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Sunday, February 24, 2013

Section 498-A of the IPC could be made compoundable, - a complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC presents difficulty because the said offence is not compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable. - We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC is not compoundable, in appropriate cases if the parties are willing and if it appears to the criminal court that there exist elements of settlement, it should direct the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through mediation. - No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the 10Page 11 wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) xxx xxx xxx (viii) xxx xxx xxx (ix) xxx xxx xxx (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. 11Page 12 (xi) xxx xxx xxx (xii) xxx xxx xxx (xiii) xxx xxx xxx (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” It is pertinent to note that in this case the husband and wife had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half years. This fact was taken into consideration along with other facts as leading to the conclusion that matrimonial bond had been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife. - directions, which the courts dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow: (a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the 36Page 37 Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable time limit for mediation centres to complete the process of mediation because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can always extend the time limit. (b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC should, at any stage and particularly, before they take up the complaint for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they feel that there exist elements of settlement and both the parties are willing. However, they should take care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the IPC is not diluted. Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to 37Page 38 grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this direction. It will be for the concerned court to work out the modalities taking into consideration the facts of each case. (c) All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation stage. 37. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1794 OF 2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4782 of
2007)
K. SRINIVAS RAO  … APPELLANT
Versus
D.A. DEEPA  … RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, has been filed by the
appellant-husband,  being aggrieved by the judgment  and
order dated 8/11/2006 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.797/03, setting aside
the decree of divorce granted in his favour.
Page 2
3. The appellant-husband is working as Assistant Registrar
in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The marriage between the
appellant-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized
on 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and customs. Unfortunately,
on the very next day disputes arose between the elders on
both sides which resulted in their abusing each other and
hurling  chappals  at  each  other.  As  a  consequence,  on
27/4/1999, the newly married couple got separated without
consummation of the marriage and started living separately.
On  4/10/1999,  the  respondent-wife  lodged  a  criminal
complaint against the appellant-husband before the Women
Protection Cell alleging inter alia that the appellant-husband
is  harassing  her  for  more  dowry.  This  complaint  is  very
crucial to this case. We shall advert to it more in detail a
little  later.   Escalated  acrimony  led  to  complaints  and
counter  complaints.  The  respondent-wife  filed  a  petition
under  Section  9  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  for
restitution  of  conjugal  rights  before  the  Family  Court,
Secunderabad.  The appellant-husband filed a counter-claim
seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and
2Page 3
desertion  under  Section  13(1)(i-a)  and  (b)  of  the  Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955.
4. The  Family  Court  while  dismissing  the  petition  for
restitution of conjugal rights and granting decree of divorce
inter  alia held  that  the  respondent-wife  stayed  in  the
appellant-husband’s house only for a day, she admitted that
she did not have any conversation with anyone and hence
any amount of oral evidence adduced by her will not support
her plea that she was harassed and driven out of the house;
that the story that the appellant-husband made a demand of
dowry of Rs.10,00,000/- is false; that by filing false complaint
against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  family,  alleging
offence under Section 498-A of the IPC in the Metropolitan
Magistrate  Court,  Hyderabad  and  by  filing  complaints
against the appellant-husband in the High Court where he is
working, the respondent-wife caused mental cruelty to the
appellant-husband and that reunion was not possible.  The
Family  Court  directed  the  appellant-husband  to  repay
Rs.80,000/-  given  by  the  respondent-wife’s  father  to  him
3Page 4
with interest at 8% per annum from the date of the marriage
till payment.
5. By the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the
appeal  carried  by  the  respondent-wife  against  the  said
judgment and set aside the decree of divorce granted in
favour of the appellant-husband. The High Court  inter alia
observed that the finding of the Family Court that lodging a
complaint  with  the  police  against  the  appellant-husband
amounts to cruelty is perverse because it is not a ground for
divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  The High Court
further held that the appellant-husband and the respondent wife
 did not live together for a long time and, therefore, the
question of their treating each other with cruelty does not
arise.  According to the High Court, the conclusion that the
respondent-wife  caused  mental  cruelty  to  the  appellant
husband is based on presumptions and assumptions.
6. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned counsel for the appellant
husband assailed the conduct of the respondent-wife and
4Page 5
submitted that it disentitles her from getting any relief from
this Court.   Counsel took us through the complaint lodged
by the respondent-wife with the Superintendent of Police,
Women  Protection  Cell,  Hyderabad,  making  defamatory
allegations against the mother of the appellant-husband and
drew our attention to the various legal proceedings initiated
by  her  against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  family.
Counsel submitted that she also lodged complaints with the
High Court asking for the removal of the appellant-husband
from his job.  Counsel submitted that by lodging such false
complaints  the  respondent-wife  caused  extreme  mental
cruelty to the appellant-husband.  Counsel submitted that
the  High  Court  fell  into  a  grave  error  in  observing  that
because the respondent-wife did not live with the appellant
husband for long she could not have caused mental cruelty
to him.  Counsel submitted that this observation is erroneous
and is contrary to the law laid down by this Court.  False and
defamatory allegations made in the pleadings can also cause
mental cruelty.  Counsel submitted that the marriage has
irretrievably broken down and, therefore, it is necessary to
5Page 6
dissolve  it  by  a  decree  of  divorce.   In  support  of  his
submissions counsel placed reliance on G.V.N. Kameswara
Rao vs.  G. Jabilli
1
,  Parveen Mehta vs.  Inderjit Mehta
2
,
Vijayakumar  R.  Bhate vs.  Neela  Vijayakumar  Bhate
3
,
Durga  Prasanna  Tripathy vs.  Arundhati  Tripathy
4
,
Naveen  Kohli vs.  Neelu  Kohli
5
 and  Samar  Ghosh vs.
Jaya Ghosh
6
.
7. Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondent-wife,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the
father of the respondent-wife had given Rs.80,000/- and 15
tolas of gold as dowry to the appellant-husband’s family.
However, they demanded additional cash of Rs.10,00,000/-.
Because this demand could not be met, the respondent-wife
and her family was humiliated and ill-treated. Therefore, the
parents of the respondent-wife had to return to their house
along with her immediately after marriage.  The father of the
respondent-wife  made  efforts  to  talk  to  the  appellant-
1
 (2002) 2 SCC 296
2
 (2002) 5 SCC 706
3
 (2003) 6 SCC 334
4
 (2005) 7 SCC 353
5
 (2006) 4 SCC 558
6
 (2007) 4 SCC 511
6Page 7
husband’s family, but, they did not respond to his efforts.
They  persisted  with  their  demands  and,  therefore,  the
respondent-wife had no alternative but to lodge complaint
against  them  under  Section  498-A of  the  IPC  before  the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.  The appellant-husband
thereafter gave a false assurance that he will not harass her
and, therefore, she withdrew the complaint and went to the
matrimonial house.  However, the approach of the appellant
husband and his family did not change. She had to therefore
renew her complaint.  Counsel submitted that only because
of  the  obstinate  and  uncompromising  attitude  of  the
appellant-husband and his family that the respondent-wife
had  to  take  recourse  to  court  proceedings.   Counsel
submitted that the respondent-wife values the matrimonial
tie.   She  wants  to  lead  a  happy  married  life  with  the
appellant-husband.  She had, therefore, filed a petition for
restitution of conjugal rights which should have been allowed
by the Family Court.  Counsel submitted that after properly
evaluating all the circumstances the High Court has rightly
set aside the decree of divorce and granted a decree of
7Page 8
restitution of conjugal rights.  The High Court’s judgment,
therefore, merits no interference.
8. The matrimonial dispute started with a quarrel between
the  elders  of  both  sides  in  which  initially  the  appellant
husband and the respondent-wife were not involved.  The
ego battle of the elders took an ugly turn.  Parties were
dragged  to  the  court  and  the  inevitable  happened.  The
relations between the two families got strained. With a fond
hope that we could bring about a settlement we requested
the counsel to talk to the parties and convey our wishes that
they should bury the hatchet and start living together. We
also tried to counsel them in the court.  The respondent-wife
appears to be very keen to go back to the matrimonial home
and start life afresh, but the appellant-husband is adamant.
He  conveyed  to  us  through  his  counsel  that  by  filing
repeated false complaints against him and his family the
respondent-wife has caused extreme cruelty to them and
therefore it will not be possible to take her back.  In view of
this we have no option but to proceed with the case.
8Page 9
9. The  High  Court  has  taken  a  view  that  since  the
appellant-husband  and  the  respondent-wife  did  not  stay
together, there is no question of their causing cruelty to
each other.  The High Court concluded that the conclusion
drawn by the Family Court that the respondent-wife caused
mental cruelty to the appellant-husband is erroneous.  We
are unable to agree with the High Court.
10. Under  Section  13(1)(i-a)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,
1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
a petition presented either by the husband or the wife on the
ground that the other party has, after solemnization of the
marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty.  In a series of
judgments this Court has repeatedly stated the meaning and
outlined the scope of the term ‘cruelty’.  Cruelty is evident
where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested
such feelings towards her or him as to cause in her or his
mind  reasonable  apprehension  that  it  will  be  harmful  or
9Page 10
injurious  to  live  with  the  other  spouse.   Cruelty  may  be
physical or mental.
11. In  Samar  Ghosh this Court set out illustrative cases
where inference of ‘mental cruelty’ can be drawn.  This list is
obviously not exhaustive because each case presents it’s
own peculiar factual matrix and existence or otherwise of
mental cruelty will have to be judged after applying mind to
it.  We must quote the relevant paragraph of Samar Ghosh.
We have reproduced only the instances which are relevant
to the present case.
“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down
for  guidance,  yet  we  deem  it  appropriate  to
enumerate some instances of human behaviour
which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of
“mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the
succeeding  paragraphs  are  only  illustrative  and
not exhaustive:
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life
of  the  parties,  acute  mental  pain,  agony  and
suffering  as  would  not  make  possible  for  the
parties to live with each other could come within
the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii)  On  comprehensive  appraisal  of  the  entire
matrimonial  life  of  the  parties,  it  becomes
abundantly clear that situation is such that the
10Page 11
wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put
up with such conduct and continue to live with
other party.
(iii)  xxx xxx xxx
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling
of  deep  anguish,  disappointment,  frustration  in
one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a
long time may lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to  torture,  discommode  or
render miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour
of  one  spouse  actually  affecting  physical  and
mental health of the other spouse. The treatment
complained  of  and  the  resultant  danger  or
apprehension must be very grave, substantial and
weighty.
(vii)  xxx xxx xxx
(viii)  xxx xxx xxx
(ix)  xxx xxx xxx 
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole
and a few isolated instances over a period of years
will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be
persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the
relationship  has  deteriorated  to  an  extent  that
because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse,
the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to
live with the other party any longer, may amount
to mental cruelty.
11Page 12
(xi)  xxx xxx xxx
(xii)  xxx xxx xxx 
(xiii)  xxx xxx xxx
(xiv)  Where  there  has  been  a  long  period  of
continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded
that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The
marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a
legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in
such  cases,  does  not  serve  the  sanctity  of
marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard
for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In
such  like  situations,  it  may  lead  to  mental
cruelty.”
It is pertinent to note that in this case the husband and
wife had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half
years.  This fact was taken into consideration along with
other facts as leading to the conclusion that matrimonial
bond  had  been  ruptured  beyond  repair  because  of  the
mental cruelty caused by the wife.  Similar view was taken in
Naveen Kohli.
12. In V. Bhagat  v.  D. Bhagat
7
  in the divorce petition
filed by the husband the wife filed written statement stating
7
 (1994) 1 SCC 337
12Page 13
that the husband was suffering from mental hallucination,
that  his  was  a  morbid  mind  for  which  he  needs  expert
psychiatric  treatment  and  that  he  was  suffering  from
‘paranoid disorder’.  In cross-examination her counsel put
several questions to the husband suggesting that several
members  of  his  family  including  his  grandfather  were
lunatics.  This court held that these assertions cannot but
constitute mental cruelty of such a nature that the husband
cannot  be  asked  to  live  with  the  wife  thereafter.   Such
pleadings and questions it was held, are bound to cause
immense  mental  pain  and  anguish  to  the  husband.   In
Vijaykumar Bhate disgusting accusations of unchastity and
indecent  familiarity  with  a  neighbour  were  made  in  the
written statement.  This Court held that the allegations are
of such quality, magnitude and consequence as to cause
mental  pain,  agony  and  suffering  amounting  to  the
reformulated concept of cruelty in matrimonial law causing
profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel
deeply  hurt  and  reasonably  apprehend  that  it  would  be
dangerous to live with her husband.  In Naveen Kohli the
13Page 14
respondent-wife got an advertisement issued in a national
newspaper that her husband was her employee.  She got
another news item issued cautioning his business associates
to  avoid dealing  with  him.   This was  treated as  causing
mental cruelty to the husband.
13. In Naveen Kohli the wife had filed several complaints
and  cases  against  the  husband.   This  Court  viewed  her
conduct as a conduct causing mental cruelty and observed
that the finding of the High Court that these proceedings
could not be taken to be such which may warrant annulment
of marriage is wholly unsustainable.
14. Thus,  to  the  instances  illustrative  of  mental  cruelty
noted in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more.  Making
unfounded  indecent  defamatory  allegations  against  the
spouse  or  his  or  her  relatives  in  the  pleadings,  filing  of
complaints or issuing notices or news items which may have
adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the
spouse and filing repeated false complaints and cases in the
14Page 15
court  against  the  spouse  would,  in  the  facts  of  a  case,
amount to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.
15. We shall apply the above principles to the present case.
Firstly, it is necessary to have a look at the legal proceedings
initiated by both sides against each other.  The facts on
record disclose that after the marriage, due to some dispute
which  arose  between  the  elders,  both  sides  abused  and
virtually  attacked  each  other.   The  respondent-wife  was
taken  by  her  parents  to  their  house.   According  to  the
respondent-wife, her father made efforts to bring about an
amicable  settlement  but  the  other  side  did  not  respond
favourably  and,  therefore,  on  4/10/1999  she  lodged  a
complaint  with  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  Women
Protection Cell against the appellant-husband and members
of his family.   In our opinion, this complaint is, to a large
extent, responsible for widening the rift between the parties.
In this complaint, after alleging ill-treatment and harassment
for dowry, it is alleged that mother of the appellant-husband
asked the respondent-wife to sleep with the father of the
15Page 16
appellant-husband.  When  she  was  cross-examined  in  the
Family Court during the hearing of her petition for restitution
of conjugal rights the respondent-wife admitted that she had
lodged  the  complaint.  PW-2  her  mother,  in  her  cross examination
 stated that though they had asked her not to
lodge the complaint, the respondent-wife lodged it.  She told
them  that  she  had  lodged  the  complaint  because  the
appellant-husband was not listening to her.  Thus, it appears
that this complaint was lodged out of frustration and anger
and was a reaction to the appellant-husband’s refusal to live
with her.  It was, perhaps, felt by her that because of the
pressure of such a complaint the appellant-husband would
take  her  back  to  his  house.   Far  from  helping  the
respondent-wife,  the  complaint  appears  to  have  caused
irreparable  harm  to  her.   It  increased  the  bitterness.
Perhaps, the respondent-wife was misguided by someone.
But, such evidence is not on record.  Even in this court, this
complaint appears to us to be a major factor amongst others
impeding settlement.  Pursuant to the said complaint, Crime
No.8/2000  was  registered  by  C.I.D.,  Hyderabad,  in  the
16Page 17
Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court), Hyderabad against
the appellant-husband and his family under Section 498-A of
the IPC.  It is the respondent-wife’s case that the appellant
husband gave an assurance before the police that he will not
harass her.  She, therefore, withdrew the complaint.  The
police  then  filed  a  closure  report.   According  to  the
respondent-wife, the appellant-husband did not abide by the
promise made by him and, therefore, she filed a protest
petition.   The  Magistrate  Court,  Hyderabad,  then,  took
cognizance  of  the  case  and  renumbered  the  case  as
C.C.No.62/2002.
16. In  the  meantime,  the  respondent-wife  filed
O.P.No.88/2001  in  the  Family  Court,  Secunderabad,  for
restitution of conjugal rights.  The appellant-husband filed a
counter claim for divorce on 27/12/2002.  The Family Court
dismissed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights and
allowed the counter claim for divorce filed by the appellant
husband.  The respondent-wife challenged the Family Court
judgment in the High Court.  On 8/12/2006 the High Court
17Page 18
reversed the Family Court’s order and allowed the petition
for restitution of conjugal rights.  The present appeal is filed
by the appellant-husband against the said judgment.
17. According to the respondent-wife, on 17/9/2007 when
she, along with her mother, came out of the court after a
case  filed  by  her  against  the  appellant-husband  was
adjourned,  the  appellant-husband  beat  her  mother  and
kicked her on her stomach.  Both of them received injuries.
She, therefore, filed complaint for the offence punishable
under Section 324 of the IPC against the appellant-husband
(C.C.No. 79/2009).  It may be stated here that on 19/10/2009
the appellant-husband was acquitted in this case.
18. On 24/6/2008 the judgment was delivered by Additional
Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Hyderabad  in  C.C.No.
62/2002.   The  appellant-husband  was  convicted  under
Section 498-A of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo six
months  simple  imprisonment.   He  and  his  parents  were
acquitted of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
18Page 19
His parents were acquitted of the offence under Section 498-
A of the IPC.  After this judgment the respondent-wife and
her parents filed a complaint in the High Court saying that
since  the  appellant-husband  was  convicted  he  should  be
dismissed from service.  Similar letters were sent to the High
Court by the maternal uncle of the respondent-wife.
19. On  14/7/2008  the  appellant-husband  filed  Criminal
Appeal No.186/2008 challenging his conviction under Section
498-A of the IPC before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge.  It is
pertinent  to  note  that  the  respondent-wife  filed  Criminal
Appeal  No.1219/2008  in  the  High  Court  questioning  the
acquittal of the appellant-husband and his parents of the
offences  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  and  also  the
acquittal  of  his  parents  of  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 498-A of the IPC.  This appeal is pending in the High
Court.  Not being content with this, the respondent-wife filed
Criminal  Revision  Case  No.1560/2008  in  the  High  Court
seeking  enhancement  of  punishment  awarded  to  the
19Page 20
appellant-husband for offence under Section 498-A of the
IPC.
20. According to the appellant-husband on 6/12/2009 the
brother  of  the  respondent-wife  came  to  their  house  and
attacked his mother.  His mother filed a complaint and the
police registered a complaint under Section 354 of the IPC.
The brother of the respondent-wife also lodged a complaint
and an offence came to be registered.  Both the cases are
pending.
21. On 29/6/2010 Criminal Appeal No. 186/2010 filed by the
appellant-husband challenging his conviction for the offence
under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  was  allowed  by  the
Metropolitan  Sessions  Judge  and  he  was  acquitted.   The
respondent-wife has filed criminal appeal in the High Court
challenging the said acquittal which is pending.
22. We need to now see the effect of the above events.  In
our opinion, the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the
scurrilous, vulgar and defamatory statement made by the
20Page 21
respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4/10/1999 addressed
to the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell.  The
statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked
her to sleep with his father is bound to anger him.  It is his
case  that  this  humiliation  of  his  parents  caused  great
anguish to him.  He and his family were traumatized by the
false and indecent statement made in the complaint.  His
grievance appears to us to be justified. This complaint is a
part of the record.  It is a part of the pleadings.  That this
statement is false is evident from the evidence of the mother
of the respondent-wife, which we have already quoted.  This
statement cannot be explained away by stating that it was
made because the respondent-wife was anxious to go back
to the appellant-husband.  This is not the way to win the
husband back.  It is well settled that such statements cause
mental cruelty.  By sending this complaint the respondent
wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.
23.     Pursuant to this complaint, the police registered a
case under Section 498-A of the IPC.  The appellant-husband
21Page 22
and his parents had to apply for anticipatory bail, which was
granted to them.  Later, the respondent-wife withdrew the
complaint.  Pursuant to the withdrawal, the police filed a
closure  report.   Thereafter,  the  respondent-wife  filed  a
protest petition.  The trial court took cognizance of the case
against  the  appellant-husband  and  his  parents  (CC  No.
62/2002).  What is pertinent to note is that the respondent
wife filed criminal appeal in the High Court challenging the
acquittal of the appellant-husband and his parents of the
offences  under  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act  and  also  the
acquittal  of  his  parents  of  the  offence  punishable  under
Section 498-A of the IPC.   She filed criminal revision seeking
enhancement of the punishment awarded to the appellant
husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC in
the High Court which is still pending.  When the criminal
appeal  filed  by  the  appellant-husband  challenging  his
conviction for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC was
allowed  and  he  was  acquitted,  the  respondent-wife  filed
criminal  appeal  in  the  High  Court  challenging  the  said
acquittal. During this period respondent-wife and members
22Page 23
of her family have also filed complaints in the High Court
complaining about the appellant-husband so that he would
be removed from the job.  The conduct of the respondent
wife in filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and
defamatory  allegation  against  her  mother-in-law,  in  filing
revision seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to
the  appellant-husband,  in  filing  appeal  questioning  the
acquittal  of  the  appellant-husband  and  acquittal  of  his
parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that
he and his parents are put in jail and he is removed from his
job.  We have no manner of doubt that this conduct has
caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.
24. In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  wrongly  held  that
because the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did
not stay together there is no question of the parties causing
cruelty to each other.
Staying together under the same roof
is not a pre-condition for mental cruelty.  Spouse can cause
mental cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is
not staying under the same roof.
In a given case, while
23Page 24
staying away,  a spouse can  cause mental cruelty to  the
other spouse by sending vulgar and defamatory letters or
notices or filing complaints containing indecent allegations
or by initiating number of judicial proceedings making the
other spouse’s life miserable.  This is what has happened in
this case.
25. It is also to be noted that the appellant-husband and
the respondent-wife are staying apart from 27/4/1999.  Thus,
they are living separately for more than ten years.  This
separation has created an unbridgeable distance between
the two.  As held in Samar Ghosh, if we refuse to sever the
tie, it may lead to mental cruelty.
26. We  are  also  satisfied  that  this  marriage  has
irretrievably broken down.  Irretrievable  breakdown  of
marriage  is  not  a  ground  for  divorce  under  the  Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955.  But, where marriage is beyond repair on
account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or
the  wife  or  of  both,  the  courts  have  always  taken
24Page 25
irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  as  a  very  weighty
circumstance  amongst  others  necessitating  severance  of
marital tie.  A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot
be  revived  by  the  court’s  verdict,  if  the  parties  are  not
willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments
and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly any
chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial
reunion created by the court’s decree.
27. In V. Bhagat this Court noted that divorce petition was
pending for eight years and a good part of the lives of both
the parties had been consumed in litigation, yet the end was
not in sight.  The facts were such that there was no question
of reunion, the marriage having irretrievably broken down.
While  dissolving  the  marriage  on  the  ground  of  mental
cruelty this Court observed that irretrievable breakdown of
marriage is not a ground by itself, but, while scrutinizing the
evidence  on  record  to  determine  whether  the  grounds
alleged are made out and in determining the relief to be
granted  the  said  circumstance  can  certainly  be  borne  in
25Page 26
mind.  In Naveen Kohli, where husband and wife had been
living separately for more than 10 years and a large number
of  criminal  proceedings  had  been  initiated  by  the  wife
against the husband, this Court observed that the marriage
had been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and public
interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition
of the fact and to declare  defunct de jure  what is already
defunct de facto.  It is important to note that in this case this
Court made a recommendation to the Union of India that the
Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  be  amended  to  incorporate
irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  as  a  ground  for  the
grant of divorce.
28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent
wife  has  caused  by  her  conduct  mental  cruelty  to  the
appellant-husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken
down.  Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain
and anguish.  In this Court the respondent-wife expressed
that she wants to go back to the appellant-husband, but,
that  is  not  possible  now.   The  appellant-husband  is  not
26Page 27
willing to take her back.  Even if we refuse decree of divorce
to the appellant-husband, there are hardly any chances of
the respondent-wife leading a happy life with the appellant
husband  because  a  lot  of  bitterness  is  created  by  the
conduct of the respondent-wife.
29. In Vijay Kumar, it was submitted that if the decree of
divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope
for reconciliation between parties.  This court observed that
judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances,
the claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of
despair  rather  than  based  upon  any  real,  concrete  or
genuine purpose or aim.  In the facts of this case we feel the
same.
30. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must
be granted, we are alive to the plight of the respondent-wife.
The appellant-husband is working as an Assistant Registrar
in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.  He is getting a good
salary.  The respondent-wife fought the litigation for more
27Page 28
than 10 years.  She appears to be entirely dependent on her
parents and on her brother, therefore, her future must be
secured  by  directing  the  appellant-husband  to  give  her
permanent alimony.  In the facts and circumstance of this
case,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  appellant-husband
should be directed to pay a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees
Fifteen Lakhs only) to the respondent-wife as and by way of
permanent alimony.  In the result, the impugned judgment is
quashed  and  set  aside.   The  marriage  between  the
appellant-husband - K. Srinivas Rao and the respondent-wife
-  D.A.  Deepa  is  dissolved  by  a  decree  of  divorce.   The
appellant-husband  shall  pay  to  the  respondent-wife
permanent alimony in the sum of Rs.15,00,000/-, in three
instalments.  The first instalment of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees
Five  Lakhs  only)  should  be  paid  on  15/03/2013  and  the
remaining amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only)
should be paid in instalments of Rs.5,00,000/- each after a
gap  of  two  months  i.e.  on  15/05/2013  and  15/07/2013
respectively.  Each instalment of Rs.5,00,000/- be paid by a
28Page 29
demand draft drawn in favour of the respondent-wife “D.A.
Deepa”. 
31. Before parting, we wish to touch upon an issue which
needs  to  be  discussed  in  the  interest  of  victims  of
matrimonial  disputes.   Though  in  this  case,  we  have
recorded a finding that by her conduct, the respondent-wife
has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband, we may
not be understood, however, to have said that the fault lies
only  with  the  respondent-wife.    In  matrimonial  disputes
there is hardly any case where one spouse is entirely at
fault.   But,  then,  before  the  dispute  assumes  alarming
proportions, someone must make efforts to make parties see
reason.  In this case, if at the earliest stage, before the
respondent-wife  filed  the  complaint  making  indecent
allegation  against  her  mother-in-law,  she  were  to  be
counselled by an independent and sensible elder or if the
parties were sent to a mediation centre or if they had access
to a pre-litigation clinic, perhaps the bitterness would not
have escalated.  Things would not have come to such a pass
29Page 30
if, at the earliest, somebody had mediated between the two.
It is possible that the respondent-wife was desperate to save
the marriage.  Perhaps, in desperation, she lost balance and
went  on  filing  complaints.   It  is  possible  that  she  was
misguided.   Perhaps,  the  appellant-husband  should  have
forgiven her indiscretion in filing complaints in the larger
interest of matrimony.  But, the way the respondent-wife
approached the problem was wrong.  It portrays a vindictive
mind.  She caused extreme mental cruelty to the appellant
husband.  Now the marriage is beyond repair.
32. Quite often, the cause of the misunderstanding in a
matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as
a  method  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  has  got  legal
recognition  now.   We  have  referred  several  matrimonial
disputes to mediation centres.  Our experience shows that
about 10 to 15% of matrimonial disputes get settled in this
Court through various mediation centres.  We, therefore, feel
that at the earliest stage i.e. when the dispute is taken up by
the Family Court or by the court of first instance for hearing,
30Page 31
it  must  be  referred  to  mediation  centres.   Matrimonial
disputes  particularly  those  relating  to  custody  of  child,
maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit for mediation. Section
9 of the Family Courts Act enjoins upon the Family Court to
make efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes and in these
efforts, Family Courts are assisted by Counsellors.  Even if
the Counsellors fail in their efforts, the Family Courts should
direct  the  parties  to  mediation  centres,  where  trained
mediators are appointed to mediate between the parties.
Being trained in the skill of mediation, they produce good
results.  
33. The idea of pre-litigation mediation is also catching up.
Some mediation centres have, after giving wide publicity, set
up “Help Desks” at prominent places including facilitation
centres  at  court  complexes  to  conduct  pre-litigation
mediation.   We  are  informed  that  in  Delhi  Government
Mediation and Conciliation Centres, and in Delhi High Court
Mediation Centre, several matrimonial disputes are settled.
These  centres  have  a  good  success  rate  in  pre-litigation
31Page 32
mediation.   If  all  mediation  centres  set  up  pre-litigation
desks/clinics by giving sufficient publicity and matrimonial
disputes  are  taken  up  for  pre-litigation  settlement,  many
families will be saved of hardship if, at least, some of them
are settled.  
34. While  purely  a  civil  matrimonial  dispute  can  be
amicably settled by a Family Court either by itself or by
directing the parties to explore the possibility of settlement
through mediation,
a complaint under Section 498-A of the
IPC  presents  difficulty  because  the  said  offence  is  not
compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where
by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable.
Though  in  Ramgopal  &  Anr.   v.   State  of  Madhya
   Pradesh & Anr.
8
  , this Court requested the Law Commission
and the Government of India to examine whether offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC could be made
compoundable, it has not been made compoundable as yet.
The  courts  direct  parties  to  approach  mediation  centres
8
 (2010) 13 SCC 540
32Page 33
where  offences  are  compoundable.   Offence  punishable
under  Section  498-A  being  a  non-compoundable  offence,
such a course is not followed in respect thereof.  This Court
has always adopted a positive approach  and encouraged
settlement  of matrimonial disputes and discouraged their
escalation.
 In this connection, we must refer to the relevant
paragraph from G.V. Rao  v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors.
9
, where
the  complaint  appeared  to  be  the  result  of  matrimonial
dispute,  while  refusing to  interfere  with  the  High  Court’s
order quashing the complaint, this court made very pertinent
observations, which read thus:
“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in
recent  times.  Marriage  is  a  sacred  ceremony,  the  main
purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle
down  in  life  and  live  peacefully.  But  little  matrimonial
skirmishes  suddenly  erupt  which  often  assume  serious
proportions  resulting  in  commission  of  heinous  crimes  in
which elders of the family are also involved with the result
that those who could have counselled and brought about
rapprochement  are  rendered  helpless  on  their  being
arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many
other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not
encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may
ponder  over  their  defaults  and  terminate  their  disputes
amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in
a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude
and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in
chasing their “cases” in different courts.”
9
 (2000) 3 SCC 693
33Page 34
In    B.S. Joshi & Ors.  v.  State of Haryana & Anr.
10
  ,
after referring to the above observations, this Court stated
that the said observations are required to be kept in view by
courts while dealing with matrimonial disputes and held that
complaint involving offence under Section 498-A of the IPC
can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers
under  Section  482 of the Code if the parties settle their
dispute.   Even in  Gian  Singh   v.   State  of  Punjab  &
Anr.
11
,  this  Court  expressed  that  certain  offences  which
overwhelmingly  and  predominantly  bear  civil  flavour  like
those  arising  out  of  matrimony,  particularly  relating  to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute and where the offender and
the victim had settled all disputes between them amicably,
irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if it feels that by not quashing the same, the
ends of justice shall be defeated.
10
 AIR 2003 SC 1386
11
 (2012) 10 SCC 303
34Page 35
35. We,  therefore,  feel  that  though  offence  punishable
under  Section  498-A  of  the  IPC  is  not  compoundable,  in
appropriate cases if the parties are willing and if it appears
to the criminal court that there exist elements of settlement,
it  should  direct  the  parties  to  explore  the  possibility  of
settlement  through  mediation.   This  is,  obviously,  not  to
dilute the rigour, efficacy and purport of Section 498-A of the
IPC, but to locate cases where the matrimonial dispute can
be nipped in bud in an equitable manner.  The judges, with
their expertise, must ensure that this exercise does not lead
to the erring spouse using mediation process to get out of
clutches of the law. During mediation, the parties can either
decide to part company on mutually agreed terms or they
may decide to patch up and stay together.  In either case for
the settlement to come through, the complaint will have to
be quashed.  In that event, they can approach the High
Court and get the complaint quashed.  If however they chose
not to settle, they can proceed with the complaint.  In this
exercise, there is no loss to anyone. If there is settlement,
the parties will be saved from the trials and tribulations of a
35Page 36
criminal case and that will reduce the burden on the courts
which will be in the larger public interest.  Obviously, the
High Court will quash the complaint only if after considering
all circumstances it finds the settlement to be equitable and
genuine.  Such a course, in our opinion, will be beneficial to
those  who  genuinely  want  to  accord  a  quietus  to  their
matrimonial disputes.  We would, however, like to clarify that
reduction of burden of cases on the courts will, however, be
merely an incidental benefit and not the reason for sending
the parties for mediation.  We recognize ‘mediation’ as an
effective  method  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  in
matrimonial matters and that is the reason why we want the
parties  to  explore  the  possibility  of  settlement  through
mediation in matrimonial disputes.
36. We,  therefore,  issue
directions,  which  the  courts
dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow: 
(a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the
Family  Courts  shall  make  all  efforts  to  settle  the
matrimonial disputes through mediation.  Even if the
36Page 37
Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts
shall,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  refer  the
matter  to  the  mediation  centre.   In  such  a  case,
however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable
time  limit  for  mediation  centres  to  complete  the
process  of  mediation  because  otherwise  the
resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may
get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance
of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can
always extend the time limit. 
  
(b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under
Section 498-A of the IPC should, at any stage and
particularly, before they take up the complaint for
hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they
feel that there exist elements of settlement and both
the parties are willing.  However, they should take
care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and
efficacy of Section 498-A of the IPC is not diluted.
Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to
37Page 38
grant  bail  is  not  in  any  way  curtailed  by  this
direction. It will be for the concerned court to work
out the modalities taking into consideration the facts
of each case. 
(c) All  mediation  centres  shall  set  up  pre-litigation
desks/clinics;  give  them  wide  publicity  and  make
efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation
stage. 
37. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms. 
……………………………………………..J.
     (AFTAB ALAM)
……………………………………………..J.
                                      (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 22, 2013.
38

Foreign Liquor (Compounding,Blending and Bottling) Rules, 1975 (for short “1975 Rules”) read with Section 14 of the Abkari Act (for short “the Act”). - whether the High Court can issue a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, directing the State to part with its exclusive privilege, in the matter of granting licence for establishing distilleries under the Foreign Liquor (Compounding, Blending and Bottling) Rules, 1975 (for short “1975 Rules”) read with Section 14 of the Abkari Act (for short “the Act”). = The Respondent, in our view, could lay a claim only if it establishes that a preferential treatment has been meted out to M/s Amrut Distilleries, Bangalore and M/s. Empee Distilleries, Madras while granting licences for establishing the respective distillery units in the Palakkad District on the ground of discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Respondent has never challenged the distillery licences granted to them, but only prayed for another licence for it as well which, in our view, cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Citizens cannot have a fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the State nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the State prefers other applicants for the grant of licence, during the pendency of some other applications, unless an applicant establishes a better claim over others.= learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have overlooked those vital factors while issuing a Writ of Mandamus directing the State Government/Commissioner to grant distillery licence to the respondent for setting up of a new distillery in the Palakkad District, thinking that the impugned order is nothing but old wine in new bottle. We are informed, after 1998, not even a single licence has been granted by the State Government/Commissioner for establishing distillery units anywhere in the State. That being the factual and legal position, we are of the view that the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in issuing a Writ of Mandamus directing the issuance of a distillery licence to the respondent. 35. We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Ordered accordingly.Page 34 34 However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.


Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1642 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9098 of 2009]
State of Kerala and Others .. Appellants
Versus
Kandath Distilleries  .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. We are, in this appeal, concerned with the question
whether
the High Court can issue a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the  Constitution  of  India,  directing  the  State  to  part  with  itsPage 2 exclusive  privilege,  in  the  matter  of  granting  licence  for establishing distilleries under the Foreign Liquor (Compounding,Blending and Bottling) Rules, 1975 (for short “1975 Rules”) read with Section 14 of the Abkari Act (for short “the Act”).
3. M/s Kandath Distilleries, respondent herein, claimed to have
submitted  an  application  dated  12.1.1987  before  the
Commissioner of Excise for a licence to establish a compounding,
blending and bottling unit in the Palakkad District.  Few others
had  also  filed  similar  applications  for  licence  for  setting  up
distillery units in the State of Kerala.  All of them were directed to
first obtain the approval of the Government of India for the setting
up of new blending and bottling units and, thereafter, to approach
the State Government.  This Court, however, vide its judgment
dated  29.1.1997  in  Writ  Petition  No.  322  of  1996  (Bihar
Distillery  and  Another  v.  Union  of  India  and  Others) took
the  view  that  the  power  to  permit  the  establishment  of  any
industry engaged in the manufacture of portable liquors, including
Indian  Made  Foreign  Liquors  (IMFLs),  beer,  country  liquor  and
other intoxicating drinks is exclusively vested in the respectivePage 3
3
State Governments.  Further, it was also held that the power to
prohibit  and/or  regulate  the  manufacture,  production,  sale,
transport of consumption of such intoxicating liquors is equally
that of the States.
4. We  notice,  during  the  year  1998  and  prior  to  that,  the
Commissioner of Excise and the State Government had received
large number of applications for setting up of distillery units in
various parts of the State.  The Commissioner of Excise or the
State  could  not  have  entertained  all  those  applications  and
granted  the  licences  for  the  setting  up  of  large  number  of
distillery units in the State.  The State Government, however,
entertained  four  applications  favourably  and  accorded  its
approval under Section 14 of the Act. The State Government, vide
GO  (Rt.)  No.  291/98/TD  dated  20.5.1998,  examined  the
application  submitted  by  M/s  Amrut  Distilleries  in  detail  and
granted approval for issuing a licence by the Excise Commissioner
for the establishment of a distillery unit for the manufacture of
IMFLs  at  Kanjkode  village  in  the  Palakkad  District.  The
Government also, vide its order dated 6.8.1998, examined thePage 4
4
application  of  M/s  Empee  Distilleries,  Madras,  and  accorded
approval for the grant of licence by the Excise Commissioner for
establishing a distillery unit at Kanjkode village in the Palakad
District.    The  application  submitted  by  M/s  K.  S.  Distilleries,
Kannur  was  also  considered  by  the  State  Government  and
granted permission to the Excise Commissioner to issue a licence
for a distillery unit to be established at Kannur, vide order dated
18.8.1998.  The application of M/s Elite Group of Companies was
also  favourably  considered  by  the  Government  and  accorded
permission to the Excise Commissioner for issuing the necessary
licence for establishing a distillery unit at Trichur.  
5. M/s Kandath Distilleries (respondent) having noticed that its
application submitted in the year 1987 for setting up the unit in
the Palakkad District was not considered, filed a Revision Petition
before  the  Minister  for  Excise  on  22.11.1998  to  consider  its
application  as  well  for  the  grant  of  licence  for  establishing  a
distillery unit in the Palakkad district, though it had not raised any
dispute with regard to the grant of other two distillery licences for
setting up the units in the Palakkad District.Page 5
5
6. We notice that the Excise Commissioner/State Government
had  received,  during  the  year  1998  and  prior  to  that,  large
number of applications for licences for establishing distillery units
in  various  districts  in  the  State  of  Kerala.   The  Government,
therefore, constituted a Scrutiny/Selection Committee to shortlist
the applications received for setting up of IMFL Units, as per G.O.
(Rt.) No. 157/99/TD dated 3.3.1999.   The Government considered
the recommendations of the Committee in detail and, vide G.O.
(Rt.)/689/99/TD dated 29.9.1999, took a policy decision not to
grant any more licences for setting up the distillery units in any
part of the State.  The order was communicated to the respondent
by  the  Joint  Excise  Commissioner  vide  his  letter  dated
11.11.1999.
7. Respondent then preferred O.P. No. 7727 of 2000 before the
High  Court  to  quash  the  above  mentioned  Government  order
dated 11.11.1999 contending that its application also should have
been considered along with the applications submitted by M/s
Amrut Distilleries, Bangalore, M/s. Empee Distilleries, Madras, M/s.Page 6
6
K.  S.  Distillery,  Kannur  and  M/s.  Elite  Group  of  Companies,
Thrissur,  in  the  year  1998.   Respondent,  however,  did  not
challenge the licences granted for establishing the units in the
Palakkad District, the very same district where it had applied for a
licence.   Learned  single  Judge  quashed  the  letter  dated
11.11.1999 issued by the Joint Excise Commissioner and directed
the State Government to consider the application submitted by
the respondent in the light of the conditions prevailing in the year
1998 vide his judgment dated 23.6.2004.
8. The  Excise  Commissioner  heard  the  respondent’s
representative on 18.10.2004 and, after obtaining the views of
the State Government, rejected the application based on G.O.
(Rt.)  No.  689/99/TD  dated  29.9.1999.    Aggrieved  by  the
communication  received  from  the  Excise  Commissioner,  the
respondent filed a Representation on 20.2.2005 before the State
Government,  which  was  rejected  by  the  Government  vide  its
communication No. 4493/G3/2005/TD dated 1.9.2005.Page 7
7
9. Respondent then challenged the above mentioned orders by
filing a Writ Petition No. 29092 of 2005.  Learned single Judge vide
his  judgment  dated  25.1.2006  quashed  the  above  mentioned
orders and passed the following order:
“So, when this Court directed the Government to
consider the claim of the petitioner under Section 14 of
the Abkari Act, with reference to the conditions obtained
in 1998, the Government decided the matter on the basis
of the G.O. issued in 1999.  So, the above quoted decision
of the Government under Section 14 is unsustainable.  It
is declared so.  Since Ext.P12 is passed, based on the
above quoted communication, it is quashed.  Though the
petitioner raised several contentions in Ext.P13 appeal,
none of them was considered in Ext.P14.  Accordingly,
Ext.P14 is also quashed.   The Government is directed to
reconsider the matter concerning grant of sanction under
Section 14 of the Abkari Act in accordance with law in the
light of the directions in Ext.P11 judgment and also the
above  observations  contained  in  this  Judgment,  within
two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this
Judgment.”Page 8
8
10. State Government, in pursuance to the directions given by
the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 29092 of 2005, again
considered the matter and took the view that the Government has
to  make  an  “independent  assessment  of  eligibility”  of  the
applicant for the grant of licence.  Holding so, the Government
passed an order on 16.3.2006.  The operative portion of the order
reads as under:
“Whenever,  applications  for  Distillery  &
Compounding (Blending  & Bottling)  units are received,
they  are  processed  separately.   The  decision  taken  in
each  application  may  be  based  on  the  facts  &  the
circumstances akin to the individual application and may
not be a common decision.  Licenses were given on the
applications  of  M/s  Amrut   Distillery,  Palakkad,  Empee
Distillery, Palakkad, Elite Distillery, Trissur & KS Distilery,
Kannur during the period as alleged by the petitioner.  At
the same time applications from Kandath Distillery, S.R.
Distillery, Sree Chakra Distillery, Rajadhani Distilleries etc.
were rejected.  Government cannot grant the privilege to
all those who had applied for such licence, for a host of
reasons.   Restrictions  have  to  be  imposed,  which  is
permissible under the Constitution.  The Government has
with  effect  from  29/9/99  issued  Government  OrderPage 9
9
deciding  not  to  grant  fresh  licenses  for  Distillery  and
Compounding (Blending & bolting) unit.  The granting of
licence  for  the  Distillery  &  Compounding  (blending  &
bottling) units is a prerogative of the Government and not
the  right  of  the  petitioner.   The  directions  and  the
communications from the offices to the petitioner are only
the statutory requirements for processing the application
and do not cast any right or claim on the petitioner.
In the above circumstances, Government finds no
reasons to reconsider the request of the petitioner under
section 14 of the Abkari Act.  Request of the petitioner is
settled accordingly, keeping in abeyance of the judgment
of the Hon’ble High Court read 5
th
 paper.
The Excise Commissioner will pass fresh orders on
Ext.P1  within  the  time limit prescribed by the Hon’ble
High Court.”
11. Respondent, noticing that the Government had not followed
the directions given by the High Court while passing the order on
16.3.2006, filed Contempt Case (C) No. 521 of 2006 before the
High Court.  Learned single Judge of the High Court felt that the
State Government should have considered, the claim for licence,
in the light of the conditions, which existed in the year 1998 andPage 10
10
could  have  granted  permission  or  rejected  it,  but  referred  to
irrelevant  matters.     Learned  single  Judge  felt  that  the
Government had  prima facie committed contempt of court by
ignoring the directions contained in its earlier judgment in O.P. No.
29092 of 2005 and passed an order on 29.6.2006, placing the
matter before the Division Bench of the High Court.
12. The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  directed  personal
appearance of the Secretary to the Government who appeared
before the Court on 9.8.2006 and offered unconditional apology
and  submitted  that  the  order  dated  16.3.2006  would  be
withdrawn and fresh orders would be passed, in conformity with
the judgment in O.P. No. 29092 of 2005.   The contempt case was
accordingly closed on 12.9.2006.
13. The  Government,  later,  passed  a  detailed  order  dated
11.10.2006.  The operative portion of the same reads as follows:Page 11
11
“Government has examined the matter in detail
with  all  available  records  and  filed  in  the  light  of
directions from the High Court of Kerala and it is found
that partnership came into existence only on 10.4.91 as
per clause no. 3 of the partnership deed.  Therefore, the
application  dated  12.11.87  cannot  be  treated  as  an
application submitted by the partnership firm. Further,
the  alleged  application  dated  12.11.87  was  already
disposed of by the Board of Revenue by letter No. XC3-
32739/93/L.Dis dated 28.6.1994.  thereafter, it is stated
that the petitioner made an application on 21.11.1998
requesting to reconsider the application alleged to have
been submitted by them on 12.1.1987.  It is contended
that in the year 1998, four licenses were granted on
20.5.1998,  06.08.1998  and  20.09.1998  respectively.
From the files it is seen that the above licences were
granted on applications which were submitted during
1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively.
From 3.2.1998 to 21.11.1998 Government received
52 applications for establishing compounding, blending
and bottling units of Indian made foreign liquor. The
Excise Commissioner as per letter No. XC3-15555/98
dated  25.11.1998  reported  that  there  was  an
unprecedented flow of application and the Government
constituted a scrutiny committee as per GO (Rt) No.Page 12
12
157/99/TD dated 3.3.1999 to shortlist the application.
As  on  21.11.1998  the  date  on  which  the  petitioner
made  the  application  for  compounding blending and
bottling licence there were other 52 applications and
Government  have  not  considered  any  one  of  them.
Moreover, the application put in by the partnership firm
byname M/s. Kandath Distilleries on 12.1.1987 cannot
be treated as an application put in by the firm based on
a  partnership  deed  which  came  into  existence  on
10.4.1991 as per Clause 3 of the Partnership Deed.
In the above circumstances the application put in
by  M/s  Kandath  Distilleries  on  21.11.1998  does  not
merit consideration for approval by Government based
on the factual conditions available as on 21.11.1998.”
14. M/s  Kandath  Distilleries  then  challenged  the  above
mentioned order by filing Writ Petition No. 2708 of 2007.  Learned
single  Judge  took  the  view  that  no  reason  other  than  the
constitution of the firm and the date of its effect, was noticed in
the impugned order dated 11.10.2006 for refusing the licence and
that there was no  other  ground found by the Government to
refuse the licence.  Consequently, learned single Judge quashedPage 13
13
the Government order dated 11.10.2006 and directed the State
Government to grant licence applied for vide application dated
12.1.1987.
15. The State Government, aggrieved by the said judgment, filed
a Writ Appeal No. 716 of 2008.  The Division Bench felt that the
State Government had ingenuously made a classification to weed
out respondent to the effect that, from 21.11.1998 onwards, State
had a different policy. The Division Bench noticed that the High
Court  had  directed  the  State  Government  to  consider  its
application submitted as early as in 1987.  Further, it was also
pointed out that the State  Government had no  case  that the
respondent applicant was not suitable, nor such contention had
ever been taken in the previous litigations.  Further, it was also
held by the Division Bench that similarly situated persons had
already been granted licences long back.  In such circumstances,
the  Division  Bench  held  that  there  was  no  illegality  in  the
directions given  by  the  learned single  Judge giving a positive
direction to grant the licence, which was necessary to uphold thePage 14
14
majesty of rule of law.  The appeal filed by the State Government
was accordingly dismissed.  Aggrieved by  the  same,  the  State
Government has come up with appeal.
16. Shri C. S. Rajan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
State,  submitted that the learned single Judge as well as the
Division Bench of the High Court has committed a grave error
while  exercising  their  jurisdictions  under  Article  226  of  the
Constitution  of  India  in  giving  a  positive  direction  to  grant  a
distillery  licence  to  the  respondent.   Learned  senior  counsel
submitted that a citizen has no fundamental right to trade or
business in liquor and that the matter relating to grant of licence
for  dealing  in  liquor  or  starting  distillery  unit  is  within  the
exclusive domain of the State.
Learned senior counsel submitted that if the State has the right to
adopt a policy decision and, indisputably, it has the right to vary,
amend or rescind the same.   Further, it was also submitted that
the  application  submitted  by  the  respondent  was  a  defective
application and, therefore, the Government was justified in notPage 15
15
entertaining that application.  Learned senior counsel submitted
that cogent reasons have been stated by the Government vide its
order dated 11.10.2006 rejecting the application submitted by the
respondent and the High Court was not right in issuing a Writ of
Mandamus directing the State Government to grant the licence
applied for.
17. Shri Giri, learned senior counsel and Shri George Ponthottam,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent, traced the entire
history of the case starting from 1987 till the Government passed
the  order  dated  11.10.2006.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that
there was a concerted effort on  the part of the State  not to
consider the application of the respondent for licence for starting
the distillery unit in the Palakkad District.   At the same time, on
the basis of Policy which was in force in the year 1998, four
licences  were  granted  and  the  respondent  was  discriminated.
Learned counsel submitted that, on non-compliance of the various
directions given by the High Court, the High Court found that the
Secretary to Government had committed contempt and the order
dated 11.10.2006 was nothing but a repetition of earlier ordersPage 16
16
and  it  is  under  those  circumstances,  the  High  Court  gave  a
positive direction to grant distillery licence to the respondent,
which shall not be interfered with by this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution.  Learned counsel also referred the judgment
of this Court in Comptroller and Auditor-General of India and
Anr.  v.  K.S.  Jagannathan  and  Anr. (1986)  2  SCC  679  and
submitted that in order to prevent injustice, this Court can always
give  direction  to  compel  performance  of  a  discretion  by  an
authority in a proper and lawful manner.  Reference was also
made to the judgment of this Court in  Harigovind  Yadav  v.
Rewa Sidhi Gramin Bank and Ors (2006) 6 SCC 145 and RBF
Rig Corporation, Mumbai v. The Commissioner of Customs
(Imports),  Mumbai (2011) 3 SCC 573 and submitted that in
appropriate cases under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court
can always mould the reliefs.
18. We may, before examining the rival contentions, examine
the  scheme  of  the  Act  as  well  as  1975  Rules.   The  Act  was
enacted to consolidate and amend law relating to the import,Page 17
17
export,  transport,  manufacture,  sale  and  possession  of
intoxicating liquor and of intoxicating drugs in the State of Kerala.
Section 14 of the Act deals with the establishment and control of
distilleries, breweries, warehouses, etc, which confers power on
the Commissioner to issue a licence with the previous approval of
the  Government  to  establish  public  distilleries,  breweries  or
wineries,  or  authorize  the  establishment  of  private  distilleries,
breweries, wineries or other manufactories in which liquor may be
manufactured.  Section 14 is given below for easy reference:
“14. Establishment and control of distilleries,
breweries,  warehouses,  etc.-  The  Commissioner
may, with the previous approval of the Government,-
(a) Establish  public  distilleries,  breweries  or
wineries,  or  authorize  the  establishment  of
private distilleries, breweries, wineries or other
manufactories  in  which  liquor  may  be
manufactured  under  a  licence  granted  under
this Act.
Xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”Page 18
18
19. The State Government, in exercise of its powers conferred by
Section 29 of the Act framed the 1975 Rules.  Rule 3 deals with
the application for licence, which requires a person who desires to
carry on  operations  of  compounding,  blending  and bottling  of
foreign liquor to apply in writing to the Commissioner and furnish
the necessary details as required under the Rule.  Rule 3 is given
below for easy reference:
3.  Application  for  Licence.-  Any  person  who
desires  to  carry  on  operations  of  compounding,
blending and bottling of foreign liquor shall apply in
writing to the Commissioner.  Every application for a
lilcence shall give details of the operation desires to
perform and shall be accompanied by –
(i) description and plan of the building in which
the operations are to be carried out in triplicate, drawn
on scale in tracing cloth;
(ii) statement  specifying  the  number,  size  and
descriptions of the permanent apparatus, if any, which
are proposed to be used;
(iii) details  regarding  the  maximum  quantity  in
proof litres of spirits expected to be in the store or in
the process of compounding, blending or bottling; andPage 19
19
(iv) a treasury receipt for the deposit of an earnest
money of one hundred rupees.”
Rule 4 deals with the grant and renewal of licence, which
empowers the Commissioner to issue the licence applied for.
Rule 4 reads as under:
“4.  Grant  and  renewal  of  licence.-  (1)  The
Commissioner may, if he is satisfied after making such
enquiries  as  he  may  consider necessary  that  the
applicant is a person to whom licence  may be issued,
grant to the applicant.-
(i) a compounding and blending licence in
Form  1  on  payment  of  a  fee  of
Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs only); and
(ii) a bottling licence in Form 2 on payment
of a fee of Rs.2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs
only).
(2) The Commissioner shall retain the original of
the description of plan and forward the duplicate to the
officer-in-charge  through  the  Assistant  Excise
Commissioner and return the triplicate to the lilcensee.
(3) The earnest money deposit shall be adjusted
towards the fees of the licence.  If the licence appliedPage 20
20
for is not granted, the earnest money deposit of Rs.100
shall be refunded to the applicant.
(4) The Commissioner may on application made
to  him  in  this  behalf  and  on  payment  of  the  fee
specified in rules renew a licence for a period of one
year at a time.”
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 5 deals with the requirements to be satisfied with regard to
building  in  which  the  compounding,  blending  and  bottling
operations are to be carried out.  Licence for compounding and
blending of foreign liquor is issued in Form No. 1 and the licence
for bottling of foreign liquor is issued in Form No. 2.
20. We  may,  before  examining  the  scope  of  the  above
mentioned provisions and the nature of jurisdiction or the powers
to be exercised by the Commissioner and the State Government,
examine the general purport of the Act in the light of Article 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution of India.
RIGHT TO CARRY ON TRADE OR BUSINESS IN LIQUORPage 21
21
21. Article 47 is one of the Directive Principles of State Policy
which is fundamental in the governance of the country and the
State has the power to completely prohibit the manufacture, sale,
possession, distribution and consumption of liquor as a beverage
because  it  is  inherently  dangerous  to  the  human  health.
Consequently, it is the privilege of the State and it is for the State
to  decide  whether  it  should  part  with  that  privilege,  which
depends upon the liquor policy of the State.  State has, therefore,
the exclusive right or privilege in respect of portable liquor.   A
citizen has, therefore, no fundamental right to trade or business in
liquor  as  a  beverage  and  the  activities,  which  are  res  extra
commercium, cannot be carried on by any citizen and the State
can prohibit completely trade or business in portable liquor and
the State can also create a monopoly in itself for the trade or
business in such liquor.  This legal position is well settled.  State
can  also  impose  restrictions  and  limitations  on  the  trade  or
business in liquor as a beverage, which restrictions are in nature
different from those imposed on trade or business in legitimate
activities  and  goods  and  articles  which  are  res  commercium.Page 22
22
Reference may be made to the judgments of this Court in Vithal
Dattatraya  Kulkarni  and  Others  v.  Shamrao  Tukaram
Power  SMT  and  Others (1979) 3 SCC 212,  P.  N.  Kaushal  &
Others v. Union of India & Others (1978) 3 SCC 558, Krishna
Kumar Narula etc. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Others
AIR 1967 SC 1368, Nashirwar and Others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Others (1975) 1 SCC 29, State of A. P. & Others v.
McDowell  &  Co  and  Others (1996) 3 SCC 709 and  Khoday
Distilleries  Ltd.  &  Others  v.  State  of  Karnataka  &  Others
(1995) 1 SCC 574.
22. Legislature, in its wisdom, has given considerable amount of
freedom to the decision makers, the Commissioner and the State
Government since they are conferred with the power to deal with
an article which is inherently injurious to human health.
23. Section 14 of the Act indicates that the Commissioner can
exercise his powers to grant licence only with the approval of the
State Government because the State has the exclusive privilege
in dealing with liquor.  The powers conferred on the CommissionerPage 23
23
and the State Government under Section 14 as well as Rule 4 are
discretionary in nature, which is discernible from the permissible
language used therein.
LIQUOR POLICY:
24. Liquor  policy  of  State  is  synonymous  or  always  closely
associated with the policy of the Statute dealing with liquor or
such obnoxious subjects.    Monopoly in the trade of liquor is with
the State and it is only a privilege that a licensee has in the
matter of manufacturing and vending in liquor, so held, by this
Court in State of Maharashtra v. Nagpur Distilleries (2006) 5
SCC 112.  Courts are also not expected to express their opinion as
to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation,
any such policy should have been adopted or not.  1998 Policy
has life only in that year and if any rights have accrued to any
party, that have to be adjudicated then and there.    Writ Petition
was  moved  only  in  the  year  2000,  by  then,  policy  had  been
changed  because  1999  liquor  policy  was  total  ban,  so  also
subsequent liquor policies.   It is trite law that a Court of Law isPage 24
24
not expected to propel into “the unchartered ocean” of State’s
Policies.  State has the power to frame and reframe, change and
re-change, adjust and readjust policy, which cannot be declared
as illegal or arbitrary on the ground that the earlier policy was a
better and suited to the prevailing situations.  Situation which
exited in the year  1998 had its natural death  and cannot be
revised in the year 2013, when there is total ban.  
DISCRETION AND DUTY:
25. Discretionary power implies freedom of choice, a competent
authority may decide whether or not to act.  The legal concept of
discretion implies power to make a choice between alternative
courses of action (Discretionary Justice Davis 1969).  Statute has
conferred discretionary  power  on  the  Commissioner  and  State
Government but not discretion coupled with duty because they
are dealing with a subject matter on which State has exclusive
privilege.  Permissive language used by the Statute in Section 14
and  the  rule  making  authority  in  Rule  4  gives  the  State
Government  and  the  Commissioner,  no  mandatory  duty  orPage 25
25
obligation to grant the licence except perhaps to consider the
application, if the liquor policy permits so.  
26. Section 14 uses the expression “Commissioner may”, “with
the  approval  of  the  Government”  so  also  Rule  4  uses  the
expressions “Commissioner may”, “if he is satisfied” after making
such enquiries as  he may consider necessary “licence may be
issued”.    All those expressions used in Section 14 and Rule 4
confer discretionary powers on the Commissioner as well as the
State Government, not a discretionary power coupled with duty.
The  powers,  conferred  on  the  Commissioner  as  well  as  the
Government,  have  to  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the
Constitutional scheme bearing in mind the fact that the trade or
business which is inherently harmful can always be restricted,
curtailed  or  prohibited  by  the  State,  since  it  is  the  exclusive
privilege  of  the  State.   No  duty  is,  therefore,  cast  on  the
Commissioner to grant a licence for establishing a distillery unit
and no right is conferred on any citizen to claim it as a matter of
right.  State can always adopt a “restrictive policy”, e.g., reducing
the number of licences in a particular district or a particular area,Page 26
26
or not to grant any licence at all in a particular district, even in
cases  where  the  applicants  have  satisfied  all  the  conditions
stipulated in the rules and the policy permits granting of licences.
In other words, the satisfaction of the conditions laid  -down in
1975 Rules would not entitle an applicant as a matter of right to
claim a distillery licence which is within the exclusive privilege of
the State.
MANDAMUS – TO ISSUE LICENCE
27. Legislature  when  confers  a  discretionary  power  on  an
authority, it has to be exercised by it in its discretion, the decision
ought to be that of the authority concerned and not that of the
Court.  Court would not interfere with or probe into the merits of
the decision made by an authority in exercise of its discretion.
Court cannot impede the exercise of discretion of an authority
acting under the Statute by issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.  A
Writ of Mandamus can be issued in favour of an applicant who
establishes  a  legal  right  in  himself  and  is  issued  against  an
authority which has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/orPage 27
27
neglected to do so, but such a legal duty should emanate either in
discharge of the public duty or operation of law.  We have found
that there is no legal duty cast on the Commissioner or the State
Government exercising powers under Section 14 of the Act read
with Rule 4 of the 1975 Rules to grant the licence applied for.  The
High Court, in our view, cannot direct the State Government to
part  with  its  exclusive  privilege.   At  best,  it  can  direct
consideration of an application for licence.  If the High Court feels,
in spite of its direction, the application has not been properly
considered or arbitrarily rejected, the High Court is not powerless
to deal with such a situation that does not mean that the High
Court can bend or break the law.  Granting liquor licence is not
like granting licence to drive a cab or parking a vehicle or issuing
a municipal licence to set up a grocery or a fruit shop.  Before
issuing a writ of mandamus, the High Court should have, at the
back of its mind, the legislative scheme, its object and purpose,
the  subject  matter,  the  evil  sought  to  be  remedied,  State’s
exclusive  privilege  etc.  and  not  to  be  carried  away  by  the
idiosyncrasies or the  ipse dixit of an officer who authored thePage 28
28
order challenged.  Majesty of law is to be upheld not by bending
or breaking the law but by strengthening the law.
28. Respondent-applicant, in the instant case, in our view, has
failed to establish a legal right or to show that there is a legal
duty on the Commissioner or the Government to issue a distillery
licence.
DISCRETIONARY ORDER – ARTICLE 14
29. Discretionary power leaves the donee of the power free to
use or not to use it at his discretion.  (refer Rani Drig Raj Kuer
v. Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh AIR 1960 SC 444).  Law
is well settled that the exercise of statutory discretion must be
based  on  reasonable  grounds  and  cannot  lapse  into  the
arbitrariness or caprice anathema to the rule of law envisaged in
Article 14 of the Constitution.  It is trite law that, though, no
citizen has a legal right to claim a distillery licence as a matter of
right and the Commissioner or the State Government is entitled to
either not to entertain or reject the application, they cannot enter
into a relationship by arbitrarily choosing any person they like orPage 29
29
discriminate between persons similarly circumscribed.  The State
Government,  when  decides  to  grant  the  right  or  privilege  to
others,  of course, cannot escape of the rigor of Article 14, in the
sense that it can act arbitrarily.  In such a situation, it is for the
party who complains to establish that a discriminatory treatment
has been meted out to him as against similarly placed persons
but cannot demand a licence for establishing a distillery unit, as a
matter of right.
30. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4
SCC 566, this Court held that no one can claim as against the
State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the
State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive privilege or
right of manufacturing and selling liquor.  But, when the State
decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot
escape from the rigor of Article 14 of the Constitution, it cannot
act arbitrarily or at its sweet will.
31. We  have  noticed  that  the  application  preferred  by  M/s
Kandath Distilleries (respondent herein) in the year 1987 was forPage 30
30
establishing a distillery unit in the Palakkad District.  So also the
applications submitted by M/s Amrut Distilleries, Bangalore and
M/s.  Empee  Distilleries,  Madras  and  licences  were  granted  to
them for establishing the distillery units in the Palakkad District.
However, the respondent’s application was not considered.  The
Commissioner  or  the  State  Government  has  to  take  an
independent decision in each application based on its eligibility
and there cannot be any common decision.  As held in Nandlal
Jaiswal (supra) when the State Government is granting licence
for putting up new industry, it is not necessary that it should
advertise and invite offers for putting up such industry.  The State
Government is entitled to negotiate with those who have come up
with an offer to set up such industry.  The State Government
cannot grant the privilege to all those who have applied for such a
licence in a particular district, for a host of reasons.  The State
Government could restrict the number of distillery lincences in a
particular district by two and it can also grant a third licence in a
particular district as well, but an applicant cannot claim a licence
as a matter of right.   Page 31
31
32. The Respondent, in our view, could lay a claim only if it
establishes that a preferential treatment has been meted out to
M/s  Amrut  Distilleries,  Bangalore  and  M/s.  Empee  Distilleries,
Madras  while  granting  licences  for  establishing  the  respective
distillery  units  in  the  Palakkad  District  on  the  ground  of
discrimination  violating Article  14  of the Constitution  of India.
Respondent has never challenged the distillery licences granted
to them, but only prayed for another licence for it as well which,
in our view, cannot be claimed as a matter of right.  Citizens
cannot have a fundamental right to trade or carry on business in
the properties or rights belonging to the State nor can there be
any  infringement  of  Article  14,  if  the  State  prefers  other
applicants for the grant of licence, during the pendency of some
other applications, unless an applicant establishes a better claim
over others.
33. We  have  gone  through  the  Government  Order  dated
11.10.2006  in extenso  and we are not prepared to say that the
application of the respondent was rejected solely on the ground
Page 32
32
that the application dated 12.1.1987 could not be treated as an
application put forward by a firm based on a partnership deed,
which came into existence on 10.4.1991, as per Clause 3 of the
Partnership Deed but on various other grounds as well.  
The State
Government,  in  our  view,  has  considered  the  respondent’s
application dated 12.1.1987 with regard to the conditions that
existed in the year 1998. The Government letter dated 28.6.1994
would  indicate  that,  apart  from  the  respondent,  few  other
applications were also pending prior to the year 1994.  Over and
above,  the  State  Government  during  the  year  1998,  from
3.2.1998  to  21.11.1998,  had  received  52  applications  for
establishing compounding, blending and bottling units in IMFLs in
various parts of the State.  The Excise Commissioner vide his
letter  dated  25.11.1998  had  reported  that  there  was  an
unprecedented  flow  of  applications,  that  was  the  situation
prevailing in the year 1998, a factor which was taken note of in
not  entertaining  the  respondent’s  application,  whether  it  was
submitted on 12.1.1987 or on 22.11.1998.  We cannot, in any
Page 33
33
way, activate an out-modeled, outdated, forgotten liquor policy of
1998, in the year 2013, by a Writ of Mandamus.
34. We are, therefore, of the view that the 
learned single Judge
as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have overlooked
those vital factors while issuing a Writ of Mandamus directing the
State Government/Commissioner to grant distillery licence to the
respondent  for  setting  up  of  a  new  distillery  in  the  Palakkad
District, thinking that the impugned order is nothing but old wine
in new bottle.  
We are informed, after 1998, not even a single
licence has been granted by the State Government/Commissioner
for establishing distillery units anywhere in the State.  That being
the factual and legal position, we are of the view that the learned
single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court was
not justified in issuing a Writ of Mandamus directing the issuance
of  a distillery licence to the respondent.   
35. We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside
the judgment of the learned single Judge and affirmed by the
Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court.   Ordered  accordingly.Page 34
34
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be
no order as to costs.
............................................J.
(K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
............................................J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
February 22, 2013.