IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 25848 of 2011
Noor Mohammed ... Petitioner
Versus
Jethanand and another ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
In a democratic body polity which is governed by a written
Constitution and where Rule of Law is paramount, judiciary is regarded as
sentinel on the qui vive not only to protect the Fundamental Rights of the
citizens but also to see that the democratic values as enshrined in the
Constitution are respected and the faith and hope of the people in the
constitutional system are not atrophied.
Sacrosanctity of rule of law
neither recognizes a master and a slave nor does it conceive of a ruler and
a subject but, in quintessentiality, encapsules and sings in glory of the
values of liberty, equality and justice In accordance with law requiring
the present generation to have the responsibility to sustain them with all
fairness for the posterity ostracising all affectations.
To maintain the
sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in continuum by every member of the
collective is a categorical imperative. The fundamental conception of
democracy can only be preserved as a colossal and priceless treasure where
virtue and values of justice rule supreme and intellectual anaemia is kept
at bay by constant patience, consistent perseverance, and argus-eyed
vigilance.
The foundation of justice, apart from other things, rests on
the speedy delineation of the lis pending in courts. It would not be an
exaggeration to state that it is the primary morality of justice and
ethical fulcrum of the judiciary.
Its profundity lies in not allowing
anything to cripple the same or to do any act which would freeze it or make
it suffer from impotency.
Delayed delineation of a controversy in a court
of law creates a dent in the normative dispensation of justice and in the
ultimate eventuate, the Bench and the Bar gradually lose their reverence,
for the sense of divinity and nobility really flows from institutional
serviceability.
Therefore, historically, emphasis has been laid on
individual institutionalism and collective institutionalism of an
adjudicator while administering justice.
It can be stated without any fear
of contradiction that the collective collegiality can never be regarded as
an alien concept to speedy dispensation of justice. That is the hallmark
of duty, and that is the real measure.
2. Presently to the factual matrix. The respondent initiated civil
action by instituting Civil Suit No. 42 of 1990 for injunction to restrain
the defendant therein from selling or otherwise transferring the suit land
towards the southern side of the house and further to permanently injunct
him to make any construction on the land in dispute.
After the written
statement was filed, a counter claim was put forth by the defendant.
Thereafter, issues were framed and the parties adduced evidence to
substantiate their respective stands.
On 12.9.1997, the learned Civil
Judge (Junior Division) Nohar, District Hanumangarh, Rajasthan dismissed
the suit and decreed the counter claim filed by defendant-petitioner
herein.
Being grieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the first
respondent preferred Civil First Appeal No. 59 of 1997 in the Court of the
concerned Additional District Judge, Nohar who, on 10.07.2001 dismissed the
appeal.
The dismissal of appeal compelled the respondent to file a Civil
Second Appeal No. 207/2001 in the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur.
3. Be it noted, we have not adverted to the factual controversy and
findings returned thereon because advertence to the same is not necessary
for our purpose.
4. The chequered history of the second appeal, a tragic one, commenced
on 27.7.2011, when memorandum of the appeal was presented. The appeal was
listed for admission along with the stay application on 30.07.2001.
The
petitioner herein had entered caveat and was present on the date of
admission and on the basis of the prayer made by both the parties, the
court called for the lower courts’ records.
Subsequently, the matter was
listed on 8.11.2001, 5.12.2001 and 18.1.2002 but due to non-appearance of
counsel for the parties, no order was passed.
On 18.2.2002, though none
was present on behalf of the appellant therein, yet the court adjourned the
appeal. Similarly, adjournments were granted in the absence of counsel on
20.01.2003 and 4.2.2003.
It is interesting to note that when the appeal
was listed on 4.2.2003, the court directed issuance of notice to the
appellant for making appropriate arrangements for his representation.
It
is apposite to note that the counsel for the respondent therein was present
on that day.
Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on many an occasion
awaiting for service of notice on the appellant.
After completion of
service of notice, the matter was listed on 23.9.2003 and, as usual, none
was present for the appellant.
Similar was the situation on 7.10.2003. On
10.11.2003, when none was present for the appellant, the appeal was
dismissed for non-prosecution in the presence of the counsel for the
respondent.
5. After the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution, the
appellant before the High Court woke up from slumber and filed an
application for restoration in 2004 which was eventually allowed vide order
dated 9.1.2006.
As the order sheet would reflect, time got comatosed for
more than six years and eventually, ministerial order of restoration was
recorded on 11.5.2010.
After the formality of restoration was over
breaking the artificial arrest of time, when the file moved like a large
python, the appeal was listed before the court for admission on 25.10.2010
on which day the learned counsel for the appellant commenced the argument
and ultimately sought adjournment.
The matter stood adjourned to
10.11.2010. Thereafter, an application under Section 100 (5) read with
Order 41, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the appellant and
opportunity was granted to the counsel for the respondent, the plaintiff
therein, to file reply to the same and the matter was directed to be listed
after two weeks.
As the order sheet would further uncurtain the appeal
was listed again on 29.11.2010 and in the meantime, the respondent had
filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC.
6. On 24.2.2011, when the matter was listed for admission, the Court
directed that the matter shall be listed for admission and all the
applications would be considered on that date. On 7.3.2011, it was
directed by the court to list the matter after one week as adjournment was
sought for. Similar prayer for adjournment was made on 16.3.2011 and the
matter was again directed to be listed after two weeks as prayed for. On
27.04.2011, the learned Single Judge passed the following order:
“None for the appellant.
I have perused the record. This second appeal was filed
as back as in the year 2001 and it is now more than 10 years
that it is not yet either admitted for final hearing with a view
to find out whether it involves any substantial question of law
within the meaning of Section 100. It has undoubtedly caused
serious concern to my conscience that this appeal has taken ten
years to decide whether it involves any substantial question of
law.
The matter is being adjourned almost on every occasions in
the last ten years to accommodate the counsel regardless of the
sufficient cause and only on mere request.
Even today the counsel is engaged for the appellant has
not appeared. Another counsel got up and said that the counsel
engaged is not well and, therefore, the case be adjourned.
I could have dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution
but I prefer not to do so because it does not serve anybody’s
purpose. With extreme reluctance and against my conscience and
with a view to do substantial justice to the appellant to give
right of audience, I am constrained to adjourn the case to
accommodate the counsel (though I am not supposed to) and list
the appeal for admission in the next week.”
7. At last, on 9.5.2011, the learned counsel for both the sides appeared
and the matter was admitted on two substantial questions of law and there
was direction for stay of operation of the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the courts below.
8. Mr. H.D. Thanvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended
that there was no substantial question of law involved and the High Court
had no reason to entertain the second appeal only on the factual score.
9. When the matter was listed on 21.9.2012 before us, the following
order was passed: -
“Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Second Appeal
preferred by Respondent No. 1 in 2001 was dismissed for non-
prosecution on 10.11.2003, but later restored to file in
January, 2006 and after almost 10 years of filing of the second
appeal, the judgment and decree of both the courts below have
been stayed by the High Court by its impugned order dated
9.5.2011.
Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court is directed
to file the details of the progress of S. B. Civil Second Appeal
No. 207 of 2001, from 2001 to 2011, within two weeks.”
10. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Registrar General has sent a
report to this Court on the basis of which we have referred to the
proceedings before the High Court. At this juncture, we may clearly
state that we had not issued notice to the contesting respondent as we
are not inclined to interfere with the order. But, a pregnant one, the
manner in which the proceedings in the second appeal continued, being
disturbing, compels us to say something on the said score. Not that
this Court is saying it for the first time but a reminder serves as a
propeller for keen introspection and paves the path of needed
rectification.
11. The proceedings in the second appeal before the High Court, if we allow
ourselves to say so, epitomizes the corrosive effect that adjournments
can have on a litigation and how a lis can get entangled in the
tentacles of an octopus. The philosophy of justice, the role of a
lawyer and the court, the obligation of a litigant and all legislative
commands, the nobility of the Bench and the Bar, the ability and
efficiency of all concerned and ultimately the divinity of law are
likely to make way for apathy and indifference when delay of the present
nature takes place, for procrastination on the part of anyone destroys
the values of life and creates a catastrophic turbulence in the sanctity
of law. The virtues of adjudication cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
by adjournments and non-demonstration of due diligence to deal with the
matter. One cannot be oblivious to the feeling necessities of the time.
No one can afford to sit in an ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor a
lawyer can ignore “the total push and pressure of the cosmos”. It is
devastating to expect infinite patience. Change of attitude is the
warrant and command of the day. We may recall with profit what Justice
Cardozo had said:
“It is true, I think, today in every department of law that the
social value of a rule has become a test of growing power and
importance”.
12. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has to be given a
decent burial. The sooner it takes place, the better it is. It is the
obligation of the present generation to march with the time and remind
oneself every moment that rule of law is the centripodal concern and
delay in delineation and disposal of cases injects an artificial virus
and becomes a vitiating element. The unfortunate characteristics of
endemic delays have to be avoided at any cost. One has to bear in mind
that this is the day, this is the hour and this is the moment, when all
soldiers of law fight from the path. One has to remind oneself of the
great saying, “Awake, Arise, ‘O’ Partha”.
13. As advised, at present, we are disposed to refer to certain
pronouncements of this Court. A three-Judge Bench in Kailash v. Nanhku
and others[1], while dealing with the issue whether Order 8 Rule 1 of
Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory or directory, referred to the
observations in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar[2] which we may
profitably reproduce: -
“The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a
judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law
reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to
overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The
humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the
mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a
residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the
tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. … Justice
is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as
substantive.”
The Bench further referred to the pronouncement in State of Punjab v.
Shamlal Murari[3] to emphasise the approach relating to the process of
adjective law. It has been stated in the said case: -
“Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an
obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are
the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant
in the administration of justice.”
14. We may note with profit that the Court had further opined that the
procedure is directory but emphasis was laid on the concept of desirability
and for the aforesaid purpose, reference was made to Topline Shoes Ltd. v.
Corpn. Bank[4]. Analysing the purpose behind it, the three-Judge-Bench,
referring to Topline Shoes Ltd. (supra), observed thus: -
“36. The Court further held that the provision is more by way of
procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such
disputes. The strong terms in which the provision is couched are
an expression of “desirability” but do not create any kind of
substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of
delay so as to debar the respondent from placing his version in
defence in any circumstances whatsoever.”
15. In Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast Private Limited and others[5] this
Court was dealing with a judgment passed by the High Court in a second
appeal wherein the High Court had not formulated any substantial question
of law and further allowed the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff
solely on the ground that the stakes were high and the plaintiff should
have been non-suited on the basis of no evidence. This Court took note of
the fact that after issues were framed and the matter was fixed for
production of the evidence of the plaintiff on three occasions, the
plaintiff chose not to adduce the evidence. The question posed by the
Court was to the following effect: -
“Is the court obliged to give adjournment after adjournment
merely because the stakes are high in the dispute? Should the
court be silent spectator and leave control of the case to a
party to the case who has decided not to take the case forward?”
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to answer thus: -
“15. It is sad, but true, that the litigants seek - and the
courts grant - adjournments at the drop of the hat. In the cases
where the Judges are little proactive and refuse to accede to
the requests of unnecessary adjournments, the litigants deploy
all sorts of methods in protracting the litigation. It is not
surprising that civil disputes drag on and on. The misplaced
sympathy and indulgence by the appellate and revisional courts
compound the malady further. The case in hand is a case of such
misplaced sympathy. It is high time that courts become sensitive
to delays in justice delivery system and realise that
adjournments do dent the efficacy of the judicial process and if
this menace is not controlled adequately, the litigant public
may lose faith in the system sooner than later. The courts,
particularly trial courts, must ensure that on every date of
hearing, effective progress takes place in the suit.
16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure provided in
CPC. Adjournments have grown like cancer corroding the entire
body of justice delivery system.”
After so stating, the Bench observed as follows: -
“A party to the suit is not at liberty to proceed with the trial
at its leisure and pleasure and has no right to determine when
the evidence would be let in by it or the matter should be
heard. The parties to a suit — whether the plaintiff or the
defendant — must cooperate with the court in ensuring the
effective work on the date of hearing for which the matter has
been fixed. If they don’t, they do so at their own peril.”
16. In Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor and others[6], after
referring to a passage from Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt.
Ltd.[7], the Court cautioned thus: -
“Nonetheless we put the profession to notice that in future the
advocate would also be answerable for the consequence suffered
by the party if the non-appearance was solely on the ground of a
strike call. It is unjust and inequitable to cause the party
alone to suffer for the self imposed dereliction of his
advocate. We may further add that the litigant who suffers
entirely on account of his advocate’s non-appearance in Court,
he has also the remedy to sue the advocate for damages but that
remedy would remain unaffected by the course adopted in this
case. Even so, in situations like this, when the Court mulcts
the party with costs for the failure of his advocate to appear,
we make it clear that the same Court has power to permit the
party to realize the costs from the advocate concerned.
However, such direction can be passed only after affording an
opportunity to the advocate. If he has any justifiable cause
the Court can certainly absolve him from such a liability.”
17. Be it noted, though the said passage was stated in the context of
strike by the lawyers, yet it has its accent on non-appearance by a
counsel in the court.
18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement in Pandurang
Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, Bombay and
others[8], wherein the Court observed that an advocate stands in a loco
parentis towards the litigants and it, therefore, follows that the
client is entitled to receive disinterested, sincere and honest
treatment especially where the client approaches the advocates for
succour in times of need.
19. In Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Administration)[9], a three-
Judge Bench, while dealing with the role of an advocate in a criminal
trial, has observed as follows: -
“We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be
experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate
is finding it difficult to attend the court from day-to-day. It
is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a
criminal case to attend the trial from day-to-day. We cannot
over-stress the duty of the Advocate to attend to the trial from
day-to-day. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a
breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend.”
20. In Mahabir Prasad Singh (supra), the Bench, laying emphasis on the
obligation of a lawyer in his duty towards the Court and the duty of the
Court to the Bar, has ruled as under: -
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall
detract from the dignity of the Court of which he is himself a
sworn officer and assistant. He should at all times pay
deferential respect to the judge, and scrupulously observe the
decorum of the Court room. (Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p.182)
Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a
reciprocal duty for the Court also to be courteous to the
members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for maintaining
and protecting the respect which members of the Bar are entitled
to have from their clients as well as from the litigant public.
Both the Bench and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of the
judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid mutual respect is
sine qua non for the efficient functioning of the solemn work
carried on in Courts of law. But that does not mean that any
advocate or group of them can boycott the courts or any
particular Court and ask the Court to desist from discharging
judicial function. At any rate, no advocate can ask the Court
to avoid a case on the ground that he does not want to appear in
that Court.”
21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards the Court and the
society, being a member of the legal profession, this Court in O.P.
Sharma and others v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana[10] has observed
that the role and status of lawyers at the beginning of sovereign and
democratic India is accounted as extremely vital in deciding that the
nation’s administration was to be governed by the Rule of Law. The
Bench emphasized on the role of eminent lawyers in the framing of the
Constitution. Emphasis was also laid on the concept that lawyers are
the Officers of the Court in the administration of justice.
22. In R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of Himachal Pradesh[11], Chandrachud,
C.J., speaking for the Court pertaining to the relationship between the
Bench and the Bar, opined thus: -
“....the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same
mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members
of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their past association
is a source of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a
matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that
courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at
home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous Judge
is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a court room.
But members of the Bar will do well to remember that such
flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct
will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without
which no democracy can survive.”
23. We have referred to the aforesaid judgments solely for the purpose
that this Court, in different contexts, had dealt with the malady of
adjournment and expressed its agony and anguish. Whatever may be the
nature of litigation, speedy and appropriate delineation is fundamental to
judicial duty. Commenting on the delay in the justice delivery system,
although in respect of criminal trial, Krishna Iyer, J. had stated thus: -
“Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers from slow
motion syndrome which is lethal to “fair trial”, whatever the
ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social
justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in the
criminal being condignly and finally punished within a
reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the
inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings.”
24. In criminal jurisprudence, speedy trial has become an indivisible
component of Article 21 of the Constitution and it has been held by this
Court that it is the constitutional obligation on the part of the State
to provide the infrastructure for speedy trial (see Hussainara Khatoon
v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar[12], Hussainara Khatoon (IV) and
others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna[13]).
25. In Diwan Naubat Rai and others v. State through Delhi
Administration[14], it has been opined that right to speedy trial
encompasses all stages of trial, namely, investigation, enquiry, trial,
appeal and revision.
26. In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab[15], it has been reiterated that
speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Thus, it has been put at the zenith and that
makes the responsibility of everyone Everestine which has to be
performed with Olympian calmness.
27. The anguish expressed in the past and the role ascribed to the Judges,
lawyers and the litigants is a matter of perpetual concern and the same
has to be reflected upon every moment. An attitude of indifference can
neither be appreciated nor tolerated. Therefore, the serviceability of
the institution gains significance. That is the command of the Majesty
of Law and none should make any maladroit effort to create a concavity
in the same. Procrastination, whether at the individual or
institutional level, is a systemic disorder. Its corrosive effect and
impact is like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man
suffering from an incurable and fast progressive malignancy. Delay
either by the functionaries of the court or the members of the Bar
significantly exhibits indolence and one can aphoristically say,
borrowing a line from Southwell “Creeping snails have the weakest
force”. Slightly more than five decades back, talking about the
responsibility of the lawyers, Nizer Louis[16] had put thus: -
“I consider it a lawyer’s task to bring calm and confidence to
the distressed client. Almost everyone who comes to a law
office is emotionally affected by a problem. It is only a
matter of degree and of the client’s inner resources to
withstand the pressure.”
28. A few lines from illustrious Frankfurter is fruitful to recapitulate:
“I think a person who throughout his life is nothing but a
practicing lawyer fulfils a very great and essential function in
the life of society. Think of the responsibilities on the one
hand and the satisfaction on the other, to be a lawyer in the
true sense.”
29. In a democratic set up, intrinsic and embedded faith in the
adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal concern. Delay gradually
declines the citizenry faith in the system. It is the faith and faith
alone that keeps the system alive. It provides oxygen constantly.
Fragmentation of faith has the effect-potentiality to bring in a state
of cataclysm where justice may become a casuality. A litigant expects a
reasoned verdict from a temperate Judge but does not intend to and,
rightly so, to guillotine much of time at the altar of reasons. Timely
delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and establishes the
sustained stability. Access to speedy justice is regarded as a human
right which is deeply rooted in the foundational concept of democracy
and such a right is not only the creation of law but also a natural
right. This right can be fully ripened by the requisite commitment of
all concerned with the system. It cannot be regarded as a facet of
Utopianism because such a thought is likely to make the right a mirage
losing the centrality of purpose. Therefore, whoever has a role to play
in the justice dispensation system cannot be allowed to remotely
conceive of a casual approach.
30. In this context, it is apt to refer to a passage from Ramdeo Chauhan
Alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam[17]: -
“22. ... The judicial system cannot be allowed to be taken to
ransom by having resort to imaginative and concocted grounds by
taking advantage of loose sentences appearing in the evidence of
some of the witnesses, particularly at the stage of special leave
petition. The law insists on finality of judgments and is more
concerned with the strengthening of the judicial system. The
courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object
of strengthening the confidence of the common man in the
institution entrusted with the administration of justice. Any
effort which weakens the system and shakens the faith of the
common man in the justice dispensation system has to be
discouraged.”
31. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another v. State of Gujarat and
others[18], emphasizing on the duty of Court to maintain public
confidence in the administration of justice, this Court has
poignantly held as follows: -
“35. ...Courts have always been considered to have an overriding
duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice – often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold
the “majesty of the law”. Due administration of justice has
always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to
determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to
function as a court of law in the future as in the case before
it.”
Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear as day that everyone involved in
the system of dispensation of justice has to inspire the confidence of the
common man in the effectiveness of the judicial system. Sustenance of
faith has to be treated as spinal sans sympathy or indulgence. If someone
considers the task to be herculean, the same has to be performed with
solemnity, for faith is the ‘elan vital’ of our system.
32. Coming to the proceedings before the High Court from the date of
presentation of the second appeal till the date of admission, the manner
in which it has progressed is not only perplexing but also shocking.
We
are inclined to think that the Court should not have shown indulgence of
such magnitude by adjourning the matter when the counsel for the
appellant was not present.
It is difficult to envision why the Court
directed fresh notice to the appellant when there was nothing suggestive
for passing of such an order.
The matter should have been dealt with
taking a recourse to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure.
It
is also astonishing that the lawyers sought adjournments in a routine
manner and the court also acceded to such prayers.
When the matter
stood dismissed, though an application for restoration was filed, yet it
was listed after a long lapse of time.
Adding to the misery, the
concerned official took his own time to put the file in order.
From the
Registrar General’s communication it is perceptible that some
disciplinary action has been initiated against the erring official.
That is another matter and we do not intend to say anything in that
regard.
But the fact that cannot be brushed aside is that there is
enormous delay in dealing with the case.
Had timely effort been made
and due concern bestowed, it could have been avoided.
There may be
cases where delay may be unavoidable. We do not intend to give
illustrations, for facts in the said cases shall speak for themselves.
In the case at hand, as we perceive, the learned counsel sought
adjournment after adjournment in a nonchalant manner and the same were
granted in a routine fashion.
It is the duty of the counsel as the
officer of the court to assist the court in a properly prepared manner
and not to seek unnecessary adjournments.
Getting an adjournment is
neither an art nor science. It has never been appreciated by the
courts. All who are involved in the justice dispensation system, which
includes the Judges, the lawyers, the judicial officers who work in
courts, the law officers of the State, the Registry and the litigants,
have to show dedicated diligence so that a controversy is put to rest.
Shifting the blame is not the cure.
Acceptance of responsibility and
dealing with it like a captain in the frontier is the necessity of the
time. It is worthy to state that diligence brings satisfaction. There
has to be strong resolve in the mind to carry out the responsibility
with devotion.
A time has come when all concerned are required to
abandon idleness and arouse oneself and see to it that the syndrome of
delay does not erode the concept of dispensation of expeditious justice
which is the constitutional command.
Sagacious acceptance of the
deviation and necessitous steps taken for the redressal of the same
would be a bright lamp which would gradually become a laser beam.
This
is the expectation of the collective, and the said expectation has to
become a reality.
Expectations are not to remain at the stage of hope.
They have to be metamorphosed to actuality.
Long back, Francis Bacon,
in his aphoristic style, had said, “Hope is good breakfast, but it is
bad supper”. We say no more on this score.
33. Though we have dwelled upon the issue, yet we restrain from issuing any
directions, for the High Court as a constitutional Court has to carry
the burden and live up to the requisite expectations of the litigants.
It is also expected from the lawyers’ community to see that delay is
avoided. A concerted effort is bound to give results.
Therefore, we
request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well
as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a mechanism,
regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid such inordinate
delays in matters which can really be dealt with in an expeditious
manner.
Putting a step forward is a step towards the destination. A
sensible individual inspiration and a committed collective endeavour
would indubitably help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.
34. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed of.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
January 29, 2013
-----------------------
[1] (2005) 4 SCC 480
[2] (1975) 1 SCC 774
[3] (1976) 1 SCC 719
[4] (2002) 6 SCC 33
[5] (2011) 9 SCC 678
[6] AIR 2001 SC 207
[7] AIR 1999 SC 287
[8] (1984) 2 SCC 556
[9] AIR 1984 SC 618
[10] (2011) 6 SCC 86
[11] (1981) 3 SCC 166
[12] AIR 1979 SC 1360
[13] (1980) 1 SCC 98
[14] AIR 1989 SC 542
[15] (2005) 7 SCC 387
[16] My life in Court (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1961) p.213
[17] (2001) 5 SCC 714
[18] (2004) 4 SCC 158
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