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Saturday, March 23, 2013

Dying Declaration - no corroboration needs = “Q: How many years have passed to your marriage? Ans: 8 years Q: How many children have you? Ans: Four Q: On which day the incident took place? Ans: The quarrel was continuing for the last 15 days. Q: On the night of last Thursday at 11.00 P.M. what happened with you? Ans: My husband used to say as to why I did not bring money in the marriage of my sister. He used to demand money from my father. My mother-in-law Ram Piari and father-in-law Siri Ram used to harass/tease me for dowry. It was Thursday, my mother-in-law, Devar (husband’s younger brother) Lala were at home. My mother-in-law caught hold of my hand and my husband set me on fire with match stick after sprinkling kerosene oil. My devar came afterwards, when I was set on fire. My husband gave beating to me and set me ablaze. Then my husband put his leg on my neck and I was beaten up mercilessly. After 8Page 9 that my father-in-law came, but he did not set me on fire. My husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law brought me to the hospital. Q: Do you want to say any thing else? Ans: No (Right great Toe impression of Patient) Sd/- J.M.I.C.(D) R.O. & A.C. Patient remained fit and conscious during the statement Sd/- in English Dr. Raman Sethi P.G. Surg 5/IV”=(e) On 21.05.1998, Rakesh was arrested and got medically examined by the doctor who opined that his hands were found to be having superficial to deep burns. On his disclosure, a stove containing the kerosene was recovered.- if he had sustained burn injuries in his hands nothing prevented him from taking treatment on the same day from the same doctor. Admittedly, he did not get treatment till he was arrested on 21.05.1998.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1779 OF 2009
Rakesh and Another .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Haryana .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) This appeal has been filed against the final judgment
and order dated 15.05.2006 passed by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
575-DB of 2001 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants
herein and confirmed the judgment on conviction and
sentence dated 27.09.2001 and 28.09.2001 respectively,
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, Haryana
in Sessions Case No. 39 of 1998/2001 holding the appellants
1Page 2
guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and
302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short ‘IPC’) and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment (RI) for one year for the offence punishable
under Section 498-A and a fine of Rs.500/- each and RI for
life for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with
34 IPC and a fine of Rs.2000/- each, in default, to undergo RI
for one year and both the sentences to run concurrently.
2) Brief facts:
(a) The case of the prosecution is that the deceased -
Kailash was married to Rakesh, resident of Gohana, Sonepat
about 8 years prior to the date of the incident. Out of the
wedlock, four children were born to them. At the time of
marriage, adequate dowry was given by the parents of the
deceased. However, being unsatisfied with the dowry,
Kailash has been subjected to harassment and cruelty in her
matrimonial home by Rakesh (A-1) and Smt. Ram Piari, (A-2)
mother-in-law. 15 days prior to the occurrence, the
deceased attended the marriage of her sister along with her
husband and in-laws. The accused started harassing her for
2Page 3
not bringing adequate amount after seeing the marriage of
her sister.
(b) On 14.05.1998, at about 11 p.m., a quarrel took place in
the house of Rakesh (A-1) where he put his leg on the neck
of the deceased and beaten her mercilessly. Thereafter,
Ram Piari (A-2) caught hold of the hands of the deceased
while Rakesh (A-1) sprinkled kerosene upon her and set her
ablaze. At that time, Lala, younger brother of Rakesh (A-1)
was also present in the house. On the same night, Rakesh
(A-1), Ram Piari (A-2) and Siri Ram - father-in-law took the
deceased to the hospital and admitted her in the hospital on
15.05.1998 at 1.30 a.m. After getting a telephonic message,
the parents of the deceased also reached the hospital.
(c) On 16.05.1998, on receipt of telephonic information
about the admission of Kailash in PGI MS, Rohtak, on account
of burn injuries, the police contacted Kailash and an
application was moved by the investigating officer to the
Duty Magistrate at 5.50 p.m. Ms. Shalini Nagpal, Judicial
Magistrate, on getting the permission of the doctor at 6.10
3Page 4
p.m. about the fitness of the victim to make a statement,
recorded her statement.
(d) On the same day, a copy of the statement was sent to
the police station for registration of the case. An FIR was
registered and the investigating officer took the case for
investigation on 17.05.1998.
(e) On 21.05.1998, Rakesh was arrested and got medically
examined by the doctor who opined that his hands were
found to be having superficial to deep burns. On his
disclosure, a stove containing the kerosene was recovered.
(f) On 29.05.1998 Ram Piari– mother-in-law of the
deceased was also arrested. Ultimately, on 04.06.1998,
Kailash succumbed to her injuries in Safdarjung Hospital at
New Delhi.
(g) On completion of the investigation, charges for the
offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 read with
Section 34 IPC were framed against the accused.
(h) The Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, after
examination of all the witnesses, vide judgment 27.09.2001,
convicted the accused persons guilty for the offences
4Page 5
punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section
34 IPC. By judgment dated 28.09.2001, the trial Judge,
sentenced the accused persons to RI for one year and a fine
of Rs.500/- under Section 498-A and RI for life and a fine of
Rs.2000/- under Section 302/34 IPC and in default of
payment of fine, both the accused shall have to undergo RI
for one year. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
(i) Being aggrieved, the accused persons (A-1 and A-2)
filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh. After hearing both the parties, by impugned
judgment dated 15.05.2006, the High Court confirmed the
judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal
preferred by the appellants herein.
(j) Questioning the conviction and sentence, Rakesh (A-1)
and Smt. Ram Piari (A-2) preferred this appeal by way of
special leave before this Court and leave was granted on
11.09.2009.
3) Heard Mr. R.N. Kush, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants-accused and Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent-State.
5Page 6
Contentions:
4) Mr. R.N. Kush, learned counsel for the appellants, at the
foremost, contended that since the deceased - Kailash was
not fit to make a statement as she was suffering from 85%
burn injuries, reliance and conviction based on the dying
declaration cannot be sustained. He further submitted that
Rakesh (A-1) also suffered injuries which are indicative of the
fact that he came to rescue her wife on seeing her burning.
On the other hand, Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the
respondent-State contended that the dying declaration was
recorded by the Judicial Magistrate only after the duty doctor
duly certified that she was in a fit condition to make a
statement and the same was rightly relied on by both the
courts below. As regards the second contention, it is pointed
out by that if the injuries alleged to have been sustained by
Rakesh (A-1) as claimed by him, nothing prevented him from
taking treatment on the date of the incident, particularly
when he took the deceased to the Hospital. However, the
fact remains that only on 21.05.1998, when he was arrested
6Page 7
by the police, he showed his alleged injuries to the doctor
which itself create a doubt about his version.
5) We have perused all the relevant materials and
considered the rival contentions.
Discussion:
6) It is not in dispute that the deceased – Kailash
sustained burn injuries at the house of the accused – Rakesh
where they were living for about eight years. The incident
occurred at 11.00 p.m. on 14.05.1998 and she was admitted
in the hospital on 15.05.1998 at about 1.30 a.m. It is also
not in dispute that the deceased was under the supervision
of doctors as well as the accused Rakesh till 10.00 a.m. on
16.05.1998.
7) Now, let us consider the dying declaration, its contents,
and the procedure followed while recording the same. It is
seen that after knowing the condition of the deceased, the
police requested Ms. Shalini Nagpal, the Judicial Magistrate,
Ist Class, Rohtak (PW-10) for recording her statement. It is
further seen that before recording her statement, the
Magistrate (PW-10) asked for the opinion of the duty doctor
7Page 8
about her condition whether she was fit to make a
statement. The record shows that after obtaining the
opinion of doctor, all the police officials and relatives were
directed to leave the ward. Dr. Raman Sethi (PW-6)
explained to the patient that she is deposing before the
Magistrate and apprised that she is free to make her
statement voluntarily without any fear or pressure. After
satisfying her position to make a statement, the Magistrate
(PW-10) recorded the statement of the deceased. It reads as
follows:
“Q: How many years have passed to your marriage?
Ans: 8 years
Q: How many children have you?
Ans: Four
Q: On which day the incident took place?
Ans: The quarrel was continuing for the last 15 days.
Q: On the night of last Thursday at 11.00 P.M. what
happened with you?
Ans: My husband used to say as to why I did not bring
money in the marriage of my sister. He used to demand
money from my father. My mother-in-law Ram Piari and
father-in-law Siri Ram used to harass/tease me for dowry.
It was Thursday, my mother-in-law, Devar (husband’s
younger brother) Lala were at home. My mother-in-law
caught hold of my hand and my husband set me on fire
with match stick after sprinkling kerosene oil. My devar
came afterwards, when I was set on fire. My husband gave
beating to me and set me ablaze. Then my husband put
his leg on my neck and I was beaten up mercilessly. After
8Page 9
that my father-in-law came, but he did not set me on fire.
My husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law brought me
to the hospital. 
Q: Do you want to say any thing else?
Ans: No
(Right great Toe impression of Patient) Sd/- J.M.I.C.(D) 
R.O. & A.C.
Patient remained fit and conscious during the statement
Sd/- in English Dr. Raman Sethi
P.G. Surg 5/IV”
8) In order to strengthen the above statement, the
prosecution examined Dr. Raman Sethi (PW-6) who certified
the condition of the deceased. In his evidence, he deposed
that on 16.05.1998, Ram Kumar (ASI) moved an application
(Ex. PD) before him seeking opinion regarding fitness of
Kailash, W/o Rakesh, resident of Gohana for making a
statement. PW-6 declared her fit to make a statement at
6.30 p.m. on 16.05.1998. Basing on his statement, the duty
Magistrate recorded her statement. Even after recording the
statement, PW-6 again examined Kailash and opined that
the deceased remained fit and conscious during her
statement. He also stated that the statement was over
within 20 minutes and also informed that he did not treat the
9Page 10
patient at any stage and denied that he gave wrong opinion
at the behest of Magistrate.
9) Ms. Shalini Nagpal, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class,
Rohtak, who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased
was examined as PW-10. According to her, on 16.05.1998,
the police had moved an application before her for recording
the statement of Kailash, and she had visited PGIMS, Rohtak
at about 5.50 p.m. on the same day and contacted the
doctor concerned in Ward No.5 and sought his opinion about
her fitness to make a statement. She asserted that the
doctor had declared Kailash fit to make a statement (Memo
Ex PB/3). She further explained that thereafter, she
recorded her statement in the form of question and answers
form which is Ext. PB. The statement was concluded by her
at 6.25 p.m and PW-6, after examining the deceased
certified that Kailash was in her sense throughout the period
of her examination. She also deposed that the statement
(Ex.PB) had been recorded by her in the very language of
Kailash without any addition or omission and her certificate
to that effect is Ex.PB/5. The certificate of the doctor about
1
0Page 11
the physical condition of the deceased during the course of
examination is Ex.PB/4. She also informed the Court that the
statement was read over to Kailash who accepted the
contents to be correct. She also stated that she did not
obtain the thumb impression of the patient as both her
hands were burnt, hence she elected to obtain the
impression of her right toe. In the cross examination, she
admitted that the document exhibited as Ex.PB by her is the
carbon copy prepared by her in the same process. It is also
clear from her evidence that before recording the statement
of the deceased, she specifically directed the police officials
and relatives to leave the ward so that the patient was not
under any influence while making the statement before her.
Though, in the evidence, it has come on record that few of
the relatives were standing in the ward, in view of the
assertion of the Magistrate (PW-10) who recorded her
statement, mere presence of some of the close relatives
would not affect the contents of the declaration.
10) Dr. S.P. Chug, Casualty Medical Officer, PGIMS, Rohtak
was examined as PW-11. In his evidence, he deposed that
1
1Page 12
on 15.05.1998 at about 1.30 a.m., he examined Kailash W/o
Rakesh and on examination he found that the patient was
conscious, pulse and BP were unrecordable. He further
stated that there were superficial to deep burns involving
almost all the body except the legs below the knees. There
was approx. 85% burns which were subjected to surgeon’s
opinion and was kept under observation. Though it was
pointed out that while recording the history of the patient,
he noted that it was the accidental fire while cooking food, in
view of categorical statement by the deceased in her dying
declaration the reference made by PW-11 while recording
the history of the patient would not affect the prosecution
case.
11) Dr. B.S.Kadian, Medical Officer of CHC, Gohana was
examined as PW-7. In his evidence, he explained the nature
of burn injuries.
12) Dr. L.K. Barua, who was examined as PW-13 has
conducted the post mortem on the dead body of Kailash and
submitted the report vide (Ex.PH). He asserted that the
death was due to burn injuries.
1
2Page 13
13) Hiralal, father of the deceased was examined as PW-14.
He explained the manner in which the in-laws of Kailash was
behaving with her prior to the occurrence. He has supported
the entire prosecution version.
14) Madhu – daughter of Rakesh aged about 12 years, was
examined as a defence witness. Though she deposed that
her mother caught fire, per chance, from the kersone stove,
however, she admitted that her father Rakesh was present in
the house at the time of the incident.
15) It is not in dispute that the accused did not inform the
parents of the deceased about the incident. Though it is the
claim of A-1 that it was he who informed PW-14, father of the
deceased, in his evidence, he denied the same and
according to him, he received a message from Hukum
Chand. It is also relevant to note that only after arrival of
PW-14 and on seeing the deteriorating condition of her
daughter, he complained to the doctor concerned to shift her
to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi. The fact remains that the
accused did not take any such step.
1
3Page 14
16) The statement of the deceased in the form of dying
declaration is fully acceptable since on receipt of intimation
from the police, the Judicial Magistrate (PW-10) reached the
hospital and after satisfying herself through the statement of
the duty doctor that the deceased was conscious and fit to
make a statement, recorded her statement in the form of
question and answers. In the dying declaration, which we
have extracted in the earlier part of our order, she had
specifically stated that her husband scolded her for not
brining money in the marriage of her sister. He used to
demand money from her father. Her in-laws used to
harass/tease her for not bringing sufficient dowry and on the
relevant date her mother-in-law caught hold of her hands
and her husband set her on fire with a match stick after
sprinkling kerosene oil. It is also seen from her dying
declaration that before she was set on fire, her husband
gave beat on her neck with his leg and she was beaten up
mercilessly. Considering the materials placed by the
prosecution about the recording of dying declaration,
procedure followed, her fitness to make a statement, the
1
4Page 15
evidence of doctor and the evidence of Magistrate, who
recorded her statement, it amply prove their case.
17) Coming to the claim that inasmuch as the husband
Rakesh also sustained burn injuries in his hands, it is highly
impossible to set her ablaze, it is relevant to note that the
incident occurred late night on 14.05.1998, though the
accused-husband took her to the hospital admittedly, he did
not tried to get any treatment from the doctor for the
alleged burn injuries. As rightly pointed out by the learned
counsel for the State, if he had sustained burn injuries in his
hands nothing prevented him from taking treatment on the
same day from the same doctor. Admittedly, he did not get
treatment till he was arrested on 21.05.1998. In view of the
same, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant
that inasmuch as the burn injuries were found on the hands
of the husband, it was necessary to look for corroboration is
liable to be rejected. In view of the factual position, the
decisions of various Courts relied on by the counsel for the
appellants on this aspect are not applicable to the case on
hand and there is no need to refer the same.
1
5Page 16
18) The claim that there was wrong description of names in
the dying declaration and some of the relatives were present
at the time of recording of dying declaration are not material
contradictions which would affect the prosecution case.
19) Though learned counsel for the appellants contended
that in view of the conduct of A-1 taking the deceased to the
hospital and he also sustained injuries on his hand prayed
for altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304
Part I, in view of our earlier discussion, we are not in a
position to accept the same. It is not in dispute that the
occurrence took place in the house of the accused where
Kailash was residing, and unfortunately, even after having
four children, she died at the matrimonial home due to burn
injuries at the instance of the accused appellants. There is
no valid ground to alter the conviction as pleaded by the
counsel for the first appellant.
20) Inasmuch as the second appellant-Ram Piari had been
released after 14 years on the orders of the appropriate
Government, no argument was advanced about the decision
of the courts below.
1
6Page 17
21) In view of the above discussion, we are satisfied that
the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable
doubt and we are in entire agreement with the conclusion
arrived at by the trial Court as well as the High Court.
Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
………….…………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
 ………….…………………………J.
(M. Y. EQBAL)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 22, 2013.
1
7Page 18

CUT OFF DATE - whether the candidate must have the prescribed educational and other qualifications as on the particular date specified in the Rule or the advertisement is no longer res integra.“13. …..(i) that the cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules and if there be no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date as may be appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications; (ii) that if there be no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications have to be received by the competent authority.” = It is to be noted that the petitioner did not hold Ph.D. Degree certificate before the last date prescribed for receipt of applications and apparently he did not enclose a copy of the said Degree. It appears that it is for this reason he was called upon to submit the copies. From this it cannot be inferred that it was intended to treat the petitioner as eligible for consideration. The Scrutiny Committee is not at all a competent authority to accord any relaxation with respect to the conditions of the Recruitment Notification. The instant case is the one in which no specific date has been mentioned as cut-off date with regard to the eligibility requirement. Therefore, the last date appointed for submission of applications shall be treated as the cut-off date. Clearly, therefore, the petitioner is not qualified and not entitled for consideration. 19. For the foregoing reasons, there are no merits in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 20. In view of the disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.4954 of 2013 is dismissed as unnecessary.




*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI

+Writ Petition No.3969 of 2013


%Date: 14.02.2013


#Between:

K. Suresh Kumar Reddy
                                                                             … Petitioners

And


Krishna University,
Andhra Jateeya Kalasala Campus,
Rajupeta, Machilipatnam,
Krishna District, rep.by its Registrar.
                                                                         … Respondent



! Counsel for Petitioners :          :  Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy

^Counsel for Respondents     : Dr. P.B. Vijaya Kumar
                                                 S.C. respondent

                              

<GIST:


> HEAD NOTE:


? Cases referred

1. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 611
2. (1997) 4 SCC 18
3. (2011) 9 SCC 438
4. (1990) 2 SCC 669



THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI
 
 WRIT PETITION No.3969 OF 2013

ORDER

The question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether or not the petitioner, who was not qualified with a Ph.D. Degree as on the date of Notification/last date for submission of applications, but who acquired the qualification later, can be considered as qualified for consideration and appointment as Assistant Professor.
2.  On 23.04.2011 the respondent-University issued Recruitment Notification inviting applications for appointment of Professors, Associate Professors and Assistant Professors in various departments of the University. The last date for submission of applications was 10.06.2011. The petitioner was an applicant to one of the three posts of Assistant Professor in Computer Science allocated under open category.
3.  The following qualifications were prescribed as per the minimum qualifications laid down by the UGC, approved by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.14, Higher Education (UE.II) Department dated 20.02.2010 and UGC Regulations dated 20.06.2010 –
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
i.        Good academic record as defined by the concerned university with at least 55% marks (or an equivalent grade in a point scale wherever grading system is followed) at the Master’s Degree level in a relevant subject from an Indian University, or an equivalent degree from an accredited foreign university.
ii.       Besides fulfilling the above qualifications, the candidate must have cleared the National Eligibility Test (NET) conducted by the UGC, CSIR or similar test accredited by the UGC like SLET/SET.
iii.     Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) above, candidates, who are, or have been awarded a Ph.D. Degree in accordance with the University Grants Commission (minimum Standards and Procedure for Award of Ph.D. Degree) Regulations, 2009, shall be exempted from the requirement of the minimum eligibility condition of NET/SLET/SET for recruitment and appointment of Assistant Professor or equivalent positions in universities / Colleges / Institutions.
iv.    NET/SLET/SET shall also not be required for such Masters Programmes in disciplines for which NET/SLET/SET is not conducted.

          4.  In addition to the above general qualifications, the following special qualifications and requirements were prescribed.
COMPUTER SCIENCE
Assistant Professor
First/High second class with at least 55% of marks in the Master’s degree level in Computer Application / Computer Science / Computer Technology / Computer Engineering / Information Technology, Ph.D. Degree in any relevant area of Computer Science/Information Technology.
Candidates for the post of Assistant Professor should possess NET/SLET or Ph.D. in the relevant discipline as specified above.
Teaching experience and evidence of research work are desirable.

          5.  Thus a candidate should hold Masters Degree securing at least 55% marks and Ph.D. Degree in any relevant area of Computer Science / Information Technology as the minimum qualification for the post of Assistant Professor. The petitioner did not possess Ph.D. Degree as on the date of notification, i.e., 23.04.2011 or the last date 10.6.2011 prescribed for submission of applications. The petitioner states that by the said date, he had submitted thesis and that the degree was awarded to him on 29.11.2011.
6.  Fortuitously, selections pursuant to the notification were not finalized for over one and half years. Taking advantage of the same, the petitioner approached the University to treat him as qualified and eligible for the post as he had acquired the qualification before the interviews were held. The University is reportedly not considering his application on the ground that he did not hold Ph.D. Degree as on the date of notification. The petitioner has therefore filed this writ petition seeking Mandamus to direct the University to interview him treating him as qualified for the post of Assistant Professor.
          7.  Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would strenuously argue that the petitioner cannot be treated as unqualified for the post. According to him there is no stipulation in the Recruitment Notification that a candidate should hold Ph.D. Degree as on the date of notification and unless a cut off date is mentioned, qualification acquired subsequent to the notification, but before the selection, should be taken into consideration. Therefore, the petitioner should be treated as qualified for the post.
          8.  The aforesaid contention is without substance. It is true that no cut-off date for eligibility is mentioned in the notification. But, it is always not necessary that a cut-off date should be mentioned in the notification. It is entirely a matter of discretion of the employer to fix or not to fix a date for acquiring the eligibility requirements. If the employer feels that it would be in the interest of the Organisation to prescribe a date other than the  date of notification, he can do so, and in that event the relevant date will be the date so fixed. If no cut off date is mentioned, by inference it is reasonable to treat the last date appointed for submission of applications as the relevant date.
9.  In the prospectus, it was stipulated that a candidate to be eligible for the post should have Ph.D. Degree besides a minimum of 55% marks in the Masters Degree as the minimum qualifications required for the post. The said requirement is indicative of mandatory character and its operation in praesenti.  The notification does not / is not capable of being construed as giving leverage to relax the in praesenti requirement and permit satisfaction of the requirements later in point of time. Any other construction will lead to absurd results. Firstly it would result in the filing of applications by unqualified persons and keep the applications alive until they acquire the required qualifications. It would confer unfair advantage on such applicants at the cost of others who are prevented from applying due to unawareness and thus deprive them of their right for seeking appointment. Such a situation can neither be contemplated nor countenanced in matters of employment.
          10.  It is true that the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma and Anr. V. Chander Shekhar and Anr.,[1] justified appointments of the candidates, who were qualified by the date of interview though not by the date prescribed in the advertisement, on the proposition that the Recruiting Authority would be able to get the best talents available. The said view was reversed in the review sought for by the aggrieved parties inReview Petition (C) Nos.600-601 of 1993[2]. One of the issues in the review was –
(1)     Whether the view taken by the majority (Hon'ble Thommen & V. Ramaswami, JJ.) that it is enough for a candidate to be qualified by the date of interview even if he was not qualified by the last date prescribed for receiving the applications, is correct in law and whether the majority was right in extending the principle of Rule 37 of the Public Service Commission Rule to the present case by analogy?
The Court held as follows.
So far as the first issue referred to in our order dated 1st September, 1995 is concerned, we are of the respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered by Dr. T.K. Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ.) in unsustainable in law. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement of notification issued/published calling for application constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the person had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority Judgment. This is also the proposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v.University of Rajasthan and Ors. MANU/SC/0838/1993 : (1993)ILLJ617SC . The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the Recruiting Authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J.(and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview.

11.  The question whether a candidate must have the prescribed qualifications as on a particular date specified in the rule or the advertisement was again considered in
 Alka Ojha v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission[3]
wherein the Apex Court after referring to various judgments held as follows:
“The question 
whether the candidate must have the prescribed educational and other qualifications as on the particular date specified in the Rule or the advertisement is no longer res integra. 
In Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of Punjab – (2000) 5 SCC 262 this Court referred to the earlier judgments in A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra – (1990) 2 SCC 669; Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi – (1990) 3 SCC 655, M.V. Nair v. Union of India – (1993) 2 SCC 429, Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan – 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168, U.P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana – (1994) 2 SCC 723 and Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar – (1997) 4 SCC 18 and approved the following proposition laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court: (Bhupinderpal Singh case, SCC p.268 para 13)

“13. …..(i) that the cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules and if there be no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date as may be appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications; (ii) that if there be no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications have to be received by the competent authority.”

          The same view was reiterated in M.A. Murthy v. State of Karnataka – (2003) 7 SCC 517 and Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India – (2007) 4 SCC 54. Therefore, the Full Bench of the High Court rightly held that  a candidate who does not possess a driving licence on the last date fixed for submission of the application is not eligible to be considered for selection.”

12.  From the aforesaid it is abundantly clear that the qualifications acquired subsequent to the prescribed date is of no avail.
13.  The learned counsel would seek to contend that the petitioner was called upon by the University vide Memorandum dated 13.10.2012 to send copies of Ph.D. Degree certificate and the petitioner complied the same. From this he would submit that it was not the intention of the University to restrict the qualifications only up to the date of notification or the last date prescribed therein but extend the same until the selections.
14. He would further contend that, having called upon the petitioner to submit the testimonials including the Ph.D. Degree certificates and the Notification issued by the University declaring his result, the University cannot go back and place the petitioner’s position as existed on the date of Notification. The University is estopped from the promise which it has conferred on the petitioner by virtue of the said Memo. The learned counsel would place reliance on A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Saratchandra[4].
15.  The aforesaid contention is without any merit. It is not possible to construe the Memo as a promise. The Memo reflects that only the task of scrutiny of applications has been taken up by the Scrutiny Committee and that the petitioner was directed to submit attested copy of his Ph.D. Degree Certificate/Copy of the Notification issued by the University declaring his result as per the findings of the Scrutiny Committee dataed 13.10.2012.
16.  It is to be noted that the petitioner did not hold Ph.D. Degree certificate before the last date prescribed for receipt of applications and apparently he did not enclose a copy of the said Degree. It appears that it is for this reason he was called upon to submit the copies. From this it cannot be inferred that it was intended to treat the petitioner as eligible for consideration. The Scrutiny Committee is not at all a competent authority to accord any relaxation with respect to the conditions of the Recruitment Notification.
17.  The decision in B. Saratchandra’s case (4 supra) relied upon by the petitioner does not support the contention of the petitioner. In that case, minimum and maximum age was prescribed as “the first date of July of the year in which the selection is made under the Rule” and it was held that the age should be reckoned with reference to the said date.
          18.  The instant case is the one in which no specific date has been mentioned as cut-off date with regard to the eligibility requirement. Therefore, the last date appointed for submission of applications shall be treated as the cut-off date. Clearly, therefore, the petitioner is not qualified and not entitled for consideration.  
          19.  For the foregoing reasons, there are no merits in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
          20.  In view of the disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.4954 of 2013 is dismissed as unnecessary.

                                                                   _____________________
                                                             JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI
14.02.2013.
Js/Msr

NOTE: L.R. Copy be marked.
                (B/O)
                  Msr

sec. 71 of Evidence Act r/w Order XVI Rules 7 and 21 and Section 151 CPC = It is the case of the plaintiff that as defendants 1 and 2 who are her sisters are aware of the execution of the Will, she wants to examine them on her behalf. Hence, she prayed to issue summons to them to examine on her behalf.- whether the Court was right in allowing the application filed under Order XVI Rules 7 and 21 and under Section 151 of CPC.- Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, his evidence may be proved by other evidence. Section 71 will come into play when the attesting witness who has been called failed to prove the execution of the Will or turned hostile. Section 71 is a permissive and enabling provision and is in the nature of safeguard to the mandatory provision of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, when the plaintiff could not examine the second attestor to the Will, she has no other option but to file an application under Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act and prove the Will by way of other evidence. I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Judge is a well considered one and does not warrant any interference from this Court.


 



                        THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA

                         

                        CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 539 OF 2013

                         

                        Dated:  8-03-2013

                         

Between:

Lakkamraju Subba Lakshmi
... PETITIONER
              AND

                         

Valivarthi Rama Devi
... RESPONDENT

                         

                         

                         

 




























                         

                        THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA

                         

                        CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 539 OF 2013

                         

ORDER:

                         


The present revision is filed aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in I.A No. 2311 of 2012 in O.S No. 1425 of 2009, wherein the learned Judge has allowed the petition filed by the plaintiff under Order XVI Rules 7 and 21 and Section 151 CPC by an order dated
18-10-2012.

The petitioner is the 3rd defendant in the suit. The respondent who is the plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration that she is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property basing on the Will dated 09-06-1987 executed in her favour by her father, and after the death of her mother on 29-10-2008.  
The revision petitioner who is defendant in the suit is none other than the elder sister of the plaintiff.  
The other two sisters defendants 1 and 2 remained ex parte.  
According to the respondent - plaintiff, the revision petitioner has obtained the gift deed fraudulently from the mother though she is very much aware of the Will dated 09-06-1987.  
It is the case of the plaintiff that as defendants 1 and 2 who are her sisters are aware of the execution of the Will, she wants to examine them on her behalf.  Hence, she prayed to issue summons to them to examine on her behalf.
It is the case of the revision petitioner – 3rd defendant that duty is cast upon the plaintiff to prove the execution of the Will by examining the witnesses.  As the plaintiff could not elicit anything by examining PWs 1 and 2, she came up with the present application.  It is her further case that though other attesting witnesses are available, the plaintiff did not examine them intentionally. Examining the other witnesses is contrary to Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act.  The 3rd defendant filed O.S No. 914 of 2011 on the file of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada and in that suit, the other two sisters along with the plaintiff are the defendants and all the three are represented by the same advocate who is appearing on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit and, hence, sought for dismissal of the application.
The learned Judge after hearing both the parties has allowed the application by an order dated 18-10-2012 holding that as the 2nd witness did not turn up for the cross examination and the chief examination is eschewed, there is no other alternative to the plaintiff to prove the Will, except to take shelter under Section 71 of the Evidence Act.
Assailing the said order, the revision petitioner who is the 3rd defendant in the suit approached this Court.
Now the issue that falls for consideration before this Court is whether the Court was right in allowing the application filed under Order XVI Rules 7 and 21 and under Section 151 of CPC.
It is the specific case of the plaintiff that she has examined herself as PW 1 and one of the attestors as PW 2 and the second attestor was cited as PW 3, his chief examination affidavit is filed.  PW 3 could not be cross examined as in spite of the repeated requests by the plaintiff he did not turn up and accordingly on the memo filed by the plaintiff the evidence of PW 3 is eschewed.  The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the execution of Will. 
The burden of proof of a Will, law is well settled, that the mode of proving Will does not differ from that of proving any other document except for the requirement under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the  Indian Evidence Act.
Section 68 of the Evidence Act lays down the mode and manner in which execution of a Will is to be proved.  Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act postulates the mode and manner in which proof and execution of a document required by law is to be attested. In unequivocal terms, Section 68 prescribes that the execution of the Will must be proved at least by one attesting witness.
Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, his evidence may be proved by other evidence.  Section 71 will come into play when the attesting witness who has been called failed to prove the execution of the Will or turned hostile.  Section 71 is a permissive and enabling provision and is in the nature of safeguard to the mandatory provision of Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
Coming to the facts of the case on hand, when the plaintiff could not examine the second attestor to the Will, she has no other option but to file an application under Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act and prove the Will by way of other evidence.
I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Judge is a well considered one and does not warrant any interference from this Court.
Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed.


               N.V. RAMANA, J

8th March, 2013
ks

Friday, March 22, 2013

partition - Will Deed - whether he is a beneficial owner or is a benami, is a question of fact. There was no averment made in the plaint with regard to the aforestated allegation. No issue to the said fact had been raised before the trial court. The said issue had been raised for the first time before the appellate court and in our opinion, the issue with regard to the fact could not have been raised before the appellate court for the first time and therefore, all submissions made in relation to the provisions of Benami Transfer (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and with regard to real ownership of the suit property cannot be looked into at this stage.the mental capacity of Sumitra Devi at the time of execution of the Will cannot also be looked into at this stage because the mental capacity of the testator to execute a Will being a question of fact, we would like to accept the findings arrived at by the court below and all allegations with regard to soundness of mind of Sumitra Devi at the time of execution of the Will or allegation with regard to undue influence of the present appellant with whom Sumitra Devi was residing at the time of her death cannot be looked into by this Court as they are the issues pertaining to fact. = the Will executed by Sumitra Devi was just and proper, the consequences of the Will would be like this: Rao Gajraj Singh was survived by his eight children and his widow – Sumitra Devi. As Rao Gajraj Singh died intestate, according to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, his property would devolve upon all his nine heirs i.e. his widow and eight children. So, everyone would get 1/9th share in the property of Rao Gajraj Singh. Though Sumitra Devi had executed her Will and had bequeathed the entire property in question to the present appellant namely Narinder Singh Rao, Sumitra Devi could not have bequeathed under her Will what she did not own. She was only 1/9th owner of the suit property so she could have bequeathed only her share i.e. 1/9th share in the suit property. As a result of the Will of Sumitra Devi, Narinder Singh Rao- the appellant would not only inherit his own share in the property, which he had inherited from his father Rao Gajraj Singh but he would also inherit share of his mother Sumitra Devi as per her Will. Thus, the present appellant would become the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property. In our opinion the final finding of the High Court that the appellant is the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property is, therefore, absolutely correct. 18. The averments with regard to court fee are not of importance at this stage as looking to the facts of the case, the court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the issue with regard to the court fee was a matter between the litigant filing the suit and the court and the defendants need not have bothered about the same. In view of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and the legal position clarified hereinabove and by the High Court, in our opinion, the High Court has committed no error and therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. 21. For the aforestated reasons, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.


Page 1
1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6918-6919 OF 2011
NARINDER SINGH RAO .....APPELLANT
 VERSUS
AVM MAHINDER SINGH RAO ....RESPONDENTS
AND OTHERS
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment delivered in Civil Regular Second
Appeal No. 3937 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 9-C of 2005 dated 21st
May, 2010 by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, these
appeals have been filed by original defendant No.1.
2. The facts giving rise to the appeals in a nutshell are as under:Page 2
2
Rao Gajraj Singh and his wife Sumitra Devi were occupiers of the suit
property. The property appears to have been constructed somewhere in
1935 and as per the municipal record, it belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh. A
document was executed by Rao Gajraj Singh to the effect that upon death of
himself or his wife, the suit property would be inherited by the survivor.
The said writing was attested by Rao Devender Singh, the son of Rao Gajraj
Singh’s real sister.
Rao Gajraj Singh expired on 29th March, 1981 and thereafter Sumitra
Devi, who had eight children, started residing at Ranchi with the appellant.
Somewhere in 1980s, Sumitra Devi got constructed some shops in the
suit premises and the said shops were given on rent.
On 1st June, 1989, Sumitra Devi executed a Will whereby she
bequeathed the suit property to one of her sons, namely, Narinder Singh Rao
(the present appellant and original defendant No.1) and she expired on 6th
June, 1989.
3. After the death of Sumitra Devi, her four children, one of them being
the present respondent No.1, filed a suit for declaration claiming their right
in the suit property. Subsequently, the plaint was amended so as to make it a
suit for partition. According to the case of the said children, the Will was
not genuine and therefore, the said Will could not have been acted upon andPage 3
3
as Sumitra Devi was survived by eight children, the suit property would be
inherited by all the children. Thus, each child had 1/8th share in the suit
property.
4. Even after death of Rao Gajraj Singh, the suit property continued to
remain in his name because nobody had got the property mutated in the
names of his heirs/legal representatives after his death.
5. The said suit was dismissed and therefore, the original plaintiffs,
along with others, preferred an appeal. After hearing the learned advocates
and considering the facts of the case, the lower appellate court dismissed the
said appeal though allowed the appeal on the question of court fee.
6. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered by the lower appellate court,
original plaintiff No.1 filed a second appeal, being Civil Regular Second
Appeal No. 3937 of 2005. On the issue with regard to court fee, cross
objection was filed by the present appellant. The said appeal was partly
allowed whereas the cross objection was dismissed on 25th May, 2010 and
being aggrieved by the judgment delivered in the said appeal, the present
appeal has been filed by the appellant, who is original defendant no.1.
7. It is pertinent to note as to how the High Court has decided the Second
Appeal and for that purpose let us look at the findings, which are as under:Page 4
4
The ultimate findings arrived at by the court below are to the effect
that the writing executed by Rao Gajraj Singh, which stated that upon death
of himself or his wife, the suit property would be inherited by the survivor,
was neither in the nature of a Will nor in the nature of transfer of the
property because the said writing was neither registered as required under
the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 nor was attested by two
witnesses as it should have been done, had it been a Will. Thus, the writing
executed by Rao Gajraj Singh, in the eyes of law, was only a piece of paper,
having no legal effect. Factually also, the said writing was not a Will
because it was not attested by two attesting witnesses as is required to be
done for execution of a valid Will. It is also a fact that the said writing had
not been registered and by virtue of the said writing either complete
ownership or share of Rao Gajraj Singh was not transferred to Sumitra Devi,
thus, the High Court in its impugned judgment rightly ignored the said
writing executed by Rao Gajraj Singh.
 8. Upon the death of Rao Gajraj Singh, no mutation entry was made in
the Municipal Corporation records to show as to who had inherited the
property in question and the said property continued to remain in the name
of late Rao Gajraj Singh.Page 5
5
9. By virtue of the Will executed by Sumitra Devi, whereby the property
had been bequeathed to the present appellant, the appellant claims complete
ownership over the suit property.
10. So far as inheritance of the suit property by the present appellant in
pursuance of the Will dated 1st June, 1989 executed by Sumitra Devi is
concerned, the finding of the lower appellate court is to the effect that the
Will was validly executed by Sumitra Devi, which had been attested by two
witnesses, one being an advocate and another being a medical practitioner.
Though there was an allegation to the effect that Sumitra Devi was not
keeping good health at the time when she had executed the aforesaid Will
and she was not having sound and disposing mind at the time of execution of
the Will, the said submission made before the courts below was not
accepted. Upon appreciation of evidence adduced, it was held that the Will
was validly executed and Sumitra Devi was competent to execute the Will
which had been duly attested by two competent witnesses. In the
circumstances, the courts below came to the conclusion that the Will was
validly executed. The question with regard to the state of mind of the
testatrix and execution of the Will being a question of fact, the High Court
rightly accepted the findings arrived at by the lower appellate court. As the
said finding has been accepted by the High Court, in our opinion, even thisPage 6
6
Court would not re-appreciate the said fact. In the circumstances, so far as
the validity of the Will is concerned, it is treated to have been executed
properly. The next question which was to be considered by the High Court
was with regard to the ownership right of the suit property. The property
was in the name of Rao Gajraj Singh and no evidence of whatsoever type
was adduced to the effect that the property originally belonged to Sumitra
Devi. Looking to the said fact, the findings arrived at by the High Court that
the suit property belonged to Rao Gajraj Singh cannot be disturbed. As Rao
Gajraj Singh died intestate and was the owner of the property at the time of
his death, the suit property should have been inherited by his widow, namely
Sumitra Devi and his eight children in equal share, as per the provisions of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In that view of the matter, the High Court
arrived at the conclusion that the suit property would be inherited by all the
9 heirs i.e. Sumitra Devi and her eight children and therefore, Sumitra Devi
had inherited only 1/9th of the right and interest in the suit property whereas
1/9th of the right and interest in the suit property belonged to each child of
Rao Gajraj Singh.
11. Though the Will executed by Sumitra Devi has been treated as a
validly executed Will, Sumitra Devi, who had only 1/9th of the right and
interest in the suit property, could not have bequeathed more than herPage 7
7
interest in the suit property. If Sumitra Devi was not a full-fledged owner of
the suit property, she could not have bequeathed the entire suit property to
the present appellant- Narinder Singh Rao who has claimed the entire
property by virtue of the Will executed by Sumitra Devi. At the most
Sumitra Devi could have bequeathed her interest in the property which was
to the extent of 1/9th share in the said property. So the High Court rightly
came to the conclusion that the 1/9th share in the suit property belonging to
Sumitra Devi would be inherited by the present appellant - Narinder Singh
Rao by virtue of the Will executed by her. In addition to his own right and
interest in the suit property to the extent of 1/9th share, which the present
appellant had inherited from his father, the present appellant would get 1/9th
share in the suit property as he also inherited share of his mother Sumitra
Devi whereas all other children of Rao Gajraj Singh would get 1/9th share
each in the suit property. Thus, the present appellant would be having 2/9th
share in the suit property.
12. In our opinion, the aforestated findings arrived at by the court below
are absolutely just and proper. So far as findings of facts are concerned, the
same have been finally decided by the court below and therefore, we would
not like to interfere with the findings of the fact.Page 8
8
13. So far as legal issues are concerned, in our opinion, the court below
did not make any error while coming to the aforestated conclusions after
applying law to the facts of the case.
14. The learned counsel appearing for the parties had made lengthy
submissions, however, in our opinion not a single submission made on
behalf of the appellant is impressive.
15. On behalf of the appellant, the submissions were made to the effect
that the suit property in fact belonged to Sumitra Devi though it was in the
name of Rao Gajraj Singh.
The provisions of Benami Transfer (Prohibition)
Act, 1988 had been referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant.
The question whether the suit property in fact belongs to an
individual i.e. whether he is a beneficial owner or is a benami, is a question
of fact. There was no averment made in the plaint with regard to the
aforestated allegation. No issue to the said fact had been raised before the
trial court. The said issue had been raised for the first time before the
appellate court and in our opinion, the issue with regard to the fact could not
have been raised before the appellate court for the first time and therefore,
all submissions made in relation to the provisions of Benami Transfer
(Prohibition) Act, 1988 and with regard to real ownership of the suit
property cannot be looked into at this stage.
Page 9
9
16. The submissions made with regard to the mental capacity of Sumitra
Devi at the time of execution of the Will cannot also be looked into at this
stage because the mental capacity of the testator to execute a Will being a
question of fact, we would like to accept the findings arrived at by the court
below and 
all allegations with regard to soundness of mind of Sumitra Devi
at the time of execution of the Will or allegation with regard to undue
influence of the present appellant with whom Sumitra Devi was residing at
the time of her death cannot be looked into by this Court as they are the
issues pertaining to fact. 
We, therefore, do not accept the submissions made
with regard to validity of the Will executed by Sumitra Devi.
17. As we have come to the conclusion that
the Will executed by Sumitra
Devi was just and proper, the consequences of the Will would be like this: Rao Gajraj Singh was survived by his eight children and his widow – Sumitra Devi. As Rao Gajraj Singh died intestate, according to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, his property would devolve upon all his nine heirs i.e. his widow and eight children. 
So, everyone would get 1/9th
share in the property of Rao Gajraj Singh. Though Sumitra Devi had executed her Will and had bequeathed the entire property in question to the present appellant namely Narinder Singh Rao, Sumitra Devi could not have bequeathed under her Will what she did not own. She was only 1/9th owner
Page 10
10
of the suit property so she could have bequeathed only her share i.e. 1/9th share in the suit property. 
As a result of the Will of Sumitra Devi, Narinder
Singh Rao- the appellant would not only inherit his own share in the property, which he had inherited from his father Rao Gajraj Singh but he would also inherit share of his mother Sumitra Devi as per her Will. 
Thus,
the present appellant would become the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property. 
In our opinion the final finding of the High Court that the
appellant is the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property is, therefore, absolutely correct.
18. The averments with regard to court fee are not of importance at this
stage as looking to the facts of the case, the court below has rightly come to
the conclusion that the issue with regard to 
the court fee was a matter
between the litigant filing the suit and the court and the defendants need not have bothered about the same. 
19. The learned counsel appearing for both sides have cited several
judgments. The propositions laid down in the said judgments cannot be
disputed, however, the fact remains that the said judgments do not render
any assistance to the appellant in view of the aforestated facts.
20. In view of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and the
legal position clarified hereinabove and by the High Court, in our opinion,
Page 11
11
the High Court has committed no error and therefore, we see no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment.
21. For the aforestated reasons, the appeals are dismissed with no order as
to costs.
 ………..……………............J.
 (R.M. LODHA)
 ………..……………............J.
 (ANIL R. DAVE)
New Delhi
MARCH 22, 2013.