LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, March 11, 2013

The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has set aside the judgment of acquittal and held all the accused guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count with a default clause. Those three found guilty under Section 304, Part II read with Section 109 or under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code simplicitor have, instead, been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with default clause. “But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no special rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case and however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. All that is necessary is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put it in the time-honoured way, ‘the incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis’. (Sarkar's Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30)” From the discussion aforesaid, it is evident that the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the judgment of acquittal and holding all the accused guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and convicting the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life with default clause. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 229 OF 2007
GOUDAPPA & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
Appellant No. 1, Goudappa (Accused No.3),
Appellant No.2, Chhannappa @ Ajjappa (Accused No.4)
and Appellant No. 3, Mahadevappa (Accused No.5)
aggrieved by their conviction and sentence, have
preferred this appeal with the leave of the court.Page 2
Altogether five brothers namely, Basappa,
Vipakshappa, Goudappa, Channappa @ Ajjappa and
Mahadevappa were put on trial for offence under
Section 143, 148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and 506
read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
The trial court acquitted accused no. 1, Basappa
and accused no. 2 Vipakshappa of all the charges.
Accused no. 3, Goudappa and accused no. 4,
Channappa @ Ajjappa were, however, held guilty
under Section 304, Part II read with Section 109 of
the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for one year. Accused no. 5,
Mahadevappa has been convicted under Section 304,
Part II of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. They
have, however, been acquitted of all other charges.
State of Karnataka, aggrieved by the order of
acquittal of the aforesaid two accused and
conviction of other three only under Section 304,
Part II, instead under Section 302 of the Indian
2Page 3
Penal Code and those convicted and sentenced also
preferred separate appeals before the High Court.
Both the appeals were heard together and disposed
of by a common judgment. The High Court by the
impugned judgment and order has set aside the
judgment of acquittal and held all the accused
guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced them to pay fine of Rs.
1,000/- on each count with a default clause. Those
three found guilty under Section 304, Part II read
with Section 109 or under Section 304, Part II of
the Indian Penal Code simplicitor have, instead,
been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for life with default clause.
Matrimonial discord between deceased Channappa
and Kalavathi, daughter of accused no. 1, Basappa
is the cause of the crime. All the accused are
brothers and reside in Village Navalur within
Dharwad District of the State of Karnataka.
Kalavathi was married to deceased Channappa, who
3Page 4
was also the resident of the same village, houses
of both being situated within a distance of 100 ft.
from each other. Marriage between them had taken
place on 5th of May, 1996. The relationship between
the couple was not cordial and, according to the
prosecution, as usual the elders of the village
convened a Panchayat in which the father of
Kalavathi i.e. accused no. 1 Basappa wrote an
undertaking (Exh. P-6) to counsel his daughter and
not to blame anyone else, if any untoward incident
happens. However, this did not bring peace and
matrimonial harmony and Kalavathi left the
matrimonial house without informing anybody. This
was not liked by her husband, Channappa and he
stopped her entry in the matrimonial house. All
the accused thus nurtured ill-will against him.
According to the prosecution, on 9th of
January, 1998 at about 9.30 P.M. the deceased
Channappa, his brother Manjunatha (PW-1), mother
Siddawwa (PW-2) and grandson of PW-2, Manjunath
4Page 5
(PW-3) were watching TV. The deceased Channappa at
that time was chewing paan and came out of the
house to spit. Accused Basappa started abusing him
alleging that he failed to keep his daughter,
whereupon all the accused entered the house and
accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused No. 4 Channappa
@ Ajjappa caught hold of the deceased and accused
no. 5 Mahadevappa stabbed him with jambia over the
left side of the chest. The blow was so severe
that it penetrated into the heart and liver.
Prosecution has further alleged that accused no. 1,
Basappa pelted stone over the door of the house
whereas accused no. 2 Vipakshappa damaged its front
door with an axe. Manjunatha (PW-1), Siddawwa (PW-
2) and Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to have seen the
incident. Manunatha (PW-1) conveyed the message to
the Police Control Room and called Dr. Shamsuddin
Kasimsab Jamadar (PW-18) for treatment, but
noticing profuse bleeding, he advised to shift the
injured to the Government Hospital. While
arrangement to shift the injured was being made,
5Page 6
Shashidhar (PW-24), the police constable, Manappa
Siddappa Arer (PW-27), the Sub-Inspector of Police
of Vidhyagiri Police Station and other two police
constables came to the spot and the injured was
shifted to Civil Hospital, Dharwad. He was
examined by the doctor and declared dead.
Manjunatha (PW-1) gave report to Manappa Siddappa
Arer which led to registration of Crime No. 14 of
1998 under Section 143, 147, 148, 323, 427, 452,
302, 504 and 506 read with Section 149 of the
Indian Penal Code.
After usual investigation, police submitted the
charge-sheet and all the five accused were
ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions to
face the trial. The trial court framed charges
under Section 143, 148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and
506 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution
has altogether examined 28 witnesses and a large
number of documents (Exibits P-1 to P-24) and
6Page 7
material objects (M.Os. 1 to 14) were exhibited.
Out of the aforesaid witnesses, Manjunatha (PW-1),
Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to be
the eye-witnesses of the occurrence. Dr.
Rajashekara (PW-6) has conducted the post-mortem
examination on the dead body of the deceased. The
defence of the accused is of total denial and they
have led no evidence. There is consistent evidence
of Manjunatha (PW-1), Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath
(PW-3) that relation of Kalawathi, daughter of
accused no. 1 Basappa and her husband, the deceased
Channappa was strained and the accused have
virtually accepted this part of the prosecution
story. Manjunatha (PW-1), has stated in his
evidence that while he along with the other two
eye-witnesses, Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3)
and the deceased Channappa were watching TV, all
the accused had assembled in the house of accused
no. 3, Goudappa and were hurling abuses. According
to this witness, the deceased Channappa was in the
habit of chewing paan and, therefore, he had gone
7Page 8
out of the house to spit. At that time accused no.
1 Basappa abused him alleging that he is not able
to lead married life with his daughter. Immediately
thereafter, all the accused entered into the house.
At that time, accused no. 2, Vipakshappa was armed
with an axe whereas accused no. 5, Mahadevappa was
carrying a jambia. According to this witness,
accused no. 3, Goudappa and accused no. 4 Channappa
@ Ajjappa caught hold of the deceased Channappa
whereupon accused no. 5, Mahadevappa assaulted the
deceased with jambia on his chest. It has further
been stated that accused no. 1, Basappa pelted
stone over the door whereas accused no. 2,
Vipakshappa damaged the front door with an axe. In
the cross-examination, this witness has admitted
that all of them including the deceased Channappa,
were inside the house and watching TV when the
accused have come in front of their house and the
occurrence had taken place inside the house. He
has further admitted that in the first information
report he had not mentioned about the availability
8Page 9
of electric light in the house and in the street,
at the time of the incident.
Siddawwa (PW-2), who happens to be the mother
of the deceased, stated in her evidence that all
the accused came to their house, abused and
threatened them of dire consequences as the
deceased was not accepting Kalavathi to lead a
married life. She has further stated that accused
no. 3, Goudappa and accused no. 4, Channappa @
Ajjappa caught hold of deceased’s hands and accused
no. 5, Mahadevappa gave jambia blow on his chest.
Evidence of Manjunath (PW-3), the grandson of
Siddawwa (PW-2), is the same as those of other two
eye witnesses. In the cross-examination he had
stated that the deceased Channappa was inside the
house when the accused came to the spot.
Dr. Rajashekara (PW-6), who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased
Channappa, had found the following external
injuries on his person:
9Page 10
“1. Punctured wound over the left side
of the chest over 2, 3 and 4th
intercostal space 3” below the
junction of medial 1/3rd and later 2/3rd
of clavicle bone 3” lateral to
midline.”
He also found the following internal
injuries on his person:
“On opening of the skull brain was
pale in colour. On examination of the
chest, crack fracture of 2nd rib on the
left side 3” from sterno costal
junction. Plura opened at the site of
the wound, which was described above.
Containing blood with some clots and
blood was about 1000 ml.
Laryanx and treachea was intact and
pale.
Lungs were intact and pale. Plura was
opened over the left atrium of the
heart.
Punctured wound over left atrium
1½” x 1” clot blood at the margins and
reddish in colour.”
Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Senior Advocate
appears on behalf of the appellants, whereas the
10Page 11
respondent-State of Karnataka is represented by Ms.
Anitha Shenoy.
Mr. Patil submits that the claim of Manjunatha
(PW-1), Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) to be
the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and having
witnessed the incident is fit to be rejected as,
according to their own evidence, they were watching
the television inside the house (PADASALE) at the
time of occurrence, whereas the occurrence has
taken place near the front door inside the house.
In this connection, he has drawn our attention to
the sketch map and points out that from the place
where these witnesses were watching the television,
the place where the deceased was assaulted is not
visible. Ms. Shenoy, however, submits that the
house where the incident had taken place is a small
house and the distance between the place of
occurrence and the PADASALE where they were
watching TV is hardly 20 ft. She further submits
that after the accused persons entered into the
11Page 12
house and saw the deceased Channappa, the latter
had raised an alarm which attracted the attention
of the witnesses and they came to the spot and,
hence, witnessed the occurrence.
We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and we find substance in the submission
of Ms. Shenoy. The house in question is a small
house and the distance between the place where they
were watching TV and the place of occurrence is
about 20 ft. Further, there was an alarm raised by
the deceased Channappa which attracted the
witnesses and, thus their claim of being eyewitnesses of the occurrence cannot be rejected on
this ground.
Mr. Patil then submits that, according to the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, when the
deceased came out of the house to spit, the
occurrence has taken place, but the dead body was
found inside the house and, therefore, prosecution
has not been able to prove the place of occurrence
12Page 13
beyond all reasonable doubt. According to him, the
consistent case of the prosecution is that the
deceased along with other eye-witnesses were
watching TV in the PADASALE and the deceased was
assaulted when he came out of the house to spit.
In this connection, he has drawn our attention to
the sketch map which gives the details of the house
and the place of occurrence. This, according to
Mr. Patil, clearly shows that the occurrence has
taken place inside the house. We do not find any
substance in the submission of Mr. Patil and the
same is fit to be rejected. For appreciation of
this submission one has to bear in mind that the
house where the occurrence has taken place is a
small house and the dead body was found 7 ft.
inside the front door. It is the consistent
evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the
deceased Channappa was chewing paan and came out of
the house to spit when accused no. 1 Basappa abused
him alleging that he failed to keep his daughter
whereupon all the accused persons entered the house
13Page 14
and the crime was committed. As stated earlier,
the dead body was found 7 ft. inside the front
door, we do not find any inconsistency in regard to
the place of occurrence.
Mr. Patil lastly submits that, according to the
prosecution itself, role attributed to accused no.
3 Goudappa and accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa is
that they had caught hold of the deceased Channappa
and from that it cannot be inferred that the crime
was committed in furtherance of common intention.
According to him, these appellants had not intended
to cause the death of the deceased and, hence,
cannot be convicted for the offence under Section
302 with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code. In support of the submission reliance has
been placed on the judgment of this Court in the
case of Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8
SCC 555:
“This being the requirement of law for
applicability of Section 34 IPC, from the
mere fact that accused Ram Pravesh Yadav
14Page 15
and Ramanand Yadav came and caught hold of
Tapeshwar, whereafter Samundar Yadav and
Sheo Layak Yadav came with gandasa in
their hands and gave blows by means of
gandasa, it cannot be said that the
accused Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand
Yadav shared the common intention with
accused Samundar Yadav and Sheo Layak
Yadav. Consequently, accused Ram Pravesh
Yadav and Ramanand Yadav cannot be held
guilty of the charge under Sections 302/34
IPC but accused Samundar Yadav and Sheo
Layak Yadav did commit the offence under
Sections 302/34, having assaulted deceased
Tapeshwar on his head by means of gandasa
on account of which Tapeshwar died. The
accused Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand
Yadav are, therefore, acquitted of the
charges levelled against them and they be
set at liberty forthwith.”
Ms. Shenoy, however, submits that from the
manner in which the crime has been committed and
the role played by the aforesaid two appellants
clearly show that the criminal act was done by
several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all and, hence, each of such person
shall be liable for the criminal act in the same
manner as if it was done by him alone. Reference,
in this connection, has been made to a decision of
15Page 16
this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh v. State of
A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 305.
We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and the submission made by Ms. Shenoy
commend us. Ordinarily, every man is responsible
criminally for a criminal act done by him. No man
can be held responsible for an independent act and
wrong committed by another. The principle of
criminal liability is that the person who commits
an offence is responsible for that and he can only
be held guilty. However, Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code makes an exception to this principle.
It lays down a principle of joint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The essence of that
liability is to be found in the existence of common
intention, animating the accused leading to the
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention. It deals with the doing of separate
acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if all
are done in furtherance of common intention. In
such situation, each person is liable for the
16Page 17
result of that as if he had done that act himself.
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code thus lays down
a principle of joint criminal liability which is
only a rule of evidence but does not create a
substantive offence. Therefore, if the act is the
result of a common intention that every person who
did the criminal act share, that common intention
would make him liable for the offence committed
irrespective of the role which he had in its
perpetration. Then how to gather common intention?
The common intention is gathered from the manner in
which the crime has been committed, the conduct of
the accused soon before and after the occurrence,
the determination and concern with which the crime
was committed, the weapon carried by the accused
and from the nature and injury caused by one or
some of them. Therefore, for arriving at a
conclusion whether the accused had the common
intention to commit an offence of which they could
be convicted, the totality of circumstances must be
taken into consideration.
17Page 18
Bearing in mind the principle aforesaid, when
we proceed to consider the case of these two
appellants namely, accused no. 3 Goudappa and
accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa, we have no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the
deceased Channappa was done to death in furtherance
of their common intention. All the accused had
assembled at one place and the moment deceased came
out of the house to spit, one of the accused
started abusing him. They were armed with axe and
jambia and by catching and immobilizing the
deceased these two accused facilitated the assault
by accused no. 5. Accused no. 5 stabbed the
deceased with jambia over the left side of the
chest and the blow was so severe that it penetrated
into the heart and liver. The fact that these
appellants held the deceased and facilitated the
other accused to give the fatal blow and made no
effort to prevent him from assaulting the deceased
leads to irresistible and inescapable conclusion
that these two appellants shared the common
18Page 19
intention with accused no. 5. The intention of
accused no. 5 is clear from the nature of weapon
used and the severity of attack which was in the
area of chest penetrating deep inside up to heart
and liver which caused the death of the deceased.
The view which we have taken finds support from
the judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh
Singh (supra) in which it has been observed as
follows:
“Once the prosecution evidence tendered
through PWs 1 to 3 is accepted, then it is
clear that when A-2 and A-3 held the hands
of the deceased, they had some intention
in disabling the deceased. This inference
is possible to be drawn because the
appellants in their statement recorded
under Section 313 CrPC did not give any
explanation why they held the hands of the
deceased which indicates that the
appellants had the knowledge that A-1 was
to assault the deceased. The fact that the
appellants continued to hold the deceased
all along without making any effort to
prevent A-1 from further attacking, in our
opinion, leads to an irresistible and an
inescapable conclusion that these accused
persons also shared the common intention
with A-1.”
19Page 20
However, we hasten to add that each case rests
on its own facts and mere similarity of the facts
in one case cannot be used to determine a
conclusion of fact in another. Whether the crime
was committed in furtherance of common intention is
determined on appreciation of evidence laid in that
case and the similarity of facts in one case may
not be decisive to come to a definite conclusion of
fact in another. Hence, answer of such question
has to be found in the facts of a given case. In
this connection, it is apt to reproduce the
following passage from the case of Pandurang v.
State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216:
“But to say this is no more than to
reproduce the ordinary rule about
circumstantial evidence, for there is no
special rule of evidence for this class
of case. At bottom, it is a question of
fact in every case and however similar
the circumstances, facts in one case
cannot be used as a precedent to
determine the conclusion on the facts in
another. All that is necessary is either
to have direct proof of prior concert, or
proof of circumstances which necessarily
lead to that inference, or, as we prefer
20Page 21
to put it in the time-honoured way, ‘the
incriminating facts must be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused and
incapable of explanation on any other
reasonable hypothesis’. (Sarkar's
Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30)”
From the discussion aforesaid, it is evident
that the High Court has not committed any error in
setting aside the judgment of acquittal and holding
all the accused guilty under Section 143 and 148 of
the Indian Penal Code and convicting the appellants
under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life
with default clause.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the
appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. 
 ………………….………………………………….J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
21Page 22
 ………..………..……………………………….J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 11, 2013.
22Page 23
23

So far as the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan, viz. Civil Appeal No. 1494 of 2008 is concerned, it mainly challenges the impugned judgment on the ground that by virtue of methodology directed to be employed in the said judgment, the State would suffer substantial loss as the lessee company, viz. Hindustan Zinc Limited would be paying much less royalty than what it is supposed to pay. 3. On the other hand, an appeal has also been filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the direction issued by the High Court, whereby the amount of royalty has been directed to be re-calculated.=The negligible contents of metal which remains in the mining area by way of tailings, slimes or rejects, which are returned to the mother earth cannot be said to be the part of metal content in the ore produced. “Dumped tailings or rejects may be liable to payment of royalty if only they are sold or consumed”.- whether the details given by the lease holder on the basis of which royalty is calculated is correct. Upon carefully going through the impugned judgment and the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, we find that the courts below did not commit any mistake in arriving at the conclusion that the holder of the lease was not liable to pay the amount demanded under the impugned notices because, by virtue of Notification dated 12th September, 2000 read with the relevant Rules, the lease holder is supposed to pay royalty only on the contents of metal in ore produced and not on the metal contained in the tailings, rejects or slimes which had not been taken out of the leased area and which had been dumped into dumping ground of the leased area. For the afore-stated reasons, we do not find any substance in the appeal and therefore, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. So far as the present appeal is concerned, it has been filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the directions whereby the matter has been ordered to be remitted to the mining engineer for re-computing the royalty payable on lead and zinc contained in the ore produced. The submission on behalf of the appellant-company was to the effect that as the entire concentrate has been taken out of the leased area and as the quantity of concentrate of lead and zinc was very much known, it was not necessary to give such a direction because there is no question with regard to re-computation of royalty on the basis of metal contained in ore produced. We find substance in what has been submitted because the metal concentrate which had been taken out from the leased area is known to the parties and therefore, it is not necessary to have any further details regarding the ore produced by the appellantcompany. 40. We, therefore, quash the afore-stated direction and the appeal filed by the appellant-company is allowed to the above effect with no order as to costs.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1494 OF 2008
State of Rajasthan & Ors. .....APPELLANTS
 VERSUS
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. & Anr. ....RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1526 OF 2008
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 6th July, 2007
delivered by the High Court of Rajasthan in D.B. Civil Special
Appeal No.43 of 2006, the afore-stated two appeals have been
filed. One appeal has been filed by the State of Rajasthan whereas
the other appeal has been filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited, who
1Page 2
had been leased land situated in districts Bhilwara, Rajsamand and
Udaipur by the State of Rajasthan for extraction of lead and zinc
therefrom.
2. As both the appeals arise from a common judgment, at the
request of the learned counsel, both the appeals were heard
together. So far as the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan, viz.
Civil Appeal No. 1494 of 2008 is concerned, it mainly challenges
the impugned judgment on the ground that by virtue of
methodology directed to be employed in the said judgment, the
State would suffer substantial loss as the lessee company, viz.
Hindustan Zinc Limited would be paying much less royalty than
what it is supposed to pay.
3. On the other hand, an appeal has also been filed by
Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the direction
issued by the High Court, whereby the amount of royalty has been
directed to be re-calculated.
4. As Civil Appeal No. 1494 of 2008 filed by the State of
Rajasthan is the main appeal, we would like to deal with the said
2Page 3
appeal at the first instance and, thereafter we would deal with the
appeal filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited i.e. Civil Appeal No. 1526
of 2008.
Civil Appeal No. 1494 of 2008
5. The appellant-State and the State Authorities have been
aggrieved by the impugned order whereby the additional demand
raised under notice dated 24th December, 2001 and subsequent
notices issued by the State for recovery of royalty in respect of the
lead and zinc extracted by the respondent-company had been
quashed by the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court
and the order of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the
Division Bench in the appeal filed before it. After hearing the
concerned learned advocates appearing for the State and the
respondent-company, the learned Single Judge had come to the
conclusion that the impugned notices, whereby additional amount
was demanded, were bad in law and therefore, the petition was
allowed and the impugned notices dated 22nd December, 2001, 24th
December, 2001 and 4th January, 2002 had been quashed. It may
3Page 4
also be stated here that the afore-stated notices had been
challenged by the respondent-company initially before the
revisional authority under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960,
which had confirmed the validity of the said notices and therefore,
the order passed by the revisional authority dated 2nd July, 2003,
whereby the validity of the impugned notices had been upheld, was
also quashed and set aside.
6. The facts giving rise to the issue in question, in a nutshell, are
as under:
7. The respondent-company had been leased land in the areas of
District Bhilwara, Rajsamand and Udaipur for the purpose of
extracting lead and zinc therefrom under the provisions of Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’). Section 9 of the Act is the charging
section, which enables the State to recover royalty in respect of the
minerals extracted by the holder of a mining lease. The Mineral
Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’)
have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred under
4Page 5
Section 13 of the Act. Rules 64A, 64B, 64C & 64D of the Rules
are relevant Rules, which pertain to calculation of the amount of
royalty payable by the holder of the lease in respect of the minerals
extracted from the land leased to the holder of the mining lease.
8. From time to time, the Government had issued Notifications
determining the rate at which royalty was to be paid by the holder
of the lease in respect of the minerals extracted. In the instant
case, we are concerned with two minerals: lead and zinc. Two
Notifications are relevant for the purpose of determining the issue
involved in these appeals. Under Notification dated 11th April,
1997, by virtue of item nos. 22 and 41 incorporated in the said
Notification, royalty in respect of the afore-stated two minerals
was to be paid as under:
Item No. 22 4% of London metal exchange
Lead concentrate metal price on ad valorem basis
Chargeable per tonne of
concentrate produced.
Item No. 41 3.5% of London metal exchange
Zinc concentrate metal price on ad valorem basis
Chargeable per tonne of
concentrate produced.
5Page 6
9. Thereafter, by virtue of another Notification dated 12th
September, 2000, substituting the Notification dated 11th April,
1997, royalty in respect of the afore-stated two minerals was
payable as under:
Item No. 25 5% of London metal exchange
Lead lead metal price chargeable on
the contained lead metal in ore
produced.
Item No. 50 6.6% of London metal exchange
Zinc Zinc metal price on ad valorem
basis chargeable on contained
zinc metal in ore produced.
10. By virtue of the afore-stated Notification dated 12th
September, 2000, the manner in which the royalty was to be
calculated had been changed.
11. Formerly the royalty was to be charged on the basis of
mineral concentrate produced but by virtue of the Notification
dated 12th September, 2000, royalty is now to be charged on ad
valorem basis on the contents of metal found in the ore produced.
12. According to the appellant-State, the respondent-lease holder
was supposed to pay the royalty on the entire mineral extracted
6Page 7
from the earth and accordingly the impugned notices were issued
to the respondent for recovery of difference of royalty.
13. On the other hand, the case of the respondent-company was
that the royalty was chargeable only on the contents of lead and
zinc metal in the ore produced because, by virtue of the
Notification issued in 2000, the respondent-company was supposed
to pay royalty only on the contents of lead or zinc, as the case may
be, contained in the ore produced.
14. As stated hereinabove, the demand made by the appellantState under the impugned notices had been upheld by the
revisional authority but the same had been quashed by the High
Court when the order of the revisional authority was challenged
before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and the view of
the learned Single Judge had been upheld by virtue of the
impugned order passed by the Division Bench.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State
submitted that the High Court committed an error in interpreting
provisions of the Rule 64A, 64B and 64C of the Rules read with
7Page 8
the Notification dated 12th September, 2000 issued by the Central
Government.
16. The sum and substance of the submissions made by the
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant was that the
royalty ought to have been charged on the basis of the metal
contained in the ore produced so as to give effect to the provisions
of Section 9 and the Second Schedule to the Act read with Rules
64B, 64C and 64D of the Rules.
17. According to the learned counsel, the contention of the
respondent, that unless the ores are taken out of the leased
premises, the royalty would not be leviable, is not correct because
processing the ore would also amount to consumption of the ores
and therefore, even if the said ores are not physically taken out of
the leased area, the royalty will have to be paid on the contents of
lead and zinc contained in the ore.
18. He further submitted that the methodology approved by the
High Court would amount to re-writing the provisions with regard
to computation and calculation of royalty.
8Page 9
19. He further submitted that the amount of royalty demanded by
the appellant-State from the respondent-company was just and
proper and therefore, the order passed by the High Court be
quashed and set aside. So as to substantiate his submissions, he
relied upon the judgment delivered by this Court in State of
Orissa & Ors. v. M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(1998) 6
SCC 476].
20. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent-company vehemently supported the reasons given
by the High Court whereby the High Court has held that the
respondent-company was not liable to pay royalty on the tailings as
they had not been taken out of the leased area. Relying upon the
judgment delivered in National Mineral Development
Corporation Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
[(2004) 6 SCC 281], the High Court had further held that as per the
provisions of Rule 64C of the Rules, unless dumped tailings or
rejects are consumed by the lessee, no royalty can be collected on
such tailings or rejects.
9Page 10
21. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondentcompany mainly submitted that the negligible contents of lead and
zinc contained in tailings, which is not taken out of the leased area
and which is dumped within the leased area, can never be taken
into account for the purpose of calculating royalty for the reason
that according to the Notification dated 12th September, 2000,
royalty is to be paid in respect of the metal contained in the ore
produced and the metal which has been left out by way of tailings
within the leased area would never be treated as metal in the ore
produced.
22. According to him, the negligible metal contained in the
tailings, slimes or the rejects can never be the subject matter of
calculation of royalty as that portion of metal was returned to the
mother earth by dumping the same in the leased area without being
taken out of the leased area and that can not be included in the
contents of the metal produced.
23. Upon hearing the learned counsel at length and upon perusal
of the relevant material and the impugned judgment and the
10Page 11
judgments referred to by the learned counsel, we are of the view
that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct.
24. It is pertinent to note that Section 9 of the Act enables the
appellant-authority to charge royalty on the minerals extracted by
the lease holder from the land given on lease for the purpose of
mining. The methodology for calculating the amount of royalty is
determined by the Rules and by the Notifications issued by the
Central Government from time to time.
25. It is also pertinent to note that prior to issuance of
Notification dated 12th September, 2000, by virtue of Notification
dated 11th April, 1997, royalty was to be calculated on the basis of
metal concentrate produced by the lease holder whereas in
pursuance of Notification dated 12th September, 2000, the method
of calculating the royalty has been substantially changed and in
pursuance of the said Notification, royalty is to be calculated on
the contents of lead and zinc metal in the ore produced.
26. Immediately after the aforestated Notification dated 12th
September, 2000 was issued by the Central Government,
11Page 12
provisions of Rule 64 of the Rules had also been amended. By
virtue of the said amendment, Rule 64B and Rule 64C had been
inserted with effect from 25th September, 2000, which read as
follows:
“64B. Charging of royalty in case of minerals
subjected to processing.- (1) In case processing of run-ofmine is carried out within the leased area, then, royalty shall be
chargeable on the processed mineral removed from the leased
area.
(2) In case run-of-mine mineral is removed from the
leased area to a processing plant which is located outside the
leased area, then, royalty shall be chargeable on the
unprocessed run-of-mine mineral and not on the processed
product.
64C. Royalty on tailings or rejects – On removal of
tailings or rejects from the leased area for dumping and not for
sale or consumption, outside leased area such tailings or rejects
shall not be liable for payment of royalty;
Provided that in case so dumped tailings or rejects are
used for sale or consumption on any later date after the date of
such dumping, then, such tailings or rejects shall be liable for
payment of royalty.”
27. In the instant case, we are more concerned with the
provisions of Rule 64C of the Rules. Upon perusal of the said
Rule, it is very clear that unless the tailings or rejects are used for
sale or for consumption, such tailings or rejects would not be liable
for payment of royalty.
12Page 13
28. Moreover, provisions of Rule 64B of the Rules also make it
clear that in case of processing of run-of-mine, royalty shall be
charged only on the processed mineral removed from the leased
area.
29. The aforestated amendment and Notification dated 12th
September, 2000 clearly denote intention of the Government with
regard to the calculation of royalty on the contents of metal in the
ore produced and not on tailings or rejects, which are not taken out
of the leased area. The negligible contents of metal which remains
in the mining area by way of tailings, slimes or rejects, which are
returned to the mother earth cannot be said to be the part of metal
content in the ore produced. 
30. This court in the case of National Mineral Development
Corporation Limited (supra) has clearly observed as under:
“Dumped tailings or rejects may be liable to
payment of royalty if only they are sold or
consumed”.
31. From the contents of what has been stated hereinabove by
this Court, it is very clear that once a portion of the metal is
13Page 14
returned back to the mother earth, it cannot be said to have been
extracted or cannot be said to have been taken out of the leased
area and when the metal which has not been taken out from the
leased area or which is not contained in the ore produced, it cannot
be made subject to payment of royalty because the lease holder
never took out that portion of the metal from the earth and
therefore, that cannot be said to be the part of metal contained in
the ore produced.
32. Though the learned counsel for the State referred to the forms
in which information with regard to ore received from the mines
and treated ore was required to be filled up and supplied to the
concerned Government Authorities by the holder of the mining
lease, in our opinion the said information and the averments are not
much relevant because each and every information required by the
Government may not be necessary for the purpose of calculating
royalty. Possibly the information received from the holders of the
mining lease would be for some other incidental purpose or for the
purpose of cross checking the information given by the holder of
14Page 15
the mining lease so as to find out whether the details given by the
lease holder on the basis of which royalty is calculated is correct. 
33. For the afore-stated reasons, in our opinion, we need not refer
to the submissions made in relation to the forms referred to in the
Rules.
34. Upon carefully going through the impugned judgment and
the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court, we find that the courts below did not commit any mistake in
arriving at the conclusion that the holder of the lease was not liable
to pay the amount demanded under the impugned notices because,
by virtue of Notification dated 12th September, 2000 read with the
relevant Rules, the lease holder is supposed to pay royalty only on
the contents of metal in ore produced and not on the metal
contained in the tailings, rejects or slimes which had not been
taken out of the leased area and which had been dumped into
dumping ground of the leased area.
15Page 16
35. For the afore-stated reasons, we do not find any substance in
the appeal and therefore, the appeal is dismissed with no order as
to costs.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1526 OF 2008
36. So far as the present appeal is concerned, it has been filed by
Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the directions
whereby the matter has been ordered to be remitted to the mining
engineer for re-computing the royalty payable on lead and zinc
contained in the ore produced.
37. The appellant-company is aggrieved by the afore-stated
direction because it was never prayed by the State that the matter
be remitted back to the mining engineer for re-computation of the
royalty.
38. The submission on behalf of the appellant-company was to
the effect that as the entire concentrate has been taken out of the
leased area and as the quantity of concentrate of lead and zinc was
very much known, it was not necessary to give such a direction
16Page 17
because there is no question with regard to re-computation of
royalty on the basis of metal contained in ore produced.
39. We find substance in what has been submitted because the
metal concentrate which had been taken out from the leased area is
known to the parties and therefore, it is not necessary to have any
further details regarding the ore produced by the appellant company.
40. We, therefore, quash the afore-stated direction and the appeal
filed by the appellant-company is allowed to the above effect with
no order as to costs.
 .........................................J.
 (R.M. LODHA)
.........................................J.
 (ANIL R. DAVE)
New Delhi
March 11, 2013
17

Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. = whether, to maintain an election petition, it is imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In our opinion, there is no such mandate in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and a reading of P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 511 which suggests to the contrary, does not lay down correct law to this limited extent. Another question that has arisen is that if an affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate is not in the statutory Form No. 25 prescribed by the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, whether the election petition is liable to be summarily dismissed. In our opinion, as long as there is substantial compliance with the statutory form, there is no reason to summarily dismiss an election petition on this ground. However, an opportunity must be given to the election petitioner to cure the defect. Further, merely because the affidavit may be defective, it cannot be said that the petition filed is not an election petition as understood by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter.” “However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.” 65. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition, and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed format of Form No.25 and with a defective verification were curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects. No submissions were made with regard to the striking out, in accordance with Order VI rule 16 of the CPC, of specifically objectionable paragraphs in the election petition. In any event this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. Conclusion: 67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed, but without any costs.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2250-2251 OF 2013
Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 14172-14173 OF 2010
G.M. Siddeshwar ... Appellant
 Versus
Prasanna Kumar ... Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2252-2255 OF 2013
Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24886-24889 OF 2010
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The principal question of law raised for our consideration is
whether, to maintain an election petition, it is imperative for
an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI
Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in support of
the averments made in the election petition in addition to an
affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have
been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by
Page 1 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 2
the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. In our opinion, there is no such mandate
in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and a reading
of P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan & Ors.,
(2012) 5 SCC 511 which suggests to the contrary, does not
lay down correct law to this limited extent. 
3. Another question that has arisen is that if an affidavit filed in
support of the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned
candidate is not in the statutory Form No. 25 prescribed by
the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, whether the election
petition is liable to be summarily dismissed. In our opinion,
as long as there is substantial compliance with the statutory
form, there is no reason to summarily dismiss an election
petition on this ground. However, an opportunity must be
given to the election petitioner to cure the defect. Further,
merely because the affidavit may be defective, it cannot be
said that the petition filed is not an election petition as
understood by the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 
The facts:
4. The challenge in these appeals is to a judgment and order
dated 24th February 2010 passed by a learned Single Judge
of the High Court of Karnataka in Miscellaneous Civil No.
Page 2 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 3
386/2010 and Miscellaneous Civil No. 1431/2010 in Election
Petition No.2/2009. The decision is reported as Prasanna
Kumar v. G.M. Siddeshwar & Ors, 2010 (6) KarLJ 78.
5. In Miscellaneous Civil No. 386/2010 the appellant
(Siddeshwar) sought the dismissal/rejection of the election
petition challenging his election to the 15th Lok Sabha from
13, Davangere Lok Sabha Constituency in the election held
on 13th April 2009. It was submitted in the application that
the provisions of Section 81(3) and Section 83 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act) had not been complied with and therefore, in
view of Section 86 of the Act read with Order VII Rule 11(a)
of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the
CPC), the election petition ought to be rejected/dismissed at
the threshold.
6. For the present purposes, we are concerned with Section 83
and Section 86 of the Act and to the extent they are
relevant, they read as follows:
“83. Contents of petition.—(1) An election petition—
(a)shall contain a concise statement of the material
facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b)shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice
that the petitioner alleges, including as full a
Page 3 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 4
statement as possible of the names of the parties
alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and
the date and place of the commission of each such
practice; and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the
manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings:
Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt
practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an
affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation
of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also
be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same
manner as the petition.”
“86. Trial of election petitions.—(1) The High Court
shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply
with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section
117.
Explanation.—An order of the High Court dismissing an
election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to
be an order made under clause (a) of Section 98.
(2) to (7) xxx xxx xxx [presently not relevant]”
7. Among the grounds urged in the High Court and reiterated
before us were that the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act
requires an affidavit to be filed in the prescribed form in
support of the allegations of corrupt practice and the
particulars thereof. Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961 prescribes Form No. 25 as the format affidavit.
Page 4 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 5
According to Siddeshwar, the affidavit filed by the election
petitioner (Prasanna Kumar) did not furnish the material
particulars on the basis of which allegations of corrupt
practice were made and also that it carried a defective
verification and therefore it was not an affidavit that ought to
be recognized as such.
8. On the issue of non-compliance with the format affidavit, the
High Court was of the view that though there was no
verbatim compliance, but the affidavit filed by Prasanna
Kumar was in substantial compliance with the prescribed
format. Consequently, this contention was rejected. The High
Court subsequently dealt with the absence of material
particulars in the affidavit along with the second application.
9. The High Court also considered the contention that the
verification in the affidavit in Form No.25 was defective but
concluded that it was a curable defect and therefore, an
opportunity should be given to Prasanna Kumar to cure the
defect. It was held that if the defect is not cured the election
petition is liable to be dismissed.
10. It was also contended that in view of Section 83(1)(c)
of the Act, an election petition is required to be verified in
Page 5 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 6
the manner laid down in the CPC for the verification of
pleadings. Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC requires that the
person verifying the pleadings shall also furnish an affidavit
in support of the pleadings. In the election petition, such an
affidavit was not filed despite the affidavit being an integral
part of the election petition. For this reason also, the election
petition ought to be dismissed at the threshold.
11. In this regard, the High Court was of the view that
there was no necessity of the election petitioner filing any
other affidavit in support of the election petition and that the
affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in Form No.25 substantially
complied with the requirements of Rule 94-A of the Rules.
12. It was finally contended that Prasanna Kumar had
leveled allegations of corrupt practices against Siddeshwar
without any material particulars. As such, the election
petition did not disclose a complete cause of action and was
liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC.
This contention was considered with the second application.
13. In Miscellaneous Civil No. 1431/2010 Siddeshwar
invoked the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the CPC for
striking out some paragraphs of the election petition on the
Page 6 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 7
ground that allegations of corrupt practice were scandalous
and vexatious. It was contended that on a deletion of the
offending paragraphs, the election petition would not
survive.
14. In regard to the objections raised, the High Court was
of the opinion that some of the allegations made against
Siddeshwar alleging corrupt practices did not contain
material particulars apart from being vague and deficient.
Consequently, a few paragraphs of the election petition were
struck off by the Court under Order VI Rule 16 of the CPC.
The remaining paragraphs were retained since the High
Court was of the view that they required trial and could not
be struck off at the initial stage. Consequently, the
objections regarding absence of material particulars and
absence of a cause of action were rejected.
15. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed
by the High Court, Siddeshwar has preferred these appeals.
Reference to a larger Bench:
16. These matters were earlier heard by a Bench of two
learned judges when it was contended by learned counsel for
Siddeshwar, relying upon P.A. Mohammed Riyas (decided
by a Bench of two learned judges) that since Prasanna
Page 7 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 8
Kumar had not filed an ‘additional’ affidavit as required by
Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC in support of the election
petition, the High Court ought to have dismissed it at the
threshold. Learned counsel placed reliance on R.P.
Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammad and Another,
(2000) 1 SCC 481 in support of his contention that an
election petition could be dismissed at the threshold if it did
not disclose a cause of action.
17. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for
Prasanna Kumar relied upon a larger Bench decision in F.A.
Sapa & Ors. v. Singora & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 395 and
contended that Mohammed Riyas was not in consonance
with that decision. Reliance was also placed on G.
Mallikarjunappa & Anr. v. Shamanur
Shivashankarappa & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 428 to contend
that an election petition is not liable to be dismissed at the
threshold under Section 86 of the Act for non-compliance
with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act. It was contended
that any defect in non-compliance with the provisions of
Section 83 of the Act is a curable defect which can be
removed and judged at the trial of the election petition.
Page 8 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 9
18. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and
considering the view expressed in Mohammed Riyas which
apparently proceeded on the basis that in addition to an
affidavit in Form No.25, an election petitioner was also
required to furnish an ‘additional’ affidavit in support of the
election petition in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC, it
was felt that the issues raised ought be heard by a larger
Bench of at least three Judges.
19. It was also noted that in Mallikarjunappa, a Bench
of three judges of this Court held that an election petition
was not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of
the Act for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83
thereof. It was observed that Mallikarjunappa had not
been referred to or considered in Mohammed Riyas.
20. Accordingly, by an order passed on 19th July 2012 the
issues raised were referred to a larger Bench of three judges.
It is under these circumstances that the Special Leave
Petitions were placed before us for consideration.
(i) Affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC:
21. The submission made by learned counsel is to the
effect that in addition to an affidavit required to be filed in
Form No.25 prescribed by Rule 94-A of the Rules in support
Page 9 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 10
of allegations made of corrupt practices by the returned
candidate, an election petitioner is also required to file an
affidavit in support of the election petition keeping in mind
the requirement of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC.
22. Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC reads as follows:
“15. Verification of pleadings.— (1) Save as otherwise
provided by any law for the time being in force, every
pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by
one of the parties pleading or by some other person
proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted
with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to
the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he
verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon
information received and believed to be true.
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person
making it and shall state the date on which and the place
at which it was signed.
(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish
an affidavit in support of his pleadings.”
23. A plain reading of Rule 15 suggests that a verification
of the plaint is necessary. In addition to the verification, the
person verifying the plaint is “also” required to file an
affidavit in support of the pleadings. Does this mean, as
suggested by learned counsel for Siddeshwar that Prasanna
Page 10 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 11
Kumar was obliged to file two affidavits – one in support of
the allegations of corrupt practices and the other in support
of the pleadings?
24. A reading of Section 83(1)(c) of the Act makes it clear
that what is required of an election petitioner is only that the
verification should be carried out in the manner prescribed in
the CPC. That Order VI Rule 15 requires an affidavit “also” to
be filed does not mean that the verification of a plaint is
incomplete if an affidavit is not filed. The affidavit, in this
context, is a stand-alone document.
25. Mohammed Riyas dealt with the issue whether the
election petitioner is required to file two affidavits – one
affidavit in support of the allegations of corrupt practices and
the second affidavit in compliance with the requirements of
Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC. This is apparent from the
submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing in the
case.
26. It was contended by the election petitioner that two
affidavits would be necessary in an election petition only
where the election petitioner wanted the election of the
returned candidate to be set aside on the ground of
Page 11 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 12
commission of corrupt practices under Section 100(1)(b) of
the Act as well as on other grounds as set out in Section
100(1) of the Act. In other words, the argument was that two
affidavits were required to be filed by the election petitioner.
It is important to note that it was not argued (as in the
present case) that Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC does not
require the filing of an affidavit as a part of the requirement
of verifying the election petition. An alternative contention
was put forward that a single affidavit, satisfying the
requirement of the Act, could also be filed. The contention
put forward was as follows:
“The learned counsel submitted that two affidavits would
be necessary only where an election petitioner wanted the
election to be set aside both on grounds of commission of
one or more corrupt practices under Section 100(1)(b) of
the Act and other grounds as set out in Section 100(1). In
such a case, two affidavits could possibly be required, one
under Order 6 Rule 15(4) CPC and another in Form 25.
However, even in such a case, a single affidavit that satisfies the requirements of both the provisions could be filed.
In any event, when the election petition was based entirely on allegations of corrupt practices, filing of two affidavits over the selfsame matter would render one of them
otiose, which proposition was found acceptable by the Karnataka High Court in Prasanna Kumar v. G.M. Siddeshwar
[2010 (6) KarLJ 78].”
27. It was argued on behalf of the returned candidate that the
election petitioner is required to file an affidavit in support of
Page 12 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 13
the pleadings and another affidavit in support of the allegations
of corrupt practices by the returned candidate. In other words,
the election petitioner is required to file two affidavits. The contention urged was as follows:
“Mr Rao contended that Section 83(1)(c) of the above Act
requires the election petition to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner specified in CPC for the
verification of pleadings. Referring to Order 6 Rule 15 of
the Code, Mr Rao submitted that sub-rule (4) requires that
the person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings, which was a requirement
independent of the requirement of a separate affidavit
with respect to each corrupt practice alleged, as mandated by the proviso to Section 83(1)(c) of the above Act.”
28. The conclusions of this Court are given in paragraphs 45
and 46 of the Report in the following words:
“45. Of course, it has been submitted and accepted that
the defect was curable and such a proposition has been
upheld in the various cases cited by Mr Venugopal, beginning with the decision in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar case [AIR 1964 SC 1545] and subsequently followed
in F.A. Sapa case [(1991) 3 SCC 375], Sardar Harcharan
Singh Brar case [(2004) 11 SCC 196] and K.K. Ramachandran Master case [(2010) 7 SCC 428], referred to hereinbefore. In this context, we are unable to accept Mr Venugopal’s submission that despite the fact that the proviso
to Section 83(1) of the 1951 Act provides that where corrupt practices are alleged, the election petition shall also
be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, it
could not have been the intention of the legislature that
two affidavits would be required, one under Order 6 Rule
15(4) CPC and the other in Form 25. We are also unable to
accept Mr Venugopal’s submission that even in a case
where the proviso to Section 83(1) was attracted, a single
Page 13 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 14
affidavit would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
both the provisions.
46. Mr Venugopal’s submission that, in any event, since
the election petition was based entirely on allegations of
corrupt practices, filing of two affidavits in respect of the
selfsame matter, would render one of them redundant, is
also not acceptable. As far as the decision in F.A. Sapa
case is concerned, it has been clearly indicated that the
petition, which did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 83 of the 1951 Act, could not be said to
be an election petition as contemplated in Section 81 and
would attract dismissal under Section 86(1) of the 1951
Act. On the other hand, the failure to comply with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act rendered the election petition ineffective, as was held in Hardwari Lal case [(1972) 1
SCC 214] and the various other cases cited by Mr P.P.
Rao.”
29. Unfortunately, the submissions made by the election petitioner were not discussed, but were simply rejected. No reasons have, unfortunately, been given by this Court for arriving
at the conclusions that it did and rejecting the contentions of
learned counsel for the election petitioner.
30. It seems to us that a plain and simple reading of Section
83(1)(c) of the Act clearly indicates that the requirement of an
‘additional’ affidavit is not to be found therein. While the
requirement of “also” filing an affidavit in support of pleadings
filed under the CPC may be mandatory in terms of Order VI
Rule 15(4) of the CPC, the affidavit is not a part of the
verification of the pleadings – both are quite different. While
Page 14 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 15
the Act does require a verification of the pleadings, the plain
language of Section 83(1)(c) of the Act does not require an
affidavit in support of the pleadings in an election petition. We
are being asked to read a requirement that does not exist in
Section 83(1)(c) of the Act.
Recommendation of the Law Commission:
31. To get over the difficulty posed by the plain language of
Section 83 of the Act, learned counsel for Siddeshwar referred
to the imperatives of an affidavit in support of statements of
fact made in a plaint, which would hopefully give some sanctity
to the averments made therein. Reliance was placed on
judgments of this Court as well as on the 163rd Report of the
Law Commission of India (LCI) on the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Bill, 1997.
32. In this context, in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of
Haryana, (1995) 3 SCC 757 it was held:
“The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not
only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due
course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to
impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of
justice. ……... The stream of justice has to be kept clean
and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with
sternly so that the message percolates loud and clear that
no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the
court and interfere with the due course of judicial
proceedings or the administration of justice.”
Page 15 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 16
A similar view was expressed in Mohan Singh v. Amar
Singh, (1998) 6 SCC 686. The LCI referred to both these
decisions and proposed the insertion of sub-section (2) in
Section 26 of the CPC making it obligatory upon a plaintiff to
file an affidavit in support of facts stated in the plaint. A similar
provision was proposed in Order VI of the CPC by inserting subRule (4) in Rule 15 thereof. In this context, the LCI had this to
say:
“2.6.1. The response of members of the Bench as well
as the Bar has been uniformly against the above
proposals. The general view expressed by them is that
such a provision would only add to the delays in
disposal of suits. It was submitted that there are
enough provisions in the existing law to deal with false
and malicious averments in the pleadings and that this
additional requirement would not make any difference.
…..
“2.6.2. The Law Commission is, however, of the opinion
that the proposed amendments are salutary and may,
at least to some extent, check the tendency to make
false averments in the pleadings. ……. This tendency
has certainly to be checked. Even if the parties in two
to five per cent cases could be dealt with appropriately
for making false statements in the pleadings, it would
greatly help in arresting this tendency……”
33. While the necessity of an affidavit in support of facts
stated in a plaint may be beneficial and may have salutary
results, but we have to go by the law as it is enacted and not
go by the law as it ought to be. The CPC no doubt requires that
Page 16 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 17
pleadings be verified and an affidavit “also” be filed in support
thereof. However, Section 83(1)(c) of the Act merely requires
an election petitioner to sign and verify the contents of the
election petition in the manner prescribed by the CPC. There is
no requirement of the election petitioner “also” filing an
affidavit in support of the averments made in the election
petition except when allegations of corrupt practices have been
made.
34. In any event, as in the present case, the same result has
been achieved by the election petitioner filing a composite
affidavit, both in support of the averments made in the election
petition and with regard to the allegations of corrupt practices
by the returned candidate. This procedure is not contrary to law
and cannot be faulted. Such a composite affidavit would not
only be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the
Act but would actually be in full compliance thereof. The filing
of two affidavits is not warranted by the Act nor is it necessary,
especially when a composite affidavit can achieve the desired
result.
35. The Court must make a fine balance between the purity of
the election process and the avoidance of an election petition
Page 17 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 18
being a source of annoyance to the returned candidate and his
constituents. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1986
(Supp) SCC 315 this Court observed (in the context of
summary dismissal of an election petition):
“So long as the sword of Damocles of the election petition
remains hanging an elected member of the legislature
would not feel sufficiently free to devote his whole-hearted
attention to matters of public importance which clamour
for his attention in his capacity as an elected
representative of the concerned constituency. The time
and attention demanded by his elected office will have to
be diverted to matters pertaining to the contest of the
election petition. Instead of being engaged in a campaign
to relieve the distress of the people in general and of the
residents of his constituency who voted him into office,
and instead of resolving their problems, he would be
engaged in campaign to establish that he has in fact been
duly elected.”
In light of the above, it is not possible to accept the view that
the salutary intention of the LCI to ensure purity in the litigation
process must extend to an election petition notwithstanding the
mandate of Parliament as expressed in Section 83 of the Act.
Legislation by reference:
36. The final contention urged under this subject was that in
view of the language used in Section 83(1)(c) of the Act, the
doctrine of legislation by reference would need to be invoked in
as much as any amendment to the CPC would be applicable to
the working of the Act. It was argued that since an amendment
Page 18 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 19
was made to Rule 15(4) of Order VI of the CPC, that
amendment has been legislated by reference in the Act and so
the election petitioner would be bound by the terms thereof
and would, therefore, not only need to sign and verify the
contents of an election petition, but also file an affidavit in
support thereof. Reliance was placed on a Constitution Bench
decision in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 3 SCC 1. In that case, after an analysis of the entire
case law on the subject, the Constitution Bench held:
“Having perused and analysed the various judgments
cited at the Bar we are of the considered view that this
rule [of legislation by reference] is bound to have
exceptions and it cannot be stated as an absolute
proposition of law that wherever legislation by reference
exists, subsequent amendments to the earlier law shall
stand implanted into the later law without analysing the
impact of such incorporation on the object and effectuality
of the later law. The later law being the principal law, its
object, legislative intent and effective implementation
shall always be of paramount consideration while
determining the compatibility of the amended prior law
with the later law as on relevant date.”
37. We are not inclined to debate the contention whether
Order VI Rule 15 of the CPC has been legislated by reference or
by incorporation into the Act for the reasons already indicated
above, namely, that on a plain reading of Section 83 of the Act,
only a verification and not an affidavit in support of the
Page 19 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 20
averments in an election petition is required, except when
allegations of corrupt practices are made by the election
petitioner. Any amendment in the CPC is of no consequence in
this regard unless the meaning of ‘verification’ is amended to
include an affidavit.
Defective affidavit:
38. What exactly are the contents of an affidavit in Form
No.25 as prescribed by Rule 94-A of the Rules? The format
reads as follows:
“Form 25
(see Rule 94A)
AFFIDAVIT
I, ……………………., the petitioner in the accompanying
election petition calling in question the election of Shri/Shrimati
…………………. (respondent No……………….. in the said petition)
make solemn affirmation/oath and say-
(a) that the statements made in paragraphs …………. of
the accompanying election petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of* ……………… and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs ……………….. of the same petition and in paragraphs ……………… of the Schedule annexed thereto
are true to my knowledge;
(b) that the statements made in paragraphs
……………….. of the said petition about the commission
of the corrupt practice of* ……………… and the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraphs
………………. of the said petition and in paragraphs
………………….. of the Schedule annexed thereto are
true to my information:
(c)
(d)
(e)
Page 20 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 21
(f)
etc.
Signature of deponent
Solemnly affirmed/sworn by Shri/ Shrimati ………………. at
………….this………. day of …………… 20…………..
Before me, Magistrate of the first class/
Notary/Commissioner of Oaths.
*Here specify the name of the corrupt practice.”
39. Prasanna Kumar’s affidavit accompanying the election
petition reads as follows:
“Form 25
(Rule 94-A)
In The High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
(Original Jurisdiction)
Election Petition No. 2/2009
Between:
Prasanna Kumar .... Petitioner
And
Sri G.M. Siddeshwar and Ors .... Respondents
Affidavit
I, Prasanna Kumar, the petitioner in the accompanying Election
petition, catting in question the election of Sri G.M.
Siddeshwar (1st respondent in the said petition) make solemn
and affirmation on oath and say-
(a) That I am an elector in 13 Davanagere Lokasabha
Constituency in Harihar Assembly Segment and I am fully
Page 21 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 22
aware and acquainted with the facts of the case and swear to
this affidavit,
(b) That the statements made in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11,
12 and 13 & 14 of the accompanying Election Petition about the
violation of the law during the conduct of election and the
particulars mentioned in the above noted paragraphs are true
to my knowledge and contents of paras 18, 19, 20 and 21 are
based on legal advise;
(c) That the statements made in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15
and 16 of the accompanying Election Petition about the
commission of electoral offence of corrupt practices and the
particulars mentioned in the said paragraphs of the petition are
true to my knowledge and partly on Information.
(d) That Annexures - 1 to 14 and 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 are true
copies and 15, 16, 17, 21 are original copies.
Sd/-
Signature of the Deponent
Solemnly affirmed/sworn to by Sri Prasanna Kumar
at Bangalore, this the 18th day of June 2009.
Sd/- Identified by me
Sd/- corrections: (nil).
sworn to before me”
40. A perusal of the affidavit furnished by Prasanna Kumar ex
facie indicates that it was not in absolute compliance with the
format affidavit. However, we endorse the view of the High
Court that on a perusal of the affidavit, undoubtedly there was
substantial compliance with the prescribed format. It is correct
that the verification was also defective, but the defect is
Page 22 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 23
curable and cannot be held fatal to the maintainability of the
election petition.
41. Recently, in Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap
Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 the issue of a failure to file an
affidavit in accordance with the prescribed format came up for
consideration. This is what this Court had to say:
“The format of the affidavit is at any rate not a matter of
substance. What is important and at the heart of the
requirement is whether the election petitioner has made
averments which are testified by him on oath, no matter in
a form other than the one that is stipulated in the Rules.
The absence of an affidavit or an affidavit in a form other
than the one stipulated by the Rules does not by itself
cause any prejudice to the successful candidate so long as
the deficiency is cured by the election petitioner by filing a
proper affidavit when directed to do so.”
We have no reason to take a different view. The contention
urged by Siddeshwar is rejected.
(ii) Summary dismissal under Section 86 of the Act:
42. Undoubtedly, Section 86 of the Act makes no reference to
Section 83 thereof and so, prima facie, an election petition
cannot be summarily dismissed under Section 86 of the Act for
non-compliance of the provisions of Section 83 thereof. This
was briefly adverted to in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh,
(1972) 1 SCC 214 but that was in the context of dismissal of
Page 23 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 24
the election petition under the provisions of the CPC. The
contention urged in Hardwari Lal was to the effect that since
Section 83 of the Act does not find a mention in Section 86
thereof, an election petition could not be summarily dismissed
for non-compliance of Section 83. A three-judge Bench of this
Court held that since an election petition is required to be tried
as nearly as possible in accordance with the procedure
applicable under the CPC to the trial of suits, an election
petition could nevertheless be dismissed if it did not disclose a
cause of action.
43. The issue was, again, specifically raised in Azhar
Hussain. The question considered was:
“Since the Act does not provide for dismissal of an election
petition on the ground that material particulars necessary
to be supplied in the election petition as enjoined by
Section 83 of the Act are not incorporated in the election
petition inasmuch as Section 86 of the Act which provides
for summary dismissal of the petition does not advert to
Section 83 of the Act there is no power in the court trying
election petitions to dismiss the petition even in exercise
of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure.”
44. While answering this issue, this Court referred to
Hardwari Lal. It was held, relying on that decision that since
powers under the CPC could be exercised by the Court, an
Page 24 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 25
election petition could be summarily dismissed if it did not
disclose a cause of action. This is what this Court had to say:
“In view of this pronouncement there is no escape from
the conclusion that an election petition can be summarily
dismissed if it does not furnish cause of action in exercise
of the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. So also it
emerges from the aforesaid decision that appropriate
orders in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil
Procedure can be passed if the mandatory requirements
enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to incorporate the
material facts in the election petition are not complied
with.”
45. In Mallikarjunappa the issue was considered yet again
and it was held:
“An election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine
under Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does
not comply with either the provisions of “Section 81 or
Section 82 or Section 117 of the RP Act”. The requirement
of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the
prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt
practice is contained in Section 83(1) of the Act. Noncompliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act,
however, does not attract the consequences envisaged by
Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election petition is
not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the
Act, for alleged non-compliance with provisions of Section
83(1) or (2) of the Act or of its proviso.”
46. More recently, the issue was again considered in Ponnala
Lakshmaiah and relying upon Sardar Harcharan Singh
Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh, (2004) 11 SCC 196 it was
held:
Page 25 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 26
“Even otherwise the question whether non-compliance
with the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act is fatal to the
election petition is no longer res integra in the light of a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Sardar
Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh. In that case
a plea based on a defective affidavit was raised before the
High Court resulting in the dismissal of the election
petition. In appeal against the said order, this Court held
that non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83 of the
Act did not attract an order of dismissal of an election
petition in terms of Section 86 thereof. Section 86 of the
Act does not provide for dismissal of an election petition
on the ground that the same does not comply with the
provisions of Section 83 of the Act. It sanctions dismissal
of an election petition for non-compliance with Sections
81, 82 and 117 of the Act only. Such being the position,
the defect if any in the verification of the affidavit filed in
support of the petition was not fatal, no matter the proviso
to Section 83(1) was couched in a mandatory form.”
47. The issue having been considered several times by this
Court must now be allowed to rest at that.
What is an election petition:
48. However, another aspect of this contention is that if the
provisions of Section 83 of the Act are not complied with, then
the election petition that has been filed cannot truly be
described as an election petition.
49. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop
Singh Rathore & Ors. [1963] 3 SCR 573, the Constitution
Bench dealt with the issue whether non-compliance with the
proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was fatal to the
Page 26 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 27
maintainability of an election petition wherein allegations of
corrupt practices were made. It was urged that the affidavit in
respect of corrupt practices which accompanied the election
petition was neither properly made nor in the prescribed form.
A different facet of this argument was that an election petition
must comply with the provisions of Section 83 thereof and if it
did not, then it could not be called an election petition.
50. The Constitution Bench agreed with the Election Tribunal
that a defect in the verification of an affidavit “cannot be a
sufficient ground for dismissal of the petitioner's petition
summarily, as the provisions of Section 83 are not necessarily
to be complied with in order to make a petition valid and such
affidavit can be allowed to be filed at a later stage also.” In
other words, non-compliance with the proviso to Section 83(1)
of the Act was not ‘fatal’ to the maintainability of an election
petition and the defect could be remedied. It would follow that
if an election petition did not comply with the proviso to Section
83(1) of the Act, it would still be called an election petition.
51. The broad principle laid down in Murarka was somewhat
restricted by another Constitution Bench decision rendered in
Ch. Subba Rao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad
Page 27 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 28
[1964] 6 SCR 213. In that case, the Constitution Bench
introduced two clear principles: firstly, that “if there is a total
and complete non compliance with the provisions of Section
81(3), the election petition might not be “an election petition
presented in accordance with the provisions of this part” within
Section 80 of the Act” and secondly, that “if there is a
substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3),
the election petition cannot be dismissed by the Tribunal under
Section 90(3).”
52. In T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose & Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 274
this Court reiterated the doctrine of substantial compliance as
mentioned in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar and Ch.
Subba Rao and also introduced the doctrine of curability on
the principles contained in the CPC. It was held that the defect
in the affidavit in that case was curable and was not of such a
fatal nature as to attract dismissal of the election petition at the
threshold.
53. The doctrine of substantial compliance as well as the
doctrine of curability were followed in V. Narayanaswamy v.
C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, (2000) 2 SCC 294. This Court held
that a defect in verification of an affidavit is not fatal to the
Page 28 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 29
election petition and it could be cured. Following Moidutty it
was held that if the election petition falls foul of Order VI Rule
16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and does not disclose a
cause of action then it has to be rejected at the threshold.
54. Somewhat more recently, in Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar
v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar, (2009) 9 SCC 310 this
Court reiterated this position in law and held:
“The position is well settled that an election petition can
be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish the cause of
action in exercise of the power under the Code of Civil
Procedure. Appropriate orders in exercise of powers under
the Code can be passed if the mandatory requirements
enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to incorporate the
material facts in the election petition are not complied
with.”
55. The principles emerging from these decisions are that
although non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of
the Act is a curable defect, yet there must be substantial
compliance with the provisions thereof. However, if there is
total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of
Section 83 of the Act, then the petition cannot be described as
an election petition and may be dismissed at the threshold.
Integral part of an election petition:
56. An issue arises whether an affidavit required to be filed
under the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act is an integral part
Page 29 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 30
of an election petition and, if so, whether the filing of a
defective affidavit would be fatal to the maintainability of an
election petition. This would, in a sense, be an exception to the
general rule mentioned above regarding a defect under Section
83 of the Act being curable.
57. In Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar [1968] 3
SCR 13 the question raised was as follows:
“Whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed for
contravention of Section 81 (3) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 as copy of Annexure ‘A' to the
petition was not given along with the petition for being
served on the respondents.”
58. It was noted that the contents of the pamphlet, in
translation, were incorporated in the election petition. It was
also noted that the trial of an election petition has to follow, as
far as may be, the provisions of the CPC. Therefore, this Court
approached the problem by looking at the CPC to ascertain
what would have been the case if what was under
consideration was a suit and not the trial of an election petition.
59. It was held that where the averments are too
compendious for being included in an election petition, they
may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election
petition. In such an event, these schedules or annexures would
Page 30 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 31
be an integral part of the election petition and must, therefore,
be served on the respondents. This is quite distinct from
documents which may be annexed to the election petition by
way of evidence and so do not form an integral part of the
averments of the election petition and may not, therefore, be
served on the respondents.
60. In M. Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohammed, (1978)
2 SCC 659 this Court followed Sahodrabai Rai and held that
a schedule or an annexure which is an integral part of an
election petition must comply with the provisions of Section
83(2) of the Act. Similarly, the affidavit referred to in the
proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act where the election petition
alleges corrupt practices by the returned candidate also forms
a part of the election petition. If the affidavit, at the end of the
election petition is attested as a true copy, then there is
sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 81(3) of
the Act and would tantamount to attesting the election petition
itself.
61. F.A. Sapa and Others v. Singora and Others, (1991)
3 SCC 375 a three-judge Bench of this Court reviewed the
relevant provisions of the Act, Rule 94-A of the Rules, Form No.
Page 31 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 32
25, the provisions of the CPC as well as the case law and
arrived at the following conclusions:
“28. From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P.
Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and
Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case
law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the
verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that
the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the
affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the
grounds or sources of information in regard to the
averments or allegations which are based on information
believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better
particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he
may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be
required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the
affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless
the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which
case the defect concerning material facts will have to be
dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as
indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide
in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure
referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of
the election petition or not; different considerations will
follow in the case of the former as compared to those in
the case of the latter.”
62. It was further laid down that even though a defective
affidavit may not be fatal to the maintainability of an election
petition, the High Court should ensure compliance before the
parties go to trial so that the returned candidate can meet the
allegations and is not taken by surprise at the trial.
63. What is the consequence of not curing the defect?
In
Moidutty a defect in verification of the election petition was
Page 32 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 33
pointed out by raising a plea in that regard in the written
statement. Notwithstanding this, the election petitioner did not
cure the defect. Under these circumstances it was held that
until the defect in the verification was rectified the petition
could not have been tried. Additionally, it was held that since
there was a lack of material particulars regarding the
allegations of corrupt practices, it was a case where the
election petition ought to have been rejected at the threshold
for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to
pleadings.
64. This issue was again discussed in Umesh Challiyill v.
K.P. Rajendran, (2008) 11 SCC 740 and this Court
suggested the following solution:
“However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed
out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss
the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the
sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a
technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the
threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the
Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects
and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could
result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be
dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can
be rejected when the election petition is not properly
constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in
the present case we regret to record that the defects
which have been pointed out in this election petition were
purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter
Page 33 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 34
and secondly even if the Court found them of serious
nature then at least the Court should have given an
opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.”
65. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it
seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in
compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section
83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition,
and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the
affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to
the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed
format of Form No.25 and with a defective verification were
curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to
Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects. 
66. No submissions were made with regard to the striking out,
in accordance with Order VI rule 16 of the CPC, of specifically
objectionable paragraphs in the election petition. In any event
this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view
different from that taken by the High Court.
Conclusion:
67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are,
accordingly dismissed, but without any costs. 
Page 34 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013Page 35
….…….…………………….. J.
(R.M. LODHA)
….…….…………………….. J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
….…….…………………….. J.
(MADAN B. LOKUR)
New Delhi,
March 08, 2013
Page 35 of 35
C.A. No. of 2013