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Wednesday, March 13, 2013

inter se seniority - The inter se seniority between the appellants and respondent no. 1 in the Senior Branch cadre of Orissa Superior Judicial Service is the subject matter of this appeal. 3. In the writ petition filed by the respondent no.1 before the High Court, the principal question under consideration was whether the service rendered by him (writ petitioner) in the Fast Track Court as Additional District Judge is to be taken into account while fixing his seniority after 1Page 2 regularization of his service in the Senior Branch cadre under the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 (for short, “1963 Rules”). The High Court in the impugned judgment dated 15.11.2011 has answered the above question in favour of the writ petitioner, allowed the writ petition and directed the Orissa High Court on administrative side to treat the period of service rendered by the writ petitioner in the Fast Track Court for the purpose of seniority from the date of his joining the post i.e., 26.04.2002 and re-fix his seniority in light of the judgment. 4. The appellants, direct recruits, who were respondent nos. 3 and 4 in the writ petition, have challenged the above judgment principally on the ground that it is not consistent with the 1963 Rules, Orissa Judicial Service (Special Schemes) Rules, 2001 and Orissa Superior Judicial Service and Orissa Judicial Service Rules, 2007.- the service in FTCs will be deemed as service of the promoted judicial officers rendered in the parent cadre. However, no right would accrue to such recruits promoted/posted on ad hoc basis from the lower judiciary for regular promotion on the basis of such appointment. For direct recruits, continuation in service will be dependent on review by the High Court and there could be possibility of absorption in the regular vacancy if their performance was found to be satisfactory………..”. The Court noted that while appointing Fast Track Court Judges, it was clearly stipulated that such appointments would be ad hoc and temporary and that the appointees shall not derive any benefit from such appointments. We have already indicated above that on 05.01.2002 or 26.04.2002, there was no vacancy in the cadre of Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch) for being filled up by promotion. Such vacancy in the Senior Branch cadre of the service occurred on 15.12.2003 and from that date the writ petitioner has been given benefit of his service rendered in the Fast Track Court. The administrative decision by the Full Court is in accord with the 1963 Rules, the 2001 Rules and the legal position already indicated above. The view of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment is legally unsustainable. The impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and is set aside. 52. Appeal is allowed, as above, with no order as to costs.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2316 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 192 of 2012)
Debabrata Dash and Anr. …… Appellants
 Vs.
Jatindra Prasad Das & Ors. ……Respondents
JUDGMENT
R.M. LODHA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The inter se seniority between the appellants and respondent
no. 1 in the Senior Branch cadre of Orissa Superior Judicial Service is the
subject matter of this appeal.
3. In the writ petition filed by the respondent no.1 before the High
Court, the principal question under consideration was whether the service
rendered by him (writ petitioner) in the Fast Track Court as Additional
District Judge is to be taken into account while fixing his seniority after
1Page 2
regularization of his service in the Senior Branch cadre under the Orissa
Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 (for short, “1963 Rules”). The High
Court in the impugned judgment dated 15.11.2011 has answered the
above question in favour of the writ petitioner, allowed the writ petition and
directed the Orissa High Court on administrative side to treat the period of
service rendered by the writ petitioner in the Fast Track Court for the
purpose of seniority from the date of his joining the post i.e., 26.04.2002
and re-fix his seniority in light of the judgment.
4. The appellants, direct recruits, who were respondent nos. 3
and 4 in the writ petition, have challenged the above judgment principally
on the ground that it is not consistent with the 1963 Rules, Orissa Judicial
Service (Special Schemes) Rules, 2001 and Orissa Superior Judicial
Service and Orissa Judicial Service Rules, 2007. The appellants contend
that the High Court has not correctly applied the decisions of this Court in
O.P Singla and Another v. Union of India and Others1
, Direct Recruit Class
II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and Others2
,
Rudra Kumar Sain and Others v. Union of India and Others3
, Brij Mohan
Lal v. Union of India and Others4
 [Brij Mohan Lal 1] and Brij Mohan Lal v.
Union of India and Others5
 [Brij Mohan Lal 2].
1
 (1984) 4 SCC 450
2
 (1990) 2 SCC 715
3
 (2000) 8 SCC 25
4
 (2002) 5 SCC 1
5
 (2012) 6 SCC 502
2Page 3
5. The brief facts leading to the controversy are these: The writ
petitioner joined the judicial service in the State of Orissa as Munsiff on
probation on 15.07.1981 under the Orissa Judicial Service Rules, 1964.
He was promoted to the Junior Branch of the Superior Judicial Service on
19.07.1999. On 05.01.2002, the writ petitioner, who was continuing as a
member of Superior Judicial Service (Junior Branch), was appointed, on
ad hoc basis, as Additional District Judge in the Fast Track Court.
Pursuant to the above order of appointment, on 11.04.2002 writ petitioner
was posted as an ad hoc Additional District Judge in the Fast Track Court
at Bargarh where he joined on 26.04.2002.
6. On 13.01.2003, the appellants were appointed in the Senior
Branch cadre of Orissa Superior Judicial Service by way of direct
recruitment under the 1963 Rules. Pursuant to the posting order dated
22.01.2003, they joined as Additional District and Sessions Judges at
Cuttack and Behrampur on 03.02.2003 and 07.02.2003 respectively.
7. By an order dated 28.05.2003, the tenure of writ petitioner as
ad hoc Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Bargarh was extended
for a further period of one year or 31.03.2004 (whichever was earlier).
8. By a notification dated 15.12.2003, the writ petitioner was
allowed to officiate in the Senior Branch of the Superior Judicial Service on
regular basis on account of a vacancy that arose due to retirement of an
officer of the Senior Branch on 31.07.2003. The writ petitioner was posted
3Page 4
on 19.01.2004 as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bargarh
pursuant to the notification dated 15.12.2003 to which post the writ
petitioner joined on 03.02.2004.
9. Appellant no. 1 was confirmed in the cadre of Senior Branch,
Superior Judicial Service with effect from 03.02.2004 while appellant no. 2
was confirmed with effect from 07.02.2004. The appellants were conferred
selection grade with effect from 03.02.2008 and 07.02.2008 respectively.
10. The writ petitioner was substantively appointed in the cadre of
District Judge with effect from 17.01.2007 and he was granted selection
grade with effect from 22.10.2009.
11. On 13.11.2009, the writ petitioner submitted a representation
to the High Court on administrative side seeking seniority in the cadre of
District Judge with effect from 26.04.2002, i.e., the date of his joining as
ad hoc Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Bargarh. The claim of
seniority by the writ petitioner over and above the appellants was based on
the ground that the period of his service as an ad hoc Additional District
Judge (Fast Track Court) should be included for the purpose of computing
his length of service in the cadre of Senior Branch, Superior Judicial
Service under the 1963 Rules.
12. A committee to consider the representation of the writ
petitioner was constituted. The committee by majority opined that the writ
petitioner’s representation was liable to be rejected. On 02.08.2011 the
4Page 5
Full Court of the High Court considered the report of the committee. The
representation of the writ petitioner was rejected on 08.08.2011. It was this
administrative decision of the High Court that was challenged by the writ
petitioner before the High Court on the judicial side.
13. The writ petition was contested by the appellants as well as
the High Court on the administrative side and the State of Orissa.
14. Before we deal with the relevant rules, reference may be
made to the various notifications concerning the appointments of the writ
petitioner and the appellants. As noted above, by a notification dated
05.01.2002, the writ petitioner was allowed ad hoc promotion to the Senior
Branch of the service. To the extent it is relevant, the said notification
reads as under:
“ GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA
 HOME DEPARTMENT
 NOTIFICATION
 Bhubaneswar the 5th January 2002.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
No. 993/Sri Jatindra Prasad Das, an officer of Orissa
Superior Judicial Service (Junior Branch) at present Adviser,
Orissa Electricity Regularity Commission Orissa,
Bhubaneswar is allowed adhoc promotion to the Senior
Branch of the said service in the scale of pay of Rs. 10,650-
325-15,850/- with effect from the date he joins as such until
further order in pursuance of Rule 3,4 & 5 of Orissa Judicial
Service, (Special Scheme) Rules, 2001 for his appointment
as adhoc Additional District Judge in the Fast & Track Court
established out of 11th Finance Commission Award.”
5Page 6
15. The notification dated 11.04.2002 whereby the writ petitioner
was posted as an ad hoc Additional District Judge pursuant to the
notification dated 05.01.2002 reads as under:
“ ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
 NOTIFICATION
 Dated, Cuttack the 11th April, 2002.
No. 150/A: On being reverted to the general line, Shri
Jatindra Prasad Das, an officer of Orissa Superior Judicial
Service (Junior Branch) at present Adviser, Orissa Electricity
Regulatory Commission, Bhubaneswar, who has been
allowed ad hoc promotion to the Senior Branch of the said
service vide Home Department Notification No. 1933 dated
05.1.2002 is transferred and appointed to be the Ad hoc
Additional District Judge in the Additional District Judge
Court established out of the 11th Finance Commission Award
in the Judgeship and Sessions Division of Sambalpur
Bargarh Deogarh Jharsuguda with headquarters at Bargarh
Vice Shri Susanta Kumar Patnaik transferred on promotion.”
16. The appellants were appointed as direct recruits in the cadre
of Senior Branch, Superior Judicial Service by a notification dated
13.01.2003 which reads as follows:
 “ GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA
 HOME DEPARTMENT
 NOTIFICATION
 Dated, Bhubaneswar, the 13.01.2003
No. 2495/SJS/1-13/2002/HS. In pursuance of Rule 8 of the
Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 Sri Debabrata
Dash, Advocate, Mayurbhanj, Baripada is hereby appointed
on probation for a period of one year on the Orissa Superior
Judicial Service (Senior Branch) in the scale of pay of Rs.
10,610-335-15,850/- by direct recruitment with effect from
the date he joins the said service.
6Page 7
No.2496/HS. In pursuance of Rule 8 Orissa Superior
Judicial Service Rules, 1963, Sri Satrughana Fujahari,
Advocate, Sambalpur is hereby appointed in probation for a
period one year in the Orissa Superior Judicial Service
(Senior Branch) in the scale of pay of Rs. 10,650-325-
15,850/- by direct recruitment with effect from the date he
joins the said service.”
17. We may now refer to the relevant rules. The 1963 Rules have
been made by the Governor of Orissa under the proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution of India for the regulation of recruitment to posts in, and
the conditions of service of persons appointed to the Orissa Superior
Judicial Service.
18. Rule 3(d) provides that “Service” means the Orissa Superior
Judicial Service. An officer appointed to the service in accordance with
Rule 8 is called the “Direct Recruit” under rule 3(f), while an officer
appointed to the service in accordance with Rule 9 is called the “Promoted
Officer” under rule 3(g).
19. In Rule 4, it is provided that cadre of service shall consist of
two branches, (i) Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch) and (ii)
Superior Judicial Service (Junior Branch). The cadre of Superior Judicial
Service (Senior Branch) comprises of diverse posts, including District and
Sessions Judges and Additional District and Sessions Judges. Rule 4(3)
provides that the cadre of the Superior Judicial Service, Junior Branch,
shall consist of 13 Chief Judicial Magistrates and 06 Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrates.
7Page 8
20. Part III of the 1963 Rules which deals with recruitment, is
crucial to the controversy. Rule 5 thereof provides as follows :
“5. Recruitment to the service shall be made by the
following methods, namely :
(1) In respect of the Senior Branch—
(a) by direct recruitment in accordance with Rule 8,
and
(b) by promotion of officers from the Junior Branch of
the service.
(2) In respect of the Junior Branch by promotion of
officers of the Orissa Judicial Service (Class-I) in
accordance with the Rule 10.”
21. Rule 7 enables the government to fill up the vacancy in Senior
Branch of the service in consultation with the High Court by direct
recruitment or promotion. It reads as under:
“7. When a vacancy occurs in the Senior Branch of the
service, Government shall decide in consultation with the
High Court whether it may be filled up by direct recruitment
or promotion:
Provided that the number of direct recruits in the
Senior Branch of the service shall not exceed twenty-five per
cent of the cadre posts mentioned in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4.”
22. Rule 9 lays down as follows:
“9. (1) Whenever a vacancy in the Senior Branch of the
service is decided to be filled up by promotion the
Government shall fill up the same after due consideration of
the recommendation of the High Court in accordance with
sub-rule (2).
(2) The High Court shall recommend for appointment to
such vacancy, an officer of the Junior Branch of the service,
who in the opinion of the High Court is the most suitable for
the purpose:
Provided that if for any reason, Government are
unable to accept the recommendation as aforesaid they may
call for further recommendations from the High Court to fill
up the vacancy.”
8Page 9
23. Rule 17 makes provision for seniority of officers in the
following manner.
“17. Seniority of officers in the service shall be determined
in accordance with the dates of substantive appointment to
the service.
Provided that a promoted officer, who may have been
allowed to continuously officiate from a date prior to the date
of appointment of a direct recruit, shall, if he is subsequently
substantively appointed in the service without reversion to
his parent service, take his seniority in the cadre over such
direct recruit.”
24. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article
309 read with Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India, the
Governor of Orissa, after consultation with the High Court of Orissa,
framed the rules entitled, “Orissa Judicial Service (Special Scheme) Rules,
2001” which we shall refer to as “the 2001 Rules” hereinafter. 2001
Rules were made to regulate the recruitment of judicial officers in the State
on ad hoc and purely on temporary basis exclusively for implementation of
the recommendations of 11th Finance Commission for upgradation of
judicial administration under upgradation grant for elimination of old
pending cases. The 2001 Rules define “service” in Rule 2(f) which means
the judicial service of the State of Orissa. Rules 3 and 4 of these rules
make provision for appointment which read as under:
“3. Appointment – Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 and Orissa
Judicial Service Rules, 1994 the appointment of Additional
District Judges on ad hoc and purely temporary basis for
implementation of the Scheme will be made under these
rules.
9Page 10
4. (1) The appointment made under these rules shall be
purely on ad hoc and temporary basis.
(2) The appointment shall be made initially for a
period of one year and shall be liable to be terminated at any
time without any prior notice.
(3) During the term of such appointment the
appointees will be under the administrative and disciplinary
control of the High Court.”
25. Rule 5 of the 2001 Rules prescribes eligibility. Clause (c) of
sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 is relevant which reads as follows:
“5. Eligibility. – (1) The appointment of Additional District
Judges on ad hoc and purely temporary basis shall be made
by the Governor on recommendation of the High Court from
amongst;
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) in-service Chief Judicial Magistrates/Additional
Magistrates having three years of service as
such.”
26. Rule 6 of the 2001 Rules provides that the selection of inservice Judicial Officers for ad hoc appointment under the scheme shall be
based on scrutiny of their judgments and their service record.
27. Rule 7 of 2001 Rules provides that inservice judicial officer
shall not claim regular promotion in the regular cadre on the basis of
his/her appointment made under this scheme.
28 . The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has observed
that though the promotion of the writ petitioner in Senior Branch cadre of
Superior Judicial Service was initially ad hoc but that was given to him
after the High Court adjudged his suitability for promotion by following the
10Page 11
1963 Rules. The Division Bench observed that such ad hoc promotion was
regularized vide notification dated 15.12.2003 under the 1963 Rules as the
writ petitioner had rendered uninterrupted service. The Division Bench has
referred to and considered the minutes of the meeting of the Full Court
held on 14.12.2001 against agenda no. 3 which concerned promotion of
officers of Junior Branch to the cadre of Senior Branch for their posting as
ad hoc Additional District Judges against Fast Track Courts. The relevant
portion of the minutes of the meeting dated 14.12.2001 referred to and
considered by the Division Bench, reads as follows:
“Considered the Judicial and administrative capabilities
along with C.C.Rs. of the following officers in the cadre of
Orissa Superior Judicial Service (Jr. Br.) for the purpose of
their promotion to the cadre of Orissa Superior Judicial
Service for their posting as ad hoc Additional District Judges
against Fast Track Courts (Sr. Branch).
1. Shri G.R. Purohit, Secretary, Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Cuttack.
2. Shri M.K. Panda, Deputy Secretary, Orissa Legal
Services Authority, Cuttack.
3. Shri J.P. Das, Adviser, O.E.R.C., Bhubaneswar.
Resolved that all the above named officers are found
suitable for promotion to the cadre of O.S.J.S. (Sr. Branch)
and accordingly their names be recommended to the State
Government for promotion to the cadre of O.S.J.S. (Sr.
Branch) for their appointment against the Fast Track Courts
on ad-hoc basis.”
29. The Division Bench, thus, found that promotion of the writ
petitioner along with two others was considered by the Full Court taking
into account their judicial and administrative capabilities and the
confidential reports and thereafter the name of the writ petitioner was
11Page 12
recommended to the state government for promotion to the Senior Branch
of the service and such promotion could have been granted only under the
1963 Rules. In the opinion of the Division Bench the resolution of the Full
Court dated 14.12.2001 has left no ambiguity that writ petitioner was
promoted to the Senior Branch cadre in Superior Judicial Service under
the 1963 Rules and his promotion as ad hoc Additional District Judge
cannot be treated under the 2001 Rules. The Division Bench has held that
the promotion of the writ petitioner to the Senior Branch has to be counted
with effect from 26.04.2002 when he joined the post initially and his
subsequent regularization deserves to be considered to be effective from
that date.
30. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench has held that
the view taken by the High Court on administrative side was in ignorance
of the law laid down by this Court in Brij Mohan Lal 14
. In paragraph 17 of
the impugned judgment, the consideration of the matter by the High Court
with reference to the Brij Mohan Lal 14
is as follows :
“17. The aforesaid direction of the apex Court clearly lays
down the mandate that the promotees’ service in such Fast
Track Courts shall be counted towards regular service.
Moreover, the appointment of the petitioner was never on
officiating basis for any particular period, but was a final
selection in accordance with the Rules, 1963 and Scheme
Rules 2001 and that is why the apex Court directed for filling
up all the consequential vacancies in the lower cadre from
which the promotions are given in Fast Track Courts
simultaneously. Moreover, it was also made clear that the
persons appointed under the Scheme shall get all service
benefits which are applicable to the members of Judicial
12Page 13
Service of the State on equivalent status. The State
Government took cognizance and promoted the incumbents
like the petitioner from the cadre of Orissa Superior Judicial
Service (Junior Branch) to Orissa Superior Judicial Service
(Senior Branch) by following the prescribed procedure. The
opposite parties 3 and 4 joined in Orissa Superior Judicial
Service (Senior Branch) as direct recruits as contemplated
under Rules 5 and 8 of the Rules, 1963. They were
appointed as Addl. District Judges vide Home Department
Notification Nos. 2495 and 2496 dated 13.01.2003, copy of
which is filed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition and the High
Court notifications dated 22.1.2003, filed as Annexure-9 and
9-A respectively. The opposite parties 3 and 4 joined in their
respective posts on 3.2.2003 and 7.2.2003 respectively,
meaning thereby they were born in the cadre of Orissa
Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch) after about 10
months of the petitioner entering into such cadre on
promotion to the post. But even then the opposite parties 3
and 4 were given selection grade with effect from 3.2.2008
and 7.2.2008 respectively vide Court’s notification no. 79
and 80 dated 22.2.2008, copy of which is annexed as
Annexure-10, thereby ignoring the claim of the petitioner
with regard to his seniority. All this clearly spells out that the
petitioner and other officers were superseded by the
opposite parties 3 and 4 and on the other hand the petitioner
was promoted to the cadre of Selection grade with effect
from 22nd October, 2009 vide notification no. 899 dated
29.10.2009 of the High Court (Annexure-11) and in this
manner the period of service as Addl. District Judge (Fast
Track) was not taken into consideration ignoring the settled
law of the apex Court.”
31. The crucial question that arises for consideration in this
appeal is, whether promotion of the writ petitioner as an ad hoc Additional
District Judge vide Notification dated 5.1.2002 to the Senior Branch of the
Superior Judicial Service for being posted in the Fast Track Court
established out of 11th Finance Commission recommendations can be said
to be an appointment in the Senior Branch cadre of Superior Judicial
13Page 14
Service. The fate of the appeal depends upon answer to this question. If
the answer to this question is found in the affirmative, the appeal must fail.
On the other hand, appeal must succeed if the answer is in the negative.
32. It is not in dispute that immediately before writ petitioner’s ad
hoc promotion to the Senior Branch of Superior Judicial Service for being
posted in the Fast Track Court, he was a member of the Junior Branch of
the Superior Judicial Service. There is also no dispute before us that there
was no cadre post available on 05.01.2002 or 26.04.2002 under the 1963
Rules. The fact of the matter is that 72 posts of ad hoc Additional District
Judges (Fast Track Court) were created out of 11th Finance Commission
recommendations and these posts were to be filled up under the 2001
Rules.
33. In the backdrop of the above factual position, we shall now
consider the scheme of the 1963 Rules. Rule 4 of the 1963 Rules
provides that cadre of Superior Judicial Service shall consist of two
branches; (i) Superior Judicial Service, Senior Branch and (ii) Superior
Judicial Service, Junior Branch. There are two modes of recruitment to the
Superior Judicial Service in respect of Senior Branch. These two modes
prescribed in Rule 5, are, (a) by direct recruitment in accordance with Rule
8 and (b) by promotion of officers from the Junior Branch of the service.
Rule 9(1) lays down that whenever a vacancy in the Senior Branch of the
service is decided to be filled up by promotion, the government shall fill up
14Page 15
the same after due consideration of the recommendation of the High Court
in accordance with sub-rule (2). As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 9, the High
Court shall recommend for appointment to such vacancy an officer of the
Junior Branch of the service, who, in the opinion of the High Court, is the
most suitable for the purpose. If the government is unable to accept the
recommendation of the High Court, it may call for further recommendations
from the High Court to fill up the vacancy. Rule 7 of the 1963 Rules,
enables the government to fill up the vacancy in the Senior Branch of the
service in consultation with the High Court either by direct recruitment or
promotion. As regards the strength of direct recruits in the Senior Branch
of the service, a cap is put that their number shall not exceed 25 per cent
of the cadre posts mentioned in Rule 4 (2). The direct recruitment to the
Senior Branch of the service is required to be made from the Bar. Rule 8
makes the complete provision about the eligibility of the candidates,
reservation and the procedure for filling up the vacancies available to
direct recruits to the Senior Branch of the service. Rules 7,8 and 9 of the
1963 Rules are quite significant. The position that emerges from these
provisions is this : When a vacancy occurs in the Senior Branch of the
service, first a decision is taken whether such vacancy is to be filled up by
promotion or direct recruitment. Obviously, while taking such decision, the
cap on the number of the direct recruits has to be kept in view. If the
vacancy is to be filled up by direct recruitment, Rule 8 comes into play. In
15Page 16
case, such vacancy is decided to be filled by promotion, the procedure in
Rule 9 has to be followed. In other words, for a vacancy in the Senior
Branch of service to be filled by promotion, the High Court makes
recommendation for appointment to such vacancy an officer of the Junior
Branch of the service, who in the opinion of High Court is the most suitable
for the purpose. When such recommendation is made by the High Court
for filling the vacancy, either the government accepts the recommendation
or if, for any reason the government is unable to accept the
recommendation, it may call for further recommendations from the High
Court. Thus, in the absence of any vacancy in the Senior Branch cadre of
Superior Judicial Service to be filled up by promotion, no appointment to
the Senior Branch of service by way of promotion can be made. It is as
fundamental as this.
34. The cadre strength in Orissa Superior Judicial Service, Senior
Branch has been fixed in the 1963 Rules. No ad hoc or temporary posts of
Additional District Judges have been created under these Rules before
05.01.2002 or 26.04.2002. The cadre strength of Senior Branch of service
has not been increased. In this view of the matter, the question of giving
any promotion to the Senior Branch of service in the absence of a vacancy
in the cadre does not arise.
35. It is appropriate at this stage to consider the 2001 Rules and
its scheme. 2001 Rules were made to regulate the recruitment of Judicial
16Page 17
Officers in the State of Orissa on ad hoc and purely temporary basis
exclusively for implementation of the recommendations of 11th Finance
Commission for upgradation of Judicial Administration under upgradation
grant for elimination of old pending cases. Rule 2 of the 2001 Rules
defines “service” to mean the Judicial Service of State of Orissa. Rule 3
thereof provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the 1963 Rules
and Orissa Judicial Service Rules, 1994 the appointment of Additional
District Judges on ad hoc and purely temporary basis shall be made for
implementation of the scheme. Rule 4 again clarifies that the appointment
made under 2001 Rules is purely on ad hoc and temporary basis. It also
provides that appointment under these Rules shall be made initially for a
period of one year and shall be liable to be terminated at any time without
any prior notice. Rule 5 of the 2001 Rules lays down the eligibility for the
appointment of Additional District Judges. The appointment of the
Additional District Judges under this scheme can be made from 4 sources,
one of such sources is in-service Chief Judicial Magistrates/Additional
Magistrates having three years of service as such. Rule 6 of these Rules
provides that the selection of in-service Judicial Officers for ad hoc
appointment shall be based on scrutiny of their judgments and service
record. The selection shall be made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
Rule 7 makes the provision that inservice Judicial Officer shall not claim
17Page 18
regular promotion in the regular cadre on the basis of appointment made
under this scheme.
36. As noted earlier, 72 posts of ad hoc Additional District Judges
were created under the 2001 Rules to meet its objectives. These posts
were not part of cadre strength of Senior Branch Service in the 1963 Rules
nor by creation of these posts under the 2001 Rules, the cadre strength of
the Senior Branch of service got increased. The writ petitioner’s promotion
as an ad hoc Additional District Judge vide Notification dated 05.01.2002
pursuant to which he joined the post of ad hoc Additional District Judge,
Bargarh on 26.04.2002 is traceable wholly and squarely to the 2001 Rules.
Merely because the writ petitioner was adjudged suitable on the
touchstone of the 1963 Rules, we are afraid, it cannot be said that he was
given appointment to the post of ad hoc Additional District Judge under the
1963 Rules. As noted above, there was no vacancy to be filled by
promotion in cadre strength of Senior Branch of the service under the 1963
Rules on that date.
37. As a matter of fact, on the representation made by the writ
petitioner, the Committee advised to the Full Court of the Orissa High
Court to reject the representation, inter alia, for the following reason:
“Shri Das claims seniority over and above Shri D. Dash and
Shri S. Pujhari as he was appointed as Ad hoc Addl.
Sessions Judge prior to them. Shri Dash and Shri Pujhari
were appointed in regular cadre vacancy of 44 against the
available direct recruit quota of 2(11 being the total quota).
18Page 19
When Shri Dash and Shri Pujhari were appointed, no quota
to the promotees was available either in the cadre or in the
ex-cadre (44+36). So no substantive vacancy was available
for being filled up from the promotion quota. When Shri Das
was not born in the cadre of substantive vacancy of District
Judge (which includes cadre + ex-cadre) and also even no
vacancy was available to absorb him in the cadre then, his
claim for seniority in the cadre by no stretch of imagination
be allowed”.
38. The essence of the reason given by the Committee is that
when appellants were appointed as Additional District Judges, no vacancy
to be filled by way of promotion to the Senior Branch of the service was
available either in the cadre or in the ex-cadre. When no vacancy was
available against which the writ petitioner could have been brought into the
cadre then his claim for seniority in the cadre over the appellants did not
arise. The above Report of the Committee was accepted by the Full
Court and the writ petitioner’s representation claiming seniority over the
appellants was rejected. There is no legal flaw at all in the decision of the
Full Court which is founded on the above view of the Committee. In view
of the admitted factual position, the proviso following the main provision in
Rule 17 of the 1963 Rules does not help the writ petitioner at all.
39. The Division Bench committed two fundamental errors, one, in
holding that the promotion of the writ petitioner on 05.01.2002 as
Additional District Judge is under the 1963 Rules and two, that the
existence of substantive vacancy in the Senior Branch cadre of Superior
Judicial Service on 05.01.2002 or for that matter 26.04.2002 is wholly
19Page 20
academic. The Division Bench overlooked the true scope of Rules 7, 8 and
9 of the 1963 Rules. In the absence of vacancy in the Senior Branch
cadre of service to be filled up by promotion on the relevant date, no
promotion could have been accorded on ad hoc basis or otherwise under
the 1963 Rules.
40. The question of inter se seniority between promotees and
direct recruits has engaged the attention of this Court on more than one
occasion. In the words of Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. in O.P. Singla1
, “there
are many decisions bearing upon the familiar controversy between
promotees and direct recruits and this will be one more. Perhaps, just
another.” We do not think that anybody will dispute this apt description in
respect of litigations between promotees and direct recruits. In O.P.
Singla1
, this Court was concerned with the question of inter se seniority
between promotees and direct recruits in the Judicial Service of Delhi.
This Court considered the above question in light of the provisions in Delhi
Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970. Having regard to the provisions
contained in Rule 2(d), the majority decision in para 21 of the Report held
as under:
21. …….. This Rule shows that two conditions must co-exist
in order that a person can become a ‘Member of the
Service’. Firstly, his appointment has to be in a substantive
capacity and secondly, the appointment has to be to the
Service, that is, to a post in the Service. Persons who hold
posts bearing designations similar to the designations of
posts comprised in the Service cannot, for that reason
alone, become members of the Service. It is only when they
20Page 21
are appointed in a substantive capacity to a post in the
Service, that they become members of the Service.”
(emphasis supplied by us)
41. Rules 3(d), 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the 1963 Rules leave no
manner of doubt that a person can become a member of the Senior
Branch of the Superior Judicial Service only if his appointment has been
made to a post in the service. If there is no vacancy to be filled in by
promotion in the cadre of Senior Branch service, there is no question of
any appointment being made to the service. The membership of service is
limited to the persons who are appointed within the cadre strength by
direct recruitment and by promotion.
42. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II
Engineering Officers’ Association2
 was concerned with a question of
seniority in service between the direct recruits and promotees amongst
Deputy Engineers in the State of Maharashtra. This Court considered
previous decisions of this Court, including S.B. Patwardhan v. State of
Maharashtra6 and Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P.7
 and in paragraph 47
of the Report summed up the legal position. Clauses (A), (B) and (C) of
paragraph 47 are relevant for the present purpose which read as follows:
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to
rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his
6
 1977 (3) SCC 399
7
 1980 (4) SCC 226
21Page 22
appointment and not according to the date of his
confirmation.
The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and
made as a stop gap arrangement, the officiation in such post
cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the
procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee
continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularization of
his service in accordance with the rules, the period of
officiating service will be counted.
(C) When appointments are made from more than one
source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from
the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard
they must ordinarily be followed strictly.
43. The essence of direction in clause (A) is that the seniority of
an appointee has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not
according to the date of his confirmation once a recruitee is appointed to a
post according to rules. In other words, where initial appointment is only
ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement,
the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the
seniority. The writ petitioner’s appointment as an ad hoc Additional District
Judge is not traceable to the 1963 Rules. The simple reason leading to this
consequence is that there was no vacancy available which was to be filled
up by promotion on that date in Superior Judicial Service (Senior Branch).
44. In Rudra Kumar Sain3
, a Five-Judge Bench of this Court was
again concerned with the inter se seniority between the promotees and
direct recruits in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service. The contention was
whether the guidelines and directions given by this Court in O.P. Singla1
22Page 23
have been followed or not. The Court considered the 3 terms “ad hoc”,
“stop-gap” and “fortuitous” in the context of the service jurisprudence and
in para 20 of the Report held as under:
“20. In service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the
requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post
and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation
of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a
fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held
to be “stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc”. In this view of
the matter, the reasoning and basis on which the
appointment of the promotees in the Delhi Higher Judicial
Service in the case in hand was held by the High Court to be
“fortuitous/ad hoc/stopgap” are wholly erroneous and,
therefore, exclusion of those appointees to have their
continuous length of service for seniority is erroneous.”
45. The Division Bench in the impugned order has quoted the
above paragraph from Rudra Kumar Sain3
 but applied it wrongly.
46. In Brij Mohan Lal 14
, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, inter
alia, considered the Fast Track Courts scheme. In paragraph 10 of the
judgment, this Court gave various directions. Direction no. 14 in that para
is relevant which can be paraphrased as follows:
(i) No right will be conferred on judicial officers in service
for claiming any regular promotion on the basis of
his/her appointment on ad hoc basis under the scheme.
(ii) The service rendered in Fast Track Courts will be
deemed as service rendered in the parent cadre.
23Page 24
(iii) In case any judicial officer is promoted to higher grade
in the parent cadre during his tenure in Fast Track
Courts, the service rendered in Fast Track Courts will
be deemed to be service in such higher grade.
47. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner heavily relied
upon the third part of direction no. 14. As a matter of fact, this part has
been relied upon in the impugned judgment as well. It is submitted on
behalf of the writ petitioner that on promotion to the Senior Branch cadre
of Superior Judicial Service during his tenure in the Fast Track Courts, the
writ petitioner is entitled to the counting of the service rendered by him in
the Fast Track Court as a service in Superior Judicial Service (Senior
Branch). The submission overlooks the first two parts of direction no. 14,
one, no right will be conferred in judicial service for claiming any regular
promotion on the basis of his/her appointment on ad hoc basis under the
scheme; and two, the service rendered in Fast Track Courts will be
deemed as service rendered in the parent cadre. In our opinion, until the
vacancy occurred in the cadre of Superior Judicial Service (Senior
Branch) which was to be filled up by promotion, the service rendered by
the writ petitioner in the Fast Track Court cannot be deemed to be service
rendered in the Superior Judicial Service, Senior Branch. Rather until
then, he continued to be a member of the parent cadre, i.e., Superior
Judicial Service (Junior Branch). The third part of direction no. 14, in our
24Page 25
view, does not deserve to be read in a manner that overrides the 1963
Rules.
48. In Brij Mohan Lal 25
, inter alia, the controversy centered
around the closure of Fast Track Courts Scheme and the appointment of
retired district and sessions judges as ad hoc judges of the Fast Track
Courts. In one of the writ petitions filed before this Court, the relief was
intended to ensure that only the members of the Bar were appointed by
direct recruitment to the post of ad hoc district and sessions judges under
the Fast Track Courts Scheme. The Court considered the directions given
by this Court in Brij Mohan Lal 14
. The Court observed in Brij Mohan Lal
2
5
, that this Court had foreseen the possibility of the closure of the Fast
Track Courts Scheme. The Court noted the directions given in Brij Mohan
Lal 14 , inter alia, in the following manner: “…. that the service in FTCs will
be deemed as service of the promoted judicial officers rendered in the
parent cadre. However, no right would accrue to such recruits
promoted/posted on ad hoc basis from the lower judiciary for regular
promotion on the basis of such appointment. For direct recruits,
continuation in service will be dependent on review by the High Court and
there could be possibility of absorption in the regular vacancy if their
performance was found to be satisfactory………..”.
25Page 26
49. In Brij Mohan Lal 25
, this Court with reference to the Superior
Judicial Service in the State of Orissa, noted in paragraph 171 of the
Report thus:
“171. Similarly, we also find no merit in the contention that
this Court should quash the advertisement issued by the
State of Orissa for making selections to the Orissa Higher
Judicial Services on the basis of the claims for regularisation
of the petitioners against such posts. There are two different
sets of Rules, applicable in different situations, to these two
different classes of officers and further they are governed by
different conditions of service. They cannot be placed on a
par. The process of their appointments is distinct and
different. These petitioners have no right to the post. Thus, it
would neither be permissible nor proper for the Court to halt
the regular process of selection on the plea that these
petitioners have a right to be absorbed against the posts in
the regular cadre.”
50. Then, in paragraph 176 of the Report, the Court observed that
the Fast Track Court Judges were appointed under a separate set of rules
than the rules governing the regular appointment to the State Higher
Judicial Service. The Court noted that while appointing Fast Track Court
Judges, it was clearly stipulated that such appointments would be ad hoc
and temporary and that the appointees shall not derive any benefit from
such appointments. 
51. We have already indicated above that on 05.01.2002 or
26.04.2002, there was no vacancy in the cadre of Superior Judicial Service
(Senior Branch) for being filled up by promotion. Such vacancy in the
Senior Branch cadre of the service occurred on 15.12.2003 and from that
26Page 27
date the writ petitioner has been given benefit of his service rendered in
the Fast Track Court. The administrative decision by the Full Court is in
accord with the 1963 Rules, the 2001 Rules and the legal position already
indicated above. The view of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment
is legally unsustainable. The impugned judgment is liable to be set aside
and is set aside.
52. Appeal is allowed, as above, with no order as to costs. 
 ……………………….J.
 (R.M. Lodha)
 ..…..………………...J.
 (J. Chelameswar)
 .……………………...J.
 (Madan B. Lokur)
NEW DELHI
MARCH 11, 2013.
27

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Section 136-Attachment order-Property falling outside The jurisdiction of the issuing authority-Procedure for executions-Non-compliance with- Attachment challenged as invalid-Held, the non-compliance wilt not invalidate the attachment order as such since defect in the procedure could be cured-Order 38 Rules S and 7, Order 38 Rule 5(1) (as amended by Amending Act, 1976) and Section 136- Difference between. Auction sale-Execution proceedings-Challenge on ground of insufficiency of consideration--Held, mere Inadequacy of consideration is not a ground for setting aside Court sale. In a money suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff certain property of the defendant falling in another district was attached. The order was sent directly to Subordinate Judge, and not through District Judge of the concerned district. After ex-parte decree of the suit in execution proceedings, the property was auction-sold and was purchased by the appellant-decree holder. Respondents filed a case for release of the land from attachment as they had purchased the property from the judgment debtor. The case of the respondents was rejected by the execution Court. Respondents filed Revision Petition before High Court contending that the attachment of property by the appellant-decree holder was not in accordance with Section 136 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and that since the agreements for sale of the property were prior to the attachment, the subsequent attachment would not prevail over the sale deeds executed pursuant to the agreements of sate; and that the price, at which the appellant purchased the property in auction sale, was not adequate. High Court, on the ground of non-compliance of procedure laid down in Section 136 C.P.C, set aside the auction sale and allowed the Revision Petition. Hence this appeal.


http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4394 of 1991
PETITIONER:
RAJENDER SINGH
RESPONDENT:
RAMDHAR SINGH AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/05/2001
BENCH:
UMESH C. BANERJEE & K.G. BALAKRJSHNAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2001 (3) SCR 736
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BALAKRISHNAN,,I. This appeal is directed against the order passed n Civil
Revision No, 1208/87 by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The
Dlaintiff-appellant herein filed Money Suit no. 13 of 1974 before the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Biharsharif. On 26.3.1974, the plaintiff obtained
an order of attachment before judgment in respect of certain properties of
defendant situated within the local jurisdiction of Sub-ordinate Judge,
Jehanabad. The attachment order was sent directly to Sub-ordinate Judge.
Jehanabad on 27,3.1974 and it was served on the defendant in the suit on
3L3.1974. The defendant remained ex-parte and the suit was decreed on
11.10.1974. The plaintiff-decree hold sent the decree for execution to the
Court of Sub-ordinate Judge, Jehanabad, On 25.8.1976, a fresh order of
attachment of the properties was made by the executing court and the
properties were sold through court auction on 19.1 1.1977. The decree
holder himself purchased the attached property for a sum of Rs. 5996.38.
The properties were having an extent of about 5. acres’. The respondents
herein filed a Miscellaneous Case on 19:11.1977 contending that they had
purchased the disputed properties from the judgment debtor on 27.4.1974:
According to the respondents, they had purchased these disputed properties
under three registered sale deeds dated 27.4.1974 & 7.9.1974 for a total
sum of Rs. 47,000, They had also alleged that prior to the sale deeds,
there were two deeds of Baibeyana (Agreement to sell) dated 9.2.1974 and
16.2.1974 respectively. The respondents contended that there was no proper
attachment of these properties arid the auction of the properties was held
illegally and they prayed that the lands be released from attachment. The
Miscellaneous case no. 28 of 1977 fifed by them was rejected by the
Execution Court and aggrieved by the same, they filed Revision Petition No.
1208 of 1987 before the High Court,
The respondents contended that the attachment before judgment obtained by
the decree holder-appellant was not in accordance with Section 136 of Civil
Procedure Code, They also contended that the decree holder had purchased
the property without obtaining previous sanction of the Court and
therefore, the sale in his favour was illegal They had further contended
that the two agreements for sale were prior to the attachment obtained by
the plaintiff and, therefore, the subsequent attachment wilt not prevail
over the sale deeds executed pursuant to the agreements for sale. This plea
was not considered on merits by the High Court. The High Court accepted the
plea of the respondents regarding non-compliance of Section 136 6f the
Civil Procedure Code. The High Court held that the attachment order was not
sent through the District Judge, Gaya within worse territorial
jurisdiction, the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Jehanabad, and the attached
properties were situate. The High Court accepted this plea and held that:
as the attachment before judgment was not sent through the District Judge,
Gaya, within whose territorial Jurisdiction the attached property washttp://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6
situate, the same was ineffective and that warrant of attachment being
ineffective, subsequent alienations, by the judgment-debtor were valid
transactions and the purchasers obtained valid title. In that view of the
matter, the auction sale was set aside and the revision application filed
by the respondents was allowed. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal
is ..filed.
The question that arises for consideration is whether the Court, which
passes an order of attachment in respect of properties situated within the
jurisdiction of another Court, can directly send the order of attachment to
that Court or it should always endorse the order of attachment to the
District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the attached
property is situate. Attachment before Judgment is effected under Order
XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 7 of Order XXX VI11
provides the mode of making attachment. It says as under ;
"Save as otherwise expressly provided, the attachment shall be made in the
manner provided for the attachment of property in execution of a decree.1’
Section 136 prescribes the procedure to be followed where a person to be
arrested or property to be attached is outside the district. The relevant
portion of the Section reads as follows :-
"(1) Where an application is made that any person shall be arrested or that
any property shall be attached under any provision of this Code not
relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such
property is situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
Court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion,
issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send to the
District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person of
property resides or is situate a copy of the warrant or order, together
with the probable amount of the costs of the arrest or attachment.
2. The District Court shall, on receipt of such copy and amount, cause the
arrest or attachment to be made by its own officers, or by a Court
subordinate to itself, and shall inform the Court which issued or made such
warrant or order of the arrest or attachment.
3. XXXX
4.XXXX"
(Emphasis added)
From the above provision, it is clear that for effecting attachment of
property situated outside the local limits of a Civil Court, the mode
prescribed is that the order of attachment shall be sent to the District
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate
and the District Court thereafter shall send the order of attachment to the
subordinate Court within whose jurisdiction the property is situated for
effecting the attachment.
The validity of the attachment order issued not in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under Section 136 Civil Procedure Code was considered
by different High Courts and different views have been taken on this
matter:
In Mariaimma Mathew v. lttoop Paulo, AIR (1952) Travancore-Cochin 159, the
full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court held that the procedure
prescribed under Section 136 Civil Procedure Code is not mandatory so long
as the Court effecting the attachment has jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of attachment. In that case, one Munsif Court issued an order of
attachment in respect of 12 items of immovable properties out of which 11
items were situated within the jurisdiction of another Munsif Court The
attachment order and the connected papers were sent directly to the Munsif
Court within whose jurisdiction the property was situated. When thehttp://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6
plaintiff took steps to execute the decree by the sale of the attached
properties, the alienees who had purchased the properties from the judgment
debtor raised an objection to the effect that the attachment effected was
not valid, inasmuch as the order of attachment was not sent through the
District Court as enjoined by Section 101 of Travancore Civil Procedure
Code. Section 101 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code is in part materia
with Section 136 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The Court after
elaboratedly considering the question held as under :
"The question is, when an order of attachment before judgment of properties
situated within the jurisdiction of one Court is made by another Court, the
provision in Section 101 to send the order of attachment to the District
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the properties sought
to be attached are situated is only a mode of procedure prescribed or
whether the jurisdiction of the Court effecting the attachment will depend
upon the District Court’s order in that behalf. Our considered view is that
the provision is only a procedural one and that so long as the Court
effecting the attachment has jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
attachment non-compliance with the provision in Section 101 can only amount
to an irregularity.
Sub-section 2 of Section 101 shows that when an order for attachment
before judgment passed by a Court is sent to the District Court, the latter
Court is bound to carry out the order itself or through a Court subordinate
to it. The only function of the District Court to which the order of
attachment is sent or of a Court subordinate to it which the District Court
might sent it is only to carry out the order and complete the formalities
of attachment, It other words, Section 101 prescribes the procedure, it
does not touch the jurisdiction,"
In Mookan Ouseph Thamakutty v. Puramundekat Padinjare Madathil Nanu, AIR
(1963) Kerala 193, a Single judge of the High Court followed Mariamma
Mathew v. Ittoop Poulo, AIR (1952) Travancore Cochin 159 and held that
Section 136 Civil Procedure Code prescribes only a procedure and does not
confer jurisdiction on the Court, which effects the attachment. The noncompliance of that procedure being only a procedural defect, may be waived
if no objection is taken and it does not invalidate the attachment itself.
ln Bansropan Singh and Others v. Emperor, AIR (1937) Patna 603, the warrant
of arrest Was issued by Munsif of Korimako for arresting a judgment debtor
for recovery of money. As the judgment debtor was evading arrest, the Civil
Court peon alongwith three police constables approached the house of the
judgment debtor and the peon informed that he had a warrant of arrest
against the judgment debtor. The person who was found in the house of the
judgment debtor tried to run away but the peon Caught him. He cried for
help and the judgment debtor came out of the house and wounded the police
constable with a dagger. The question arose whether the warrant issued by
the Munsif Court, Kohima was valid. The judgment debtor was residing within
the jurisdiction of Munsif Court, Buxar. It was contended that as the
warrant was not endorsed to the District Court and as the warrant had to be
executed outside the jurisdiction of the issuing court, it was not validity
issued. Under that circumstances, the Court held that when a Court
exercises the extraordinary powers conferred oil it by Section 136, Civil
PX., the provisions--of that section must be strictly observed; arid the
warrant must be endorsed to the District Court outside the jurisdiction of
the issuing Court in which the warrant is to be executed. The warrant
against judgment debtor was therefore held to be defective,
In another case reported in AIR (1963) Allahabad 320,Haji Pahim Bux and
Sons and Others v, Firm Samiullah find Sons a decree holder had obtained
order of attachment before judgment. After the decree, he applied for
execution thereof by sale of the property attached. The sale was notified
and in the meantime, an objection was raised that the attachment of the
property made before judgment was invalid and that the property could not
be sold. The sale was adjourned and as there was no stay, the property washttp://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6
actually sold and the objection filed by the appellants came up for
consideration later. The objection was dismissed and in the appeal, the
High Court held that as the attachment was not in accordance with Section
136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was invalid. The Court held in
paragraph 9 at page 323 as under:
"A plain reading of these two sub-sections will show that where the
property to be attached is situate outside the local limits of the
jurisdiction of the Court to which an application for the purpose is made,
an order of attachment has to be sent to the District Court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate together with
the probable amount of the costs of the attachment. On receipt of the order
of attachment, the District Court may cause the attachment to be made by
its own officers or by a Court subordinate to it. Primarily, therefore,
jurisdiction to make an attachment on the authority of a precept received
from an outside Court vests in the District Court. A Court subordinate to
the District Court may attach the property in compliance with the order of
attachment received but that would be possible only if the District Court
requires it to do so. It is the District Court, which has jurisdiction to
cause the attachment ’to- be made by its own officers or by a Court
subordinate to itself. In the absence of a direction of the District Court
to that effect, therefore, any attachment, which may be made by a
subordinate Court in pursuance of a precept received from a Court in
another district would be without jurisdiction and consequently void." the
Counsel for the appellant: contended that the views taken by the Allahabad
High Court and Patna High Court are not correct. In the above two
decisions, the Court had held that when the property to be attached is
situate outside the local jurisdiction of the Court to which an application
for the purpose is made, an order of attachment has to be sent to the
District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the property
is situate, and it is the District Court which may cause the attachment of
the property and, therefore, the attachment order passed by the issuing
Court without sending the papers to the District Court is invalid and
defective. Though, in Section 136 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is stated
that the District Court shall, on receipt of the order of attachment or
order of arrest as the case may be, cause the attachment or arrest to be
made by its own officers or by a Court subordinate to itself, in effect,
the order is as such not passed by the District Court. The Court which
passes the attachment before judgment passes the same under Order XXX VIII
Rule 5 of the Code. The said rule gives authority to the Court to pass
attachment before judgment after being satisfied by affidavit or otherwise,
that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any
decree that may be passed against him may try to dispose of the property.
Before issuing such order of attachment, the Court must satisfy itself that
the, defendant is about to dispose of the whole or any part Of his
property, or is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from
the local limits of the: jurisdiction of the Court.
It is only on the satisfaction of these conditions, the Court can pass an
order of attachment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5. Rule 7 of Order XXX VIII
says that such attachment shall be made in the manner provided for the
attachment of the property in execution of a decree.
Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the procedure to be
followed where the person to be arrested or property to be attached is
outside the District Court which passes the order of arrest or attachment.
Section 136 only lays down the procedure in case the property is situate
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The District Court to
which such order of attachment is sent is only effecting the attachment and
the power under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 is not as such exercised by that
Court.
In MG. Brothers v. Shah Talchand Parswachand & Co., AIR (1963) Mys. 147. it
was held that the Court passing the order of attachment has got the power
to raise the attachment. In that case, a warrant was issued under Sectionhttp://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6
136 of the Code by the Subordinate Judge, Kunoor to the District Court,
Bellary in which a lorry was attached, and a claim was preferred before the
District Judge and he made an order raising the attachment on the claimant
furnishing security. The High Court held that the Court which could hear
the claim was the Court which made the order of attachment and not the
Court which actually effected the attachment.
The order of attachment is sent to the District Court when the property is
situate outside the jurisdiction of the issuing authority. It is only to
maintain the comity of Courts as. in some cases, the attachment order mignt
be issued by the Munsif ’Civil Judge (Junior Division) and the property to
be attached might be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (Senior
Division)/ \007Subordinate Judge arid in the fitness of things. Section 136
lays down the procedure (hat under such circumstances, the order of
attachment should be sent to the District Court which is having supervisory
jurisdiction over all the subordinate Courts within that district- It is
only a procedure and if the owner of the property raised an objection to
the effect that the procedure was not complied with, Court can issue
appropriate direction to cure the defect in the procedure. If such an
objection was not raised within a reasonable time, we do hot think that the
attachment order itself could be treated as invalid.
It is also pertinent to note that by the Amending Act of 1976, a new sub
rule was added to Rule 5 of Order XXX VIII to the effect that if an order
of attachment is made without complying with the provisions of sub-rule (1)
of the said rule, such attachment shall be void. Therefore, the importance
is given to the mandatory conditions under Rule 5(1) of Order XXXVIII and
we do not find any such similar insertion in Section 136. Therefore, the
failure, if any, on the part of the Court which issued the attachment order
in sending the attachment order and the connected papers to the District
Court will not invalidate the attachment order as such. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court was not correct in holding that the
attachment order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Biharsharif was invalid.
The other ground for setting aside the same is the inadequacy of the price.
The respondents have not alleged any fraud or material irregularity in the
conduct of the Court’s auction sale, whereby they suffered injustice. Mere
inadequacy of the price is not a ground for setting aside the Court sale,
That finding of the learned Judge also is not sustainable in law.
The respondents had also urged another ground to set aside the same,
namely, that there were two deeds of Baibeyana ( Agreements to sell), one
on 9.2.1974 and another on 16.2.1974 prior to the date of attachment,
namely, 6.3.1974. The respondents had contended before the Execution Court
that these agreements should prevail over the attachment but this plea was
rejected by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the attachment does
prevail over the pre-existing contract to sell even though the attaching
creditor has ho notice of a contract to sell. The very same plea was
advanced before the learned Single Judge of the High Court but the same was
not considered as the decision was taken in the matter having regard to
non-compliance of Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
learned Single Judge felt that it was not necessary for him, in this case,
to consider that plea.
As we have taken a contrary view regarding Section 136, the matter has to
go back to the learned Single Judge to consider the plea raised by the
respondents regarding the two agreements allegedly executed by them. It may
be noted that as regards the question whether the agreement entered into by
the judgment debtor prior to the attachment of property in execution of a
decree would prevail over the attachment itself, was considered by this
Court in Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan
and another, [1990] 3 SCC 291 and this Court approved the views expressed
in Paparaju Veeraraghavayya v. Killaru Kamala Devi. AIR (1935) Mad; 193;
Veerappa Thevar v.. C.S Venkatarama Aiyar, AIR (1935) Mad. 872 and Angu
Pillai v. M.S.M, Kasiviswanthan Chettiar, AIR (1974) Mad. 16 followed byhttp://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6
Rango Ramachandra Kulkarni v. Gurlingappa Chinnappa Muthal, AIR (1941) 198;
Yesvant Shatikar Dunakhe V. Pyaraji Nurji Tambol, AIR (1943) Bom 145 and
Kochuponchi Varughese v. Ouseph Lonan, AIR (1952) TC 467 and held that the
agreement for sale creates an obligation attached to the ownership of
property and since the attaching creditor is entitled to attach only the
right, title and interest of the judgement debtor, the attachment cannot be
free from the obligations incurred under the contract for sale.
It is for the learned Single Judge to consider these aspects having regard
to the nature of the agreements alleged to have been executed by the
respondents on 9,2.1974 and 162.1974,
As the learned Single Judge has not considered the questions raised by the
respondents regarding the two agreements and their effect on the
attachment, the matter has to go back to High Court to be considered afresh
subject to the observation made by us above. It is ordered accordingly.
As this litigation has been protracted and delayed, the learned Single
Judge before whom the matter comes up for decision is requested to dispose
of the same at an early date.
The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Parties to tear their respective
costs.

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

defamatory.= “Mamlatdar Shri Gambhirsinh Dhakre is caught red handed by the youngstersMamlatdar is indulged in illicit relations with the wife of Doctor who is residing at Ajwa Road- attempts to conceal the matter- why the Government is not taking any action against the Mamlatdar?”- A news item has the potentiality of bringing doom’s day for an individual. The Editor controls the selection of the matter that is published. Therefore, he has to keep a careful eye on the selection. Blue-penciling of news articles by any one other than the Editor is not welcome in a democratic polity.- ‘Editor’ to mean ‘the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper’. Section 7 raises the presumption in respect of a person who is named as the Editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper. The Act does not recognise any other legal entity for raising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief Editor is printed in the newspaper, there is no presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act.” - for recalling an erroneous order of issuance of process, no specific provision of law is required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stagesTherefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew’s case (supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law.” .-In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the court in seisin of the case shall now proceed with the trial in accordance with law.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.433 OF 2013
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 3475 OF 2008)
GAMBHIRSINH R. DEKARE … APPELLANT
VERSUS
FALGUNBHAI CHIMANBHAI PATEL
AND ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
The petitioner Gambhirsinh R. Dekare, at the
relevant point of time was serving as Taluka
Mamlatdar and an Executive Magistrate in Vadodara
Taluka in the State of Gujarat. 
A Gujarati daily
newspaper “Sandesh” is published from different
places i.e., Surat, Valsad, Bharuch, Vadodara and
other cities of India. 
Navinbhai Chauhan is the
Page 2
Resident Editor of Vadodara edition of “Sandesh”
whereas Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel is the Editor of
“Sandesh”. 
The newspaper published a news item in
its Vadodara issue dated 28.09.1999 that the
petitioner “is in love and keeping illicit relations
with the wife of a doctor at Ajwa Road with the
following headlines:
“Mamlatdar Shri Gambhirsinh Dhakre is
caught red handed by the youngstersMamlatdar is indulged in illicit
relations with the wife of Doctor who
is residing at Ajwa Road- attempts to
conceal the matter- why the Government
is not taking any action against the
Mamlatdar?”
According to the petitioner (hereinafter referred
to as “the complainant”), the allegation published in
the newspaper is false and defamatory. 
Accordingly,
he filed complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Vadodara.
The complainant alleged that
the news items are printed in the newspaper “as per
the instructions and directions of the accused
persons”.
In paragraph 3 of the complaint the
complainant alleged as under:
2Page 3
“3. The Accused No. 1 and 2 of this
case have deliberately published the
news in the Page No. 12 of their daily
newspaper ‘Sandesh’ dated 28/9/99
which is quite defaming and offending
to us. The accused persons were in
the knowledge that we the complainant
shall be defamed in the Society due to
publishing of such news and with a
view to vilify us as the person having
bad character, the accused persons, in
collusion with each other, have
published the following news in the
newspaper deliberately.”
The complainant termed those allegations to be
false and stated that the Editor and the Resident
Editor have tried to prove him a characterless person
in the society and because of that he had faced
shameful and disgraceful situation amongst the family
members and friends. 
The news item further brought
him in disrepute in the Department and the public.
It has been alleged that the accused persons have
published the news item without any evidence or
proof. 
The complainant denied to have any illicit
relation with the doctor’s wife. The complainant was
examined on solemn affirmation in which he reiterated
the allegation. 
3Page 4
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, taking into
account the allegation made in the petition of
complaint and the statement of the complainant on
solemn affirmation, took cognizance of the offence
under Section 500, 501, 502, 506, 507 and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code and issued process against both the
accused.
Accused no. 2, Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel, the
Editor of “Sandesh”, aggrieved by the order taking
cognizance and issuing process, filed an application
before the High Court seeking quashing of the
complaint filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Vadodara on 08.10.1999. 
He sought quashing of the
complaint on the ground that he is the Editor of the
newspaper, stationed at Ahmedabad and the offending
news item was published in the Vadodara Edition of
the newspaper, of which Navinbhai Chauhan, accused
no. 1, is the Resident Editor. 
It was further
contended that he was not aware of the offending news
item being published in the newspaper or for that
matter he had any role to play in selection of such
item for publication. 
The High Court by the impugned
4Page 5
order allowed the application and while doing so
observed as follows:
“6. In the complaint itself, the
petitioner is described as editor of
the newspaper and his address is shown
at Ahmedabad. Original accused No. 1
is described as a resident editor of
Baroda of the same newspaper. It is
not in dispute that the newspaper in
question has its registered office at
Ahmedabad and Baroda edition of the
newspaper is being separately
published from Baroda. It is also not
in dispute that offending news item
was carried in Baroda edition of the
newspaper only.”
The High Court further went on to observe as
under:
“10. In the present case also, I find
that there is nothing in the complaint
to suggest that the petitioner herein
was aware about the offending news
item being published or that he had
any role to play in selection of such
item for publication. In absence of
any material disclosed in the
complaint and in view of the admitted
fact that the petitioner is an editor
of the newspaper stationed at
Ahmedabad and the news item was
carried in its Baroda edition alone
where the newspaper has a separate
resident editor, the petitioner cannot
be proceeded against for the offence
of defamation of the complaint.”
5Page 6
The High Court came to the conclusion that
prosecution of accused no. 2 would amount to
miscarriage of justice and, accordingly, quashed the
complaint and the process issued against him. 
It is against this order that the complainant has
preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, Senior Advocate appears on
behalf of the complainant (appellant herein) whereas
accused no. 2 (Respondent no. 1 herein) is
represented by Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate.
Mr. Ahmadi, submits that according to the
complainant, accused no. 2 was the Editor stationed
at Ahmedabad and there is specific allegation against
him that the news items are published in the
newspaper “as per the instructions and directions of
the accused persons”. The complainant has further
alleged in the complaint that both the accused i.e.
the Editor (accused no. 2) and the Resident Editor
(accused no. 1) had deliberately published the news
6Page 7
in their Gujarati daily newspaper “Sandesh” which is
defamatory. The complainant went on to say that the
“accused persons were in the knowledge that the
complainant shall be defamed in the society due to
publication of such news”. In the face of the
aforesaid allegation, Mr. Ahmadi points out that the
High Court committed a serious error by observing
that “there is nothing in the complaint to suggest
that” accused no. 2 “was aware about the offending
news item being published or that he had any role to
play in selection of such item for publication”. Mr.
Dave, however, submits that, according to the
complainant’s own showing, accused no. 2 was the
Editor of the newspaper stationed at Ahmedabad and
the offending news item having been published at
Vadodara for which there is admittedly a separate
Resident Editor, it has to be assumed that the
accused no. 2 was not aware of the same and had no
role to play in the selection of such item for
publication.
We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submission and we do not find any substance in the
7Page 8
submission of Mr. Dave. Complainant has specifically
averred in the complaint that the news item was
printed in the newspaper as per the instructions and
directions of the accused persons. The complainant
had specifically alleged that accused nos. 1 and 2
have deliberately published the offending news and it
was within their knowledge. At this stage, it is
impermissible to go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegation and one has to proceed on
a footing that the allegation made is true. Hence,
the conclusion reached by the High Court that “there
is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the
petitioner herein was aware of the offending news
item being published or that he had any role to play
in the selection of such item for publication” is
palpably wrong. Hence, in our opinion, the High
Court has quashed the prosecution on an erroneous
assumption of fact which renders its order illegal.
Mr. Ahmadi, further submits that the impugned
order is vulnerable on another count. He points out
that according to the complainant, the present
accused was the Editor and his name has been printed
8Page 9
as such in the publication and, therefore, he is
responsible for the publication of the news item.
Mr. Dave, however, submits that there being Resident
Editor for the Vadodara Edition of the newspaper, the
present accused, who is the Editor and stationed at
Ahmedabad, cannot be held responsible for the
publication. He emphasizes that it would be the
Resident Editor who shall be responsible for the
contents of the Vadodara Edition. In support of the
submission he has placed reliance on a decision of
this Court in the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of
Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 217.
A news item has the potentiality of bringing
doom’s day for an individual. The Editor controls
the selection of the matter that is published.
Therefore, he has to keep a careful eye on the
selection. Blue-penciling of news articles by any
one other than the Editor is not welcome in a
democratic polity. Editors have to take
responsibility of everything they publish and to
maintain the integrity of published record. It is
apt to remind ourselves the answer of the Editor of
9Page 10
the Scotsman, a Scottish newspaper. When asked what
it was like to run a national newspaper, the Editor
answered “run a newspaper! I run a country”. It may
be an exaggeration but it does reflect the well known
fact that it can cause far reaching consequences in
an individual and country’s life.
The scheme and scope of Press and Registration of
Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”) also brings forward the same conclusion.
Section 1 of the Act is the interpretation clause and
the expression “Editor” has been defined as follows:
“1. Interpretation-clause.-(1)In this
Act, unless there shall be something
repugnant in the subject or context,-
 xxx xxx xxx
"editor" means the person who controls
the selection of the matter that is
published in a newspaper;”
Section 5 of the Act provides for rules as to
publication of newspapers and prohibits its
publication in India except in conformity with the
rules laid down. Section 5 (1) of the Act which is
relevant for the purpose reads as follows:
10Page 11
“5. Rules as to publication of
newspapers.-No newspaper shall be
published in India, except in
conformity with the rules hereinafter
laid down:
(1)Without prejudice to the provisions
of section 3, every copy of every such
newspaper shall contain the names of
the owner and editor thereof printed
clearly on such copy and also the date
of its publication.
xxx xxx xxx”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision,
it is evident that every copy of every newspaper
published in India is mandated to contain the names
of the owner and Editor thereof. It is in the light
of the aforesaid obligation that the name of the
accused no. 2 has been printed as Editor. Section 7
of the Act makes the declaration to be prima facie
evidence for fastening the liability in any civil or
criminal proceeding on the Editor. Section 7 of the
Act reads as follows:
7. Office copy of declaration to be
prima facie evidence.- In any legal
proceeding whatever, as well civil as
criminal, the production of a copy of
such declaration as is aforesaid,
attested by the seal of some Court
empowered by this Act to have the
custody of such declarations, or, in
11Page 12
the case of the editor, a copy of the
newspaper containing his name printed
on it as that of the editor shall be
held (unless the contrary be proved)
to be sufficient evidence, as against
the person whose name shall be
subscribed to such declaration, or
printed on such newspaper, as the case
may be that the said person was
printer or publisher, or printer and
publisher(according as the words of
the said declaration may be) of every
portion of every newspaper whereof the
title shall correspond with the title
of the newspaper mentioned in the
declaration, or the editor of every
portion of that issue of the newspaper
of which a copy is produced.”
Therefore, from the scheme of the Act it is
evident that it is the Editor who controls the
selection of the matter that is published in a
newspaper. Further, every copy of the newspaper is
required to contain the names of the owner and the
Editor and once the name of the Editor is shown, he
shall be held responsible in any civil and criminal
proceeding. Further, in view of the interpretation
clause, the presumption would be that he was the
person who controlled the selection of the matter
that was published in the newspaper. However, we
hasten to add that this presumption under Section 7
12Page 13
of the Act is a rebuttable presumption and it would
be deemed a sufficient evidence unless the contrary
is proved. The view which we have taken finds
support from the judgment of this Court in the case
of K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham, (2002) 6 SCC 670, in
which it has been held as follows:
“20. The provisions contained in the
Act clearly go to show that there
could be a presumption against the
Editor whose name is printed in the
newspaper to the effect that he is the
Editor of such publication and that he
is responsible for selecting the
matter for publication. Though, a
similar presumption cannot be drawn
against the Chief Editor, Resident
Editor or Managing Editor,
nevertheless, the complainant can
still allege and prove that they had
knowledge and they were responsible
for the publication of the defamatory
news item. Even the presumption under
Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption
and the same could be proved
otherwise. That by itself indicates
that somebody other than editor can
also be held responsible for selecting
the matter for publication in a
newspaper.”
Now reverting to the authority of this Court in
the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1
SCC 217, relied on by Mr. Dave, in our opinion, same
13Page 14
instead of supporting his contention, goes against
him. In the said case it has been observed as
follows:
“9. In the instant case there is no
averment against the Chief Editor
except the motive attributed to him.
Even the motive alleged is general and
vague. The complainant seems to rely
upon the presumption under Section 7
of the Press and Registration of Books
Act, 1867 (‘the Act’).But Section 7 of
the Act has no applicability for a
person who is simply named as ‘Chief
Editor’. The presumption under Section
7 is only against the person whose
name is printed as ‘Editor’ as
required under Section 5(1). 
There is
a mandatory (though rebuttable)
presumption that the person whose name
is printed as ‘Editor’ is the Editor
of every portion of that issue of the
newspaper of which a copy is produced.
Section 1(1) of the Act defines
‘Editor’ to mean ‘the person who
controls the selection of the matter
that is published in a newspaper’.
Section 7 raises the presumption in
respect of a person who is named as
the Editor and printed as such on
every copy of the newspaper. The Act
does not recognise any other legal
entity for raising the presumption.
Even if the name of the Chief Editor
is printed in the newspaper, there is
no presumption against him under
Section 7 of the Act.” 
14Page 15
In this case the accused was the Chief Editor of
Malyalam Manorama and there was no allegation against
him in the complaint regarding knowledge of the
objectionable character of the matter published.
In
the absence of such allegation, the Magistrate
decided to proceed against the Chief Editor. On an
application by the Chief Editor, the process issued
against him was recalled. 
The High Court, however,
set aside the order of the Magistrate and when the
matter travelled to this Court, it set aside the
order of the High Court. 
This Court made distinction
between ‘Editor’ and ‘Chief Editor’. 
In no uncertain
terms the Court observed that the Press and
Registration of Books Act recognizes ‘Editor’ and
presumption is only against him. 
The Act does not
recognize any other legal entity viz., Chief Editor,
Managing Editor etc. for raising the presumption.
They can be proceeded against only when there is
specific allegation.
We may here observe that in this case, this Court
has held that the Magistrate has the power to drop
15Page 16
proceeding against an accused against whom he had
issued process in the following words:
“8. It is open to the accused to plead
before the Magistrate that the process
against him ought not to have been
issued. The Magistrate may drop the
proceedings if he is satisfied on
reconsideration of the complaint that
there is no offence for which the
accused could be tried. It is his
judicial discretion. No specific
provision is required for the
Magistrate to drop the proceedings or
rescind the process. The order issuing
the process is an interim order and
not a judgment. It can be varied or
recalled. The fact that the process
has already been issued is no bar to
drop the proceedings if the complaint
on the very face of it does not
disclose any offence against the
accused.”
However, this Court
in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal
Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338, has specifically overruled
K.M. Mathew (Supra) in regard to the power of the
Magistrate to recall its order issuing process.
It
has been observed as follows:
“15. It is true that if a Magistrate
takes cognizance of an offence, issues
process without there being any
allegation against the accused or any
material implicating the accused or in
contravention of provision of Sections
16Page 17
200 and 202, the order of the
Magistrate may be vitiated, but then
the relief an aggrieved accused can
obtain at that stage is not by
invoking Section 203 of the Code
because the Criminal Procedure Code
does not contemplate a review of an
order. Hence in the absence of any
review power or inherent power with
the subordinate criminal courts, the
remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of
the Code.
16. Therefore, in our opinion the
observation of this court in the case
of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala,
1992 (1) SCC 217, that for recalling
an erroneous order of issuance of
process, no specific provision of law
is required, would run counter to the
scheme of the Code which has not
provided for review and prohibits
interference at interlocutory stages.
Therefore, we are of the opinion, that
the view of this Court in Mathew’s
case (supra) that no specific
provision is required for recalling an
erroneous order, amounting to one
without jurisdiction, does not lay
down the correct law.”
Thus our reference to K.M. Mathew (supra) may not
be construed to mean that we are in any way endorsing
the opinion, which has already been overruled in
Adalat Prasad (supra).
17Page 18
Thus the impugned judgment of the High Court is
indefensible both on facts and law. Any observation
made by us in this judgment is for the decision in
this case. It does not reflect on the merit of the
allegation, which obviously is a matter of trial.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the
impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the court in seisin of the case shall now proceed
with the trial in accordance with law. 
……………………..………………………………..J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
…….….……….………………………………..J.
(V. GOPALA GOWDA)
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 11, 2013
18