non-consideration of his case for promotion= The High Court, by impugned order dated 27.04.2010, allowed the petition and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and directed the appellants herein to issue appropriate order in favour of the respondent herein for promotion with all consequential benefits. f) Challenging the said order, the Union of India has filed this appeal by way of special leave. It is further seen that up to 21.04.2003, the date on which the respondent’s batch mates were promoted to IRAS, neither any criminal proceedings was initiated against him nor any departmental enquiry was initiated, nor any charge sheet was served upon him and nor he was placed under suspension. We have carefully gone through the factual position and the ultimate ratio laid down by this Court in R.S. Sharma’s case (surpa). Even though in the said decision, this Court has distinguished the decision in Jankiraman’s case (supra) and held that the same is not applicable to its case, in the light of the conditions mentioned in para 2 as well as para 7 of the office memorandum dated 14.09.1992 and of the categorical finding that none of the conditions mentioned therein has been fulfilled, we are of the view that the decision in R.S. Sharma’s case (supra) is not helpful to the case of the appellant. In the light of the above discussion and in view of factual position as highlighted in the earlier paras, we hold that the ratio laid down in Jankiraman’s case (supra) are fully applicable to the case on hand, hence we are in agreement with the ultimate decision of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Union of India fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2537 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.1933 of 2011)
The Union of India & Ors. .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Anil Kumar Sarkar ....
Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Delay condoned.
2) Leave granted.
3) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 27.04.2010 passed by the Gauhati High Court at
Gauhati in Writ Petition (C) No. 744 of 2010 whereby the
Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the respondent herein and set aside the order dated
1Page 2
21.08.2009 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Gauhati Bench, Gauhati in O.A. No. 251 of 2007.
4) Brief facts
a) Anil Kumar Sarkar, the respondent herein, joined the
Northern Railways as a Junior Clerk on 04.11.1977.
He was
promoted to various posts and
 while he was working as
senior AFA/T-1 in the office of the Financial Adviser and Chief
Accounts Officer of Northeast Frontier (N.F.) Railway at
Maligaon, a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) was
convened by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) on
26.02.2002 and 27.02.2002 to consider eligible Group ‘B’
officers of the Accounts Department for their substantive
promotion to Group ‘A’ (Jr. Scale) of Indian Railways Accounts
Service (IRAS) against the vacancies for various Zonal
Railways/Production Units.
 In the said DPC, the respondent’s
name was also considered against the vacancies in N.F.
Railway for the year 2001-2002 and accordingly, his name
was placed in the extended select panel.
b) It was alleged by the appellants herein that during the
year 1994-95, while the respondent was working as Assistant
2Page 3
Accounts Officer in the Central Stores Accounts (Bills) in the
office of the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer
(Open Line), N.F. Railway, Maligaon, he committed gross
misconduct in the matter of checking and passing the bills of
various firms involved in manufacturing and supplying of cast
iron sleeper plates to N.F. Railways.
For the said acts, four
memorandum of charges were issued to the respondent, out
of which two were issued on 13.08.2003 and others on
01.09.2003 and 05.11.2003. On the basis of the said
memorandums, four departmental proceedings were
initiated against the respondent at three different places,
i.e., Delhi, Kolkata and Gauhati, enquiries were completed
and show cause notices were served.
c) Based on the similar charges, in the year 2004, the CBI
lodged 11 FIRs against the respondent herein on different
dates under Section 120B/420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and accordingly, cases
were registered against him.
Subsequently, 11 cases were
amalgamated into 3 cases being numbered as Special Case
Nos. 59/04, 60/04 and 62/04. According to the appellants, on
3Page 4
the basis of these charges, the respondent was not promoted
to Group ‘A’ (Jr. Scale). 
d) By office order dated 21.04.2003, the batch mates of
the respondent were promoted. Being aggrieved, the
respondent herein filed several representations to the
Department for consideration of his case for promotion which
were duly rejected. Challenging the non-consideration of his
case for promotion, the respondent filed O.A. No. 251 of 2007
before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Gauhati Bench for
a direction to the appellants herein to promote him to Group
‘A’ (Jr. Scale) of IRAS w.e.f. 05.03.2002 in terms of the
recommendations of the DPC held on 26.02.2002 and
27.02.2002 wherein his name was figured in the extended
panel list. Vide order dated 21.08.2009, the Tribunal
dismissed his application. 
e) Challenging the order of the Tribunal, the respondent
herein filed a petition being W.P.(C) No. 744 of 2010 before
the Gauhati High Court. The High Court, by impugned order
dated 27.04.2010, allowed the petition and set aside the
order passed by the Tribunal and directed the appellants
4Page 5
herein to issue appropriate order in favour of the respondent
herein for promotion with all consequential benefits.
f) Challenging the said order, the Union of India has filed
this appeal by way of special leave.
5) Heard Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the Union of India and Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent.
Contentions:
6) Mr. Mohan Jain, learned ASG, after taking us through the
Office Memorandum dated 14.09.1992 issued by the Ministry
of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of
Personnel and Training, submitted that paragraph 2 of the
said memorandum has to be considered along with
paragraph 7 of the same. According to him, the High Court is
not justified in considering paragraph 2 of the memorandum
alone. He further submitted that at the relevant time, 4
charge sheets were issued to the respondent and enquiries
were completed and notices to show cause had already been
served upon the respondent. On the other hand, Mr. Rakesh
Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
5Page 6
that as on the date i.e. 21.04.2003, when his juniors were
promoted, neither the respondent was under suspension nor
any charge sheet was served upon him and he was not
facing any criminal prosecution, hence, there was no
impediment in promoting him.
7) We have carefully considered the rival submissions and
all the relevant materials including the decision of the
Tribunal and the impugned order of the High Court.
Discussion:
8) There is no dispute as to the fact that the Office
Memorandum No. 22011/4/91-Estt(A), Government of India,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions,
Department of Personnel & Training, New Delhi dated
14.09.1992 is applicable to the case on hand. In fact,
learned ASG appearing for the appellants and learned
counsel for the respondent heavily relied on the said
memorandum. The relevant paragraphs for our present
purpose are 2 and 7 which are reproduced hereunder:
“No. 22011/4/91-Estt(A)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions
Department of Personnel & Training
6Page 7
North Block, New Delhi-110001
Dated: 14.09.1992
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject : Promotion of Government servants against whom
disciplinary/court proceedings are pending or whose conduct is under
investigation. Procedure and guidelines to be allowed. 
Board’s L/No. E(D&A)
88RG6-21 dt. 21.9.88 &
2.7.90
In supersession of all instructions
contained in Bd’s letters referred to in the
margin on the above subject, the
procedure and guidelines laid down below
shall be followed in the matter of
promotion from Group ‘B’ to Group ‘A’ and
within Group ‘A’ of Railway Officers
against whom disciplinary/Court
proceedings are pending.
Cases of Govt. to whom
sealed cover procedure
will be applicable.
2. At the time of consideration of the
cases of Govt. servants for empanelment
details of Govt. servants in the
consideration zone for promotion falling
under the following categories should be
specifically brought to the notice of the
Departmental Promotion Committee:-
(i) Government Servants under
suspension;
(ii) Government servants in respect of
whom a charge sheet has been issued and
the disciplinary proceedings are pending;
(iii) Government servants in respect of
whom prosecution for a criminal charge is
pending.
Sealed cover procedure
applicable to officers
coming under cloudholding of DPC but
before promotion.
………..………………………………………………
……………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………
7. A Govt. servant, who is recommended
for promotion by the Departmental
Promotion Committee but in whose case
any of the circumstances mentioned in
para 2 above arise after the
recommendations of the DPC are received
but before he is actually promoted, will be
considered as if his case had been placed
7Page 8
in a Sealed Cover by the DPC. He shall
not be promoted until the conclusion of
disciplinary case/criminal proceedings and
the provisions contained in this letter will
be applicable in his case also.”
9) It is not in dispute that the respondent had joined the
Northern Railways as a Junior Clerk on 04.11.1977, and got
promoted time and again. While he was working as a Group
‘B’ Officer, his case was taken up for promotion to Group ‘A’
(Junior Scale) of the Indian Railways Accounts Service (IRAS).
It is also not in dispute that in the meetings of the DPC
conducted on 26.02.2002 and 27.02.2002, the respondent’s
name was considered and he was placed in the extended
select panel.
  It is further seen that up to 21.04.2003, the
date on which the respondent’s batch mates were promoted
to IRAS, neither any criminal proceedings was initiated
against him nor any departmental enquiry was initiated, nor
any charge sheet was served upon him and nor he was
placed under suspension.
Aggrieved by the non consideration of his representations for promotion, the
respondent filed O.A. before the Central Administrative
Tribunal. Learned counsel for the Railways, by placing
reliance on the Office Memorandum dated 14.09.1992,
8Page 9
contended before the Tribunal that a Government servant
who is recommended for promotion by the DPC and in whose
case the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 2 are in
existence, he shall not be promoted. Accepting the above
stand of the Railways, the Tribunal rejected the petition filed
by the respondent herein.
10) Aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal, the
respondent herein filed a petition before the High Court,
wherein, the said memorandum, particularly paragraph 2,
was pressed into service. The High Court, taking note of the
conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 and in the absence of
any such condition as on the relevant date, i.e., 21.04.2003,
set aside the order of the Tribunal and directed the Railways
to consider the case of the respondent for promotion.
11) As per paragraph 2 of the said memorandum, at the
time of consideration of the Government servants for
promotion, the following details of Government servants in
the consideration zone for promotion falling in the categories
mentioned should be specifically brought to the notice of the
DPC, viz., (i) Government servant is under suspension; (ii)
Government servant has been served with a charge sheet
9Page 10
and the disciplinary proceedings are pending; and (iii)
Government servant is facing prosecution for a criminal
charge and the said proceedings are pending. As rightly
observed by the High Court, if the above conditions are
available, even one of them, then the DPC has to apply the
‘sealed cover process’. In the case on hand, it is not in
dispute that the relevant date is 21.04.2003, when the
respondent’s batch mates were promoted, admittedly on
that date the respondent was not under suspension, no
charge sheet was served upon him nor he was facing any
criminal prosecution. In such circumstances, in terms of
paragraph 2 referred to above, the recommendation of the
DPC has to be honored and there is no question of applying
‘sealed cover process’.
12) Mr. Mohan Jain, learned ASG submitted that paragraph
2 has to be read along with paragraph 7 of the office
memorandum dated 14.09.1992. We have already extracted
paragraph 7 of the memorandum which makes it clear that a
government servant, who is recommended for promotion by
the DPC if any of the circumstances mentioned in para 2 of
the said memorandum arises after the recommendations of
1Page 11
the DPC are received, but before he is actually promoted will
be considered as if his case has been placed in a sealed
cover by the DPC. After extracting para 2, we also
highlighted the three conditions prescribed therein. Though,
learned ASG has mentioned that four charge sheets were
issued to the respondent, enquires were completed and show
cause notices had already been served on the respondent,
on the relevant date, namely, 21.04.2003, when his batch
mates were promoted, none of the conditions was in
existence in the case of the respondent. Admittedly, the
respondent was not placed under suspension, charge sheet
had been issued only on 13.08.2003 i.e. nearly after 4
months, no disciplinary proceedings were initiated or
pending as on 21.04.2003. In such circumstances, we are of
the view that the High Court is fully justified in issuing
direction based on para 2 of the memorandum. No doubt, the
learned ASG heavily relied on later part of para 7 of the
memorandum which reads as under:
“He shall not be promoted until the conclusion of
disciplinary case/criminal proceedings and the provisions
contained in this letter will be applicable in his case also.”
1Page 12
Inasmuch as none of the circumstances was in existence as
on 21.04.2003, reliance placed on the later part of para 7
cannot be accepted or even not applicable.
13) It is not in dispute that an identical issue was
considered by this Court in Union of India and Others vs.
K.V.Jankiraman and Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109. The
common questions involved in all those matters were:
(1) What is the date from which it can be said that
disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against an
employee? (2) What is the course to be adopted when the
employee is held guilty in such proceedings if the guilt merits
punishment other than that of dismissal? and (3) To what
benefits an employee who is completely or partially
exonerated is entitled to and from which date?. Among the
three questions, we are concerned about question No.1. As
per the rules applicable, the “sealed cover procedure” is
adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment
etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending
against him at the relevant time and hence, the findings of
his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed cover to be
opened after the proceedings in question are over.
1Page 13
Inasmuch as we are concerned about the first question, the
dictum laid down by this Court relating to the said issue is as
follows:-
“16. On the first question, viz., as to when for the purposes
of the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/criminal
proceedings can be said to have commenced, the Full
Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is only when a
charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee
that it can be said that the departmental
proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the
employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to
only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The
pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage
will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the
sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the
Tribunal on this point. The contention advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant-authorities that when
there are serious allegations and it takes time to collect
necessary evidence to prepare and issue chargememo/charge-sheet, it would not be in the interest of the
purity of administration to reward the employee with a
promotion, increment etc. does not impress us. The
acceptance of this contention would result in injustice to
the employees in many cases. As has been the experience
so far, the preliminary investigations take an inordinately
long time and particularly when they are initiated at the
instance of the interested persons, they are kept pending
deliberately. Many times they never result in the issue of
any charge-memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations are
serious and the authorities are keen in investigating them,
ordinarily it should not take much time to collect the
relevant evidence and finalise the charges. What is
further, if the charges are that serious, the authorities
have the power to suspend the employee under the
relevant rules, and the suspension by itself permits a
resort to the sealed cover procedure. The authorities thus
are not without a remedy.
In para 17, this Court further held:
17. … The conclusion No. 1 should be read to mean that
the promotion etc. cannot be withheld merely because
some disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending
1Page 14
against the employee. To deny the said benefit, they must
be at the relevant time pending at the stage when chargememo/charge-sheet has already been issued to the
employee….”
After finding so, in the light of the fact that no charge sheet
was served on the respondent-employee when the DPC met
to consider his promotion, yet the sealed cover procedure
was adopted. In such circumstances, this Court held that
“the Tribunal has rightly directed the authorities to open the
sealed cover and if the respondent was found fit for
promotion by the DPC, to give him the promotion from the
date of his immediate junior Shri M. Raja Rao was promoted
pursuant to the order dated April 30, 1986. The Tribunal has
also directed the authorities to grant to the respondent all
the consequential benefits…..We see no reason to interfere
with this order. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed.”
The principles laid down with reference to similar office
memorandum are applicable to the case on hand and the
contrary argument raised by the appellant-Union of India is
liable to be rejected.
14) In Coal India Limited & Ors. vs. Saroj Kumar
Mishra, AIR 2007 SC 1706, this Court, in para 22, has held
1Page 15
that a departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be
initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued.
15) In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India
Limited and Others vs. Ananta Saha and Others, (2011)
5 SCC 142, this Court held as under:
“27. There can be no quarrel with the settled legal
proposition that the disciplinary proceedings commence
only when a charge-sheet is issued to the delinquent
employee. (Vide Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991)
4 SCC 109 and UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6
SCC 694)”
We also reiterate that the disciplinary proceedings
commence only when a charge sheet is issued.
Departmental proceeding is normally said to be initiated only
when a charge sheet is issued.
16) Learned ASG, by drawing our attention to the decision
of this Court in Union of India and Another vs. R.S.
Sharma, (2000) 4 SCC 394 submitted that in spite of
decision of this Court in Jankiraman’s case (supra) in view
of para 7 of the office memorandum and in the light of the
fact that proceedings were initiated both criminal and
departmentally, the High Court committed an error by
overlooking para 7 of sealed cover process and contended
1Page 16
that the direction issued by it cannot be sustained. 
We have
carefully gone through the factual position and the ultimate
ratio laid down by this Court in R.S. Sharma’s case
(surpa). Even though in the said decision, this Court has
distinguished the decision in Jankiraman’s case (supra)
and held that the same is not applicable to its case, in the
light of the conditions mentioned in para 2 as well as para 7
of the office memorandum dated 14.09.1992 and of the
categorical finding that none of the conditions mentioned
therein has been fulfilled, we are of the view that the
decision in R.S. Sharma’s case (supra) is not helpful to the
case of the appellant. 
17) In the light of the above discussion and in view of
factual position as highlighted in the earlier paras, we hold
that the ratio laid down in Jankiraman’s case (supra) are
fully applicable to the case on hand, hence we are in
agreement with the ultimate decision of the High Court.
Consequently, the appeal filed by the Union of India fails and
the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to
costs. 
1Page 17
...…………………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
...…………………………………J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 15, 2013.
1

convicted under Section 376, I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years.- The contention urged on behalf the appellant that it was consensual sex with the prosecutrix is to be believed for the reason that she herself has gone to the house of the appellant though her version is that she went there at the request of the appellant to take back her book which she had given to him. This is a strong circumstance to arrive at the conclusion that the defence case of the appellant is a consensual sex. Further, the prosecution case is that after the offence was committed by the appellant he had locked the room from outside and left. After half an hour Purnendu Babu- PW3 arrived and unlocked the room. This story is improbable to believe and the prosecutrix has not lodged the complaint either immediately or within reasonable period from the date of occurrence. The complaint was undisputably lodged after lapse of 11 days by the prosecutrix. - “12. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh case to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape. It is however significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualised as the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case, and others such as this one, need to be examined.” 15. For the aforesaid reasons the prosecution case is not natural, consistent and probable to believe to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the alleged offence said to have committed by him. The trial court as well as the High Court should have appreciated the evidence on record with regard to delay and not giving proper explanation regarding delay of 11 days in filing FIR by the prosecutrix and non-examination of complainant witnesses, viz. the Doctor and the I.O. which has not only caused prejudice to the case of the appellant but also the case of prosecution has created reasonable doubt in the mind of this Court. Therefore, the benefit of doubt must enure to the appellant. As we have stated above the testimony of the prosecutrix is most unnatural and improbable to believe and therefore it does not inspire confidence for acceptance of the same for sustaining the conviction and sentence. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned judgment requires to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. 17. If the appellant has executed the bail bonds, the same may be discharged.

Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1149 OF 2008
RAJESH PATEL … APPELLANT
Vs.
STATE OF JHARKHAND … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
V. Gopala Gowda, J.
This criminal appeal is directed against the
judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi
passed in Criminal Appeal No.58 of 1999 dated
14.11.2006 wherein it has confirmed the judgment
and order passed by the 1st Additional Sessions
Judge, Jamshedpur in S.T.No.168 of 1994/172 of
1995. By the said judgment, the appellant hereinPage 2
2
was convicted under Section 376, I.P.C. and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of seven years.
2. The prosecution case in nutshell is stated
hereunder for the purpose of appreciating the rival
legal contentions urged in this appeal.
3. The prosecutrix in this case has made a
statement before the police at Ghatsila police
station, stating that she has narrated the incident
which took place on 14.2.1993 at 11.00 a.m. in the
house of the appellant. She stated that she was
working as a nurse in the Nursing Home of Dr.
Prabir Bhagat at Moubhandar in the jurisdiction of
Ghatsila, East Singhbhum District. The house of
the appellant Rajesh, who appears to be a classmate
of prosecutrix, is situated near the Nursing Home
in which the prosecutrix was working as a nurse.
It is the case of the prosecution that at the
request of the appellant she went to his house in
order to get back her book from him. As soon as she
entered the house of the appellant, he closed thePage 3
3
door from inside. At that time the members of the
appellant’s family were not present inside the
house. When the prosecutrix tried to raise alarm,
she was terrorized by the appellant who threatened
her that she would be killed by a knife if she
raises alarm. Thereafter, the appellant committed
rape on her. When she felt pain on her private
part, she wanted to cry but she was silenced by the
appellant by displaying a knife to her. After
committing the offence of rape the appellant left
the house and locked the door from outside. After
half an hour, one Purnendu Babu of Chundih came and
unlocked the house and the prosecutrix returned to
her house silently. It is further the case of the
prosecution that she went to her house and narrated
the incident to her mother. However, the mother of
the prosecutrix remained silent for two to four
days on the assurance of Mr. Purnendu Babu that he
would take action in the matter. Additionally, it
was alleged that the appellant at the time of
committing the offence had also threatened thePage 4
4
prosecutrix that she would be killed if she lodges
a complaint against him.
4. The trial court convicted the accused and
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment of seven
years. The correctness of the same was challenged
before the High Court of Jharkhand by filing
Criminal Appeal No.58 of 1999 urging various legal
contentions. After considering the legal
contentions on behalf of the appellant, the High
Court has affirmed the conviction and sentence of
the accused and dismissed the appeal. The
correctness of the same is challenged in this
appeal urging the following legal contentions: that
the courts below have failed to appreciate that the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix could not have
been used against the appellant to hold him guilty
of offence under Section 376, IPC; that the
prosecution has not examined either the doctor who
conducted the medical examination of the
prosecutrix or the investigating officer.Page 5
5
Therefore, the finding of fact holding that the
appellant is guilty of the offence is erroneous in
law and liable to be set aside. Another ground
urged by Mr.Sanjay Hegde, the learned counsel for
the appellant, is that the courts below failed to
appreciate that the story of confinement of the
prosecutrix in the house of the appellant cannot be
sustained. This is because PW3 Purnendu Babu, a
common friend of the appellant and the prosecutrix,
who is alleged to have rescued the prosecutrix from
the alleged confinement, did not support the same,
thereby breaking the chain of events of the
prosecution story. Further, it is urged by him that
the courts below failed to note the delay in
lodging the FIR which has not been adequately
explained.
The Courts below have explained the
delay in filing FIR on the basis of the
intervention of PW3 and PW4, namely, Purnendu Babu
and the Doctor of the Nursing Home in which the
prosecutrix was working, as they assured the victim
to settle the matter between the parties. However,
Page 6
6
both of these witnesses were declared either
tendered by the prosecution or hostile during the
course of the trial.
Further, the appellant
contends that the learned courts below failed to
take into consideration of the serious
contradiction in the version of the prosecutrix and
her mother.
The prosecutrix in her cross
examination has stated that Dr. Prabir Bhagat – PW4
was in his chamber in the evening when the
appellant along with Purnendu Babu- PW3 went to the
Nursing Home whereas the mother of the prosecutrix
in her testimony has stated that the incident could
not be reported to Dr.Prabir Bhagat on the date of
the occurrence since the Doctor was in TATA.
According to the appellant, the courts below have
ignored the contradiction in the version of the
prosecutrix.
On one hand she says that she never
met the appellant till 21.2.93, on the other hand
she has stated that on the evening of the alleged
occurrence, she met the appellant at the dispensary
of Dr.Prabir Bhagat. It was further contended byPage 7
7
the appellant regarding the prosecution explanation
that
she could not raise alarm when the house was
locked and offence was being committed on her as
she was threatened by the appellant with a knife is
improbable to believe her statement. This is
because she could have raised an alarm when the
appellant allegedly locked the prosecutrix inside
the house for half an hour after the appellant
committing offence of rape on her.
For all the
abovementioned grounds, the appellant’s counsel
contends that the conviction and sentence imposed
upon the appellant cannot be allowed to sustain.
5. Alternatively, the learned counsel contends
that if, the physical relationship between the
appellant and the prosecution is established, it
was a case of consensual sex. Both of them were
majors to enter into such alliance and they were
classmates and familiar with each other as well as
on visiting terms prior to the alleged occurrence
of offence. Therefore, the appellant has notPage 8
8
committed offence as alleged. On the issue of
sentencing, the learned counsel has relied upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Ram Kumar v.
State of Haryana1, as the appellant in the present
case had already undergone the imprisonment of more
than 1 year and 8 months and more than 20 years
have elapsed from the date of commission of the
offence and therefore the appeal may be allowed by
passing appropriate order.
The prosecutrix and the
appellant are both married and settled in life and
further the appellant is of a young age. Therefore,
this Court may exercise its power by recording
special and adequate reasons as provided under
proviso to Section 376, IPC and the sentence
imposed may be reduced to the period already
undergone in judicial custody by the appellant and
treat the same as imprisonment and relief may be
granted to him to this extent as was observed in
Ram Kumar case (Supra), if the case urged on behalf
of the appellant is not acceptable. 
1 (2006) 9 SCC 589
Page 9
9
6. On the other hand, the prosecution sought to
justify the concurrent findings of fact recorded by
the High Court and the Trial Court on the charge
against the accused. The learned counsel for
prosecution would contend that the Courts below,
while accepting the testimony of the prosecutrix
and her mother, have rightly convicted and
sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for
seven years and the same need not be interfered
with by this Court in this appeal in exercise of
its jurisdiction. Further, it is contended by the
learned counsel that the judgment referred to supra
by the appellant’s counsel is inapplicable to the
facts situation of the present case and therefore,
discretionary power of this court for reduction of
the sentence need not be exercised and prayed for
dismissal of this appeal.
7. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties, we havePage 10
10
carefully examined the case to find out as to
whether the impugned judgment warrants interference
of this Court on the ground that the concurrent
finding of fact by the High Court on the charge
leveled against the appellant under Section 376,
IPC, and the finding recorded on this charge
against the appellant on the basis of the evidence
on record is erroneous in law and if so, whether it
requires interference of this Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction. The said points are answered in
favour of the appellant by assigning the following
reasons:
8. The prosecution case is that the appellant has
committed the offence of rape on the prosecutrix on
14.2.1993. She is the solitary witness to prove the
charge. The same is sought to be corroborated by
her mother PW2 who has supported the prosecution
case on the basis of narration of the alleged
offence by the prosecutrix to her. It is an
undisputed fact that both the appellant and thePage 11
11
prosecutrix are class-mates and had good
acquaintance with each other as they were
exchanging books. The case of the prosecution is
that she had given her book to the appellant. She
asked him to return the same and he asked her to go
to his house on 14.2.93 to take back the book.
Accordingly, she went to the house of the
appellant. When she entered the house he locked the
door of the house from inside. At that time she
has not raised an alarm, except stating that she
insisted not to lock the door of the house as there
were no other inmates in the house at that point of
time. The version of the prosecutrix is that she
could not raise alarm as the appellant has
threatened her with knife. Further case of the
prosecution is that he had then committed offence
of rape on her. Further she has stated that while
the appellant was committing rape on her she got
pain in her private part at that point of time also
she wanted to raise alarm, but he has shown the
knife to her not to raise alarm. Thus, thePage 12
12
prosecution story as narrated by the prosecutrix is
most improbable and unnatural. This contention of
the appellant is further supported by the
contention urged on his behalf that after the
offence was committed, the appellant locked her in
the house and went away from the house. After about
half an hour Mr.Purnendu Babu –PW3, who is a common
friend of both the appellant and the prosecutrix
came there and unlocked the room till then she did
not raise alarm drawing the attention of the
neighbours. The aforesaid circumstance would
clearly go to show to come to the conclusion that
the case of the prosecution is not natural and
probable. Neither the prosecutrix nor the PW3 has
informed the police with regard to the alleged
offence said to have committed by the appellant
after the prosecutrix was unlocked from the house.
The reason given by the prosecution is that PW3 was
making sincere efforts to bring about the
settlement of marriage between the appellant and
the prosecutrix. The same did not materialize and,Page 13
13
therefore, the complaint was lodged with the
jurisdictional police on 25.2.93. The above said
version of PW1 regarding settlement between her and
the appellant is not proved as PW3 has stated in
his evidence that he does not know anything
regarding the alleged offence.
9. Further, there is an inordinate delay of nearly
11 days in lodging the FIR with the jurisdictional
police. The explanation given by the prosecutrix in
not lodging the complaint within the reasonable
period after the alleged offence committed by the
appellant is that she went to her house and
narrated the offence committed by the appellant to
her mother and on assurance of Purnendu Babu – PW3,
the mother remained silent for two to four days on
the assurance that he will take action in the
matter. Further, the explanation given by the
prosecutrix regarding the delay is that at the time
of commission of offence the appellant had
threatened her that in case she lodges anyPage 14
14
complaint against him, she would be killed. The
said explanation is once again not a tenable
explanation. Further, the reason assigned by the
High Court regarding not lodging the complaint
immediately or within a reasonable period, it has
observed that in case of rape, the victim girl
hardly dares to go to the police station and make
the matter open to all out of fear of stigma which
will be attached with the girls who are ravished.
Also, the reason assigned by the trial court which
justifies the explanation offered by the
prosecution regarding the delay in lodging the
complaint against the appellant has been
erroneously accepted by the High Court in the
impugned judgment. In addition to that, further
observation made by the High Court regarding the
delay is that the prosecutrix as well as her mother
tried to get justice by interference of PW3, who is
a common friend of both of them and PW4, the Doctor
with whom the prosecutrix was working as a Nurse.
When the same did not materialize, after lapse ofPage 15
15
11 days, FIR was lodged with the jurisdictional
police for the offence said to have been committed
by the appellant. Further, the High Court has also
proceeded to record the reason that prosecutrix had
every opportunity to give different date of
occurrence instead of 14.2.93 but she did not do it
which reason is not tenable in law. Further, the
High Court accepted the observation made by the
learned trial Judge wherein the explanation given
by the prosecutrix in her evidence about being
terrorized to be killed by the appellant in case of
reporting the matter to the police, is wholly
untenable in law. The same is not only unnatural
but also improbable. Therefore, the inordinate
delay of 11 days in lodging the FIR against the
appellant is fatal to the prosecution case. This
vital aspect regarding inordinate delay in lodging
the FIR not only makes the prosecution case
improbable to accept but the reasons and
observations made by the trial court as well as the
High Court in the impugned judgments are whollyPage 16
16
untenable in law and the same cannot be accepted.
Therefore, the findings and observations made by
the courts below in accepting delay in lodging the
FIR by assigning unsatisfactory reasons cannot be
accepted by this Court as the findings and reasons
are erroneous in law.
10. Further in the case in hand, PW3, who is a
common friend of the appellant and the prosecutrix,
according to the prosecution case, he has
categorically stated that he does not know anything
about the case for which he had received the notice
from the court to depose in the case. PW4 has
stated in his evidence that the prosecutrix was
getting nursing training privately in his chamber
for the last three years as on the date of his
examination, namely, on 16.11.95. He has stated in
his examination-in-chief that on 14.2.93 when he
opened his chamber the prosecutrix came to his
chamber and further stated that her mother did not
tell him anything. He has been treated as hostile
by the prosecution, he was cross-examined by thePage 17
17
prosecutor, in his cross-examination he has
categorically stated that he has told the police
that he does not know anything about the incident.
He has further stated that neither the prosecutrix
nor her mother told him about the incident and
further stated that he does not know anything about
the case.
11. Further, neither the Doctor nor the I.O. has
been examined before the trial court to prove the
prosecution case. The appellant was right in
bringing to the notice of the trial court as well
as the High Court that the non-examination of the
aforesaid two important witnesses in the case has
prejudiced the case of the appellant for the reason
that if the doctor would have been examined he
could have elicited evidence about any injury
sustained by the prosecutrix on her private part or
any other part of her body and also the nature of
hymen layer etc. so as to corroborate the story of
the prosecution that the prosecutrix suffered
unbearable pain while the appellant committed rapePage 18
18
on her. Non-examination of the doctor who has
examined her after 12 days of the occurrence has
not prejudiced the case of the defence for the
reason that the prosecutrix was examined after 12
days of the offence alleged to have committed by
the appellant because by that time the sign of rape
must have disappeared. Even if it was presumed
that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured and
no injury was found on her private part or any
other part of her body, finding of such rupture of
hymen may be for several reasons in the present age
when the prosecutrix was a working girl and that
she was not leading an idle life inside the four
walls of her home. The said reasoning assigned by
the High Court is totally erroneous in law.
12. In view of the above statement of evidence of
PW3 and PW4 whose evidence is important for the
prosecution to prove the chain of events as per its
case, the statement of evidence of the aforesaid
witnesses has seriously affected the prosecution
case. Therefore, the courts below could not have,Page 19
19
at any stretch of imagination, on the basis of the
evidence on record held that the appellant is
guilty of committing the offence under Section 376,
IPC. Further, according to the prosecutrix, PW3
who is alleged to have rescued her from the place
of occurrence of offence, has clearly stated in his
evidence that he does not know anything about the
incident in his statement thereby he does not
support the version of prosecution. The High Court
has erroneously accepted the finding of the trial
court that the appellant has not been prejudiced
for non-examination of the doctor for the reason
that she was working as a Nurse in the private
hospital of PW4 and being a nurse she knew that the
information on commission of rape is grave in
nature and she would not have hesitated in giving
the information to the police if the occurrence was
true. Further, the finding of the courts below that
non-examination of the I.O. by the prosecution who
has conducted the investigation in this case has
not caused prejudice to the case of the appellant,Page 20
20
since the prosecution witnesses were unfavorable to
the prosecution who were either examined or
declared hostile by the prosecution, which
reasoning is wholly untenable in law. Therefore,
the finding and reasons recorded by both the trial
court as well as the High Court regarding nonexamination of the above said two witnesses in the
case has not prejudiced the case of the appellant
is totally an erroneous approach of the courts
below. For this reason also, we have to hold that
the findings and reasons recorded in the impugned
judgment that the trial court was justified in
holding that the prosecution has proved the charge
against the appellant and that he has committed the
offence on the prosecutrix, is totally erroneous
and the same is wholly unsustainable in law.
13. The finding with regard to the sentence of the
appellant recorded by the trial court which is
accepted by the High Court on the basis of the
solitary testimony of prosecutrix which is
supported by the evidence of her mother PW2 is oncePage 21
21
again an erroneous approach on the part of the High
Court. The offence of rape alleged to have
committed by the appellant is established without
any evidence as the prosecution failed to prove the
chain of events as stated by the prosecutrix.
Since the evidence of PW3 & PW4 did not support the
prosecution case, but on the other hand, their
evidence has seriously affected the story of
prosecution. Therefore, the courts below could not
have found the appellant as guilty of the charge
and convicted and sentenced him for the offence of
rape.
14. Further, one more strong circumstance which has
weighed in our mind is that they had good
acquaintance with each other as they were classmates and
 they were in terms of meeting with each
other.
The defence counsel had alternatively argued
that the appellant had sex with her consent. 
The
High Court proceeded not to accept the said
argument by giving reasons that the appellant
Page 22
22
failed to explain as to under what circumstance he
had sex with the consent of the prosecutrix when
she was confined in his house. The contention
urged on behalf the appellant that it was
consensual sex with the prosecutrix is to be
believed for the reason that she herself has gone
to the house of the appellant though her version is
that she went there at the request of the appellant
to take back her book which she had given to him.
This is a strong circumstance to arrive at the
conclusion that the defence case of the appellant
is a consensual sex. Further, the prosecution case
is that after the offence was committed by the
appellant he had locked the room from outside and
left. After half an hour Purnendu Babu- PW3 arrived
and unlocked the room. This story is improbable to
believe and the prosecutrix has not lodged the
complaint either immediately or within reasonable
period from the date of occurrence. The complaint
was undisputably lodged after lapse of 11 days by
the prosecutrix. 
In this regard, it is pertinent
Page 23
23
to mention the judgment of this Court in Raju v.
State of Madhya Pradesh2, the relevant paragraph of
which is extracted hereunder for better
appreciation in support of our conclusion:
“12. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh case to
the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the
Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape
more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence
Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard
to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape.
It is however significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B
too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same
amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of
abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised
against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a
clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no
similar presumption with respect to rape is visualised as
the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely
restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that
insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence
of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured
witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can
never be presumed that her statement should, without
exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her
statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that
ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a
person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles
that this case, and others such as this one, need to be
examined.”
15. For the aforesaid reasons the prosecution case
is not natural, consistent and probable to believe
to sustain the conviction and sentence of the
2
 (2008) 5 SCC 133
Page 24
24
appellant for the alleged offence said to have
committed by him.
16. The trial court as well as the High Court
should have appreciated the evidence on record with
regard to delay and not giving proper explanation
regarding delay of 11 days in filing FIR by the
prosecutrix and non-examination of complainant
witnesses, viz. the Doctor and the I.O. which has
not only caused prejudice to the case of the
appellant but also the case of prosecution has
created reasonable doubt in the mind of this Court.
Therefore, the benefit of doubt must enure to the
appellant. As we have stated above the testimony of
the prosecutrix is most unnatural and improbable to
believe and therefore it does not inspire
confidence for acceptance of the same for
sustaining the conviction and sentence. Therefore,
we are of the view that the impugned judgment
requires to be interfered with by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
Page 25
25
allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment.
17. If the appellant has executed the bail bonds,
the same may be discharged.
 ……………………………………………………………J.
[ CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD ]
 ……………………………………………………………J.
[ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]
New Delhi,
March 15, 2013.Page 26
26

whether a compromise entered into by husband and wife under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), agreeing for a consolidated amount towards permanent alimony, thereby giving up any future claim for maintenance, accepted by the Court in a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), would preclude the wife from claiming maintenance in a suit filed under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short “the Act’)=Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a piece of social legislation which provides for a summary and speedy relief by way of maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain herself and her children. Section 125 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of parties, which is in the nature of a civil proceeding, though are governed by the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the order made underPage 7 7 Section 125 Cr.P.C. is tentative and is subject to final determination of the rights in a civil court. 11. Section 25 of the Contract Act provides that any agreement which is opposed to public policy is not enforceable in a Court of Law and such an agreement is void, since the object is unlawful. Proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is summary in nature and intended to provide a speedy remedy to the wife and any order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by compromise or otherwise cannot foreclose the remedy available to a wife under Section 18(2) of the Act. 12. The above being the legal position, we find no error in the view taken by the Family Court, which has been affirmed by the High Court. The Petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine. .

Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 11800 OF 2013
[Arising out of C.C. No. 1297 of 2012]
Nagendrappa Natikar .. Petitioner
Versus
Neelamma ..
Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. The question that is raised for consideration in this case is
whether a compromise entered into by husband and wife under
Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), agreeing
for a consolidated amount towards permanent alimony, thereby
giving up any future claim for maintenance, accepted by the
Court in a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Page 2
2
Procedure (CrPC), would preclude the wife from claiming
maintenance in a suit filed under Section 18 of the Hindu
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short “the Act’).
3. The marriage between the petitioner (husband) and
respondent (wife) took place on 24.5.1987. Alleging that the
petitioner is not maintaining his wife, respondent filed an
application under Section 125 CrPC for grant of maintenance
before the 1st Additional JMFC at Gulbarga, being Misc. Case No.
234 of 1992. While the matter was pending, an application was
preferred by the parties under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC on
3.9.1994 stating that the parties had arrived at a compromise,
by which the respondent had agreed to receive an amount of
Rs.8,000/- towards permanent alimony and that she would not
make any claim for maintenance in future or enhancement of
maintenance. Consent letter dated 30.3.1990, which is in
Kannada, the English translation of the same reads as follow:
“Consent letter:
I, Neelamma W/o Nagendra Natikar, Age 23
years, R/o Old Shahabad, do hereby execute this
consent letter in favour of my husband Nagendra
Natikar with free will and consent without coercion
and misrepresentation. After my marriage with
Nagendra Natikar, I could not lead marital life happy
with my husband due to my ill health as prior to myPage 3
3
marriage I was suffering from backache, Paralysis
stroke to my left hand and left leg and was also
suffering from epilepsy (Fits disease) and therefore I
have myself decided to withdraw from marital life. I
have given my consent for mutual divorce. I have
no objection if my husband would contract second
marriage with someone. Prior to my marriage I was
suffering from chronic disease. I had asked my
father not to celebrate her marriage with anyone.
My father forcibly got marriage with Nagendrappa
Natikar. Henceforth I will not make any further
claims and also forfeit my rights in future and I will
not claim compensation or maintenance or alimony.
I am satisfied with the payment of Rs.8000/- and I
will not make any further claims against my
husband.
I have executed this consent letter in favoaur of
my husband without any force of anybody and free
from misrepresentation or coercion. My father mother or nay other family members have no
objection for executing this consent letter.
Signature of Executant
Neelamma
(Signed in Kannada))
Signature of witnesses:
1. Tippanna (signed in Kannada)
2. Devindrappa (signed in Kannada)
3. Syed Zabiullah Sahab (signed scribe)”
The Court, on the same day, passed the following order:
“Parties both present. Both parties and advocates
files compromise petition. The contents of thePage 4
4
compromise petition is read over and explained to
them. They admit the execution of the same before
court. Respondent paid Rs.8000/- (eight thousand)
before court towards full satisfaction of the
maintenance as per compromise recorded. In view
of the compromise, petition dismissed.”
4. Respondent wife then filed a Misc. Application no. 34 of
2003 under Section 127 Cr.P.C. before the Family Court,
Gulbarga for cancellation of the earlier order and also for
awarding future maintenance, which was resisted by the
petitioner stating that the parties had already reached a
compromise with regard to the claim for maintenance on
3.9.1994 and hence the application for cancellation of the
earlier order is not maintainable. The Court accepted the plea
of the husband and took the view that since such an order was
still in force and not set aside by a competent Court, it would
not be possible to entertain an application under Section 127
Cr.P.C. The application was, therefore, dismissed on 31.7.2006.
5. We notice, while the application under Section 127 Cr.P.C.
was pending, respondent wife filed O.S. No. 10 of 2005 before
the Family Court, Gulbarga under Section 18 of the Act claiming
maintenance at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month. The claim wasPage 5
5
resisted by the petitioner husband contending that, in view of
the compromise reached between the parties in Misc. Case No.
234 of 1992 filed under Section 125 CrPC, respondent could not
claim any monthly maintenance and hence the suit filed under
Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. The question of
maintainability was raised as a preliminary issue. The Family
Court held by its order dated 15.9.2009 that the compromise
entered into between the parties in a proceeding under Section
125 Cr.P.C. would not be bar in entertaining a suit under Section
18 of the Act.
6. The suit was then finally heard on 30.9.2010 and the
Family Court decreed the suit holding that the respondent is
entitled to monthly maintenance of Rs.2,000/- per month from
the defendant husband from the date of the filing of the suit.
7. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner took up the matter
before the High Court by filing an appeal, being M.F.A. No.
31979 of 2010, which was dismissed by the High Court by its
judgment dated 28.3.2011, against which this SLP has been
preferred.Page 6
6
8. Shri Raja Venkatappa Naik, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, husband, submitted that suit filed under Section
18 of the Act is not maintainable, in view of the order dated
3.9.1994, accepting the consent terms and ordering a
consolidated amount towards maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C.
9. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the
Family Court and confirmed by the High Court that the suit
under Section 18 of the Act is perfectly maintainable, in spite of
the compromise reached between the parties under Order XXIII
Rule 3 C.P.C. and accepted by the Court in its order dated
3.9.1994. 
10. Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a piece of social legislation which
provides for a summary and speedy relief by way of
maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain herself and her
children. Section 125 is not intended to provide for a full and
final determination of the status and personal rights of parties,
which is in the nature of a civil proceeding, though are governed
by the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the order made underPage 7
7
Section 125 Cr.P.C. is tentative and is subject to final
determination of the rights in a civil court.
11. Section 25 of the Contract Act provides that any
agreement which is opposed to public policy is not enforceable
in a Court of Law and such an agreement is void, since the
object is unlawful. Proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is
summary in nature and intended to provide a speedy remedy to
the wife and any order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by
compromise or otherwise cannot foreclose the remedy available
to a wife under Section 18(2) of the Act. 
12. The above being the legal position, we find no error in the
view taken by the Family Court, which has been affirmed by the
High Court. The Petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine. 
…………………………………J.
(K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
…………………………………J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
March 15, 2013

procrastination in trial, gradual corrosion of their social reputation, deprivation of respectable livelihood because of order of suspension passed against the petitioner No. 1 during which he was getting a meagre subsistence allowance and has reached the age of superannuation without being considered for promotion,extreme suffering of emotional and mental stress and strain, and denial of speedy trial that has impaired their Fundamental Right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is perceivable that delay has occurred due to dilatory tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the part of the prosecution and faults on the part of the system, i.e., to keep the court vacant. It is also interesting to note that though there was no order directing stay of the proceedings before the trial court, yet at the instance of the accused, adjournments were sought. After the High Court clarified the position, the accused, by exhibition of inherent proclivity, sought adjournment and filed miscellaneous applications for prolonging the trial, possibly harbouring the notion that asking for adjournment is a right of the accused and filing applications is his unexceptional legal right. When we say so, we may not be understood to have said that the accused is debarred in law to file applications, but when delay is caused on the said score, he cannot advance a plea that the delay in trial has caused colossal hardship and agony warranting quashment of the entire criminal proceeding. In the present case, as has been stated earlier, the accused, as alleged, had acquired assets worth Rs. 33.44 lacs. The value of the said amount at the time of launching of the prosecution has to be kept in mind. It can be stated with absolute assurance that the tendency to abuse the official position has spread like an epidemic and has shown its propensity making the collective to believe that unless bribe is given, the work may not be done. To put it differently, giving bribe, whether in cash or in kind, may become the “mantra” of the people. We may hasten to add, some citizens do protest but the said protest may not inspire others to follow the path of sacredness of boldness and sacrosanctity of courage. Many may try to deviate. This deviation is against the social and national interest. Thus, we are disposed to think that the balance to continue the proceeding against the accused-appellants tilts in favour of the prosecution and, hence, we are not inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings. However, the learned Special Judge is directed to dispose of the trial by the end of December, 2013 positively. 22. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 50 OF 2012
Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal
and another ...
Petitioners
Versus
State of Maharashtra ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The gravamen of grievance of the petitioners in this
petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India pertains to procrastination in trial, gradual corrosion
of their social reputation, deprivation of respectable
livelihood because of order of suspension passed against
the petitioner No. 1 during which he was getting a meagre
subsistence allowance and has reached the age of
superannuation without being considered for promotion,Page 2
extreme suffering of emotional and mental stress and
strain, and denial of speedy trial that has impaired their
Fundamental Right enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The asseverations pertaining to long delay
in trial have been made on the constitutional backdrop
leading to the prayer for quashment of the proceedings of
Special Case No. 4 of 1993 pending in the court of learned
Special Judge, Greater Bombay.
2. Before we proceed to state the factual score, it is
necessary to mention that this is not the first time
that the petitioners have approached this Court.
They, along with others, had assailed the order of the
High Court of Bombay declining to quash the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners and others on the
ground of delay in investigation and filing of charge
sheet in three special leave petitions which were
converted to three criminal appeals, namely, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 176 of 2001, 177 of 2001 and 178 of
2001. This Court adverted to the facts and
expressed the view that there was no justification to
quash the criminal prosecution on the ground of
2Page 3
delay highlighted by the appellants in all the appeals.
However, this Court took note of the allegations
against two senescent ladies who were
octogenarians relating to their abetment in the
commission of the crime and opined that the
materials were insufficient to prove that the old
ladies intentionally abetted the public servant in
acquiring assets which were disproportionate to his
known sources of income and further it would be
unfair and unreasonable to compel them, who by
advancement of old age, would possibly have already
crossed into geriatric stage, to stand the long trial
having no reasonable prospect of ultimate conviction
against them and, accordingly, on those two grounds,
allowed the appeals preferred by them and quashed
the criminal prosecution as far as they were
concerned. The other appeals, preferred by the
public servant and his wife, stood dismissed.
3. Be it noted, in the said judgment, while quashing the
proceedings against the two ladies, this Court
referred to the decision in Rajdeo Sharma v. State
3Page 4
of Bihar1
 and observed that the trial was not likely
to end within one or two years, even if the special
court would strictly adhere to the directions issued by
this Court in Rajdeo Sharma’s case.
4. The facts as uncurtained are that the Anti Corruption
Bureau (ACB), after conducting a preliminary enquiry,
filed an FIR on 26.6.1986 against the petitioner No. 1
who was a Deputy Commissioner in the Department
of Prohibition and Excise, Maharashtra Government,
for offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The lodgement
of the FIR led to conducting of raids at various places
and, eventually, it was found that the petitioner, a
public servant, had acquired assets worth Rs.33.44
lakhs which were in excess of his known sources of
income. After the investigation, the Government of
Maharashtra was moved for grant of sanction which
was accorded on 22.1.1993 and thereupon, the
charge-sheet was lodged against the petitioners
along with two old ladies on 4.3.1993 before the
1
 (1998) 7 SCC 507
4Page 5
Special Court. The offence alleged against the
petitioner, the public servant, was under Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Allegations against the ladies
were abetment for the main offences. As there was
delay in conducting the investigation and filing of
charge-sheet and disposal of certain interlocutory
applications, the High Court of Bombay was moved
on 15.4.1997 for quashing of the criminal
proceedings. As has been stated earlier, the High
Court declined to interfere and, hence, all the
accused persons approached this Court in appeal,
wherein the criminal case in respect of the old ladies
was delinked and quashed.
5. It is asserted in this petition that after this Court
disposed of the earlier criminal appeals, charges
were framed only on 15.12.2007 nearly after expiry
of seven years. It is put forth that during the
pendency of the trial, the wife of the petitioner No. 1
has breathed her last on 23.5.2008. It is averred that
nearly after four years of framing of charges, on
5Page 6
1.2.2011, Shri Vasant S. Shete, the Investigating
Officer, was partly examined by the prosecution and,
thereafter, the matter was adjourned on many an
occasion. Despite the last opportunity being granted
by the learned Special Judge, the Investigating
Officer was not produced for examination. As
pleaded, the Investigating Officer appeared before
the Special Judge on 20.7.2011 and sought further
time instead of getting himself examined.
Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on 25.8.2011,
21.9.2011 and 18.10.2011 and the examination of
the Investigating Officer could not take place. On
15.11.2011, the Investigating Officer submitted a
letter to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, ACB,
stating that he had already taken voluntary
retirement and due to bad health was unable to
attend the court and follow up the case. He made a
request to the ACP to appoint some other officer for
prosecuting the case. Thereafter, the Investigating
Officer absented himself before the learned trial
judge to give his evidence. It is contended that
6Page 7
because of the said situation, the examination-inchief of PW-1 has not yet been completed and the
other witnesses have not been produced for
examination by the prosecution. It is urged that
despite prayer made by the petitioner that the
prosecution case ought to be closed because of its
inability to produce the witnesses, the learned
Special Judge has not closed the evidence. It is
urged that more than ten years have elapsed since
the earlier judgment of this Court was rendered and,
therefore, the whole proceeding deserved to be
quashed. Emphasis has been laid on the loss of
reputation, mental suffering, stress and anxiety and
the gross violation of the concept of speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.
6. The stand of the State of Maharashtra, respondent
No. 1, is that after delivery of the judgment in the
earlier appeals, the accused on 29.3.2001 moved
numerous miscellaneous applications seeking various
reliefs and made a prayer that framing of charges
should be deferred till all the miscellaneous
7Page 8
applications were decided. He moved the High Court
in its revisional jurisdiction and writ jurisdiction and
though the High Court did not grant stay, yet the
case was adjourned at the instance of the accused.
On number of occasions, the accused himself moved
applications for adjournment and some times sought
adjournment to go out of the country to Bangkok,
Thailand and Singapore.
7. Even after the trial commenced, the accused did not
cooperate and remained non-responsive. A chart has
been filed showing the manner in which
adjournments were taken by the accused at the
stage of framing of charge on the ground that the
matter was pending before the High Court. A
reference has been made to the order dated
30.1.2003 directing all the accused to remain present
on the next date of hearing, i.e., 07.2.2003, for
framing of charge. Reference has been made to the
orders passed wherefrom it is clear that the accused
persons had sought adjournment on the ground that
writ petitions were pending before the High Court. It
8Page 9
is also put forth that certain applications were filed
by the accused persons seeking longer date by giving
personal reasons and sometimes on the ground of
non-availability of the counsel. It is the case of the
prosecution that because of adjournments, the
charges could not be framed within a reasonable
time but ultimately, on 15.12.2007, the charges were
framed. The factual narration would further reveal
that certain miscellaneous applications were filed
and they were ultimately dismissed on 20.2.2008.
On 04.4.2009, an order was passed requiring the
counsel for the accused to submit admission and
denial of the documents as per the description
mentioned in the application under Section 294 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Some time was
consumed to carry out the said exercise. The matter
was also adjourned as PW.1 had undergone an
operation. On 26.8.2012, the trial Court recorded
that the witness, Shetye, was unable to attend the
Court and on the next date, i.e., 13.7.2012, the
Prosecution Witness No. 1 stated that he was
9Page 10
suffering from mental imbalance and was not in a
position to depose and in view of the said situation,
the Court directed the prosecution to lead evidence
of other witnesses on the next date. Relying on the
documents annexed to the counter affidavit, it is
contended that on most of the dates, the accused
has taken adjournment on some pretext or the other.
8. In the body of the counter affidavit, various dates
have been referred to and, computing the same, it
has been stated that delay attributable to the
accused is 15.5 years and the delay in bringing the
matter in queue in the trial Court is one year. The
rest of the delay is caused as the prosecution has
taken time on certain occasions and on some dates,
the learned trial Judge was on leave. In this
backdrop, it has been contended that it is not a fit
case, where this Court should quash the proceedings
in exercise of powers under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.
9. An affidavit-in-rejoinder has been filed stating, inter
alia, that applications were filed for release which
10Page 11
were within the legal rights and hence, the delay
cannot be attributed to the accused persons. It is
urged that though number of orders have been
passed, yet not a single witness has been examined.
The allegation that the accused had gone on vacation
has been seriously disputed. Emphasis has been laid
on the order dated 18.3.2005 passed by the High
Court clarifying the position that it had not granted
stay and the pendency of the matter should not be a
ground to adjourn the case. It is contended that the
Investigating Officer is neither serious nor interested
to see the progress of the trial but is desirous of
delaying as he is aware that the case of the
prosecution is totally devoid of merit. It is further
stated that there has been gross and unexplained
delay at each stage of the proceedings and hence,
the same deserves to be quashed.
10. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay V. Kharde,
learned counsel for the respondent-State.
11Page 12
11. To appreciate the centripodal issue whether in such a
case this Court, in exercise of powers under Article
32 of the Constitution, should quash the criminal trial
on the ground of delay, it is requisite to state that in
the present petition, we are only concerned with the
time spent after 02.3.2001, i.e., the date of
pronouncement of the judgment in the earlier
criminal appeals, and further the factual matrix as
already exposited shows how the delay has occurred.
The factum of delay and its resultant effect are to be
tested on the basis of the exposition of law by this
Court.
12. In Abdul Rehman Antulay and others v. R.S.
Nayak and another2
, a proponement was advanced
that unless a time limit is fixed for the conclusion of
the criminal proceedings, the right to speedy trial
would be illusory. The Constitution Bench, after
referring to the factual matrix and various
submissions, opined that there is a constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21
2
(1992) 1 SCC 225
12Page 13
which is also reflected in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state
as follows:-
“83. But then speedy trial or other
expressions conveying the said concept –
are necessarily relative in nature. One may
ask – speedy means, how speedy? How
long a delay is too long? We do not think it
is possible to lay down any time schedules
for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The
nature of offence, the number of accused,
the number of witnesses, the workload in
the particular court, means of
communication and several other
circumstances have to be kept in mind.”
After so stating, the Court gave certain examples
relating to a murder trial where less number of witnesses
are examined and certain trials which involve large
number of witnesses. It also referred to certain offences
which, by their very nature, e.g., conspiracy cases, cases
of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery,
sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public
servants, cases of corruption against high public officials,
take longer time for investigation and trial. The Court also
took note of the workload in each court, district, regional
and State-wise and the strikes by the members of the Bar
13Page 14
which interfere with the work schedules. The Bench
further proceeded to observe that in the very nature of
things, it is difficult to draw a time limit beyond which a
criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go, and if it is a
minor offence, not an economic offence and the delay is
too long, not caused by the accused, different
considerations may arise but each case must be left to be
decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does
not become illusory when a time limit is not fixed.
13. In the said case, in paragraph 86, the Court culled
out 11 propositions which are meant to sub-serve as
guidelines. The Constitution Bench observed that
the said propositions are not exhaustive as it is
difficult to foresee all situations and further, it is not
possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. The
propositions which are relevant for the present
purpose are reproduced below:-
“(5) While determining whether undue
delay has occurred (resulting in violation of
Right to Speedy Trial) one must have
regard to all the attendant circumstances,
including nature of offence, number of
accused and witnesses, the workload of the
court concerned, prevailing local conditions
14Page 15
and so on – what is called, the systemic
delays. It is true that it is the obligation of
the State to ensure a speedy trial and State
includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and
practical approach should be adopted in
such matters instead of a pedantic one.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance
and weigh the several relevant factors -
‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ – and
determine in each case whether the right to
speedy trial has been denied in a given
case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court
comes to the conclusion that right to
speedy trial of an accused has been
infringed the charges or the conviction, as
the case may be, shall be quashed. But this
is not the only course open. The nature of
the offence and other circumstances in a
given case may be such that quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a case, it is open to the
court to make such other appropriate order
– including an order to conclude the trial
within a fixed time where the trial is not
concluded or reducing the sentence where
the trial has concluded – as may be deemed
just and equitable in the circumstances of
the case.
It has been laid down therein that it is neither
advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of
offences inasmuch as any such rule is bound to be
qualified one.
15Page 16
14. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab3
, another
Constitution Bench, while accepting the principle that
denial of the right to speedy trial to the accused may
eventually result in a decision to dismiss the
indictment or a reversal of conviction, further went
on to state as follows:-
“92. Of course, no length of time is per se
too long to pass scrutiny under this
principle nor the accused is called upon to
show the actual prejudice by delay of
disposal of cases. On the other hand, the
court has to adopt a balancing approach
by taking note of the possible prejudices
and disadvantages to be suffered by the
accused by avoidable delay and to
determine whether the accused in a
criminal proceeding has been deprived of
his right of having speedy trial with
unreasonable delay which could be
identified by the factors — (1) length of
delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3)
the accused's assertion of his right to
speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to
the accused by such delay.”
15. However, thereafter, certain pronouncements,
namely, “Common Cause”, A Registered Society
through its director v. Union of India and
others4
, “Common Cause”, A Registered
3
 (1994) 3 SCC 569
4
 (1996) 4 SCC 33
16Page 17
Society through its director v. Union of India
and others5
, Raj Deo Sharma (supra) and Raj
Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar6
, came to the
field relating to prescription of outer limit for the
conclusion of the criminal trial and the consequences
of such delay, being either discharge or acquittal of
the accused. The controversy required to be
addressed and, accordingly, the matter was referred
to a Seven-Judge Bench in P. Ramchandra Rao v.
State of Karnataka7
 and the larger Bench by the
majority opinion, analyzing the dictum of A.R.
Antulay’s case and Kartar Singh’s case and other
legal principles relating to the power of the
Legislature, the power of the Court and spectrums of
jurisdiction, recorded certain conclusions. The
conclusion Nos. 3 and 4, which are pertinent for the
present case, are as under:-
“(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R.
Antulay case are not exhaustive but only
illustrative. They are not intended to
operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be
applied like a straitjacket formula. Their
5
 (1996) 6 SCC 775
6
 (1999) 7 SCC 604
7
 (2002) 4 SCC 578
17Page 18
applicability would depend on the fact
situation of each case. It is difficult to
foresee all situations and no generalization
can be made.
(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor
judicially permissible to draw or
prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of
all criminal proceedings. The time-limits
or bars of limitation prescribed in the
several directions made in Common
Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj
Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so
prescribed or drawn and are not good
law. The criminal courts are not obliged
to terminate trial or criminal
proceedings merely on account of lapse
of time, as prescribed by the directions
made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj
Deo Sharma Case (I) and (II). At the
most the periods of time prescribed in
those decisions can be taken by the
courts seized of the trial or proceedings
to act as reminders when they may be
persuaded to apply their judicial mind to
the facts and circumstances of the case
before them and determine by taking
into consideration the several relevant
factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay
case and decide whether the trial or
proceedings have become so
inordinately delayed as to be called
oppressive and unwarranted. Such
time-limits cannot and will not by
themselves be treated by any Court as a
bar to further continuance of the trial or
proceedings and as mandatorily obliging
the court of terminate the same and
acquit or discharge the accused.”
[Emphasis added]
18Page 19
16. At this juncture, we may notice few decisions to show
how the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman
Antulay (supra) and P. Ramachandra Rao (supra)
have been applied by this Court either for the
purpose of quashing of the prosecution or refusal to
accede to the prayer in that regard. In Vakil Prasad
Singh v. State of Bihar8
, the two-Judge Bench took
note of factual scenario that the investigation was
conducted by an officer who had no jurisdiction to do
so; that the accused-appellant therein could not be
accused of causing delay in the trial because he had
successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal
investigation; that despite direction by the High
Court to complete the investigation within a period of
three months on 7.9.1990, nothing had happened till
27.2.2007 and the charge-sheet could only be filed
on 1.5.2007 and, accordingly, opined that it was not
a case where there was any exceptional
circumstance which could be possibly taken into
consideration for condoning the inordinate delay of
more than two decades in investigation and,
8
 (2009) 3 SCC 355
19Page 20
accordingly, quashed the proceedings before the trial
court.
17. In Sudarshanacharya v. Purushottamacharya
and another9
, a criminal prosecution was launched
for commission of an offence for misappropriation
and criminal breach of trust. On an application being
filed for quashing of the proceedings, the High Court
declined to quash the proceedings taking note of the
fact that the accused had also played a role in the
procrastination of the proceeding and directed that
the case be heard on day-to-day basis. The matter
travelled to this Court and a contention was
advanced that it would be unfair to submit the
accused-appellant to the agony of a trial after a lapse
of long time. The Division Bench referred to the
principles laid down in P. Ramachandra Rao
(supra) and, further taking note of the conduct of the
accused, declined to quash the proceedings.
18. At this stage, we think it apposite to advert to
another aspect which is some times highlighted. It is
9
 (2012) 9 SCC 241
20Page 21
quite common that a contention is canvassed in
certain cases that unless there is a speedy trial, the
concept of fair trial is totally crucified. Recently, in
Mohd. Hussain alias Julfikar Ali v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi)10, a three-Judge
Bench, after referring to the pronouncements in P.
Ramchandra Rao’s case, Zahira Habibulla H.
Shekh and another v. State of Gujarat and
others11
, Satyajit Banerjee and others v. State
of West Bengal and others12, pointed out the
subtle distinction between the two in the following
manner:-
“40 “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a
person accused of a crime are integral part
of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative
difference between the right to speedy trial
and the accused’s right of fair trial. Unlike
the accused’s right of fair trial, deprivation
of the right to speedy trial does not per se
prejudice the accused in defending himself.
The right to speedy trial is in its very nature
relative. It depends upon diverse
circumstances. Each case of delay in
conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen
in the facts and circumstances of such case.
Mere lapse of several years since the
commencement of prosecution by itself
10 (2012) 9 SCC 408
11 (2004) 4 SCC 158
12 (2005) 1 SCC 115
21Page 22
may not justify the discontinuance of
prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The
factors concerning the accused’s right to
speedy trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis
the impact of the crime on society and the
confidence of the people in judicial system.
Speedy trial secures rights to an accused
but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. The nature and gravity of crime,
persons involved, social impact and societal
needs must be weighed along with the right
of the accused to speedy trial and if the
balance tilts in favour of the former the long
delay in conclusion of criminal trial should
not operate against the continuation of
prosecution and if the right of the accused
in the facts and circumstances of the case
and exigencies of situation tilts the balance
in his favour, the prosecution may be
brought to an end.”
[Emphasis added]
19. It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of
the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the
other, the quashment of the indictment or the
acquittal or refusal for sending the matter for re-trial
has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of
the crime on the society and the confidence of the
people in the judicial system. There cannot be a
mechanical approach. From the principles laid down
in many an authority of this Court, it is clear as
crystal that no time limit can be stipulated for
22Page 23
disposal of the criminal trial. The delay caused has
to be weighed on the factual score, regard being had
to the nature of the offence and the concept of social
justice and the cry of the collective. In the case at
hand, the appellant has been charge-sheeted under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for
disproportionate assets. The said Act has a purpose
to serve. The Parliament intended to eradicate
corruption and provide deterrent punishment when
criminal culpability is proven. The intendment of the
legislature has an immense social relevance. In the
present day scenario, corruption has been treated to
have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the
economy. There are cases where the amount is
small and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The
gravity of the offence in such a case, in our
considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the
bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to
abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of
benefit is a crime against the collective and an
anathema to the basic tenet of democracy, for it
23Page 24
erodes the faith of the people in the system. It
creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law. Be
it noted, system of good governance is founded on
collective faith in the institutions. If corrosions are
allowed to continue by giving allowance to quash the
proceedings in corruption cases solely because of
delay without scrutinizing other relevant factors, a
time may come when the unscrupulous people would
foster and garner the tendency to pave the path of
anarchism.
20. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that
corruption is not to be judged by degree, for
corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to
progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the
conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions,
paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes
the sense of civility and mars the marrows of
governance. It is worth noting that immoral
acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the
people believing in honesty, and history records with
agony how they have suffered. The only redeeming
24Page 25
fact is that collective sensibility respects such
suffering as it is in consonance with the
constitutional morality. Therefore, the relief for
quashing of a trial under the 1988 Act has to be
considered in the above backdrop.
21. It is perceivable that delay has occurred due to
dilatory tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the
part of the prosecution and faults on the part of the
system, i.e., to keep the court vacant. It is also
interesting to note that though there was no order
directing stay of the proceedings before the trial
court, yet at the instance of the accused,
adjournments were sought. After the High Court
clarified the position, the accused, by exhibition of
inherent proclivity, sought adjournment and filed
miscellaneous applications for prolonging the trial,
possibly harbouring the notion that asking for
adjournment is a right of the accused and filing
applications is his unexceptional legal right. When
we say so, we may not be understood to have said
that the accused is debarred in law to file
25Page 26
applications, but when delay is caused on the said
score, he cannot advance a plea that the delay in
trial has caused colossal hardship and agony
warranting quashment of the entire criminal
proceeding. In the present case, as has been stated
earlier, the accused, as alleged, had acquired assets
worth Rs. 33.44 lacs. The value of the said amount
at the time of launching of the prosecution has to be
kept in mind. It can be stated with absolute
assurance that the tendency to abuse the official
position has spread like an epidemic and has shown
its propensity making the collective to believe that
unless bribe is given, the work may not be done. To
put it differently, giving bribe, whether in cash or in
kind, may become the “mantra” of the people. We
may hasten to add, some citizens do protest but the
said protest may not inspire others to follow the path
of sacredness of boldness and sacrosanctity of
courage. Many may try to deviate. This deviation is
against the social and national interest. Thus, we are
disposed to think that the balance to continue the
26Page 27
proceeding against the accused-appellants tilts in
favour of the prosecution and, hence, we are not
inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 32
of the Constitution to quash the proceedings.
However, the learned Special Judge is directed to
dispose of the trial by the end of December, 2013
positively.
22. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
March 15, 2013
27