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Saturday, December 15, 2012

the AICTE passed an order withdrawing the approval granted to the appellant-college in terms of Clause 2.11 of the Approval Process Handbook and the Guidelines for the academic year 2008-2009 and the terms and conditions mentioned in the Letter of Approval. The basis for withdrawing the approval was shifting of the college to the new location without Occupancy Certificate, without informing the State Government and without obtaining the requisite permission from the AICTE as per regulations. While noticing the above Clauses, the High Court proceeded on the admitted position that the appellant-college had shifted to the new site without the necessary permission and further it had no ownership to the land in question at the relevant time. The Court also noticed that an inspection was carried out by the Municipal Corporation on 9th August, 2012 and they had still not issued the Occupancy Certificate to the appellant- college. 16. In view of the above factual matrix of the case, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 22nd August, 2012 and also passed a direction with regard to adjustment of students in other colleges keeping their welfare in mind. The operative part of the order reads as under:- “20. In the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it would not be permissible for this Court to direct AICTE to grant its approval for conducting the engineering college at the new location particularly in view of the fact that no Occupation Certificate has been granted; the Petitioners have not established a clear title to or ownership of land and they have not obtained the NOCs of the State government or of the University of Mumbai. 21. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of AICTE has stated before the Court that AICTE will take all necessary steps to ensure that the welfare of the students who have been allotted to the Petitioners would be duly taken care of by making alternative allotments to other institutions in consultation with the Directorate of Technical Education of the State government. 22. For these reasons, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the decision which has been taken by the AICTE. The Petition shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. In view of the dismissal of the Petition, the Notices of Motion do not survive which shall accordingly stand disposed of.” 17. Aggrieved from the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellants have filed the present appeals.= we find no merit in both the appeals afore-referred. While dismissing these appeals, we issue the following directions : (i) Both grant/refusal of approval and admission schedule, as aforestated, shall be strictly adhered to by all the authorities concerned including the AICTE, University, State Government and any other authority directly or indirectly connected with the grant of approval and admission. (ii) No person or authority shall have the power or jurisdiction to vary the Schedule prescribed hereinabove. (iii) While dealing with the application for grant of approval to new colleges or additional seats, the AICTE shall inform the applicant within three weeks from the date of receipt of its application or date of inspection, as the case may be, the shortcomings/defects, who, in turn, shall remove such shortcomings/defects within 15 days from the date of such communication or within such period as the AICTE may grant and re-submit its papers without default. The process of grant of approval has to be transparent and fair. The AICTE or the concerned University or State Government shall take disciplinary action against the person who commits default in adherence to the Schedule and performance of his duties in accordance therewith. (iv) The reports submitted by the Expert Committee visiting the college should be unambiguous and clear, and should bear the date and time of inspection and should be sufficiently comprehensive and inspection be conducted in the presence of a representative of the institute. (v) The students of the appellant-college shall be re-allocated to the recognized and affiliated colleges in terms of the judgment of the High Court; and the AICTE and the concerned University shall ensure that the academic courses of these students are completed within the balance period of the academic year in all respects. For this purpose, if extra classes are required to be held, the concerned institute, the University and the AICTE are directed to ensure holding of such extra classes. (vi) If the appellate authority decides the matter prior to 30th April of the concerned year and grants approval to a college, then alone such institution will be permitted to be included in the list of colleges to which admissions are to be made and not otherwise. In other words, even if the appellate authority grants approval after 30th April, it will not be operative for the current academic year. All colleges which have been granted approval/affiliation by 10th or 30th April, as the case may be, shall alone be included in the brochure/advertisement/website for the purpose of admission and none thereafter.



                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                CIVIL APPEAL NO.   9048              OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 26086 of 2012)


Parshavanath Charitable Trust & Ors.              … Appellants


                                   Versus


All India Council for Tech. Edu & Ors.           …Respondents


                                     AND

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9047           OF 2012
       (Arising out of SLP(C) No.27021of 2012 @ CC No. 15485 of 2012)

Chetan Pathare & Anr.                           … Appellants


                                   Versus


All India Council for Technical
Education & Ors.                             ...Respondents









                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.    IA Nos.1-2 of 2012 are applications  filed  by  the  two  students  of
Parshavanath College of Engineering run  by  Parshavanath  Charitable  Trust
for permission to file special leave  petition  SLP  (C)  No............  of
2012 (CC No.15485 of 2012) against the  judgment  dated  22nd  August,  2012
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.460  of
2011.  The applications are allowed subject to just exceptions.

2.    SLP (C) No.26086 of 2012 has been  preferred  by  the  appellant-Trust
against the same judgment.

3.    Leave granted in both the SLPs.

4.    As the challenge in  both  these  appeals  is  to  one  and  the  same
judgment of the Bombay High Court, it will, thus, be appropriate for  us  to
dispose of both these appeals by this common judgment.

FACTS :

5.     The  appellant,  Parshvanath  Charitable  Trust,  was  formed   as  a
minority community trust in the year  1993.  
One  of  its  objects  was  to
establish  educational  institutions.   Consequently,  it  established   the
Parshavanath  College,  after  obtaining  approval  of  all  the   concerned
authorities on 11th June, 1994 with the intake capacity of 140 students  for
academic year 1994-95.  
This college was  running  at  the  premises  being
Survey No.27 (part) at Kasarvadavali, Ghodbunder Road  in  the  district  of
Thane.
The  annual  approvals  by  the  All  India  Council  for  Technical
Education (for short, the ‘AICTE’) continued till the year  2008.  
On  29th
April, 2008, the appellant sought a  ‘No  Objection  Certificate’  from  the
University of Mumbai.  
It also applied for an ‘occupation certificate’  from
the Municipal  Corporation  of  Bombay  for  shifting  the  college  to  new
premises located at a distance of barely 300 meters from the old site  being
Survey No. 12/1, 2, 4, 13/8, 9, 10A and 13/10B.  
In  furtherance  to  this,
the appellant had made an application dated 24th May, 2008 to  the  Regional
Office of the AICTE seeking its permission to shift the college to  the  new
premises and also submitted all the requisite documents.  
The appellant  had
also written to the Directorate of Technical Education for issuance of a  No
Objection Certificate for the said purpose.

6.    It is not in dispute that  in  May,  2008,  the  college  shifted  its
location to the new site.   
This exercise was undertaken by the college  and
the Trust without taking prior approval of the AICTE and  
without  receiving
“No Objection Certificate” from the University of  Mumbai  as  well  as  the
State Government.
 It is also evident from the  record  that  no  Occupation
Certificate was received from the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Thane  before
shifting.

7.    On or about 24th June, 2008, the AICTE appointed an  Expert  Committee
to verify the infrastructure available  at  the  new  site  and  the  Expert
Committee visited the  college  on  28th  June,  2008.  
It  noted  that  No
Objection Certificate of  the  affiliating  University  for  change  in  the
location had not been produced though they were informed that the  same  was
in process.   
It also made certain observations with regard to the title  of
the land and the same, according to them, stood in the name  of  some  other
Trust which in turn had leased out the land to the appellant  Trust.     
The
Committee also noticed that all the laboratories  and  other  infrastructure
had been shifted to the new site.   
On 30th June, 2008,  the  AICTE  granted
an extension of approval to the Engineering College for the  academic  years
2008-2011 with an intake capacity  of  280  students.  
Clause  3  of  this
approval letter reads as under :-

          “3.   That the institution shall operate only  from  the  approved
          location, and that the institution shall not open any  off  campus
          study centres/extensive centres directly or in collaboration  with
          any other institution/university organization for the  purpose  of
          imparting technical education  without  obtaining  prior  approval
          from the AICTE.”




8.    As is obvious from a  bare  reading  of  the  letter,  the  appellant-
college was  to  run  its  courses  from  the  campus  which  was  approved.
Thereafter vide letter dated 20th August, 2009, AICTE  granted  approval  to
the appellant-college with increased intake from 280  to  360  students  for
the academic year 2009.

9.    The appellant college was running its  courses  when  the  show  cause
notice dated 18th May, 2010 was issued by the AICTE  to  the  Trust  on  the
ground that the college had shifted to another  location  without  obtaining
prior approval of the AICTE.  
It was stated therein  that  an  institution
has to run courses only from an approved site and if it desires to shift  to
another site, it has to follow the complete procedure as per  the  norms  of
AICTE.  
The show cause notice reads as under:-

             “Your institutions i.e. PARSHWANATH COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING and
             VEER MATA HIRABEN P. SHAH COLLEGE OF PHARMACY are approved  by
             AICTE  for  running  engineering  and   pharmacy   course   at
             GODBHUNDER ROAD, KASAR VADAVALI 400601 DIST. THANE as per  our
             records as a permanent site.

             As per AICTE norms, the institute has to run  the  courses  in
             the approved site only.   In any case, if the institute  wants
             to shift the institute to another location, due process has to
             be followed as per AICTE  norms  to  get  AICTE  approval  for
             shifting.

             However, it was found that you have shifted  your  Engineering
             And  Pharmacy  institutions  to   another   location   without
             obtaining approval from AICTE, which  is  gross  violation  of
             AICTE norms.

             In the above circumstances, you are requested to show-cause as
             to why disciplinary action should not be  initiated  including
             withdrawal of approval or reducing your intake/stop admission.
               Your reply should  reach  AICTE  headquarters  and  Regional
             Office within three working days.”

10.   To this, the appellant Trust submitted its reply dated 21st May,  2010
relevant extract of which reads as under:-

           “We have reason to state that after filing proposal for shifting
           the aforesaid colleges to the new premises, we have applied  for
           permission for  shifting  the  aforesaid  colleges  in  the  new
           premises in the year 2008 only and accordingly we are conducting
           engineering and pharmacy colleges in the new premises.”



11.   The matter remained in controversy, but as a  result  of  issuance  of
show cause notice, the college of the appellant Trust was  not  included  in
the Centralised Admission Process  (CAP)  by  the  State  Government.  
The
appellant, thus, challenged the non- inclusion of the  college  in  the  CAP
and action of the State Government by filing  a  Writ  Petition  before  the
Bombay High Court being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1776 of 2010.  
This  Writ
Petition was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court  vide  its  order
dated 11th August, 2010 wherein it directed as under:-

           “17.  We, therefore, allow this petition and quash and set aside
           the  impugned  communication  of  the  Director   of   Technical
           Education and direct the respondents to  permit  the  appellant-
           college to participate in the Central Admission Process when the
           second round has commenced.

           18.   In view of the submission already made by the  petitioners
           in their reply dated 21st  May,  2010  i.e.  the  Joint  Charity
           Commissioner has passed the  restraint  against  their  Managing
           Trustee restraining him from interfering in  the  administration
           of the college and the educational institution run by the trust,
           we also direct  that  the  respondent-Municipal  Corporation  of
           Thane should consider the petitioner’s application for grant  of
           occupation certificate for the building in which the engineering
           college and the pharmacy college are  being  run  without  being
           influenced by any objection taken by Mr. Tekchand  Shah  against
           whom the order is passed by the Charity Commissioner.

           19.   It is clarified that it is open to the  AICTE  to  proceed
           with the show-cause notice but  if  any  order  adverse  to  the
           petitioner-college is passed, the same shall not be  implemented
           for a period of two weeks from today.

           20.   This order is passed in presence of the learned  Assistant
           Government Pleader  appearing  for  the  Director  of  Technical
           Education and Mr. S.V. Kolla, officer,  Admission  Section  from
           the  office  of  Director  of  Technical  Education  who   shall
           immediately instruct the concerned persons to place the name  of
           the  petitioner-engineering  college  on  the  website  of   the
           centralised online admission process today itself.”

12.   It needs to be noticed at  this  stage  that  during  the  proceedings
before the Division Bench, the Municipal Corporation  of  Thane  had  stated
that Occupancy Certificate had not been granted  to  the  appellant-college;
however, reason thereof could not be brought to the notice of the  Court  at
that stage  because  of  shortage  of  time.    In  the  meanwhile,  certain
disputes also arose among the management of the appellant-Trust.

13.   Subsequent to the above order of  the  High  Court,  on  7th  January,
2011, the AICTE passed an order withdrawing  the  approval  granted  to  the
appellant-college in terms of Clause 2.11 of the Approval  Process  Handbook
and the Guidelines for  the  academic  year  2008-2009  and  the  terms  and
conditions mentioned in the Letter of Approval.  
The basis for  withdrawing
the approval was shifting  of  the  college  to  the  new  location  without
Occupancy Certificate, without informing the State  Government  and  without
obtaining the requisite permission from the AICTE as per regulations.    
The
Expert Committee had also noticed in its inspection dated  28th  June,  2008
that the construction was not suitable.

14.   This cancellation of approval was challenged  by  the  appellant-Trust
before the Bombay High Court in  Writ  Petition  No.460  of  2011.    
Inter
alia,  the  principal  contention  before  the  High  Court  was   that   an
application dated 24th May, 2008  was  made  to  the  AICTE  for  change  in
location.  Contemporaneously, applications were also made to the  University
of Mumbai and the Directorate of Technical Education for the issuance of  No
Objection Certificate and extension of approval by the AICTE  itself  showed
that the site in question met the  requisite  standards  and  there  was  no
justification  for  reducing  the  intake  capacity  and   withdrawing   the
approval.  
The High Court noticed that  there  was  no  challenge  to  the
Regulations or any other clause of the Handbook.  Clause 9.22  of  the  Hand
Book for Approval Process 2008 required a registered sale or  gift  deed  in
favour of the institution and only  a  Government  lease  of  30  years  was
acceptable as per that clause.   The relevant para of Clause 9.22  reads  as
follows:-

         “9.22.   Procedure for Change of Site and Norms Concerning Land and
         Building on New Site.

         Changing  of location/Station may be permitted  after  getting  “No
         Objection Certificate” (NOC)  from  the  concerned  State  Govt./UT
         Administration and Affiliating Body, by the Competent Authority  in
         AICTE as per laid down procedure subject to the fulfilment of Norms
         and Standards of AICTE.  
No  request/representation/Proposal  for
         change  of  site   will   be   considered   after   submission   of
         application/proposal  for  establishment   of   a   new   Technical
         Institution, till the completion of at least two years after a  new
         institution is started with the approval  of  AICTE.    No  partial
         shifting of institution to a different site shall be permitted.

              The following procedure shall be followed:

              The applicant shall have to submit a Proposal along with  the
         following documents  in  original  in  one  lot  to  the  concerned
         Regional Office of AICTE.

           • Registration document of the Trust/Society indicating  members
             of Society/Trust and its Objectives.

           •  Land  document(s)  in  original  for  the  new  site  showing
             ownership  in  the  name  of  Trust/Society  in  the  form  of
             Registration     Sale     Deed/Irrevocable      Gift      Deed
             (Registered)/Irrevocable Government Lease (for a minimum of 30
             years) by concerned authority of Government.    In  case,  the
             land documents are in vernacular language,  Notarized  English
             translation of the document must to be produced.

           • Land use Certificate/Land Conversion Certificate for  the  new
             site allowing the land to be  used  for  educational  purpose,
             from the Competent Authority  along  with  Topo-sketch/Village
             Map indicating land Survey Nos. and a copy of city map showing
             location of proposal site of the institution.

           • Site Plan, Building Plan  for  the  new  site  prepared  by  a
             registered Architect and duly approved by the  Competent  Plan
             Sanctioning Authority designated by the concerned State.

           • Proof of completion of the building structure at the new  site
             as per approved Engineering & Architectural Building Plan,  in
             the form of Color photographs  giving  External  and  Internal
             views.

           • An undertaking by the Institution  stating  that  the  changes
             shall not affect the admission procedure and the  fee  that  a
             student has to pay.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

15.   While noticing the above Clauses, the  High  Court  proceeded  on  the
admitted position that the appellant-college had shifted  to  the  new  site
without the necessary permission and further it  had  no  ownership  to  the
land in question at the relevant time.   
The  Court  also  noticed  that  an
inspection was carried out by the Municipal Corporation on 9th August,  2012
and they had still not issued the Occupancy Certificate  to  the  appellant-
college.

16.   In view of the above factual matrix of the case,  the  Division  Bench
of the High Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 22nd  August,
2012 and also passed a direction with regard to adjustment  of  students  in
other colleges keeping their welfare in mind.  
The operative  part  of  the
order reads as under:-

             “20.   In the exercise of the jurisdiction under  Article  226
             of the Constitution of India it would not be  permissible  for
             this  Court  to  direct  AICTE  to  grant  its  approval   for
             conducting  the  engineering  college  at  the  new   location
             particularly  in  view  of  the  fact   that   no   Occupation
             Certificate  has  been  granted;  the  Petitioners  have   not
             established a clear title to or ownership  of  land  and  they
             have not obtained the NOCs of the State government or  of  the
             University of Mumbai.

             21.   Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of AICTE has  stated
             before the Court that AICTE will take all necessary  steps  to
             ensure that the welfare of the students who have been allotted
             to the Petitioners would be  duly  taken  care  of  by  making
             alternative allotments to other institutions  in  consultation
             with the Directorate  of  Technical  Education  of  the  State
             government.

             22.  For  these  reasons,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to
             interfere with the decision which has been taken by the AICTE.
               The Petition shall stand  dismissed.    There  shall  be  no
             order as to costs.

             23.       In view  of  the  dismissal  of  the  Petition,  the
             Notices of Motion do not survive which shall accordingly stand
             disposed of.”




17.   Aggrieved from the dismissal of the writ petition by the  High  Court,
the appellants have filed the present appeals.

18.   As already noted, two students of Parshvanath College  of  Engineering
have filed  a  separate  application  for  leave  to  prefer  Special  Leave
Petition against the same judgment of the  High  Court  dated  22nd  August,
2012.    According to the appellant-students in Civil Appeal arising out  of
SLP (C) No. ..............of 2012 (CC No.15485/2012), the  judgment  of  the
High Court has adversely affected their interests.  It is  their  contention
that revocation of approval has  resulted  in  closure  of  the  Engineering
College and it has  jeopardised  the  future  and  career  of  the  students
studying in the  college  including  those  studying  in  pursuance  of  the
interim orders passed by the same High Court.

19.   We allow this  application  and,  in  fact,  the  affected  appellant-
students have been heard along with parties in the main  appeal.   Thus,  as
already noticed, we would dispose of  both  these  appeals  by  this  common
judgment.

20.   Before we dwell  upon  the  merit  or  otherwise  of  the  contentions
raised, it is necessary for us to notice certain  settled  legal  principles
which would help in judicious disposal of these appeals.

21.   The provisions of the All India Council for Technical  Education  Act,
1987 (for short ‘the AICTE Act’)  are  intended  to  improve  the  technical
education system throughout the country.
The various authorities under  the
AICTE Act  have  been  given  exclusive  responsibility  to  coordinate  and
determine the standards of higher education.  
It is a general  power  given
to evaluate, harmonise and secure proper  relationship  to  any  project  of
national importance.    Such coordinated action  in  higher  education  with
proper standard is of paramount importance to national progress.

22.   The provisions of the AICTE  Act,  including  its  preamble,  make  it
abundantly clear that the AICTE has  been  established  under  the  Act  for
coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system  at
all levels throughout the country and is  enjoined  to  promote  qualitative
improvement of such education in relation to  planned  quantitative  growth.
The AICTE is required to regulate and ensure  proper  maintenance  of  norms
and standards in technical education  system.    The  AICTE  is  to  further
evolve suitable performance appraisal system for technical institutions  and
universities  incorporating  norms  and  mechanisms   in   enforcing   their
accountability.   It is required to  provide  guidelines  for  admission  of
students and has the  power  to  withhold  or  discontinue  grants  to  such
technical institutions where  norms  and  standards  laid  down  by  it  and
directions given by it from time to time are not  followed.   The  duty  and
responsibility cast on the AICTE implies that the norms and standards to  be
set should be such as would prevent isolated  development  of  education  in
the country.

23.   Section 10 of the AICTE Act enumerates various  powers  and  functions
of  AICTE  as  also  its  duties  and  obligations  to  take  steps  towards
fulfilment of the same.  One such power as envisaged in Section 10(1)(k)  is
to  “grant  approval  for  starting  new  technical  institutions  and   for
introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the  agencies
concerned”.   It is important to see that the AICTE is empowered to  inspect
or cause to inspect any technical institution in clause (p)  of  sub-section
(1) of  Section 10 without any reservation  whatsoever.   However,  when  it
comes to the question  of  universities,  it  is  confined  and  limited  to
ascertaining the financial needs or its standards of  teaching,  examination
and research. The inspection may be  made  or  caused  to  be  made  of  any
department or departments only and that  too,  in  such  manner  as  may  be
prescribed, as envisaged in Section 11 of the AICTE Act.

24.   All these vitally important  aspects  go  to  show  that  the  Council
(AICTE) created under the AICTE Act is  not  intended  to  be  an  authority
either superior to or to supervise and control the universities and  thereby
superimpose itself upon such universities merely for the  reason  that  they
are imparting teaching in technical education or programmes in any of  their
departments or units. A careful scanning of the provisions of the AICTE  Act
and the  provisions  of  the  University  Grants  Commission  Act,  1956  in
juxtaposition, will show that the role of AICTE vis-à-vis  the  universities
is only advisory, recommendatory and  one  of  providing  guidance,  thereby
subserving the cause of maintaining appropriate  standards  and  qualitative
norms and not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce  any  sanctions
by itself.   Reference can be made to the judgments of  this  Court  in  the
case of Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash  Rahangdale  [(2012)  2  SCC
425], State of Tamil Nadu v.  Adhiyaman  Educational  &  Research  Institute
[(1995) 4 SCC 104] and Bharathidasan University v.  All  India  Council  for
Technical Education [(2001) 8 SCC 676].

25.   From the above principles, it is  clear  that  the  AICTE  has  varied
functions and powers under  the  AICTE  Act.    It  is  a  specialized  body
constituted for the purpose of bringing uniformity  in  technical  education
all over  the  country  and  to  ensure  that  the  institutions  which  are
recognised by the AICTE are possessed of complete infrastructure, staff  and
other facilities and are capable  of  maintaining  education  standards  for
imparting technical education.

26.   It is not necessary for us to  refer  to  various  provisions  of  the
AICTE  Act  in  any  greater  detail  as  no  controversy  in  relation   to
application or interpretation  of  any  of  its  provisions  is  raised  for
consideration in the present case.
The facts are primarily admitted and  it
is only the exercise of discretion vested in the AICTE which is the  subject
matter of challenge in the present appeals.  
In the  case  of  Jaya  Gokul
Educational  Trust  v.  Commissioner  &  Secretary  to   Government   Higher
Education Department, Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala State  and  Anr.  [(2000)  5
SCC 231], this Court after discussing all the  relevant  provisions  of  the
AICTE Act and provisions of the Madras University Act, 1923 (for short  “the
Madras Act”) which required the Institute to obtain approval  of  the  State
Government  before  it  started  the  academic  courses,  found   that   the
provisions of the latter Act  overlapped  and  were  in  conflict  with  the
provisions of the AICTE Act in various areas and granting  of  approval  for
starting new technical institutions, inspection of  technical  institutions,
etc.    The Court held as under:-

           “17. ... Thus, in the two passages set  out  above,  this  Court
           clearly held that because of Section 19(K) of  the  Central  Act
           which vested the powers of granting approval in the Council, the
           T.N. Act of 1976 and the University Act,  1923  could  not  deal
           with any questions of ‘approval’ for establishment of  technical
           institutions.   All  that  was  necessary  was  that  under  the
           Regulations, the AICTE Council had to consult them.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX

           22. As held in  T.N.  case  the  Central  Act  of  1987  and  in
           particular, Section 10(k) occupied the field relating to  “grant
           of approvals” for establishing technical  institutions  and  the
           provisions of the Central Act alone were to be complied with. So
           far as the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi  University  Act  or
           its statutes were concerned and in particular Statute 9(7), they
           merely required the University to  obtain  the  “views”  of  the
           State Government. That could not be characterised  as  requiring
           the  “approval”  of  the  State  Government.  If,  indeed,   the
           University statute could be so  interpreted,  such  a  provision
           requiring approval of the State Government would be repugnant to
           the provisions of Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act, 1987 and would
           again be void. As pointed out in T.N.  case  there  were  enough
           provisions in the Central Act for consultation by the Council of
           AICTE with various agencies, including the State Governments and
           the universities concerned. The State-Level  Committee  and  the
           Central Regional Committees contained various experts and  State
           representatives. In case of difference of opinion as between the
           various consultees, AICTE would have to go by the views  of  the
           Central  Task  Force.  These  were  sufficient  safeguards   for
           ascertaining  the  views  of  the  State  Governments  and   the
           universities.  No  doubt  the  question  of  affiliation  was  a
           different matter and was not covered by the Central Act  but  in
           T.N. case it was held that the University could not  impose  any
           conditions inconsistent with the AICTE Act or its Regulation  or
           the conditions imposed by AICTE. Therefore,  the  procedure  for
           obtaining the affiliation and  any  conditions  which  could  be
           imposed by the University, could not be  inconsistent  with  the
           provisions  of  the  Central  Act.  The  University  could  not,
           therefore, in any event have sought for “approval” of the  State
           Government.


           23. Thus we  hold,  in  the  present  case  that
there  was  no
           statutory requirement for obtaining the approval  of  the  State
           Government and even  if  there  was  one,  it  would  have  been
           repugnant to the AICTE Act. 
The University Statute  9(7)  merely
           required that the “views” of the State  Government  be  obtained
           before granting affiliation and this did not amount to obtaining
           “approval”. If the University statute  required  “approval”,  it
           would have been repugnant to the AICTE Act. Point 1  is  decided
           accordingly.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX


           27. The so-called “policy” of the  State  as  mentioned  in  the
           counter-affidavit filed in the High Court was not a  ground  for
           refusing  approval.
In  Thirumuruga   Kirupananda   &   Variyar
           Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal  Medical  Educational  &  Charitable
           Trust v. State of T.N. which was  a  case  relating  to  medical
           education and which also related to the effect of a Central  law
           upon a law made by the State under Entry 25  List  III,  it  was
           held (at SCC p. 35, para 34) that the

                 “essentiality certificate cannot be withheld by  the  State
                 Government on any policy consideration because  the  policy
                 in the matter of establishment of a new medical college now
                 rests with the Central Government alone”.
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

         
Therefore, the State could not have  any  “policy”  outside  the
           AICTE Act and indeed if it had a policy, it should  have  placed
           the same before AICTE and that too  before  the  latter  granted
           permission. 
Once that procedure laid down in the AICTE  Act  and
           Regulations had been followed under  Regulation  8(4),  and  the
           Central   Task   Force   had   also   given    its    favourable
           recommendations, there was no scope for any further objection or
           approval by the State. 
We may however add  that  if  thereafter,
           any fresh facts came to light after an approval was  granted  by
           AICTE or if the State felt that some conditions attached to  the
           permission and required by AICTE to be complied with,  were  not
           complied with, then the State Government could always  write  to
           AICTE, to enable the latter to take appropriate action.

           Decision  of  University  in  not  granting  further  or   final
           affiliation wrong on merits.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX

           30. Thus, the University ought to have considered the  grant  of
           final or further affiliation without waiting  for  any  approval
           from the State Government and should have acted on the basis  of
           the permission granted by AICTE and other  relevant  factors  in
           the University Act or statutes, which are not inconsistent  with
           the AICTE Act or its Regulations.”



27.   The consistent view of this Court has been that
where both  Parliament
and State Legislature have the power to legislate,  the  Central  Act  shall
take precedence in the matters which are covered  by  such  legislation  and
the State enactments shall pave way for  such  legislations  to  the  extent
they are in conflict or repugnant.  
As per the established canons of  law,
primacy of  the  Central  Act  is  undisputable  which  necessarily  implies
primacy of AICTE in the field of technical  education.  
Statutes  like  the
present one as well as the National  Council  for  Teachers  Education  Act,
1993,
the Medical Council of India Act, 1956, etc. fall within the ambit  of
this canon of law.  
The  AICTE  is  the  authority  constituted  under  the
Central Act with the responsibility  of  maintaining  operational  standards
and judging  the  infrastructure  and  facilities  available  for  imparting
professional education.   It shall take precedence over the opinion  of  the
State as well as that of the University.   The concerned department  of  the
State and the affiliating university have a role to play, but it is  limited
in its application.   They cannot lay down any  guidelines  or  policies  in
conflict with the Central statute or the standards laid down by the  Central
body.  
The State can frame its policies, but such policy again has to be  in
conformity with the direction issued by the Central body.   Though there  is
no such apparent conflict in the present case, yet it needs to be  clarified
that grant of approval by the State and affiliation by  the  University  for
increased intake of seats or commencement  of  new  college  should  not  be
repugnant to  the  conditions  of  approval/recommendation  granted  by  the
AICTE.  
These authorities have to work in tandem as all of  them  have  the
common object to  ensure  maintenance  of  proper  standards  of  education,
examination  and  proper  infrastructure   for   betterment   of   technical
educational system.

28.   It is also a settled principle that  the  regulations  framed  by  the
central authorities such as the  AICTE   have  the  force  of  law  and  are
binding on all concerned.
Once approval is  granted  or  declined  by  such
expert body, the courts would normally not substitute  their  view  in  this
regard.   Such expert views would normally be accepted by the  court  unless
the  powers  vested  in  such  expert  body   are   exercised   arbitrarily,
capriciously or in a manner impermissible  under  the  Regulations  and  the
AICTE Act.  
In the case of AICTE v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan  [(2009)  11  SCC
726], this Court, while stating the  principles  that  the  courts  may  not
substitute their opinion in place of opinion of the Council, held as under:-


           “The role of statutory expert bodies on education  and  role  of
           courts are well defined by a simple rule.    If it is a question
           of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the
           courts keep their hands off.     If  any  provision  of  law  or
           principle of law has to be  interpreted,  applied  or  enforced,
           with reference to or connected with education, courts will  step
           in.    In  Dr.  J.P.  Kulshreshtha  v.   Chancellor,   Allahabad
           University: (1980) IILJ 175 SC this Court observed:

           Judges must  not  rush  in  where  even  educationists  fear  to
           tread... While there is  no  absolute  bar,  it  is  a  rule  of
           prudence that courts should hesitate to  dislodge  decisions  of
           academic bodies.

           In Maharashtra State Board of  Secondary  and  Higher  Secondary
           Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth :  [1985]  1  SCR  29,
           this Court reiterated:

           ..the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its  own
           views as to what is wise, prudent  and  proper  in  relation  to
           academic  matters  in  preference   to   those   formulated   by
           professional  men  possessing  technical  expertise   and   rich
           experience  of  actual   day-to-day   working   of   educational
           institutions and the departments controlling them.”

           18.   This is a classic case where  an  educational  course  has
           been created and continued merely by  the  fiat  of  the  court,
           without any prior statutory or academic evaluation or assessment
           or acceptance.  
Granting approval for a new course or programme
           requires examination of various academic/technical facets  which
           can only be done by an expert body like AICTE.    This  function
           cannot obviously be taken over or  discharged  by  courts.    In
           this case, for example, by a mandamus of  the  court,  a  bridge
           course was permitted for four year Advance Diploma  holders  who
           had  passed  the  entry  level  examination  of  10+2  with  PCM
           subjects.   Thereafter, by another  mandamus  in  another  case,
           what was a one time measure was extended for several  years  and
           was also extended to Post Diploma holders.    Again  by  another
           mandamus, it was extended to those  who  had  passed  only  10+1
           examination.   Each direction was  obviously  intended  to  give
           relief to students who wanted to better their career  prospects,
           purely as an ad hoc measure.   But  together  they  lead  to  an
           unintended  dilution   of   educational   standards,   adversely
           affecting  the  standards  and  quality  of  engineering  degree
           courses.   Courts should guard against such forays in the  field
           of education.”



29.   Right from the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. and  others  etc.  etc.  V.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Others etc. etc. [(1993) 1 SCC 645], this  Court
has  unequivocally  held  that  the  right  to  establish   an   educational
institution does not carry within it the right to recognition or  the  right
to affiliation.
Grant of recognition or affiliation is neither a matter  of
course nor is it a formality.   Admission to the privileges of a  University
is a power to be exercised with great care keeping in view the  interest  of
the public at  large  and  the  nation.    
Recognition  has  to  be  as  per
statutorily  prescribed  conditions  and  their  strict  adherence  by   all
concerned.   These  conditions  of  recognition  and   the   duly   notified
directions controlling  the  admission  process  are  to  be  construed  and
applied stricto sensu.    
They cannot be varied from  case  to  case.   Time
schedule is one such condition specifically prescribed for admission to  the
colleges.   Adherence  to  admission  schedule  is  again  a  subject  which
requires strict conformity by all concerned, without exception.  
Reference
in this regard  can  be  made  to  Ranjan  Purohit  and  Ors.  v.  Rajasthan
University of Health Science and Ors. [(2012) 8 SCALE 71] at this stage,  in
addition to the case of Medical Council of India v. Madhu  Singh  [(2002)  7
SCC 258].

30.   In light of the above principles, let us now revert to the  facts  of
the case in hand.  
There is no dispute as to the fact that the  appellant-
college had shifted to the new premises without approval of the  AICTE  and
without  ‘No  Objection  Certificate’  from  the   State   Government   and
Directorate of Technical Education.
Undisputedly, the college had no title
to the property in question inasmuch as the property had  been  sold  in  a
Court auction by the bank on 8th August, 2011 and had been purchased  by  a
firm in which the members of the Trust were partners. This partnership firm
had executed a Memorandum of Understanding with  the  appellant  Trust  and
given property on lease to the Trust.  
These undisputed facts clearly show
that the appellant-college had no title to the property and,  in  fact,  it
did not even have a registered lease deed in  its  favour  to  create  some
recognizable interest in the property in question.
The High Court  in  its
judgment had specifically noticed the defects pointed  out  by  the  Expert
Committee.
They, inter alia, related to some disputes within the management
of the Trust, failure to obtain NOC from the  State  Government,  Occupancy
Certificate  from  the  Municipal  Corporation,  Thane  and  NOC  from  the
University of Mumbai, omission to seek/obtain the  approval  of  AICTE  and
finally shifting to the new premises despite such non-compliance.



31.   We have already noticed that the compliance with the  conditions  for
approval as well as regulations and provisions  of  the  AICTE  Act  is  an
unexceptionable condition.  Clause 9.22 of the Handbook of Approval Process
issued by the AICTE provides a complete procedure for change  of  location,
station and  the  same  is  permissible  subject  to  compliance  with  the
procedure.  It contemplates obtaining of ‘No  Objection  Certificate’  from
the concerned State Government or UT Administration and  affiliating  body.
The same clause also requires submission of the land documents in  original
and clearly  provides  that  the  same  may  be  a  registered  sale  deed,
irrevocable government lease for a minimum period of 30 years, etc. by  the
concerned authority of the Government.   Further,  it  provides  that  site
plan, building plan for  new  site  should  be  prepared  by  a  registered
architect  and  should  be  approved  by  the  Competent  Plan  Sanctioning
Authority designated by the State.




32.   One of the contentions raised before us is that the AICTE itself  had
granted approval for the academic  years  2008-09  and  2009-10  both  vide
letters dated 30th June, 2008 and 20th August, 2009,  respectively.    This
itself should be taken to be a deemed compliance of all  the  requirements.
We shall separately deal with the issue with regard to the effect of  these
letters and whether withdrawal of approval was a step  appropriately  taken
by the AICTE or not as well as the effect of the prescribed time  schedule.
As of now, suffice it to note that even these approvals  for  the  relevant
academic years had clearly stated that the institution shall  operate  only
from the approved location and  it  shall  not  open  any  campus/executive
centres directly or in collaboration with any other  institution/university
for the purpose of imparting technical education  without  obtaining  prior
approval from the AICTE.  The approval for these academic years was granted
to the college being run at Survey Nos.27 (part) at Lasandvali,  Godbhunder
Road, Kasar Vadavali, Thane, and not at any other place.



33.   Thus, there is no occasion to take it  as  a  deemed  and/or  implied
approval for the new site of the appellant-college.  Approval can hardly be
inferred.    It is a matter of fact and the  authorities  are  expected  to
pass appropriate orders in accordance with law and upon due  diligence  and
in compliance with the procedure prescribed under law. For  these  reasons,
we find that the view taken by  the  High  Court  does  not  call  for  any
interference.




34.   Thus, the view of the High Court  that  the  college  had  failed  to
comply with the requirements for grant of approval and had shifted  to  the
new site without approval of the  AICTE  and  other  concerned  authorities
cannot  be  faulted  with.    There  being  no  compliance  to  the   legal
requirements and binding  conditions  of  recognition,  the  withdrawal  of
approval by the AICTE can  also  be  not  interfered  with.    Shifting  of
students is a consequential order and is in the interest of the students.

35.   The sequel to the above finding is that the appellant  college  could
not have been included in the counselling  for  the  current  year.    Even
otherwise, the last date for admission was  30th  August,  2012,  which  is
since over and we see no reason whatsoever to extend this date.    We  have
already noticed various judgments of this Court stating that the  Court  is
required to strictly construe and comply with the schedule  for  admission.
Even on that count, the appellant  would  not  be  entitled  to  any  other
relief.



36.   Another argument raised before us is that the  appellant-college  had
applied for shifting of the college to the new premises on 24th May,  2008,
but even after a lapse of two years, the AICTE had not finally disposed  of
said request.




37.   The college  had  shifted  to  the  new  premises  without  requisite
permission/approval and still permission was granted  for  the  two  years,
i.e., 2008-09 and 2009-10 and the show cause notice was issued only on 18th
May, 2010.    We  have  no  hesitation  in  observing  that  the  AICTE  is
evidentiary at fault and it ought not to have granted any approval for  the
academic years 2008-09 and 2009-10.   There has been definite slackness and
irresponsibility in  functioning on the part of the AICTE.    The  approval
itself was issued by  the  Regional  Committee  when  the  application  for
transfer was pending with the AICTE itself.    It is  a  matter  of  regret
that as a result of such approval granted by the AICTE, the career of these
students has been jeopardised to some extent.  Now, they  are  required  to
shift colleges mid-term,  even  in  excess  of  specified  seats  of  those
colleges and hinder their academic courses.  All this  is  bound  to  prove
disadvantageous to their academic career.




38.   It is the requirement of law that there should be strict adherence to
the time schedule for grant of approval as well as for  admissions  without
exception.   In exercise of the powers vested  in  the  AICTE,  under  sub-
section (1) of Section 23 of the AICTE Act, it had made regulations  namely
the All India Council for  Technical  Education  (Grant  of  Approvals  for
Staffing New Technical Institution, Introduction of Course  and  Programmes
and Approval of Intake Capacity) Regulations,  1994.    Schedule  to  these
regulations reads as under:-



      |Sl. |Stage of processing application     |Last date by which  |
|No. |                                    |the processing      |
|    |                                    |should be completed |
|(1) |(2)                                 |(3)                 |
|1.  |For receiving proposals by Bureau   |31st December       |
|    |RC.                                 |                    |
|2.  |For the Bureau RC to screen the     |                    |
|    |application and (a) to return the   |                    |
|    |incomplete applications to          |                    |
|    |applicants, and (b) to forward the  |                    |
|    |applications to (i) State Government|                    |
|    |concerned (ii) University or State  |                    |
|    |Board concerned, for their comments |                    |
|    |(iii) Regional Officer to arrange   |                    |
|    |visits by Export Committees, and    |                    |
|    |(iv) Bureaus MPCD, BOS and RA for   |                    |
|    |their comments.                     |                    |
|3.  |For receiving the comments is from  |15th March          |
|    |(i) the State Government (ii) the   |                    |
|    |University or State Board and (iii) |                    |
|    |the Regional Committee based on the |                    |
|    |Expert Committee’s report and (iv)  |                    |
|    |from the Bureaus MPCD, BOS and RA   |                    |
|4.  |For consideration of the comments   |                    |
|    |from the State Governments,         |31st March          |
|    |Universities or State Boards,       |                    |
|    |Regional Committees, and Bureaus of |                    |
|    |the Council by the State level      |                    |
|    |Committee                           |                    |
|5.  |For recommendations to be made by   |                    |
|    |the Central Task Force              |15th April          |
|6.  |For communicating the final decision|                    |
|    |to the State Government or the      |30th April          |
|    |University Grants Commission, under |                    |
|    |intimation to the Regional office,  |                    |
|    |Director of Technical Education,    |                    |
|    |applicant, University or State Board|                    |





39.   This  Schedule  has  statutory  backing.    Thus,  its  adherence  is
mandatory and not directory.

40.   Non-adherence of this Schedule can result in serious consequences  and
can jeopardize not only the interest of the college students  but  also  the
maintenance of proper standards of  technical  education.   The  authorities
concerned, particularly the AICTE, should ensure proper  and  timely  action
upon the applications submitted to it.  It must  respond  to  the  applicant
within a reasonable time period and should not let the matter drag till  the
final date giving  rise  to  avoidable  speculations  by  all  stakeholders.
Thus, it would  be  appropriate  for  these  authorities  to  bring  to  the
knowledge of the parties  concerned,  the  deficiencies,  if  any,  and  the
defects pointed out by the Expert Committee  during  the  inspection  within
three weeks from the date of such inspection or pointing out of defects,  as
the case may be.  For better administration, the  AICTE  should  also  state
the time within which such deficiencies/defects should  be  removed  by  the
applicant.  This will help in building of a coherent and disciplined  method
of working to ensure the proper  implementation  of  the  entire  formulated
scheme of technical education.  The AICTE will not have any jurisdiction  or
authority to issue  approval  for  commencement  of  a  new  course  or  for
additional intake of students beyond 30th  April  of  the  year  immediately
preceding the commencement of an academic year.

41.   Apparently, there seems to be some variations in the  Schedule  issued
under Regulation 8(15), as aforenoticed, and  the  dates  reflected  in  the
Handbook.  Another Schedule has been printed  as  per  the  website  of  the
AICTE according to which the letter of approval for starting  new  technical
institutions could be issued by 10th October, if application  was  submitted
between January to June  of  the  relevant  year  and  10th  April,  if  the
application was submitted between July to December of that year.   Rejection
of approval is an order which is appealable to the  Appellate  Committee  of
the AICTE.  If the applicant wishes to file an appeal against the order,  he
is expected to file the appeal and, in any case,  after  directions  of  the
Appellate Committee are complied with,  the  order  of  approval  after  the
reconsideration/appeal has to be issued by 15th November in the  first  case
and 15th May in the other. If one reads these  two  schedules  collectively,
it is clear that the letter of approval should be issued by  15th  April  or
by 30th April at the maximum.  It is only the  Appellate  Committee’s  order
which can be issued by 15th May.  If such order grants recognition, then  it
must specify the academic year for which it is being granted.  If  it  falls
foul of the admission schedule, then it ought not  to  be  granted  for  the
current academic year.  It has been brought to  our  notice  that  the  last
date for admission to the courses and the date on which the  courses  should
begin is 30th August of the academic year.  In  that  event,  admissions  to
such courses, if  permitted  by  the  appellate  authority,  could  be  made
strictly in accordance with the academic Schedule and without violating  the
same in any manner whatsoever.  This brings us  to  the  admission  schedule
which again should be strictly obeyed by all concerned.

42.   We must notice that admission schedule should  be  declared  once  and
for all rather  than  making  it  a  yearly  declaration.   Consistency  and
smoothness in admission process would demand and require  that  there  is  a
fixed and unaltered time schedule provided for admission to the colleges  so
that the students know with certainty and  well  in  advance  the  admission
schedule that is to be followed and on the basis of which they are  to  have
their choice of college or course exercised.   The  Schedule  for  admission
for the coming academic year, i.e., 2013-2014  has  been  submitted  to  the
Court after the matter was reserved for judgment.  The said  Schedule  reads
as under :

|Event                           |Schedule            |
|Conduct of Entrance Examination |In the month of May |
|(AIEEE/State CET/ Mgt. quota    |                    |
|exams etc.)                     |                    |
|Declaration of Result of        |On or before 5th    |
|Qualifying Examination (12th    |June                |
|Exam or similar) and Entrance   |                    |
|Examination                     |                    |
|1st round of counselling/       |To be completed on  |
|admission for allotment of seats|or before 30th June |
|2nd round counselling for       |To be completed on  |
|allotment of seats              |or before 10th July |
|Last round of counselling for   |To be completed on  |
|allotment of seats              |or before 20th July |
|Last date for admitting         |30th July.          |
|candidates in seats other than  |However, any number |
|allotted above                  |of rounds for       |
|                                |counselling could be|
|                                |conducted depending |
|                                |on local            |
|                                |requirements, but   |
|                                |all the rounds shall|
|                                |be completed before |
|                                |30th July           |
|Commencement of academic session|1st August          |
|Last date upto which students   |30th August         |
|can be admitted against         |                    |
|vacancies arising due to any    |                    |
|reason (no student should be    |                    |
|admitted in any institution     |                    |
|after the last date under any   |                    |
|quota)                          |                    |
|Last date of granting or        |30th April          |
|refusing approval by AICTE      |                    |
|Last date of granting or        |31st May            |
|refusing approval by University |                    |
|/ State Govt.                   |                    |



43.   The above Schedule though was  finalized  by  the  Committee  on  29th
January, 2012 but the same appears  to  have  been  notified  only  on  30th
September, 2012.  The reasons for the  same  are  again  unknown.    We  are
unable to appreciate that once the academic session begins  on  1st  August,
then as to why should admission be granted upto 30th  August  of  the  year,
particularly when, as per the terms of the Schedule, beyond  or  after  30th
April, AICTE will not issue any approval for commencement of new course  for
additional  intakes.   The  Schedule,  thus,  introduces   an   element   of
arbitrariness and may cause prejudice to the students who might  miss  their
classes for a period of one month without any justification.   Thus,  it  is
required that the above-stated Schedule be modified  to  bring  it  in  line
with  the  Schedule  for  approval  as  well  as  to  prevent  inequalities,
arbitrariness and prejudice from  affecting  the  students  in  relation  to
their academic courses.  The order  granting  or  refusing  approval,  thus,
should positively be passed by 10th April of the relevant year.  The  appeal
should be filed within one week and the Appellate Committee should hear  the
appeal and decide the  same  by  30th  April  of  the  relevant  year.   The
University should grant/decline approval/affiliation  by  15th  May  of  the
relevant year.  Advertisement should  be  issued  and  entrance  examination
conducted positively by the end  of  the  month  of  May.   The  appropriate
Schedule, thus, would be as follows :



|Event                           |Schedule            |
|Conduct of Entrance Examination |In the month of May |
|(AIEEE/State CET/ Mgt. quota    |                    |
|exams etc.)                     |                    |
|Declaration of Result of        |On or before 5th    |
|Qualifying Examination (12th    |June                |
|Exam or similar) and Entrance   |                    |
|Examination                     |                    |
|1st round of counselling/       |To be completed on  |
|admission for allotment of seats|or before 30th June |
|2nd round counselling for       |To be completed on  |
|allotment of seats              |or before 10th July |
|Last round of counselling for   |To be completed on  |
|allotment of seats              |or before 20th July |
|Last date for admitting         |30th July.          |
|candidates in seats other than  |However, any number |
|allotted above                  |of rounds for       |
|                                |counselling could be|
|                                |conducted depending |
|                                |on local            |
|                                |requirements, but   |
|                                |all the rounds shall|
|                                |be completed before |
|                                |30th July           |
|Commencement of academic session|1st August          |
|Last date upto which students   |15th August         |
|can be admitted against         |                    |
|vacancies arising due to any    |                    |
|reason (no student should be    |                    |
|admitted in any institution     |                    |
|after the last date under any   |                    |
|quota)                          |                    |
|Last date of granting or        |10th April          |
|refusing approval by AICTE      |                    |
|Last date of granting or        |15th May            |
|refusing approval by University |                    |
|/ State Govt.                   |                    |



44.   The admission to academic courses should start, as  proposed,  by  1st
August of the relevant year.  The seats remaining  vacant  should  again  be
duly notified and advertised. All seats should be filled positively by  15th
August after which there shall be no admission, whatever be  the  reason  or
ground.

45.    We  find  that  the  above  Schedule  is  in  conformity   with   the
affiliation/recognition schedule afore-noticed.   They  both  can  co-exist.
Thus, we approve these admission dates and declare it to be  the  law  which
shall be strictly adhered to by all concerned and none  of  the  authorities
shall have the power or jurisdiction  to  vary  these  dates  of  admission.
Certainty in this field is bound to serve the ends of fair, transparent  and
judicious method of grant of admission and  commencement  of  the  technical
courses.  Any variation is bound to  adversely  affect  the  maintenance  of
higher  standards  of  education  and  systemic  and  proper  completion  of
courses.

46.   Having declared the confirmed  Schedule  for  grant  of  approval  and
completion of admission process, now it is necessary for  us  to  revert  to
the apparent error in  exercise  of  power  and  discretion  by  the  AICTE.
Admittedly,  the  appellant-college  had  been  carrying  on  its  education
courses since the year 1994.  It had submitted its application for  transfer
to the new site on 24th May, 2008.
There is no document  placed  before  us
by any party including the AICTE to show that  this  application  was  dealt
with either by the Regional Office or by  the  main  office  of  the  AICTE.
Having known the fact that the college had shifted to a new site, the  AICTE
accorded approval for the academic  years  2008-09  and  2009-10  for  which
again there is no justification placed on record.
 It is  the  case  of  the
appellant that the Expert Committee visited the new site of  the  appellant-
college where the college was being run  on  26th  June,  2008.   Thereafter
approval for the two academic years was granted.
Strangely,  on  the  basis
of the same report, on 18th May, 2010 the show cause notice was  issued  and
again the Expert Committee is stated to have visited  the  college  premises
on 16th July, 2010 leading to the issuance firstly of the rejection  of  the
seats and, secondly, of withdrawal/cancellation of approval on 7th  January,
2011.

47.   We fail to understand 
why the college was  granted  approval  for  the
academic years 2008-09 and 2009-10 particularly when  the  Expert  Committee
is stated to have  visited  the  premises  on  26th  June,  2008  and  found
inadequacies in the report.  
It is certainly a lapse  on  the  part  of  the
AICTE  which  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  Court  as  it  had  far-reaching
consequences including placing the career of the  students  admitted  during
these two years in jeopardy.   
Even  though  the  High  Court  has  directed
allocation of these  students  in  other  colleges,  their  academic  course
certainly stands adversely affected and disturbed, for which  the  AICTE  is
responsible.  
In this  regard,  the  Court  cannot  overlook  such  apparent
erroneous approach and default which can  be  for  anything  but  bona  fide
reasons.  
Thus, we impose costs of  Rs.50,000/-  upon  the  AICTE  for  such
irresponsible working.  The costs would be  payable  to  the  Supreme  Court
Legal Services Committee and would be  recovered  from  the  salary  of  the
erring  officials/officers  involved  in  this  erroneous   approach.    The
recovery shall be effected in accordance with law.

48.   For the reasons afore-recorded,
we find no merit in both  the  appeals
afore-referred.  While dismissing these  appeals,  we  issue  the  following
directions :

(i)    Both  grant/refusal  of  approval   and    admission   schedule,   as
      aforestated, shall be strictly  adhered  to  by  all  the  authorities
      concerned including the AICTE, University, State  Government  and  any
      other authority directly or indirectly connected  with  the  grant  of
      approval and admission.

(ii)  No person or authority shall have the power or  jurisdiction  to  vary
      the Schedule prescribed hereinabove.

(iii) While dealing with the  application  for  grant  of  approval  to  new
      colleges or additional seats, the AICTE  shall  inform  the  applicant
      within three weeks from the date of receipt of its application or date
      of inspection, as the case may be, the shortcomings/defects,  who,  in
      turn, shall remove such shortcomings/defects within 15 days  from  the
      date of such communication or within such  period  as  the  AICTE  may
      grant and re-submit its papers without default.  The process of  grant
      of approval has  to  be  transparent  and  fair.   The  AICTE  or  the
      concerned University  or  State  Government  shall  take  disciplinary
      action against the person who commits  default  in  adherence  to  the
      Schedule and performance of his duties in accordance therewith.

(iv)  The reports submitted by the Expert  Committee  visiting  the  college
      should be unambiguous and clear, and should bear the date and time  of
      inspection and should be sufficiently comprehensive and inspection  be
      conducted in the presence of a representative of the institute.

(v)   The students of the appellant-college shall  be  re-allocated  to  the
      recognized and affiliated colleges in terms of  the  judgment  of  the
      High Court; and the AICTE and the concerned  University  shall  ensure
      that the academic courses of these students are completed  within  the
      balance period of  the  academic  year  in  all  respects.   For  this
      purpose, if extra classes are  required  to  be  held,  the  concerned
      institute, the University and the AICTE are directed to ensure holding
      of such extra classes.

(vi)  If the appellate authority decides the matter prior to 30th  April  of
      the concerned year and grants approval to a college, then  alone  such
      institution will be permitted to be included in the list  of  colleges
      to which admissions are to be made and not otherwise.  In other words,
      even if the appellate authority grants approval after 30th  April,  it
      will not be operative for the current  academic  year.   All  colleges
      which have been granted approval/affiliation by 10th or 30th April, as
      the   case   may   be,   shall    alone    be    included    in    the
      brochure/advertisement/website for the purpose of admission  and  none
      thereafter.



                                                   …….…………................J.
                                                              (A.K. Patnaik)



                                                 ...….…………................J.
                                                           (Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi;
December 13, 2012

Friday, December 14, 2012

whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short “the CBI”), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short “the Special Police Act”), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.” 26. After considering the various decisions on this point, as also Article 246 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench ultimately answered the reference in the manner following : “In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.” The review petitions are disposed of with the following directions : i) The CBI shall drop the inquiry into the assets of the Respondent No.4, Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav; ii) The CBI may take such independent action, as it considers fit, on the basis of the inquiry conducted by it pursuant to the directions given by this Court in the judgment under review, without seeking any direction from the Union of India or on the basis of any direction that may be given by it.


                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.272 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 AKHILESH YADAV                        …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           2 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.339 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 MULAYAM SINGH YADAV                   …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           3 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.347 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005


1


2 PRATEEK YADAV                         …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           4 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.348 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 SMT. DIMPLE YADAV                          …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           5 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS






                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.


1.    Certain questions of fact  and  law  were  raised  on  behalf  of  the
parties  when  the  review  petitions  were  heard.
Review  petitions  are
ordinarily restricted to the confines of the principles enunciated in  Order
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in this case,  we  gave  counsel  for
the parties ample opportunity to satisfy us  that  the  judgment  and  order
under review suffered from any error apparent on the face of the record  and
that permitting the order to stand would occasion a failure  of  justice  or
that the judgment suffered from some material  irregularity  which  required
correction in review.
The scope of a review petition is  very  limited  and
the submissions advanced were made mainly on  questions  of  fact.
  As  has
been repeatedly indicated by this Court, review of a judgment on account  of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of  the  record  is  permissible,
but an error apparent on the face of the record has to  be  decided  on  the
facts of each case as an erroneous decision by itself  does  not  warrant  a
review of each decision.
In order to appreciate the  decision  rendered  on
the  several  review  petitions   which   were   taken   up   together   for
consideration, it is necessary to give a background in  which  the  judgment
and order under review came to be rendered.

2.    One Vishwanath Chaturvedi, claiming to be an  Advocate  by  profession
and unconnected with any political party or  parties,  filed  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005, inter alia, for the following relief :-

      “(a)  issue an appropriate writ in the nature  of  mandamus  directing
      Respondent No.1 to take appropriate  action  to  prosecute  Respondent
      Nos.2 to 5 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for acquiring
      amassed assets more than the known source of their income by  misusing
      their power and authority;”



3.    In the Writ Petition, the Writ Petitioner provided  instances  of  the
wealth allegedly acquired by the said Respondents beyond their known  source
of income.
After a contested hearing, this Court was of the  view  that  the
inquiry should not be shut out at the threshold because  political  elements
were involved.
The prayer in the Writ Petition was, therefore, moulded  and
the same was disposed of on 1st March,  2007,  with  a  direction  upon  the
Central Bureau of Investigation, hereinafter referred to as  the  “CBI”,  to
inquire into the allegations  relating  to  acquisition  of  wealth  by  the
Respondent Nos.2 to 5. 
The CBI was also directed to find out as  to  whether
there was any truth in the allegations  made  by  the  Petitioner  regarding
acquisition of assets by the  said  Respondents  disproportionate  to  their
known source of income and to submit a report to the Union  of  India  which
could take further steps in the matter.

4. Soon, thereafter, the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 filed  Review  Petitions  for
review of the aforesaid judgment dated 1st  March,  2007  in  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005 and the same was directed to  be  posted  before  the
Court on 16th March, 2007.
Subsequently, the Review Petitions  were  placed
for hearing before the Court on 20th March,  2007  and  ultimately  on  10th
February, 2009, the Court  directed  notice  to  issue  thereupon.
 On  1st
April, 2009, when  the  Review  Petitions  were  taken  up  for  hearing,  a
submission was made on behalf of the Review  Petitioners  that  one  of  the
questions, which could have a vital bearing on the matters, related  to  the
question
as to  
whether  the  Court  could  issue  directions  to  the  CBI,
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6  of  the  Delhi  Special  Police
Establishment Act, 1946, which was under consideration of  the  Constitution
Bench in Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of 2001  filed  by  the  State  of  West
Bengal.
The hearing of the Review Petitions was, therefore,  adjourned  till
a decision was pronounced by the Constitution Bench in  the  above  Appeals.
The Constitution Bench ultimately held that the High Court  was  within  its
jurisdiction in directing the CBI to investigate into a  cognizable  offence
alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State  without  the
consent of that State and the same would neither impinge  upon  the  federal
structure of the Constitution nor violate  the  doctrine  of  separation  of
powers and would be valid in law.  However,  a  note  of  caution  was  also
given and it was further observed that the  extra-ordinary  power  conferred
by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of  India  has  to  be  exercised
sparingly,  cautiously  and  in  exceptional  situations  where  it  becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instill  confidence  in  investigations
or where the incident may have national and international  ramifications  or
where such an  order  may  be  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  and
enforcing fundamental rights.

5.    Thereafter, the Review Petitions were again taken up  for  hearing  on
8th February, 2011.

6.    Five broad  propositions  were  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  Review
Petitioner, Shri Akhilesh Yadav, namely,

        i)       Can this Court direct a CBI inquiry without the consent of
           the State concerned?


       ii)       Does a Court have jurisdiction to refer the matter to  the
           CBI for investigation without forming a opinion as to whether  a
           prima facie case of the commission of an offence had  been  made
           out?


      iii)       Can the Supreme Court order a  CBI  investigation  without
           expressly invoking its jurisdiction under  Article  142  of  the
           Constitution of India?


       iv)       Could the Supreme Court have entertained the Writ Petition
           filed by the Respondent No.1 in the Review  Petition  under  the
           garb of a public interest litigation? and


        v)             Does the judgment and order dated 1st  March,  2007,
           passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of 2005 warrant a  review
           thereof?



7.    Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the  Review
Petitioners, Shri Akhilesh Yadav and Smt. Dimple Yadav  did  not  press  the
first proposition, since, as indicated hereinbefore, the said  question  had
been settled by the Constitution Bench.

8.    On the second proposition, Mr. Dwivedi  urged  that  in  the  decision
rendered by this Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society  Vs.  Union  of
India & Ors. [(1999) 6 SCC 667], a Bench of three Judges of this  Court  had
specifically held that the CBI should not be involved  in  an  investigation
unless a prima facie case is found  and  established  against  the  accused.
Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that this Court had inter  alia  observed  that  the
right to life engrained in Article 21 of the  Constitution  means  something
more than mere survival or animal existence.  A man had,  therefore,  to  be
left alone to enjoy life without fetters and should not  be  allowed  to  be
hounded either by the police or CBI only to find out as to  whether  he  had
committed any offence or was living as a law abiding  citizen.   This  Court
also observed that even under Article 142 of the  Constitution,  this  Court
could not issue such a direction ignoring the substantive provisions of  law
and the constitutional rights available to a person.

9.    On the third proposition  relating  to  cases  where  this  Court  had
directed the CBI to investigate,  Mr.  Dwivedi  submitted  that  there  were
cases involving gross atrocities and State apathy and there were also  cases
which stand on a  different  footing  and  are  concerned  with  corruption.
Learned counsel submitted that in the present case no prima  facie  case  of
corruption had been established against the review  petitioners  and/or  any
of the proforma respondents and, accordingly, the  direction  given  to  the
CBI to conduct investigations against them was ex facie illegal.   Referring
to various judgments in which directions had been given  by  this  Court  to
the CBI to conduct investigation, there were special reasons  for  doing  so
in each case and not without  a  prima  facie  case  having  been  made  out
against them in  such  cases.   Mr.  Dwivedi  urged  that  the  CBI  has  no
jurisdiction to inquire or investigate into  a  matter  where  there  is  no
material to show prima facie  that  an  offence  has  been  committed.   Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak [(1988)  2
SCC 602], this Court had held that no jurisdiction can be  conferred  beyond
the scope of the Act by Courts of law even with consent. He also urged  that
in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of  India  [(1998)  4
SCC 409], this Court had observed that even the powers under Article 142  of
the Constitution vested in this Court could not be  exercised  in  a  manner
which was contrary to the Statute. It is only on account of special  reasons
where it was felt that an investigation by the local police would  prove  to
be ineffective, that directions had been given to the CBI  to  take  up  the
investigation.  Mr. Dwivedi  submitted  that  there  were  no  such  special
reasons in the instant case which warranted the directions  being  given  to
the CBI to conduct investigation into  the  allegations  of  corruption  and
police excesses as well as human rights violations.

10.   As far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, Mr. Dwivedi  submitted  that
except for the fact that she is the wife of Akhilesh Yadav, who had  been  a
Member of Parliament since 2000, there is no other ground to treat her as  a
public servant  for  the  purposes  of  inquiry  by  the  CBI.
Mr.  Dwivedi
submitted  that  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav  carried  on  her   own   business   in
agricultural produce and had her own income which had been  wrongly  clubbed
by the Writ Petitioner with the assets of Shri Akhilesh Yadav to  bring  her
within the ambit of the investigation by the CBI  under  the  provisions  of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
 It was further  submitted  that  there  is
also no allegation that Smt. Dimple Yadav had, in any way, aided or  abetted
any public servant  to  commit  any  act  which  could  have  attracted  the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act  and  including  Smt.  Dimple
Yadav in the inquiry against those who could be said to be public  servants,
amounts to harassment of a private individual having a  separate  source  of
income in respect of which no offence under the aforesaid Act could be  made
out.
Mr. Dwivedi contended that the inquiry directed  to  be  conducted  by
the CBI in relation to the assets held by  Shri  Adkhilesh  Yadav  and  Smt.
Dimple Yadav was contrary to the procedure established by law and could  not
have been ordered even upon invocation of powers under Article  142  of  the
Constitution and was, therefore, liable to be set aside in review.

11.   As far as the fourth proposition  is  concerned,  as  to  whether  the
Supreme Court  could  have  entertained  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the
Respondent No.1 in the review  petition  in  the  garb  of  Public  Interest
Litigation, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the writ petitioner had not made  any
specific  allegation  against  the  review  petitioners  which   merited   a
direction by the Court to the CBI  to  conduct  an  investigation  into  the
allegations relating to acquisition of wealth by the Respondent Nos.2  to  5
in the writ petition, beyond their known  sources  of  income.  Furthermore,
the Writ Petitioner had links with the Indian National  Congress,  although,
he had denied any connections with the Congress  Party.  Mr.  Dwivedi  urged
that the Respondent No.1 herein had no locus standi  to  maintain  the  writ
petition as a Public Interest Litigation, since it was more  of  a  personal
enmity rather than a public cause which had resulted in the  filing  of  the
writ petition. Mr. Dwivedi submitted  that  the  entire  exercise  had  been
undertaken to malign the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 and was without  any  factual
basis and the writ petition had been filed only  to  harass  the  Respondent
No.2 to 5 therein and to tarnish their  reputation  amongst  the  people  of
Uttar Pradesh and also other parts of the  country.  Mr.  Dwivedi  submitted
that the writ petition had been  filed  with  the  mala  fide  intention  of
discrediting the Review Petitioner and his family members  in  the  eyes  of
the local public and to adversely affect their  political  fortunes  in  the
State.

12.   In addition to Mr. Dwivedi’s submissions, Mr. Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned
Senior Advocate, who also appeared for Smt.  Dimple  Yadav,  submitted  that
merely because she  belongs  to  a  family  of  politicians,  she  had  been
included within the ambit of  the  scope  of  the  investigation  which  was
unwarranted, since it did not have any nexus with the objects sought  to  be
achieved by such an inquiry.

13.   Mr. Rohatgi also submitted that since despite his denial it was  amply
clear  that  the  Writ  Petitioner,  Mr.  Vishwanath   Chaturvedi,   was   a
representative of the Congress Party, the Writ Petition ought to  have  been
dismissed in limine.  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that the  explanation  given  in
the judgment under review for invoking the Court’s powers under Article  142
of the Constitution relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Anis  Vs.
Union of India [(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145], needed a second  look  in  view  of
the decision in the  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association  case  (supra).    Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that in Mohd. Anis’s case (supra), it had been  held  that
in order to do complete justice, the Supreme  Court’s  power  under  Article
142 of the Constitution was not circumscribed by  any  statutory  provision,
and the Supreme Court could direct an  investigation  by  the  CBI  into  an
offence committed within a State without  a  notification  or  order  having
been issued in that behalf, in public interest, to do  complete  justice  in
the circumstances of a particular case. However, in exercise of  its  powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should  not  direct
a fishing inquiry without reference to the facts and  circumstances  of  the
offence of disproportionate assets under the Prevention of  Corruption  Act,
1988.  Mr.  Rohatgi  urged  that  subsequently  in  the  Supreme  Court  Bar
Association case (supra), this Court held that the powers conferred on  this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in  the  Court  and
are complementary to those powers which are specifically  conferred  on  the
Court by various Statutes, though not  limited  by  those  Statutes.   These
powers exist independent of the Statutes with a view to do complete  justice
between the parties.  However, the  powers  conferred  on  the  Court  under
Article 142 of  the  Constitution,  being  curative  in  nature,  cannot  be
construed as powers which authorize the  Court  to  ignore  the  substantive
rights of a litigant while dealing with the cause pending before it. It  was
further observed that “Article 142, even with the width  of  its  amplitude,
cannot be used to build  a  new  edifice  where  none  existed  earlier,  by
ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby  to
achieve something indirectly which cannot be  achieved  directly.  The  very
nature of the power must lead the Court to  set  limits  for  itself  within
which to  exercise  those  powers  and  ordinarily  it  cannot  disregard  a
statutory provision governing a  subject,  except  perhaps  to  balance  the
equities between  the  conflicting  claims  of  the  litigating  parties  by
‘ironing out the creases’ in a cause or matter before it.” It was  submitted
that the decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association case  (supra)  cannot
be reconciled with the reasoning  of  the  decision  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case
(supra).  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that all the decisions  rendered  subsequent
to the decision rendered in the Supreme Court Bar Association case  (supra),
following the earlier decision  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case  (supra),  were  per
incuriam.  In support  of  his  submission,  Mr.  Rohtagi  referred  to  the
decision  of  this  Court  in  Textile  Labour  Association   Vs.   Official
Liquidator [(2004) 9 SCC 741] wherein while examining the plenary  power  of
this Court under Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  it  referred  to  the
decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association  case  (supra).   Mr.  Rohatgi
concluded on the note that  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  the
Supreme Court could always correct any error made by it and to  that  effect
it could recall its own order, as was held in  M.S.  Ahlawat  Vs.  State  of
Haryana [(2000) 1 SCC 278].

14.   Mr. Ashok Desai,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  Shri
Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Review Petitioner in Review Petition (C) No.339  of
2007, based his submissions mainly on the powers of  the  Supreme  Court  to
direct the CBI  to  conduct  an  investigation  in  respect  of  an  offence
committed within a State, without the consent of  the  State  Government  as
envisaged in Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,  1946,
hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  1946  Act’.   Mr.  Desai  attempted  to
distinguish the decisions rendered by this Court  in  the  case  of  Advance
Insurance Company Vs. Gurudasmal [(1970) 3 SCR 881 = (1970) 1 SCC  633]  and
in the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorzi Vs. CBI [(1994) Supp.  2  SCC  116].   Mr.
Desai submitted that while in the first case, the Government of  Maharashtra
had given its consent to the investigation by the CBI, in  the  latter  case
the question involved was not of grant of  permission  to  investigate  into
the case, but withdrawal of such consent which had already been granted.

15.   Mr. Desai reiterated the contentions, both  of  Mr.  Dwivedi  and  Mr.
Rohatgi, that powers under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  could  not  be
invoked in contravention of the provisions of a Statute and a  fortiori  the
provisions of the Constitution. Mr. Desai also urged  that  in  the  Supreme
Court Bar Association case (supra)  not  only  had  the  decision  in  Mohd.
Anis’s  case  (supra)  been  referred  to,  but  this  Court  had  expressly
disapproved the observation made therein by Mr.  V.C.  Misra  that  the  law
laid down in Prem  Chand  Garg  Vs.  Excise  Commissioner,  U.P.,  Allahabad
[(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 885], in which it had been  observed  that  despite  the
width of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Article  142(1),  even
this Court could not under the  said  provision  make  an  order  which  was
plainly inconsistent with the express statutory  provisions  of  substantive
law, much less, inconsistent  with  any  constitutional  provision,  was  no
longer good law.

16.   Mr. Desai submitted that since the decision in the Supreme  Court  Bar
Association case (supra)  had  not  been  considered  by  this  Court  while
rendering the judgment under review and the relief had been moulded  without
any discussion on such issue, the judgment was liable to be reviewed.

17.   Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Senior Advocate, who  appeared  for  the  Respondent
No.5, Shri Prateek Yadav, reiterated the submissions made  by  Mr.  Dwivedi,
Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Desai in relation  to  the  decision  rendered  by  this
Court in the  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association  case  (supra).   Dr.  Dhawan
submitted that the CBI, as a statutory body for the  purpose  of  conducting
criminal investigation in extra-ordinary circumstances with the  consent  of
the  State  Government,  could  exercise  powers  within  the   limits   and
constraints of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which  fact
had not been considered in the decisions rendered in State  of  West  Bengal
Vs. Sampat Lal [(1985) 1 SCC 317], Bihar State Construction Co.  Vs.  Thakur
Munendra Nath Sinha [(1988) Supp. SCC 542] and also  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case
(supra).  Dr. Dhawan submitted that  within  the  constitutional  framework,
the CBI could not encroach upon the powers of the police of several  States.
  Referring  to  Entry  80  in  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution and Article  239AA,  Dr.  Dhawan  submitted  that  the  Central
Government was not entitled to extend the powers  and  jurisdiction  of  the
members of the police force belonging to any area outside the  State  so  as
to enable the police of one State to exercise  powers  and  jurisdiction  in
any area outside that State without the consent of the State  Government  of
that State in which such area is situated.  Dr.  Dhawan  submitted  that  it
was, therefore, clear that the direction given by this  Court  to  the  CBI,
which is a creation of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,  to
investigate into  a  State  subject,  was  contrary  to  the  constitutional
safeguards engrafted in Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution.  Reference was also made  by  Dr.  Dhawan  to  the  principles
evolved by the Privy Council in King Emperor Vs.  Khwaja  Nazir  Ahmed  [AIR
1945 PC 18] and Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Haryana [(1992) Supp.  1  SCC  335],
wherein it was observed that judicial review is subject  to  the  principles
of judicial restraint and must not  become  unmanageable  in  other  aspects
relating to the power of the Union  or  State  Governments.   Reference  was
also made to Section 5 of the 1946 Act which listed the classes of  offences
which may be inquired into by the CBI.

18.   Dr. Dhawan also contended that while entertaining  a  public  interest
litigation, it was always necessary for  the  Court  to  be  extra  cautious
since at the very initial stage no opportunity is given  to  the  Respondent
to state his case before notice is issued and at times it  could  result  in
premature reference to the CBI on a  view  short  of  a  prima  facie  case,
particularly where the public interest litigation was politically  motivated
to adversely affect the political consequences of the persons involved.  Dr.
Dhawan  lastly  submitted  that  the  direction  given  to  the  CBI   after
completion of the inquiry to submit its report to the  Union  of  India  was
clearly contrary to law and could not be sustained under any  circumstances.


19.   In addition to the  above  petitions,  we  had  also  considered  I.A.
Nos.16 and 17 of 2009 which had been filed by one Shri Ashutosh  Srivastava,
who appeared in-person in support of his application  for  being  impleaded.
Having heard learned counsel for  the  Respondents  and  the  Applicant  in-
person, we had reserved orders on the same.



20.   In the facts and circumstances of the case, we  are  not  inclined  to
implead Shri Srivastava in these proceedings and his application  for  being
impleaded stands rejected.

21.   Appearing for the Writ Petitioner, Vishwanath Chaturvedi,  Mr.  K.T.S.
Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate,  submitted  that  every  order  in  which  a
mistake may be noticed does not automatically call for a   review  and  that
the power of review could be invoked only in circumstances as  contained  in
Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil  Procedure  (CPC).   Referring  to  the
decision dated 16th June, 2008 of this Court in State  of  West  Bengal  Vs.
Kamal Sengupta  and  Anr.  in  Civil  Appeal  No.1694  of  2006,  Mr.  Tulsi
submitted that the term “mistake or error apparent”  which  finds  place  in
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, by its very connotation signifies  an  error  which  is
evident per se from the  record  of  the  case  and  does  not  require  any
detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or  legal
position.  In fact, in Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC  715]  it
was observed that if an error is  not  self-evident  and  detection  thereof
requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be  treated  as  an
error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule  1
CPC.  In other words, an order or decision or judgment cannot  be  corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on  the  ground  that  a  different
view could have been taken on a point of fact or law,  as  the  Court  could
not sit in appeal over its own judgment.  Similar views were expressed by  a
Five-Judge Bench of the Federal Court in Sir Hari Shankar Pal and  Anr.  Vs.
Anath Nath Mitter & Ors. [(1949)  FCR  36],  wherein  it  was,  inter  alia,
observed that a decision being erroneous in law is certainly no  ground  for
ordering review.

22.   Various other decisions were also referred to which  will  only  serve
to duplicate the decisions of this Court on the said issue.

23.   As has been indicated in paragraph 5  of  this  judgment,  five  broad
propositions were  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  review  petitioner,  Shri
Akhilesh Yadav, which were mainly confined to the jurisdiction of  the  High
Court and the Supreme Court to  direct  a  CBI  inquiry  in  respect  of  an
offence alleged to have been committed within a State, without  the  consent
of the State concerned.  Along with the above, the locus standi of the  writ
petitioner to maintain the writ petition was also raised on behalf  of  Shri
Yadav. While the submissions on behalf of all the  review  petitioners  were
centered around the said two propositions, a specific issue  was  raised  by
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi as to whether the investigation and/or inquiry could  also
be extended to the assets of  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav,  wife  of  Shri  Akhilesh
Yadav, since she had neither held any post under the Government nor was  she
involved in the activities of her husband  or  father-in-law,  Shri  Mulayam
Singh Yadav. The  acquisition  of  wealth  by  her  was  attributed  to  her
agricultural income and not to any source of income through her husband  and
her father-in-law.

24.   Same were the submissions made by  Dr.  Rajiv  Dhawan,  appearing  for
Shri Prateek Yadav, and,  in  addition,  it  was  submitted  that  the  said
Respondent did not get a reasonable opportunity of stating his  case  before
the judgment was delivered in Writ  Petition  (C)  No.633  of  2005  on  1st
March, 2007.

25.   As far as the first contention is concerned, the same has been set  at
rest by the Constitution Bench in State  of  West  Bengal  &  Ors.  Vs.  The
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West  Bengal  &  Ors.,  being
Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of 2001.
In the  very  first  paragraph  of  its
judgment the Constitution Bench set out the issue, which had  been  referred
to it for its opinion in the following terms :
           “The issue which has  been  referred  for  the  opinion  of  the
      Constitution Bench is whether the  High  Court,  in  exercise  of  its
      jurisdiction under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  can
      direct the Central Bureau of  Investigation  (for  short  “the  CBI”),
      established under the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,  1946
      (for short “the Special Police  Act”),  to  investigate  a  cognizable
      offence, which is alleged to have taken place within  the  territorial
      jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.”




26.   After considering  the  various  decisions  on  this  point,  as  also
Article 246 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench ultimately  answered
the reference in the manner following :
           “In the final analysis, our answer to the question  referred  is
      that a direction             by the High Court,  in  exercise  of  its
      jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  Constitution,  to  the  CBI  to
      investigate a    cognizable offence alleged  to  have  been  committed
      within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will
      neither impinge upon the federal structure  of  the  Constitution  nor
      violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law.
       Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens,  this  Court
      and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but  also
      an    obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part
      III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular,
      zealously and vigilantly.”

27.   A note of caution was also given by the Constitution Bench, which,  in
fact, finds place in all the decisions relating to this issue, namely,  that
the power which is  vested  in  the  superior  courts  should  be  exercised
sparingly,  cautiously  and  in  exceptional  situations  where  it  becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instill  confidence  in  investigations
or where the incident may have national and international  ramifications  or
where such an  order  may  be  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  and
enforcing fundamental rights.  The said note of caution is an  echo  of  the
observations made by this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association  Vs.  Union
of India & Anr. [(1998) 4 SCC 409], that such an inquiry by  the  CBI  could
be justified in certain circumstances to  prevent  any  obstruction  to  the
stream of justice.

28.   That this Court had jurisdiction to direct the CBI to make an  inquiry
into the accumulation of wealth by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav and  his  family
members in excess of their known source of income, based on the  allegations
made in the writ petition, cannot be questioned.  By its judgment dated  1st
March,  2007,  this  Court  merely  directed  an  investigation   into   the
allegations made in the writ petition and to submit a report  to  the  Union
Government.  The submissions made on behalf of  the  review  petitioners  in
this  regard,  must,  therefore,  be  rejected,  except  in  regard  to  the
direction given to the CBI to submit a report of its inquiry  to  the  Union
Government.

29.   In addition,  the  submissions  made  qua  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav  merits
consideration, since when  the  order  under  review  was  passed,  she  had
neither held any public office nor Government post  and  was  essentially  a
private person notwithstanding her proximity  to  Shri  Akhilesh  Yadav  and
Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav. On reconsideration of her  case,  we  are  of  the
view that the investigation launched against her on the  issue  of  amassing
wealth beyond her known source of income, is  liable  to  be  dropped.   The
review petition, so far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, is,  accordingly,
allowed and the investigation conducted  by  the  CBI  against  her  should,
therefore, be dropped.

30.   As far as the other review petitioners are concerned, we have to  keep
in mind the fact that the scope and ambit of a review proceeding is  limited
and the order dated 1st March, 2007, in respect of  which  review  has  been
sought, was neither irregular nor without jurisdiction and was passed  after
considering the submissions made on behalf of the  respective  parties.  The
review proceedings cannot be converted into an appeal.

31.   The judgment under review does not,  in  our  view,  suffer  from  any
error apparent on the face of the record, except for  the  directions  given
in the case  of  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav.   There  is  another  error  which  we
ourselves are inclined to correct.  While disposing  of  the  writ  petition
and directing the CBI to inquire into the alleged acquisition of  wealth  by
the Respondent Nos.2 to 5, the CBI was directed to submit a  report  to  the
Union of India and on receipt of such report, the Union of India  was  given
the liberty to  take  further  steps  depending  upon  the  outcome  of  the
preliminary inquiry into the assets of the  said  respondents.   Since,  the
CBI is an independent body and is under  no  obligation  to  report  to  the
Union of India in regard to investigations undertaken by it,  the  direction
to submit a report of the inquiry to the Union  of  India  and  the  liberty
given to the Union of India to take further steps  on  such  report  is  not
contemplated in the scheme of the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,
1946. It is for the CBI to decide what steps it wishes to take on the  basis
of the inquiry conducted.  We, therefore, modify the order dated 1st  March,
2007, and direct that the directions given to the CBI to submit a report  of
its inquiry to the Union of India and the liberty  given  to  the  Union  of
India to take further steps on such report, be deleted from the order.

32.   The review petitions are disposed of with the following directions :

     i)          The CBI shall drop the  inquiry  into  the  assets  of  the
        Respondent No.4, Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav;

    ii)          The CBI may take such independent action, as  it  considers
        fit, on the basis of the    inquiry conducted by it pursuant to  the
        directions given by this Court in the judgment under review, without
        seeking any direction from the Union of India or on the basis of any
        direction that may be given by it.


                                                     …………………………………………………CJI.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                         (H.L. DATTU)
New Delhi
Dated: December 13, 2012.