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Thursday, May 16, 2013

JUDICIAL INDISCIPLINE and disregard =The judge clearly ignored that the law declared by this Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, and judicial discipline required him to follow the mandate of the Constitution. He entered into an impermissible exercise, and deleted the votes received by the appellant which he considered to be tainted votes. It is quite shocking to see that the learned judge has proceeded to delete the votes of the appellant from 8 polling stations, although the grievance was only about Ruhi and Roing polling stations. By making these deductions, he came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 had received 826 votes more. As can be seen from paragraph 28 of the judgment, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1539 of 2012, that at best the case of the first respondent was that there were double entries of voters in 1304 names. The allegation was only with respect to two polling stations. In those polling stations, the appellant had received 1873 votes. Even if these 1304 votes were to be deleted, it would not affect the result materially since the appellant had won with a margin of 2713 votes. The learned judge, therefore, ignored that even if the ground of improper reception of votes under section 100(1)(d)(iii) was to be taken, the respondent no.1 had failed to establish that the result of the election of the appellant had been materially affected by such improper reception of votes. The decision of the learned judge was therefore clearly flawed and untenable. - Thus, the learned judge went into the counterfoils of the voters inspite of the fact that this court had already ruled in the judgment in C.A. 1539 of 2010, that in the facts of the present case, no case was made out for calling of the counterfoils. - Thereafter, however he proceeded to act exactly contrary to the direction emanating from the dismissal of M.C. (EP) No. 5 (AP) of 2010, which amounts to nothing but judicial indiscipline and disregard to the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This is shocking, to say the least, and most unbecoming of a judge holding a high position such as that of a High Court Judge. We fail to see as to what made the judge act in such a manner, though we refrain from going into that aspect. = it is unfortunate that such acts of judicial impropriety are repeated inspite of clear judgments of this court on the significance of Article 141 of the Constitution. Thus, in a judgment by a bench of three judges in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Anr., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 450, this court observed, “32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.” We may as well refer to Para 28 of the State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Shivanand Pathak and Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 513, wherein this court observed, “If a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires that the judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to the judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, rewrite the overruled judgment…” 28. In the circumstances, we have no option but to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order rendered by the learned judge of Gauhati High Court dated 12.11.2012. The Election Petition filed by the respondent no. 1, bearing Election Petition No. 1(AP) of 2009, renumbered as Election Petition No. 1 (AP) of 2012, shall stand dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.


Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 8260 OF 2012
Markio Tado ... Appellant
Versus
Takam Sorang ... Respondents
J U D G E M E N T
H.L. Gokhale J.
This statutory appeal under Section 116A of the
Representation of the People’s Act, 1951, seeks to challenge the
judgment and order of the Gauhati High Court dated 12.11.2012, allowing
the Election Petition No. 1(AP) of 2009, renumbered as Election Petition
No. 1 (AP) of 2012, filed by the Respondent No. 1 whereby the election of
the appellant from 20-Tali (ST) constituency of the Arunanchal Pradesh
Assembly was declared void, and whereby the first respondent was
declared elected to the State Legislative Assembly from the said
constituency. After passing of the said judgment and order, the appellant
applied for the stay of the said order, and the learned Judge by his order
dated 16.11.2012 stayed the impugned judgment and order for a periodPage 2
of 14 days from the date of the said order. He made it clear that the
appellant will have the right to participate in the assembly proceedings
but will not have the right to vote and will not be entitled to any
remuneration as an elected member of the assembly. This appeal,
therefrom, was admitted on 27.11.2012, and by the order passed on that
date by this Court, the above order dated 16.11.2012 was directed to
continue to remain in operation. This interim order has been
subsequently continued until further orders.
2. Facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
 The appellant and
the respondent No. 1 herein contested the election to the Arunachal
Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 20-Tali (ST) Assembly Constituency
held in October 2009.
The respondent no.1 was the sitting MLA from the
said constituency at the time when the election was held, and the
Government formed by the Indian National Congress was in power in the
State. The appellant was a candidate of the People’s Party of Arunanchal
Pradesh (PPA), and the first respondent was that of the Indian National
Congress. The voting took place on 13.10.2009, and the appellant was
declared elected on 22.10.2009, defeating his nearest rival the
respondent No. 1, by 2713 votes. Respondent No. 1 filed Election Petition
No. 01/2009 to challenge the election of the appellant on the ground of
corrupt practice of booth capturing.
3. This 20-Tali (ST) Assembly Constituency consists of two circles
viz. (i) Tali, and (ii) Pipsorang. Each of the circles was having 10 polling
stations. It was alleged in the petition by the first respondent that on
2Page 3
two polling stations viz. (i) 7-Roing and (ii) 2-Ruhi from circle Tali, boxes
(containing EVMs) were illegally removed by the party workers of the
appellant, and votes in favour of the appellant were cast single handedly.
The genuine voters were not allowed to exercise their voting rights as
they were threatened for their lives by the miscreants of the appellant. It
was claimed that polling agents of the first respondent, at these two
polling stations, jointly reported about the happenings in these polling
stations on 15.10.2009, to the Assistant Returning Officer. It was further
alleged that such incidents also took place in 6 more polling stations.
4. It was stated in para 9 of the petition, that it was necessary to
bring the EVMs and counter foils of Form 17A (register of voters) of these
8-polling stations (mentioned in para-7 of the petition) for forensic test
and other examinations etc. before the Hon’ble Court for proper
adjudication of the case. It was claimed that the votes received by the
appellant in these 8 polling stations were 3763, and if they were deleted
from the votes of appellant, the first respondent would be declared as
elected. It was prayed that the records of (i) register of voters
counterfoils (Form 17-A) of these 8 polling stations described in paragraph
7 of the petition, (ii) EVMs of these 8 polling stations, and (iii) records
relating to 20 Tali (ST) Assembly Constituency be called, and the
appellant be directed to show cause as to why votes cast by booth
capturing in 8 polling stations, in favour of the appellant, should not be
declared as illegal, and the election order dated 22.10.2009 not be
3Page 4
declared as void, and why the respondent No. 1 should not be declared as
the elected candidate.
5. The petition was contested by the appellant by filing a Written
Statement. He submitted that no unfair means were employed by him, or
by his agents, and stated that the allegation of illegal practice adopted in
8 polling stations is completely false. He submitted that the election was
conducted peacefully with free and fair means. The polling stations were
guarded by police personnel who carried arms and ammunition. There
was no booth capturing or criminal intimidation at all. EVMs and voters’
counterfoils were duly verified at the Receiving Centre, and there was no
need to call for any of these documents, nor was there any question to
declare the election void.
6. Thereafter, the learned Judge by his order dated 8.3.2010
formulated the following issues:- (i) Whether the Election Petition is
maintainable?; (ii) Whether the polling team of 7-Roing polling station
alongwith the EVM were kidnapped on 12.10.2009 by PPA Workers?; (iii)
Whether booth capturing was committed at 2-Ruhi and 5-Guchi polling
stations on 13.10.2009 by PPA workers, including the Petitioner?; (iv)
Whether any offence of booth capturing was committed at any of the
other 5 polling stations; (v) Whether Annexures 1 to 9 to the Election
Petition are forged, fabricated and an afterthought?; (vi) Whether the
election of the returned candidate Markio Tado is liable to be declared
void?; and (vii) Whether the Election Petitioner is entitled to be declared
elected?
4Page 5
7. It is relevant to note that, before the evidence could start, the
first respondent filed Interlocutory Application No. 6 of 2010 in the said
Election Petition on 29th March, 2010. In para 1 thereof he submitted as
follows:-
“1. That your applicants beg to state and submit
that some thousand of voters of those 8 polling stations
viz. (i) Giba, (ii) Tungmar, (iii) 15-Richik, (iv) 7-Roing, (v)
10-Yarda, (vi) 5-Guchi, (vii) 8-Dotte, (viii) 2-Ruhi of 20 Tali
(ST) Assembly Constituency have double entry in different
38 polling stations of 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly
Constituency. So far your applicant knowledge is
concerned about 80% of the voters of 20-(ST) Tali
Assembly Constituency from those 8 polling stations viz.
(i) 6-Giba, (ii) 4-Tugnmar, (iii) 15-Richik, (iv) 7-Roing, (v)
10-Yarda, (vi) 5-Guchi, (vii) 8-Dotte, (viii) 2-Ruhi have cast
their votes at 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly Constituency and
not at 20-(ST) Tali Constituency.”
Thereafter, he gave the list of 38 polling stations of Itanagar
constituency. He claimed that the total number of such voters, who had
their names in those 38 polling stations, was 1304. He, therefore, prayed
that the record of register of voters counterfoils (Form 17-A) of the above
38 polling stations of 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly Constituency from the
District Returning Officer, Distt. Papum Pare be called.
8. This application was opposed by the appellant. The learned
Single Judge noted the submissions on behalf of the respondent No. 1. He
also noted the submissions on behalf of the appellant that there was no
allegation of double enrollment, and no issue had been framed in this
respect in the election petition, and therefore the application was liable to
be dismissed. Having noted the submissions, the learned Single Judge
rejected the said application by his order dated 31.03.2010 observing “I
5Page 6
am of the considered view that calling of records as sought for by the
applicant is not justified at this stage.”
9. When the evidence was recorded, PW (1) stated that 1 person
voted for another person. PW (2) stated that she was not allowed to enter
the polling station, and yet she stated that there was single handed
voting. PW (3) was the polling agent of the respondent No. 1, but he did
not state that he lodged any complaint about whatever had happened at
the polling station. PW (4) stated that he was not allowed to enter the
polling station. He stated that the workers of both the parties were not
allowed to enter the polling station, but at the same time he said that the
polling agents of both the parties were inside the polling station. He has
filed no complaint. PW(5) made some interesting statements. He stated
that he was the agent of the Indian National Congress, and he was forced
to vote for his candidate. He also stated that he did not file any complaint
with the presiding officer. PW (6) also made similar interesting
statements in the sense that it was proposed that a few votes be casts in
favour of Indian National Congress. It is relevant to note that at the
polling station, where he cast his vote, Indian National Congress got 42
votes. PW (7) was the polling agent of the first respondent at the Roing
polling station. He claims to have lodged the complaint, but he does not
know who wrote that complaint. PW (8) stated in his cross-examination
that he does not know whether any polling officer was kidnapped. PW (9)
makes an interesting statement that he was forced to cast some votes for
the Indian National Congress.
6Page 7
10. Thereafter, the first respondent PW (10) went into the witness
box on 4.4.2010. In his examination in chief, he stated that he had sent a
fax message to the Returning Officer of 20-Tali (ST) Assembly
Constituency on 15.10.2009 alleging the booth capturing of 2-Ruhi and 7-
Roing polling stations. He stated that he had complained about the booth
capturing in 6 more polling stations, and produced copies of complaints.
He stated that there was single handed voting in favour of the appellant,
and first respondent’s voters were threatened and not allowed to cast
their votes. He further stated that a large number of voters had double
entries in the electoral roll of 20 Tali (ST) as well as Itanagar (ST)
Assembly Constituency. They had actually cast their votes at 38 different
polling stations of 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly Constituency, and in their
place votes were cast in Tali Constituency by the miscreants of the
appellant. The electoral rolls of the two constituencies were to be
exhibited. He further pointed out that a vote was cast against a dead
person by name Markio Tama from 2-Ruhi polling station, and the death
certificate of the person concerned was produced.
11. The first respondent, in his cross examination on 9.6.2010,
accepted that he had not made any averments in the election petition
regarding double enrollment of the voters in the two Assembly
Constituencies. He accepted that he was aware that the final electoral
rolls were published by the authorities concerned before the election was
held, prior to which the draft roll was published for information of the
voters concerned, and that he did not lodge any complaint before the
7Page 8
authorities concerned about the double enrollment in the two
constituencies. He explained it by stating that he did not know that such
double enrollment had taken place. He could not say who actually cast
the vote for Markio Tama, who had already expired. 
12. The first respondent accepted that he had appointed his
polling agents for all the polling stations. He knew about the duties of the
polling agents which included raising objection in case of detection of any
impersonation during the polling time, before the Presiding Officer
concerned by filling up a prescribed form alongwith a fee of Rs. 2/-. He
stated that his polling agents were not allowed to enter into the polling
booths, and the candidates appointed by the appellant acted as fake
polling agents for the first respondent. He however, accepted that he has
not stated in election petition that the candidates appointed by the
opposite party had acted as fake polling agents for him. He further
accepted that his complaint to the Returning Officer did not mention all
the 8 polling stations. It mentioned only about 2 polling stations. He also
accepted that he did not mention the names of persons involved in booth
capturing. He stated in his examination-in-chief itself as follows-
“I have no direct evidence regarding casting of votes by
impersonation by the booth capturing party but it can be
proved if the finger prints and thumb impression taken and
the signatures put in Form 17A of the respective polling
station are compared by the respective votes.”
13. The first respondent had alleged that in two polling stations
viz. Ruhi and Roing, booth capturing had taken place which was on the
basis that in Ruhi the first respondent got only 3 votes as against
8Page 9
appellant getting 697 votes, and in Roing he got only one vote as against
the appellant getting 1196 votes. On this aspect, it was put to him that
there were two circles in this constituency viz. Tali and Pipsorang. The
above two polling stations were in Tali Circle. The first respondent
accepted that the returned candidate secured no vote in 11-Vovia polling
station. He also accepted that the returned candidate secured only 7
votes in 13-Zara polling station, both falling in Pipsorang circle.
Thereafter, he accepted that
“It may be correct that securing less vote by a
candidate may be due to his less attachment to the people
of a particular area and it may also be the one of the
reasons for losing the election.”
The first respondent also accepted that Micro Observers were
appointed in all the polling stations and they were provided with digital
cameras for their use, as and when required during the election, for all
the purposes.
14. It was at that stage that the first respondent moved another
application viz. Misc. Case No. 05(AP) of 2010 on 29th June, 2010. In that
application he repeated that some of the voters of the 8 polling stations
mentioned earlier, had double entries in different 38 polling stations of 13
Itanagar (ST) Assembly Constituency. In para 2 he stated that 30% of
voters of Tali Constituency, from those 8 polling stations, had cast their
votes in Itanagar and not in Tali, and in their place the double voting was
effected on behalf of the appellant, and therefore it was necessary to get
the record of the voters’ counterfoils (in Form 17A) from the 38 polling
9Page 10
stations under 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly Constituency. The appellant
opposed this application. The counsel for the appellant submitted that
this was a fishing inquiry to improve the case.
This time however, the
learned Judge observed:
 “This allegation sounds to be new one, but when it is
closely examined, it also comes under the purview of
booth capturing because votes by impersonation is one of
the modus operandi adopted towards accomplishment of
securing votes by use of illegal method or illegal resource.”
15. The learned Judge referred to a judgment of this Court in Hari
Ram Vs. Hira Singh reported in AIR 1984 SC 396, that electoral rolls
and counter foils should be called sparingly, and only when sufficient
material is placed before the Court. He also referred to a judgment of this
Court in Fulena Singh Vs. Vijoy Kr. Sinha reported in 2009(5) SCC
290 wherein it was held that inspection of the record of register of voters
in Form 17-A would be permissible where a clear case is made out. The
learned Judge held that the official record would be the most reliable
evidence to decide as to whether there was impersonation, and thereafter
passed the order calling for the record of registers of voters’ counterfoils
in form 17A from 38 polling stations of 13-(ST) Itanagar Assembly
Constituency, which order was challenged by the appellant by filing one
SLP earlier.
16. This earlier petition was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 1539 of
2012 which came to be decided by this Court on 2.12.2012. It was
pointed out on behalf of the appellant that the Election Petition was filed
1Page 11
on the basis of corrupt practice of booth capturing, and what was being
canvassed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 was the allegation of
impersonation/double voting on the part of the appellant. It was
submitted on behalf of the appellant that booth capturing is a specific
corrupt practice under section 123 (8) read with section 135A of 1951 Act.
Booth capturing involves use of force, whereas impersonation or double
voting is on the basis of deception. This submission was accepted by this
Court. This was apart from the fact that impersonation or double voting
would lead to improper reception of votes, which is another ground for
declaring an election to be void under section 100 (1) (d) (iii) of the Act,
and this ground was not pleaded in the petition nor was any issue framed
thereon for trial. It was canvassed on behalf of the appellant that double
voting or impersonation could not be considered as facets of booth
capturing which was also accepted by this Court.
17. This Court while deciding Civil Appeal No. 1539 of 2012 noted
that there was hardly any evidence to justify any plea of impersonation or
double voting. Therefore, this Court held in the said appeal, that it was
thus obvious that having failed to place any material with respect to
either booth capturing or impersonation, the first respondent was trying
to make fishing and roving inquiry to improve his case by calling for the
record of the voters register from Itanagar Constituency, in support of his
grievance of double voting. In the absence of any evidence with respect
to the persons who, at the instance of the appellant, allegedly captured
the booths or made double voting or impersonation in Tali Constituency,
1Page 12
no such inference could have been drawn. The learned Single Judge,
therefore, was clearly in error in allowing the second application made by
the first respondent.
18. As seen from the above, the learned Judge while deciding
Misc. Case No.5(AP) of 2010 had relied upon the judgment of this court in
Fulena Singh (supra) to justify his direction to produce the record of
register of voters’ counterfoils in Form 17-A of 38 polling stations of 13-
(ST) Itanagar constituency. This court, therefore, while deciding Civil
Appeal 1539 of 2012 explained the judgment in Fulena Singh, and the
correct legal position with respect to the production of such records in
court. It referred to the Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Ram
Sevak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, reported in AIR 1964 SC
1249, which has held that an order for inspection cannot be granted as a
matter of course having regard to the secrecy of the ballot papers. To
seek such an order two conditions are required to be fulfilled:
(i) that the petition for setting aside an election contains an
adequate statement of the material facts on which the petitioner
relies in support of his case; and
(ii) the tribunal is prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the
dispute and to do complete justice between the parties inspection
of the ballot papers is necessary.
But an order for inspection of ballot papers cannot be made to support
vague pleas made in the petition, not supported by material facts, or to
1Page 13
fish out evidence to support such pleas. In the present case, there was no
material whatsoever to justify the production of the register of
counterfoils of votes in Form 17-A and therefore, this court allowed the
said Civil Appeal and dismissed Misc. Case (EP) No. 05 (AP) of 2010 by
judgment and order dated 2.2.2012
19. Facts which had come on record clearly showed that the first
respondent received overwhelming votes in some polling stations,
whereas the appellant received similarly overwhelming votes in other
polling stations. The first respondent had in fact accepted that it
depended on the popularity of the candidate whether he would receive
more votes in any particular voting station. Assuming that the ground of
improper reception of votes could be raised for declaring the election to
be void under section 100 (1) (d), this Court noted in the decision of C.A
No. 1539 of 2012 as follows:-
“28. Besides, the ground of improper reception
requires a candidate to show as to how the election in so
far as it concerns the returned candidate was materially
affected, in view of the requirement of Section 100 (1) (d)
of the Act of 1951. First respondent has stated that there
were some 1304 double entries of voters. The allegation
of respondent No.1 on evidence was only with respect to
Roing and Ruhi polling station. The votes received by the
appellant in both these polling stations put together
come to 1873. The appellant has won with a margin of
2713 votes. That being so the second application could
not have been entertained even on that ground in the
absence of prima facie case that the result of the election
had been materially affected.”
20. Therefore, this Court went into the issue as to whether the
record of the voters’ counterfoils in Form 17 (A) from 38 polling station of
1Page 14
13 Itanagar (ST) Assembly Constituency could be called. It examined the
relevant provisions of Rule 93 of Conduct of Elections rules, 1961 and the
judgments governing the field, and held in this matter also as in Ram
Sevak Yadav (supra), that an order for inspection of ballot papers could
not be granted to support the vague pleas made in the petition not
supported by material facts or to fish out the evidence to support such
pleas. This Court therefore, allowed that appeal and set aside the
judgment and order dated 14.9.2010 and dismissed Misc. Case No. 5
(AP)/2010 dated 29.6.2010. The judgment in Civil Appeal 1539 of 2012 in
Markio Tado Vs. Takam Sorang and Ors. is reported in 2012 (3) SCC
236.
21. In this background when the matter proceeded further there
was no occasion for the Court to once again call for that record. The
learned Judge still passed an order on 19.3.2012 on Misc. Case (EP) 06
(AP) of 2010 holding that:-
 “it is considered expedient to send the registers of voters
(Form 17A) which were already procured from the District
Election Authority under sealed cover to the Director of
Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Police Training
Centre, Banderdewa, Arunachal Pradesh requesting him to
conduct scientific examination and verification of
signatures/finger prints appearing in Form 17A and to ascertain
as to whether the thumb impression and signatures contained
and recorded in Form 17A (voters register) were put single
handedly and fraudulently by few persons as a measure of
impersonation of the genuine voters concerned and after such
scientific examination/verification to submit report to the
Registry of this Court is sealed cover within 3rd of May, 2012.
The registry was directed to take steps accordingly.
1Page 15
This order dated 19.3.2012 passed by the learned Judge was challenged
by the appellant by filing Special Leave Petition 12707 of 2012, by
pointing out that such an order could not be made in the teeth of the
judgment and order rendered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1539 of
2012. However, the appellant, preferred to withdraw the SLP No. 12707 of
2012 subsequently, with a liberty to agitate the questions raised therein,
if required, when the main Election Petition was decided.
22. The learned Judge proceeded to examine court witnesses
including finger print expert, CW3. Thereafter, the court examined the
defence witnesses, and after hearing the arguments of the counsel for
both the parties allowed the Election Petition, and held that the election of
the petitioner was void. On the basis of the calculations of votes made by
the learned judge, he held that the first respondent had received more
votes, and therefore, declared him as elected from the constituency
concerned. It is this order which is under challenge.
23. Now, as can be seen from the narration above, the Election
Petition was filed only on the ground of booth capturing. The respondent
No. 1 himself accepted that he could not name any person involved in the
act of booth capturing. The evidence on record clearly showed that, apart
from some allegations, there was no material evidence placed in support
thereof. The petitioner tried to claim impersonation and double voting as
a facet of booth capturing. This submission was already rejected by this
Court while deciding C.A No. 1539 of 2012 (supra) by holding that
1Page 16
impersonation and double voting would amount to deception and it will be
a facet of improper reception of votes and not booth capturing. Booth
capturing involves use of force and that was not established. The petition
was not filed on the ground of improper reception of votes. Even if that
ground was to be looked into, the respondent No. 1 accepted in his
evidence that he had no direct evidence regarding casting of votes by
impersonation.
24. The learned judge has clearly transgressed the limits of his
jurisdiction, by going into the exercise of calling for the handwriting and
finger print experts, and comparing the voters’ signatures and finger
prints with the help of the records in Form 17A, when that was clearly
held to be impermissible in the present case itself. This is apart from the
fact that this has resulted into a waste of the time of the Court, which is
so precious. The evidence was recorded on a number of dates and so
many witnesses, including public officers, were called when their evidence
was not required. It would be relevant to refer to the observations of this
Court in paragraph 12 of Azar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi reported in AIR
1986 SC 1253 in the context of rejecting an election petition summarily,
at the threshold, where such a case is not made out. The observations are
to the following effect,
“12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next argued that
in any event the powers to reject an election petition summarily
under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be
exercised at the threshold. In substance, the argument is that the
court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only
after the trial of the election petition is concluded that the powers
1Page 17
under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the
defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be
exercised. 
With respect to the learned counsel, it is an argument
which it is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of
conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation
which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should
not be permitted to occupy the time of the court and
exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles
need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily
without point or purpose. ………..”
(emphasis supplied)
25. The judge clearly ignored that the law declared by this Court
is binding on all courts within the territory of India under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, and judicial discipline required him to follow the mandate of the Constitution.
He entered into an impermissible exercise,
and deleted the votes received by the appellant which he considered to
be tainted votes. 
It is quite shocking to see that the learned judge has
proceeded to delete the votes of the appellant from 8 polling stations,
although the grievance was only about Ruhi and Roing polling stations.
By making these deductions, he came to the conclusion that the
respondent No. 1 had received 826 votes more. 
As can be seen from
paragraph 28 of the judgment, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1539 of 2012,
that at best the case of the first respondent was that there were double
entries of voters in 1304 names. 
The allegation was only with respect to
two polling stations. In those polling stations, the appellant had received
1873 votes.
 Even if these 1304 votes were to be deleted, it would not
affect the result materially since the appellant had won with a margin of
2713 votes. 
The learned judge, therefore, ignored that even if the ground
of improper reception of votes under section 100(1)(d)(iii) was to be
1Page 18
taken, the respondent no.1 had failed to establish that the result of the election of the appellant had been materially affected by such improper reception of votes. The decision of the learned judge was therefore
clearly flawed and untenable. 
26. Thus, the learned judge went into the counterfoils of the
voters inspite of the fact that this court had already ruled in the judgment in C.A. 1539 of 2010, that in the facts of the present case, no case was made out for calling of the counterfoils.
It is not that he was unaware of
the judgment rendered by this court. He referred to this judgment in Para
9(i) by stating that CA No. 1539 of 2010 was preferred against his
judgment and order dated 14.9.2010.
Thereafter, he specifically noted
“the said Civil Appeal was allowed vide judgment and order dt. 2.2.2012
dismissing the aforesaid M.C. (EP) No. 5 (AP) of 2010 under Section 83(1)
of the R.P. Act as reported in (2012) 3 SCC 236.”
Thereafter, however he
proceeded to act exactly contrary to the direction emanating from the
dismissal of M.C. (EP) No. 5 (AP) of 2010, which amounts to nothing but
judicial indiscipline and disregard to the mandate of Article 141 of the
Constitution of India. 
This is shocking, to say the least, and most
unbecoming of a judge holding a high position such as that of a High
Court Judge. We fail to see as to what made the judge act in such a
manner, though we refrain from going into that aspect. 
27. Before we conclude, we may state that it is unfortunate that
such acts of judicial impropriety are repeated inspite of clear judgments of
1Page 19
this court on the significance of Article 141 of the Constitution. Thus, in a
judgment by a bench of three judges in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries
Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Anr., reported
in (1997) 6 SCC 450, this court observed,
“32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of
judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial
impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including
the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a
judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position.
Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly
deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying
the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which
necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted
relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.”
We may as well refer to Para 28 of the State of West Bengal & Ors. v.
Shivanand Pathak and Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 513, wherein
this court observed,
“If a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial
discipline requires that the judge whose judgment is overruled must
submit to the judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in
collateral proceedings between the same parties, rewrite the
overruled judgment…”
28. In the circumstances, we have no option but to allow this
appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order rendered by the
learned judge of Gauhati High Court dated 12.11.2012. The Election
Petition filed by the respondent no. 1, bearing Election Petition No. 1(AP)
of 2009, renumbered as Election Petition No. 1 (AP) of 2012, shall stand
dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
1Page 20
…………..
……………………..J.
( G.S. Singhvi )
………………………………….
.J.
( H.L. Gokhale )
New Delhi
Dated: May 10, 2013
2

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – KARNATAKA AMENDMENT IN RESPECT OF DAUGHTERS SHARE ON PAR WITH SONS = if law governing the parties is amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefited by such amendment can make a request to the court to take cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If the rights of the parties to the suit change due to other reasons, the court seized with the final decree proceedings is not only entitled but is duty-bound to take notice of such change and pass appropriate order.- the Act was amended by the State Legislature and Sections 6-A to 6-C were inserted for achieving the goal of equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In terms of Section 2 of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994, Section 6-A came into force on 30-7-1994 i.e. the date on which the amendment was published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were pending. Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek enlargement of her share by pointing out that the discrimination practised against the unmarried daughter had been removed by the legislative intervention and there is no reason why the court should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the State Legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 15(3) of the Constitution."


ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.3 SECTION IVA

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)....../2013
CC 9253-9255/2013

(From the judgement and order dated 11/01/2010 in RFA No.935/2003,RFA
No.1012/2003 dated 06/01/2012 in RP No.2516/2011, of The HIGH COURT OF
KARNATAKA AT GULBARGA)

MAHESH & ORS. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

SIDRAM (D) TR.LRS.& ORS. Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for c/delay in filing SLP,c/delay in refiling SLP and office
report ))


Date: 01/05/2013 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.


CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI



For Petitioner(s) Mr. P.Vishwanatha Shetty, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sharan Thakur, Adv.
Mr. V. Lakshim Naryana, Adv.
Mr. Ramesh Babu M.R.,AOR

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R


Delay condoned.
In one of these petitions, the petitioners have questioned
correctness of judgment dated 11.1.2010 passed by the Division Bench
of the Karnataka High Court in RFA Nos.935/2003 and 1012/2003. In the
other petition, the petitioners have challenged order dated 6.1.2012
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Review Petition
No.2516/2011.
The suit filed by the petitioners for partition and
separate possession was partly decreed by the trial Court vide
judgment dated 19.11.2002, the operative portion of which reads as
under:
" Suit of the plaintiffs No.1 to 3 is decreed partly.


Plaintiffs 1 to 3 together entitled for partition and separate
possession of 1/2 share in plaint para 7A and plaint Schedule B
Properties.


Defendant No. 2 is entitled of 3/16 share in plaint Para 7A and
Schedule B Properties.


Defendant No. 3 is entitled for 1/16 share in those properties.


Defendant No. 4 and 5 are each entitled for 1/8 share in those
properties (Para 7A and Schedule B of the Plaint)."


The regular first appeals filed by the parties were
disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court in the following
terms:
"(b) The finding of the trial court that Schedule "A" and "B"
properties are joint family properties, in which, the
plaintiff are entitled to a share is affirmed.


(c) Plaintiff "C" schedule property is declared as the
joint family property, in which, the plaintiffs are
entitled to share.

(d) The decree of the trial court in respect of "D"
schedule properties is upheld and the plaintiffs are not entitled to a
share.

(e) In substitution of the shares allotted by the trial
court, it is held that the plaintiffs together and defendants 4 and 5
each one of them are entitled to 1/3rd in the remaining schedule
properties.

(f) Parties to work out their respective share in the final
decree proceedings including mesne profits from the date of the
suit."




The review petition filed by the petitioners in RFA
No.1012/2003 was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by
observing that the amendment made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by
Karnataka Legislature was retrospective and the daughters who were
married prior to the amendment were entitled to share in the property
of their father.
We have heard Shri P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior
counsel appearing for the petitioners and perused the record.
The question whether the Karnataka Amendment in the Hindu
Succession Act is retrospective is no longer res integra and must be
treated as settled by the judgment of this Court in Prema v. Nanje
Gowda and others (2011) 6 SCC 462. After noticing the relevant
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and the amendments made by the
State Legislature, this Court observed:

"15. In the present case, the preliminary decree was passed on
11-8-1992. The first appeal was dismissed on 20-3-1998 and the
second appeal was dismissed on 1-10-1999 as barred by
limitation. By the preliminary decree, shares of the parties
were determined but the actual partition/division had not taken
place. Therefore, the proceedings of the suit instituted by
Respondent 1 cannot be treated to have become final so far as
the actual partition of the joint family properties is concerned
and in view of the law laid down in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal AIR
1967 SC 1470 and S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (1991) 3 SCC
647, it was open to the appellant to claim enhancement of her
share in the joint family properties because she had not married
till the enforcement of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994. Section 6-A of
Karnataka Act 23 of 1994 is identical to Section 29-A of the
Andhra Pradesh Act. Therefore, there is no reason why ratio of
the judgment in S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (1991) 3 SCC
647 should not be applied for deciding the appellant's claim for
grant of share on a par with male members of the joint family.
In our considered view, the trial court and the learned Single
Judge were clearly in error when they held that the appellant
was not entitled to the benefit of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994
because she had not filed an application for enforcing the right
accruing to her under Section 6-A during the pendency of the
first and the second appeals or that she had not challenged the
preliminary decree by joining Defendants 1, 4 and 5 in filing
the second appeal.


16. We may add that by virtue of the preliminary decree passed
by the trial court, which was confirmed by the lower appellate
court and the High Court, the issues decided therein will be
deemed to have become final but as the partition suit is
required to be decided in stages, the same can be regarded as
fully and completely decided only when the final decree is
passed. If in the interregnum any party to the partition suit
dies, then his/her share is required to be allotted to the
surviving parties and this can be done in the final decree
proceedings. Likewise, if law governing the parties is amended
before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party
benefited by such amendment can make a request to the court to
take cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If
the rights of the parties to the suit change due to other
reasons, the court seized with the final decree proceedings is
not only entitled but is duty-bound to take notice of such
change and pass appropriate order.


17. In this case, the Act was amended by the State Legislature
and Sections 6-A to 6-C were inserted for achieving the goal of
equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In terms
of Section 2 of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994, Section 6-A came into
force on 30-7-1994 i.e. the date on which the amendment was
published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were
pending. Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek
enlargement of her share by pointing out that the discrimination
practised against the unmarried daughter had been removed by the
legislative intervention and there is no reason why the court
should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the
State Legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under
Article 15(3) of the Constitution."



In view of the aforesaid judgment, there is no escape from
the conclusion that the special leave petitions are meritless and are
liable to be dismissed as such. Ordered accordingly.




|(Parveen Kr.Chawla) | |(Phoolan Wati Arora) |
|Court Master | |Court Master |
| | | |







Objection to withdrawal of a suit by impleader /defendant No.4- not maintainable in view of the facts = "5. The grievance of the Appellant is that the aforesaid amount ought not to have been allowed to have been withdrawn since the Appellant has filed a separate suit for specific performance of its agreement, against the Respondents and others. Now, in so far as the Appellant is concerned, the Appellant must necessarily pursue its claim in that suit. A motion has been taken out by the Appellant in its suit which is still pending before the Learned Trial Judge. As regards the suit out of which the present appeal arises, that was for specific performance of the agreement between the First Respondent and the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents. Whether the suit should be pursued or should be unconditionally withdrawn was a matter for the First Respondent- Plaintiff to determine since it is the First Respondent who is in carriage of these proceedings. Upon the withdrawal of that suit, an order had to be passed in regard to the monies which were deposited in pursuance of the interim direction. The Appellant could have no objection whatsoever if the monies were directed to be refunded back to the First Respondent who had deposited the money. It would make no difference to the legal position if the monies are directed to be paid over to the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents in terms of the agreement between the First Respondent and the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents. The Appellant which has instituted its own independent suit would be at liberty to pursue its suit to a logical conclusion. The agreement between the First Respondent and the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents does not preclude the Appellant from pursing its own remedies in respect of the agreement which the Appellant claims and in respect of which a separate suit is pending."- We have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner at some length and perused the record. In our opinion, the petitioner's challenge to the order passed by the learned Single Judge was wholly misconceived and the Division Bench of the High Court rightly held that it cannot have any legitimate objection to the disposal of the suit in terms of the agreement reached between respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2 to 4 because it had already instituted independent suit. The reasons recorded by the Division Bench for declining to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge are correct and the impugned order does not call for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. However, it is made clear that the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the impugned order shall not prejudicially affect adjudication of Suit No.2691/1998.


ITEM NO.57 COURT NO.3 SECTION IX
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)....../2013
CC 10223-10224/2013
(From the judgement and order dated 30/04/2013 in NM No. 812/2013 in AN
No.190/2013 in SN No.2055/2010 and AN No.190/2013 in SN No.2055/2010 of the
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY)

LOK HOUSING & CONSTRUCTIONS LTD. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

RUNWAL DEVELOPERS LTD. & ORS. Respondent(s)

(With appln(s) for permission to file SLP without c/copy as well as plain
copy of the impugned order and exemption from filing c/copy as well as
plain copy of the impugned order and with prayer for interim relief and
office report)

Date: 10/05/2013 These Petitions were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Uday U. Lalit, Sr. Adv.
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Indu Malhotra, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kotak, Adv.
Mr. Kush Chaturvedi, Adv.
Ms. Nishtha Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Vanshdeep Dalmia, Adv.
Mr. Vikas Mehta,AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. C.U. Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr.Shishir Deshpande,Adv.
Mr. Amit Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Pradeep Bakhru, Adv.
Mr. Aman Gandhi, Adv.
Ms. Bindi Girish Dave, Adv

UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R

These petitions are directed against order dated 30.4.2013 passed
by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court whereby the appeal preferred
by the petitioner was dismissed and order dated 6.3.2013 passed by the
learned Single Judge granting leave to the plaintiff (respondent No.1
herein) to unconditionally withdraw Suit No.2055/2010 filed against
Madhusudhan Mehra and others was upheld.

The petitioner filed Suit No.2691/1998 against respondent No.2 and
his five brothers for specific performance of Development-cum-Sale
Agreement dated 22.7.1995 by asserting that it was always ready and willing
to perform its obligation under the agreement and that the defendants were
guilty of non-fulfilling their part of the contract. 

The trial Court
passed order dated 13.7.1998 in Notice of Motion No.2241/1998 taken out by
the petitioner and restrained respondent No.2 and his brothers from
alienating, transferring and/or disposing of the suit property or from
parting with possession subject to the condition of depositing Rs.4 crores.
The petitioner did not fulfill this condition.

Respondent Nos.2 to 4 filed Suit No.423/2001 against the
petitioner for grant of a declaration that the termination of Development- cum-Sale Agreement was valid.


On 4.1.2008, respondent Nos.2 to 4 are said to have executed a
Memorandum of Understanding with respondent No.1 for sale of their one-
third undivided share in the suit property covered by agreement dated
22.7.1995. 

After two years and about six months, respondent Nos.2 to 4
terminated the Memorandum of Understanding. 

Thereupon, respondent No.1 filed Suit No.2055/2010 for specific performance thereof.
 In that suit, the trial Court passed order dated 22.10.2010 and restrained all the defendants i.e. respondent Nos.2 to 4 and the petitioner from selling, alienating, encumbering, transferring and/or creating any third party rights in one-third portion of the suit property. 
This was subject to
deposit of Rs.7,70,65,750/- by respondent No.1. 

The latter did the needful on 18.11.2010.

During the pendency of Suit No.2055/2010, respondent No.1 and
respondent Nos.2 to 4 executed consent terms whereby respondent No.1 agreed to withdraw the suit with liberty to respondent Nos.2 to 4 to withdraw sum of Rs.7,70,65,750/- . 


The petitioner, who was impleaded as defendant No.1
in the suit objected to the acceptance of consent terms. 

The learned Single
Judge took cognizance of the prayer made by respondent No.1, the objection
raised on behalf of the petitioner and granted leave for withdrawal of the
suit. 

The relevant portions of the order passed by the learned Single Judge
read as under:


"1. The plaintiff desires to withdraw the suit against all
defendants. Plaintiff and defendants 1, 2 and 3 have agreed
that the amount of Rs.7,70,65,750/deposited in this Court
pursuant to the interim order dated 22nd October, 2010
together with all accrued interest thereon be allowed to be
withdrawn by defendants 1, 2 and 3.

2. The attorneys for the plaintiff and defendants 1, 2 and
3 have tendered minutes of the order in that behalf.

3. Counsel on behalf of defendant No.4 opposes the above
agreement being effectuated between the plaintiff and
defendants 1, 2 and 3 in as much as defendants 1, 2 and 3
would be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited in the
Court.

4. Counsel on behalf of defendant No.4 contends that the
plaintiff may withdraw the suit which he has the right to
do against all the defendants.


5. He has drawn my attention to the order dated 22nd
October, 2010 directing the deposit. Upon the deposit the
plaintiff has been granted injunction against all the
defendants against creation of third party rights in the
suit property.


6. Defendant No.4 has an earlier claim under an earlier
agreement which was known to the plaintiff at the time of
entering into the suit agreement between the plaintiff and
defendants 1, 2 and 3. 

The order considers the claim of the
plaintiff under Section 19(c ) of the Specific Relief Act
upon such knowledge.


7. Having considered the prior claim as also the
plaintiff's claim the interim order had come to be passed.


8. The defendant No.4 has sued upon his claim earlier. 

That
is in Suit No.2691 of 1998 filed in this Court. 

However the
plaintiff in that suit, defendant No.4 herein, 

failed to
obtain any interim reliefs. 

His claim for specific
performance remains at that. 

That would have to be agitated
in the suit upon the evidence led in the trial. 

The claim
of defendant No.4 herein would, therefore, be considered
only at that stage and upon such evidence. 

If defendant
No.4, the plaintiff in that suit, makes out his case he may
obtain the relief of specific performance or the relief of
damages. Defendant No.4 as the plaintiff in that suit would
have to execute that decree as and when obtained. The
amount lying to the credit of this suit cannot be utilised
for the purpose of execution of the decree passed in that
suit. That is what defendant No.4 seeks to do.


9. It is seen that the plaintiff's suit is based upon the
plaintiff's agreement with defendants 1, 2 and 3. To secure
that agreement the amount was directed to be deposited.
Consequently upon the settlement of the claim between the
parties to that agreement, the amount must be allowed to be
withdrawn by either of those parties. Not allowing them to
withdraw that amount would mean that the amount of
consideration secured under that agreement would be
utilised as a security for a decree which would be passed
in future. 

That cannot be allowed in this suit. 
What
defendant No.4 would get in this suit is the freedom of the
plaintiff's claim upon the plaintiff withdrawing the suit.
Defendant No.4 is freed of his obligation to defend the
suit. 

He cannot claim any other relief in the plaintiff's
suit. 

Hence, the suit is allowed to be withdrawn against
all the defendants.


10. There shall be an order and decree in terms of minutes
of the order signed by Advocates of the parties and the
plaintiff as also defendants 1, 2 and 3."




The minutes of the order to which reference has been made in
paragraph 10 of the aforesaid order are also extracted below:
"MINUTES OF THE ORDER

1. The Plaintiff withdraws the captioned Suit against all
the Defendants.

2. All interim orders to stand vacated.

3. In so far as the sum of Rs.7,70,65,750/- (Rupees Seven
Crores Sixty Five Thousand and Seven Hundred and fifty
only) deposited by the Plaintiff in the Hon'ble High Court
on 18th November, 2010 towards compliance of the Order
dated 22nd October, 2010 office of the Prothonotary and
Senior Master, High Court Bombay pursuant to the order
dated 22nd October, 2010 of this Court is concerned, the
Plaintiff agrees that Defendant No.3 i.e. Mr. Vinay
Madhusudan Mehra, shall for an on behalf of Defendant Nos.1
to 3, be entitled to withdraw the same together with all
the interest accrued on the said amount. The Plaintiff
shall render all the necessary assistance to enable
Defendant No.3 to withdraw the said sum."



The petitioner challenged the order of the learned Single Judge in
Appeal (L) No.190/2013 and pleaded that the learned Single Judge was not at
all justified in disposing of the suit in terms of the agreement reached
between respondent No.1 on the one hand, and respondent Nos.2 to 4 on the
other. The Division Bench of the High Court rejected the grievance of the
appellant by recording the following observations:

"5. The grievance of the Appellant is that the aforesaid
amount ought not to have been allowed to have been
withdrawn since the Appellant has filed a separate suit for
specific performance of its agreement, against the
Respondents and others. 

Now, in so far as the Appellant is
concerned, the Appellant must necessarily pursue its claim
in that suit. 

A motion has been taken out by the Appellant
in its suit which is still pending before the Learned Trial
Judge. 

As regards the suit out of which the present appeal
arises, that was for specific performance of the agreement
between the First Respondent and the Second, Third and
Fourth Respondents. 

Whether the suit should be pursued or
should be unconditionally withdrawn was a matter for the
First Respondent- Plaintiff to determine since it is the
First Respondent who is in carriage of these proceedings.


Upon the withdrawal of that suit, an order had to be passed
in regard to the monies which were deposited in pursuance
of the interim direction. 

The Appellant could have no
objection whatsoever if the monies were directed to be
refunded back to the First Respondent who had deposited the
money.

 It would make no difference to the legal position if
the monies are directed to be paid over to the Second,
Third and Fourth Respondents in terms of the agreement
between the First Respondent and the Second, Third and
Fourth Respondents. 

The Appellant which has instituted its
own independent suit would be at liberty to pursue its suit
to a logical conclusion. 

The agreement between the First
Respondent and the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents
does not preclude the Appellant from pursing its own
remedies in respect of the agreement which the Appellant
claims and in respect of which a separate suit is pending."



We have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner at some
length and perused the record.

In our opinion, the petitioner's challenge to the order passed by
the learned Single Judge was wholly misconceived and the Division Bench of
the High Court rightly held that it cannot have any legitimate objection to
the disposal of the suit in terms of the agreement reached between
respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2 to 4 because it had already instituted
independent suit. The reasons recorded by the Division Bench for declining
to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge are correct and the
impugned order does not call for interference under Article 136 of the
Constitution.


The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. However,
it is made clear that the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the
impugned order shall not prejudicially affect adjudication of Suit
No.2691/1998.



|(Parveen Kr.Chawla) | |(Phoolan Wati Arora) |
|Court Master | |Court Master |
| | | |

-----------------------
4






Tuesday, May 14, 2013

An application for modification/clarification of a final order passed by this Court is not contemplated by the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 which specifically provides the remedy of review and also lays down the procedure governing the consideration of a review application by this Court. In fact, filing of such applications for modification has been deprecated by this Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 296] and A.P. SRTC & Ors. Vs. Abdul Kareem [(2007) 2 SCC 466].= the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs 1 (since deceased), 2 and 3 was decreed in the following terms :- “30....We are of the further view that the sale deed that will now have to be executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs will be for the market price of the suit property as on the date of the present order. As No material, whatsoever is available to enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and circumstances.= they are ready and willing to offer an amount of Rs.6 crores for the property as against the sum of Rs.3.75 lakhs as mentioned in agreement dated 22.12.1970 has been specifically recorded.- It is the aforesaid “offer” made on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs that had led to the direction in question inasmuch as no material was available to Court to find out as to whether the offered amount of Rs.6 crores was, in any way, indicative of the market value of the property. It is in such a situation that the direction to execute the sale deed at the market price and the request to the learned Trial Judge to determine the same came to be recorded in the judgment dated 3.12.2012. It is, therefore, clear that we did not intend to lay down any law of general application while issuing the direction for execution of the sale deed at the market price as on the date of the judgment i.e. 3.12.2012. The exercise by the learned Trial Judge in terms of our judgment dated 3.12.2012 is yet to be made. The aforesaid determination, naturally, will be made by the learned single Judge only after affording an opportunity to all the affected parties and after taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances. Furthermore, any party aggrieved by such determination will be entitled to avail of such remedies that may be open in law to such a party. In view of the above, we do not deem it to be necessary to cause any variation or modification in the aforesaid direction contained in our judgment dated 3.12.2012. 21. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 12-13 of 2013 shall stand disposed of in the above terms.


Page 1
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A. NOS. 3-5 & I.A. D.No. 37212 OF 2013
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8653 OF 2012
SATYA JAIN (D) & ORS. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TH. LRS. & ORS ... Respondent(s)
With
I.A. NOS. 12-13 & 14-15 OF 2013
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8675-8676 OF 2012
O R D E R
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Civil Appeal No. 8653 of 2012 and other connected
appeals were allowed by this Court by judgment and order
dated 3.12.2012.
The decree passed by the Appellate Bench of
the High Court of Delhi in RFA (OS) No. 11/1984 was set aside
and
the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs 1
(since deceased), 2 and 3 was decreed in the following terms :-
“30....We are of the further view that the
sale deed that will now have to be
Page 2
2
executed by the defendants in favour of
the plaintiffs will be for the market price of
the suit property as on the date of the
present order. 
As No material, whatsoever
is available to enable us to make a correct
assessment of the market value of the suit
property as on date we request the learned
trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to
undertake the said exercise with such
expedition as may be possible in the
prevailing facts and circumstances.
31. All the appeals shall accordingly stand
allowed in terms of our above conclusions
and directions.”
2. I.A. Nos. 3-5, 12-13, 14-15 and D.No. 37212 of 2013 have
been filed seeking impleadment/clarification/modification/
correction of the judgment dated 3.12.2012, in the
circumstances noted below.
3. I.A. Nos. 3-5 have been filed by one Amit Jain, Rahul Jain
and Smt. Aruna Jain contending that during the pendency of the
Civil Appeal before this Court, out of total suit property
measuring 5373 Sq. Yds., two parcels measuring 1500 Sq. Yds.,
in all, were sold by Ms. Sameen Rushdie Momen (respondent
No.1 in Civil Appeal No. 8653/2012 and Respondent 1B in Civil
Appeals No. 8675-76 of 2012) in favour of the applicants. On
the said basis, the applicants seek impleadment and
clarification of the judgment dated 3.12.2012 to mean that the
Page 3
3
successor-in-interest of the original defendant (late Anis Ahmed
Rushdie) i.e. Ms. Sameen Rushdie Momen, has been left with
the right of ownership in respect of only 3873 Sq. Yds. of the
property situated at No. 4, Flag Staff Road, Civil Lines, Delhi.
4. I.A. Nos. 12-13 have been filed by Narender Jain and Arvind
Jain (original plaintiffs No.2 & 3) seeking the following reliefs :-
“(a) modify/clarify/correct Paragraphs
29 and 30 of the judgment and order
dated 3.12.2012 as mentioned in the
present application;
(b) correct the typographical errors in the
judgment and order dated 3.12.2012 as
mentioned in Paragraph 8 of this
application;
(c) pass such other and further orders as
may be deemed fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the present
case.”
5. In the aforesaid I.As. the applicants have, inter alia, stated
that Ms. Sameen Rushdie Momen who is the legal heir/
successor-in-interest of the deceased sole defendant Anis
Ahmed Rushdie (by virtue of a Will dated 9.1.1984 executed by
Anis Ahmed Rushdie and accepted by the other legal heirs) had
executed a irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated
4.11.2010 with consideration in favour of one Fine Properties
Page 4
4
Private Limited disposing of all her rights, shares and interest
etc. in the suit property “as on whereon basis” subject to the
following salient terms:-
“1. That, the FIRST-PARTY agrees to
absolutely grant to the SECONDPARTY all his rights, shares, interest,
liens, registrations clear-titles, etc. in
the un-encumbered plot/property/
house bearing no. 4, Flag Staff Road,
Delhi-110054 alongwith:
unauthorized Occupant/ User (i.e.
late Sh. BHIKU RAM JAIN): and
another unauthorized-Occupant/
User (i.e. legal-heirs of late Mr. I.M.
Lal): and portion of the property in
possession of the FIRST-PARTY.
And the SECOND PARTY has
accepted to be the Attorney for the
purchase acquisition and possessing
of the entire-property, for the total
CONSIDERATION of Rs.4,50,00,000/-
(Rupees Four-Crores and Fifty Lacs)
only through this presently executed
and registered G.P.A.
Sufficiency of the above
CONSIDERATION for signing and
executing of this G.P.A. is hereby
acknowledged (payments and
receipts) by both Parties.
(vii) Para 6 of the said General Power of
Attorney reads under:-
 6. That, the SECOND-PARTY shall
pursue and bear the entire charge, costs,
expenses, fees, etc. regarding the
following:-Page 5
5
• R.F.A. (OS) No. 11 of 1984;
• Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) or
equivalent, etc. before the Supreme
Court of India), if subsequently filed
thereafter;
Effective from the date of execution and
registration of this G.P.A.
(vii) Para 8 of the said General Power of Attorney
reads as under :-
8. That, on handing over the payment of: fullCONSIDERATION to the FIRST-PARTY, by the
SECOND-PARTY, the FIRST-PARTY ceases to
exercise any rights, interests, liens, titles, etc.
(what-so-ever) in the said plot/property/house;
and the Attorney for the same shall absolutely
stand in favour of the SECOND-PARTY (in all
respects what-so-ever).’
(viii) Para 12 of the said General Power of Attorney
reads as under :-
12. That, the CONSIDERATION-amounts shall
not be returned/refunded, by the FIRST-PARTY
to the SECOND-PARTY.
Also, the amount paid, incurred, etc. and
expenses, cost etc. and incidentals thereto
towards the Registration (eg. Stamp Duty, etc.)
by the SECOND-PARTY shall also not be
returned/refunded/reimbursed).”
6. In the light of the aforesaid facts, the applicants state that
directions contained in judgment dated 3.12.2012 requiring the
legal heirs of the deceased sole defendant, i.e., Respondents 1A
Page 6
6
to 1D (in Civil Appeal No. 8675-76 of 2012) to execute the sale
deed in favour of the plaintiffs, at the market price of the suit
property as on the date of the judgment, would require
appropriate modification inasmuch as the defendant respondents are not entitled to the said reliefs having already
parted with the suit property.
7. The applicants further/alternatively contend that in view of
the several decisions of this Court referred to in paragraph 5 of
the I.A., the judgment of the Court directing execution of the
sale deed by the defendant-respondents in favour of the
plaintiffs at the market price as on the date of the said
judgment i.e. 3.12.2012 would also require appropriate
modification.
8. In addition to the above, correction of certain
typographical errors specifically mentioned in paragraph 8 of
the I.A. have been prayed for by the applicants.
9. I.A. Nos. 14-15 of 2013 have also been filed by plaintiffs 2
and 3, i.e., Narender Jain and Arvind Jain seeking to bring to the
notice of the Court that Fine Properties Private Limited has filed
an I.A. before the learned Trial Judge of the High Court seeking
certain orders in respect of the execution of the sale deed in
Page 7
7
terms of the judgment of this Court dated 3.12.2012. The
applicants contend that notice has been issued in the aforesaid
I.A. by the learned Trial Judge of the High Court without any
justifiable basis and the same needs to be appropriately
interfered with by this Court. In any event, the proceedings in
the aforesaid I.A. are required to be stayed till a decision is
rendered by this Court in the present I.As.
10. In addition to the above, I.A. D.No.37212 of 2013 has been
filed by one Chopra Marketing Private Limited seeking
impleadment in C.A. No. 8653 of 2012 on the basis that an
agreement to sell the suit property was executed by and
between the applicant and persons claiming to be the Attorneys
of the defendant-respondents pursuant whereto the applicant
had parted with a sum of Rs. 2 crores as advance payment.
According to the applicant it had subsequently come to its
knowledge that rights in the suit property had already been
created in favour of the Fine Properties Private Limited as well
as the applicants in I.A. 3-5 for which reason a FIR dated
8.12.2012 has been filed by the applicant before the
Jurisdictional Police Station, i.e., Economic Offences Wing, Delhi.
11. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
Page 8
8
12. An application for modification/clarification of a final order
passed by this Court is not contemplated by the provisions of
the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 which specifically provides the
remedy of review and also lays down the procedure governing
the consideration of a review application by this Court.
 In fact,
filing of such applications for modification has been deprecated
by this Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh
Uban & Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 296] and A.P. SRTC & Ors. Vs.
Abdul Kareem [(2007) 2 SCC 466].
 It is in the above backdrop
that we must proceed to examine the prayers made in the I.As.
filed.
13. Insofar as I.A. Nos.3-5 are concerned, suffice it will be to
note that the facts stated therein, on the basis of which the
prayer for modification/clarification has been made, were not
before the Court at the time when the judgment dated
3.12.2012 was rendered. In I.A. Nos.14-15 and I.A. D.No. 37212
of 2013 the reliefs sought are based on facts and events which
have occurred subsequent to the order of this Court. Not only
on the basis of the principles of law laid down by this Court in
Gurdip Singh Uban and Abdul Kareem (supra), even
otherwise, the said I.As. would not be maintainable and the
Page 9
9
prayers made therein cannot be granted. The applicants seek
to reopen concluded issues and alteration of the consequential
directions which have attained finality. Such a course of action
is not permissible and at best the parties may be left with the
option of seeking such remedies as may be open in law to
vindicate any perceived right or claim. We, therefore, dispose of
the I.A. Nos.3-5, 14-15 and D.No. 37212 of 2013 in the above
terms.
14. Insofar as I.A. Nos.12-13 of 2013 are concerned,
Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the applicants
has submitted that an application seeking review of this Court’s
judgment dated 3.12.2012, to the extent prayed for in the I.As.,
has been filed. That apart, Shri Bhushan has drawn our
attention to some typographical errors in the judgment dated
3.12.2012. We, therefore, deem it proper to consider the
aforesaid I.As. on a slightly different footing.
15. Insofar as typographical errors and the suggested
corrections mentioned in para 8 of the I.As. are concerned, we
have examined the contents of the relevant paragraphs of the
judgment dated 3.12.2012. On such consideration, we find that
the errors pointed out by the applicants in para 8, indeed, havePage 10
10
occurred. Consequently, we correct the said errors in the
following terms.
(i) Para 2 of the judgment dated 3.12.2012 be read as
follows :
“2. The appellants, Narendra Jain (original
Plaintiff No.2), and Arvind Jain (original Plaintiff No. 3)
also claim to be the Legal heirs and representatives
of the original plaintiff No. 1 who had along with
Narendra Jain and Arvind Jain instituted suit No.
994/1977 in the High Court of Delhi seeking a decree
of specific performance in respect of an agreement
dated 22.12.1970 executed by and between original
plaintiff No.1 (Bhikhu Ram Jain) and the original
defendants Anis Ahmed Rushdie in respect of a
property described as Bungalow No.4, Flag Staff
Road, Civil Lines, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘suit property’). The plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are the
sons of the original plaintiff No.1. The suit was
decreed by the learned trial judge. The decree
having been reversed by a Division Bench of the
High Court the present appeals have been filed by
the original plaintiff No.2, Narendra Jain and Arvind
Jain (original Plaintiff No.3) and the other appellants
who claim to be vested with a right to sue on the
basis of the claims made by the original plaintiffs in
the suit. It is, however, made clear at the very
outset that though all such persons claiming a right
Page 11
11
to sue through the deceased plaintiffs 1 and 3 are
being referred to hereinafter as the plaintiffs and an
adjudication of the causes/claims espoused is being
made herein the said exercise does not, in any way,
recognize any right in any such impleaded ‘plaintiffs’
which Question(s) are left open for decision if and
when so raised.”
(ii) In paragraph 4 of the judgment dated 3.12.2012 the
date of the filing of the suit mentioned as 3.11.1997
be read as 3.11.1977.
(iii) In paragraph 6 of the judgment dated 3.12.2012 the
date 22.12.1977 be read as 22.12.1970.
(iv) Paragraph 8 of the judgment dated 3.12.2012 be
replaced by following paragraph :-
“8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree
passed by the learned trial Judge, the original
defendant had filed an appeal which was allowed by
the impugned judgment dated 31.10.2011.
During
the proceedings of the appeal before the High Court
the original plaintiff 1 as well as the original
defendant had died.
As already noticed, while the
original plaintiff No.2 and original plaintiff No.3
continue to remain on record as appellants, the
remaining appellants claim to be the legal
heirs/representatives of the deceased plaintiff No.1.
In so far as the original defendant in the suit is
Page 12
12
concerned the legal representatives of the said
defendant are on record having been so
impleaded.”
16. This will bring the Court to a consideration of the prayer for
clarification/modification of the direction for execution of the
sale deed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs at the
market price as on 3.12.2012.
The first ground on which such
modification has been sought is that during the pendency of the
appeals all rights in the suit property have been transferred by
the defendant-respondents to one Fine Properties Private
Limited for valuable consideration and therefore, the said
defendant-respondents are not entitled to any relief much less
the relief of the market value of the property.
Additionally, it
has been contended that instead of the defendant-respondents
it is the Registrar of the Delhi High Court who should be
directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs.
17. We have already observed that the facts surrounding the
alleged transfer of the suit property or the rights over the said
property by the defendant-respondents to Fine Properties
Private Limited were not before the Court at the time of hearing
of the appeals in question or even at the time when the
judgment dated 3.12.2012 was rendered. Though the aforesaid
Page 13
13
facts along with the supporting documents were filed by way of
an additional paper book no specific order of the Court was
sought or granted to the appellants to rely on the said
documents.
 In such circumstances, the aforesaid facts now
sought to be brought on record cannot be a legitimate basis for
any modification of our judgment even if the I.As. in question
are construed to be applications for review of our judgment
dated 3.12.2012.
18. The aforesaid prayer for modification is based on the
additional ground that the same is contrary to the several
decisions of this Court reference to which has been made in
para 5 of the I.A. 
We do not consider the abovestated ground to
be a justifiable or sufficient cause to alter our direction(s) for
execution of the sale deed at the market price inasmuch as the
said direction was passed by us in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case enumerated below.
19. In paragraph 10 of the judgment dated 3.12.2012, the
statement made on behalf of the appellants (Plaintiffs) that
they are ready and willing to offer an amount of Rs.6 crores for
the property as against the sum of Rs.3.75 lakhs as mentioned
in agreement dated 22.12.1970 has been specifically recorded.
Page 14
14
It is the aforesaid “offer” made on behalf of the
appellants/plaintiffs that had led to the direction in question
inasmuch as no material was available to Court to find out as to
whether the offered amount of Rs.6 crores was, in any way,
indicative of the market value of the property.
 It is in such a
situation that the direction to execute the sale deed at the
market price and the request to the learned Trial Judge to
determine the same came to be recorded in the judgment
dated 3.12.2012. It is, therefore, clear that we did not intend to
lay down any law of general application while issuing the
direction for execution of the sale deed at the market price as
on the date of the judgment i.e. 3.12.2012. 
20. The exercise by the learned Trial Judge
 in terms of our
judgment dated 3.12.2012 is yet to be made. 
The aforesaid
determination, naturally, will be made by the learned single
Judge only after affording an opportunity to all the affected
parties and after taking into account all relevant facts and
circumstances. 
Furthermore, any party aggrieved by such
determination will be entitled to avail of such remedies that
may be open in law to such a party. 
In view of the above, we do
not deem it to be necessary to cause any variation or
Page 15
15
modification in the aforesaid direction contained in our
judgment dated 3.12.2012.
21. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 12-13 of 2013 shall stand disposed of
in the above terms.
...…………………………J.
[P. SATHASIVAM]
.........……………………J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
May 8, 2013.

Monday, May 13, 2013

the National Eligibility Entrance Test(NEET) for both MBBS and Post-Graduate courses in different disciplines, as also the BDS and MDS examinations. Presuming that the hearing would be completed on the dates indicated, we had directed that the Medical Council of India, the Dental Council of India, as well as the States and Universities and other institutions, would be entitled to conduct their respective examinations for the MBBS, BDS and Post-Graduate courses, but the results of the examinations were not to be declared until further orders of the Court. Consequently, although, the examinations have been held, the results have been withheld and have not been declared, on account of the interim order passed by us.= Apart from the above, the students, who aspire to gain entry into the medical colleges at the MBBS and BDS and the Post-Graduate levels, have been caught in the legal tangle for no fault of theirs and are the victims of policy decisions. In order to safeguard their interests, as also the interest of the hospitals, we consider it just and equitable to lift the bar imposed by us on 13th December, 2012, for this year’s entrance examinations and, to that extent, we modify our order of 13th December, 2012, and allow the results of the examinations already conducted to be declared to enable the students to take advantage of the same for the current year.


Page 1
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
T.C.(C) NO.98 OF 2012
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE
VELLORE & ORS ...Petitioners
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ...Respondents
WITH T.C.(C) NO.99/2012
T.C.(C) NO.101/2012
T.C.(C) NO.100/2012
T.C.(C) NO.102/2012
T.C.(C) NO.103/2012
W.P.(C) NO.480/2012
T.C.(C) NO.104/2012
T.C.(C) NO.105/2012
W.P.(C) NO.468/2012
W.P.(C) NO.467/2012
W.P.(C) NO.478/2012
T.C.(C) NO.107/2012
T.C.(C) NO.108/2012
W.P.(C) NO.481/2012
W.P.(C) NO.464/2012
T.C.(C) NO.110/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.132-134/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.117-118/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.115-116/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.125-127/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.113-114/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.128-130/2012Page 2
2
T.C.(C) NOS.121-122/2012
T.C.(C) NO.112/2012
T.C.(C) NO.131/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.123-124/2012
T.C.(C) NO.111/2012
T.C.(C) NO.120/2012
T.C.(C) NO.119/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.135-137/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.138-139/2012
W.P.(C) NO.495/2012
W.P.(C) NO.511/2012
W.P.(C) NO.512/2012
W.P.(C) NO.514/2012
W.P.(C) NO.516/2012
W.P.(C) NO.519/2012
W.P.(C) NO.535/2012
T.C.(C) NO.142/2012 @ T.P.(C) NO.364/2012
W.P.(C) NO.544/2012
W.P.(C) NO.546/2012
W.P.(C) NO.547/2012
T.C.(C) NO.144/2012 @ T.P.(C) NO.1524/2012 &
1447/2012
T.C.(C) NO.145/2012
T.C.(C) NO.1/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1527/2012
T.C.(C) NOS.14-15/2013 @ T.P.(C) NOS.1672-1673/2012
T.C.(C) NO.76/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1702/2012
T.C.(C) NO.12-13/2013
T.C.(C) NO.4/2013
T.C.(C) NO.11/2013
T.C.(C) NOS.21-22/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1714-1715/2012
T.C.(C) NO.5/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1718/2012
W.P.(C) NO.2/2013
W.P.(C) NO.1/2013
T.C.(C) NO.60/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.12/2013
W.P.(C) NO.13/2013
W.P.(C) NO.15/2013
W.P.(C) NO.16/2013Page 3
3
W.P.(C) NO.20/2013
T.C.(C) NO....../2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.31/2013
T.C.(C) NO.2/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1532/2012
T.C.(C) NO.8/2013
T.C.(C) NO.3/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1533/2012
W.P.(C) NO.24/2013
T.C.(C) NO.9/2013
T.C.(C) NO.17/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1588/2012
W.P.(C) NO.483/2012
W.P.(C) NO.501/2012
W.P.(C) NO.502/2012
W.P.(C) NO.504/2012
W.P.(C) NO.507/2012
T.C.(C) NO.10/2013
T.C.(C) NO.7/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1644/2012
T.C.(C) NO.18/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1645/2012
T.C.(C) NO.75/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1647/2012
T.C.(C) NO.19/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1653/2012
T.C.(C) NO.20/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1654/2012
T.C.(C) NO.59/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1656/2012
T.C.(C) NO.53/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1658/2012
T.C.(C) NO.25/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1671/2012
T.C.(C) NO.23-24/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1697-1698/2012
T.C.(C) NO.58/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.1/2013
W.P.(C) NO.27/2013
T.C.(C) NO.72/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.58/2013
T.C.(C) NO.16/2013
T.C.(C) NO.61/2013
T.C.(C) NO.73/2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.75/2013
T.C.(C) NO....../2013 @ T.P.(C) NO.79/2013
T.C.(C) NO.62/2013
W.P.(C) NO.47/2013
T.C.(C) NO.28-29/2013
T.C.(C) NO.30/2013
T.C.(C) NO.31-32/2013
T.C.(C) NO.33-36/2013
T.C.(C) NO.37-38/2013Page 4
4
T.C.(C) NO.39/2013
T.C.(C) NO.40/2013
T.C.(C) NO.41/2013
T.C.(C) NO.42/2013
T.C.(C) NO.43/2013
T.C.(C) NO.44/2013
T.C.(C) NO.45/2013
T.C.(C) NO.46/2013
T.C.(C) NO.47/2013
T.C.(C) NO.48/2013
T.C.(C) NO.49/2013
W.P.(C) NO.66/2013
W.P.(C) NO.76/2013
W.P.(C) NO.74/2013
T.C.(C) NOS.63-65/2013
T.C.(C) NOS.66-69/2013
T.C.(C) NOS.70-71/2013
W.P.(C) NO.41/2013
W.P.(C) NO.228/2013
O R D E R
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.
1. In all these 115 matters, which include writ
petitions filed in this Court and in different High
Courts, which have been transferred to this Court
for decision, the subject matter of challenge is a
notification published on 27th December, 2010,
being No. MCI-81(1)/2010-MED/49070 dated 21stPage 5
5
December, 2010, issued by the Medical Council of
India, notifying a National Eligibility Entrance
Test (NEET) for admission to Post-Graduate Medical
Courses conducted in colleges all across the
country.
2. The challenge to the said notification gave
rise to a wide range of submissions involving the
competence of the Medical Council of India,
constituted under Section 3 of the Indian Medical
Council Act, 1956, to introduce such a test which
denudes the different medical colleges across the
country from having any control over their entrance
examinations and admissions on the basis thereof.
3. On 13th December, 2012, when the matters were
taken up for consideration, we decided to post the
matters for final hearing on 15th, 16th and 17th
January, 2013, and allowed the respective entrance
examinations, which had already been notified, toPage 6
6
be held, while the hearing progressed. Such
examinations included the National Eligibility
Entrance Test(NEET) for both MBBS and Post-Graduate
courses in different disciplines, as also the BDS
and MDS examinations. Presuming that the hearing
would be completed on the dates indicated, we had
directed that the Medical Council of India, the
Dental Council of India, as well as the States and
Universities and other institutions, would be
entitled to conduct their respective examinations
for the MBBS, BDS and Post-Graduate courses, but
the results of the examinations were not to be
declared until further orders of the Court.
Consequently, although, the examinations have been
held, the results have been withheld and have not
been declared, on account of the interim order
passed by us.
4. The hearing could not be concluded within 17th
January, 2013, as we had hoped, on account of thePage 7
7
enlargement of the scope of the hearing and the
large number of parties who had to be heard in the
matter. In fact, the matters were last heard on
30th April, 2013, and it has, therefore, not been
possible to pronounce judgment before the Supreme
Court closed for the summer vacations on 10th May,
2013.
5. While the matters were being heard, we had been
informed by the learned senior counsel appearing
for the Christian Medical College, Vellore, and the
Karnataka Pvt. Medical & Dental College, that a
large number of students would be adversely
affected and would stand to lose a year, if the bar
on the declaration of their results was not lifted.
Although, initially, we had declined to entertain
such prayer, on account of the delay in completion
of the hearing and the prospect of the students
losing a year on account thereof, we feel that
students hoping to gain admission in the MBBS as
Page 8
8
well as Post-Graduate courses on the strength of
the results of the examinations, which have already
been held and for which they had appeared, should
not be denied such opportunity, at least for this
year. We are also alive to the fact that it is the
Post-Graduate students in the medical colleges, who
take charge of the medical treatment of patients in
the hospitals. Without fresh entrants into the
Post-Graduate courses, even for a year, the
hospitals are likely to be adversely affected on
account of lack of doctors to directly take care of
the patients in the hospitals. 
6. Apart from the above, the students, who aspire
to gain entry into the medical colleges at the MBBS
and BDS and the Post-Graduate levels, have been
caught in the legal tangle for no fault of theirs
and are the victims of policy decisions. In order
to safeguard their interests, as also the interest
of the hospitals, we consider it just and equitable
Page 9
9
to lift the bar imposed by us on 13th December,
2012, for this year's entrance examinations and, to
that extent, we modify our order of 13th December,
2012, and allow the results of the examinations
already conducted to be declared to enable the
students to take advantage of the same for the
current year. 
...................CJI.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
.....................J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
.....................J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
Dated: May 13, 2013.