. We make it clear that we have
not considered the merits of the case. The appeal shall be
disposed of independently and on merits. 
8. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
……………………………………………..J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
……………………………………………..J.
(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
……………………………………………..J.
(SHARAD ARVIND BOBDE)
NEW DELHI,
July 2, 2013.
6

Land Acquisition Act - fixation of market value - We also find merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the landowners that while fixing market value of the acquired land the learned Single Judge committed serious error by not considering an important piece of evidence, i.e., Exhibit PW9/A dated 23.11.1999 vide which HSIIDC had allotted land to M/s. Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India (Private) Limited at the rate of Rs.1254.18 per square yard. Although, this document was produced before the Reference Court but the same was not taken into consideration while determining the amount of compensation.The same error has been repeated in the impugned judgment. If this document is taken into consideration, then market value of the acquired land would come to Rs.60,69,360 per acre. By making deduction of 50% towards development cost and granting annual increase of 12/15% (cumulative), market value of the land will be much higher than Rs.37,40,000 per acre.= In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeals filed by the parties under Section 54 of the Act as also the cross objections. The parties shall be free to urge all points in support of their respective cause and the High Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by the observations contained in this judgment. 36. Maruti Udyog Limited shall be free to file an appropriate application before the High Court for its impleadment or grant of leave to act as intervenor in the appeals filed by the parties. If such an application is filed, the same shall be decided on its own merits. 37. The State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of compensation determined by the High Court, i.e., Rs.37,40,000 - Rs.28,15,356 = Rs.9,24,644 per acre to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with all statutory benefits within a period of four months from today. The payment shall be made to the landowners and/or their legal representatives by following the procedure laid down in the interim orders passed by this Court.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40499
Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4843-4940 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 17962-18059 of 2011)
Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited …Appellant
versus
Udal and others etc. etc. …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4967-73 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 18660-18666 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4974-78 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 24153-24157 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4979-82 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs.24158-24161 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4983 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 21030 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4984 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO.34338 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4985 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33240 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4986 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 32853 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4987-92 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 4208-4213 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4993-95 OF 2013
1Page 2
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 33626-33628 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4996 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 12103 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4997 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 12104 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4998 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 32826 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4999 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 32827 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5000 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33587 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5001 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33589 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5002 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33591 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5003 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33592 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5004 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33593 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5005 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33594 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5006 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 33600 of 2011)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5007-17 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 4149-4159 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5018 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 4325 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5019-30 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 17422-17433 of 2012)
2Page 3
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5031 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 15794 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5032-33 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 24678-24679 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5034-39 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 29009-29014 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5040 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 29015 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5041 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 29020 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5042-43 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 29021-29022 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5044-71 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) NOs. 34068-34095 of 2012)
J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling aggrieved/dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby he enhanced
the amount of compensation payable to the landowners from Rs.28,15,356
per acre to Rs.37,40,000 per acre, the beneficiary of the acquisition,
namely, Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited, now
known as Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development
3Page 4
Corporation (HSIIDC), and the landowners have filed these appeals.
3. In furtherance of the policy decision taken by it to establish
Industrial Model Township at Manesar (hereinafter described as ‘IMT
Manesar’), District Gurgaon, the Government of Haryana acquired large
tracts of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’).
For Phase-I of IMT, Manesar, over 700 acres of land was acquired. By
notification dated 30.04.1994 issued under Section 4 of the Act, which
was followed by declaration dated 30.09.1995 issued under Section 6, 256
acres 3 kanals and 17 marlas land of village Manesar was acquired. By
another notification dated 15.11.1994 issued under Section 4 of the Act,
which was followed by Section 6 declaration dated 10.11.1995, 490 acres
3 kanals 17 marlas land situated in villages Manesar, Naharpur Kasan,
Khoh and Kasan was acquired.
4. For Phase-II, 1380 kanals 16 marlas land situated in villages Kasan,
Bas Kusla, Naharpur Kasan and Manesar was acquired vide notification
dated 6.3.2002 issued under Section 4 of the Act which was followed by
Section 6 declaration dated 15.11.2002. Another notification was issued
on 7.3.2002 under Section 4 of the Act for the acquisition of 595 acres 5
kanals 12 marlas land situated in villages Kasan, Bas Kusla, Bas Haria and
Dhana for Phase-III of IMT, Manesar. The declaration under Section 6
4Page 5
was issued on 25.11.2002.
5. For Phase-IV, 567 acres 4 kanals 3 marlas land was acquired vide
notification dated 26.2.2002 issued under Section 4 of the Act and for
Phase-V, 965 acres 5 kanals 18 marlas land was acquired vide notification
dated 17.9.2004 issued under Section 4 of the Act.
6. Since the issue arising in these appeals relates to the quantum of
compensation payable in lieu of the acquisitions made for Phases-II and III
of IMT, Manesar, we do not consider it necessary to take cognizance of
the facts relating to other acquisitions but would make a reference to the
events leading to the judgment of this Court in Haryana State Industrial
Development Corporation v. Pran Sukh and others (2010) 11 SCC 175,
and the orders passed in the review applications filed by HSIIDC.
7. For the acquisition made vide notification dated 30.4.1994, the Land
Acquisition Collector passed award dated 28.3.1997
whereby he fixed
market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs.3,67,400 per acre.
On
a reference made at the instance of the landowners, the Reference Court
divided the acquired land into two blocks, i.e., A and B. 
For the land
falling in Block A, i.e., land situated 500 yards from National Highway 8,
the Reference Court determined the compensation at the rate of
5Page 6
Rs.6,51,994.13 per acre.
 For the remaining land categorized as Block B,
market value was fixed at the rate of Rs.3,91,196.97 per acre. 
8. For the acquisition made vide notification dated 15.11.1994, the
Land Acquisition Collector passed award dated 3.4.1997 and fixed market
value at the rate of Rs.4,13,600 per acre. The Reference Court fixed
market value of the acquired land by dividing the same into two blocks.
Block A comprised of the land falling within 500 yards of National
Highway 8 and market value thereof was fixed at Rs.6,89,333. The
remaining land was included in Block B and market value thereof was not
increased.
9. The appeals filed by the landowners in relation to the first
acquisition were disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court vide judgment dated 5.9.2008 and the amount of
compensation was determined at the rate of Rs.12,00,000 per acre. 
The
appeals filed by the landowners covered by notification dated 15.11.1994
were disposed of by the learned Single Judge by enhancing the amount of
compensation to Rs.15,00,000 per acre for the entire acquired land.
10. The appeals arising out of the special leave petitions filed by
HSIIDC and the landowners against the judgments of the High Court were
6Page 7
disposed of by this Court vide judgment dated 17.08.2010 titled Haryana
State Industrial Development Corporation vs. Pran Sukh and others (supra)
and the amount of compensation payable to the landowners was enhanced
to Rs.20,00,000 per acre for the entire acquired land with a stipulation that
they shall be entitled to all statutory benefits.
Paragraphs 22 to 26 of that
judgment, which contain the reasons for granting enhanced compensation
to the landowners, are reproduced below:
“22. In our view, the learned Single Judge did not commit
any error by relying upon sale transaction, Ext. P-1 for the
purpose of fixing market value of the acquired land. Undisputedly, that sale transaction was between two corporate entities and the entire sale price was paid through bank
drafts. It is also not in dispute that the land which was
subject-matter of Ext. P-1 is situated at Village Naharpur
Kasan and is adjacent to the acquired land. The Corporation and the State Government did not adduce any evidence to prove that the land sold vide Ext. P-1 was overvalued with an oblique motive of helping the landowners to
claim higher compensation. Therefore, we do not find any
justification to discard or ignore sale deed, Ext. P-1. The
refusal of the learned Single Judge to rely upon other sale
transactions in which sale price of the land was shown as
Rs. 7 lakhs per acre also does not suffer from any legal infirmity because it is well known that transactions involving transfer of properties are usually undervalued with
a view to avoid payment of the requisite stamp duty and
registration charges.
23. However, we agree with the learned counsel for the
landowners that the High Court should not have imposed
cut of 1/4th in one batch of appeals and 20% cut in the
other batch of appeals qua the average sale price reflected
by Ext. P-1 only on the ground that the area of the land
acquired by the State Government was too large as compared to 12 acres of land for which sale deed, Ext. P-1
was executed.
7
24. In a matter like the present one, it cannot be ignored
that the land was acquired for setting up an industrial
model township at Manesar and after developing the land,
the Corporation was bound to sell the plots at a much
higher price to the existing or prospective industrial entrepreneurs. In this scenario, the learned Single Judges committed an error by applying 1/4th or 20% cut on market
value determined for the purpose of payment of compensation to the landowners.
25. This approach is in consonance with the law laid
down in Subh Ram v. State of Haryana (2010) 1 SCC
444, the relevant portions of which are extracted below: 
“16. Therefore, when deduction is made from the value
of a small residential plot towards the development
cost, to arrive at the value of a large tract of agricultural or undeveloped land with development potential,
the deduction has nothing to do with the purpose for
which the land is acquired. The deduction is with reference to the price of the small residential plot, to work
back the value of the large tract of undeveloped land.
On the other hand, where the value of acquired agricultural land is determined with reference to the sale price
of a neighbouring agricultural land, no deduction need
be made towards ‘development cost’.
17. It is no doubt true that this Court in some decisions
has observed that purpose of acquisition will also be
relevant. But it is made in a different context. The
Land Acquisition Collectors in some cases adopt belting methods for valuation of land, with reference to a
focal point, that is, either with reference to the distance
from the main road, or distance from a developed area.
Lands that adjoin a developed area or a main road are
given a higher value than a land farther away from the
road or the developed area. The Land Acquisition Collectors also award different compensation depending
upon whether the acquired land is a dry land or wet/irrigated land.
18. When different categories of lands (or lands with
different situational advantages) are acquired for the
8
same purpose, say for forming of a residential layout,
courts have sometimes felt that determination of their
value with reference to previous status or situation
should be avoided and a uniform rate of compensation
should be awarded for all lands acquired under the
same notification.
26. For the reasons stated above, the appeals filed by the
Corporation are dismissed and those filed by the landowners are allowed with the direction that the Corporation
shall pay market value of the entire acquired land at the
rate of Rs. 20 lakhs per acre with all statutory benefits.”
 11. The first batch of the review petitions filed by HSIIDC was
dismissed by detailed order dated 2.7.2012 titled Haryana State Industrial
Development Corporation Limited v. Mawasi (2012) 7 SCC 200.
The
second batch of the review petitions was dismissed vide order dated
13.1.2011 titled Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation
Limited v. Pran Sukh and others (2012) 7 SCC 721.
While dismissing the
first batch of review petitions, the Court took cognizance of the following
averments contained in the reply affidavits filed on behalf of the
landowners:
Paras 4 to 9 of the reply affidavit filed in Review Petition No. 239
of 2011.
“4. I state that vide five sale deeds all dated 6-7-1992 land
measuring 49 kanals 2 marlas situated in Village Kherka
Daula, District Gurgaon was sold by some of the co-owners
to one Shri D.C. Rastogi, s/o Shri L.P. Rastogi at the sale
price of Rs 1,35,000 per acre. The said village is at a distance
of about 2 km from the land in question. Copies of five sale
deeds all dated 6-7-1992 are collectively Annexure R-1
hereto. Thereafter the vendee Shri D.C. Rastogi sold the said
9
land in terms of agreement to sell dated 6-12-1993 vide sale
deed dated 16-3-1994 at the rate of about Rs 15,73,289 per
acre. This shows that there was a jump in the price of the
land in that area equal to almost 11 times of the original
price. It is also common knowledge that the parties often undervalue the land price in order to minimise stamp duty and
the land might have been sold at a higher price. Copy of sale
deed dated 16-3-1994 is Annexure R-2 hereto. Thus if M/s
Heritage Furniture (P) Ltd. purchased land, which is the subject-matter of sale deed dated 16-9-1994, Ext. P-1, in the
year 1993 at a price of about Rs 6 lakhs per acre as alleged
by the review petitioner even though there is no evidence of
purchase at such rate then its value increasing to Rs 20 lakhs
per acre in the year 1994 is commensurate with the market
trend. Moreover agreement to sell dated 31-5-1994 was executed after first notification was issued under Section 4 on
30-4-1994 and it is a common knowledge that after publication of Section 4 notification, the value of the land increases.
5. It is further submitted that vide sale deed dated 14-12-
1993 (Ext. P-10) one M/s DCN International Ltd. sold land
measuring 62 kanals 7 marlas situated in Village Naurangpur,
District Gurgaon for Rs 95,21,160 i.e. at the rate of Rs
13,74,345 per acre. Copy of sale deed dated 14-12-1993 is
Annexure R-3 hereto.
6. I further state that sale deed dated 16-9-1994 (Ext. P-1)
was executed pursuant to the agreement to sell dated 31-5-
1994 between M/s Heritage Furniture (P) Ltd. (vendor) and
M/s Duracell (India) (P) Ltd. (vendee) wherein the vendor
agreed to sell the land in question measuring about 12 acres
to the vendee at a sale price of Rs 2,42,00,000 (Rupees two
crore forty-two lakhs only) as is clear from the recital in the
sale deed itself. Ultimately vide sale deed dated 16-9-1994
the said land was sold at the same sale price by the vendor to
the vendee. Thus the sale price of the land was agreed upon
and fixed on 31-5-1994 as is clear from the recitation of the
sale deed itself.
7. I further state that as per assertion of the review petitioner
M/s Heritage Furniture (P) Ltd. (vendor) and M/s Duracell
(India) (P) Ltd. (vendee) had common persons in their Board
of Directors, namely, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar, Ms Jyotsana
10
Poddar and Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill. The review petitioner
has filed search reports of both the said companies to show
that the abovesaid three persons were common Directors of
both the companies. However, from the said search report of
M/s Duracell (India) (P) Ltd. it is clear that the two Directors, namely, Shri Saroj Kumar Poddar and Ms Jyotsana Poddar were appointed as Directors of this company on 9-6-1994
whereas Shri Gurbunder Singh Gill was appointed as its Director on 9-2-1997. Thus all the three alleged common Directors of the vendor and vendee companies were not on the
Board of Directors of M/s Duracell (India) (P) Ltd. on or before 31-5-1994 on which date the agreement to sell the land
in question was executed and the sale price was fixed. The
said three Directors had no interest in M/s Duracell (India)
(P) Ltd. (vendee) as on 31-5-1994 when the sale price of the
land was fixed.
8. I further state that except for making a bald allegation that
the sale price of the said land was inflated intentionally so
that the vendee company would increase its share holding in
a joint venture it was going to enter into with one Duracell
Inc. USA, this assertion has not been substantiated by placing
any cogent evidence on record. So much so that even it has
not been pleaded in the review petition as to whether joint
venture between M/s Duracell (India) (P) Ltd. and M/s Duracell Inc. USA did take place or not. To the knowledge of the
deponent there was no joint venture between M/s Duracell
(India) (P) Ltd. and M/s Duracell Inc. USA. This fact that
there was no joint venture between the said two companies
also stands proved from the fact that the land purchased vide
the said sale deed dated 16-9-1994 was sold by M/s Duracell
(India) (P) Ltd. vide sale deed dated 28-4-2004 to one M/s
Lattu Finance & Investments Ltd. at a sale consideration of
Rs 13,62,00,000 i.e. approximately at the rate of Rs
1,13,00,000 (Rupees one crore thirteen lakhs per acre approximately). At the time the name of M/s Duracell (India)
(P) Ltd. had been changed to M/s Gillette India Ltd. on account of its amalgamation with other company. In this sale
deed dated 28-4-2004 entire history of purchase of land by
M/s Duracell (India) (P) Ltd. from M/s Heritage Furniture (P)
Ltd. in 1994 onwards has been recited, which includes construction of industrial building over the said land, its conversion of status from private limited to public limited company,
its amalgamation with Indian Shaving Products Ltd. in the
11
year 2000 and its change of name from Indian Shaving
Products Ltd. to Gillette India Ltd. in December 2000 and
thereafter its sale to M/s Lattu Finance & Investments Ltd.
However, in the entire recitation there is no mention of any
joint venture with M/s Duracell Inc. USA.
9. It is submitted by the respondents/landowners that the said
sale deed (Ext. P-1) reflects true market price of the land in
the year 1994 when Section 4 notification for the acquired
land was issued. The allegation of the review petitioner that
the sale deed (Ext. P-1) reflects inflated price is false and
baseless. It is further submitted that another sale deed dated
17-7-1996 which is on record as (Ext. P-9) reflects the market value of the land in one of the acquired villages at Rs
25,00,000 (Rupees twenty-five lakhs) per acre. In this transaction 1 kanal 11 marlas of land situated in Village Naharpur
Kasan, has been sold at a price of Rs 4,84,375. This sale
deed also proves that the market price of the acquired land in
the year 1994 was Rs 20 lakhs per acre. Copy of sale deed
dated 17-7-1996 is Annexure R-4 hereto. It may be mentioned here that the same purchaser purchased different
pieces of land at the same rate vide 15 different sale deeds
and the total land purchased was 18 kanals 5 marlas i.e. more
than 2.25 acres.”
Para 5 of the reply-affidavit filed on behalf of the
landowners who were respondents in Civil Appeal No.
6561 of 2009
“5. That the present review petition is being filed only on the
ground that Ext. P-1, which has been relied upon by the
Hon’ble High Court as well as upheld by this Hon’ble Court
was entered into by the corporates which were under the control and management of common Board of Directors and
hence it is not the correct market value. In reply thereto the
respondents humbly submits that:
(a) This fact for the first time is brought into notice at
the level of this Hon’ble Court, therefore, the review petitioners are estopped by their own conduct.
12
(b) That merely both the corporates have a common
Board of Directors does not prove that the sale in between
the corporates was at escalated rates, rather it should be
on other side i.e. a common Board would have tried to get
the sale as possible as on lower rate. Therefore the ground
for review is not legally justifiable.
(c) It is submitted that later on corporate Gillette India
Ltd. made a sale deed (land in issue of Ext. P-1) dated 28-
4-2004 to another corporate, namely, Lattu Finance & Investments Ltd. for a sum of Rs 13,62,00,000 of land
measuring 96 kanals and 13 marlas. (i.e. Rupees one crore
sixty-two lakhs per acre). It is submitted that this sale cannot be said to be at an escalated rate and therefore Ext. P-
1 denotes the correct market value at the relevant time.
The copies of the relevant sale deeds are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure R-1.
(d) It is also submitted that some other sale deeds at
the relevant time (20-9-1996) were executed in favour of
Time Master (P) Ltd. which came around Rs 25 lakhs per
acre. Details of the same are as follows:
Sl. No.Vasika No. Date Land sold Sale consideration
1. 8725 20-9-1996 1K 1½M Rs 3,55,000
2. 8726 20-9-1996 1K 8M Rs 3,59,375
3. 8727 20-9-1996 1K 1½M Rs 3,53,000
4. 8728 20-9-1996 1K 5M Rs 4,06,000
5. 8799 20-9-1996 1K 9M Rs 3,75,000
6. 8807 20-9-1996 1K 5M Rs 4,06,000
7. 8815 20-9-1996 1K 6M Rs 4,08,000
8. 8825 20-9-1996 1K 1M Rs 3,53,000
9. 8832 20-9-1996 0K 17M Rs 2,75,000
10. 8839 20-9-1996 1K 6M Rs 4,08,000
11. 8846 20-9-1996 1K 5M Rs 4,06,000
12. 8854 20-9-1996 1K 1M Rs 3,55,000
13. 8861 20-9-1996 0K 17M Rs 2,75,000
Total land sold is 15 kanals 3 marlas, total amount
is Rs 47,34,375 i.e. at the rate of Rs 25 lakhs per acre.
14. 5431 17-7-1996 1K 11M Rs 4,84,375
i.e. at the rate of Rs 25 lakhs per acre.
13
It is submitted that Sale Deed No. 5431 (at Sl. No. 14)
was already produced as Ext. P-9 before the Reference
Court in favour of Time Master (P) Ltd. by Vinod Kumar
(vendor).
Thus Time Master India (P) Ltd. purchased total
land measuring 16 kanals 14 marlas at the rate of Rs 25
lakhs per acre.
(e) It is also relevant to point out the following are the
sale transactions in December 2006 of Village Naharpur
Kasan:
Land sold of Village Naharpur Kasan
Sl. No. Vasika No. Date Land sold Sale Per acre
 Consideration
1. 18628 4 -12-2006 12K16.5M Rs2,56,50,000 1,60,00,000
2. 18742 5-12-2006 5K 13M Rs1,13,00,000 1,60,00,000
3. 18743 5-12-2006 5K 14M Rs 74,00,000 1,60,00,000
4. 19350 14-12-2006 5K 13M Rs1,13,00,000 1,60,00,000
(f) It is also submitted that the rate at which auction-sale of
Tower site on acquired land is done on 30-6-2006 is as follows:
Tower Area in metres Amount of Per square
Site No. consideration yard
J 6804 Rs 95.10 crores 1,16,865
K 5832 Rs101.50 crores 1,45,518
L 6804 Rs93.00 crores 1,14,284.50
(g) It also submitted the following details of auction by HSIDC
IMT, Manesar:
Auction-sales by HSIDC IMT, Manesar
Allotment of SCO sites for shopping booth in Sector 1, IMT,
Manesar, auction held on 18-8-2009.
Sl. No. Site No. Area in sq m Price of site
1. T-1 144 Rs 2,67,50,000
2. T-2 144 Rs 2,33,50,000
3. T-3 144 Rs 2,29,00,000
4. T-4 144 Rs 2,29,00,000
14Page 15
5. T-5 144 Rs 2,31,00,000
6. T-7 144 Rs 2,28,00,000
7. T-8 144 Rs 2,25,00,000
8. T-9 144 Rs 2,22,00,000
9. T-10 144 Rs 2,16,00,000
10. D-1 108 Rs 1,82,00,000
11. D-2 108 Rs 1,58,00,000
12. D-3 108 Rs 1,62,50,000
13. D-4 108 Rs 1,60,00,000
14. D-5 108 Rs 1,51,00,000
15. D-6 108 Rs 1,38,50,000
16. D-7 108 Rs 1,40,00,000
17. D-8 108 Rs 1,37,00,000
18. D-9 108 Rs 1,35,00,000
19. D-10 108 Rs 1,33,50,000
Total area 2376 sq m, total amount Rs 35,78,50,000 i.e. Rs
1,50,610.26 per metre i.e. Rs 1,25,928.58 per yard i.e. Rs
60,94,94,327 per acre.
Allotment of SCO sites for shopping booth in Sector 1,
IMT, Manesar, auction held on 11-8-2010:
Sl. No. Site No. Area in sq m Price of site
1. D-10 108 Rs 2,12,50,000
2. D-12 108 Rs 1,89,50,000
3. D-14 108 Rs 1,90,00,000
4. D-15 108 Rs 1,88,50,000
5. D-16 108 Rs 1,92,00,000
Allotment of triple-storeyed SCO sites in Sector 1, IMT,
Manesar, auction held on 11-8-2010 at the following rates:
Sl. No. Site No. Area in sq m Price of site
1. 11 144 Rs 3,03,00,000
2. 12 144 Rs 3,00,00,000
3. 12-A 144 Rs 2,87,00,000
Total area 972 sq m allotted for total amount of Rs
18,62,50,000 i.e. Rs 1,91,615.22 per metre i.e. Rs 1,60,213.67
per square yard or Rs 77,54,34,189 per acre.”
15
12. For the land acquired for Phase-II of IMT, Manesar, the Land
Acquisition Collector passed award dated 22.7.2003 and determined
market value of the acquired land as under:
Name of the
village
Chahi per
acre in Rs.
Bhood per
acre in Rs.
Banjar per
acre in Rs.
Gair Mumkin
per acre in
Rs.
Kasan 5,25,000 5,00,000 5,00,000 7,50,000
Bas Kusla 2,25,000 1,75,000 1,75,000 3,60,000
Naharpur
Kasan
5,25,000 4,00,000 4,00,000 7,20,000
Manesar 7,00,000 7,00,000 7,00,000 10,00,000
13. The landowners did not feel satisfied with the award of the Land
Acquisition Collector and filed applications under Section 18 of the Act.
The Reference Court relied upon the judgment of the High Court in Pran
Sukh’s case whereby market value was assessed as Rs.15,00,000 per acre,
applied an increase of 12% for the time gap of 7 years 3 months and 21
days and held that the landowners are entitled to compensation at the rate
of Rs.28,15,356 per acre with all statutory benefits. The Reference Court
also held that its judgment would be subject to the outcome of the cases
pending before this Court.
14. For the land acquired for Phase-III of IMT, Manesar, the Land
Acquisition Collector passed award dated 24.12.2003 and assessed the
market value of the acquired land as under:
Name of the village Chahi per acre in Rs. Gair Mumkin per acre
in Rs.
16Page 17
Kasan 5,25,000 7,50,000
Bas Kusla 2,25,000 3,60,000
Bas Haria 2,25,000 3,60,000
Dhana 2,25,000 3,60,000
15. The Reference Court relied upon the judgment rendered in relation
to the acquisition made vide notification dated 6.3.2002 and held that the
landowners are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.28,15,849 per
acre with all statutory benefits.
16. In the appeals filed by them under Section 54 of the Act, the
landowners prayed for further enhancement in the amount of
compensation. HSIIDC also challenged the judgments of the Reference
Court and prayed that the amount of compensation awarded to the
landowners be reduced. In some of the matters cross objections were also
filed by the parties.
17. When the appeals and cross objections were taken up for hearing,
the learned Single Judge found that the site plans Ext. PW1/1 and P8 did
not clearly depict the location of various chunks of land acquired in 1994
and thereafter. Therefore, learned counsel for HSIIDC was asked to
submit a plan showing the exact location of the lands acquired in the years
1994 and 2002. Accordingly, a fresh site plan marked ‘A’ was produced,
the correctness of which was not disputed by the counsel appearing for the
17
landowners.
18. The learned Single Judge then took cognizance of the site plan
marked ‘A’ and the acquisitions made for Phases-II to V of IMT, Manesar
and proceeded to observe as under:
“The aforesaid facts clearly establish that the area was
developing. There was demand for plots. That is the
reason that the State also sought to acquire substantial
land after acquisition of land for development of Phase-I,
regularly after some intervals. It had also come in the
cross-examination of R.W.1-Dalbir Singh Bhati that 80%
of the plots carved out of the land acquired in the year
1994 had already been sold when notification under
Section 4 of the Act in the present case was issued. 50%
thereof had either been built or were under construction.
This was the pace of development, which clearly establish
that the land in question had potentiality for being used for
industrial/commercial purposes.”
19. In support of their claim for award of higher compensation, the
landowners relied upon the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh’s case
and the allotments made by HSIIDC and its predecessor to various
persons. The learned Single Judge did take cognizance of the allotments
made vide Exhibits P4 to P7 but declined to rely upon them for
determination of the compensation payable to the landowners. This is
evinced from paragraphs 25 and 26 of the impugned judgment, which are
extracted below:
“25. In addition to that, reference was made to four
allotment letters, namely, Ex. P4 to Ex. P7, the details of
which are as under:
18Page 19
Ex. Date Area in sq.
meters
Amount of
Consideration
in Rs.
Rate per
sq. yard
in Rs.
P
4
2.2.2000 30,000 4.50 crores 1,371.60
P
5
30.6.2006 6,804 95.10 crores 1,27,806.77
P
6
30.6.2006 5,832 101.50 crores 1,74,039.78
P
7
30.6. 2006 6,804 93.00 crores 1,36,684.30
26. The aforesaid plots were big chunks of land. The
average sale consideration paid therein was stated to be
Rs.1,25,608.67 per square yard. However, the fact is that
these plots were sold in open auction for commercial
purpose and more than 4 years after the issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act and that too
carved out of the land, which had already been acquired in
the year 1994 and located quite close to National
Highway No.8. Reference had also been made to
allotment letter dated 2.2.2000 (Ex.P38) pertaining to
plots No. 13, 14 and 15, Sector 5, IMT, Manesar,
whereby 30,000 square meters of land was allotted for
Rs.4,50,00,000/- at an average price of Rs.1,254.72 per
square yard. The aforesaid allotment was two years prior
to the acquisition in question. However, the fact remains
that even the aforesaid plots were also carved out of the
land acquired in the year 1994.”
20. The learned Single Judge then noted that the State and HSIIDC did
not adduce any documentary evidence to support the award made by the
Collector and observed:
“28. As against the evidence led by the landowners, the
State or even HSIIDC did not lead any documentary
evidence to justify the award of the Collector by showing
any sale transaction pertaining to agricultural land in the
area. This is not a case in isolation of the type. A lot of
hue and cry is raised by the agencies of the State for
19
whose benefit the land is acquired that they should be
heard before assessment of compensation at every stage,
but the experience is that it is very rare that in any case
they lead evidence or raise any effective argument in the
court below and many a times, even in this Court.”
 21. The learned Single Judge finally relied upon the judgment of this
Court in Pran Sukh’s case and held that the landowners are entitled to
compensation at the rate of Rs.37,40,000 per acre. The reasons recorded
by the learned Single Judge for arriving at this conclusion are contained in
paragraphs 29 and 30 of the impugned judgment, which are extracted
below:
“29. From the appreciation of evidence produced on
record, in my opinion, the price of the agricultural land,
which was acquired in the year 1994, as determined by
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Pran Sukh’s case (supra),
can very well be taken as base for assessment of value of
the acquired land, which also on the date of notification
was being put to agricultural use. The additional
advantage available at the time of acquisition of the land
in question was that the area in the vicinity had started
developing during interregnum of 7-8 years after the first
acquisition in the year 1994. The value of the land, which
was being put to agricultural use and was in the vicinity of
the land already acquired cannot be determined at the
same rate at which the plots were being sold by way of
allotment or auction in the already developed area but
those prices are certainly the guiding factors for
determination of rate at which the increase should be
awarded, which in my opinion, should be @ 12% per
annum. Taking the same into account and considering the
time gap in the two acquisition being 7 years and 3
months, the value of the land is determined at
Rs.37,40,000/- per acre. The landowners shall also be
entitled to the statutory benefits available to them under
the Act.
20Page 21
30. The aforesaid value will be quite close if we
consider the valuation of land from different angle, i.e.,
considering the allotment of 30,000 square meters of land
vide allotment letter (Ex.P38) @ Rs.1254/- per square
yard on 2.2.2000, granting increase thereon @ 12% per
annum and reducing 50% therefrom on account of various
factors.”
22. The learned Single Judge separately considered the claim of M/s.
Kohli Holdings Private Limited which had filed R.F.A. No.4646 of 2010.
He took cognizance of the location of 69 kanals 15 marlas land belonging
to M/s. Kohli Holdings Private Limited on National Highway 8 with
frontage of two acres and the existence of a five star hotel and a resort on
the adjoining land. The learned Single Judge relied upon allotment of
30,000 square meters land made by HSIIDC vide Exhibit P38 to M/s.
Orient Craft Limited (sister concern of M/s. Kohli Holdings Private
Limited) at the rate of Rs.1,254 per square yard, granted an annual
increase of 15% on that price and awarded compensation at the rate of
Rs.2119 per square yard (Rs.1,02,55,960 per acre). Paragraphs 31, 33
and 34 of the impugned judgment which exclusively deal with the case of
M/s. Kohli Holdings Private Limited are as under:
“31.
As far as value of the land owned by M/s Kohli
Holdings Private Limited (R.F.A. No.4646 of 2010)
is concerned, the same has to be determined
separately. This fact was not even disputed by
learned counsel for HSIIDC and rightly so for the
reason that the aforesaid portion of 69 kanals and
15 marlas is located on National Highway No.8
21Page 22
with frontage of two acres. Even from the back
side also, it has connection from a link road. It was
also not disputed that adjoining thereto is a five star
hotel and a resort. The other area adjoining to it,
which was earlier acquired by the State in the year
1994, had already been developed. Even on the
other side of National Highway No.8, opposite the
acquired land, the area had already been developed
as Housing Project for industrial workers. The
value of this land cannot be assessed merely at the
rates, which have been granted to the owners of
land which is located 4-5 kilometers from National
Highway No.8.
33.
The aforesaid sale transaction having taken place
two years prior to the issuance of notification under
Section 4 of the Act and looking at the pace of
development close to the acquired land, in my
opinion, increase @ 15% per annum can very well
be added in the value, as is evident in Ex P38.
Adding the same, the value of the land will come
out to Rs.1,630/- per square yard. The aforesaid
plot is located about one kilometer inside from
National Highway No.8, though in the developed
industrial estate, but as against that, the acquired
land is abutting the National Highway with frontage
of two acres out of 69 kanals and 15 marlas owned
by the appellant-landowner. The value of the land
on National Highway is always more as against the
value of the land, which is located off the road. It
has its own advantages. There are certain
limitations for which the land located off the main
road can be used, but as far as the land located on
the National Highway or the State Highway is
concerned, it can be put to many uses, to which the
land located off the road may not be appropriately
used.
34.
Considering the aforesaid facts, in my opinion,
applying a thumb rule, an addition of 30% thereon
22Page 23
can very well be added on account of special
locational advantage available to the land in
question. Adding the same, the value of the land
owned by M/s Kohli Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (R.F.A.
No.4646 of 2010) is assessed at Rs.2,119/- per
square yard. The land owner shall also be entitled
to the statutory benefits available under the Act.”
23. Although in the special leave petitions filed by HSIIDC several
grounds have been taken for challenging the judgment of the learned
Single Judge, the only point urged by Shri Parag P. Tripathi, learned
senior counsel appearing on its behalf is that the escalation of 12% granted
by the learned Single Judge in the amount of compensation determined by
this Court in Pran Sukh’s case is excessive and is not in consonance with
the law laid down by this Court. He relied upon the judgment of this
Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Rameshbhai
Jivanbhai Patel and another (2008) 14 SCC 745 and argued that while
assessing market value of a large chunk of land, the Court cannot award
more than 7.5% escalation in the market value determined in respect of
similar parcels of land. Learned senior counsel emphasized that HSIIDC
had to spend a substantial amount on carrying out development and argued
that this factor should have been taken into consideration by the learned
Single Judge while fixing market value of the acquired land. Shri Tripathi
also criticized the impugned judgment insofar as it relates to the award of
compensation at the rate of Rs.1,02,55,960 per acre in the case of M/s.
Kohli Holdings Private Limited by arguing that in view of several statutory
23Page 24
restrictions on the development of land along National Highway 8, the
landowners could not have been awarded higher compensation.
24. Shri V.K. Bali, learned senior counsel, and other learned counsel
appearing for the landowners, who are the appellants in various appeals
except the appeals arising out of SLP(C) No.18044 of 2011 (R.F.A.
No.4278 of 2010) and SLP(C) No.21030 of 2011 raised several
contentions in support of their clients’ prayer for grant of further
enhancement in the amount of compensation determined by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court. Their main contentions are enumerated
below:
1. The High Court committed
an error by not awarding higher compensation to all the landowners
as was done in the case of M/s. Kohli Holdings Private Limited.
2. The impugned judgment
suffers from the vice of discrimination inasmuch as M/s. Kohli
Holdings Private Limited has been allowed 15% increase over and
above the price for which 30,000 square meters land was allotted to
M/s. Orient Craft Limited whereas the other landowners were
allowed only 12% increase. Likewise, they were not given an
additional 30% amount as was done in the case of M/s. Kohli
Holdings Private Limited.
24
3. The learned Single Judge
committed an error by not clarifying that the landowners shall be
entitled to the benefit of annual increase on cumulative basis.
4. Though the land of M/s.
Kohli Holdings Private Limited appears to have special locational
advantage inasmuch as it is adjacent to National Highway 8, the
development potential of land belonging to other landowners is
much higher because the same is located between two highways,
i.e., National Highway 8 and KMP Express Way and a 60 meter
road connects that land and National Highway 8.
5. The learned Single Judge
committed an error by not relying upon Exhibit PW9/A dated
23.11.1999 by which HSIIDC allotted 26.778 acres land to M/s.
Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India (Private) Limited at the rate
of Rs.1254.18 per square yard for manufacture of two
wheelers/three wheelers. Even if 40% deduction is made towards
development cost, as was done in Sanath Kumar v. Special
Tahsildar and another (2011) 12 SCC 404 and cumulative increase
of 15% is given, the landowners will be entitled to compensation at
a much higher rate.
25. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for M/s.
25Page 26
Kohli Holdings Private Limited vehemently argued that the learned Single
Judge of the High Court committed an error by not awarding higher
compensation to his client in the light of the auction sale conducted by
HSIIDC in 2006. He submitted that even though these auctions were
conducted about four years after finalization of the acquisition
proceedings, the rate at which the land was sold should be taken into
consideration for the purpose of fixation of market value because no other
tangible evidence was available for that purpose. He relied upon the
judgment in Executive Engineer, Karnataka Housing Board vs. Land
Acquisition Officer, Gadag and others (2011) 2 SCC 246 and submitted
that in the absence of private sale transactions, auction sale conducted by
the beneficiary of acquisition can be relied upon for the purpose of fixing
market value.
26. Shri P.S. Patwalia and Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior
counsel appearing for Maruti Suzuki India Limited (for short, ‘Maruti
Udyog Limited’) opposed the landowners’ claim for further enhancement
in the amount of compensation by arguing that this would place
unbearable burden on the company. They pointed out that out of 771
acres land acquired for Phases-II and III of IMT, Manesar, 600 acres land
was allotted to Maruti Udyog Limited at the rate of Rs.19,00,000 per acre
in 2008 and if further enhancement is granted, the financial health of the
26Page 27
company will be seriously impaired. Learned senior counsel pointed out
that vide letter dated 1.10.2012 HSIIDC has already made demand of
Rs.500 crores in lieu of the enhanced compensation to the landowners and
submitted that if further enhancement is granted, the management may
have to take a decision to discontinue the plant at Manesar. Shri Patwalia
emphasized that if the manufacturing activities are closed by the company
at Manesar, more than 20000 workers will be rendered jobless and the
State will suffer revenue loss to the tune of Rs.8000 crores. Both the
learned senior counsel emphasized that the land was allotted to Maruti
Udyog Limited without any development and argued that this should be
taken as the criteria for determination of the compensation. Shri Patwalia
also made an additional submission that the judgments of the Reference
Court and the High Court are liable to be set aside because Maruti Udyog
Limited was not impleaded as a party despite the fact that it falls within
the ambit of the expression ‘person interested’ in Section 3(b) of the Act.
In support of this argument, reliance has been placed on the judgments of
this Court in Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Limited v. Francis Victor
Coutinlo (1980) 3 SCC 223, U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad v. Giyan Devi
(1995) 2 SCC 326 and DDA v. Bhola Nath Sharma (2011) 2 SCC 54.
27. Learned counsel for the landowners controverted the statement
made by the learned senior counsel for Maruti Udyog Limited that the
27Page 28
company was allotted the land in 2008. They pointed out that as per
conveyance deed dated 7.8.2008, 501.8 acres of land was allotted to
Maruti Udyog Limited vide allotment letter dated 5.4.2004 which was
followed by agreement dated 9.8.2004. They further argued that if the
object of the acquisition was to benefit Maruti Udyog Limited, the
Government should have resorted to the provisions contained in Part VII
of the Act and its failure to do so should be treated as sufficient for
quashing the acquisition proceedings in their entirety. In support of this
argument, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Royal
Orchid Hotels Limited v. G. Jayarama Reddy (2011) 10 SCC 608.
Learned counsel also pointed out that as per Exhibit P11 which was filed
in L.A.C. No.34/2008, 7875 square meters of land was allotted to M/s.
Krishna Maruti Limited (subsidiary of Maruti Udyog Limited) at the rate
of Rs.73,38,795 per acre and argued that this by itself should be treated as
sufficient for awarding higher compensation to the landowners.
28. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully
scrutinized the records including the additional affidavits filed on behalf of
the parties and their written arguments.
29. A careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment shows that while
determining the amount of compensation payable to the landowners other
28
than M/s. Kohli Holdings Private Limited, the learned Single Judge did
make a reference to Exhibit P38 (paragraph 30) but did not rely upon the
same for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation.
Instead of adopting a holistic approach and examining the documents
produced before the Reference Court, the learned Single Judge simply
referred to the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh’s case, granted a flat
increase of 12% for the time gap of about 7 years and 3 months between
the two acquisitions, i.e., 1994 and 2002 and determined market value at
the rate of Rs.37,40,000 per acre. In the case of M/s. Kohli Holdings
Private Limited, the learned Single Judge squarely relied upon Exhibit
P38 for the purpose of fixing market value of the acquired land, granted an
increase at a flat rate of 15% per annum on the price of land specified in
Exhibit P38 with an addition of 30% on account of special locational
advantage and held that the particular landowner is entitled to
compensation at the rate of Rs.2119 per square yard (Rs.1,02,55,960 per
acre). However, no discernible reason has been given for granting the
benefit of annual increase at different rates to M/s. Kohli Holdings Private
Limited on the one hand and the remaining landowners on the other.
Therefore, we find merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the
remaining landowners that their clients have been subjected to
discrimination in the matter of grant of annual increase.
29Page 30
30. The other error committed by the learned Single Judge is that he
granted annual increase at a flat rate of 12/15%.
31. The question whether the benefit of annual increase in the predetermined price of a portion of the acquired land or a similar land should
be cumulative was considered by this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (supra) and answered
in the affirmative. Paragraphs 12 to 15 and 18 and 19 of that judgment,
which contain the rationale of granting cumulative increase are extracted
below:
12. We have examined the facts of the three decisions relied on
by the respondents. They all related to acquisition of lands in
urban or semi-urban areas. Ranjit Singh related to acquisition for
development of Sector 41 of Chandigarh. Ramanjulu related to
acquisition of the third phase of an existing and established industrial estate in an urban area. Bipin Kumar related to an acquisition of lands adjoining Badaun-Delhi Highway in a semiurban area where building construction activity was going on all
around the acquired lands.
13. Primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four
factors: situation of the land, nature of development in surrounding area, availability of land for development in the area, and the
demand for land in the area. In rural areas, unless there is any
prospect of development in the vicinity, increase in prices would
be slow, steady and gradual, without any sudden spurts or
jumps. On the other hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where
the development is faster, where the demand for land is high and
where there is construction activity all around, the escalation in
market price is at a much higher rate, as compared to rural areas.
In some pockets in big cities, due to rapid development and high
demand for land, the escalations in prices have touched even
30% to 50% or more per year, during the nineties.
30
14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there was
no chance of any development and hardly any buyers, the prices
stagnated for years or rose marginally at a nominal rate of 1% or
2% per annum. There is thus a significant difference in increases
in market value of lands in urban/semi-urban areas and increases
in market value of lands in the rural areas. Therefore, if the increase in market value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10%
to 15% per annum, the corresponding increases in rural areas
would at best be only around half of it, that is, about 5% to 7.5%
per annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the
nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or any specific evidence relating to the actual increase in prices, then the increase to
be applied would depend upon the same.
15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining
the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the
proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisitions), where there is no
evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said
method is reasonably safe where the relied on sale
transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only
a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond that it may
be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be
a reliable standard if the gap is of only a few years, may become
unsafe and unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value of a land acquired in
1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference to a
sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This
is because, over the course of years, the “rate” of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in prices or
sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard of increase.
18. The increase in market value is calculated with reference to
the market value during the immediate preceding year. When
market value is sought to be ascertained with reference to a
transaction which took place some years before the acquisition,
the method adopted is to calculate the year to year increase. As
the percentage of increase is always with reference to the previous year's market value, the appropriate method is to calculate
31
the increase cumulatively and not applying a flat rate. The difference between the two methods is shown by the following illustration (with reference to a 10% increase over a basic price of Rs
10 per square metre):
Year By flat rate increase By cumulative increase
 method method
1987 10.00 10.00
 (Base year)
1988 10 + 1 = 11.00 10.00 + 1.00 = 11.00
1989 11 + 1 = 12.00 11.00 + 1.10 = 12.10
1990 12 + 1 = 13.00 12.10 + 1.21 = 13.31
1991 13 + 1 = 14.00 13.31 + 1.33 = 14.64
1992 14 + 1 = 15.00 14.64 + 1.46 = 16.10
19. We may also point out that application of a flat rate will lead
to anomalous results. This may be demonstrated with further reference to the above illustration. In regard to the sale transaction
in 1987, where the price was Rs 10 per square metre, if the annual increase to be applied is a flat rate of 10%, the increase will
be Rs 1 per annum during each of the five years 1988, 1989,
1990, 1991 and 1992. If the price increase is to be determined
with reference to sale transaction of the year 1989 when the
price was Rs 12 per square metre, the flat rate increase will be
Rs 1.20 per annum, for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992. If the
price increase is determined with reference to a sale transaction
of the year 1990 when the price was Rs 13 per square metre,
then the flat rate increase will be Rs 1.30 per annum for the
years 1991 and 1992. It will thus be seen that even if the percentage of increase is constant, the application of a flat rate leads
to different amounts being added depending upon the market
value in the base year. On the other hand, the cumulative rate
method will lead to consistency and more realistic results.
Whether the base price is Rs 10 or Rs 12.10 or Rs 13.31, the increase will lead to the same result. The logical, practical and appropriate method is therefore to apply the increase cumulatively
and not at a flat rate.”
32. The same view was reiterated in Valliyammal v. Special Tahsildar
(Land Acquisition) (2011) 8 SCC 91. Of course, in that case annual increase of 10% was allowed to the landowners.
32
33. We also find merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the
landowners that 
while fixing market value of the acquired land the learned
Single Judge committed serious error by not considering an important piece of evidence, i.e., Exhibit PW9/A dated 23.11.1999 vide which HSIIDC had allotted land to M/s. Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India (Private) Limited at the rate of Rs.1254.18 per square yard. 
Although, this
document was produced before the Reference Court but the same was not taken into consideration while determining the amount of compensation.The same error has been repeated in the impugned judgment. 
If this document is taken into consideration, then market value of the acquired land would come to Rs.60,69,360 per acre. By making deduction of 50% towards development cost and granting annual increase of 12/15% (cumulative), market value of the land will be much higher than Rs.37,40,000 per acre.
34. In view of the above conclusions, we do not consider it necessary to
deal with the other points argued by learned counsel for the parties/intervenors and feel that ends of justice will be served by setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the matters to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeals and cross objections filed by the parties subject to the
rider that the State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of
Rs.37,40,000 to the landowners along with other statutory benefits.
33
35. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeals filed by the parties under Section 54 of the Act as also the cross objections. 
The parties shall be free to urge all points in support of their
respective cause and the High Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by the observations contained in this judgment.
36. Maruti Udyog Limited shall be free to file an appropriate application before the High Court for its impleadment or grant of leave to act as intervenor in the appeals filed by the parties. If such an application is filed, the same shall be decided on its own merits. 
37. The State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of compensation determined by the High Court, i.e., Rs.37,40,000 - Rs.28,15,356 =
Rs.9,24,644 per acre to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with all statutory benefits within a period of four months from today.
The payment shall be made to the landowners and/or their legal representatives by following the procedure laid down in the interim orders passed by this Court.
 ...................................................................J.
 [G.S. SINGHVI]
34
NEW DELHI; ...................................................................J.
JULY 02, 2013. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
35