specific performance of an agreement of re-conveyance of the suit land. is not maintainable =The District Court also held that Ex-18, the alleged agreement of re-conveyance did not mention that there was a loan transaction between the parties and that Ex-19, the sale deed was not to be acted upon. It did not mention the date and period within which the suit land was to be re-conveyed after payment of the loan amount. Therefore, the case that Ex-19 was a nominal sale deed cannot be accepted. = Ex-19 is a genuine sale deed. It clearly speaks of an out and out sale. We have stated that Ex-18 is not an agreement to re- convey the land on repayment of loan. The sale deed [Ex-19] is clearly worded leaving no scope of ambiguity. So far as Ex-18 is concerned, it is so worded as not to establish any link with Ex-19. It does not speak of any loan transaction at all. Though there is no ambiguity in Ex-19 and we are certain that the transaction in question is a genuine sale transaction, to lend support to our conclusion we may touch upon the surrounding circumstances. If Ex-18 was to be an agreement for re-conveyance, it would not have been titled as 'Receipt'. It would have been signed by the original plaintiff and the defendant. It is pertinent to note that it is signed only by the defendant. It is executed on a simple paper. It does not state within what time the amount was to be repaid and the agreement of repurchase was to be executed. It is also important to note that in the cross-examination, original plaintiff has clearly admitted that Ex- 18 was executed before execution of sale deed [Ex-19]. Hence, the original plaintiff's case that the defendant insisted that he would lend money to him only if he would execute nominal sale deed and, therefore, the nominal sale deed was executed and the loan was advanced, does not stand to reason. The District Court has rightly said that at the most it could be said that Ex-18 culminated into a genuine sale deed [Ex-19]. The original plaintiff's case that the transaction of sale was followed by agreement for re-transfer is not substantiated. It is also hit by Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act which this Court analyzed in Chunchun Jha and stated that if sale and agreement for re-purchase are embodied in separate deeds then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. Here we clearly have two separate documents. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Raj Kishore v. Prem Singh[3]. The High Court, therefore, clearly erred in holding that there was an agreement for re-conveyance and the original plaintiff was entitled to specific performance thereof.- In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 20/7/2004 is set aside. The judgment and order dated 12/3/1986 passed by the District Judge, Buldana in Regular Civil Appeal No.130 of 1983 is restored.

' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1648 OF 2006


DASHRATH KACHRU KAKDE ... APPELLANT

Versus

VIKRAM S/O. DHONDU AWHALE ...RESPONDENT
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRs.



O R D E R


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.


1. This appeal, by special leave, is filed by the original defendant.
The challenge is to the judgment and order dated 20/07/2004 passed by
the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No.24 of
1987.
2. One Vikram Dhondu Awhale ('original plaintiff' - for convenience),
represented by his heirs, filed Regular Civil Suit No.166/78 in the
court of Second Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mehkar against the
appellant ('the defendant' - for convenience) for specific
performance of an agreement of re-conveyance of the suit land.

3 The gist of the original plaintiff's case needs to be stated.
According to the original plaintiff, as he was badly in need of money,
on 10/5/1976 he approached the defendant and requested him to advance
a loan of Rs. 2,000/- to him. The defendant asked him to execute a
nominal sale deed pertaining to the suit land in his favour by way of
security for the loan. The defendant agreed to re-convey the suit land
on repayment of loan. It was also agreed that the defendant would
enjoy produce of crops grown on the suit land in lieu of interest.
Thus, according to the original plaintiff, there was an oral agreementbetween the parties which was, in fact, a loan transaction. The
original plaintiff was, therefore, constrained to execute a nominal
sale deed dated 10/5/1976 by way of security for the loan of Rs.
2,000/- in favour of the defendant. According to the original
plaintiff, the defendant gave a writing to him on the same day
agreeing to re-convey the suit land to him upon repayment of the loan
amount. He, thereafter, sent two notices to the defendant asking him
to accept the money, re-convey the suit land and hand over possession
thereof to the original plaintiff. Since the defendant failed to
comply, the original plaintiff filed suit for specific performance ofthe agreement of re-conveyance and for mesne profits. The defendant
denied the original plaintiff's case. He contended that the
transaction was an out and out sale transaction and not a money
lending transaction. There was no agreement either oral or written
between the parties admitting the nature of the transaction to be aloan transaction. The defendant contended that the document
purporting to be an agreement to re-convey the suit land in favour of
the original plaintiff on re-payment of loan amount is obtained by
misrepresentation and is vitiated by fraud.


4. The original plaintiff examined himself. The original plaintiff
produced document of re-conveyance [Ex-18] and sale deed [Ex-19]. He
examined Sudhakar Gangaram Kakde the attesting witness of Ex-18 and Ex-
19, who claimed to be present when the alleged talk took place. The
defendant examined himself and one Shivaji Dagdu Avale and Trimbak
Kachru Kakde. 
The trial court held that the original plaintiff had
proved that Ex-18, the document of re-conveyance, was executed by
examining the scribe. According to the trial court by proving Ex-18,
the original plaintiff had established that the sale deed dated
10/5/1976 [Ex-19] was a nominal sale deed and it was not to be acted
upon. 
The trial court further held that oral evidence about the
execution of nominal sale deed [Ex-19] was admissible under Section 92
of the Evidence Act. 
The trial court, in the circumstances, decreed
the suit.


5. The defendant carried an appeal to the Court of District Judge,
Buldana being Civil Appeal No.130/83. Upon perusal of Ex-18 and Ex-19
and the oral evidence, the District Court held that it was not
permissible for the original plaintiff to seek relief of specific
performance of the alleged agreement of re-conveyance when it was not embodied in Ex-19, the sale deed dated 10/5/1976.
The District Court
also held that Ex-18, the alleged agreement of re-conveyance did not mention that there was a loan transaction between the parties and that Ex-19, the sale deed was not to be acted upon. 
It did not mention the date and period within which the suit land was to be re-conveyed after payment of the loan amount. Therefore, the case that Ex-19 was a nominal sale deed cannot be accepted. 
The District Court, in the
circumstances, allowed the appeal.


6. The original plaintiff carried second appeal to the High Court.
The substantial question of law which was formulated by the High Court
was as under:

"Whether the transaction in question is covered by Section 58(c)
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, being 'a mortgage by
conditional sale' and whether parties can be allowed to lead evidence to prove that the transaction was by way of security in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act."

The High Court held that the plaintiff had never raised the plea
that there was a mortgage by conditional sale. According to the High
Court, the District Court did not notice the real issue involved in
the case. It overlooked the fact that the plaintiff's case was that
the sale deed was a nominal sale deed executed as a security for the
loan transaction and that there was an agreement of re-conveyance of
the suit land upon repayment of the loan. The High Court held that
evidence can be adduced to prove the real nature of transaction. The
High Court was of the view that the plaintiff was entitled to specific
performance of the agreement of re-conveyance. In the circumstances,
the High Court allowed the second appeal and restored the trial
court's decree. Hence, this appeal, by special leave, by the
defendant.


7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, carefully
perused the evidence and Ex-18 and Ex-19. In our opinion, the High
Court misdirected itself in reversing the District Court's judgment
for the reasons, we shall now state.


8. Since the original plaintiff's case was that the transaction was a
loan transaction; that the sale deed was a nominal sale deed and that
there was an agreement of re-conveyance executed on the same day; it
follows that his case was premised on the alleged existence of a
relationship of creditor and debtor between him and the defendant.
Obviously, according to him, there was no absolute transfer of all the
rights in the suit property i.e. it was not a case of an out and outsale. The defendant, on the other hand, denied this case and
contended that the sale deed was genuine. In such circumstances, it
was obligatory on the court to find out what was the real nature of
the transaction. Whether the plaintiff used the words "mortgage by
conditional sale" or not, in the facts of this case reference to
Section 58(c) of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 was inevitable.
The High Court was, therefore, wrong in holding that the District
Court's approach was erroneous.


9. We must first turn to the plaint. The plaint is very cryptic, sans
necessary averments in support of the original plaintiff's case. It
is extremely vague. It states that on 10/5/1976, as the original
plaintiff was in need of Rs.2,000/-, he approached the defendant for a
loan. The defendant asked him to execute a nominal sale deed of the
suit land as a security for the loan. The defendant was to enjoy the
crop grown on the suit land in lieu of interest. It is further
averred that as per the oral agreement on 10/5/1976, nominal sale deed
was executed. There is no clear averment that on the same day, an
agreement of re-conveyance was executed. The plaint states that the
defendant gave a writing on the same day agreeing to re-convey the
land. There is, however, no averment that the repayment of loan was
to be done on a particular date or within a specified period. Period
or date of specific performance of the agreement of re-conveyance is
not stated. In paragraph 7, it is stated that the original plaintiff
does not rely upon any specific or particular document. In the same
paragraph, it is stated that he relies on writing given by the
defendant. There is no averment in the plaint that the original
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
The original plaintiff appears to be unsure about his case.


10. To examine the original plaintiff's case that Ex-19, the
sale deed, was a nominal sale deed executed as a security for loan and
that there was an agreement to re-convey the land we must turn to both
these documents. We must first go to Ex-19, the sale deed. A careful
reading of this sale deed leads us to the irresistible conclusion that
it is not a nominal sale deed but a genuine sale deed. The contents
of the sale deed clearly establish that the transaction between the
original plaintiff and the defendant was an out and out sale
transaction. It does not say that any agreement of re-conveyance was
executed between the parties in respect of the suit land. It is now
necessary to go to Ex-18, the alleged agreement of re-conveyance. It
is executed on a simple paper. It is titled as a receipt. It bears
the same date as of sale deed [Ex-19] i.e. 10/5/1976. It is stated in
this document that the defendant had purchased the suit property and
that after the amount of Rs.2,000/- was repaid, the defendant would re-
convey the suit land to the original plaintiff. It is not, however,
stated in this document that there was any loan transaction between
the parties. It is not stated that sale deed [Ex-19] was executed
between the parties and that it was not to be acted upon. It is not
stated that the defendant had agreed to enjoy crops grown on the suit
land in lieu of interest. It is signed by the defendant and not by
the original plaintiff. It is, therefore, impossible to come to a
conclusion that it is an agreement executed by the defendant to re-
convey the suit land to the original plaintiff if he repaid the loan.
The original plaintiff's case that the transaction evidenced by Ex-18
and Ex-19 is a nominal sale with a condition of repurchase is
difficult to accept. We reject the evidence of the original plaintiff
and his witness that there was any oral agreement about a loan
transaction and re-conveyance of suit land on repayment of loan. This
story is totally unsustainable.


11. The question 
whether a given transaction is a 'mortgage by
conditional sale' or a sale outright with a condition of repurchase
was considered by this Court in Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali andanother[1]. 
This Court held that the question whether a given
transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale outright with
a condition of repurchase is a vexed one and must be decided on its
own facts. 
In such cases the intention of the parties is the
determining factor. The intention must be gathered in the first place
from the document itself.
 If the words are express and clear effect
must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought
or intended is ruled out. 
This court further observed that if,
however, there is ambiguity in the language employed then it is
permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what
was intended. 
This Court quoted from Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan
Din[2] where it is observed by the Privy Council that the rule of law
on this subject is one dictated by commonsense;
 that prima facie an
absolute conveyance, containing nothing to show that the relation of
debtor and creditor is to exist between the parties, does not cease to
be an absolute conveyance and become a mortgage merely because the
vendor stipulates that he shall have a right to repurchase. ........
In every such case the question is, what upon a fair construction, is
the meaning of the instruments?" 
This court further observed that the
converse also holds good and if, on the face of it, an instrument
clearly purports to be a mortgage it cannot be turned into a sale by
reference to a host of extraneous and irrelevant considerations.
Difficulty only arises in the border line cases where there is
ambiguity. This Court further observed that because of the welter of
confusion caused by conflicting decisions of the courts, the
legislature amended Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and
now it is absolutely clear that if the sale and the agreement to
repurchase are embodied in separate documents then the transaction
cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously
executed or not.


12. Before we proceed further it would be advantageous to
reproduce Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act so that the
law laid down by this Court in Chunchun Jha could be better
appreciated.

"58. "Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage-money" and
"mortgage-deed" defined. -


(a) xxx xxx xxx


(b) xxx xxx xxx


(c) Mortgage by conditional sale. - Where, the mortgagor
ostensibly sells the mortgaged property -


on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on
a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or


on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall
become void, or


on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall
transfer the property to the seller,


the transaction is called mortgage by conditional sale and the
mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale:


[Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a
mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which
effects or purports to effect the sale.]"


13. The gist of the conclusions drawn by this Court in Chunchun
Jha which are relevant for the present case is that the nature of the
document must be firstly determined by the language employed in it.
If the language is clear, then there is no need to look into anything
else. What is the nature of transaction must be decided on the facts
of each case. In this, intention of the parties is the determining
factor. In case of ambiguity in the language employed, surrounding
circumstances could be looked into. If the sale and the agreement to
repurchase are embodied in separate documents then the transaction
cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously
executed or not.


14. We have already adverted to Ex-18 and Ex-19. 
After
analyzing the averments of these documents, we have noted our
conclusion that Ex-19 is a genuine sale deed.
 It clearly speaks of an out and out sale. 
We have stated that Ex-18 is not an agreement to re-
convey the land on repayment of loan. 
The sale deed [Ex-19] isclearly worded leaving no scope of ambiguity. 
So far as Ex-18 is
concerned, it is so worded as not to establish any link with Ex-19.
It does not speak of any loan transaction at all. 
Though there is no
ambiguity in Ex-19 and we are certain that the transaction in question
is a genuine sale transaction, to lend support to our conclusion we
may touch upon the surrounding circumstances. 
If Ex-18 was to be an
agreement for re-conveyance, it would not have been titled as
'Receipt'. It would have been signed by the original plaintiff and the defendant.
 It is pertinent to note that it is signed only by the
defendant. It is executed on a simple paper. It does not state
within what time the amount was to be repaid and the agreement of repurchase was to be executed. 
It is also important to note that in
the cross-examination, original plaintiff has clearly admitted that Ex-
18 was executed before execution of sale deed [Ex-19]. 
Hence, the
original plaintiff's case that the defendant insisted that he would
lend money to him only if he would execute nominal sale deed and,
therefore, the nominal sale deed was executed and the loan was
advanced, does not stand to reason. 
The District Court has rightly
said that at the most it could be said that Ex-18 culminated into a
genuine sale deed [Ex-19]. 
The original plaintiff's case that the
transaction of sale was followed by agreement for re-transfer is not
substantiated. 
It is also hit by Section 58(c) of the Transfer of
Property Act which this Court analyzed in Chunchun Jha and stated that
if sale and agreement for re-purchase are embodied in separate deeds
then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are
contemporaneously executed or not. 
Here we clearly have two separate
documents. 
Similar view has been taken by this Court in Raj Kishore
v. Prem Singh[3]. 
The High Court, therefore, clearly erred in
holding that there was an agreement for re-conveyance and the original
plaintiff was entitled to specific performance thereof.


15. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order
dated 20/7/2004 is set aside. The judgment and order dated 12/3/1986
passed by the District Judge, Buldana in Regular Civil Appeal No.130
of 1983 is restored.

.....................................................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)


.....................................................J.
(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI
MARCH 6, 2013.


ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.3 SECTION IX

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 1648 OF 2006


DASHRATH Appellant (s)

VERSUS

VIKRAM S/O DHONDU A. (D) TH. LRS. Respondent(s)


Date: 06/03/2013 This Appeal was called on for hearing today.


CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI



For Appellant(s) Mr. Manish Pitale, Adv.
Mr. Sunil Kumar, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Nikhil Mehra, Adv.

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R


We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order. The
impugned order dated 20/07/2004 is set aside. The judgment and order
dated 12/3/1986 passed by the District Judge, Buldana in Regular Civil
Appeal No.130 of 1983 is restored.




|(Parveen Kr.Chawla) | |(Phoolan Wati Arora) |
|Court Master | |Court Master |
| | | |


[signed order is placed on the file]
-----------------------
[1] AIR 1954 SC 345
[2] 17 Ind. App. 98
[3] AIR 2011 SC 382

set off of the period of pre-trial detention against the period of sentence is concerned, Section 428 of the Code is not attracted to the cases of persons convicted by the court-martial to undergo imprisonments.- sentence Set off not applicable to court martial laws= As he is in illegal detention because he had already spent one and half months in custody before the conviction was recorded by the court-martial. the petitioner, an employee of Indian Air Force, who has been found guilty of the offence under Section 39(a) of The Air Force Act, 1950 (for brevity “the Act”) and has been awarded sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months along with other punishments by order dated 15.3.2013 which has been affirmed by the Competent Authority under Section 161(1) of the said enactment, has prayed for issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to release him= In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the pre-trial detention cannot be set off against the sentence of imprisonment passed by the court-martial for the offence under Section 39(a) which has been affirmed under Section 161(1) of the Act and the period of sentence shall commence from the date when the original proceeding was signed by the Presiding Officer. Thus, there is no illegal detention warranting issue of writ of habeas corpus.= Section 169-A to avoid hardship to the persons convicted by the court-martial. The said provision is as follows: - “169-A. Period of custody undergone by the officer or person to be set off against the imprisonment.— When a person or officer subject to this Act is sentenced by a court martial to a term of imprisonment, not being an imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period spent by him in civil or military custody during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of order of such sentence, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed upon him, and the liability of such person or officer to undergo imprisonment on such order of sentence shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed upon him.”- Section 151(1) and (3): - “151. Commencement of sentence. – (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) every term of imprisonment or detention awarded in pursuance of this Act shall be reckoned as commencing on the day on which the sentence was awarded. (2) .................. (3) Whenever any offender is sentenced by a court-martial to a term of imprisonment, in pursuance of this Act, not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period spent by him in civil or naval custody during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case, and before the date of order of such sentence, shall be set off against the terms of imprisonment imposed upon him, and the liability of such offender to undergo imprisonment on such order of sentence shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed upon him.”=Though such amendments have been made by the Parliament under the 1950 Act and the 1957 Act, yet no such amendment has been incorporated in the Air Force Act, 1950. The aforesaid provisions, as we perceive, have been incorporated in both the statutes to avoid hardship to persons convicted by the court-martial. Similar hardship is suffered by the persons who are sentenced to imprisonment under various provisions of the Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid amendment in the other two enactments and regard being had to the purpose of the amendment and the totality of the circumstances, we think it apt to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider to bring an amendment in the Act so that the hardships faced by the persons convicted by the court-martial are avoided.

Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) No. 78 of 2013
Samrendra Beura ... Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & others ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
In this writ petition, preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner, an employee of Indian
Air Force, who has been found guilty of the offence under
Section 39(a) of The Air Force Act, 1950 (for brevity “the
Act”) and has been awarded sentence to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for three months along with other
punishments by order dated 15.3.2013 which has been
affirmed by the Competent Authority under Section 161(1)
of the said enactment, has prayed for issue of a writ of
habeas corpus directing the respondents to release him as
Page 2
Reportable
he is in illegal detention because he had already spent one
and half months in custody before the conviction was
recorded by the court-martial.
2. The factual score, as depicted, is that the petitioner
was appointed as a Mechanical Transport Driver in
the Indian Air Force on 16.12.2002. As he absented
himself without leave from 9.10.2012 to 1.2.2013, a
court-martial proceeding was initiated against him
and, eventually, by order dated 15.3.2013, he was
found guilty and was imposed the sentence of
rigorous imprisonment for three months apart from
dismissal from service and reduction of rank. It is put
forth in the petition that the petitioner had
surrendered before the Competent Authority
whereafter he was charged for the offence under
Section 39(a) of the Act. It is contended that the
sentence imposed under Section 39(a) should take
into consideration the period commencing 1.2.2003
as he had surrendered to custody before the
Competent Authority.Page 3
Reportable
3. As the respondents have been represented and the
issue involved exclusively relates to pure realm of
law, we have heard Mr. Merusagar Samantary,
learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Rakesh
Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor General, and Mr.
Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the
respondents.
4. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner surrendered
to custody on 1.2.2013. There is a dispute with
regard to the date of the order passed by the
Competent Authority, namely, district court-martial.
The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend
that it was passed on 15.3.2013 whereas Mr. Khanna
would submit that it was passed on 18.3.2013. The
said disputed fact is neither material one nor would it
have any impact on the adjudication of the writ
petition inasmuch as the fulcrum of the matter is
whether the period of custody prior to the date of
passing and signing of the order by the district court martial is to be set off in respect of the sentence
imposed.Page 4
Reportable
5. Section 39 which provides for absence without leave
stipulates that any one who commits any offence
falling under clauses 39(a) to (g) shall, on conviction
by court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years or such less
punishment as the Act mentions. Chapter IX deals
with arrest and proceedings before trial. Section
102, which occurs in this Chapter, deals with custody
of offenders and reads as follows: -
“102. Custody of offenders. – (1) Any person
subject to this Act who is charged with an
offence may be taken into air force custody.
(2) Any such person may be ordered into air
force custody by any superior officer.
(3) Any officer may order into air force
custody any officer, though he may be of a
higher rank, engaged in a quarrel, affray or
disorder.”
6. Section 103 deals with duty of commanding officer in
regard to detention and Section 104 provides for
interval between committal and court-martial. It
reads as follows: -
“104. Interval between committal and
court-martial. – In every case where any such
person as is mentioned in section 102 and as is
not on active service remains in such custodyPage 5
Reportable
for a longer period than eight days, without a
court-martial for his trial being ordered to
assemble, a special report giving reasons for
the delay shall be made by his commanding
officer in the manner prescribed; and a similar
report shall be forwarded every eight days until
a court-martial assembled or such person is
released from custody.”
7. Section 107 deals with inquiry into absence without
leave. Sub-section (1) of the said Section provides
that when any person has been absent from duty
without due authority for a period of 30 days, a court
of inquiry shall, as soon as practicable, be assembled
and such court shall, on oath or affirmation
administered in the prescribed manner, inquire
regarding the absence of the person. The rest of the
provision need not be adverted to.
8. Section 109 deals with different kinds of court-martial
and clause (b) of the said Section relates to district
court-martial. Section 119 deals with the powers of
district court-martial. Chapter XI commencing from
Sections 127 to 151 deals with the procedure of
court-martial. Section 152, which occurs in Chapter
XII, deals with confirmation and revision and provides
that no finding or sentence of a general, district orPage 6
Reportable
summary general court-martial shall be valid except
so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Act.
Section 154 deals with the power to confirm finding
and sentence of district-court martial.
9. In the case at hand, after the sentence was imposed,
the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief confirmed the
order on 20.4.2013. The learned counsel for the
petitioner would propone that the sentence of
imprisonment of three months should commence
from 1.2.2013, the date on which he surrendered and
was taken into custody. In this context, Mr. Khanna
has drawn our attention to Section 164 of the Act. It
reads as follows: -
“164. Commencement of sentence of
transportation or imprisonment. –
Whenever any person is sentenced by a courtmartial under this Act to transportation,
imprisonment or detention the term of his
sentence shall, whether it has been revised or
not, be reckoned to commence on the day on
which the original proceedings were signed by
the presiding officer.”
10. On a plain reading of the said provision, it is clear as
day that the period of imprisonment is to be
reckoned to commence on the day on which thePage 7
Reportable
original proceedings were signed by the Presiding
Officer. The Presiding Officer has signed, as
submitted by Mr. Khanna, on 18.3.2013 and,
therefore, the petitioner has to suffer three months
imprisonment from that date. In this context, we
may usefully refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in
Ajmer Singh and others v. Union of India and
others1
. The issue before this Court was regarding
the applicability of Section 428 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to a person sentenced to undergo
imprisonment by general court-martial under the
Army Act, 1950 (for short “the 1950 Act”). The two
learned Judges observed that the position in the
Army Act would equally govern the person sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment by the courtmartial under the Navy Act, 1957 (for short “the 1957
Act”) and the Air Force Act. The two-Judge Bench
referred to the divergence of views between different
High Courts pertaining to the applicability of Section
428 of the Code and, thereafter, the interpreted
1
 (1987) 3 SCC 340Page 8
Reportable
Section 167 of the 1950 Act and came to hold as
follows: -
“9. Section 167 of the Act specifically lays down
that whenever a person is sentenced by a court
martial under the Act to imprisonment, the term
of his sentence shall, whether it has been
revised or not, be reckoned to commence on
the day on which the original proceedings were
signed by the Presiding Officer or, in the case of
a summary court martial, by the Court. In the
face of this categorical provision laying down
that the sentence of imprisonment shall be
deemed to have commenced only on the day
when the court martial proceeding was signed
by the Presiding Officer or by the Court as the
case may be, it is in our opinion futile to
contend that the Army Act is silent with respect
to the topic as to the date with effect from
which the period of imprisonment covered by
the sentence is to be reckoned. We state this
only for the reason that an ingenious argument
was advanced before us by counsel for the
appellants that Section 5 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure only lays down that nothing
in the Code shall affect any special or local law
and hence in the absence of any specific
provision in the special or local law covering the
particular subject-matter, the provisions of the
Code would get attracted. Even if this argument
is to be assumed to be correct (which
assumption we shall presently show is wholly
unwarranted), inasmuch as Section 167 of the
Act specifically deals with the topic of the date
of commencement of the sentence of
imprisonment, there is absolutely no scope for
invoking the aid of Section 428 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in respect of prisoners
convicted by court martial under the Act.”Page 9
Reportable
11. In Bhuwaneshwar Singh v. Union of India and
others2
, the Court referred to the pronouncement in
Ajmer Singh (supra) and opined that as far as set
off of the period of pre-trial detention against the
period of sentence is concerned, Section 428 of the
Code is not attracted to the cases of persons
convicted by the court-martial to undergo
imprisonments.
12. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can
be no scintilla of doubt that the pre-trial detention
cannot be set off against the sentence of
imprisonment passed by the court-martial for the
offence under Section 39(a) which has been affirmed
under Section 161(1) of the Act and the period of
sentence shall commence from the date when the
original proceeding was signed by the Presiding
Officer. Thus, there is no illegal detention warranting
issue of writ of habeas corpus.
13. We have been apprised that the petitioner has
submitted a representation under Section 180(1)
2
 (1993) 4 SCC 327Page 10
Reportable
read with Section 184 of the Act. Without expressing
any opinion on the merits of the said representation,
we direct the Competent Authority to decide the
same within a period of seven days from today.
14. Before parting with this case, it is necessary to note
that in the 1950 Act, the Parliament has incorporated
Section 169-A to avoid hardship to the persons
convicted by the court-martial. The said provision is
as follows: -
“169-A. Period of custody undergone by the
officer or person to be set off against the
imprisonment.— When a person or officer
subject to this Act is sentenced by a court martial to a term of imprisonment, not being an
imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the
period spent by him in civil or military custody
during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same
case and before the date of order of such
sentence, shall be set off against the term of
imprisonment imposed upon him, and the
liability of such person or officer to undergo
imprisonment on such order of sentence shall
be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the
term of imprisonment imposed upon him.”
15. Similarly, Section 151 of the 1957 Act which deals
with commencement of sentence has been amended
by Act 23 of 2005 with effect from 23.6.2005. For
Page 11
Reportable
the present purpose, it is requisite to reproduce
Section 151(1) and (3): -
“151. Commencement of sentence. – (1)
Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and
(3) every term of imprisonment or detention
awarded in pursuance of this Act shall be
reckoned as commencing on the day on which
the sentence was awarded.
(2) ..................
(3) Whenever any offender is sentenced by a
court-martial to a term of imprisonment, in
pursuance of this Act, not being
imprisonment in default of payment of
fine, the period spent by him in civil or
naval custody during investigation, inquiry
or trial of the same case, and before the
date of order of such sentence, shall be set
off against the terms of imprisonment
imposed upon him, and the liability of such
offender to undergo imprisonment on such
order of sentence shall be restricted to the
remainder, if any, of the term of
imprisonment imposed upon him.”
16. Though such amendments have been made by the
Parliament under the 1950 Act and the 1957 Act, yet
no such amendment has been incorporated in the Air
Force Act, 1950. 
The aforesaid provisions, as we
perceive, have been incorporated in both the
statutes to avoid hardship to persons convicted by
the court-martial. Similar hardship is suffered by the
persons who are sentenced to imprisonment under
Page 12
Reportable
various provisions of the Act. Keeping in view the
aforesaid amendment in the other two enactments
and regard being had to the purpose of the
amendment and the totality of the circumstances, 
we
think it apt to recommend the Union of India to
seriously consider to bring an amendment in the Act
so that the hardships faced by the persons convicted
by the court-martial are avoided.
17. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
…………………………….J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
….………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
May 20, 2013.

the victim is an eight year old girl who possibly would be deprived of the dreams of “Spring of Life” and might be psychologically compelled to remain in the “Torment of Winter”. When she suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is historically abhorred by the society. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court. The mitigating factors put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant are meant to invite mercy but we are disposed to think that the factual matrix cannot allow the rainbow of mercy to magistrate. Our judicial discretion impels us to maintain the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and, 22Page 23 hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed by the High Court. 23. Ex consequenti, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.

Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1860 OF 2010
Shyam Narain ...Appellant
Versus
The State of NCT of Delhi ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The wanton lust, vicious appetite, depravity of
senses, mortgage of mind to the inferior endowments of
nature, the servility to the loathsome beast of passion and
absolutely unchained carnal desire have driven the
appellant to commit a crime which can bring in a ‘tsunami’
of shock in the mind of the collective, send a chill in the
spine of the society, destroy the civilized stems of the
milieu and comatose the marrows of sensitive polity.
It is
Page 2
brutal rape of an eight year old girl.
The sensitive learned
trial Judge, after recording conviction under Section 376(2)
(f) of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”), had taken
note of the brutality meted out to the child and sentenced
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs.5000/- failing which to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months.
The Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court has equally reflected its anguish over the
crime by describing it as “pervaded with brutality” and
“trauma which the young child would face all her life” and
has concurred with the sentence of imprisonment and the
fine.
2. This Court, at the time of issuance of notice, had
restricted it to the quantum of sentence. However,
we shall dwell upon the merits of the case in brief.
3. The horrid episode as unfurled by prosecution is that
on 29.10.2003, about 6.30 p.m., an eight year old
child, daughter of one Binda Saha, was taken by the
appellant to Lal Bahadur Shastri Hospital and from
there, being referred, she was admitted in GTB
Hospital, Shahdara, at 1.30 a.m. on 30.10.2003. The
2Page 3
young girl, as recorded in MLC Ext.PW-10/D, had
stated that she had fallen down in the toilet about
2.00 p.m. on 29.10.2003 as a consequence of which
she had sustained the injuries.
The treating doctor,
Dr. Anju Yadav, was not convinced with what was
being narrated to her.
 As the factual narration would
reflect, the duty constable informed the local police
station, i.e., P.S. Kalyanpuri, about the admission of
the young girl (hereinafter whom we shall refer to as
‘M’) and her condition, as recorded in the MLC.
The
child remained in the hospital for six days and
thereafter she was discharged.
The anxious mother,
unable to digest the story that was told to her by the
daughter, asked her to muster courage and tell the
truth to her.
The young ‘M’ gained confidence and,
eventually, on 10.11.2003, broke down before her
mother and told her how the appellant had brutally
raped her and threatened her that if she disclosed
the said fact to anyone, her life as well as the lives of
her parents would be in danger.
The disturbed father
proceeded to the police station and informed what
3Page 4
was told by his daughter and, accordingly, an FIR was
registered.
After the criminal law was set in motion,
the investigating agency arrested the accused and,
eventually, the accused-appellant was sent up for
trial.
The accused pleaded innocence and claimed to
be tried.
4. The prosecution, in order to establish the charge
levelled against the accused, examined 11 witnesses
including the child ‘M’, her parents, the doctors and
other formal witnesses.
The accused in his
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure stated that on 28.10.2003, the parents of
‘M’ had gone to see her maternal uncle and,
therefore, he had taken the prosecutrix ‘M’ to the
hospital for medical aid, but as Lal Bahadur Shastri
Hospital refused on the ground that the prosecutrix
should be taken to some big hospital, he took her to
GTB Hospital for medical treatment. It was his
further explanation that he took the girl to the
hospital for saving her life and he was not aware that
she had been raped.
The allegation of threat was
4Page 5
disputed by the accused. It is also his stand that
initially the child had not named him being asked by
the doctor and had stated that she had sustained the
injuries by fall, and after the discharge of the child,
he went to attend his work on 4.11.2003.
Be it
noted, the defence chose not to adduce any
evidence.
5. The learned trial Judge, considering the entire
evidence on record and the contentions raised on
behalf of the accused, came to hold that the version
of the prosecutrix could be relied upon in entirety
and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that
she was a tutored witness; that the delay in lodging
the FIR was not at all fatal to the case of the
prosecution as the child was in a tremendous state of
panicky; that the factum of rape has been clearly
proven from the medical evidence and the testimony
of the doctors which have remained unimpeachable
despite roving cross-examination; that no plea of any
hostility or previous animosity had been suggested to
the child or to her parents; that the presence of the
5Page 6
accused in the house had remained unexplained; and
that no suggestion had been given to any of the
doctors who were cited by the prosecution that the
injuries could be caused by fall.
Considering the
entire evidence in detail, the learned trial Judge
found the accused guilty of the offence under Section
376(2)(f) IPC and sentenced him as has been stated
hereinbefore.
6. In appeal, the High Court took note of number of
factors, narrating the condition of the child, the
revelation of the tragic treatment by the accused, the
circumstances under which the FIR was lodged, the
testimony of the prosecutrix as to how she had been
raped in a cruel manner by the accused, the absence
of any reason of his going to the house of young ‘M’
and the circumstances under which he could see the
injured child, the credibility and unimpeachability of
the evidence of the child ‘M’, the courage that was
gradually gathered by the child after getting out of
the state of fear and trauma, the evidence of the
doctors which showed the physical condition of the
6Page 7
victim and the conduct of the accused in the hospital
and, on the said basis, concurred with the view
expressed by the learned trial Judge.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, and
Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned Additional Solicitor General,
and Mr. B.V. Balram Dass, learned counsel appearing
for the NCT of Delhi.
8. To consider the defensibility of the judgment of
conviction rendered by the learned trial Judge and
affirmed by the Division Bench, it is necessary to
appreciate the nature of injuries suffered by the
victim. True it is, the young child had told the
doctors that she had suffered a fall but the same was
not given credence to by the treating doctors. The
MLC where the condition of the young child was
recorded is as follows: -
“O/E-Apprehensive look, G.C. fair, pallor mild, P-
96/m, BP 110/80, heart NAD. No bruises seen on
the body. Breasts and secondary sexual
characters not developed. P/A Soft, lever
spleen not palpable. No shifting dullness, no
area of tenderness. L/E – On separation of labia,
a tear of 1.5 approx. to 2 cm. seen from
posterior fourchette towards anus just 1 cm.
7Page 8
short of anal opening and same tear extending
upto hymen. Clot was seen in her vagina, anal
opening was intact, no area of bruise seen on
perineum. Bleeding per vagina was present.
Decision for examination under anaesthesia and
repair of vaginal perennial tear taken. Patient
was admitted in septic labour room and shifted
to gynae emergency operation theatre. On
examination under anaesthesia, showed same
findings as above but in addition a tear of 3 cm
approximately was seen in left vaginal wall from
hymen into the vagina. Bleeding was positive.
Apex of tear seen, tear stitched in layers, cervix
seen healthy, no bleeding through OS. In view
of EUA, findings under anaesthesia high index of
suspicion of sexual assault was made although
the child and her uncle were denying of any
such episode.”
9. Dr. Sapna Verma, PW-4, who examined the victim,
found that the hymen of the child ‘M’ was torn. The
victim has deposed that about 1.00 p.m. in the
afternoon, on the date of the incident, the accused appellant came to the house and gave her an
intoxicating drink and took her into a room. He raped
her and also gave threat that if she would tell her
parents or any other person, he would inflict knife
blows upon her and her family members. He had
further told her that she should tell her parents that
she received the injuries when she slipped in the
toilet. It has also come in her evidence that the
8Page 9
accused took her to the hospital while she was
bleeding from her private parts. She has truthfully
spoken that initially she told her parents that she had
sustained injuries as a result of a fall in the toilet
because she was terribly scared and thereafter she
spoke out how she sustained the injuries. In her
cross-examination, she has stood embedded in her
version. The time gap between the occurrence and
the accused taking the child to the hospital has its
own significance. The child was bleeding from her
private parts. Had the child been left to herself, she
would have bled to death. The accused took her to
the hospital to avoid a situation when somebody
might have come hearing her cry and saved her life
and she might have ultimately spoken the truth. The
totality of the circumstances would show that he was
with the child. It is interesting to note that the
accused had not disclosed why he had gone to the
house of the child ‘M’ and under what circumstances
he took the child to the hospital. The unimpeachable
evidence of the child ‘M’, the testimony of the
9Page 10
treating physicians, the medical evidence and the
conduct of the accused go a long way to show that
the accused had raped the child ‘M’ in a cruel and
brutal manner and the conviction recorded on that
score by the learned trial Judge which has been given
stamp of approval by the High Court cannot be
faulted.
10. Presently, we shall proceed to deal with the
justification of the sentence. Learned counsel for the
appellant, would submit that though Section 376(2)
provides that sentence can be rigorous imprisonment
for life, yet as a minimum of sentence of ten years is
stipulated, this Court should reduce the punishment
to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. It is urged by
him that the appellant is a father of four children and
their lives would be ruined if the sentence of
imprisonment for life is affirmed. Mr. Paras Kuhad,
and Mr. B.V. Balram Dass, counsel for the State,
submitted that the crime being heinous, the sentence
imposed on the accused is absolutely justified and
does not warrant interference. It is also canvassed
10Page 11
by them that reduction of sentence in such a case
would be an anathema to the concept of just
punishment.
11. Primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for
any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be
imposed regard being had to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which the offence has
been committed. The fundamental purpose of
imposition of sentence is based on the principle that
the accused must realise that the crime committed
by him has not only created a dent in his life but also
a concavity in the social fabric. The purpose of just
punishment is designed so that the individuals in the
society which ultimately constitute the collective do
not suffer time and again for such crimes. It serves
as a deterrent. True it is, on certain occasions,
opportunities may be granted to the convict for
reforming himself but it is equally true that the
principle of proportionality between an offence
committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in
view. While carrying out this complex exercise, it is
11Page 12
obligatory on the part of the Court to see the impact
of the offence on the society as a whole and its
ramifications on the immediate collective as well as
its repercussions on the victim.
12. In this context, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in Jameel v. State of Uttar
Pradesh1
, wherein this Court, speaking about the
concept of sentence, has laid down that it is the duty
of every court to award proper sentence having
regard to the nature of the offence and the manner
in which it was executed or committed. The
sentencing courts are expected to consider all
relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the
question of sentence and proceed to impose a
sentence commensurate with the gravity of the
offence.”
13. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai and another v. State of
Gujarat and others2
, the Court has observed thus:
“Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated
that: “State of criminal law continues to be - as
1
 (2010) 12 SCC 532
2
 (2006) 2 SCC 359
12Page 13
it should be -a decisive reflection of social
consciousness of society.” Therefore, in
operating the sentencing system, law should
adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence
based on factual matrix. By deft modulation,
sentencing process be stern where it should be,
and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
be. The facts and given circumstances in each
case, the nature of the crime, the manner in
which it was planned and committed, the
motive for commission of the crime, the
conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons
used and all other attending circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area
of consideration”.
14. In State of M.P. v. Babulal3
, two learned Judges,
while delineating about the adequacy of sentence,
have expressed thus : -
“19. Punishment is the sanction imposed on the
offender for the infringement of law committed
by him. Once a person is tried for commission
of an offence and found guilty by a competent
court, it is the duty of the court to impose on
him such sentence as is prescribed by law. The
award of sentence is consequential on and
incidental to conviction. The law does not
envisage a person being convicted for an
offence without a sentence being imposed
therefore.
20. The object of punishment has been
succinctly stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England,
(4th Edition: Vol.II: para 482) thus:
“The aims of punishment are now
considered to be retribution, justice,
deterrence, reformation and protection
3
 AIR 2008 SC 582
13Page 14
and modern sentencing policy reflects a
combination of several or all of these aims.
The retributive element is intended to
show public revulsion to the offence and to
punish the offender for his wrong conduct.
The concept of justice as an aim of
punishment means both that the
punishment should fit the offence and also
that like offences should receive similar
punishments. An increasingly important
aspect of punishment is deterrence and
sentences are aimed at deterring not only
the actual offender from further offences
but also potential offenders from breaking
the law. The importance of reformation of
the offender is shown by the growing
emphasis laid upon it by much modern
legislation, but judicial opinion towards this
particular aim is varied and rehabilitation
will not usually be accorded precedence
over deterrence. The main aim of
punishment in judicial thought, however, is
still the protection of society and the other
objects frequently receive only secondary
consideration when sentences are being
decided”.
(emphasis supplied)”
15. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand4
, while
dealing with the philosophy of just punishment which
is the collective cry of the society, a two-Judge Bench
has stated that just punishment would be dependent
on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial
discretion. Neither the personal perception of a
4
 2013 (2) SCALE 533
14Page 15
Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor
hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to
have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure
cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot
be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the
ground of discretion vested in a Court. The real
requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the
crime has been committed and other concomitant
factors.
16. The aforesaid authorities deal with sentencing in
general. As is seen, various concepts, namely,
gravity of the offence, manner of its execution,
impact on the society, repercussions on the victim
and proportionality of punishment have been
emphasized upon. In the case at hand, we are
concerned with the justification of life imprisonment
in a case of rape committed on an eight year old girl,
helpless and vulnerable and, in a way, hapless. The
victim was both physically and psychologically
vulnerable. It is worthy to note that any kind of
15Page 16
sexual assault has always been viewed with
seriousness and sensitivity by this Court.
17. In Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and
another5
, it has been observed as follows:-
“... though all sexual assaults on female
children are not reported and do not come to
light yet there is an alarming and shocking
increase of sexual offences committed on
children. This is due to the reasons that
children are ignorant of the act of rape and are
not able to offer resistance and become easy
prey for lusty brutes who display the
unscrupulous, deceitful and insidious art of
luring female children and young girls.
Therefore, such offenders who are menace to
the civilized society should be mercilessly and
inexorably punished in the severest terms.”
18. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bodem Sundra
Rao6
, this Court noticed that crimes against women
are on the rise and such crimes are affront to the
human dignity of the society and, therefore,
imposition of inadequate sentence is injustice to the
victim of the crime in particular and the society in
general. After so observing, the learned Judges had
to say this: -
5
 (1992) 3 SCC 204
6
 AIR 1996 SC 530
16Page 17
“The Courts have an obligation while awarding
punishment to impose appropriate punishment
so as to respond to the society’s crime for justice
against such criminals. Public abhorrence of the
crime needs a reflection through the Court’s
verdict in the measure of punishment. The
Courts must not only keep in view the rights of
the criminal but also the rights of the victim of
crime and the society at large while considering
imposition of the appropriate punishment.”
19. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and others7
,
this Court stated with anguish that crime against
women in general and rape in particular is on the
increase. The learned Judges proceeded further to
state that it is an irony that while we are celebrating
women’s rights in all spheres, we show little or no
concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection of the
attitude of indifference of the society towards the
violation of human dignity of the victims of sex
crimes. Thereafter, the Court observed the effect of
rape on a victim with anguish: -
“We must remember that a rapist not only
violates the victim’s privacy and personal
integrity, but inevitably causes serious
psychological as well as physical harm in the
process. Rape is not merely a physical assault –
it is often destructive of the whole personality of
the victim. A murderer destroys the physical
7
 AIR 1996 SC 1393
17Page 18
body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very
soul of the helpless female.”
20. In State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa8
, a threeJudge Bench opined that the courts must hear the
loud cry for justice by the society in cases of the
heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of
tender years and respond by imposition of proper
sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs
reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence
by the court. It was further observed that to show
mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be
travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly
misplaced.
21. In Jugendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh9
,
while dwelling upon the gravity of the crime of rape,
this Court had expressed thus: -
“Rape or an attempt to rape is a crime not
against an individual but a crime which destroys
the basic equilibrium of the social atmosphere.
The consequential death is more horrendous. It
is to be kept in mind that an offence against the
body of a woman lowers her dignity and mars
her reputation. It is said that one’s physical
frame is his or her temple. No one has any right
8
 (2000) 4 SCC 75
9
 (2012) 6 SCC 297
18Page 19
of encroachment. An attempt for the
momentary pleasure of the accused has caused
the death of a child and had a devastating
effect on her family and, in the ultimate
eventuate, on the collective at large. When a
family suffers in such a manner, the society as a
whole is compelled to suffer as it creates an
incurable dent in the fabric of the social milieu.”
22. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, the
obtaining factual matrix, the brutality reflected in the
commission of crime, the response expected from
the courts by the society and the rampant
uninhibited exposure of the bestial nature of pervert
minds, we are required to address whether the
rigorous punishment for life imposed on the appellant
is excessive or deserves to be modified. The learned
counsel for the appellant would submit that the
appellant has four children and if the sentence is
maintained, not only his life but also the life of his
children would be ruined. The other ground that is
urged is the background of impecuniousity. In
essence, leniency is sought on the base of aforesaid
mitigating factors. It is seemly to note that the
legislature, while prescribing a minimum sentence for
a term which shall not be less than ten years, has
19Page 20
also provided that the sentence may be extended
upto life. The legislature, in its wisdom, has left it to
the discretion of the Court. Almost for the last three
decades, this Court has been expressing its agony
and distress pertaining to the increased rate of
crimes against women. The eight year old girl, who
was supposed to spend time in cheerfulness, was
dealt with animal passion and her dignity and purity
of physical frame was shattered. The plight of the
child and the shock suffered by her can be well
visualised. The torment on the child has the
potentiality to corrode the poise and equanimity of
any civilized society. The age old wise saying “child
is a gift of the providence” enters into the realm of
absurdity. The young girl, with efflux of time, would
grow with traumatic experience, an unforgettable
shame. She shall always be haunted by the memory
replete with heavy crush of disaster constantly
echoing the chill air of the past forcing her to a state
of nightmarish melancholia. She may not be able to
assert the honour of a woman for no fault of hers.
20Page 21
Respect for reputation of women in the society shows
the basic civility of a civilised society. No member of
society can afford to conceive the idea that he can
create a hollow in the honour of a woman. Such
thinking is not only lamentable but also deplorable. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that the thought
of sullying the physical frame of a woman is the
demolition of the accepted civilized norm, i.e.,
“physical morality”. In such a sphere, impetuosity
has no room. The youthful excitement has no place.
It should be paramount in everyone’s mind that, on
one hand, the society as a whole cannot preach from
the pulpit about social, economic and political
equality of the sexes and, on the other, some pervert
members of the same society dehumanize the
woman by attacking her body and ruining her
chastity. It is an assault on the individuality and
inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that
she should be elegantly servile to men. Rape is a
monstrous burial of her dignity in the darkness. It is
a crime against the holy body of a woman and the
21Page 22
soul of the society and such a crime is aggravated by
the manner in which it has been committed.
We
have emphasised on the manner because, in the
present case, the victim is an eight year old girl who
possibly would be deprived of the dreams of “Spring
of Life” and might be psychologically compelled to
remain in the “Torment of Winter”. 
When she
suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a
singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is
historically abhorred by the society. It demands just
punishment from the court and to such a demand,
the courts of law are bound to respond within legal
parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award
of punishment has to be in consonance with the
legislative command and the discretion vested in the
court. The mitigating factors put forth by the learned
counsel for the appellant are meant to invite mercy
but we are disposed to think that the factual matrix
cannot allow the rainbow of mercy to magistrate.
Our judicial discretion impels us to maintain the
sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and,
22Page 23
hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction and the
order of sentence passed by the High Court.
23. Ex consequenti, the appeal, being sans merit, stands
dismissed.
..............................................J.
 [Dr. B. S. Chauhan]
..............................................J.
 [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
May 15, 2013
23

Section 376(2) (f) of the Indian Penal Code= offences punishable under Sections 365 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the `IPC’) = “We are of opinion that the expression “under a misconception of fact” is broad enough to include all cases where the consent is obtained by misrepresentation; the misrepresentation should be regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with reference to which the consent is given. In Section 3 of the Evidence Act Illustration (d) states that a person has a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the fact about which the second and third prosecution witnesses were made to entertain a misconception was the fact that the second accused intended to get the girl married…….. “thus … if the consent of the person from whose possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud, the taking is deemed to be against the will of such a person”. … Although in cases of contracts a consent obtained by coercion or fraud is only voidable by the party affected by it, the effect of Section 90 IPC is that such consent cannot, under the criminal law, be availed of to justify what would otherwise be an offence.”; there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.” Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.= If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to marry the appellant, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, we fail to understand on what basis the allegation of “false promise of marriage” has been raised by the prosecutrix. We also fail to comprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be leveled against the appellant, in light of the afore-mentioned fact situation. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant, who has already served more than 3 years sentence, is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2322 of 2010
Deepak Gulati …Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment
and order dated 28.1.2010, passed by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court at Chandigarh in CRA No. 960-SB of 1998 by way of which,
the High Court has affirmed the judgment and order of the Additional
Sessions Judge, Karnal dated 13.11.1998 passed in Sessions Case No.
7 of 1995, by way of which the appellant stood convicted for the
offences punishable under Sections 365 and 376 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the `IPC’) and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years, alongwithPage 2
a fine of Rs.2,000/- under Section 365 IPC; and rigorous
imprisonment for a period of seven years, alongwith a fine of
Rs.5,000/- under Section 376 IPC. Both the sentences were ordered to
run concurrently.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
A. The appellant and Geeta, prosecutrix, 19 years of age, student
of 10+2 in Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Karnal, had
known each other for some time. Appellant had been meeting her in
front of her school in an attempt to develop intimate relations with
her. On 10.5.1995, the appellant induced her to go with him to
Kurukshetra, to get married and she agreed. En route Kurukshetra
from Karnal, the appellant took her to Karna lake (Karnal), and had
sexual intercourse with her against her wishes, behind bushes.
Thereafter, the appellant took her to Kurukshetra, stayed with his
relatives for 3-4 days and committed rape upon her.
B. The prosecutrix was thrown out after 4 days by the appellant.
She then went to one of the hostels in Kurukshetra University, and
stayed there for a few days. The warden of the hostel became
suspicious and thus, questioned the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix thus
2Page 3
narrated the incident to the warden, who informed her father.
Meanwhile, the prosecutrix left the hostel and went to a temple, where
she once again met the appellant. Here, the appellant convinced her to
accompany him to Ambala to get married. When they reached the bus
stand, they found her father present there alongwith the police. The
appellant was apprehended.
C. Baldev Raj Soni, father of the prosecutrix, had lodged a
complaint on 16.5.1995 under Sections 365 and 366 IPC, which was
later converted to one under Sections 365 and 376 IPC.
D. The prosecutrix was medically examined on 17.5.1995. Her
statement was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
`Cr.P.C.’) on 20.5.1995. After completing the investigation, a
chargesheet was filed against the appellant, and in view of the
material on record, charges under Sections 365 and 376 IPC were
framed against him by the Sessions Court, vide order dated 3.5.1996.
E. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses in support of its case
and in view thereof, the Sessions Court convicted the appellant under
Sections 365/376 IPC, vide judgment and order dated 13.11.1998 and
3Page 4
awarded him the sentence for the said charges as has been referred to
hereinabove.
F. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 960-
SB of 1998 (D & M) in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh, which stood dismissed by the impugned judgment and
order dated 18.11.1998.
Hence, this appeal.
3. None present for the appellant. In view thereof, the Court has
examined the material on record and gone through both the impugned
judgments with the help of Shri Kamal Mohan Gupta, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State.
4. The statement of the prosecutrix (PW.7) was recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 20.5.1995, wherein she has clearly stated that
she had gone alongwith the appellant to get married and for such
purpose, she had also obtained a certificate from her school as proof
of her age. On the said date i.e. 10.5.1995, as the appellant had been
unable to reach the pre-decided place, the prosecutrix had telephoned
him on the number provided by him. She has further deposed that the
appellant had asked her to have a physical relationship with him, but
4Page 5
that she had not agreed to do so before marriage. When they reached
Kurukshetra and stayed with his relatives there, the appellant had
sexual intercourse with her for 3 days. On the 4th day, she was thrown
out of the house by the appellant and thus, she had gone to the Girls
Hostel in Kurukshetra University, where she had stayed under the
pretext of getting admitted to the university. However, the university
personnel became suspicious, and after making enquiries from her,
they telephoned her house. She then left the university and had gone
to the Birla Mandir at Kurukshetra, where she had met appellant.
Here he lured her once again, and thus, she had agreed to accompany
him to Ambala to get married in court there. However, when they
reached the old bus stand Kurukshetra, she had found her father and
several police officials present there, and thereafter the appellant had
been arrested and the prosecutrix was taken to Karnal.
5. The prosecutrix was examined in court as PW.7 on 5.7.1996,
wherein she deposed that on 10.5.1995, as per the agreed plan, she
had left her house to go alongwith the appellant to Kurukshetra to get
married in court. However, she had not found the appellant at the
place decided upon by them, and had thus telephoned him at the
number provided to her by him. She was then informed that the
5Page 6
appellant had already left for Kurukshetra and hence, waited for him
from 12.00 noon till 1.30 p.m. When he arrived, she went alongwith
the appellant at 2.30 p.m. to Karna lake (Karnal) by bus. Here, she
was taken into some bushes behind the restaurant at Karna lake, and
thereafter raped by the appellant. At the said time, she neither raised
any objection, nor any hue and cry. The prosecutrix did not even
mention the said incident to any person, despite going to Kurukshetra
and staying there for 3-4 days. She raised no grievance in this regard
before any person or authority at the bus stand. She continued to stay
with the appellant in the house of his relatives and was raped there.
The appellant continued to postpone their marriage on one pretext or
the other. Thereafter, she was thrown out of the house. She thus went
and stayed in the University hostel and on being questioned, she
disclosed details regarding her treatment to the warden, who informed
her family.
After this, she went to the Birla Mandir at Kurukshetra,
and here she met the appellant once again. 
The appellant made another attempt to convince her to go to Ambala with him to get married in court there.
Upon reaching the old Bus Stand, she found
her brother Rajinder there alongwith a police party, who had been
accompanying them in a jeep to Karnal. 
6Page 7
6. In his statement, Baldev Raj Soni (PW.8), father of the
prosecutrix has deposed that on 10.5.1995, her daughter Geeta did not
come home. He thus lodged a complaint and contacted Rajni, a friend
of Geeta, who told him that the appellant Deepak had taken her to
Kurukshetra. On 17.5.1995, the police had gone alongwith him to
Kurukshetra to locate Geeta, where they had found the prosecutrix
and the appellant sitting at the old bus stand in Kurukshetra. Both of
them had been caught hold of by them, and were brought to Karnal.
7. Smt. P. Kant Vashisht (PW.10), Warden of Saraswati Bhawan
Kurukshetra University, though did not support the case of the
prosecution, and was declared hostile, has deposed in her examination
in chief that Geeta, prosecutrix, had been brought to her office by one
person, namely, Shri Ashwini, student of the engineering college, and
that he had left Geeta in her office, stating that he would inform her
parents. After sometime, her brother had come and taken her away.
She was cross-examined by the prosecution, and she has deposed that
the prosecutrix had in fact stayed in the hostel without any
authority/permission. One Nirmla, attendant therein had allowed her
to stay in the hostel without any such requisite permission.
7Page 8
8. Smt. Krishana Chawla (PW.3), Lecturer of Political Science in
Government Senior Secondary School, Karnal, has deposed before
court, and has proved the school register to show that the date of birth
of the prosecutrix was 26.6.1976.
9. Dr. (Mrs.) Amarjeet Wadhwa (PW.11), Medical Officer,
Government Hospital, Karnal, who examined the prosecutrix on
17.5.1995, has deposed that the prosecutrix had indulged in sexual
intercourse and was habitual to the same.
10. Shri Bhagwan Chand (PW.12), ASI, the Investigating Officer,
has deposed that after recording the statement of the father of the
prosecutrix on 17.5.1995, he had taken her father to Kurukshetra to
search for the prosecutrix alongwith one constable. At about 12.00
noon, when they reached the old bus stand at Kurukshetra, the father
of the prosecutrix noticed Geeta, sitting with the appellant Deepak in
one corner of the bus stand, and thereafter, they had apprehended
them. He has also disposed that he had recorded the statement of the
prosecutrix.
11. There exist in the statements of the witnesses material
contradictions, improvements and embellishments. In the cross-
8Page 9
examination, Baldev Raj Soni (PW.8) has deposed that he had gone
to Kurukshetra with his relatives i.e. Ashwini Kumar and Surinder,
and has stated that his son Rajinder was not with him at such time. He
has not deposed that he had received any telephone call from the
warden of any hostel, as has been suggested by the prosecutrix.
Furthermore, the prosecutrix in her statement under Section 164
Cr.P.C., has not mentioned the incident involving her indulging in
sexual contact with the appellant at the Karna lake at Karnal.
Bhagwan Chand (PW.12) has not mentioned that any relatives of the
prosecutrix had accompanied them while they were traveling from
Kurukshetra to Karnal.
12. The FIR in the present case has been registered under Sections
365 and 366 IPC, by Baldev Raj Soni (PW.8), father of the
prosecutrix, naming several persons, including the appellant, accusing
them of enticing his daughter and wrongfully confining her at an
unknown place. Thus, he has expressed his apprehension with respect
to danger to the life of his daughter.
13. Admittedly, the prosecutrix has never raised any grievance
before any person at any stage. In fact, she seems to have submitted to
9Page 10
the will of the appellant, possibly in lieu of his promise to marry her. .
Thus, a question arises with respect to whether, in light of the facts
and circumstances of the present case, the appellant had an intention
to deceive her from the very beginning when he had asked the
prosecutrix to leave for Kurukshetra with him from Karnal.
14. The undisputed facts of the case are as under:
I. The prosecutrix was 19 years of age at the time of the said
incident.
II. She had inclination towards the appellant, and had willingly
gone with him to Kurukshetra to get married.
III. The appellant had been giving her assurance of the fact that he
would get married to her.
IV. The physical relationship between the parties had clearly
developed with the consent of the prosecutrix, as there was
neither a case of any resistance, nor had she raised any
complaint anywhere at any time despite the fact that she had
been living with the appellant for several days, and had
travelled with him from one place to another.
10Page 11
V. Even after leaving the hostel of Kurukshetra University, she
agreed and proceeded to go with the appellant to Ambala, to get
married to him there.
15. Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Act 1872’) provides, that if the prosecutrix deposes
that she did not give her consent, then the Court shall presume that
she did not in fact, give such consent. The facts of the instant case
do not warrant that the provisions of Section 114-A of the Act 1872
be pressed into service. Hence, the sole question involved herein is
whether her consent had been obtained on the false promise of
marriage. Thus, the provisions of Sections 417, 375 and 376 IPC have
to be taken into consideration, alongwith the provisions of Section 90
of the Act 1872. Section 90 of the Act 1872 provides, that any consent
given under a misconception of fact, would not be considered as valid
consent, so far as the provisions of Section 375 IPC are concerned,
and thus, such a physical relationship would tantamount to
committing rape.
16. This Court considered the issue involved herein at length in the
case of Uday v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639; Deelip
11Page 12
Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203; Yedla
Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 615; and Pradeep
Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 3059, and
came to the conclusion that in the event that the accused’s promise is
not false and has not been made with the sole intention to seduce the
prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would not amount
to rape. Thus, the same would only hold that where the prosecutrix,
under a misconception of fact to the extent that the accused is likely
to marry her, submits to the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act
cannot be said to be consensual, so far as the offence of the accused is
concerned.
17. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in
a society, as it is an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the
victim. While a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a
rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape
reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life.
By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a
permanent scar on the life of the victim, and therefore a rape victim is
placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. Rape is a crime
against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim.
12Page 13
Being the most hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the
supreme honour of a woman, and offends both, her esteem and
dignity. It causes psychological and physical harm to the victim,
leaving upon her indelible marks.
18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry
the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to
this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach
of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given
after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have
sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the
13Page 14
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he
could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was
unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for
rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the
accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
19. In Deelip Singh (supra), it has been observed as under:
“20. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are
from the point of view of the victim.
The second part of
Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the
point of view of the accused. It envisages that the
accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that
the consent was given by the victim in consequence of
fear of injury or misconception of fact.
Thus, the second
part lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable
belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The
requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively
satisfied. In other words, the court has to see whether the
person giving the consent had given it under fear of
injury or misconception of fact and the court should also
be satisfied that the person doing the act i.e. the alleged
offender, is conscious of the fact or should have reason
to think that but for the fear or misconception, the
consent would not have been given. This is the scheme of
Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology.”
20. This Court, while deciding Pradeep Kumar Verma (Supra),
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High Court
14Page 15
delivered in N. Jaladu, Re ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453, wherein it has
been observed:
“We are of opinion that the expression “under a
misconception of fact” is broad enough to include all
cases where the consent is obtained by
misrepresentation; the misrepresentation should be
regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with
reference to which the consent is given. In Section 3 of
the Evidence Act Illustration (d) states that a person has
a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the fact
about which the second and third prosecution witnesses
were made to entertain a misconception was the fact that
the second accused intended to get the girl married……..
“thus … if the consent of the person from whose
possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud, the
taking is deemed to be against the will of such a person”.
… Although in cases of contracts a consent obtained by
coercion or fraud is only voidable by the party affected
by it, the effect of Section 90 IPC is that such consent
cannot, under the criminal law, be availed of to justify
what would otherwise be an offence.”
21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the
victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
15Page 16
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the
term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate
relevance.” Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal
liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that
from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her.
22. The instant case is factually very similar to the case of Uday
(Supra), wherein the following facts were found to exist:
I. The prosecutrix was 19 years of age and had adequate
intelligence and maturity to understand the significance and
morality associated with the act she was consenting to.
II. She was conscious of the fact that her marriage may not take
place owing to various considerations, including the caste
factor.
III. It was difficult to impute to the accused, knowledge of the fact
that the prosecutrix had consented as a consequence of a
misconception of fact, that had arisen from his promise to
marry her.
16Page 17
IV. There was no evidence to prove conclusively, 
that the appellant
had never intended to marry the prosecutrix. 
23. To conclude, 
the prosecutrix had left her home voluntarily, of
her own free will to get married to the appellant.
 She was 19 years of
age at the relevant time and was, hence, capable of understanding the
complications and issues surrounding her marriage to the appellant.

According to the version of events provided by her, 
the prosecutrix
had called the appellant on a number given to her by him, to ask him
why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by
them. 
She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally
arrived she went with him to the Karna lake where they indulged in
sexual intercourse. 
She did not raise any objection at this stage and
made no complaints to any one. 
Thereafter, she also went to
Kurukshetra with the appellant, where she lived with his relatives.

Here to, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the
appellant. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at
Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact
with the appellant at the Birla Mandir. 
Thereafter, she even
proceeded with the appellant to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to
17Page 18
leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married in court at
Ambala. However, here they were apprehended by the police. 
24. If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to marry the
appellant, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, we
fail to understand on what basis the allegation of “false promise of
marriage” has been raised by the prosecutrix. 
We also fail to
comprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be
leveled against the appellant, in light of the afore-mentioned fact
situation. 
25. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
appellant, who has already served more than 3 years sentence, is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, the appeal succeeds and is
allowed. His conviction and sentences awarded by the courts below
are set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.
………………………J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
………………………J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
May 20, 2013
18