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Friday, May 17, 2013

legality of an order passed by the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Sagar Division, Sagar, M.P., superseding the Board of Directors of District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Panna without previous consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, as provided under the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960= In such circumstances of the case, we are inclined to dismiss both the appeals with costs directing re-instatement of the first respondent Board of Directors back in office forthwith and be allowed to continue for the period they were put out of office by the impugned order which has been quashed. We also direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority within a period of one month by way of costs and also impose a cost of Rs.10,000/- as against the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, the officer who passed the order, which will be deducted from his salary and be deposited in the Panna DCB within a period of two months from today. Ordered accordingly. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees: (1) Supersession of an elected managing Committee/Board is an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to complete the term for which it is elected. (2) Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the shortcomings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee, unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the illegalities committed by the previous committees. (3) Elected Committee in Office be given sufficient time, say at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated when the previous committee was in office. (4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with thePage 34 34 financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. (5) Registrar/ Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the consequences of an order of supersession which has the effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding elections. Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. (6) Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for the cost of the legal proceedings. (7) Public money not to be spent by the State Government or the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes between various factions in a co-operative society. Tax payers money is not expected to be spent for settling those disputes. If found necessary, the same be spent from the funds available with the concerned Bank


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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4691 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6860 of 2012]
State of M.P. and Others .. Appellants
Versus
Sanjay Nagayach and Others .. Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4692 OF 2013,
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 13125 of 2012]
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
Leave granted.
1. We are, in this case, concerned with the legality of an
order passed by the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies,
Sagar Division, Sagar, M.P., superseding the Board of Directors
of District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Panna without
previous consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, as
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provided under the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the
Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 [for short ‘the
Act’].
2. The Board of Directors of the Bank challenged the above
mentioned order on various grounds, including the ground of
violation of the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act that
is non-consultation with the Reserve Bank of India [RBI] before
taking a decision to supersede the Board of Directors.
The
order was challenged by the Board of Directors by filing a writ
petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur
Bench. Learned single Judge of the High Court disposed of the
writ petition directing the parties to avail of the alternative
remedy provided under Section 78 of the Act.
But on appeal,
the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of
supersession dated 30.9.2011 on the ground of non-compliance
of the second proviso to section 53(1) of the Act. 
Aggrieved by
the same, the State of M.P., through its Principal Secretary,
Department of Co-operation, the Commissioner Cum
Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhopal and the Joint
Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, have come up with
Civil Appeal No. ......... of 2013 [arising out of SLP No. 6860
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of 2012] and a private party filed Civil Appeal No. ........... of
2013 [arising out of SLP No. 13125 of 2012] challenging the
judgment of the High Court dated 13.2.2012, followed by lot of
intervening applications.
3. As the question of laws involved in both the above
mentioned appeals are common, we are disposing of both the
appeals by a common judgment.
Facts and Arguments
4. The Board of Directors of the Bank was elected to Office
on 16.10.2007 and while in office they were served with a
show-cause-notice dated 2.3.2009 issued by the Joint Registrar,
Co-operative Societies under Section 53(2) of the Act
containing 19 charges.
 Detailed replies were sent by the Board
of Directors on 6.5.2009 and 16.5.2011 stating that most of the
charges levelled against them were related to the period of the
previous Committee and the rest were based exclusively on an
Audit Report dated 25.9.2008. It was pointed out that the
Board of Directors on receipt of the Audit report took necessary
action and a communication dated 5.12.2008 was sent to the
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Branch Managers of Primary Societies to take immediate followup action on the basis of the Audit report. After filing the
detailed reply, nothing was heard from the Joint Registrar but
due to political pressure and extraneous reasons after two and
half years of the show cause notice, an order of supersession
was served on the Board, followed by the appointment of an
Administrator in gross violation of the second proviso to Section
53(1) of the Act.
5. Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi, learned senior advocate
appearing for the State, submitted that the High Court was not
justified in interfering with the order of supersession passed by
the Joint Registrar, while an alternative remedy was available
under Section 78 of the Act by way of an appeal before the Cooperative Tribunal.
 Learned senior counsel placed reliance on
the judgments of this Court in Harbanslal Sahnia and
Another v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others (2003) 2 SCC
107, United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and
Others (2010) 8 SCC 110 and Om Prakash Saini v. DCM
Ltd. and Others (2010) 11 SCC 622. Learned senior
counsel also submitted that the Division Bench of the High
Court has not correctly appreciated the scope of the second
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proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act. Learned senior counsel
also pointed out that the Joint Registrar has forwarded the
show-cause notice dated 23.2.2009 along with other materials
to RBI seeking its views on the proposed action of supersession
and the RBI through its communications dated 17.4.2009,
3.6.2009 and 8.12.2009 had only directed the Joint Registrar to
indicate RBI of the action taken against the Board of Directors.
Consequently, the Joint Registrar was only required to inform
the RBI of the action taken against the Board of Directors.
Learned senior counsel also submitted that the charges levelled
against the Board of Directors were of serious nature and the
order of supersession was passed bona fide and in public
interest and the Division Bench of the High Court was not
justified in interfering with the order of supersession.
6. Shri V. K. Bali, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants in Civil Appeal No. ........... of 2013 [arising out of
SLP No. 13125 of 2012], also submitted that the charges
levelled against the Board of Directors were of serious nature
and there was sufficient materials to establish those charges
and the Joint Registrar has rightly passed the order of
supersession and appointed the Collector, Panna as an
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Administrator of the Bank. Learned senior counsel also pointed
out that the Joint Registrar had forwarded the show-causenotice
as well as the connected materials to RBI and RBI had
failed to respond to the show-cause-notice within 30 days of
the receipt of the same and, therefore, it would be presumed
that RBI had agreed to the proposed action and the Joint
Registrar had rightly passed the order of supersession. Shri
Mahavir Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the
Interveners also submitted that the High Court has committed
an error interfering with the order of supersession and, in any
view, if any of the parties were aggrieved, they ought to have
availed of the alternate remedy available under the Act.
7. Shri Vivek Tankha, learned senior counsel appearing for
the 1st respondent, submitted that the High Court has correctly
understood the scope of the second proviso to Section 53(1) of
the Act and rightly came to the conclusion that before passing
the order of supersession, there should be a meaningful
consultation with the RBI, therefore, the consultee could apply
its mind and form an independent opinion as to whether the
Board be superseded or not. Learned senior counsel submitted
that merely forwarding the show cause notice along with other
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relevant materials is not sufficient compliance of the second
proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act, so held by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in several judgments. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the order of supersession was passed
by the Joint Registrar after a period of two and half years of the
issuance of the show-cause-notice and most of charges levelled
against the Board of Directors were related to the period when
the previous Committee was in office and even the charges
based on the Audit Report dated 25.9.2008 were also rectified
by the Board of Directors by addressing the primary societies.
Learned senior counsel also submitted that the order was
passed at the instance of respondents 2 and 3 herein on
extraneous considerations and was actuated by mala fide and
ulterior motive. Learned counsel submitted that the Joint
Registrar had acted under the political pressure and was not
exercising his powers in accordance with the provisions of the
Act and the order of supersession was passed to disqualify the
members of the Board of Directors from contesting the ensuing
election. Learned senior counsel prayed that the Board of
Directors be put back in office and be allowed to continue for
the period they were put out of office illegally.
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8. We heard learned counsel on either side at great length.
When the matter came up for hearing before us on 17.10.2012,
we passed the following order, the operative portion of which
reads as under:
“We are informed that the period of the Managing
Committee is already over and District Collector is
acting as the Administrator of the Cooperative Bank
vide this Court’s order dated 23.02.2012. However,
the legality of the order has to be tested. Before that
we feel it appropriate to place the entire material
before the Reserve Bank of India (for short, ‘RBI’)
(Respondent NO. 7) for its opinion as per Section 53 of
the Act. The RBI will take a final decision on that within
a period of two months and forward the opinion to the
Secretary General of this Court, who will place it before
the Court.”
RBI submitted its detailed report on 18.12.2012, in pursuance to
the order passed by this Court. RBI, referring to the second
proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act, took the view that the socalled consultation made by the Joint Registrar cannot be
treated as previous consultation, as per law. RBI, after
examining all the documents made available by the Joint
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Registrar including the show-cause-notice, reply filed by the
Board of Directors opined as follows:
(i) The JRCS has alleged that Panna DCCB has not
deducted tax on the interest paid to the depositors.
In terms of the CBDT circular No. 9/2002 dated 11-9-
2002 tax is deductible at source from any payment of
income by way of interest other than income by way
of interest on securities. Clause (v) of sub-section (3)
of section 194A exempts such income credited or
paid by a co-operative society to a member thereof
from requirement of TDS. Clause (viia) of sub-section
(3) of section 194A exempts from the requirement of
TDS such income credited or paid in respect of
deposits (other than time deposits made on or after
1-7-1995) with a co-operative society engaged in
carrying on the business of banking. It is not clear
from observation of JRCS, Panna that the interest
accrued and paid was time deposit or saving bank
deposit account made after 01.07.1995.
(ii) The amount collected as VAT was not remitted to the
Government.
VAT is not applicable to the banking transactions.
Hence collection itself is not correct.
(iii) In terms of Audit para 21 of Audit Report for the FY
ended 2000-01, Panna DCCB in the year June 1997,
without the approval of PACS’ Committee had stored
pesticides. These medicines expired on December 98
and August 99. Despite expiry, stock of medicines
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worth Rs.16.28 lakh was left over which could not be
sold in the market. The amount should have been
recovered from the employees of the bank.
As per the reply furnished by the bank, the present
Board of Directors had initiated the process of
recovery of dues of which the major portion of
outstanding dues has already been recovered. The
bank is effecting recovery from its 39 employees
through monthly deductions of Rs.500 to Rs1000.
(iv) In terms of Audit para 32 of Audit Report for the FY
ended 2000-01, an outstanding amount of Rs23200/-
to be recovered from cashier Shri D.L. Tiwari is still
pending for recovery.
It is seen from the records that the bank has initiated
disciplinary proceedings against the erring employees
besides filing a recovery suit with Civil Court, Powai.
(v) In terms of Audit para 16 of Audit Report for the FY
ended 2000-01, Shri Jawaharlal Srivastav, Manager of
Laxmipur PACs had committed fraud of Rs.20.93 lacs
thereby misappropriated the bank’s funds. He has
been removed from services and an amount of
Rs.36,637/- has been recovered from his claims.
Bank vide its letter dated 15.02.2002 has written to
Kotwali Police Panna to register the case. No action
has been initiated by the present Board in the matter.
The Bank has already registered a case against Shri
Jawaharlal Srivastav. However, it appears from the
records and reply furnished by the bank that no
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effective steps were taken after 15.02.2002 to lodge
FIR in the matter. Even the present Board of
Directors apparently has not taken any effective
steps after it took over during the end of 2007.
(vi) In terms of Audit para 23 of Audit Report for the FY
ended 2000-01, reconciliation of entries in the books
of accounts of DCCB Panna was pending and it has
not been resolved.
Non-reconciliation of books by DCCB Panna is an
operational risk which has also been pointed out by
NABARD in its inspection reports for the FY 2008-
2009 and 2010-2011. Therefore, the compliance
submitted by the bank does not appear to be
satisfactory.
(vii) In terms of Audit para 13 of Audit Report for the FY
ended 2003-04, fraud in respect of 37 Managers to
the tune of Rs.43.34 lakh was mentioned and the
cases are still pending. 27 Employees have been
terminated from the services. Case against only one
employee has been registered with police and the
bank has not registered the cases against 27
employees.
From the records made available to us, we do not
observe any monitoring by JRCS, on the issue during
the intervening period. It is evident that this matter
was being discussed in the Board meetings of the
present Board, some amount was already recovered,
disciplinary action against the erring employees have
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been taken and the legal proceeding initiated against
them is also pending.
(viii) As mentioned in Audit Report for the FY ended 2006-
07, rectification of audit objections is not satisfactory.
No action was taken on most of the audit objections
and compliance submitted by the management is
mere eyewash.
Compliance to Audit Report is an ongoing process
which needs to be monitored on a continuous basis.
The table showing the allegations of the JRCS Panna,
comments of Panna DCCB and the observation of RBI
is enclosed herewith and marked as Exhibit – IX.
RBI, therefore, took the view that the deficiencies pointed out in
the show-cause-notice were general in nature and did not
warrant the supersession of the Board of Directors. RBI,
however, opined that it would be desirable that new election of
the Board of Directors be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the Management of the Bank be
handed over to the newly elected body by the present
administrator.
Legal Framework
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9. The validity of the order of supersession has to be tested
under the legal framework in which the Cooperative Bank and
its controlling authorities have to function under the Act read
with the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (for
short ‘RBI Act’), the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (for short
‘Regulation Act’), the Banking Law (Application to Cooperative
Societies) Act, 1965 (23 of 1976), the Deposit Insurance and
Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (for short ‘DICGC Act’),
the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development Act,
1981 (for short ‘NABARD Act’) etc. Since the order impugned
results in the supersession of a body elected to achieve social
and economic democracy with emphasis on weaker sections of
the society, as the preamble of the Act depicts, a close look at
the powers of the functionaries instrumental in over-turning an
elected body is of paramount importance.
10. Co-operative philosophy on society must rest on free
universal association, democratically governed and conditioned
by equity and personal liberty. First legislation in India relating
to cooperative societies was the Co-operative Societies Act,
1904, established for the purpose of credit only, but to extend
the privilege of credit societies to other societies also a
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legislation with wider scope and object, that is Cooperative
Societies Act 1912, was passed which was applicable to the
whole of British India, which was a Central Act. Later, after
independence different States enacted separate Acts of which
we are in this case concerned with the 1960 Act in force in the
State of Madhya Pradesh.
11. We find, until the year 1965, the Cooperative Banks were
not being regulated by the RBI but it was felt necessary to bring
the cooperative societies carrying on the business of banking
within the purview of the Regulation Act. Since, large number
of cooperative societies were carrying on the banking business,
and also to ensure the growth of cooperative banking on sound
banking principles, the Parliament enacted the Act 23 of 1965,
called the Banking Law (Application to Cooperative Societies)
Act, 1965 and Part IV was introduced into the
Regulation Act w.e.f. 1.3.1966. Section 55 of Part V provides for
the application of the Regulation Act to Cooperative Banks.
Any existing co-operative bank at the time of the
commencement of the Act 23 of 1965 was required to apply
grant of license within a period of three months from the date of
the commencement of the Act and obtain a license from RBI
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under Section 22 of RBI Act. Every co-operative bank is also
obliged to comply with the provisions of the Regulation Act and
directions/guidelines issued by RBI from time to time.
12. We may, in this connection, refer to certain provisions of
the DICGC Act which also confers certain powers to the RBI to
supersede the committee of the management of the cooperative Bank in public interest. The Act has been enacted to
provide for the establishment of a Corporation for the purpose
of insurance deposits and guaranteed credit facilities for allied
purposes. Section 3 of the Act has empowered the Central
Government to establish the Deposit Insurance Corporation, a
wholly owned subsidiary of RBI. Section 2(gg)(iii) of DICGC Act
states that “eligible co-operative bank” means a co-operative
bank, the law for the time being governing, which provides that:
“2(gg)(iii) If so required by the Reserve Bank of India
in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of the
bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the
interest of the depositors or for securing the proper
management of the bank, an order shall be made for
the supersession of the committee of management or
other managing body (by whatever name called) of the
bank and the appointment of an administrator therefor
for such period or periods not exceeding five years in
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the aggregate as may from time to time be specified by
the Reserve Bank.”
RBI never thought it necessary to invoke the above mentioned
provision as against the first respondent. NABARD Act has been
enacted to provide and regulate credit facilities and for other
related and individual matters. Section 3 of the Act has
empowered the Central Government to establish such a
National Bank, i.e. NABARD. Section 35 of the Regulation Act
empowers the RBI to conduct inspection of the affairs of a
banking company. RBI has also got the power under Subsection (b) of Section 35 of the Regulation Act to authorise
NABARD to conduct inspection of the District Cooperative Bank.
13. Section 2(d) of the NABARD Act defines the term “Central
Co-operative Bank”. NABARD in exercise of the powers
conferred on it, is also authorised to conduct inspection on the
affairs of District Co-operative Banks.
14. We will now examine the scope of Section 53 of the Act,
especially the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Act, in the
light of the above discussion. Section 53 relevant to our
purpose is given below:
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“53. Supersession of Board of Directors- (1) If in
the opinion of the Registrar the Board of Directors of
any society-(a) is negligent in the performance of the
duties imposed on it by or under this Act or byelaws of
the society or by any lawful order passed by the
Registrar or is unwilling to perform such duties; or
(b) commits acts which are prejudicial to the
interests of the society or its members; or
(c) violates the provisions of this Act or the
rules made thereunder or byelaws of the society or any
order passed by the Registrar. The Registrar may, by
order in writing remove the Board of Directors and
appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of
the society for a specified period not exceeding two
years in the first instance:
Provided that if in opinion of the Registrar, the
Board of Directors of any Primary Agriculture Credit Cooperative Society-
(i) incurs losses for three consecutive years; or
(ii) commits serious financial irregularities or
fraud is identified; or
(iii) there is perpetual lack of quorum in the
meetings of the Board of Directors.
The Registrar may, by order in writing remove the
Board of Directors an appoint a person or persons to
manage the affairs of the society for two months which
may be extended by him for such period not exceeding
six months for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Provided further that in case of Co-operative
Bank, the order of supersession shall not be passed
without previous consultation with the Reserve Bank;
Provided further that if no communication
containing the views of the Reserve Bank of India on
action proposed is received within thirty days of the
receipt by that bank of the request soliciting
consultation, it shall be presumed that the ReservePage 18
18
Bank of India agree with the proposed action and the
Registrar shall be free to pass such order as he may
deem fit.
Provided also that if a non-official is appointed in
the Board of Directors of a primary society, he shall be
from amongst the members of that society, entitled for
such representation and in case of central or Apex
society, if a person is appointed in the Board of
Directors of such society, he shall be a member of one
of its affiliated societies entitled for such
representation.
(2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be
passed unless a list of allegations, documents and
witnesses in support of charges levelled against it has
been provided and the Board of Directors has been
given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the proposed order and representation, if any,
made by it, is considered.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Before taking action under sub-section (1) in
respect of a financing bank or in respect of a society
indebted to a financing bank, the Registrar shall
consult, in the former case, the Madhya Pradesh State
Co-operative Bank Limited and, in the latter case, the
financing bank, counterved regarding such action. If
the Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Limited or
the financing bank, as the case may be, fails to
communicate its views within thirty days of the receipt
by such bank of the request soliciting consultation, it
shall be presumed that the Madhya Pradesh State Cooperative Bank Limited or the financing bank, as the
case may be, agreed with the proposed action.”
Section 53 (1) confers powers on the Registrar to pass an order
to remove the Board of Directors and to appoint a person to
manage the affairs of the society, subject to certain conditions,
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of which, we are primarily concerned with the applicability of
the second proviso to Section 53(1), which specifically states
that in the case of a Co-operative Bank, the order of
supersession shall not be passed without previous consultation
with the RBI. The third proviso to Section 53 states that if no
communication containing the views of the RBI on the action
proposed is received within thirty days of the receipt by that
bank of the request soliciting consultation, it shall be presumed
that the RBI agreed with the proposed action and the Registrar
shall be free to pass such order, as he may deem fit. Subsection (2) to Section 53 of the Act specifically states that no
order under Sub-section (1) (order of supersession) shall be
passed unless a list of allegations, documents and witnesses in
support of charges levelled against it has been provided and
the Board of Directors has been given a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the proposed order and
representation, if any, made by it, is considered. The second
proviso to Section 53 (1) refers to the expression “order of
supersession”, means that the final order of supersession to be
passed by the Joint Registrar after complying with sub-section
(2) to Section 53. Second and third provisos, read together,
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would indicate that no order of supersession shall be passed
without previous consultation with the RBI. Before passing an
order of supersession, the show-cause-notice along with other
relevant materials, including the reply received from the bank,
has to be made available to the RBI for an effective
consultation.
15. We have already quoted the second proviso to Section
53(1), the meaning of which is clear and unambiguous which, in
our view, calls for no interpretation or explanation. In this
respect, reference to the often quoted principle laid down by
Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CIT F.85 is useful,
which reads as follows: “If the words of the Statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in the natural and
ordinary sense.” Reference may also be made to the
judgments of this Court in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Another
v. State of Bihar and Another (2009) 3 SCC 553 and Ansal
Properties and Industries Limited v. State of Haryana
and Another (2010) 5 SCC 1.Page 21
21
16. The mere serving a copy of the show-cause-notice on RBI
with supporting documents is not what is contemplated under
the second proviso to Section 53(1). For a meaningful and
effective consultation, the copy of the reply filed by the Bank to
the various charges and allegations levelled against them
should also be made available to the RBI as well as the action
proposed by the Joint Registrar, after examining the reply
submitted by the Bank. On the other hand, RBI should be told
of the action the Joint Registrar is intending to take. Only then,
there will be an effective consultation and the views expressed
by the RBI will be a relevant material for deciding whether the
elected Board be superseded or not. In other words, the
previous consultation is a condition precedent before forming
an opinion by the Joint Registrar to supersede the Board of
Directors or not.
17. This Court in Indian Administrative Services (SCS)
Association, U.P. v. Union of India 1993 Supp (1) SCC 730,
has laid down six propositions while examining the meaning of
the expression ‘consultation’. We may add one more
proposition that when the outcome of the proposed action is to
oust a democratically elected body and the expression used is
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“shall not be passed without previous consultation”, it is to be
construed as mandatory. Reference may also be made to the
judgments of this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless
Company (1987) 2 SCR 1, State of Jammu and Kashmir v.
A.R. Zakki and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548, Gauhati
High Court and Another v. Kuladhar Phkan and Another
(2002) 4 SCC 524, Andhra Bank v. Andhra Bank Officers
and Another (2008) 7 SCC 203.
Discussion
18. District Cooperative Bank, Panna (for short ‘Panna DCB”),
a Bank registered under the Act, was issued a license to
conduct the banking services in India by RBI on 3.6.2010 under
Section 22 of the Regulation Act. Panna DCB is a Central Cooperative Bank as defined under Sub-section 2(d) of NABARD
Act. NABARD had conducted an inspection of the Panna DCB
under Section 35 of the Regulation Act, with reference to the
financial position as on 31.3.2007, when the previous Board was
in office and thirty six fraud cases at Primary Agricultural Credit
Societies (PACS) involving Rs.37.05 lacs had been reported.
Certain deficiencies in the bank’s functioning, like non-
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adherence to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, lack of
internal checks and control systems and unsatisfactory
compliance to their previous inspection report, had also found a
place in their inspection report, the copy of which was
forwarded to the RBI vide their communication dated 1.2.2008.
19. The Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, as already
stated, issued a notice to Panna DCB to show cause as to why
the Board of Directors be not superseded and an Administrator
be appointed. The show-cause-notice was sent to the RBI,
which RBI received on 4.3.2009. RBI vide its letter dated
17.4.2009 requested the Joint Registrar to inform the action
being taken on the reply submitted by the Board of Directors of
Panna DCB. RBI vide its letter dated 30.3.2009 forwarded the
copy of the show-cause-notice to the Chief General Manager,
NABARD for their comments. Since, NABARD had conducted
inspection of Panna DCB under Section 35 of the Regulation Act,
NABARD vide its letter dated 29.6.2009 informed the same to
the RBI and also opined as follows:
“..... We are of the view that the deficiencies mostly
relating to systems and procedures are of general
nature, which do not provide strong ground for
Page 24
24
supersession of the Board as far as the inspection by
NABARD is concerned.”
20. RBI, again, vide its letter dated 3.6.2009 wrote to the Joint
Registrar to inform RBI the outcome of the reply submitted by
the Bank to the show-cause-notice. RBI, then sent a reminder
on 22.7.2009 to the Joint Registrar, since no reply was received.
RBI, it is seen has received a reply from the Joint Registrar on
10.8.2009. RBI, then sent a communication to the Joint
Registrar vide its letter dated 8.5.2009 to know the action taken
on the reply submitted by the Board of Directors. The Joint
Registrar then sent a detailed reply dated 19.8.2009 to the RBI
stating that in the case of a Co-operative Bank, order of
supersession would not be issued without previous consultation
with RBI, however, if no communication containing the views of
RBI on the action was received within 30 days, it should be
presumed that the RBI had agreed to the proposed action and
the Registrar would be free to pass orders as might be deemed
fit. It was further stated that in the case of District Co-operative
Bank, the powers under Section 53(2) of the Act are vested with
the Regional Joint Registrar and notice issued by the Joint
Registrar was not sent for the opinion of the State Government.
Page 25
25
Further, it was also pointed out that the Bank had submitted its
reply on 8.5.2009 and internal decision would be taken as per
the legal provisions and RBI would be informed accordingly.
Yet, another letter dated 24.12.2009 was also received by the
RBI, wherein it was stated that the hearing was going on and
the RBI would be informed of the final decision. Later, without
informing the RBI of the proposed action and also without
forwarding the reply submitted by Panna DCB to the showcause-notice to RBI, the order of supersession dated 30.9.2011
was passed by the Joint Registrar.
21. We find seven charges levelled against the Board of
Directors were relating to the period of the previous Committee,
for which the first respondent Board of Directors could not be
held responsible. Further, even though the Board had taken
charge in October 2007, the audit report was submitted before
the Board only after nine months and that the Board of
Directors took follow up action on the basis of the audit report
dated 25.9.2008. The Joint Registrar, it seems, was found to be
satisfied with the detailed replies dated 6.5.2009 and
16.5.2011submitted by the Board of Directors of the Bank,
possibly, due to that reason, even though the show-cause-
Page 26
26
notice was issued on 22.3.2009, it took about two and half
years to pass the order of supersession.
22. We are of the view that the order of supersession dated
30.9.2011 is not only in clear violation of the second proviso to
Section 53(1) of the Act, but also the allegations raised in the
show-cause-notice are deficiencies mostly relating to systems
and procedures and are of general nature and not grave
enough to overthrow a democratically elected Board of
Directors. Both NABARD and RBI have expressed the view that
the charges levelled against the Board of Directors do not
provide strong ground to supersede the Board.
23. Learned senior counsel Shri Vivek Tankha submitted that
since the Board of Directors was superseded illegally, they, be
put back in office and allow to continue, for the period they
were put out of office. We find force in that contention,
especially in view of the views expressed by NABARD as well as
RBI and the fact that the Joint Registrar himself had passed the
order of supersession only after two and half years of the date
of issuance of the show-cause-notice.
24. The legislative intention is clear from the following
statutory provisions. The statute has fixed the term of an
Page 27
27
elected Board of Directors as five years from the date on which
first meeting of Board of Directors is held. Once a Board of
Directors is illegally superseded, suspended or removed, the
legislature in its wisdom ordained that the Board should
complete their full term of five years, because electorate has
elected the Board for five years.
The proviso to Section 49(7A)
(i) reads as follows:
“7A(i) The term of the Board of Directors shall
be five years from the date on which first meeting of
the Board of Directors is held:
Provided that where a Board of Directors
superseded, suspended or removed under the Act is
reinstated as a result of any order of any Court or
authority, the period during which the Board of
Directors remained under supersession, suspension out
of office, as the case may be, shall be excluded in
computing the period of the term aforesaid.”
25. The Board of Directors, in the instant case, took charge on
16.10.2007, therefore, they could continue in office till
15.10.2012. The Board of Directors was, however, superseded
illegally on 30.9.2011 and, by virtue of the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court dated 13.2.2012, the Board
should have been put back in office on 13.2.2012, but an
Administrator was appointed. Going by the proviso referred to
above, the period during which the Board of Directors remained
Page 28
28
under supersession be excluded in computing the period of five
years. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of
the considered opinion that the duly elected Board of Directors
should get the benefit of that proviso, which is statutory in
nature.
26. In such circumstances, we direct the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Sagar to put the Board of Directors back in
office so as to complete the period during which they were out
of office.
27. The High Court, in our view, has therefore rightly exercised
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and the
alternative remedy of appeal is not bar in exercising that
jurisdiction, since the order passed by the Joint Registrar was
arbitrary and in clear violation of the second proviso to Section
53(1) of the Act.
28. We are of the view that this situation has been created by
the Joint Registrar and there is sufficient evidence to conclude
that he was acting under extraneous influence and under
dictation. A legally elected Board of Directors cannot be put
out of the office in this manner by an illegal order. If the
Page 29
29
charges levelled against the Board of Directors, in the instant
case, were serious, then the Joint Registrar would not have
taken two and half years to pass the order of supersession.
State of Madhya Pradesh did not show the grace to accept the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and has
brought this litigation to this Court spending huge public
money, a practice we strongly deprecate.
Registrar/Joint Registrar and External Influence:
29. Statutory functionaries like Registrar/Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under the respective Cooperative Act must be above suspicion and function
independently without external pressure. When an authority
invested with the power purports to act on its own but in
substance the power is exercised by external guidance or
pressure, it would amount to non-exercise of power, statutorily
vested. Large number of cases are coming up before this Court
and the High Courts in the country challenging the orders of
supersession and many of them are being passed by the
statutory functionaries due to external influence ignoring the
fact that they are ousting a democratically elected Board, the
consequence of which is also grave because the members of
Page 30
30
the Board of Directors would also stand disqualified in standing
for the succeeding election as well.
30. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of
supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be
based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final
decision. A statutory authority shall not act with pre-conceived
notion and shall not speak his masters’ voice, because the
formation of opinion must be his own, not somebody else in
power, to achieve some ulterior motive. There may be
situations where the Registrar/Joint Registrar are expected to
act in the best interest of the society and its members, but in
such situations, they have to act bona fide and within the four
corners of the Statute. In our view, the impugned order will not
fall in that category.
Judicial Precedents
31. Registrar/Joint Registrar is bound to follow the Judicial
Precedents. Ratio decidendi has the force of law and is binding
on all statutory authorities when they deal with similar issues.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in several judgments has
Page 31
31
explained the scope of the second proviso to Section 53(1) of
the Act. Reference may be made to the judgments in
Radheshyam Sharma v. Govt. of M.P. through C.K.
Jaiswal and Ors. 1972 MPLJ 796, Board of Directors of Shri
Ganesh Sahakari Vipnan (Marketing) Sanstha Maryadit
and Another v. Deputy Registrar, Co-operative
Societies, Khargone and Others1982 MPLJ 46 and Sitaram
v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies and another 1986
MPLJ 567.
32. We fail to see why the Joint Registrar has overlooked those
binding judicial precedents and the ratio decidendi. Judicial
rulings and the principles are meant to be followed by the
statutory authorities while deciding similar issues based on the
legal principles settled by judicial rulings. Joint Registrar, while
passing the impugned order, has overlooked those binding
judicial precedents.
33 We fail to notice why the State Government, Department
of Co-operative Societies has taken so much interest in this
litigation. Joint Registrar in his letter dated 19.8.2009 to RBI
stated that in the case of District Co-operative Bank, the powers
Page 32
32
under Section 53(2) of the Act are vested with Regional Joint
Registrar and the notice issued by the Joint Registrar is not
meant for the opinion of the State Government. Assuming, the
State Government has powers under Section 49-C of the Act, no
report has been forwarded by the Registrar to the State
Government and no direction have been issued by the State
Government with regard to the supersession of the Board.
Sorry so note that the State Government has spent huge public
money by litigating this matter even up to this Court, that too,
without following the binding precedents of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court on the scope of the second proviso to Section 53(1)
of the Act.
34. In such circumstances of the case, we are inclined to
dismiss both the appeals with costs directing re-instatement of
the first respondent Board of Directors back in office forthwith
and be allowed to continue for the period they were put out of
office by the impugned order which has been quashed. We also
direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay an amount of
Rs.1,00,000/- to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority
within a period of one month by way of costs and also impose a
cost of Rs.10,000/- as against the Joint Registrar, Co-operative
Page 33
33
Societies, Sagar, the officer who passed the order, which will be
deducted from his salary and be deposited in the Panna DCB
within a period of two months from today. Ordered accordingly.
35. Further, we are inclined to give the following general
directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various
Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected
Committees:
(1) Supersession of an elected managing Committee/Board is
an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional
circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to
complete the term for which it is elected.
(2) Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the shortcomings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee,
unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the
illegalities committed by the previous committees.
(3) Elected Committee in Office be given sufficient time, say
at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out
in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated
when the previous committee was in office.
(4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with
all the statutory formalities, including consultation with thePage 34
34
financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting
their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected
Committee be ousted or not.
(5) Registrar/ Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the
consequences of an order of supersession which has the
effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also
disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding
elections. Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty bound to
exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or
direction of those who are in power.
(6) Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political
pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to
disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for
the cost of the legal proceedings.
(7) Public money not to be spent by the State Government or
the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes
between various factions in a co-operative society. Tax
payers money is not expected to be spent for settling those
disputes. If found necessary, the same be spent from the
funds available with the concerned Bank.Page 35
35
…………………………..J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
…………………………..J.
(Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
May 16, 2013

Thursday, May 16, 2013

FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED DISCHARE FROM CRIMINAL CASE = “court is not a laboratory where children come to play”. The action of the accused-respondent depicts the attitude where one calculatedly conceives Page 2 the concept that he is entitled to play a game of chess in a court of law and the propriety, expected norms from a litigant and the abhorrence of courts to the issues of suppression of facts can comfortably be kept at bay. Such a proclivity appears to have weighed uppermost in his mind on the base that he can play in aid of technicalities to his own advantage and the law, in its essential substance, and justice, with its divine attributes, can unceremoniously be buried in the grave. = The fraudulent intention is writ large. In fact, he has shown his courage of ignorance and tried to play possum. The High Court, as we have seen, applied the principle “when infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse”. However, as the order has been obtained by practising fraud and suppressing material fact before a court of law to gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to stand. That apart, we have dealt with regard to the legal sustainability of the order in detail. Under these circumstances, we are disposed to think that the power under Article 142 of the Constitution is required to be invoked to do complete justice between the parties. Cognizance of the offences had been rightly taken by the learned Magistrate and charges, as we find, have been correctly framed by the learned trial Judge. A victim of a crime has as much right to get justice from the court as an accused who enjoys the benefit of innocence till the allegations are proven against him. when an order of quashment of summons has been obtained by suppression, this Court has an obligation to set aside the said order and restore the order framing charges and direct the trial to go on. And we so direct.= Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 327 of 2011 and the order passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No.1, Jodhpur, in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 are set aside and it is directed that the trial which is pending before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur, shall proceed in accordance with law.


Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 785 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl. ) No. 294 of 2013)
Moti Lal Songara ...Appellant
Versus
Prem Prakash @ Pappu and Anr. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. The factual score of the case in hand frescoes a
scenario and reflects the mindset of the first
respondent which would justifiably invite the
statement “court is not a laboratory where children
come to play”.
The action of the accused-respondent
depicts the attitude where one calculatedly conceives
Page 2
the concept that he is entitled to play a game of
chess in a court of law and the propriety, expected
norms from a litigant and the abhorrence of courts to
the issues of suppression of facts can comfortably be
kept at bay. 
Such a proclivity appears to have
weighed uppermost in his mind on the base that he
can play in aid of technicalities to his own advantage
and the law, in its essential substance, and justice,
with its divine attributes, can unceremoniously be
buried in the grave. 
But, an eloquent one, the
complainant with his committed and adroit
endeavour has allowed the cause to rise like a
phoenix from the grave by invoking the jurisdiction of
this Court assailing the order passed by the High
Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in
Criminal Revision No. 327 of 2011 whereby the
learned single Judge by order dated 13.8.2012
accepted the plea of the accused-respondent and
quashed the charges framed against him for the
offences punishable under Sections 323, 324 and 307
of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) not on the
2Page 3
substratum of merits but on the foundation that the
order dated 19.11.2008 passed by the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance
and issuing summons had already been set aside by
the Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 1,
Jodhpur, in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 and,
therefore, the principle “when the infrastructure
collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse”
got attracted.
As it appears, though the High Court
noticed the various dates, the suppression of facts
and the factum that the accused being fully aware
that the charges had been framed in Sessions Case
No. 9 of 2009 by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur on 27.7. 2009, chose not to
inform the revisional court, namely, the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 1, Jodhpur,
yet, possibly feeling legally helpless, interfered with
the order of framing charges and quashed the same
granting liberty to the prosecution to file an
application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal
3Page 4
Procedure (for brevity “the Code”) at the relevant
stage.
3. Presently to the initial factual exposition. The
appellant, as informant, lodged a First Information
Report No. 428 of 2007 on 23.11.2007 at Police
Station Pratap Nagar, District Jodhpur, on the basis of
which investigation was carried on and, eventually, a
charge sheet was placed for the offences punishable
under Sections 341, 323, 324, 307 and 379 IPC
against one Shyam Lal s/o Venaram. After the
submission of the charge-sheet, the informant filed
an application before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jodhpur, asseverating that
another accused, Prem Prakash, who had attacked
his son with knife had deliberately not been made an
accused. The learned Magistrate, as is manifest,
after analyzing the materials on record, thought it
appropriate to take cognizance against Prem Prakash
@ Pappu for the offences punishable under Sections
323, 324, 307 and 379 IPC and, accordingly,
summoned him through arrest warrant.
4Page 5
4. Being dissatisfied, accused Prem Prakash called in
question the legal sustainability of the said order in
Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 which came to be
dealt with by the learned Additional District and
Sessions Judge, No. 1, Jodhpur who, after referring to
the rulings in Kalamudeen and others v. State of
Rajasthan and another1
 and Natthi Singh v.
State of Rajasthan and another2
, opined that
when the offences were triable by a court of Session,
the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance on
the basis of a protest petition and, accordingly, set it
aside vide order dated 14.10.2009.
5. Be it noted, on that day, the Additional Public
Prosecutor was present but, unfortunately, the
informant who was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in
the revision petition was absent. The disturbing
feature, as is perceptible, is that on the basis of the
cognizance taken by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, both the accused persons,
namely, Shyam Lal and Prem Prakash, were sent up
1
 2005 (2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1118
2
 2007 (1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 621
5Page 6
for trial and the matter was dealt with by the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur
who, on 27.7.2009, heard the learned counsel for the
parties, the Public Prosecutor and after dwelling upon
the allegations in the FIR, considering the
involvement of the accused persons in the crime in
question, taking note of the nature of injuries,
adverting to the ingredients of the offence under
Section 307 IPC, prima facie appreciating the
credibility of the witnesses and many other factors,
held as follows: -
“.......looking to the facts and circumstances of
the case, in the perspective of the principle
propounded in the abovementioned rulings,
prima facie, it appears that due to the reason of
old enmity the accused persons have inflicted a
number of injuries by the sharp weapon on the
body of the victim and therefrom it is clear that
common intention of the accused persons was
to attempt to commit the murder of the victim
Dinesh Kumar. At this stage, it is not
appropriate to minutely and critically appreciate
the evidence. From the guidance sought from
the abovementioned rulings, it is clear that at
this stage compared to the result of the acts
committed by the accused persons, criminal
intention of the accused persons is more
important. Any fatal injury has not been
inflicted on any vital part of the body of the
victim and only on that ground at this stage, it
is not justified and lawful to discharge the
6Page 7
accused persons from the offence punishable
under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.”
6. However, as far as the offence under Section 379 IPC
is concerned, he discharged them of the said charge.
Ultimately, charges were framed for the offences
under Section 341, 323/34, 324/34, 307 in the
alternative under Section 307/304 IPC.
7. We have referred to the said order in detail to
highlight that the matter was heard at length at the
time of framing of charge and arguments were
considered seeking discharge. However, for the
reasons best known to the prosecution and to the
accused-respondent, it was not brought to the notice
of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge
No. 1, Jodhpur who allowed the revision holding that
the order issuing summons was not justified. It is
really unfathomable as to why the sustainability of
the order taking cognizance when called in question
was not heard by the learned Additional District and
Sessions Judge No. 3, who was dealing with the
Sessions Case No. 9 of 2009.
7Page 8
8. After the order taking cognizance was set aside in
revision, an application was filed on 11.1.2010
seeking discharge. The learned trial Judge narrated
the entire gamut of facts and observed that the fact
of framing of charges was not brought to the notice
of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,
No.1, and further the High Court, in Criminal Revision
No. 1046 of 2009 which was preferred against the
order of framing of charge, neither set it aside nor
modify it and, accordingly, did not think it
appropriate to discharge the accused-respondent.
9. As the factual matrix would uncurtain, undeterred by
his conduct, the respondent, Prem Prakash, preferred
Criminal Revision before the High Court. The learned
single Judge of the High Court, after chronicling the
facts in detail, came to hold that when the order
dated 14.10.2009 passed by the revisional court
setting aside the order taking cognizance was not
challenged, the very basis of the continuance of the
proceeding had become extinct and, therefore, the
order of framing of charges could not be sustained.
8Page 9
However, as stated earlier, he granted liberty to the
prosecution to file an application under Section 319
of the Code for summoning the additional accused at
the appropriate stage. Be it noted, the High Court
has also observed that the order passed in revision
setting aside the order of cognizance was not
justified in law.
10. Ms. Madhurima Tatia, learned counsel for the
appellant, has submitted that when the accused has
not approached the court in clean hands and the
High Court itself has observed that the order setting
aside the order of cognisance was not justified, it
should not have interfered with the order passed by
the learned trial Judge declining to discharge the
accused. Per contra, Mr. Rishabh Sancheti, learned
counsel for the respondent No. 1, would contend that
the order passed by the High Court in revision is
absolutely impeccable inasmuch as once the order
taking cognizance had gone unchallenged, it was
obligatory on the part of the High Court to direct a
discharge. That apart, it is urged by him that the
9Page 10
learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance
in exercise of power under Section 190 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed, learned
counsel for the State, submitted that though the
State has not challenged the order, yet it is a case
where the accused-respondent should not have been
discharged.
11. First, we shall advert to the legal propriety of the
order taking cognizance by the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned counsel for the
accused-respondent has submitted with immense
vehemence that in view of the conflicting views, the
controversy relating to the power of the Magistrate
under Section 190 of the Code has been referred to
the larger Bench and, hence, the order of taking
cognizance is invulnerable. To appreciate the said
submission, we think it seemly to refer to certain
pronouncements pertaining to the said issue. In
Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab3
, a three-Judge
Bench was dealing with the issue whether the
3
 (1998) 7 SCC 149
10Page 11
Sessions Court can add a new person to the array of
the accused in a case pending before it at a stage
prior to collecting any evidence. The three-Judge
Bench was dealing with the said issue as reservations
were expressed by a two-Judge Bench in Raj
Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar4
 with regard to
the ratio laid down in Kishun Singh v. State of
Bihar5
. The conclusion that has been recorded in
Ranjit Singh’s case is as follows: -
“19. So from the stage of committal till the
Sessions Court reaches the stage indicated in
Section 230 of the Code, that court can deal
with only the accused referred to in Section 209
of the Code. There is no intermediary stage till
then for the Sessions Court to add any other
person to the array of the accused.
20. Thus, once the Sessions Court takes
cognizance of the offence pursuant to the
committal order, the only other stage when the
court is empowered to add any other person to
the array of the accused is after reaching
evidence collection when powers under Section
319 of the Code can be invoked. We are unable
to find any other power for the Sessions Court
to permit addition of new person or persons to
the array of the accused. Of course it is not
necessary for the court to wait until the entire
evidence is collected for exercising the said
powers.”
4
 (1996) 4 SCC 495
5
 (1993) 2 SCC 16
11Page 12
12. In Kishori Singh and others v. State of Bihar
and another6
, the learned Judges have opined thus:
-
“10. So far as those persons against whom
charge-sheet has not been filed, they can be
arrayed as “accused persons” in exercise of
powers under Section 319 CrPC when some
evidence or materials are brought on record in
course of trial or they could also be arrayed as
“accused persons” only when a reference is
made either by the Magistrate while passing an
order of commitment or by the learned Sessions
Judge to the High Court and the High Court, on
examining the materials, comes to the
conclusion that sufficient materials exist against
them even though the police might not have
filed charge-sheet, as has been explained in the
latter three-Judge Bench decision. Neither of the
contingencies has arisen in the case in hand.”
13. In M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka and another7
, a three-Judge Bench,
after analyzing the provisions of the Code, referred to
the decisions in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh
Mishra8
 and H.S. Bains v. State9
 and, eventually,
ruled thus: -
“The position is, therefore, now well settled that
upon receipt of a police report under Section
173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take
6
 (2004) 13 SCC 11
7
 (1989) 2 SCC 132
8
 AIR 1968 SC 117
9
 (1980) 4 SCC 631
12Page 13
cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)
(b) of the Code even if the police report is to the
effect that no case is made out against the
accused. The Magistrate can take into account
the statements of the witnesses examined by
the police during the investigation and take
cognizance of the offence complained of and
order the issue of process to the accused.
Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down that a
Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence
only if the investigating officer gives an opinion
that the investigation has made out a case
against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore
the conclusion arrived at by the investigating
officer and independently apply his mind to the
facts emerging from the investigation and take
cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in
exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b)
and direct the issue of process to the accused.”
14. In Dharam Pal and others v. State of Haryana
and another10, a three-Judge Bench was dealing
with a reference to resolve the conflict of opinions in
Kishori Singh (supra), Rajinder Prasad v.
Bashir11 and SWIL Ltd. v. State of Delhi12
. At
that juncture, the pronouncements in Kishun Singh
(supra) and Ranjit Singh (supra) were brought to
the notice of the Court. After referring to various
provisions of the Code, the Bench of three learned
Judges expressed as follows: -
10 (2004) 13 SCC 9
11 (2001) 8 SCC 522
12 (2001) 6 SCC 670
13Page 14
“Prima facie, we do not think that the
interpretation reached in Ranjit Singh case is
correct. In our view, the law was correctly
enunciated in Kishun Singh case. Since the
decision in Ranjit Singh case is of three-Judge
Bench, we direct that the matter may be placed
before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for placing
the same before a larger Bench.”
15. There is no dispute that the reference is still pending.
In Uma Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar and
another13, a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the
issue pertaining to the power of the Magistrate under
Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. After taking note of
the decisions and the reference order in Dharam Pal
(supra), the Court accepted the submission that the
law is well settled that the Magistrate is not bound to
accept the final report filed by the investigating
agencies under Section 173(2) of the Code and is
entitled to issue process against an accused even
though exonerated by the said authorities without
holding any separate enquiry on the basis of the
police report itself. The learned Judges proceeded to
state that even if the investigating authority is of the
view that no case has been made out against an
13 (2010) 9 SCC 479
14Page 15
accused, the Magistrate can apply his mind
independently to the materials contained in the
police report and take cognizance thereupon in
exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC.
16. In the said case, while dealing with the pendency of a
reference before a larger Bench and also adverting to
the pending reference in relation to the lis, the Court
observed as follows: -
“...it is not necessary to wait for the outcome of
the result of the reference made to a larger
Bench in Dharam Pal case.
 The reference is
with regard to the Magistrate’s power of enquiry
if he disagreed with the final report submitted
by the investigating authorities. The facts of
this case are different and are covered by the
decision of this Court in India Carat (P) Ltd.
following the line of cases from Abhinandan Jha
v. Dinesh Mishra onwards.”
17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are of
the considered view that the order taking cognizance
cannot be found fault with. We may hasten to clarify
that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate
has taken cognizance on the basis of facts brought to
his notice by the informant and, therefore, he has, in
15Page 16
fact, exercised the power under Section 190(1)(b) of
the Code.
18. The second limb of the submission is
whether in the
obtaining factual matrix, the order passed by the
High Court discharging the accused-respondent is
justified in law.
We have clearly stated that though
the respondent was fully aware about the fact that
charges had been framed against him by the learned
trial Judge, yet he did not bring the same to the
notice of the revisional court hearing the revision
against the order taking cognizance.
It is a clear
case of suppression. It was within the special
knowledge of the accused. Any one who takes
recourse to method of suppression in a court of law,
is, in actuality, playing fraud with the court, and the
maxim supressio veri, expression faisi, i.e.,
suppression of the truth is equivalent to the
expression of falsehood, gets attracted.
We are
compelled to say so as there has been a calculated
concealment of the fact before the revisional court.
It can be stated with certitude that the accused-
16Page 17
respondent tried to gain advantage by such factual
suppression.
The fraudulent intention is writ large. In
fact, he has shown his courage of ignorance and tried
to play possum. 
The High Court, as we have seen,
applied the principle “when infrastructure collapses,
the superstructure is bound to collapse”. 
However,
as the order has been obtained by practising fraud
and suppressing material fact before a court of law to
gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to
stand. 
That apart, we have dealt with regard to the
legal sustainability of the order in detail.
 Under these
circumstances, we are disposed to think that the
power under Article 142 of the Constitution is
required to be invoked to do complete justice
between the parties. 
Cognizance of the offences had
been rightly taken by the learned Magistrate and
charges, as we find, have been correctly framed by
the learned trial Judge. 
A victim of a crime has as
much right to get justice from the court as an
accused who enjoys the benefit of innocence till the
allegations are proven against him.
 In the case at
17Page 18
hand, when an order of quashment of summons has
been obtained by suppression, this Court has an
obligation to set aside the said order and restore the
order framing charges and direct the trial to go on.
And we so direct.
19. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order
passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision No.
327 of 2011 and the order passed by the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, No.1, Jodhpur,
in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 are set aside and it
is directed that the trial which is pending before the
learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3,
Jodhpur, shall proceed in accordance with law.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
….………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
May 16, 2013.
18

‘Jugaad’= wherein the complete liability of providing compensation in a vehicular accident had been fixed upon the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RSRTC’), while unfastening the liability of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, known as ‘Jugaad’, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).= whether a particular vehicle can be defined as motor vehicle in terms of Section 2(28) of the Act, is to be determined on the facts of each case taking into consideration the use of the vehicle and its suitability for being used upon the road. Once it is found to be suitable for being used on the road, it is immaterial whether it runs on the public road or private road, for the reason, that actual user for a particular purpose, is no criteria to decide the name- The word `only’ used in Section 2(28) of the Act clearly shows that the exemption is confined only to those kinds of vehicles which are exclusively being used in a factory or in any closed premises. Thus, a vehicle which is not adapted for use upon the road, is only to be excluded. = if the tractor which is exclusively used for agricultural purpose, does require registration and insurance and driver also require a driving license, why the same provisions would not apply in case of `Jugaad’. = In view of the above, as the `Jugaad’ is covered in the definition of the motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, the statutory authorities cannot escape from their duty to enforce the law and restrain the plying of `Jugaad’. The statutory authorities must ensure that `Jugaad’ can be plied only after meeting the requirements of the Act. The same has become a menace to public safety as they are causing a very large number of accidents. ‘Jugaads’ are not insured and the owners of the `Jugaad’ generally do not have the financial capacity to pay compensation to persons who suffer disablement and to dependents of those, who lose life. Thus, considering the gravity of the circumstances, the statutory authorities must give strict adherence to the circular referred to hereinabove by the Central Government. However, we clarify that it is open to the statutory authorities to make exemptions by issuing a notification/circular specifically if such a vehicle is exclusively used for agricultural purposes but for that sufficient specifications have to be provided so that it cannot be used for commercial purposes. The matter is closed now.


Page 1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.3265 of 2012
Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport …Petitioners
Corporation & Ors.
Versus
Smt. Santosh & Ors. …Respondents
O R D E R
1. Originally this petition had been filed challenging the judgment
and order of the Rajasthan High Court dated 21.9.2011 passed in S.B.
Civil Misc. Appeal No. 480 of 2001, 
wherein the complete liability of
providing compensation in a vehicular accident had been fixed upon
the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘RSRTC’), while unfastening the liability of the
driver and the owner of the vehicle, known as ‘Jugaad’, under the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Act’). Page 2
2. At the time of hearing the petition, this court vide order dated
6.2.2012 did not consider it proper to examine the issue in respect of
compensation. However, the question was raised by Shri Imtiaz
Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the RSRTC that this court must
examine whether ‘Jugaad’ is a vehicle under the Act, and in case, it is
a motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, whether such ‘Jugaad’
is required to be insured and registered before it is permitted to ply on
the road and whether the driver of ‘Jugaad’ must compulsorily have a
driving licence. As such important issues have been raised by Shri
Imtiaz Ahmed, we had requested Shri H.P. Raval, learned ASG to
assist the court, after taking instructions from the Road Transport
Ministry of the Central Government about the status of ‘Jugaad’ under
the Act. Shri Raval responded to the aforesaid queries on 13.4.2012
and submitted that it is a motor vehicle as defined under Section 2(28)
of the Act, and the Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and
Highways had issued a circular dated 26.7.2007 issuing instructions to
all State transport authorities clarifying that ‘Jugaad’ is a vehicle
under Section 2(28) of the Act and all the States are under a legal
obligation to enforce the same. Therefore, no person should be
permitted to ply a ‘Jugaad’ as it violates all the provisions of the Act.
2Page 3
It must have a registration and insurance and the driver must have a
valid driving license and in case of an accident etc, the liability under
the provisions of the Act, may be properly determined. However, Shri
Raval has raised a grievance that in spite of issuance of such a
circular, most of the States have not enforced the terms of the said
circular issued by the Central Government.
3. Considering the aforesaid grievance raised by Shri Raval, this
court impleaded the Transport Secretary/Commissioner of all the
States as party respondents and asked them to submit their response.
While some of the States have submitted that it is not a vehicle within
the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(28) of the Act. The State of
Karnataka has submitted the vehicle like ‘Jugaad’ was not in existence
in the State.
4. It has further been pointed out by learned counsel for the parties
that enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed
under it, come within the jurisdiction of the State Governments.
Therefore, they must be directed to ensure strict compliance of the
said provisions of the Act. It has also been pointed out by Shri
Siddharth Luthra, learned ASG that a letter dated 19.7.2012 was sent
3Page 4
by the Director (RT) of the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways,
Government of India, to all the State Authorities to ensure compliance
of the statutory provisions of the Act and the rules.
5. Shri Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
State of Rajasthan has submitted that the government of Rajasthan has
examined the matter and decided to prohibit the plying of “Jugaad” on
the roads completely. Such a vehicle cannot be used for any
commercial purpose, without being registered and duly insured and in
compliance with the other statutory requirements. However, the State
Government carved out an exception that farmers/poor villagers may
be permitted to use the same for their agricultural purposes as an
interim measure till the rules are framed in this regard. It has further
been submitted that in case ‘Jugaads’ are found plying on the roads,
they shall be impounded and will be dealt with strictly in accordance
with law. A similar stand has been taken by the majority of the States.
6. An application has been filed by Rashtriya Kisan Morcha, for
impleadment/intervention which is allowed. The Morcha raised a
grievance that in case plying of the ‘Jugaad’ is prohibited completely,
it will create a serious problem for the farmers, as seizure/impounding
4Page 5
of “Jugaad” would have penal consequences. The ‘Jugaad’ is nothing,
but an improved version of a bullock cart which has been used for
centuries in the villages. The farmer communities should not be
restrained from using the improved carts/jugaad in the villages to and
from houses to the farms and for bringing the agricultural produces
from their agricultural lands.
7. Some of the lawyers have raised the issue that issuing any kind
of direction by this Court in these regards would amount to legislation
which is not permissible in law. Thus, they have suggested that
instead of issuing the directions, the Central Government and the State
authorities be directed to frame a policy, amend the rules specifically
and enforce the same. However, other lawyers have opposed this view
and submitted that the issue involved herein is restricted only with
enforcement of law and not with legislation. As the “Jugaad” is a
vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Act.
8. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
So far as the legislation by the court is concerned, as a corollary
to the doctrine of separation of powers, a judge merely applies the law
5Page 6
that it gets from the legislature. Consequently, the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition has insisted that the judge only reflects the law regardless of
the anticipated consequences, considerations of fairness or public
policy. He is simply not authorised to legislate.
9. In kindred spirit, in M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., AIR 2007 SC 71, Justice Kapadia, writing for the Constitutional
Bench, observed:
“The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document
embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It
sets out principles for an expanding future and is
intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to
be adopted to the various crisis of human affairs. . . . A
constitutional provision must be construed not in a
narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal
manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing
conditions and purposes so that a constitutional
provision does not get fossilized but remains flexible
enough to meet the newly emerging problems and
challenges.”
10. Accordingly, in State of U.P. & Ors. v. Jeet S. Bisht & Anr.,
(2007) 6 SCC 586, even though the matter was referred to another
Bench, owing to a split decision—Justice S.B. Sinha aptly described
the modern understanding of the separation of powers thus:
“Separation of power in one sense is a limit on active
jurisdiction of each organ. But it has another deeper and
more relevant purpose: to act as check and balance over
6Page 7
the activities of other organs. Thereby the active
jurisdiction of the organ is not challenged; nevertheless
there are methods of prodding to communicate the
institution of its excesses and shortfall in duty. . .
.Separation of power doctrine has been reinvented in
modern times. . . . The modern view, which is today
gathering momentum in Constitutional Courts world
over, is not only to demarcate the realm of functioning in
a negative sense, but also to define the minimum content
of the demarcated realm of functioning.”
11. In Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 333,
this Court doubted the competence of this Court to issue such
directions, which were allegedly to be legislative in nature. Therefore,
the matter was referred to a larger bench, and such larger bench held,
that in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Article 32 r/w
Article 142 of the Constitution, the directions issued by this Court
were valid and laudable, as the same had been made to fill the vacuum
that existed in the absence of any legislation, to ensure that only
genuine SC/ST and OBC candidates would be able to secure the
benefits of certificates issued, and that bogus candidates would be
kept out. Simply filling up an existing vacuum till the legislature
chooses to make appropriate laws, does not amount to taking over the
functions of the legislature.
7Page 8
12. In its activist streak, this Court has also imparted new vigour to
the process of constitutional interpretation. For instance, this Court
has insightfully identified Article 32 as the constitutional provision
that provides for the enforcement of fundamental rights in areas of
legislative vacuum. Not only has it held that fundamental rights are
limitations upon the State power, but the right to constitutional
remedies is itself a fundamental right enshrined in Article 32 of the
Constitution, and in the case of an infringement of a fundamental right
by the State, an aggrieved party can approach this Court for a remedy.
13. In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1997
SC 3011, this Court held:
“In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to
provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human
right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual
harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual
harassment at work places, we lay down the guidelines
and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all
workplaces or other institutions, until a legislation is
enacted for the purpose. This is done in exercise of the
power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for
enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further
emphasised that this would be treated as the law
declared by this Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution.”
8Page 9
14. Providing further reinforcement to the Article 32 jurisprudence,
in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889, this Court
noted that the issuance of guidelines and directions, in the exercise of
the powers under Articles 32 and 142, has become an integral part of
our constitutional jurisprudence. It also pointed out that such an
exercise of powers was absolutely necessary to fill the void in areas
with legislative vacuum. In addition, the Court noted:
“As pointed out in Vishaka (supra), it is the duty of the
executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because
its field is co-terminus with that the legislature, and
where there is inaction even by the executive for
whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise
of its constitutional obligations under the aforesaid
provisions to provide absolution till such time as the
legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper
legislation to cover the field.
On this basis, we now proceed to give the directions
enumerated hereafter for rigid compliance till such time
as the legislature steps in to substitute them by proper
legislation. These directions made under Article 32 read
with Article 142 to implement the rule of law wherein the
concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 is embedded,
have the force of law under Article 141 and by virtue of
Article 144 it is the duty of all authorities, civil and
judicial, in the territory of India to act in aid of this
Court.”
(See also: L.K. Pandey v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1986 SC 272;
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610;
Ramamurthy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1997 SC 1739; Supreme
9Page 10
Court Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895; and
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, AIR 2005 SC 972).
15. Thus, the aforesaid cases clearly reveal that the courts in India
have not violated the mandatory constitutional requirement, rather
they have only issued certain directions to meet the exigencies. Some
of them are admittedly legislative in nature, but the same have been
issued only to fill up the existing vacuum, till the legislature enacts a
particular law to deal with the situation. In view of the same, it is
permissible to issue directions if the law does not provide a solution of
a problem, as an interim measure, till the proper law is enacted by the
legislature.
We may also issue necessary directions as an interim measure,
if the need so arisen.
16. The Act replaced the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in view of the
changes in transport technology, pattern of passenger and freight
movements, taking into consideration the road safety standards,
pollution control measures, standards in transportation of hazardous
and explosive materials.
1Page 11
17. In M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty & Ors., AIR
1987 SC 2158, this Court has made certain suggestions to raise the
limit of compensation payable as a result of vehicular accidents in
respect of death and permanent disablement in the event of their being
no proof of fault on the part of the person involved in the accident and
also in hit and run motor accidents. In this case, the court also
suggested the removal of certain disparities in the liability of the
insurer to pay compensation. The said recommendations/suggestions
were also taken into consideration and incorporated in the Act.
18. The object of bringing and repealing the Act 1939 had been to
rationalise certain definitions with additions of certain new definitions
of new types of vehicles, strict procedures relating to grant of driving
licenses and period of validity thereof; standards of anti-pollution
control devices; provisions for issuance of fitness certificates of
vehicles and provision for enhancing compensation in case of no fault
liability and in hit and run vehicular accidents and also maintenance
of State register for driving licenses and vehicles registration.
19. Section 2(2) of the Act defines articulated vehicle which means
a motor vehicle to which a semi-trailer is attached; Section 2(34)
1Page 12
defines public place; Section 2(44) defines `tractor’ as a motor vehicle
which is not itself constructed to carry any load; Section 2(46) defines
`trailer’ which means any vehicle, other than a semi-trailer and a sidecar, drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle.
 Section 3 of the Act provides for necessity for driving license;
Section 5 provides for responsibility of owners of the vehicle for
contravention of Sections 3 and 4; Section 6 provides for restrictions
on the holding of driving license; Section 56 provides for compulsion
for having certificate of fitness for transport vehicles; Section 59
empowers the State to fix the age limit of the vehicles; Section 66
provides for necessity for permits to ply any vehicle for any
commercial purpose; Section 67 empowers the State to control road
transport; Section 112 provides for limits of speed; Sections 133 and
134 imposes a duty on the owners and the drivers of the vehicles in
case of accident and injury to a person; Section 146 provides that no
person shall use any vehicle at a public place unless the vehicle is
insured. In addition thereto, the Motor Vehicle Taxation Act provides
for imposition of passenger tax and road tax etc.
20. Section 2(28) of the Act defines “Motor Vehicle” as under:
1Page 13
 “Motor Vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically
propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether
the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an
external or internal source and includes a chassis to
which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but
does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a
vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a
factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle
having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity
of not exceeding twenty five cubic centimeters.”
 (Emphasis added)
Thus, any vehicle which is mechanically propelled and adapted
for use upon roads and does not fall within the exceptions provided
therein, is a Motor Vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the
Act.
21. In Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.,
AIR 2005 SC 3428, this Court dealt with the issue while dealing with
“Tractor” and held as under:
“Under Section 61 of the 1988 Act, which comes within
Chapter IV dealing with registration of motor vehicles,
registration of trailers is made compulsory. Under
Section 61(2), the registration mark assigned to a trailer
is required to be displaced on the side of the drawing
vehicle. In the present case, we are not concerned with
tractors in the conventional sense. Even the legislature
has used the word "drawing vehicle" in place of tractors.
Under Section 61(3), it is provided that no person shall
drive a motor vehicle to which a trailer is attached
unless the registration mark of the motor vehicle is
displayed on the trailer. Similarly, under Section 66 in
1Page 14
Chapter V which refers to control of transport vehicles,
no owner of a motor vehicle can use the vehicle as a
transport vehicle carrying passengers or goods without a
permit. Under Section 66(2), the holder of a goods
carriage permit may use the vehicle for drawing any
trailer. Therefore, under the M.V. Act, 1988, the
Parliament has kept in mind the existence of a vehicle
classifiable as "tractor-trailer"…
Section 2(28) is a comprehensive definition of the
words "motor vehicle". Although, a "trailer" is
separately defined under Section 2(46) to mean any
vehicle drawn or intended to be drawn by motor vehicle,
it is still included into the definition of the words "motor
vehicle" under Section 2(28). Similarly, the word
"tractor" is defined in Section 2(44) to mean a motor
vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry any load.
Therefore, the words "motor vehicle" have been defined
in the comprehensive sense by the legislature. Therefore,
we have to read the words "motor vehicle" in the
broadest possible sense keeping in mind that the Act has
been enacted in order to keep control over motor
vehicles, transport vehicles etc. A combined reading of
the definitions under Section 2, …….. shows that the
definition of "motor vehicle" includes any mechanically
propelled vehicle apt for use upon roads irrespective of
the source of power and it includes a trailer. Therefore,
even though a trailer is drawn by a motor vehicle, it by
itself being a motor vehicle, the tractor- trailer would
constitute a "goods carriage" under Section 2(14) and
consequently, a "transport vehicle" under Section 2(47).
The test to be applied in such a case is whether the
vehicle is proposed to be used for transporting goods
from one place to another. When a vehicle is so altered
or prepared that it becomes apt for use for transporting
goods, it can be stated that it is adapted for the carriage
of goods. Applying the above test, ……. the tractortrailer …… falls under Section 2(14) as a "goods
carriage" and consequently, it falls under the definition
of "transport vehicle" under Section 2(47) of the M.V.
Act, 1988.”
1Page 15
22. The Tractor is a machine run by diesel or petrol. It is a selfpropelled vehicle for hauling other vehicles. It is used for different
purposes. It is also used for agricultural purposes, along with other
implements; such as harrows, ploughs, tillers, blade-terracers, seeddrills etc. It is a self-propelled vehicle capable of pulling alone as
defined under the definition of Motor Vehicles. It does not fall within
any of the exclusions as defined under the Act. Thus, it is a Motor
Vehicle in terms of the definition under Section 2(28) of the Act,
which definition has been adopted by the Act. So, even without
referring to the definition of the Tractor, if the definition of the Motor
Vehicle as given under the Act is strictly construed, even then the
Tractor is a Motor Vehicle as defined under the Act. The Tractor is
not only used for agricultural purposes but is also used for other
purposes as stated above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tractor
in its popular meaning is only used for agricultural purposes and, thus,
is not a Motor Vehicle as defined under the Act. The Tractor is a
Motor Vehicle is also proved by this definition under Section 2(44) of
the Act. Different types of Motor Vehicles have been defined under
the provisions of the Act, and the Tractor is one of them. Thus,
1Page 16
considering the question from any angle, the Tractor is a Motor
Vehicle as defined under the Act.
23. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an
effective driving license for the type of vehicle which he intends to
drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to
prescribe forms of driving licenses for various categories of vehicles
mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said Section. The definition clause
in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which
are covered in broad types mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10.
They are 'goods carriage', 'heavy goods vehicle', 'heavy passenger
motor vehicle', 'invalid carriage', 'light motor vehicle', 'maxi-cab',
'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger motor vehicle', 'motorcab', 'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle', 'semi-trailer',
'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer' and 'transport vehicle'.
24. The Allahabad High Court in Writ Tax No. 573 of 2011-
Kishun Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors., held that ‘Jugaad’ was
squarely covered under the definition of motor vehicles as specified
under Section 2(28) of the Act, since it was mechanically propelled
adapted for use on road and hence other relevant provisions of the
1Page 17
Act/rules were applicable. The Court further directed that as the said
vehicle did not comply with the provisions of the Act/Rules, the
seizure effected by the U.P. authorities could not be interfered with by
the court. 
25. Further, in Writ Petition No. 6611(M/B) of 2005 - Avnish
Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors. decided on 23.2.2011, the Allahabad
High Court has issued directions to the statutory authorities to ensure
compliance of the provisions of the Act and the rules, and to prevent
the illegal plying of such vehicles, the statutory Authorities must take
effective measures in conformity with the statutory rules.
26. Learned standing counsel appearing for the State of Haryana
has submitted that even the Punjab and Haryana High Court while
delivering the judgment as early as 29.3.1995 had directed the State
authorities to ensure that
 no ‘Jugaad’ shall be permitted to ply in the
State of Haryana under any circumstance. The relevant part of the
said judgment reads as under:
“An interim direction is issued that no such Jugars shall
be permitted to ply in the State of Haryana under any
circumstance.
All such Jugars being plied shall be seized
by the concerned law enforcing agencies of the State.
Since the aforesaid vehicles are being plied against the
provisions of law and these vehicles are not recognised
1Page 18
under the Motor Vehicles Act, the same cannot be
released in favour of a person, who is not even admitted
to be the registered owner of such vehicle. Despite
directions, we have not been intimated as to how such
unauthorised vehicles were ordered to be released and
by whom. Prima facie, it appears to us that the aforesaid
Jugars could not be released either by the law enforcing
agencies or by the Magistrates.”
(Emphasis added)
27. As such ‘Jugaads’ were being plied against the provisions of
the Act and the rules framed under it, and in case any ‘Jugaad’ is
found on the road and is seized by the police authorities, it could not
be released in favour of its owner either by the law enforcing agency
or even by the Magistrate. Plying of such vehicles was in utter
disregard/violation of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed
thereunder. 
28. As to
whether a particular vehicle can be defined as motor
vehicle in terms of Section 2(28) of the Act, is to be determined on the
facts of each case taking into consideration the use of the vehicle and
its suitability for being used upon the road. 
Once it is found to be
suitable for being used on the road, it is immaterial whether it runs on
the public road or private road, for the reason, that actual user for a
particular purpose, is no criteria to decide the name.
 Definition of
1Page 19
motor vehicle takes within its ambit, a dumper and tractor. 
Tractor
which is used basically for agricultural purpose and a dumper is used
in the factory premises, can suitable be adapted for being used on the
road, therefore, they will meet the requirement of definition of motor
vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act. 
The word `only’ used in
Section 2(28) of the Act clearly shows that the exemption is confined only to those kinds of vehicles which are exclusively being used in a factory or in any closed premises. Thus, a vehicle which is not adapted for use upon the road, is only to be excluded. 
29. However, Shri S.C. Maheshwari, learned senior counsel
appearing for the applicant could not satisfactorily reply as under what
circumstances,
 if the tractor which is exclusively used for agricultural
purpose, does require registration and insurance and driver also
require a driving license, 
why the same provisions would not apply in
case of `Jugaad’. 
30. ‘Jugaad’ does not require the permit, insurance or a driving
licence for its driver. 
There is no specification for its body.
 It does not
require fitness certificate. 
However, passenger vehicle has a upper
limit of number of passengers it can carry. 
The same remains the
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position for the goods vehicle as there is a specification for the
maximum load it can carry. 
The ‘Jugaad’ is not liable to pay any
passenger or road tax like other vehicles. 
31. In view of the above, as the `Jugaad’ is covered in the definition
of the motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, the
statutory authorities cannot escape from their duty to enforce
the law and restrain the plying of `Jugaad’. 
The statutory authorities must ensure that `Jugaad’ can be plied only after meeting the requirements of the Act. 
The same has become a menace to public safety as they are causing a very large number of accidents. 
‘Jugaads’ are not insured and the owners of the
`Jugaad’ generally do not have the financial capacity to pay
compensation to persons who suffer disablement and to
dependents of those, who lose life.
 Thus, considering the
gravity of the circumstances, the statutory authorities must give
strict adherence to the circular referred to hereinabove by the
Central Government. 
32. However, we clarify that it is open to the statutory authorities to
make exemptions by issuing a notification/circular specifically if such
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a vehicle is exclusively used for agricultural purposes but for that
sufficient specifications have to be provided so that it cannot be used
for commercial purposes. 
The matter is closed now. 
………………………………..................................J.
 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
………………………………...................................J.
(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)
NEW DELHI,
May 10, 2013.
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