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Tuesday, July 16, 2013

The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, etc.) Act, 1995 = a teacher with mental illness failed to attend her duties and as such she was removed from service due to lack of reply from her. after 3 she filed a complaint before commissioner for reinstatement as she was dismissed when she was under mental distress = For about three years, no action was taken by appellant. In the year 2007 she filed an application before the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act. The said application was registered as Case No. 253/2007. In the said application, the appellant took plea that the order of dismissal passed by the authorities while she was suffering from mental illness was in violation of Section 47(1) of the Act. The appellant requested for her reinstatement with full back­wages.= whether the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act can look into the legality of the order of dismissal from service of a disabled person, if it comes to his notice that the said person with disabilities has been deprived of his rights. whether the appellant was entitled for benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act. 13. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act was enacted in 1995 pursuant to meet the following object and reasons: (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii)to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis­à­vis non­ disabled persons; (iv)to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi)to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream. “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= Learned Single Judge by interim order dated 11th January, 2008 directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant and to pay her regular salary w.e.f 1.2.2008 on the following terms: “8. RULE (a)By interim order, there shall be stay against the impugned order of the Commissioner to the extent that the petitioner shall not be required to pay any backwages to the respondent, but the petitioner shall reinstate the respondent in service by paying regular salary to her from 1.2.2008. (b)It is further observed that directed that the petitioner shall get respondent examined through a Government Doctor of their choice and if it is so opined by the doctor, such duty may be assigned to the respondent at a place or a nearby place, where she can comfortably and conveniently, in a safe atmosphere, discharge duty.”- Inspite of the same, the respondent authority have neither reinstated the appellant nor paid salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008. So, they cannot take advantage of their own wrong and, thereby, cannot deny the benefit of wages to which the appellant was entitled pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on 11th January, 2008. -There is nothing on the record to suggest that the respondent authority got the appellant examined by a Government Doctor to determine the duty to be assigned to her. In view of her reinstatement, now the respondent authority may get opinion of the doctor for assigning her duty. In case the appellant is not in a position to perform the normal duty because of her mental condition, the competent authority will apply Proviso to Section 47(1) of the said Act. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the authorities to reinstate the appellant in service immediately and to pay her regular salary every month. The appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the respondent shall pay within three months, else the appellant shall become entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 1.2.2008 till the actual payment. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40492
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9324 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.7647 of 2011)
GEETABEN  RATILAL PATEL          …
APPELLANT
VERSUS
DISTRICT PRIMARY EDUCATION OFFICER          …
RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
This appeal is directed against the order dated
4th November, 2009 passed by the Division Bench of
Gujarat High Court in L.P.A.No. 1988 of 2009 whereby
the Division Bench dismissed the said Letters Patent
Appeal   preferred   by  the  appellant  and  affirmed   the
order   dated   10th  December,   2008   passed   by   learned
Single   Judge   in   Writ   Petition­Special   Civil
Application   No.   27730/2007.     In   the   said   writ
1Page 2
petition the order passed by the Commissioner under
Section  62  of  the  Persons  with  Disabilities  (Equal
Opportunities,   Protection   of     Rights   and   Full
Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”)  in case No. 253/2007 was set aside.  
2. The   main   question   that   arises   for   our
consideration   is  
whether   the   Commissioner   under
Section 62 of the Act can look  into the legality of
the   order   of   dismissal   from   service   of   a   disabled
person,     if   it   comes   to   his   notice   that   the   said
person with   disabilities has been deprived of his
rights. 
3. The     factual   matrix     of   the   case     is     as
follows:
The   appellant   who   was   appointed   on   30th    July,
1990   as   Primary   Teacher   in     Vagara   School     was
transferred   to   Primary   School,   Tal.Manda,   Bharuch
from 18th  June, 1999. Thereafter,   she proceeded on
medical leave from 21st June, 1999 to 30th July, 1999,
and remained on leave  upto 7th September, 1999.  In
that respect, she had not produced any type of leave
report.     Thereafter, from 15th  September, 1999, she
2Page 3
again   remained   absent   unauthorisedly   without
producing any kind of leave report.
4. In   the   meantime,     on   31st  December,   1999,   a
notice   was   issued   to   the   appellant   regarding   her
time to time absence and she was thereby   informed
to explain   in writing the grounds for her absence
within   seven   days.   But   neither   written   nor   oral
explanation   was     received   by   the   authorities.
Thereafter,  she  directly  resumed   her  duties  in   the
school   on     25th  November,   2000.     The   Principal   of
Primary   School,   Manad   had   informed   the   same   to
Taluka   Development   Officer,   Bharuch,   who   in   turn
intimated   the   same   to   the     District   Panchayat
Committee,   Bharuch.     After     resumption   of   duty   on
25th November, 2000, the appellant went on leave from
time   to   time   without   pay.     In   this   respect,     by
memorandum     letter   dated     28th  July,   2002   she   was
served with a charge­sheet   and  informed to submit
her explanation in writing within 7 days.  Since no
explanation was submitted by the appellant, she had
been   informed   in   writing   vide   letter     dated     4th
March, 2003 to submit the medical certificate of   a
Civil Surgeon with respect to her illness within 7
3Page 4
days.   But neither any medical certificate  nor any
explanation in writing or in oral,   was submitted.
By   letter   dated   30th  April,   2003     of     Taluka
Development   Officer,   Bharuch,     the   matter   was
referred to the higher authority.           Thereafter,
the final notice was issued by letter dated 9th July,
2003  directing  the   appellant   to  explain  in   writing
within   7   days   for   her   continuous   absence,
irregularity and carelessness towards her duty.  The
appellant failed to submit her reply or explanation
to   the   said   notice   within   the   stipulated   period.
Therefore, by giving another opportunity of defence,
a   reminder   letter   was   issued   on   25th  August,   2003
followed  by  another  letter  of  similar  nature  dated
28th  August, 2003.
  Having received no reply again,
vide order dated 15th  April, 2004 she was dismissed
from service by the respondent under Section 24 of
the   Primary   Education   Act   read   with   Gujarat
Panchayat   Services   (Discipline   and   Appeal)   Rules,
1997   on   the   ground   of   carelessness   towards   duty,
absence from duty, irregularity, breach of orders of
the higher authorities and having badly affected the
future of the children.
4Page 5
5. For about  three years,  no  action  was  taken  by
appellant.    
 In   the   year   2007   she   filed   an
application before the Commissioner under Section 62
of     the Act.   
The said application was registered
as Case No. 253/2007.  
 In the said application, the
appellant   took   plea   that   the   order   of   dismissal
passed   by   the   authorities   while   she   was   suffering
from   mental   illness   was   in   violation   of   Section
47(1) of the Act.   
The appellant requested for her
reinstatement with full back­wages.
6. The   complaint   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   was
filed and verified by her father.     Therefore, the
Commissioner while issuing notice to the respondent
authority also issued notice to the appellant on 30th
June,   2007   calling   upon   both   the   parties   to   be
present on 24th July, 2007 at the time of hearing.
7. At   the   time   of   hearing   the   appellant   herself
remained present alongwith her father and on behalf
of   the   respondent   Shri   Maganbhai   B.   Vasava,   Head
Clerk and Shri Dilavarshinh A. Raj, Junior Clerk had
remained   present.    
The   appellant   contended   that
though   she   was   physically   healthy   at   the   time   of
joining the services because of mental illness that
5Page 6
developed afterwards she was treated by doctors time
to   time,   who   advised   her   to   take   rest.     She
specifically pleaded that since she was divorced by
her husband in the year 1998,  she started suffering
from mental depression which resulted in 40 to   70
per   cent   mental   disability.     A   certificate   issued
by the Medical Board of Government Hospital was also
produced  before the Commissioner.  
8. On behalf of respondent, it was contended that
the   appellant   unauthorisedly   remained     absent   from
service from time to time and   in spite of giving
opportunity to her, she never replied and because of
her   carelessness   and   negligence   towards   duty,   the
students suffered. It was further submitted that   a
charge sheet was also issued to her in this regard
but     having   received   no   reply   from   her,     she   was
dismissed from service.
9.  The Commissioner after hearing the parties and
on   perusal     of   the   evidence   held     that   as   the
appellant   was   suffering   from     40   to   70   per   cent
mental   disability   at   the   time   of   dismissal,     the
said order of dismissal was void. It was also held
that if  the appellant is not in a position  to work
6Page 7
in   the large educational interest of the students
then   an appropriate post should be created for her
and   her   appointment     to   that   post   be   made   as   per
Section   47   of   the   Act.   It   was   also   directed     to
count  the  intervening  period as continuous period
in service without any break and also to select the
place of service of the appellant in such a manner
that   she     can   live   with     her   parents     as   she
requires   constant   assistance   to   become   mentally
healthy.
10. The respondent challenged the  said order before
the   learned   Single   Judge   of     the   High   Court   in
Special   Civil   Application   No.   27730/2007.     In   the
said   case,   the   learned   Single   Judge   passed   an
interim   order   on   11th  January,   2008   with   following
observation:­
 “2. Upon hearing the learned Counsel
for   both   the   sides,   it   prima   facie
appears   that   the   respondent   was
engaged   as   a   teacher     in   the   year
1990 and it is an admitted position
that she continued in service up to
1999,     for   a   period   of   about   9
years.  In the year 1999, on account
of the divorce, she sustained mental
disability and as a result thereof,
she   had   undergone   a   prolonged
treatment.     Due   to   mental
disability,   it   appears   that   she
7Page 8
might   not   have   appeared   in   the
inquiry proceedings initiated by the
petitioner.   As per the petitioner,
she   remained   absent   and   not   even
defended the inquiry proceedings and
the   order   of   dismissal   was   passed.
It   is   true   that   the   order   of
dismissal   is   not   challenged   by   the
respondent  before  the  higher  forum,
however,   she   has   approached   the
Commissioner   for   physically
Handicapped   persons   and   ultimately,
the   Commissioner   has   passed   the
order,   setting   aside   the   dismissal
and also interim directions.
3. Whether the Commissioner has no
power to set aside the order of the
dismissal   or   not   deserves
consideration,     but   at   the   same
time,  it also appears that it is on
account   of   the   mental   disability,
the   respondent   could   not   defend   in
the   proceedings   and   as   a   result
thereof,     the   order   of   dismissal
came   to   be   passed.     It   is   an
admitted   position   that   the
respondent is mentally disabled and,
therefore,   had   the   order   of
dismissal   not   been   there,   the
respondent otherwise would have been
entitled   to   the   benefits   of     the
Act,   namely;    
The   Persons   with
Disabilities   (Equal   Opportunities,
etc.)   Act,   1995   and   more
particularly,     Section   47   of   the
Act.”
“4. Ms.   Mandavia,     learned   Counsel
appearing   for   the   petitioner,
however, submitted that it is not a
case   of   dismissal   from   the   service
on account of the mental disability
or   reduction   in   rank   and   ,
therefore,   if   the   dismissal   has
already   taken   place,     it   cannot   be
set aside by the Commissioner, which
8Page 9
may   result   into   consequential
reinstatement   in   service   with   back
wages   and   other   directions.     She
also   submitted   that   on   account   of
the   mental   disability   of     the
respondent,  she is not at all in a
position   to     discharge   any   other
work also.
5. Whereas,     Mr.   Jani,     learned
Counsel   appearing     for   the
respondent submitted that as per the
medical certificate produced on page
60   of   the   Chief   District   Medical
Officer and Civil Surgeon,   she has
mental   disability   upto   40   to   70%
and,   therefore,   she   may   be   in   a
position to do minor manual work in
the School,  if assigned to her.
6. It   appears   that   if   the   person
has   sustained   physical   disability,
including  that  of  mental  disability
while   in   service,     it   would   be
required for the authority to extend
benefit   of   Section   47   of   the   Act.
Keeping in view   the peculiar facts
and   circumstances   that   when   the
departmental actions were initiated,
she   had   already   sustained   mental
disability, a  pragmatic approach  is
required   to   be   taken.   Further,     it
will be for the concerned Doctor to
certify   regarding   the   nature   of
duty,     which   can   safely   and
conveniently   be   performed   by   the
respondent after due examination.
7. Since,   at   this   stage,       the
order   of   dismissal   is   yet   not
finalized by this Court,   there may
not be any payment of backwages and
ultimately whether the  Commissioner
has   power   or   not   is   an   aspect
finally to be decided at the   later
stage.     However,   it appears that
since   the   respondent   is   having
9Page 10
mental   disability   of   40   to   70   per
cent,   it would be just and proper
to allow the operation of  the order
passed by the Commissioner so as to
enable the respondent to get regular
salary and after examination by the
competent   doctor   appropriate   duty
may be assigned to her.
8. In view of the aforesaid,  I am
inclined   to   pass   the   following
order:­
RULE
(a)By interim order,  there shall be stay
against   the   impugned   order   of   the
Commissioner   to   the   extent   that   the
petitioner shall not be required to pay
any backwages to the respondent, but the
petitioner shall reinstate the respondent
in   service   by   paying   regular   salary   to
her from 1.2.2008.
(b)It   is   further   observed   that   directed
that the petitioner shall get respondent
examined   through   a   Government   Doctor   of
their choice  and if it  is so opined by
the doctor,   such duty   may be assigned
to the respondent at a place or a nearby
place,   where   she   can   comfortably   and
conveniently,   in   a   safe   atmosphere,
discharge duty.”
11. The   case   was   subsequently   taken   up   by   another
learned   Single   Judge   on   10th  December,   2008   who
finally   disposed   of   the   matter.     This   time     the
learned   Single   Judge   neither   perused   the   report   of
the     government   doctor   nor   noticed   the   question
10Page 11
whether the interim order passed by the High Court on
11.1.2008   was   complied   by   assigning     duty   to   the
appellant   at   the   nearby   place   where   she     can
comfortably   and   conveniently     in   safe     atmosphere
discharge   her   duties.     Learned   Single   Judge   also
failed   to   decide   the   question   whether   the
Commissioner  had jurisdiction to interfere with the
order   of   dismissal.     On     10th  December,   2008,
learned  Single Judge dismissed the  writ petition on
the following grounds  and observation:­
“14.   In   the   present   case,   the
respondent has remained on long leave
and   she   has   not   responded   to   any   of
the   communications   by   the   petitioner.
Her   services   were   terminated   in   the
year   2004   on   the   ground   of
absenteeism. Though the respondent was
asked   to   produce   certificate   she   has
failed to comply with the same.
15.  In   short,   after  2004   she   was   not
in   service   and   therefore,   the
respondent   cannot   rely   upon   the
provisions   of   said   section   which
clearly   states   that   no   establishment
shall   dispense   with,   or   reduce   in
rank,   an   employee  who   acquires   a
disability   during   his   service.  I   am
therefore   of   the   view   that   the   said
section   would   be   of   no   help   to   the
respondent.   Even   otherwise,   she   had
served   for   only   2   months   and   she
remained absent from 1990 prior to act
came into force.
11Page 12
16. As regards the contention that the
respondent sick, it is required to be
noted that the respondent was asked to
produce   medical   certificate   which   was
not   produced.   Further   it   is   required
to   be   noted  that   she   has   served  only
for 20 months in all.
17. Even otherwise the respondent was
dismissed   in   the   year   2004.   She   has
challenged   the   said   decision   after   a
period of more than three years, which
is   grossly   time­barred.   The   competent
authority ought to have applied their
mind   before   passing   the   impugned
order.   The   Commissioner   has   therefore
committed   an   error   in   setting   aside
the order of termination.
18.   In   any   case   the   absenteeism   is
from   the   year   1990,  prior   to   the   Act
came into force. The provisions of the
Act   will   apply   only   during   service.
Therefore   the   contention   of   the
petitioner cannot be accepted.
19.   It   is   also   required   to   be   noted
that   the   respondent   was   teacher   and
she   remained   absent   unreasonably   long
period   as   a  result   of   which  the  post
was vacant and the petitioner was not
able to appoint anybody. The ultimate
sufferers   were   the   students.   In   such
situation,   I   am  of   the   view  that   the
competent   authority   was   justified   in
dismissing   the   respondent   after
following the proper procedure.”
12. On an appeal, the Division Bench by its impugned
order   dated   4th  November,   2009   affirmed   the   order
passed by the  learned Single Judge and the same is
12Page 13
under challenge before this Court now.
 The Division
Bench   also   committed   the   same   error   as   the   Single
Judge, by not deciding the question of jurisdiction
of   the Commissioner   and the question
whether the
appellant   was   entitled   for   benefits   under   Section
47(1)  of  the Act.
13. The   Persons   with   Disabilities   (Equal
Opportunities,   Protection   of     Rights   and   Full
Participation) Act  was enacted in  1995 pursuant to
meet the following object and reasons:
(i) to spell out the responsibility of the
State   towards   the   prevention   of
disabilities,   protection   of     rights,
provision   of   medical   care,   education,
training, employment and rehabilitation
of persons with disabilities;
(ii) to create barrier free environment for
persons with disabilities;
(iii)to   remove   any   discrimination   against
persons with disabilities in the sharing of
development   benefits,   vis­à­vis     non­
disabled persons;
(iv)to   counteract   any   situation   of   the
abuse and the exploitation of persons with
disabilities;
(v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive
development of programmes and services and
equalization   of   opportunities   for   persons
with disabilities; and
13Page 14
(vi)to   make   special   provision   of   the
integration   of   persons   with   disabilities
into the social mainstream.
14. To   decide   the   present     issue,   it   is   also
relevant to notice Section 47 of the Act which deals
with non­discrimination  in Government employment and
reads as follows:
“47  ­  Non­discrimination   in   Government
employments   ­  (1)   No   establishment   shall
dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee
who acquires a disability during his service:
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring
disability is not suitable for the post he was
holding, could be shifted to some other post
with the same pay scale and service benefits:
Provided further that if it is not possible to
adjust the employee against any post, he may
be   kept   on   a   supernumerary   post   until   a
suitable post is available or he attains the
age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person
merely on the ground of  his disability:
Provided that the appropriate Government may,
having regard to the type of work carried on
in   any   establishment,   by   notification   and
subject to such conditions, if any, as may be
specified   in   such   notification,   exempt   any
establishment   from   the   provisions   of   this
section.”
15. The   appointment,   function   and   duties   of   the
Chief   Commissioner   and   Commissioners   for   Persons
with Disabilities  have been laid down under Chapter
XII  of  the Act.
14Page 15
Under   Section   58(c)     of   the   Act   the   Chief
Commissioner   shall   take     steps   to   safeguard   the
rights   and   facilities   made   available   to   persons
with disabilities.
The Commissioner  is empowered  under Section 62
of the Act to look into the complaints in respect to
matters relating to deprivation of rights of  persons
with disabilities, which reads as follows:­
  “62  ­  Commissioner   to   look   into
complaints   with   respect   to   matters
relating   to   deprivation   of   rights   of
persons   with   disabilities.­  Without
prejudice to the provisions of section 61
the Commissioner may of his own motion or
on the application of any aggrieved person
or   otherwise   look   into   complaints   with
respect to matters relating to­­
(a) deprivation  of rights of persons with
disabilities;
(b)   non­implementation   of   laws,   rules,
bye­laws,   regulations,   executive   orders,
guidelines or instructions made or issued
by   the   appropriate   Governments   and   the
local   authorities   for   the   welfare   and
protection   of   rights   of   persons   with
disabilities,
and     take   up   the   matter   with   the
appropriate authorities.”
16.      The provisions of Sections 47 and 62 of the
Act,   when   read   together,   empower   the   Commissioner,
to   look     into   the   complaint   with   respect   to   the
15Page 16
matters relating to deprivation of rights of persons
with   disabilities   and   non­implementation   of   laws,
rules,   bye­laws,   regulations,   executive   orders,
guidelines or instructions issued by the appropriate
Governments or local authorities and to   take up the
matter   with   the   appropriate   authorities for   the
welfare   and protection of   rights of persons with
disabilities   including   matter   relating   to
dispensation with service or reduction in rank.  The
power   of   the   Commissioner     “to   look   into   the
complaints   with   respect   to   the   matters   relating   to
deprivation of rights” as provided under Section 62
of   the   Act   is   not   an   empty   formality   and     the
Commissioner   is   required   to   apply   his   mind   on   the
question raised by the complainant   to find out the
truth behind the complaint.   If so necessary,   the
Commissioner   may  suo   motu    inquire   into   the   matter
and/or after giving notice,   hearing   the concerned
parties and going through the records may decide the
complaint.         If     it   comes   to   the   notice   of   the
Commissioner that a person with  disability has been
deprived of his rights or that the authorities have
flouted   any   law,     rule,     guideline,     instruction,
16Page 17
etc. issued  by the  appropriate Government or local
authorities,  the  Commissioner  is required to take
up   the   matter   with   the   appropriate   authority   to
ensure restoration of rights of such disabled person
and/or   to   implement   the   law,   rule,   guideline,
instruction if not followed.  A complaint may be made
by any disabled person himself   or   any   person on
behalf of  disabled persons or  by any person in the
interest   of   disabled   persons.     Thus   the   issue   as
involved is  decided  affirmatively in favour of the
appellant and against the respondent.      
17. The appellant was appointed as   Primary Teacher
on   30th  July,   1990   and   continued   for     nine   years
without any complaint till she proceeded on medical
leave on   21st  June, 1999. She thereafter, remained
absent   from   time   to   time   for   about   1360   days   from
June,   1999   till     the   date   of   dismissal.    
 The
appellant   has   taken   a   specific   plea   that   she   was
divorced by her  husband in the  year 1998 and since
then she suffered mental depression.  
The Government
Medical   Board   also   held   the   appellant   mentally
disabled as she was suffering from 40 to 70 per cent
mental     disability.     
The   order   of   dismissal   was
17Page 18
passed during her mental disability  in violation of
Section 47(1) of the Act.   In this background,  the
Commissioner having declared the  order of dismissal
as   void,     it   was   not   open   to   the   High   Court     to
interfere with such order and to restore the illegal
order of dismissal.
18. Whether     under   Section   62   of   the   Act,   the
Commissioner  was  competent to declare the order of
dismissal  as void,  was one of the question framed
by     the   learned   Single   Judge   by   order   dated
11.1.2008.   But at the time of hearing,  the learned
Single   Judge   failed   to   notice   and   decide     the
question so raised. The Division Bench also failed to
notice the aforesaid  fact and remained silent on the
issue.
19. From   the   documents     on   record,   we   find   that
show cause notices were issued to the appellant  and
charges   were   framed   but     there   is   nothing   on   the
record   to   suggest   that   any   departmental   proceeding
was   initiated.     Neither   any   inquiry   officer   was
appointed, nor any  notice was issued by any inquiry
officer   to   the   appellant   to   remain   present   in   the
departmental   proceeding.   No       evidence   was   relied
18Page 19
upon   by   the   respondent   to   bring   home   the   charges.
Aforesaid facts also show that the order of dismissal
was       passed   in   violation   of   rules   of   natural
justice.
20. Now the  question remains about the back wages,
if any, to which the appellant is entitled.      
The
appellant   remained absent   from duty from time to
time for about 1360 days  when she was  in service.
Therefore, she  cannot claim any wages for  the said
period.     The   order   of   dismissal     was   passed   on
15.4.2004,   but she moved   before the Commissioner
after a span of  three years i.e. in the year 2007.
There being delay on her part,  in moving before the
Commissioner,  she cannot  claim any salary  for such
intervening period.
21.       Learned   Single   Judge   by   interim   order   dated
11th  January,   2008   directed   the   respondent   to
reinstate the appellant and to pay her regular salary
w.e.f  1.2.2008 on the following  terms: 
“8. RULE
(a)By interim order,  there shall be stay
against   the   impugned   order   of   the
Commissioner   to   the   extent   that   the
petitioner shall not be required to pay
19Page 20
any backwages to the respondent, but the
petitioner shall reinstate the respondent
in   service   by   paying   regular   salary   to
her from 1.2.2008.
(b)It   is   further   observed   that   directed
that the petitioner shall get respondent
examined   through   a   Government   Doctor   of
their choice  and if it  is so opined by
the doctor,   such duty   may be assigned
to the respondent at a place or a nearby
place,   where   she   can   comfortably   and
conveniently,   in   a   safe   atmosphere,
discharge duty.”
22. Inspite of the same,  the respondent  authority
have     neither     reinstated   the   appellant   nor   paid
salary   w.e.f.   1.2.2008.  
 So,   they   cannot   take
advantage of their own wrong and, thereby,   cannot
deny the benefit  of wages to which the appellant was
entitled   pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   High
Court on 11th January, 2008.  
23. There is nothing on the record to suggest that
the respondent authority got the appellant examined
by a Government Doctor to determine the duty to be
assigned to her.   
In view of her reinstatement, now
the   respondent   authority   may     get   opinion   of   the
doctor   for   assigning   her   duty.         
In     case   the
appellant is not  in a position to perform the normal
20Page 21
duty because of her mental condition,  the competent
authority   will   apply     Proviso   to   Section   47(1)   of
the said Act. 
24. Having regard to the fact   that we have upheld
the order  passed by the Commissioner,  we direct the
authorities     to   reinstate   the   appellant   in   service
immediately   and   to   pay   her   regular     salary   every
month.     
The appellant shall be entitled to arrears
of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the respondent shall
pay   within   three   months,   else   the   appellant   shall
become entitled to interest at the   rate of 6% per
annum   with   effect   from   1.2.2008   till   the   actual
payment.  
25. The   appeal   is   allowed   in   the   manner   indicated
above   and   the   orders   passed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are
set aside.    There shall be no order as to costs.  
..……………………………………………..J.
( G.S. SINGHVI )
    .……………………………………………….J.
( SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA )
NEW DELHI,
JULY 2,  2013.
21Page 22
22

M.V. ACT - INSURANCE CLAIMS = THE POSITION OF VEHICLES AT THE SCENE OF ACCIDENT AND THE CONTENT OF viscera WITH ALCOHOL ALONG WITH FOOD ON DECEASED STOMACH AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT NEVER SUGGEST CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, WHEN CHARGE SHEET WAS FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED DUE TO RASH AND NEGLIGENCE ACCIDENT WAS OCCURRED = the police submitted a charge­ sheet (Ext.­A4) against the bus driver under Section 279, 337 and 304A IPC with specific allegation that the bus driver caused the death of Joy Kuruvila due to rash and negligent driving of the bus on 16th April, 1990 at 4.50P.M.- The mere position of the vehicles after accident, as shown in a Scene Mahazar, cannot give a substantial proof as to the rash and negligent driving on the part of one or the other. When two vehicles coming from opposite directions collide, the position of the vehicles and its direction etc. depends on number of factors like speed of vehicles, intensity of collision, reason for collision, place at which one vehicle hit the other, etc. From the scene of the accident, one may suggest or presume the manner in which the accident caused, but in absence of any direct or corroborative evidence, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there was negligence on the part of the driver. In absence of such direct or corroborative evidence, the Court cannot give any specific finding about negligence on the part of any individual. 25. Post Mortem report, Ext.­A5 shows the condition of the deceased at the time of death. The said report reflects that the deceased had already taken meal as his stomach was half full and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in a fluid with strong smell of spirit. 26. The aforesaid evidence, Ext.­A5 clearly suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but on the basis of the same, no definite finding can be given that the deceased was driving the car rashly and negligently at the time of accident. The mere suspicion based on Ext.­B2, ‘Scene Mahazar’ and the Ext.­A5, post mortem report cannot take the place of evidence, particularly, when the direct evidence like PW.3, independent eye­witness, , Ext.­A1(FIR), Ext.­A4(charge­sheet) and Ext.­B1( F.I. statement) are on record. In view of the aforesaid, we, therefore, hold that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in concluding that the said accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased as well, as the said conclusion was not based on evidence but based on mere presumption and surmises. ; The deceased was 45 years of age, therefore, as per decision in Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121, multiplier of 14 shall be applicable. But the High Court and the Tribunal wrongly held that the multiplier of 15 will be applicable. Thus, by applying the multiplier of 14, the amount of compensation will be Rs.5,19,000 x 14 = Rs.72,66,000/­. The family of the deceased consisted of 5 persons i.e. deceased himself, wife, two children and his mother. As per the decision of this Court in Sarla Verma (supra) there being four dependents at the time of death, 1/4th of the total income to be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. The High Court has also noticed that out of 2,500 US Dollars, the deceased used to spend 500 US Dollars i.e. 1/5th of his income. Therefore, if 1/4th of the total income i.e. Rs. 18,16,500/­ is deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, the contribution to the family will be (Rs. 72,66,000 – Rs. 18,16,500/­ =) Rs.54,49,500/­. Besides the aforesaid compensation, the claimants are entitled to get Rs.1,00,000/­ each towards love and affection of the two children i.e. Rs.2,00,000/­and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ towards loss of consortium to wife which seems to be reasonable. Therefore, the total amount comes to Rs.57,49,500/­. The claimants are entitled to get the said amount of compensation alongwith interest @ 12% from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realisation, leaving rest of the conditions as mentioned in the award intact. We, accordingly, allow the appeals filed by the claimants and partly allow the appeals preferred by the Insurance Company, so far as it relates to the application of the multiplier is concerned. The impugned judgment dated 12th April, 2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in M.F.A. Nos.1162 and 1298 of 2001 and the award passed by the Tribunal are modified to the extent above.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40491
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4945­4946 OF 2013
(arising out of SLP(C)Nos.20557­20558 of 2007)
JIJU KURUVILA & ORS. … APPELLANTS
Versus
KUNJUJAMMA MOHAN & ORS.     … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4947    OF 2013
(arising out of SLP(C)No.16078 of 2008)
THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT
Versus
SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4948  OF 2013
(arising out of SLP(C)No.15992 of 2008)
ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT
Versus
SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
1Page 2
2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the
judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High
Court  dated 12th  April, 2007 in M.F.A. Nos. 1162
and 1298 of 2001(D)
whereby compensation awarded
to   the   claimants   by   Motor   Accident   Claims
Tribunal,   Kottayam   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
‘the Tribunal’, for short) was enhanced and the
liability for the accident was apportioned at the
ratio of  50:50. 
3. The facts that lead to the present case are
as follows:
On 16th April, 1990,  a motor accident took
place on  K.K. Road, near  Pampadi Mavell Store,
whereby   the   car   driven   by   one   Joy   Kuruvila
(deceased)  had a   head on collision with a bus
that   came   from   the   opposite   direction.  
Joy
Kuruvila   sustained serious injuries and died on
the   way   to   hospital.  
 His   four   dependents,
namely,  Chinnamma  Joy  (widow   of deceased),  Jiju
Kuruvila aged 14 years, Jaison Kuruvila  aged 11
years   (2   minor   children   of   the   deceased)   and
Grace Kuruvila (mother of the deceased) aged 85
years filed a joint application under Section 140
2Page 3
and   166   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988
(hereinafter   referred   to   as,   ‘the   Act’),
claiming   compensation   of   Rs.57,25,000/­   towards
following heads:­
(a) Funeral Expenses Rs.
25,000/­
(b) Compensation   for   pain   and   suffering
Rs. 1,00,000/­
(c) Compensation on account of death
of     the   deceased   and   consequent   loss
Rs.54,00,000/­
of income to the petitioners
(d) Compensation for the loss of
consortium to the 1st petitioner
Rs. 1,00,000/­
(e) Loss of  paternal love, affection
and   guidance   to   the   2nd
and 3rd Rs. 1,00,000/­
petitioners
Rs.57,25,000/­
4. At the time of accident,   Joy Kuruvila was
about   45   years   of   age     and   was   working   as   a
Manager   in   the   Freeman   Management   Corporation,
New   York   Branch   in   the   United   State   of   America
for   more   than   nine   years   and   was   receiving   a
monthly salary of 2500 US Dollars equivalent to
Rs.43,100/­.  He was provided with quarter by the
employer   and   was   residing   alongwith   his   wife.
3Page 4
Joy Kuruvila used to give Rs.30,000/­ per month
to   his   wife   for   the   household   expenses   and
savings after meeting his personal expenses.   He
was healthy, energetic, otherwise, had longevity
of life and could have continued in service upto
the   age   of   65   years   as   per   service   conditions
i.e. for another 20 years. 
5. The   1st  claimant   is   the   wife,     2nd  and   3rd
claimants   are   the   children   and   the   4th  claimant
was the mother of the deceased.
 P.C. Kurian, who
was the 3rd respondent, was driving the bus at the
time   of   the   accident         and   1st  respondent,
Kunjujamma   Mohan   was   the   bus   owner.  
It   was
alleged that the accident occurred solely due to
rash   and   negligent   driving   of   the   bus   driver,
P.C. Kurian and the vehicle had valid insurance
with   the   Oriental   Insurance   Co.Ltd..   
Based   on
such   facts,   the   claimants   claimed   a   sum   of   Rs.
57,25,000/­ as compensation with 18% interest and
cost. 
6. In   spite   of   notice,     the   bus   owner,
Kunjujamma Mohan and the driver, P.C. Kurian did
4Page 5
not appear before the Tribunal and the High Court
and had not denied the allegations.
7. The   Oriental   Insurance   Co.   Ltd.
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   ,   “the   Insurance
Company”)   in   its   written   statement,     admitted
the existence of  the valid policy of bus No.KRK­
3057 in the name of  Kunjujamma Mohan but denied
the allegation of rash and negligent driving on
the   part   of   the   bus   driver,   P.C.   Kurian   in
causing   the   accident.     The   age,   occupation,
monthly income of the deceased and the claim of
compensation   were   also   disputed.  
According   to
the Insurance Company, the accident occurred due
to  rash and negligent driving of the deceased.
8. The   evidence   consisting   of   testimony   of
PW.1 to PW.3 and Ext.­A1 to Ext.­8 and Ext.B1 to
B3 were brought on record.
9.   During   pendency   of   the   claim   before   the
Tribunal, the 4th claimant, Grace Kuruvila, mother
of   the   deceased   expired;   the   rest   of   the
claimants   remained   as   legal   heirs   of   the
deceased.   The   2nd  and   3rd  claimants,   children   of
5Page 6
the   deceased,     who   were   minor   at   the   time   of
filing   the   claim   case   attained   majority   during
the   pendency  of the case and were declared as
major.
10. The Tribunal after hearing the parties and
recording   evidence   held   that   the   accident   was
caused due to rash and negligent driving of the
bus   driver.    
 Considering   the     contributory
negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased   the
Tribunal   apportioned   the   liability   for   the
accident in the ratio of 75:25 between the driver
of   the   bus   and   the   deceased.      
 It   assessed
compensation   to   be   Rs.   18,38,500/­   and   after
deducting 25% towards contributory negligence on
the part of the deceased,   awarded a sum of Rs.
13,80,625/­   with   12%   interest   for   payment   in
favour of the claimants.
11. The   High   Court   affirmed   the   view   of   the
Tribunal   regarding   rash   and   negligent   driving
both   on   the   part   of   the   bus   driver   and   the
deceased,     but     apportioned   the   contributory
negligence @ 50:50 for payment of  compensation.
The   High   Court   held   that   the   Tribunal   wrongly
6Page 7
fixed Rs. 10,000/­   as the monthly contribution
by the deceased to the family and observed that
even   if   1/3rd  was   deducted   towards   personal
expenses   of   the   deceased,   more   than   1600   US
Dollars   could   be   taken   as   dependency   benefit.
However, while determining the compensation, the
High Court took the figure of 1500 US Dollars as
the dependency benefit. The exchange rate as was
prevailing   on   the   date   of   filing   of   the   claim
petition     i.e.   April,   1990   was   taken   into
consideration based into Ext.­A7 and  worked  out
the contribution to the family was calculated to
be Rs. 25,950/­ per month.   On the basis of such
contribution,  the High Court assessed  the total
compensation  at Rs. 47,09,500/­  and ordered to
pay 50%  of the amount i.e. Rs. 23,45,750/­  with
interest in favour of the  claimants.  
12. The   claimants   have   challenged   the
determination   made   by   the   High   Court   mainly   on
the following terms:­  
(i) The   foreign   exchange   rate   as   was
prevailing at the time of award i.e. May, 1993,
and shown in Ext.­A8,   ought to have been taken
7Page 8
into   consideration   for   calculation   of
compensation.    
(ii) In absence of any evidence relating to
negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased   and   in
view of the direct evidence on record, both the
Tribunal and the High Court erred in holding that
there was negligence on the part of the deceased.
13. In this case, the questions which arise for
consideration are:
(i) Whether the foreign currency amount has
to   be   converted   into   the   currency   of   the
country on the basis of exchange rate as on
the   date   of   filing   claim   petition   (April,
1990)   or   as   on   the   date   of   determination
(May, 1993);
(ii) Whether   there   was   any   contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased, Joy
Kuruvila and
(iii) Whether   compensation   awarded   is
just and proper.
14. The question as to whether the proper date
for fixing rate of exchange at which the foreign
currency   amount   is   to   be   converted   into   the
currency   of   the   country,   for   determination   of
amount  payable  to  a claimant/plaintiff  fell  for
consideration before this Court in Forasol v. Oil
8Page 9
and Natural Gas Commission 1984 (Suppl.) SCC 263
wherein this Court observed as follows:
“24.  In   an   action   to   recover   an   amount
payable in a foreign currency, five dates
compete for selection by the Court as the
proper   date   for   fixing   the   rate   of
exchange   at   which   the   foreign   currency
amount   has   to   be   converted   into   the
currency   of   the   country   in   which   the
action   has   been   commenced   and   decided.
These dates are:
(1) the date when the amount became due
and payable;
(2) the date of the commencement of the
action;
(3) the date of the decree;
(4)   the   date   when   the   Court   orders
execution to issue; and
(5) the date when the decretal amount is
paid or realised.
25.  In   a   case   where   a   decree   has   been
passed by the Court in terms of an award
made in a foreign currency a sixth date
also enters, the competition, namely, the
date of the award. The case before us is
one in which a decree in terms of such an
award has been passed by the Court.”
Taking into consideration the claim as was
made in the said case this Court held as follows:
“70. It would be convenient if we now set
out the practice, which according to us,
ought to be followed in suits in which a
sum   of   money   expressed   in   a   foreign
currency   can   legitimately   be   claimed   by
the plaintiff and decreed by the court.
It   is   unnecessary   for   us   to   categorize
the  cases  in  which  such  a  claim  can  be
made   and   decreed.   They   have   been
sufficiently   indicated   in   the   English
9Page 10
decisions referred to by us above. Such
instances   can,   however,   never,   be
exhausted   because   the   law   cannot   afford
to be static but must constantly develop
and progress as the society to which it
applies,   changes   its   complexion   and   old
ideologies and concepts are discarded and
replaced by new. Suffice it to say that
the case with which we are concerned was
one which fell in this category. In such
a   suit,   the   plaintiff,   who   has   not
received   the   amount   due   to   him   in   a
foreign currency, and, therefore, desires
to   seek   the   assistance   of   the   court   to
recover that amount, has two courses open
to   him.   He   can   either   claim   the   amount
due to him in Indian currency or in the
foreign currency in which it was payable.
If he chooses the first alternative, he
can only sue for that amount as converted
into Indian rupees and his prayer in the
plaint  can  only  be  for  a  sum  in Indian
currency. For this purpose, the plaintiff
would   have   to   convert   the   foreign
currency   amount   due   to   him   into   Indian
rupees. He can do so either at the rate
of exchange prevailing on the date when
the   amount   became   payable   for   he   was
entitled   to   receive   the   amount   on   that
date   or,  at his  option,  at  the  rate  of
exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   the
filing   of   the   suit   because   that   is   the
date   on   which   he   is   seeking   the
assistance   of   the   court   for   recovering
the amount due to him. In either event,
the   valuation   of   the   suit   for   the
purposes of court ­fees and the pecuniary
limit of  jurisdiction of the court will
be the amount in Indian currency claimed
in the suit. The plaintiff may, however,
choose the second course open to him and
claim in foreign currency the amount due
to him. In such a suit, the proper prayer
for the plaintiff to make in his plaint
would be for a decree that the defendant
do   pay   to   him   the   foreign   currency   sum
claimed   in   the   plaint   subject   to   the
permission   of   the   concerned   authorities
under   the   Foreign   Exchange   Regulation
Act, 1973, being granted and that in the
event of the foreign exchange authorities
1Page 11
not granting the requisite permission or
the defendant not wanting to make payment
in   foreign   currency   even   though   such
permission   has   been   granted   or   the
defendant   not   making   payment   in   foreign
currency   or   in   Indian   rupees,   whether
such permission has been granted or not,
the defendant do pay to the plaintiff the
rupee equivalent of the foreign currency
sum   claimed   at   the   rate   of   exchange
prevailing on the date of the judgment.
For   the   purposes   of   court   fees   and
jurisdiction   the   plaintiff   should,
however, value his claim in the suit by
converting   the   foreign   currency   sum
claimed by him into Indian rupees at the
rate of exchange prevailing on the date
of   the   filing   of   the   suit   or   the   date
nearest   or   most   nearly   preceding   such
date,   stating   in   his   plaint   what   such
rate   of   exchange   is.   He   should   further
give an undertaking in the plaint that he
would   make   good   the   deficiency   in   the
court­fees, if any, if at the date of the
judgment,   at   the   rate   of   exchange   then
prevailing,   the   rupee   equivalent   of   the
foreign   currency   sum   decreed   is   higher
than that mentioned in the plaint for the
purposes of court­fees and jurisdiction.
At   the   hearing   of   such   a   suit,   before
passing the decree, the court should call
upon the plaintiff to prove the rate of
exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   the
judgment or on the date nearest or most
nearly   preceding   the   date   of   the
judgment. If necessary, after delivering
judgment on all other issues, the court
may stand over the rest of the judgment
and the passing of the decree and adjourn
the   matter   to   enable   the   plaintiff   to
prove such rate of exchange. The decree
to be passed by the court should be one
which orders the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff   the   foreign   currency   sum
adjudged   by   the   court   subject   to   the
requisite   permission   of   the   concerned
authorities   under   the   Foreign   Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973, being granted, and
in   the   event   of   the   foreign   exchange
authorities   not   granting   the   requisite
permission   or   the   defendant   not   wanting
1Page 12
to make payment in foreign currency even
though   such   permission   has   been   granted
or   the   defendant   not   making   payment   in
foreign   currency   or   in   Indian   rupees,
whether such permission has been granted
or   not,   the   equivalent   of   such   foreign
currency sum converted into Indian rupees
at the rate of exchange proved before the
court as aforesaid. In the event of the
decree   being   challenged   in   appeal   or
other   proceedings   and   such   appeal   or
other proceedings being decided in whole
or   in   part   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff,
the appellate court or the court hearing
the application in the other proceedings
challenging the decree should follow the
same procedure as the trial court for the
purpose   of   ascertaining   the   rate   of
exchange   prevailing   on   the   date   of   its
appellate decree or of its order on such
application   or   on   the   date   nearest   or
most   nearly   preceding   the   date   of   such
decree or order. If such rate of exchange
is different from the rate in the decree
which   has   been   challenged,   the   court
should   make   the   necessary   modification
with respect to the rate of exchange by
its appellate decree or final order. In
all such cases, execution can only issue
for the rupee equivalent specified in the
decree, appellate decree or final order,
as the case may be. These questions, of
course, would not arise if pending appeal
or   other   proceedings   adopted   by   the
defendant the decree has been executed or
the   money   thereunder   received   by   the
plaintiff.”
15. In  Renusagar   Power   Co.   Ltd.   v.   General
Electric   Co.   1994   Suppl   (1)   SCC   644,  similar
question   came   for   consideration.     In   the   said
case,     a   foreign   award   was   under   consideration
and   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   awarded   the   same   in
U.S.   Dollars   with   interest.     In   the   said   case
1Page 13
relying   on   decision   of   this   Court   in  Forasol
(supra),  it was held as follows:
“143. In accordance with the decision in
Forasol   case   the   said   amount   has   to   be
converted into Indian rupees on the basis
of   the   rupee­dollar   exchange   rate
prevailing at the time of this judgment.
As   per   information   supplied   by   the
Reserve   Bank   of   India,   the   Rupee­Dollar
Exchange (Selling) Rate as on October 6,
1993 was Rs 31.53 per dollar.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
146. In the result, C.A. Nos. 71 and 71­A
of   1990   and   C.A.   No.   379   of   1992   are
dismissed   and   the   decree   passed   by   the
High Court is affirmed with the direction
that in terms of the award an amount of
US   $   12,333,355.14   is   payable   by
Renusagar   to   General   Electric   out   of
which   a   sum   of   US   $   6,289,800.00   has
already   been   paid   by   Renusagar   in
discharge of the decretal amount and the
balance amount payable by Renusagar under
the   decree   is   US   $   6,043,555.14   which
amount on conversion in Indian rupees at
the   rupee­dollar   exchange   rate   of   Rs
31.53 per dollar prevalent at the time of
this   judgment   comes   to   Rs
19,05,53,293.56. Renusagar will be liable
to pay future interest @ 18 per cent on
this   amount   of   Rs   19,05,53,293.56   from
the date of this judgment till payment.
The   parties   are   left   to   bear   their   own
costs.”
16. In   the   present   case,     admittedly   the
claimants   filed   a   petition   in   April,   1990
(affidavit sworn on 24th March, 1990) and claimed
compensation   in   INR   i.e.   Rs.57,25,000/­.   Such
1Page 14
compensation   was   not   claimed   in   U.S.   Dollars.
For the said reason and in view of  the  decision
of this Court in  Forasol (supra) as followed in
Renusagar Power Co.Ltd.(supra), we hold  that the
date   of   filing   of   the   claim   petition   (April,
1990) is the proper date for fixing the rate of
exchange at which foreign currency amount has to
be converted into currency of the country (INR).
The   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court   have   rightly
relied on Ext.­A7, to fix the rate of exchange as
Rs.17.30 (as was prevailing in April, 1990). 
17. The   second   question   is   relating   to
contributory   negligence   of   the   deceased.
According to the claimants, accident occurred due
to rash and negligent driving on the part of the
bus   driver,     P.C.   Kurian   and   there   was   no
negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased,   Joy
Kuruvila. 
Per   contra,   according   to   the   Insurance
Company, the accident took place due to negligent
driving on the part of the deceased, who was in
the intoxicated condition.  They relied on Ext.­
A5, the post­mortem report. 
1Page 15
18. Three   witnesses,   PW.1   to   PW.3   deposed
before the Tribunal.   Parties placed documentary
evidence,   Ext.A­1   to   Ext.A­8,   Ext.   B1   and   B2.
On   behalf   of   the   claimants,   they   relied   on   the
oral evidence and   documentary evidence to show
rash and negligent driving on the part of the bus
driver. On behalf of the  Insurance Company,  the
counsel   relied   on     Ext.­B2   ‘Scene   Mahazar’   and
Ext.­A5, post mortem report to suggest negligence
on the part of the deceased.  
19. The   High   Court   based   on   Ext.­B2   ‘Scene
Mahazar’   and   Ext.­A5,   post   mortem   report   held
that there was also negligence on the part of the
deceased as well.  
20. On   hearing   the   parties   and   perusal   of
record,  the following facts emerge:­
The   owner   of   the   vehicle   Kunjujamma   Mohan
and the driver of the bus,  P.C. Kurian who were
the   first   and   third   respondents   before   the
Tribunal   and   High   Court,   had   not   denied   the
allegation that the accident occurred due to rash
and   negligent   driving   on   the   part   of   the   bus
driver. 
1Page 16
21. PW­3,   an   independent   eye   witness   was
accompanying   the  deceased  during   the  journey   on
the fateful day.   He stated that the bus coming
from the opposite direction hit the car driven by
the   deceased   and   the   accident   occurred   due   to
rash and negligent driving of the bus driver.
22. Ext.­A1,   FIR   registered   by   Pampady   Police
against   the   bus   driver,   P.C.   Kurian,   under
Sections   279,   337   and   304A   IPC   shows   that   the
accident   occurred   due   to   rash   and   negligent
driving   on   the   part   of   the   bus   driver.  
After
investigation,   the   police   submitted   a   charge­
sheet   (Ext.­A4)   against   the   bus   driver   under
Section   279,   337   and   304A   IPC   with   specific
allegation that the bus driver caused the death
of     Joy   Kuruvila   due   to   rash   and     negligent
driving of the bus on 16th April, 1990 at 4.50P.M.
In view of the direct evidence,  the Tribunal and
the   High   Court   held   that   the   accident   was
occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the
part of the bus driver.   
23. There  is no evidence on record  to suggest
any   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased.
Ext.­B2,   ‘Scene   Mahazar’   also   does   not   suggest
1Page 17
any rash and negligent driving on the part of the
deceased.
24. The   mere   position   of   the   vehicles   after
accident,  as  shown in  a Scene Mahazar, cannot
give   a   substantial   proof   as   to   the   rash   and
negligent   driving   on   the   part   of   one   or   the
other.   When two vehicles coming from   opposite
directions collide,  the position of the vehicles
and   its   direction   etc.   depends   on   number   of
factors   like   speed   of     vehicles,     intensity   of
collision,  reason  for  collision,   place  at  which
one vehicle hit the other, etc.   From the scene
of the accident, one may suggest or presume the
manner   in   which     the   accident   caused,     but   in
absence of any  direct or corroborative evidence,
no   conclusion   can   be   drawn   as   to   whether   there
was   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   driver.  
 In
absence of such direct or corroborative evidence,
the Court cannot give any specific finding about
negligence on the part of any individual. 
25. Post   Mortem   report,   Ext.­A5   shows   the
condition of  the  deceased at the time of death.
The   said   report   reflects   that   the   deceased   had
already taken meal as his stomach was half full
1Page 18
and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in
a fluid with strong smell of spirit.
26.   The   aforesaid   evidence,   Ext.­A5   clearly
suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but
on the basis of the same, no definite finding can
be   given   that   the   deceased   was   driving   the   car
rashly and negligently at the time of accident.
The   mere   suspicion   based   on     Ext.­B2,   ‘Scene
Mahazar’     and   the   Ext.­A5,   post   mortem   report
cannot   take     the   place   of     evidence,
particularly,     when   the   direct   evidence   like
PW.3,   independent   eye­witness,   ,   Ext.­A1(FIR),
Ext.­A4(charge­sheet)     and   Ext.­B1(   F.I.
statement)  are on record. 
In view of the aforesaid,  we,   therefore,
hold that the Tribunal and the High Court erred
in   concluding   that   the   said   accident   occurred
due   to   the   negligence   on   the   part   of   the
deceased   as well,    as  the  said  conclusion  was
not   based   on   evidence   but     based   on   mere
presumption and surmises. 
27.   The   last   question     relates   to   just   and
proper compensation.   Both the Tribunal and the
High Court have   accepted that the deceased was
1Page 19
45 years of age at the time of accident;  he was
working   as     manager,   Freeman   Management
Corporation,   New   York   Branch,   U.S.A.   and   was
getting   a   monthly   salary   of   2500   U.S.   Dollars.
The   High   Court   accepted   that   the   deceased,     as
per conditions of service,  could have continued
the employment upto the age of 65 years.
28. Ext.­A6,   is   a   certificate   issued   by   the
employer   of   deceased,   i.e.,Freeman   Management
Corporation, U.S.A. dated  23rd  April,  1990 which
shows   that   his   annual   salary   was   30,000
U.S.Dollars.   He   was   in   their   employment   for   9
years   and   had   an   excellent   standing   and   his
employment   was   of   a   permanent   nature.   The
deceased would have continued in service upto the
age of 65 years. Ext.­A6 was attested by Notary
Public   and   counter   signed   by   the   Consulate
General of India, New York, as per Section 3 of
the   Diplomatic   and   Consular   Officers(Oaths   and
Fees) Act, 1948.
29. On the basis of the aforesaid annual income
and exchange rate of Rs. 17.30 per US Dollar  as
applicable in April, 1990 (Ext.­A7),   the annual
income   of   the   deceased   if   converted   in   Indian
1Page 20
currency will be  30,000 x 17.30 = 5,19,000/­ at
the time of death.
The deceased was 45 years of
age, therefore, as per decision in Sarla Verma &
Ors.   V.   Delhi   Transport   Corporation   &   Anr.,
(2009)   6   SCC   121, 
 multiplier   of   14   shall   be
applicable.  But the High Court and the Tribunal
wrongly held that   the multiplier of 15 will be
applicable.
Thus, by applying the multiplier of
14,   the   amount   of   compensation   will   be
Rs.5,19,000 x 14 = Rs.72,66,000/­. The family of
the deceased consisted of 5 persons i.e. deceased
himself, wife, two children and his mother.   As
per   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Sarla   Verma
(supra)  there being four dependents at the time
of   death,   1/4th    of   the   total   income   to   be
deducted towards personal and living expenses of
the deceased.    The High Court has also noticed
that out of 2,500 US Dollars,  the deceased used
to spend 500 US Dollars i.e. 1/5th of his income.
Therefore, if  1/4th  of the total income i.e. Rs.
18,16,500/­   is deducted   towards   personal and
living   expenses   of   the   deceased,     the
contribution   to   the   family     will   be     (Rs.
72,66,000   –   Rs.   18,16,500/­   =)   Rs.54,49,500/­.
2Page 21
Besides the aforesaid compensation, the claimants
are   entitled   to   get   Rs.1,00,000/­   each   towards
love   and   affection   of   the   two   children   i.e.
Rs.2,00,000/­and   a   sum   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   towards
loss   of   consortium   to   wife   which   seems   to   be
reasonable. Therefore, the total amount comes to
Rs.57,49,500/­. 
30. The claimants are entitled to get the said
amount  of  compensation  alongwith   interest  @ 12%
from the date of   filing of   the petition till
the   date   of   realisation,   leaving   rest   of   the
conditions as  mentioned in the award intact. 
31. We, accordingly, allow the appeals filed by
the   claimants   and     partly   allow   the   appeals
preferred by the Insurance Company,  so far as it
relates to the application of the multiplier is
concerned. The impugned judgment dated 12th April,
2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala
High   Court   in   M.F.A.   Nos.1162   and   1298   of   2001
and the award passed by the Tribunal are modified
to the extent above. The amount which has already
been paid to the claimants shall be adjusted and
rest of the amount with interest as ordered above
2Page 22
be   paid   within   three   months.   There   shall   be   no
separate order as to costs.
……………………………………………….J.
( G.S. SINGHVI )
……………………………………………….J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 2, 2013.
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