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Thursday, July 18, 2013

Periyar river - Environmental protection = “Doctrine of the Public Trust”. It was founded on the premise that certain common properties such as air, sea, water and forests are of immense importance to the people in general and they must be held by the Government as a trustee for the free and unimpeded use by the general public and it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial exploitation to satisfy the greed of few. = In 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed a part of Periyar river within its jurisdiction and the District Tourism Promotion Council, Ernakulam decided to construct a restaurant on the reclaimed land by citing convenience of the public coming on Sivarathri festival as the cause. - When the District Promotion Council started construction of the building on the reclaimed land, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.436/2006 and prayed that the respondents be restrained from continuing with the construction of building on the banks of river Periyar and to remove the construction already made. These prayers were founded on the following assertions: a) Periyar river is a holy river called “Dakshin Ganga”, on the banks of which famous Sivarathri festival is conducted. 8 b) The river provides water to lakhs of people residing within the jurisdiction of 44 local bodies on its either side. c) In 1989, a study was conducted by an expert body and Periyar Action Plan was submitted to the Government for protecting the river but the latter has not taken any action. d) In December, 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed the land which formed part of the river and in the guise of promotion of tourism, efforts are being made to construct a hotel. e) The construction of hotel will adversely affect the flow of water as well as the river bed. f) The construction of the building will adversely affect Marthanda Varma Bridge. g) The respondents have undertaken construction without conducting any environmental impact assessment and in violation of the provisions of Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001. h) The construction of hotel building is ultra vires the provisions of notification dated 13.1.1978 issued by the State Government, which mandates assessment of environmental impact as a condition precedent for execution of any project costing more than Rs.10,00,000/-. The Division Bench of the High Court took cognizance of the sanction accorded by the State Government vide order dated 20.5.2005 for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park and dismissed the writ petition by simply observing that only a restaurant is being constructed and not a hotel, as claimed by the appellant. The cryptic reasons recorded by the High Court for dismissing the writ petition are extracted below: 10 “From the facts as gathered above, it transpires that no hotel at all is being constructed in the river belt. The petitioner does not appear to have ascertained the correct facts before filing the present petition. Main allegation by the petitioner that a hotel is being constructed on the banks of Periyar river is found to be incorrect. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed.” = We reiterate that natural resources including forests, water bodies, rivers, seashores, etc. are held by the State as a trustee on behalf of the people and especially the future generations. These constitute common properties and people are entitled to uninterrupted use thereof. The State cannot transfer public trust properties to a private party, if such a transfer interferes with the right of the public and the court can invoke the public trust doctrine and take affirmative action for protecting the right of people to have access to light, air and water and also for protecting rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests and associated natural ecosystems.”= There is nothing in the language of G.O. dated 20.5.2005 from which it can be inferred that while approving the proposal forwarded by the Director, Department of Tourism for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-, the State Government had amended G.O. dated 13.1.1978 or otherwise relaxed the conditions embodied therein. The record also does not show that the Department of Tourism had furnished a detailed comprehensive environmental impact statement for the project so as to enable the Committee to make appropriate review and assessment. Therefore, it must be held that the execution of the project including construction of restaurant is ex facie contrary to the mandate of G.O. dated 13.1.1978, which was issued by the State in discharge of its Constitutional obligation under Article 48-A. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court ignored this crucial issue and casually dismissed the writ petition without examining the serious implications of the construction of a restaurant on the land reclaimed by Aluva Municipality from the river. G.O. dated 13.1.1978 is illustrative of the State Government’s commitment to protect and improve the environment as envisaged under Article 48A. The object of this G.O. is to ensure that no project costing more than Rs.10 lakhs should be executed and implemented without a comprehensive evaluation by an expert body which can assess possible impact of the project on the environment and ecology of the area including water bodies, i.e., rivers, lakes etc. If the project had been referred to the Environmental Planning and Co-ordination Committee for review and assessment of environmental implications then it would have certainly examined the issue relating to desirability and feasibility of constructing a restaurant, the possible impact of such construction on the river bed and the nearby bridge as also its impact on the people of the area. By omitting to refer the project to the Committee, the District Tourism Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism conveniently avoided scrutiny of the project in the light of the parameters required to be kept in view for protection of environment of the area and the river. The subterfuge employed by the District Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism has certainly resulted in violation of the fundamental right to life guaranteed to the people of the area under Article 21 of the Constitution and we do not find any justification to condone violation of the mandate of order dated 13.1.1978. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. As a sequel to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the respondents are directed to demolish the structure raised for establishing a restaurant as part of renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at Aluva. The needful be done within a period of three months from today.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40498
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4941 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18837 of 2006)
Association for Environment Protection ....Appellant
versus
State of Kerala and others ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since time immemorial, people across the world have always made efforts
to preserve and protect the natural resources like air, water, plants, flora and
fauna. 
Ancient scriptures of different countries are full of stories of man’s zeal to
protect the environment and ecology. 
Our sages and saints always preached and
also taught the people to worship earth, sky, rivers, sea, plants, trees and every
form of life. 
Majority of people still consider it as their sacred duty to protect the
plants, trees, rivers, wells, etc., because it is believed that they belong to all living
creatures. 
1Page 2
3. The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the “Doctrine of the Public Trust”. 
It was founded on the premise that
certain common
properties such as air, sea, water and forests are of immense importance to the
people in general and they must be held by the Government as a trustee for the
free and unimpeded use by the general public and it would be wholly unjustified
to make them a subject of private ownership. 
The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial exploitation to satisfy the greed of few. 
4. Although, the Constitution of India, which was enforced on 26.1.1950 did not contain any express provision for protection of environment and ecology, 
the
people continued to treat it as their social duty to respect the nature, natural resources and protect environment and ecology. 
After 26 years, 
Article 48-A was inserted in Part IV of the Constitution and the State was burdened with the responsibility of making an endeavour to protect and improve the environment and
to safeguard the forest and wildlife of the country. 
By the same amendment,
Fundamental Duties of the citizens were enumerated in the form of Article 51-A (Part-IV A). 
These include the duty to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures [Article 51-A(g)].
2
5. The Courts in different jurisdictions have, time and again, invoked the public trust doctrine for giving judicial protection to environment, ecology and natural resources.
This Court also recognized the importance of the public trust doctrine and applied the same in several cases for protecting natural resources which have been treated as public properties and are held by the Government as trustee of the people.
The judgment in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 is
an important milestone in the development of new jurisprudence by the Courts in
this country for protection of environment. 
In that judgment, the Court considered the question
whether a private company running tourists resort in KulluManali valley could block the flow of Beas river and create a new channel to divert the river to at least one kilometer down stream. 
After adverting to the theoretical and philosophical basis of the public trust doctrine and judgments in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois, 146 US 387; Gould v.
Greylock Reservation Commission 350 Mass 410 (1966); Sacco v. Development
of Public Works, 532 Mass 670; Robbins v. Deptt. of Public Works 244 NE 2d
577 and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County 33 Cal 3d
419, this Court observed:
“Our legal system — based on English common law — includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. 
The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature
meant for public use and enjoyment. 
Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. 
These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.
3
We are fully aware that the issues presented in this case illustrate the classic struggle between those members of the public
who would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and open lands in
their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibilities who, under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society, find it necessary to encroach
to some extent upon open lands heretofore considered inviolate to change. 
The resolution of this conflict in any given case is for the legislature and not the courts.
 If there is a law made by Parliament or the State Legislatures the courts can serve as an
instrument of determining legislative intent in the exercise of its powers of judicial review under the Constitution. 
But in the absence of any legislation, the executive acting under the doctrine
of public trust cannot abdicate the natural resources and convert
them into private ownership, or for commercial use. 
The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the environment and the ecosystems of our country cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the public good and in public interest to encroach upon the said resources.”
6. In M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu (1999) 6 SCC 464, the
Court applied public trust doctrine for upholding the order of Allahabad High
Court which had quashed the decision of Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika permitting
appellant – M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. to construct an underground shopping complex
in Jhandewala Park, Aminabad Market, Lucknow, and directed demolition of the
construction made on the park land. The High Court had noted that Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika had entered into an agreement with the appellant for construction
of shopping complex and given it full freedom to lease out the shops and also to
sign agreement on its behalf and held that this was impermissible. On appeal by
the builders, this Court held that the terms of agreement were unreasonable, unfair
4
and atrocious.
The Court then invoked the public trust doctrine and held that being a trustee of the park on behalf of the public, the Nagar Mahapalika could not
have transferred the same to the private builder and thereby deprived the residents
of the area of the quality of life to which they were entitled under the Constitution
and Municipal Laws.
7. In Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. (2006) 3 SCC 549, this
Court again invoked the public trust doctrine in a matter involving the challenge
to the systematic destruction of percolation, irrigation and drinking water tanks in
Tirupati town, referred to some judicial precedents including M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (supra), M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra), National Audubon Society
(supra), and observed:
“This is an articulation of the doctrine from the angle of the affirmative duties of the State with regard to public trust. Formulated from a
negatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation of
the property held as a public trust. However, when the State holds a
resource that is freely available for the use of the public, it provides
for a high degree of judicial scrutiny on any action of the Government, no matter how consistent with the existing legislations, that attempts to restrict such free use. To properly scrutinise such actions of
the Government, the courts must make a distinction between the Government’s general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, more demanding obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources.....”
8. In Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571,
this Court was called upon to consider whether the appellant was entitled to block
passage to the beach by erecting fence in the garb of protecting its property. After
5
noticing the judgments to which reference has been made hereinabove, the Court
held:
“The public trust doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the
resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit
their use for private ownership or commercial purposes. This doctrine
puts an implicit embargo on the right of the State to transfer public
properties to private party if such transfer affects public interest, mandates affirmative State action for effective management of natural resources and empowers the citizens to question ineffective management thereof.
The heart of the public trust doctrine is that it imposes limits and obligations upon government agencies and their administrators on behalf
of all the people and especially future generations. For example, renewable and non-renewable resources, associated uses, ecological values or objects in which the public has a special interest (i.e. public
lands, waters, etc.) are held subject to the duty of the State not to impair such resources, uses or values, even if private interests are involved. The same obligations apply to managers of forests, monuments, parks, the public domain and other public assets. Professor
Joseph L. Sax in his classic article, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention” (1970), indicates
that the public trust doctrine, of all concepts known to law, constitutes
the best practical and philosophical premise and legal tool for protecting public rights and for protecting and managing resources, ecological values or objects held in trust.
The public trust doctrine is a tool for exerting long-established public rights over short-term public rights and private gain. Today every person exercising his or her right to use the air, water, or land and associated natural ecosystems has the obligation to secure for the rest of us the right to live or otherwise use that same resource or property for the long-term and enjoyment by future generations. 
To say it another way,
a landowner or lessee and a water right holder has an obligation to use such resources in a manner as not to impair or diminish the people's rights and the people's long-term interest in that property or resource, including down slope lands, waters and resources.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
6
We reiterate that natural resources including forests, water bodies, rivers, seashores, etc. are held by the State as a trustee on behalf of the people and especially the future generations. These constitute common properties and people are entitled to uninterrupted use thereof.
The State cannot transfer public trust properties to a private party, if such a transfer interferes with the right of the public and the court can invoke the public trust doctrine and take affirmative action for protecting the right of people to have access to light, air and water and also for protecting rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests and associated natural ecosystems.”
9. We have prefaced disposal of this appeal by discussing the public trust
doctrine and its applicability in different situations because the Division Bench of
the Kerala High Court, which dealt with the writ petition filed by the appellant for
restraining the respondents from constructing a building (hotel/restaurant) on the
banks of river Periyar within the area of Aluva Municipality skirted the real issue
and casually dismissed the writ petition only on the ground that while the
appellant had questioned the construction of a hotel, the respondents were actually
constructing a restaurant as part of the project for renovation and beautification of
Manalpuram Park.
10. The people of the State of Kerala, which is also known world over as the
‘God’s Own Country’ are very much conscious of the imperative of protecting
environment and ecology in general and the water bodies, i.e., the rivers and the
lakes in particular, which are integral part of their culture, heritage and an
important source of livelihood. 
This appeal is illustrative of the continuing
endeavour of the people of the State to ensure that their rivers are protected from
7
all kinds of man made pollutions and/or other devastations.
11. The appellant is a registered body engaged in the protection of environment
in the State of Kerala. It has undertaken scientific studies of environment and
ecology, planted trees in public places and published magazines on the subjects of
environment and ecology.
In 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed a part of
Periyar river within its jurisdiction and the District Tourism Promotion Council, Ernakulam decided to construct a restaurant on the reclaimed land by citing convenience of the public coming on Sivarathri festival as the cause.
The
proposal submitted by the District Tourism Promotion Council was forwarded to
the State Government by the Director, Department of Tourism by including the
same in the project for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park. Vide
order dated 20.5.2005, the State Government accorded administrative sanction for
implementation of the project at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-.
12. When the District Promotion Council started construction of the building
on the reclaimed land, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.436/2006 and
prayed that the respondents be restrained from continuing with the construction of
building on the banks of river Periyar and to remove the construction already
made. These prayers were founded on the following assertions:
a) Periyar river is a holy river called “Dakshin Ganga”, on the banks of
which famous Sivarathri festival is conducted. 
8
b) The river provides water to lakhs of people residing within the
jurisdiction of 44 local bodies on its either side.
c) In 1989, a study was conducted by an expert body and Periyar Action
Plan was submitted to the Government for protecting the river but the latter
has not taken any action.
d) In December, 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed the land which
formed part of the river and in the guise of promotion of tourism, efforts are
being made to construct a hotel.
e) The construction of hotel will adversely affect the flow of water as
well as the river bed.
f) The construction of the building will adversely affect Marthanda
Varma Bridge. 
g) The respondents have undertaken construction without conducting
any environmental impact assessment and in violation of the provisions of
Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act,
2001.
h) The construction of hotel building is ultra vires the provisions of
notification dated 13.1.1978 issued by the State Government, which
mandates assessment of environmental impact as a condition precedent for
execution of any project costing more than Rs.10,00,000/-. 
9Page 10
13. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, the following
averments were made:
(i) District Tourism Promotion Council has undertaken construction of a
restaurant and not a hotel as part of the project involving
redevelopment and beautification of Manalpuram Park.
(ii) The State Government has accorded sanction vide G.O. dated
20.5.2005 for construction of a restaurant.
(iii) The restaurant is meant to serve large number of people who come
during Sivarathri celebrations.
(iv) The construction of restaurant will neither obstruct free flow of water
in the river nor cause damage to the ecology of the area.
(v) There will be no diversion of water and the strength of the pillars of
Marthanda Varma Bridge will not be affected.
14. The Division Bench of the High Court took cognizance of the sanction
accorded by the State Government vide order dated 20.5.2005 for renovation and
beautification of Manalpuram Park and dismissed the writ petition by simply
observing that only a restaurant is being constructed and not a hotel, as claimed
by the appellant. 
The cryptic reasons recorded by the High Court for dismissing
the writ petition are extracted below:
10
“From the facts as gathered above, it transpires that no hotel at all is
being constructed in the river belt. The petitioner does not appear to
have ascertained the correct facts before filing the present petition.
Main allegation by the petitioner that a hotel is being constructed on
the banks of Periyar river is found to be incorrect. There is no merit
in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed.” 
15. Shri Deepak Prakash, learned senior counsel for the appellant invited the
Court’s attention to order dated 13.1.1978 issued by the State Government and
argued that the sanction accorded by the State Government on 20.5.2005 for
renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park did not have the effect of
modifying G.O. dated 13.1.1978 which mandates that all development schemes
costing Rs.10 lakhs or more should be referred to the Environmental Planning and
Coordination Committee for review and assessment. Learned counsel submitted
that unless the project was reserved for consideration by the Committee
constituted by the State Government, the respondents could not have undertaken
construction of the restaurant.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents could not draw our attention to any
document to show that the construction of restaurant building was undertaken
after obtaining clearance from the Environmental Planning and Coordination
Committee as per the requirement of G.O. dated 13.1.1978. She, however,
submitted that the construction of restaurant which is an integral part of the
project relating to renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park is not going
to adversely impact the flow of Periyar river or otherwise affect the environment
and ecology of the area.
1Page 12
17. We have considered the respective arguments and scrutinized the record.
On 13.1.1978, the Government of Kerala accepted the recommendations made by
the State Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination and issued an
order, which was published in Official Gazette dated 7.2.1978 for review and
assessment of environmental implications of various projects. The relevant
portions of that order are reproduced below:
“In the light of the recommendation of the State Committee on Environmental Planning and Co-operation in their
second meeting held on 23.7.1977, Government are
pleased to order as follows:
1. All development schemes costing Rs.10 lakhs and above will
be referred to the Committee on Environmental Planning and
Co-ordination for review and assessment of environmental implications in order to integrate environmental
concerns and the clearance of the committee will be obtained before the scheme share sanctioned and taken up
for execution.
2. In the case of projects costing Rs.25 lakhs and above the Department concerned will while referring the projects for review
and clearance by the committee furnish detailed and comprehensive environmental impact statement for the project
prepared with the help of experts.
3. In the case of schemes costing less than Rs.10 lakhs, the Environmental implication will be assessed by the concerned department in the light of guidelines formulated by the committee
and the concerned department will be responsible to ensure that
suitable remedial measures for protecting the environment are
incorporated in the scheme itself before the schemes are sanctioned and taken up for implementation. If the department concerned feels certain that with the safeguards provided in the
scheme, the ecological stability and purity of environment will
be maintained they can go ahead with the scheme without reference to the committee. Doubtful cases will however be referred
to the committee for clearance.
1
12
By order of the Government.
 SD/-
P.K.Rajasekharan Nair
 Under Secretary.”
18. By G.O. dated 20.5.2005, the State Government accorded administrative
sanction for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park and construction
of a restaurant at Aluva at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-. That order reads as
under:
“GOVERNMENT OF KERALA
Abstract
Department of Tourism -Working Group on Plan Schemes -
Renovation of Manalppuram Park and construction of
Restaurant at Aluva - Administrative Sanction accorded –
Orders issued.
TOURISM (A) DEPARTMENT
G.O.(Rt) No.3974/05/GAD. Dated, Thiruvananthapuram
20.05.2005
Read:
Letter No.C2-22446/04, dated 11.04.2005 from the
Director, Department of Tourism, Thiruvananthapuram.
ORDER
The Aluva Manalppuram is a significant pilgrim centre
as well as tourism spot. The Aluva Manalppuram is famous for
Shivarathri celebrations. The pilgrims visiting Kalady, the
birthplace of Shri Shankaracharya include this spot also in the
schedule of visit. The Director, Department of Tourism as per
the letter read above has forwarded a proposal submitted by the
District Collector and Chairman, DTPC, Ernakulam for the
renovation of the Manalppuram Park and construction of
Restaurant at Aluva and has requested for Administrative
1Page 14
Sanction for the project at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-
as detailed below.
1. Beautification of Manalppuram Park Rs.24,10,421/-
2. Construction of Restaurant Rs.3l,62,011/-
TOTAL Rs.55,72,432/-
The Working Group that met on 29.04.2005 considered
the proposal of the Director, Department of Tourism and
approved it. Sanction is therefore accorded for the Project for
the renovation of Manalppuram Park and construction of
Restaurant at Aluva at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432 /-
(Rupees Fifty Five Lakhs Seventy Two Thousand Four
Hundred and Thirty two only) .
The expenditure on this account will be met from the
head of account “3452-80-800-90(29)-Upgradation and creation
of infrastructure facilities at Tourist Centres (Plan)”. The work
will be executed through DTPC, Ernakulam and will be
completed within a period of six months.
By Order of the Governor
D. Saraswathy Amma,
Deputy Secretary.”
19. There is nothing in the language of G.O. dated 20.5.2005 from which it can be inferred that while approving the proposal forwarded by the Director, Department of Tourism for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at
an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-, the State Government had amended G.O. dated 13.1.1978 or otherwise relaxed the conditions embodied therein. 
The
record also does not show that the Department of Tourism had furnished a detailed comprehensive environmental impact statement for the project so as to
1Page 15
enable the Committee to make appropriate review and assessment. Therefore, it must be held that the execution of the project including construction of restaurant is ex facie contrary to the mandate of G.O. dated 13.1.1978, which was issued by
the State in discharge of its Constitutional obligation under Article 48-A.
Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court ignored this crucial issue and casually dismissed the writ petition without examining the serious implications of the construction of a restaurant on the land reclaimed by Aluva Municipality from the river.
20. G.O. dated 13.1.1978 is illustrative of the State Government’s commitment to protect and improve the environment as envisaged under Article 48A. 
The
object of this G.O. is to ensure that no project costing more than Rs.10 lakhs should be executed and implemented without a comprehensive evaluation by an expert body which can assess possible impact of the project on the environment and ecology of the area including water bodies, i.e., rivers, lakes etc. 
If the project
had been referred to the Environmental Planning and Co-ordination Committee for review and assessment of environmental implications then it would have certainly examined the issue relating to desirability and feasibility of constructing a restaurant, the possible impact of such construction on the river bed and the nearby bridge as also its impact on the people of the area. By omitting to refer
the project to the Committee, the District Tourism Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism conveniently avoided scrutiny of the project in the light of 
15
the parameters required to be kept in view for protection of environment of the area and the river. The subterfuge employed by the District Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism has certainly resulted in violation of the
fundamental right to life guaranteed to the people of the area under Article 21 of the Constitution and we do not find any justification to condone violation of the mandate of order dated 13.1.1978. 
21. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. 
As
a sequel to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the
respondents are directed to demolish the structure raised for establishing a restaurant as part of renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at Aluva.
The needful be done within a period of three months from today.
 ......………………………..….J.
 [G.S. SINGHVI]
New Delhi, ...….……..…..………………..J.
July 2, 2013. [SHARAD ARVIND BOBDE]

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

service matter - selections to police constable = whether the candidature of the respondents who had made a clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning this fact in their application/attestation form while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi Police on the ground that they are not found suitable for appointment to the post of constable. = The Screening Committee did not find his reply to be convincing. In his order dated 22/3/2011, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the actions of respondent - Mehar Singh depicted his violent nature and that he had no respect for the law of the land and on considering the totality of the circumstances, the Screening Committee held that he was not suitable for appointment to the post of constable.= whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. = In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents are not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the respondents’ candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the respondents - Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40496
Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4842 OF 2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.38886 of
2012)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. …Appellants
Versus
MEHAR SINGH …Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4965 OF 2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4057 of
2013)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. …Appellants
Versus
SHANI KUMAR …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. Leave granted in both the petitions.Page 2
2. In both the appeals the judgments of the Delhi High
Court are under challenge. Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil)
No. 38886 of 2012 is against Judgment dated 09/07/2012
passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3918 of 2012. Appeal
arising out of SLP (Civil) No.4057 of 2013 is against
Judgment dated 21/05/2012 passed in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.3015 of 2012. Since both these appeals raise the same
question of law, they can be disposed of by a common
judgment. It may be stated here that while issuing notice,
this Court has stayed the orders impugned in both the
appeals.
3. The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -
Mehar Singh could be shortly stated.
4. FIR No.126/04 was registered against respondent -
Mehar Singh and others under Sections 143, 341, 323 and
427 of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC”) upon a complaint
received from Ramji Lal s/o. Mamraj Saini r/o. Khetri - the
owner of Bus No.RJ-18P 0493. The substance of the
complaint was that when the bus reached the bus stand of
2Page 3
village Raipur on 15/5/2004 at about 3.15 p.m, respondent -
Mehar Singh along with others armed with iron chain, lathi,
belts, danda, stones etc. stopped the bus on the road and
rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to take
the fare from one of his associates. Sanjay Singh, Basant,
Udai Bhan, Rajesh, Sandeep, Jagmal, Suresh and Karan
Singh intervened and tried to save the conductor of the bus.
During intervention, Sanjay and Basant suffered injuries on
their back, eyes and ears.
All the accused broke the side
window panes of the bus by throwing stones and by giving
blows with lathis/dandas. When the other passengers
intervened, the accused fled the spot. The complainant
along with the injured reached the police station and lodged
the aforementioned complaint. 
5. In the year 2009, the appellants issued an
advertisement for filling-up the post of constables (Exe.)
(male). It appears that in the criminal case registered
against respondent - Mehar Singh, he arrived at a
compromise with the complainant. In terms of the
3Page 4
compromise, he and other accused were acquitted of the
offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC on
30/1/2009. As regards the offence under Section 147 of the
IPC, the trial court acquitted him and other co-accused for
want of evidence. It is pertinent to note that the witnesses
turned hostile. Respondent - Mehar Singh applied for the
post of constable pursuant to the advertisement issued by
the appellants. In relevant papers, he disclosed his
involvement in criminal case and his acquittal as both
parties had entered into a compromise. He was assigned
Roll No.422165 and put through the physical endurance and
measurement test and written test. After interview, he was
declared provisionally selected, subject to verification of
character and antecedents. During character and
antecedent verification, his involvement in the criminal case
and his subsequent acquittal due to compromise between
the parties was taken into account. 
6. The case of respondent - Mehar Singh was examined by
the Screening Committee constituted by respondent 1 i.e.
4Page 5
the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. The Screening Committee
observed that respondent - Mehar Singh and others had
assaulted the bus conductor with iron chain, belt and stones
in a preplanned manner and caused injuries to him, which
showed respondent - Mehar Singh’s violent nature and scant
respect for the law of the land. The Screening Committee in
the circumstances did not recommend his case for
appointment to the post of constable.
7. On 3/3/2011, appellant 2 - the Deputy Commissioner of
Police (Recruitment), New Delhi issued a notice to
respondent - Mehar Singh calling upon him to show cause as
to why his candidature should not be cancelled. He replied
to the show cause notice. He submitted that he was falsely
implicated in the criminal case and acquitted in the year
2009 after a full fledged trial. He submitted that a mere
registration of an FIR would not show any criminal
propensity. According to him the offence was falsely
reported by the complainant due to local issues and to avoid
prolonged proceedings, the issue was settled between him
5Page 6
and the complainant and the trial court had acquitted him.
The Screening Committee did not find his reply to be
convincing. In his order dated 22/3/2011, the Deputy
Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that
the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the
actions of respondent - Mehar Singh depicted his violent
nature and that he had no respect for the law of the land and
on considering the totality of the circumstances, the
Screening Committee held that he was not suitable for
appointment to the post of constable.
By the said letter,
candidature of respondent - Mehar Singh was cancelled.
8. On 22/4/2011, respondent - Mehar Singh filed O.A.
No.1819 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal
(for short “the Tribunal”), Principal Bench, New Delhi
challenging the order of the Screening Committee. The
Tribunal by its order dated 7/3/2012 allowed his application.
The Tribunal set aside order dated 22/03/2011 cancelling the
candidature of Mehar Singh. The Tribunal referred to a
couple of cases in which persons charged under Section 307
6Page 7
of the IPC were appointed by the appellants and held that
there was total non-application of mind on the part of the
appellants. A direction was given to consider the case of
respondent - Mehar Singh if he was otherwise found to be fit,
within six months.
9. Aggrieved by the order dated 7/3/2012 passed by the
Tribunal, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Delhi
High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition
holding that since respondent - Mehar Singh had been
acquitted of the offences for which he had faced trial, the
same cannot be held against him. Being aggrieved by the
said judgment and order, the appellants have preferred this
appeal by special leave.
10. The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -
Shani Kumar could be shortly stated. In 2007, FIR
No.114/2007 was registered against respondent Shani -
Kumar under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC at Police
Station Babri, District Muzuffar Nagar, (U.P.). Admittedly,
pursuant to an advertisement issued in the year 2009 for the
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post of Constable (Exe.) (male) in Delhi Police for Phase II
respondent - Shani Kumar applied for it. He mentioned in
his application as well as attestation form that a criminal
case was registered against him. On 23/4/2010, he was
provisionally selected to the said post subject to verification
of antecedents. On 14/5/2010, he was acquitted in the said
case by giving him benefit of doubt. On 3/3/2011, the
appellants issued a show cause notice to respondent - Shani
Kumar calling upon him to show cause as to why his
candidature to the post of Constable (Exe) (male) in Delhi
Police should not be cancelled as he along with other co accused was found involved in the offence of attempt to
commit murder with deadly weapons and causing bullet
injuries to the complainant’s brother. Respondent - Shani
Kumar sent a reply to the show cause notice on 14/3/2011,
which did not find favour with the appellants. By order dated
22/3/2011, the Deputy Commissioner of Police,
(Recruitment), NPL, Delhi cancelled respondent - Shani
Kumar’s candidature to the post of Constable (Exe.) (male).
8
11. Being aggrieved by this cancellation, respondent -
Shani Kumar filed O.A. No.1821 of 2011 before the Tribunal.
By order dated 24/1/2012, the Tribunal allowed the
application and set aside order dated 22/3/2011 cancelling
his candidature. A direction was issued that respondent -
Shani Kumar be offered appointment to the said post as
expeditiously as possible. Being aggrieved by the Tribunal’s
order, the appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High
Court. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ writ
petition. Hence, this appeal by special leave. 
12. We have heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the
appellants and Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents. We have perused the written
submissions filed by the appellants as well as by the
respondents in both the appeals.
13. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor
General, submitted that the employment in Delhi Police is of
a very sensitive nature. Therefore, the character, integrity
9Page 10
and antecedents of a candidate aspiring to join it, assume
importance. Keeping this in mind, the Commissioner of
Police issued a Standing Order No.398/2010 dated
23/11/2010 laying down a uniform policy for deciding cases
of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved
in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted). A Screening
Committee has been constituted for that purpose. Taking an
overall view of the matter, in the interest of Delhi Police,
which is a disciplined force, the Screening Committee has
taken a decision to cancel the candidature of both the
respondents. The respondents have not challenged the
Standing Order. The decision taken by the Screening
Committee, in the circumstances, ought not to be interfered
with. Counsel submitted that it is the settled law that
acquittal of a person in a criminal case does not entitle him
to reinstatement as a matter of right. The appointing
authority may still find such a person unfit to be appointed to
the post. Counsel submitted that even in cases of acquittal,
departmental proceedings may follow when the acquittal is
otherwise than honourable. If the acquittal in a criminal
10Page 11
case is on account of flawed prosecution, it would not have
any impact on the finding of misconduct recorded in a
departmental enquiry on the basis of adequate evidence. It
is only if a person is honourably acquitted, that he can
possibly argue that he should be appointed to any post.
Counsel submitted that assuming the appellants have
appointed some persons with criminal antecedents in the
past; the doctrine of equality is not attracted to such cases.
He submitted that if some candidates have been granted
some benefits inadvertently, such order does not confer any
right on the respondents to get the same relief. Counsel
submitted that the impugned order does not take note of the
above vital aspects and, therefore, must be set aside. In
support of his submissions, counsel relied on the judgments
of this Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief
Secretary & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar1
; Suresh Pathrella
v. Oriental Bank of Commerce2
; Fuljit Kaur etc. v.
State of Punjab etc3
; K. Venkateshwarlu v. State of
1
 (1996) 11 SCC 605
2
 (2006) 10 SCC 572
3
 (2010) 11 SCC 455
Andhra Pradesh4
; Deputy Inspector General of Police
& Anr. v. S. Samuthiram5
; Chandigarh Administration
& Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr.6
 and Maharaj Krishan
Bhatt & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors.7
.
14. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the appellants’ reliance on Sushil Kumar is
misplaced because Sushil Kumar has been distinguished in
Commissioner of Police v. Dhaval Singh8
. Sushil
Kumar was a case of concealment of facts whereas in this
case, there is no concealment. Counsel submitted that,
many a time, due to personal enmity and political reasons,
people are falsely implicated in criminal cases. Very often,
criminal cases end in acquittal or are compounded.
Compounding or acquittal of a criminal case should,
therefore, not act as an obstacle to a person being appointed
to any post. Counsel submitted that an order of acquittal is
always honourable. An acquittal is an acquittal for all
4
 (2012) 8 SCC 73
5
 (2013) 1 SCC 598
6
 AIR 1995 SC 705
7
 (2008) 9 SCC 24
8
 (1999) 1 SCC 246
12Page 13
purposes. Relying on Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P.9
,
counsel submitted that a person is innocent unless proved
otherwise. Administrative authorities cannot adjudicate the
suitability of a selected candidate in this manner. Quasi
judicial authorities cannot overreach the judgments
delivered by a competent court of law. Counsel submitted
that Lok Adalats have been created under the provisions of
the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 to encourage
compromises. If a selectee is to be denied appointment by
adjudging him unsuitable because the criminal case against
him has ended into acquittal only because of compromise,
then, it will defeat the object of the said Act. Counsel
submitted that the present case is different from cases
involving departmental proceedings. In the matter of
appointments, principles relating to pendency of criminal
case and initiation of departmental proceedings will not be
applicable. Counsel attacked the proceedings of the
Screening Committee as being arbitrary, unguided and
unfettered. He cited cases where, according to him, the
9
 JT 2008(10) SC324
13Page 14
Screening Committee has recommended candidates against
whom FIRs have been registered for serious offences, for
appointment. Counsel further pointed out that involvement
in a criminal case is not a disqualification or a stipulation
towards ineligibility in Delhi Police (Appointment and
Recruitment) Rules, 1980 (“the Delhi Police Rules”).
Counsel submitted that for verification of antecedents, the
appellants must not rely upon the criminal case where
acquittal has been the final outcome. It is open for the
appellants to conduct an independent enquiry about the
character and antecedents of a candidate concerned.
Counsel submitted that inasmuch as the respondents have
honestly disclosed that criminal cases were registered
against them and they ended either in acquittal or acquittal
on account of compromise, they cannot be denied
appointment in Delhi Police once having been selected for
the same. He submitted that the appeals, therefore, be
dismissed.
15. Before we deal with the rival submissions, it is
necessary to refer to the judgment of this Court in
Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh10
. In that
case the appellant had applied for the post of constable and
was selected for the same. He had suppressed the fact that
a criminal case was registered against him. Subsequently
the said fact came to light and his appointment was
terminated. Thereafter, he was acquitted in the criminal
case. The question which fell for consideration of this Court
was whether, after a person is appointed to a post in a
disciplined force, it comes to light that he had suppressed
the fact that he was involved in a criminal case his
appointment can be terminated on the ground of
suppression of material facts. Noticing conflicting decisions
of this Court on this point and also the fact that different
yardsticks are being applied in the matter of grant of relief,
this Court formulated issues and referred them to a larger
bench. Since all the formulated issues are premised on
suppression of facts and since in this case there is no
10 (2012) 8 SCC 748
15Page 16
suppression of facts it is not necessary for us to defer the
judgment of this case till the reference is answered by a
larger Bench. 
16. The question before this Court is
whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a clean
breast of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning
this fact in their application/attestation form while applying
for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally
selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who
were subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal
case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the
Delhi Police on the ground that they are not found suitable
for appointment to the post of constable. 
17. We must first deal with the submission that under the
Delhi Police Rules, past involvement of a person in a criminal
case is not a disqualification for appointment. It is true that
Rule 6 thereof which provides for grounds for ineligibility,
criminal antecedents of a person is not mentioned as a
ground for ineligibility. But, to conclude from this that
16Page 17
instances of moral turpitude, however grave, could be
overlooked because they do not find mention in Rule 6,
would be absurd. In any case, Standing Order No. 398/2010
issued by the Delhi Police to which our attention is drawn
empowers the police to take appropriate decision in such
cases. Pertinently the respondents have not challenged the
Standing Order. This Standing Order incorporates policy for
deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi
Police involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted). It
would be appropriate to re-produce the relevant portions of
the said Standing Order:
“STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010
POLICY FOR DECIDING CASES OF CANDIDATES
PROVISIONALLY SELECTED IN DELHI POLICE
INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR
ACQUITTED).
During the recruitments made in Delhi Police,
several cases come to light where candidates
conceal the fact of their involvement in criminal
cases in the application Form/Attestation Form in
the hope that it may not come to light and
disclosure by them at the beginning of the
recruitment process itself may debar them from
participating in the various recruitment tests. Also
17Page 18
the appointment if he/she has been acquitted but
not honourably.
In order to formulate a comprehensive policy,
the following rules shall be applicable for all the
recruitments conducted by Delhi Police:-
1). xxx xxx xxx
2). xxx xxx xxx
3). If a candidate had disclosed his/her
involvement and/or arrest in criminal cases,
complaint case, preventive proceedings etc. and
the case is pending investigation or pending trial,
the candidature will be kept in abeyance till the
final decision of the case. After the court’
judgment, if the candidate is acquitted or
discharged, the case will be referred to the
Screening Committee of the PHQ comprising of
Special Commissioner of Police/Administration,
Joint Commissioner of Police/Headquarters and
Joint Commissioner of Police/Vigilance to assess
his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.
4) If a candidate had disclosed his/her
involvement in criminal case, complaint case,
preventive proceedings etc. both in the application
form as well as in the attestation form but was
acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her case
will be referred to the Screening Committee of
PHQ to assess his/her suitability for appointment in
Delhi Police.
5). xxx xxx xxx
6). Such candidates against whom charge-sheet
in any criminal case has been filed in the court and
the charges fall in the category of serious offences
benefit of doubt or the witnesses have turned
hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused
person, he/she will generally not be considered
suitable for government service. However, all
such cases will be judged by the Screening
Committee of PHQ to assess their suitability for
the government job. The details of criminal cases
which involve moral turpitude may kindly be
perused at Annexure ‘A’.
7) Such cases in which a candidate had faced
trial in any criminal case which does not fall in the
category of moral turpitude and is subsequently
acquitted by the court and he/she discloses about
the same in both application form as well as
attestation form will be judged by the Screening
Committee to decide about his/her suitability for
the government job.
8) xxx xxx xxx
9). If any candidate is discharged by extending
the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 this
will also not be viewed adversely by the
department for his/her suitability for government
service.
10). If a candidate was involved in a criminal case
which was withdrawn by the State Government,
he/she will generally be considered fit for
government service, unless there are other
extenuating circumstances.”
Annexure ‘A’ as mentioned in Clause 6 above lays down
the following offences involving moral turpitude:
1. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B, IPC)
19Page 20
2. Offences against the State (Sections 121 –
130, IPC)
3. Offences relating to Army, Navy and Air Force
(Sections 131-134, IPC)
4. Offence against Public Tranquility (Section
153–A & B, IPC).
5. False evidence and offences against Public
Justice (Sections 193-216A, IPC)
6. Offences relating to coin and government
stamps (Section 231-263A, IPC).
7. Offences relating to Religion (Section 295-
297, IPC)
8. Offences affecting Human Body (Sections
302-304, 304B, 305-308, 311-317, 325-333,
335, 347, 348, 354, 363-373, 376-376-A, 376-
B, 376-C, 376-D, 377, IPC)
9. Offences against Property (Section 379-462,
IPC)
10. Offences relating to Documents and Property
Marks (Section 465-489, IPC)
11. Offences relating to Marriage and Dowry
Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, IPC)
18. Clause 3 of the Comprehensive Policy delineated in the
Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to
the Screening Committee comprising high police officers.
20Page 21
After a candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is
acquitted or discharged, the Committee has to assess
his/her suitability for appointment. Clause 6 states that those
against whom serious offences or offences involving moral
turpitude are registered and who are later on acquitted by
extending benefit of doubt or because the witnesses have
turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person
shall not generally be considered suitable for government
service. However, all such cases will be considered by the
Screening Committee manned by senior officers. In our
opinion, the word ‘generally’ indicates the nature of
discretion. As a matter of rule, such candidates have to be
avoided. Exceptions will be few and far between and
obviously must be substantiated with acceptable reasons.
19. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that
the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons
involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police
force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that
the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not
honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its
rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that
the acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of
the prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses
turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the
Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether the
acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to
similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening
Committee will have to consider the nature and extent of
such person’s involvement in the crime and his propensity of
becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation
rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this policy framed
by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference from this
Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons
with impeccable character enter the police force.
20. We find no substance in the contention that by
cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening
Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal
22Page 23
court. We are aware that the question of co-relation
between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does
not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the
principles laid down by this Court in connection with it
because the issue involved is somewhat identical namely
whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in
the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal
case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a
departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.
Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because
witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on
merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not
stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full
fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses
being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India11 this
Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can
proceed even though a person is acquitted when the
acquittal is other than honourable.
11 AIR 1964 SC 787
23Page 24
21. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ was considered
by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was
concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings
were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was
pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under
Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted in that
case because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case.
Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the
judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank
of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal12, where in
somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s
action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the
ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving
him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable
acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not
justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in
departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the
expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and
12 (1994) 1 SCC 541
24Page 25
‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Criminal Procedure
Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by
the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. This Court expressed
that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of
prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to
prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can
possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
In light of above, we are of the opinion that since the
purpose of departmental proceedings is to keep persons,
who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or
who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the
department, if found necessary, because they pollute the
department, surely the above principles will apply with more
vigour at the point of entry of a person in the police
department i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by
the Screening Committee that the person against whom a
serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is
discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same
charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening
25Page 26
Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature.
Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons
in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in
it.
22. Against the above background, we shall now examine
what is the nature of acquittal of the respondents. As per
the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal, respondent Mehar Singh
and others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda, stones etc.
stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how
he dared to take the fare from one of their associates.
Those who intervened were beaten-up. They received
injuries. The miscreants broke the side window panes of the
bus by throwing stones. The complainant was also injured.
This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public
order. The assault on the conductor was pre-planned and
pre-meditated. The FIR was registered under Sections 143,
341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. The order dated 30/01/2009
passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khetri
shows that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and
427 of the IPC are concerned, the accused entered into a
compromise with the complainant. Hence, learned
Magistrate acquitted respondent - Mehar Singh and others of
the said offences. The order further indicates that so far as
offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of the IPC is
concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. Learned
Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the said
offence. This acquittal can never be described as an
acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial. Respondent -
Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in the police force by
portraying this acquittal as an honourable acquittal.
Pertinently, there is no discussion on merits of the case in
this order. Respondent - Mehar Singh has not been
exonerated after evaluation of the evidence.
23. So far as respondent - Shani Kumar is concerned, the
FIR lodged against him stated that he along with other
accused abused and threatened the complainant’s brother.
They opened fire at him due to which he sustained bullet
injuries. Offences under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the
IPC were registered against respondent - Shani Kumar and
27Page 28
others. Order dated 14/5/2010 passed by the Sessions
Judge, Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the
injured person did not support the prosecution case. They
were declared hostile. Hence, learned Sessions Judge gave
the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted them. This
again is not a clean acquittal. Use of firearms in this manner
is a serious matter. For entry in the police force, acquittal
order based on benefit of doubt in a serious case of this
nature is bound to act as an impediment.
24. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushil
Kumar. In that case, the respondent therein had appeared
for recruitment as a constable in Delhi Police Services. He
was selected provisionally, but, his selection was subject to
verification of character and antecedents by the local police.
On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such
that his appointment to the post of constable was not found
desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He
approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the
application on the ground that since the respondent had
28Page 29
been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable
under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34 and
Section 324 of the IPC, he cannot be denied the right of
appointment to the post under the State. This Court
disapproved of the Tribunal’s view. It was observed that
verification of the character and antecedents is one of the
important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is
suitable to the post under the State. This Court observed
that though the candidate was provisionally selected, the
appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint him on
account of his antecedent record and this view taken by the
appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be
said to be unwarranted. Whether the respondent was
discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same
has nothing to do with the question as to whether he should
be appointed to the post. What would be relevant is the
conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a
service and not the actual result thereof. It was argued that
Sushil Kumar must be distinguished from the facts of the
instant case because the respondent therein had concealed
29Page 30
the fact that a criminal case was registered against him,
whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment. It is
not possible for us to accept this submission. The aspect of
concealment was not considered in Sushil Kumar at all.
This Court only concentrated on the desirability to appoint a
person, against whom a criminal case is pending, to a
disciplined force. Sushil Kumar cannot be restricted to
cases where there is concealment of the fact by a candidate
that a criminal case was registered against him. When the
point of concealment or otherwise and its effect was not
argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in Sushil
Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the
cases where there is concealment of facts.
25. Reliance placed by the respondents on Dhaval Singh
is misplaced. In Dhaval Singh, the respondent had not
mentioned the fact that a criminal case was pending against
him in the application form submitted by him on 21-
27/8/1995 seeking post of a constable. He was provisionally
selected and was interviewed pending verification of his
character. Before any order of appointment could be issued
in his favour, he, realizing the mistake, wrote a letter to the
Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15/11/1995 that a
criminal case was pending against him and he had
inadvertently not mentioned this fact in the application form.
On the ground that the respondent had concealed a material
fact, his candidature was cancelled on 20/11/1995. He was
acquitted in the criminal case on 8/12/1995. On being so
acquitted, he filed a representation before the Commissioner
of Police which was turned down. He approached the
Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the cancellation of
candidature of the respondent and the rejection of his
representation. Aggrieved by this, the Commissioner of
Police approached this Court. This Court confirmed the
Tribunal’s order basically on the ground that the order of
cancellation dated 20/11/1995 did not show that the
information furnished by the respondent vide his letter dated
15/11/1995 was communicated to the Commissioner of
Police. There was no indication in the record that the
competent authority had a look at the letter. Therefore, the
31Page 32
cancellation of candidature was without any proper
application of mind and without taking into consideration all
relevant materials. The Tribunal’s order was upheld on the
ground of non-application of mind by the Commissioner of
Police to a vital fact. Besides, this Court also noted that
pursuant to the Tribunal’s order the respondent therein was
already reinstated. This decision will have no application to
the present case. Reliance on Ghurey Lal is also
misplaced. There can be no debate over the observation
made by this Court in that case that an accused is presumed
to be innocent till proved guilty. These observations were
made while dealing with a reversal of acquittal by the High
Court. They are not relevant to the present case.
26. So far as respondent - Mehar Singh is concerned, his
case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that
acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be
treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the
purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no
32Page 33
merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have
to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable
atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to
disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce
arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of
pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be
brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high
standard of police force, the Screening Committee may
decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears to
it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted
for that.
27. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the
fact that in their application and/or attestation form they
have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do
not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of
these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential
requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts
honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
the police force. The respondents should not, therefore,
expect to score any brownie points because of this
33Page 34
disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in
issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding
whether a person against whom a criminal case was
registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should
be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant
is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement,
whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by
giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile
or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the
propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in
future. 
This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by
the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the
Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not
mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it
cannot be questioned.
28. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the
great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public
order in the society. People repose great faith and
34Page 35
confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A
candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person
of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character
and integrity. 
A person having criminal antecedents will not
fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in
the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have
to be examined to see whether he has been completely
exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his
taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of
the police force. 
The Standing Order, therefore, has
entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the
Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide.
 In
recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished.
Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner
by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of
concern.
The reputation of the police force has taken a
beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the
importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening
Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that
persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter
the police force. At the same time, the Screening
Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed
in it and must treat all candidates with even hand.
29. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have been
assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in
the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However,
certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly
persons involved in serious offences have been
recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee.
It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not
attracted. This doctrine does not envisage negative equality
(Fuljit Kaur).
 It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or
fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the
Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the
object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people
with doubtful background do not enter the police force,
deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry
36Page 37
of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of
committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but
we cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing
the respondents to rely on such cases.
 It is for the
Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the
Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the
police force in any case and to take remedial action if he
finds that it has done so. Public interest demands an indepth examination of this allegation at the highest level.
Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for
the spurt in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner
of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is
substance in the allegations to take necessary steps
forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is
strictly implemented.
30. Our attention is drawn to certain orders of this Court
where, according to the respondents, special leave petitions
filed by the State, arising out of similar fact situations, have
been dismissed. It is not necessary for us to state that in
37
limine dismissal of special leave petition does not mean that
this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned
therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the
threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any
declaration of law or a binding precedent. This submission
is, therefore, rejected. 
31. In the ultimate analysis, 
we are of the view that the
opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these
cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of
Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that 
both the respondents are
not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force
does not merit any interference. 
It is legally sustainable. 
The
Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting
aside the order of cancellation of the respondents’
candidature. 
In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed.
The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the
appeals are set aside. 
The cancellation of candidature of the
respondents - Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld. 
38Page 39
………………………….J.
(G.S. Singhvi]
………………………….J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi
July 02, 2013

The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 = High court instead of dismissing the writ petition on withdrawal of writ, ought to have consider the same under this act = “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments. ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= The inquiry was proceeded for about 11 years, when the finding was given that the appellant is insane and the order of compulsory retirement was passed on 15th October, 2007.= The appellant was appointed in the service of respondents as an IAS officer and joined in the year 1977. He served for 30 years till the order of his compulsory retirement was issued on 15th October, 2007. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant was insane and in spite of that he was appointed as an IAS Officer in 1977. Therefore, even it is presumed that the appellant became insane, as held by the Inquiry Officer, mentally illness being one of the disabilities under Section 2(i) of the Act, 1995, under Section 47 it was not open to the respondents to dispense with, or reduce in rank of the appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. If the appellant, after acquiring disability was not suitable for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. Further, if it was not possible to adjust the appellant against any post, the respondents ought to have kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or, until the appellant attained the age of superannuation whichever was earlier.= The High Court also failed to notice the relevant fact and without going into the merit allowed the counsel to withdraw the writ petition merely on the basis of the finding of Inquiry Officer. In fact the High Court ought to have referred the matter to a Medical Board to find out whether the appellant was insane and if so found, in that case instead of dismissing the case as withdrawn, the matter should have been decided on merit by appointing an Advocate as amicus curiae. ; It is informed at the bar that in normal course the appellant would have superannuated from service on 31st July, 2012. we have no other option but to set aside the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant dated 15th October, 2007 passed by the respondents; the order dated 22nd December, 2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A.No.2784/2008 and the impugned order dated 20th April, 2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.2622/2010 and the case is remitted to the respondents with a direction to treat the appellant continued in the service till the date of his superannuation. The appellant shall be paid full salary minus the subsistence allowance already received for the period from the date of initiation of departmental proceeding on the ground that he was suffering from mental illness till the date of compulsory retirement. The appellant shall also be provided with full salary from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of superannuation in view of the first and second proviso to Section 47 of the Act, 1995. If the appellant has already been superannuated, he will also be entitled to full retiral benefits counting the total period in service. The benefits shall be paid to the appellant within three months, else the respondents will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the amount was due, till the actual payment. 21. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions but there shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40495
Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4944  OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.26400 OF 2010)
ANIL KUMAR MAHAJAN  …APPELLANT
VERUS
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES
AND PENSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING, NEW DELHI. AND OTHERS           … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against
the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of
Delhi dated 20th April, 2010 in W.P.(C)No.2622 of 2010.
The   relevant   portion   of   the   said   judgment   reads   as
follows:
“O R D E R
20.04.2010
After   some   arguments,   learned   counsel
for  the    petitioner  seeks  to  withdraw   the
petition as a finding has been given by the
respondents,   that   the   petitioner   is   an
insane   person   and   the   petition   has   been
filed by the insane person himself and not
through the next friend.
In   the   circumstances,   learned   counsel
Page 2
2
for   the   petitioner   seeks   to   withdraw   the
petition   with   liberty   to   file   an
appropriate   petition   through   the   next
friend.
Dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty
prayed for.
All   the   pending   applications   are   also
disposed.”
3. The   aforesaid   order   has   been   challenged   by   the
appellant on two counts mainly:
(i) The   High   Court   failed   to   decide   the
question   as   to   whether   the   appellant   is   an
insane person; and
(ii) If so, i.e. if the appellant is insane,
the High Court ought not to have allowed the
lawyer who received instructions from an insane
person to withdraw the case.
4. In this case, it is not necessary to discuss all the
facts,  except the relevant one, as mentioned hereunder:
The appellant joined the Indian Administrative Service
(I.A.S.) on 12th  July, 1977. He alleged that while he was
posted   as   an   Additional   Secretary­cum­Editor   of   State
Gazatteer, Bihar at Patna, he was placed under suspension
from   17th  February,   1988   to   20th  February,   1988   and   by
another order dated 24th February, 1988 he was placed under
suspension till further orders. Subsequently, the order ofPage 3
3
suspension   was   revoked   on   24th  February,   1990.   He   moved
before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, in
O.A.No.288/1991 seeking a direction to the respondents to
promote him to the selection grade from the date he became
entitled with all the consequential benefits. The appellant
contended that he has a clean service record, except for
the year 1985­86 for which an adverse ACR was communicated
to him by letter dated 25th  February, 1989, after a lapse
of near about three years. The detailed facts related to
adverse entry, etc. were brought on record and the Tribunal
after hearing the parties, by the judgment dated 22nd June,
1992 held that it was not just and fair to act upon the
adverse   entry   of   1985­86   against   which   the   appellant's
representation   is   still   pending   and   directed   the
respondents   to   consider   his   case   in   the   next   DPC   for
promotion to the selection grade on the basis of existing
material. The said application was accordingly disposed of
by the Tribunal.
5. It   appears   that   another   application   Registration
O.A.No.238/1991   was   preferred   by   the   appellant   before
the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal,   Patna   Bench,
wherein on the revocation order of suspension he prayed
for a direction to the respondents to give him a post
befitting   to   his   status   with   further   prayer   to   directPage 4
4
the respondents to pay his  salary for the period from
February, 1990 onwards with interest and cost. The said
application was disposed of on 10th October, 1992 with a
direction to the respondents to pay the appellant salary
for the certain period with interest.
6. Subsequently, the appellant was placed under suspension
on   20th  May,   1993   and   was   subjected   to   departmental
inquiry   by   the   Member   Board   of   Revenue   and   Inquiry
Officer who framed charges by Memo No. 6056 dated 22nd
June, 1993 against the appellant.
7. Appellant in his reply stated that a number of time he
was   placed   under   suspension   and   proceedings   were
initiated in that regard, and orders are made directing
him to be present before a Medical Board, which not only
tortured him but also his family, and also stated that
he had developed incurable ulcer, hence he expressed his
inability to be present before the inquiry.
8. It   appears   that   one   of   the   charges   was   that   the
appellant  while  posted  as  Officer  on  Special  Duty,  Bihar
State   Planning   Council   had   directed   Treasury   Officers,
Secretariat Treasury, Patna to reject the bills of one Shri
P.K.   Mishra,   Development   Commissioner   which   was   an   act
beyond his jurisdiction. The second charge was that whilePage 5
5
submitting   one   of   the   Travelling   Allowance   Bills,   the
appellant requested the Secretary(Personnel) to countersign
the  bill.  He  alleged  that  his  Controlling  Officer,  i.e.,
the Development Commissioner cannot countersign the bill as
a   case   is   being   pursued   against   him   under   Mental   Health
Act, 1987. The third charge was that the appellant accused
the   Development   Commissioner   of   losing   his   mental
stability.     Fourth   charge   was   related   to   description   of
duties written by him as per the confidential report (1985­
86) which shows that the  appellant has become a victim of
imbalanced mental illness.  Fifth charge was that one Shri
Bhaskar   Banerjee,   the   then   Land   Reforms   Commissioner   has
accused   the     appellant   of   being     indisciplined,
irresponsible, unstable and mentally sick.
9. The appellant filed a representation on 25th  February,
2000   to   the   respondents   seeking   voluntary   retirement.   He
remained   under   suspension   for   a   long   period.     When   the
suspension  was  not  revoked  even  after  several  years,   the
appellant   preferred   representation   before   the   higher
authorities   which   was   rejected   by   the   Ministry   of
Personnel,   Public   Grievances&   Pension   Department   of
Personnel & Training on 29th April, 2002. The representation
of   the   appellant   seeking   voluntary   retirement   was   also
rejected   on   the   ground   that   he   had   not   qualified   thePage 6
6
minimum   20   years   of   service   and   thus   as   per   the
respondents, he was not eligible for voluntary retirement.
10. After about 11 years the Inquiry Officer submitted the
report on 4th December, 2004. According to the appellant he
was   not granted any opportunity of being heard   and the
Inquiry Officer submitted an ex­parte report against him.
The   suspension   order   seems   to   have   been   revoked   by   the
respondents with effect from 23rd October, 1998.
11. A writ petition was filed by the appellant before the
High Court; wherein a counter­affidavit was filed and the
respondents took a plea that despite the revocation of the
suspension   order   of   the   appellant,   he   never   joined   the
duties and remained absent despite repeated reminders made
by the Department.   In the writ petition preferred by the
appellant, the High Court has recorded the submissions of
the appellant that he would be satisfied if the respondents
considered his request for voluntary retirement and release
him from his service. A contempt petition was also filed by
the   appellant   in   2006   on   the   ground   of   violation   of   the
order dated 9th  May, 2006 passed by the Delhi High Court.
During the pendency of the writ petition and the contempt
petition,  the authorities the passed impugned order dated
15th October, 2007,  whereby the appellant was compulsorily
retired from service.   Page 7
7
12. The   appellant   preferred   an   application   being
O.A.No.2784/2008   before   the   Central   Administrative
Tribunal,  Principal Bench, New Delhi wherein he challenged
the departmental proceedings. Before the Tribunal, learned
counsel for the appellant contended that though the Inquiry
Officer had returned a finding in favour of the appellant,
insofar as charge No.3 is concerned, but the disciplinary
authority without recording a note of dissent held that the
said  charge  as  well  stands  proved.  The  Tribunal  accepted
that the disciplinary authority had not recorded any note
of dissent and accepted the report of the Inquiry Officer.
The   tentative   view   of   the   disciplinary     authority,   even
when   charge   No.3   stood   not   proved;   was   to   punish   the
appellant with the compulsory retirement.  But the Tribunal
found   that   it   was   only   U.P.S.C.   which   has   returned   a
finding of guilt insofar as, charge No.3 was concerned, and
the   disciplinary   authority   has   only   accepted   the   said
finding.   Confronted with the aforesaid position, learned
counsel for the appellant contended that the U.P.S.C. had
no  jurisdiction  whatsoever  to  return  a  finding  on  charge
No.3 by reversing the finding given by the Inquiry Officer,
and   that   it   had   only   an   advisory   role   to   play.     It   was
further urged that the disciplinary authority was not bound
to accept the advice of U.P.S.C. The Tribunal went into thePage 8
8
aspects of the case but held that in the context of the
facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no
need to go into the same as  a positive finding has been
given by the Inquiry Officer that the appellant was totally
insane.  The disciplinary authority agreed to the same and
despite the fact that charge No.3 was not proved, and while
taking the same to have not been proved, it was the opinion
of the disciplinary authority that the appellant would need
to   be   compulsorily   retired.   Therefore,   the   Tribunal   held
that   the   opinion   or   advice   of   U.P.S.C.   has   made   no
difference whatsoever in the case.  Insofar as the insanity
of   the   appellant   was   concerned,   it   appears   that   the
appellant was asked to appear before the duly constituted
Medical Board on eight occasions and he refused to appear
before the Medical Board. Instead, he challenged the order
of the Inquiry Officer calling upon him to appear before
the Medical Board.
The   Tribunal,   further,   observed   that  yet   another
reason   to   hold   the   appellant   is   insane,   i.e.,   his   non­
appearance before the duly constituted Medical Board, which
would necessarily lead to an irresistible presumption that
had   the   appellant   appeared   before   the   Medical   Board   the
opinion   of   the   Board   would   indeed   have   been   that   the
appellant is insane.   Having found no merit, the TribunalPage 9
9
dismissed the original application.
13. The appellant then preferred the writ petition being
W.P.(C)No.2622/2010 challenging the finding of the Tribunal
in the said case. The Division Bench passed the impugned
order   dated   20th  April,   2010,   as   quoted   in   the   preceding
paragraph.
14. The SLP was preferred by the appellant in person. In
view   of   the   severe   cardio   respiratory   problem   of   the
appellant,   subsequently   he   did   not   appear   in   person,   he
engaged the counsel.
15. On   hearing   the   parties   and   perusing   the   records,   we
find   that   there   was   some   problem   going   on   between   the
appellant and the authorities of the State which resulted
in   creating   numerous   problems.   Since   1988,   the   appellant
was suspended and for promotion and posting he had to move
before   the   Tribunal   in   the   year   1990.     The   departmental
inquiry was initiated, wherein the allegation was made that
the appellant was mentally sick and then the allegations of
indiscipline, irresponsible and misbehaviour were made. 
The
inquiry was proceeded for about 11 years,  when the finding
was   given   that   the   appellant   is   insane   and   the   order   of
compulsory retirement was passed on 15th October, 2007.
16. The   Persons   with   disabilities   (Equal   Opportunities,
Protection   of   Rights   and   Full   Participation)   Act,   1995
Page 10
10
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1995') was enacted in
the year 1995 with the following statement of objects and
reasons:
(i) to   spell   out   the   responsibility   of   the
State   towards   the   prevention   of
disabilities,   protection   of     rights,
provision   of   medical   care,   education,
training,   employment   and   rehabilitation
of persons with disabilities;
(ii) to   create   barrier   free   environment   for
persons with disabilities;
(iii) to remove any discriminaton against
persons with disabilities in the sharing
of development benefits, vis­à­vis non­
disabled persons;
(iv) to counteract any situation of the abuse
and   the   exploitation   of   persons   with
disabilities;
(v) to lay down a strategy for comprehensive
development   of   programmes   and   services
and   equalization   of   opportunities   for
persons with disabilities; and
(vi) to   make   special   provision   of   the
intergration   of   persons   with
disabilities   into   the   social
mainstream.”
Section 2(i) defines disability:
“Section 2(i) "disability" means­
(i) blindness;
(ii) low vision;
(iii) leprosy-cured;
(iv) hearing impairment;
(v) loco motor disability;
(vi) mental retardation;
(vii) mental illness;” Page 11
11
17. There   is   a   prohibition   imposed   under   Section   47   to
dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires
a disability during his service, which reads as follows:
“47  ­  Non ­discrimination   in   Government
employments.   ­  (1)   No   establishment   shall
dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee
who acquires a disability during his service:
Provided   that,   if   an   employee,   after
acquiring disability is not suitable for the
post he was holding, could be shifted to some
other post with the same pay scale and service
benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible
to  adjust   the  employee   against   any  post,   he
may be kept on a supernumerary post until a
suitable post is available or he attains the
age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No   promotion   shall   be   denied   to   a
person   merely   on   the   ground   of   his
disability:
Provided   that   the   appropriate   Government
may, having regard to the type of work carried
on in any establishment, by notification and
subject to such conditions, if any, as may be
specified   in   such   notification,   exempt   any
establishment   from   the   provisions   of   this
section.”
18. The   appellant   was   appointed   in   the   service   of
respondents as an IAS officer and joined in the year 1977.
He   served   for   30   years   till   the   order   of   his   compulsory
retirement was issued on  15th October, 2007. It is not the
case of the respondents that the appellant was insane and
Page 12
12
in   spite   of   that   he   was   appointed   as   an   IAS   Officer   in
1977.  
Therefore,   even   it   is   presumed   that   the   appellant
became   insane,   as   held   by   the   Inquiry   Officer,   mentally
illness being one of the disabilities under Section 2(i) of
the   Act,   1995,   under   Section   47   it   was   not   open   to   the
respondents   to   dispense   with,   or   reduce   in   rank   of   the
appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. 
If
the appellant, after acquiring disability was not suitable
for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to
some   other   post   with   the   same   pay   scale   and   service
benefits.   
Further, if it was not possible to adjust the
appellant against any post,  the respondents ought to have
kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable
post is available or, until the appellant  attained the age
of superannuation whichever was earlier.
19. In view of the aforesaid finding, we are of the view
that it was not open to the authorities to dispense with
the service of the appellant or to compulsory retire him
from   service.    
The   High   Court   also   failed   to   notice   the
relevant fact and without going into the merit allowed the
counsel to withdraw the writ petition merely on the basis
of the  finding of Inquiry Officer. 
In fact the High Court
ought   to   have   referred   the   matter   to   a   Medical   Board   to
find out whether the appellant was insane and if so found,
Page 13
13
in that case instead of dismissing the case as withdrawn,
the matter should have been decided on merit by appointing
an Advocate as amicus curiae. 
20. It is informed at the bar that in normal course the
appellant   would   have   superannuated   from   service   on   31st
July, 2012.   In that view of the matter, now there is no
question of reinstatement of the appellant though he may be
entitled   for   consequential   benefits   including   arrears   of
pay. 
Having regard to the facts and finding given above,
we
have   no   other   option   but   to   set   aside   the   order   of
compulsory retirement of the appellant dated 15th  October,
2007   passed   by   the   respondents;   the   order   dated   22nd
December,   2008   passed   by   the   Central   Administrative
Tribunal,   Principal   Bench,   New   Delhi   in   O.A.No.2784/2008
and the impugned order dated 20th April, 2010 passed by the
High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.2622/2010 and the case is
remitted to the respondents with a direction to treat the
appellant   continued   in   the   service   till   the   date   of   his
superannuation.   
The   appellant   shall   be   paid   full   salary
minus   the   subsistence   allowance   already   received   for   the
period   from   the   date   of   initiation   of   departmental
proceeding on the ground that he was suffering from mental
illness   till   the   date   of   compulsory   retirement.   The
appellant shall also be provided with full salary from the
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date   of   compulsory   retirement   till   the   date   of
superannuation in view of the first and second proviso to
Section 47 of the Act, 1995. If the appellant has already
been   superannuated,   he   will   also   be   entitled   to   full
retiral benefits counting the total period in service. The
benefits   shall   be   paid   to   the   appellant   within   three
months, else the respondents will be liable to pay interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the amount was
due,  till the actual payment.
21. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations
and directions but there shall be no order as to costs. 
        …..………………………………………….J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
……..……………………………………….J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 2,  2013.Page 15
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